Authors/Duns Scotus/Ordinatio/Ordinatio II/D3/P1Q5

• The Opinion of Others
• Rejection of the opinion

Latin	English
	Question Five: Whether Material Substance is a This and Individual through Matter
129 Quinto quaero utrum substantia materialis sit haec et individua per materiam.	129. Fifth I ask whether material substance is a 'this' and individual through matter.
130 Quod sic: Quia secundum Philosophum V Metaphysicae cap. 'De uno': Unum numero sunt quorum materia est una)); ergo etc.	130. That it is: Because according to the Philosopher Metaphysics 5.6.1016b32-33, ch. 'On One', "Things whose matter is one are in number one;" therefore etc.
131 Contra: V Metaphysicae (in antiqua translatione): 'In fundamento naturae nihil est distinctum'. Sed quod non est in se distinctum nec diversum, non potest esse prima ratio diversitatis vel distinctionis alterius; sed materia est fundamentum naturae omnino indistinctum et indeterminatum; igitur non potest esse prima ratio distinctionis vel diversitatis alterius. ƿ	131. On the contrary: Metaphysics 5.4.1014b26-32 (in the ancient translation), "in the foundation of nature there is nothing distinct." But what is not distinct or diverse in itself cannot be the first reason for the diversity or distinction in another; but matter is the altogether indistinct and indeterminate foundation of nature; therefore it cannot be the first reason for distinction or diversity in another.
	I. The Opinion of Others
132 Hic dicitur quod sic, - quod maxime tenetur propter multas auctoritates Aristotelis, quae hoc videntur sonare: Quarum una est in VII, quod generans generat aliud propter materiam: ((Callias)), inquit, ((et Socrates, diversa quidem propter materiam (diversa namque), idem vero specie, nam individua species)).	132. [Exposition of the opinion] - Here an affirmative answer is given [Aquinas, Giles, Godfrey], and it is above all held because of the many authorities from Aristotle that seem to have this meaning. One of these is Metaphysics 7.8.1034a4-8, that the generator generates another because of matter: "Callias and Socrates," he says, "are diverse because of matter (for they are diverse), but the same in species, for they are individuals of a species."
133 Item, propter idem, VII, cap. 'De partibus definitionis': ((Quod quid erat esse et unumquodque, in quibusdam substantiis idem ƿest, - quaecumque vero in materia sunt, vel accepta cum materia, non idem)); et idem videtur VIII, cap. 3: ((Nam anima et animae esse, idem, - homo et homini esse, non idem, nisi et animae esse homo dicatur)). Igitur videtur quod materia sit extra rationem quiditatis et cuiuslibet habentis primo quiditatem, et ita, cum sit aliquid in entibus, videtur esse pars individui sive individuatio totius; quidquid est in individuo quod repugnat rationi quiditatis omnino, hoc potest poni prima ratio individuandi; quare etc.	133. Again because of 7.11.1037a37-b5, ch. 'On the Parts of Definition': "The whatness and the individual are in some substances the same thing, but as to things that are in matter or taken along with matter they are not the same thing;" and 8.3.1043b2-4 seems the same, "For soul and being a soul are the same; man and being a man are not the same, unless being a soul is called man." Therefore it seems that matter is outside the idea of quiddity and of whatever first has quiddity, and so, since matter is something in beings, it seems to be part of the individual, or the individuation of the whole; but whatever there is in an individual that is repugnant altogether to the idea of quiddity, this can be posited as the first reason for individuating; therefore etc.
134 Praeterea, XII Metaphysicae probat quod non possunt esse plures caeli: ((Si enim)), inquit, ((essent plures caeli, ut homines, foret principium quidem circa unumquodque specie unum, numero vero multa; sed quaecumque)), inquit, ((sunt numero multa, habent materiam, - quod autem quod quid erat esse non habet materiam primum (entelecheia enim); unum ergo et ratione et numero primum movens, immobile, est)). Ista ratio, qua concluditur unitas caeli ex unitate motoris, et unitas motoris non tantum speƿcie sed numero, propter hoc quod non habet materiam, - non videretur valere nisi distinctio numeralis fieret per materiam; igitur etc.	134. Further 12.8.1074a31-38 proves that there cannot be several heavens: "For if," he says, "there were several heavens as there are several men, the principle as concerns each would be one in species but many in number; but," he says, "all things that are many in number have matter; now the whatness does not have matter first (for it is actuality); therefore the first, immovable mover is one in idea and in number." This reasoning - whereby the unity of the heaven is proved from the unity of the mover, and the unity of the mover is not only unity in species but in number, because of the fact the mover does not have matter - would not seem valid unless distinction in number were made by matter; therefore etc.
135 Praeterea, I Caeli et mundi: 'Cum dico caelum, dico formam, cum dico hoc caelum, dico materiam'.	135. Further On the Heaven 1.9.278a10-15: "When I say 'heaven' I state the form; when I say 'this heaven' I state the matter."
	Rejection of the opinion
136 Contra istud, - primo per auctoritates eiusdem: Secundum Philosophum VII Metaphysicae, cap. 'De partibus definitionis': ((Palam est quod anima est substantia prima, corpus autem materia; homo vero aut animal - quod est ex utrisque - ut universaliter, Socrates autem et Coriscus)) (supple 'ex his') ((ut singulariter: siquidem anima dupliciter dicitur)). Et postea subdit: ((Si vero anima haec et corpus hoc, ut quidem universale, et singulare)). ƿ	136. Against this [n.132], and first through authorities of the same Aristotle: According to the Philosopher Metaphysics 7.11.1037a5-10, ch. 'On the Parts of Definition': "It is clear that soul is substance first and that body is matter; but man or animal - which are from both soul and matter - as universals, and Socrates and Coriscus (supply: from both soul and matter) as singulars; since soul is said in the two ways." And afterwards he adds: "But if soul is a 'this' and body a 'this', then as universal and singular."
137 Et ante, in eodem cap.: ((Homo et equus et quae ita in singularibus, universaliter non sunt substantia)) (id est forma), ((sed simul quoddam totum)) (id est compositum) ((ex hac materia et hac ratione)) (ubi per ly 'hac' non intendit materiam uniformem et singularem, sed determinatam, alioquin contradiceret sibi ipsi; unde subdit ibidem: ((ut universaliter)). Et subdit postea: ((Ex ultima materia Socrates iam est)) etc.	137. And previously, in the same place on the parts of definition, 10.1035b27-31: "Man and horse and what thus exist in singulars are not substance universally," that is, form, "but together a certain whole," that is, the composite, "made from this matter and this nature" (where he means by the 'this' not uniform and singular matter but determinate matter, otherwise he would contradict himself; hence he adds in the same place, "universally"). And he adds later: "From ultimate matter there is now Socrates etc."
138 Patet etiam idem, per eundem XII, cap. 2, ubi vult quod principia sunt eadem sicut et principiata: ((Et horum)), inquit, ((quae sunt in eadem specie, diversa, non specie sed quia singularium: aliud tua materia et movens et species, et mea, sed ratione tamen universali eadem)). Igitur ita concedit distinctionem formae sicut materiae, in particulari. - et ita unitatem materiae in communi sicut formae; et ideo oportet adhuc quaerere 'quo materia sit haec'.	138. The same is also plain from the same Philosopher in 12.5.1071a27-29 where he maintains that the principles are the same just as are the things that come from the principles: "And of those in the same species," he says, "the principles are diverse, not diverse in species, but because they are principles of singulars; your matter and mover and species are one thing and mine another, but yet the same in universal idea." So in this way he admits a distinction of form as of matter in the particular, and in this way a unity of matter in general as of form; and therefore the question whereby matter is a 'this' must still be asked.
139 Praeterea, sicut probatur ex multis locis VII, cap. 'De partibus definitionis': materia est de essentia substantiae compositae, puta ƿhominis, - et non est tale compositum praecise essentia formae. Igitur sicut illud compositum non potest de se esse hoc (ex prima quaestione), ita nec materia - quae est pars eius - erit de se haec, quia non potest esse 'compositum commune et eiusdem rationis' in diversis, quin quodlibet quod est de essentia eius posset esse eiusdem rationis cum eis.	139. Further, as is proved from many places of Metaphysics 7 on the parts of definition: matter is of the essence of the composite substance, namely of man, and such a composite is not precisely the essence of the form. Therefore, just as the composite cannot be of itself a 'this' (from the first question, n.29), so neither will the matter -which is part of the composite - be of itself a 'this', because there cannot be a composite that is common and of the same idea in diverse things unless whatever is of the essence of the composite can be of the same idea in those diverse things.
140 Praeterea, per rationem: materia est eadem in generato et corrupto; igitur habet eandem singularitatem in generato et corrupto.	140. Further, by reason: matter is the same in the thing generated as in the thing corrupted; therefore it has the same singularity in the thing generated and in the thing corrupted.
141 Et si respondeas quod non sit eiusdem speciei in generato et corrupto, arguo sicut prius 'contra quantitatem interminatam', et ita erit generatio circularis: primo ignis ex aqua, secundo aquae ex igne; aqua primo corrupta et aqua secundo generata, habent eandem materiam et sunt eiusdem speciei, - ergo sunt realiter 'haec aqua'; ergo primum redit naturaliter idem numero, quod est contra eos.	141. And if you reply that the matter is not of the same species in the thing generated and in the thing corrupted, I argue as before against non-terminated quantity [n.100], and thus generation will be circular: first of fire from water, second of water from fire; the water corrupted first and the water generated second have the same matter and are of the same species; therefore they are really 'this water'; therefore the first naturally returns the same in number, which is against what they hold [sc. that matter is the principle of individuation, nn.132]. [N.B. Question Five is Continued after Question Six]