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Contents

Chapter 1

Greek Latin English
METHAPHISICE ARISTOTILIS LIBER DUODECIMUS Aristotle Metaphysics Book 12 (L)1
[1069α] [18] περὶ τῆς οὐσίας ἡ θεωρία: τῶν γὰρ οὐσιῶν αἱ ἀρχαὶ καὶ τὰ αἴτια ζητοῦνται. > De substantia quidem theoria est; nam substantiarum principia et cause quaeruntur. Chapter 1. The subject of our inquiry is substance; for the principles and the causes we are seeking are those of substances.
καὶ γὰρ εἰ ὡς ὅλον τι τὸ πᾶν, [20] ἡ οὐσία πρῶτον μέρος: καὶ εἰ τῷ ἐφεξῆς, κἂν οὕτως πρῶτον ἡ οὐσία, εἶτα τὸ ποιόν, εἶτα τὸ ποσόν. Et enim si ut totum quoddam omne, substantia est prima pars; et si eo quod consequenter, et ita primum substantia, deinde qualitas aut quantitas. For if the universe is of the nature of a whole, substance is its first part; and if it coheres merely by virtue of serial succession, on this view also substance is first, and is succeeded by quality, and then by quantity.
ἅμα δὲ οὐδ᾽ ὄντα ὡς εἰπεῖν ἁπλῶς ταῦτα, ἀλλὰ ποιότητες καὶ κινήσεις, ἢ καὶ τὸ οὐ λευκὸν καὶ τὸ οὐκ εὐθύ: λέγομεν γοῦν εἶναι καὶ ταῦτα, οἷον ἔστιν οὐ λευκόν. Simul [/Similiter] autem nec entia ut est simpliciter dicere haec, sed qualitates et motus, qua et non album et non rectum; dicimus enim esse et haec, ut puta est non album. At the same time these latter are not even being in the full sense, but are qualities and movements of it,-or else even the not-white and the not-straight would be being; at least we say even these are, e.g. there is a not-white .
ἔτι οὐδὲν τῶν ἄλλων χωριστόν. Amplius nihil aliorum separabile. Further, none of the categories other than substance can exist apart.
[25] μαρτυροῦσι δὲ καὶ οἱ ἀρχαῖοι ἔργῳ: τῆς γὰρ οὐσίας ἐζήτουν ἀρχὰς καὶ στοιχεῖα καὶ αἴτια. οἱ μὲν οὖν νῦν τὰ καθόλου οὐσίας μᾶλλον τιθέασιν (τὰ γὰρ γένη καθόλου, ἅ φασιν ἀρχὰς καὶ οὐσίας εἶναι μᾶλλον διὰ τὸ λογικῶς ζητεῖν): οἱ δὲ πάλαι τὰ καθ᾽ ἕκαστα, οἷον πῦρ καὶ γῆν, ἀλλ᾽ οὐ τὸ [30] κοινόν, σῶμα. Testantur autem et antiqui opere; nam substantiae quaerebant principia et elementa et causas. * qui quidem nunc universalia substantias magis ponunt; nam genera universalia, quae dicunt principia et substantias esse magis propter logice inquirere. Qui vero antiquitus particularia, ut ignem et terram, sed non commune, corpus. And the early philosophers also in practice testify to the primacy of substance; for it was of substance that they sought the principles and elements and causes. The thinkers of the present day tend to rank universals as substances (for genera are universals, and these they tend to describe as principles and substances, owing to the abstract nature of their inquiry); but the thinkers of old ranked particular things as substances, e.g. fire and earth, not what is common to both, body.
οὐσίαι δὲ τρεῖς, μία μὲν αἰσθητή—ἧς ἡ μὲν ἀΐδιος ἡ δὲ φθαρτή, ἣν πάντες ὁμολογοῦσιν, οἷον τὰ φυτὰ καὶ τὰ ζῷα [ἡ δ᾽ ἀΐδιος]—ἧς ἀνάγκη τὰ στοιχεῖα λαβεῖν, εἴτε ἓν εἴτε πολλά: ἄλλη δὲ ἀκίνητος, καὶ ταύτην φασί τινες εἶναι χωριστήν, οἱ μὲν εἰς δύο διαιροῦντες, [35] οἱ δὲ εἰς μίαν φύσιν τιθέντες τὰ εἴδη καὶ τὰ μαθηματικά, οἱ δὲ τὰ μαθηματικὰ μόνον τούτων. ἐκεῖναι μὲν δὴ φυσικῆς (μετὰ κινήσεως γάρ), [1069β] [1] αὕτη δὲ ἑτέρας, εἰ μηδεμία αὐτοῖς ἀρχὴ κοινή. Substantiae vero tres sunt, una quidem sensibilis, cuius alia quidem sempiterna alia corruptibilis, quam omnes * confitentur, ut plante et animalia. * Sempiterna autem, cuius elementa necesse est accipere, sive unum sive multa. Alia vero immo>bilis. Hanc dicunt quidam separabilem esse, hii quidem in duo dividentes, alii in unam naturam species ponentes et mathematica, alii horum mathematica solum. Ille quidem naturalis (* cum motu enim), et haec alterius, si nullum ipsis principium commune est. There are three kinds of substance-one that is sensible (of which one subdivision is eternal and another is perishable; the latter is recognized by all men, and includes e.g. plants and animals), of which we must grasp the elements, whether one or many; and another that is immovable, and this certain thinkers assert to be capable of existing apart, some dividing it into two, others identifying the Forms and the objects of mathematics, and others positing, of these two, only the objects of mathematics. The former two kinds of substance are the subject of physics (for they [69b] imply movement); but the third kind belongs to another science, if there is no principle common to it and to the other kinds.
ἡ δ᾽ αἰσθητὴ οὐσία μεταβλητή. εἰ δ᾽ ἡ μεταβολὴ ἐκ τῶν ἀντικειμένων ἢ τῶν μεταξύ, ἀντικειμένων δὲ μὴ [5] πάντων (οὐ λευκὸν γὰρ ἡ φωνή) ἀλλ᾽ ἐκ τοῦ ἐναντίου, ἀνάγκη ὑπεῖναί τι τὸ μεταβάλλον εἰς τὴν ἐναντίωσιν: οὐ γὰρ τὰ ἐναντία μεταβάλλει. Sensibilis vero substantia mutabilis. Si autem mutatio est ex oppositis aut mediis, oppositis autem non omnibus (non album enim * vox), sed ex contrario, necesse subesse quid mutabile in contrarietatem; non enim contraria transmutantur. Sensible substance is changeable. Now if change proceeds from opposites or from intermediates, and not from all opposites (for the voice is not-white, (but it does not therefore change to white)), but from the contrary, there must be something underlying which changes into the contrary state; for the contraries do not change.

Chapter 2

Greek Latin English
ἔτι τὸ μὲν ὑπομένει, τὸ δ᾽ ἐναντίον οὐχ ὑπομένει: ἔστιν ἄρα τι τρίτον παρὰ τὰ ἐναντία, ἡ ὕλη. Amplius hoc quidem manet, aliud vero contrarium non manet; est igitur aliquid tertium praeter contraria: materia. Chapter 2. Further, something persists, but the contrary does not persist; there is, then, some third thing besides the contraries, viz. the matter.
εἰ δὴ αἱ μεταβολαὶ τέτταρες, ἢ κατὰ τὸ τί [10] ἢ κατὰ τὸ ποῖον ἢ πόσον ἢ ποῦ, καὶ γένεσις μὲν ἡ ἁπλῆ καὶ φθορὰ ἡ κατὰ <τὸ> τόδε, αὔξησις δὲ καὶ φθίσις ἡ κατὰ τὸ ποσόν, ἀλλοίωσις δὲ ἡ κατὰ τὸ πάθος, φορὰ δὲ ἡ κατὰ τόπον, εἰς ἐναντιώσεις ἂν εἶεν τὰς καθ᾽ ἕκαστον αἱ μεταβολαί. ἀνάγκη δὴ μεταβάλλειν τὴν ὕλην δυναμένην [15] ἄμφω: Si itaque transmutationes sunt quatuor, aut secundum quid aut secundum qualitatem aut secundum quantitatem aut ubi, et generatio quidem simplex et corruptio secundum hoc, et augmentum et detrimentum quae secundum quantitatem *, alteratio autem quae secundum passionem, latio autem quae secundum locum, * in contrarietates utique erunt eas quae secundum unumquodque transmutationes. Necesse * itaque transmutari materiam potentem ambo. Now since changes are of four kinds-either in respect of the what or of the quality or of the quantity or of the place, and change in respect of thisness is simple generation and destruction, and change in quantity is increase and diminution, and change in respect of an affection is alteration, and change of place is motion, changes will be from given states into those contrary to them in these several respects. The matter, then, which changes must be capable of both states.
ἐπεὶ δὲ διττὸν τὸ ὄν, μεταβάλλει πᾶν ἐκ τοῦ δυνάμει ὄντος εἰς τὸ ἐνεργείᾳ ὄν (οἷον ἐκ λευκοῦ δυνάμει εἰς τὸ ἐνεργείᾳ λευκόν, ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ ἐπ᾽ αὐξήσεως καὶ φθίσεως), ὥστε οὐ μόνον κατὰ συμβεβηκὸς ἐνδέχεται γίγνεσθαι ἐκ μὴ ὄντος, ἀλλὰ καὶ ἐξ ὄντος γίγνεται πάντα, δυνάμει [20] μέντοι ὄντος, ἐκ μὴ ὄντος δὲ ἐνεργείᾳ. Quoniam autem duplex est ens, transmutatur omne ex potentia ente in actu ens, ut puta ex albo * potentia in actu album; similiter autem in augmento et detrimento. Quare non solum secundum accidens contingit fieri ex non ente, sed et ex ente fiunt omnia, potentia quidem > ente, ex non ente vero actu. And since that which is has two senses, we must say that everything changes from that which is potentially to that which is actually, e.g. from potentially white to actually white, and similarly in the case of increase and diminution. Therefore not only can a thing come to be, incidentally, out of that which is not, but also all things come to be out of that which is, but is potentially, and is not actually.
καὶ τοῦτ᾽ ἔστι τὸ Ἀναξαγόρου ἕν: βέλτιον γὰρ ἢ "ὁμοῦ πάντα"—καὶ Ἐμπεδοκλέους τὸ μῖγμα καὶ Ἀναξιμάνδρου, καὶ ὡς Δημόκριτός φησιν—"ἦν ὁμοῦ πάντα δυνάμει, ἐνεργείᾳ δ᾽ οὔ": ὥστε τῆς ὕλης ἂν εἶεν ἡμμένοι: Et hoc est Anaxagorae unum; dignius est enim quam “ simul omnia” — Et empedoclis mixtura et anaximandri et ut Democritus ait — “ nobis erant omnia potentia, actu vero minime”. Quare materiam utique erant tangentes. And this is the One of Anaxagoras; for instead of all things were together -and the Mixture of Empedocles and Anaximander and the account given by Democritus-it is better to say all things were together potentially but not actually . Therefore these thinkers seem to have had some notion of matter.
πάντα δ᾽ ὕλην ἔχει ὅσα μεταβάλλει, [25] ἀλλ᾽ ἑτέραν: καὶ τῶν ἀϊδίων ὅσα μὴ γενητὰ κινητὰ δὲ φορᾷ, ἀλλ᾽ οὐ γενητὴν ἀλλὰ ποθὲν ποί. Omnia vero materiam habent quaecumque transmutantur, sed aliam; et sempiternorum quaecumque non generabilia mobilia autem latione, verum non generabilem habent, sed unde quo. Now all things that change have matter, but different matter; and of eternal things those which are not generable but are movable in space have matter-not matter for generation, however, but for motion [69b 26] from one place to another.
ἀπορήσειε δ᾽ ἄν τις ἐκ ποίου μὴ ὄντος ἡ γένεσις: τριχῶς γὰρ τὸ μὴ ὄν. εἰ δή τι ἔστι δυνάμει, ἀλλ᾽ ὅμως οὐ τοῦ τυχόντος ἀλλ᾽ ἕτερον ἐξ ἑτέρου: οὐδ᾽ ἱκανὸν ὅτι ὁμοῦ πάντα [30] χρήματα: διαφέρει γὰρ τῇ ὕλῃ, ἐπεὶ διὰ τί ἄπειρα ἐγένετο ἀλλ᾽ οὐχ ἕν; ὁ γὰρ νοῦς εἷς, ὥστ᾽ εἰ καὶ ἡ ὕλη μία, ἐκεῖνο ἐγένετο ἐνεργείᾳ οὗ ἡ ὕλη ἦν δυνάμει. Dubitabit autem utique aliquis ex quali [/quo] non ente est generatio; tripliciter enim non ens. Si itaque aliquid est potentia, at tamen non ex quocumque sed alterum ex altero. Neque sufficiens quia simul res omnes; differunt enim materia, quoniam quare infinita facta sunt sed non unum? Intellectus enim unus; quare si et materia una, illud factum est actu cuius materia erat potentia. One might raise the question from what sort of non-being generation proceeds; for non-being has three senses. If, then, one form of non-being exists potentially, still it is not by virtue of a potentiality for any and every thing, but different things come from different things; nor is it satisfactory to say that all things were together ; for they differ in their matter, since otherwise why did an infinity of things come to be, and not one thing? For reason is one, so that if matter also were one, that must have come to be in actuality which the matter was in potency.
τρία δὴ τὰ αἴτια καὶ τρεῖς αἱ ἀρχαί, δύο μὲν ἡ ἐναντίωσις, ἧς τὸ μὲν λόγος καὶ εἶδος τὸ δὲ στέρησις, τὸ δὲ τρίτον ἡ ὕλη. [35] Tres vero sunt causae et tria principia: duo quidem contrarietas, cuius hoc quidem ratio et species illud vero privatio, tertium autem materia. 60 The causes and the principles, then, are three, two being the pair of contraries of which one is definition and form and the other is privation, and the third being the matter.

Chapter 3

Greek Latin English
μετὰ ταῦτα ὅτι οὐ γίγνεται οὔτε ἡ ὕλη οὔτε τὸ εἶδος, λέγω δὲ τὰ ἔσχατα. πᾶν γὰρ μεταβάλλει τὶ καὶ ὑπό τινος καὶ εἴς τι: [1070α] [1] ὑφ᾽ οὗ μέν, τοῦ πρώτου κινοῦντος: ὃ δέ, ἡ ὕλη: εἰς ὃ δέ, τὸ εἶδος. εἰς ἄπειρον οὖν εἶσιν, εἰ μὴ μόνον ὁ χαλκὸς γίγνεται στρογγύλος ἀλλὰ καὶ τὸ στρογγύλον ἢ ὁ χαλκός: ἀνάγκη δὴ στῆναι. Postea quia nec fit materia nec species, dico autem ultima. Omne namque transmutat aliquid et ab aliquo et in quid. A quo quidem, primo movente; cuius vero, materia; in quod vero, species. In infinitum ergo sunt, si non solum es fit rotundum sed et ipsum rotundum aut es; necesse est itaque stare. Chapter 3. Note, next, that neither the matter nor the form comes to be-and I mean the last matter and form. For everything that changes is something and is changed by some[70a]thing and into something. That by which it is changed is the immediate mover; that which is changed, the matter; that into which it is changed, the form. The process, then, will go on to infinity, if not only the bronze comes to be round but also the round or the bronze comes to be; therefore there must be a stop.
μετὰ ταῦτα ὅτι ἑκάστη [5] ἐκ συνωνύμου γίγνεται οὐσία (τὰ γὰρ φύσει οὐσίαι καὶ τὰ ἄλλα). ἢ γὰρ τέχνῃ ἢ φύσει γίγνεται ἢ τύχῃ ἢ τῷ αὐτομάτῳ. ἡ μὲν οὖν τέχνη ἀρχὴ ἐν ἄλλῳ, ἡ δὲ φύσις ἀρχὴ ἐν αὐτῷ (ἄνθρωπος γὰρ ἄνθρωπον γεννᾷ), αἱ δὲ λοιπαὶ αἰτίαι στερήσεις τούτων. >Postea quia queque ex univoco fit substantia; nam et quae sunt natura substantia et alia. Aut enim arte aut natura foint aut fortuna aut casu. Ars igitur principium est in alio, natura autem principium in ipso (homo namque hominem generat), relique vero cause horum privationes. Note, next, that each substance comes into being out of something that shares its name. (Natural objects and other things both rank as substances.) For things come into being either by art or by nature or by luck or by spontaneity. Now art is a principle of movement in something other than the thing moved, nature is a principle in the thing itself (for man begets man), and the other causes are privations of these two.
οὐσίαι δὲ τρεῖς, ἡ μὲν ὕλη [10] τόδε τι οὖσα τῷ φαίνεσθαι (ὅσα γὰρ ἁφῇ καὶ μὴ συμφύσει, ὕλη καὶ ὑποκείμενον), ἡ δὲ φύσις τόδε τι καὶ ἕξις τις εἰς ἥν: ἔτι τρίτη ἡ ἐκ τούτων ἡ καθ᾽ ἕκαστα, οἷον Σωκράτης ἢ Καλλίας. Substantiae autem tres sunt, materia quidem hoc aliquid substantia in apparere; nam quaecumque tactu et non connascentia, materia et subiectum. Natura vero hoc aliquid in quam et habitus quidam . Amplius tertia quae est ex hiis singularis, ut Socrates et Callias. There are three kinds of substance-the matter, which is a this in appearance (for all things that are characterized by contact and not, by organic unity are matter and substratum, e.g. fire, flesh, head; for these are all matter, and the last matter is the matter of that which is in the full sense substance); the nature, which is a this or positive state towards which movement takes place; and again, thirdly, the particular substance which is composed of these two, e.g. Socrates or Callias.
ἐπὶ μὲν οὖν τινῶν τὸ τόδε τι οὐκ ἔστι παρὰ τὴν συνθετὴν οὐσίαν, οἷον οἰκίας τὸ εἶδος, εἰ [15] μὴ ἡ τέχνη (οὐδ᾽ ἔστι γένεσις καὶ φθορὰ τούτων, ἀλλ᾽ ἄλλον τρόπον εἰσὶ καὶ οὐκ εἰσὶν οἰκία τε ἡ ἄνευ ὕλης καὶ ὑγίεια καὶ πᾶν τὸ κατὰ τέχνην), ἀλλ᾽ εἴπερ, ἐπὶ τῶν φύσει: διὸ δὴ οὐ κακῶς Πλάτων ἔφη ὅτι εἴδη ἔστιν ὁπόσα φύσει, εἴπερ ἔστιν εἴδη ἄλλα τούτων <οἷον πῦρ σὰρξ κεφαλή: [20] ἅπαντα γὰρ ὕλη ἐστί, καὶ τῆς μάλιστ᾽ οὐσίας ἡ τελευταία>. Igitur in quibusdam hoc non est praeter compositam substantiam, ut domus species, si non ars; nec est generatio et corruptio horum, sed alio modo sunt et non sunt domus quae sine materia et sanitas et omne quod secundum artem. Sed siquidem, in eis quae sunt natura. Quapropter non male Plato ait quia species sunt quaecumque natura, siquidem sunt species aliae horum, ut ignis, caro, caput; omnia enim materia sunt, et eius quae maxime substantiae ultima. Now in some cases the this does not exist apart from the composite substance, e.g. the form of house does not so exist, unless the art of building exists apart (nor is there generation and destruction of these forms, but it is in another way that the house apart from its matter, and health, and all ideals of art, exist and do not exist); but if the this exists apart from the concrete thing, it is only in the case of natural objects. And so Plato was not far wrong when he said that there are as many Forms as there are kinds of natural object (if there are Forms distinct from the things of this earth).
τὰ μὲν οὖν κινοῦντα αἴτια ὡς προγεγενημένα ὄντα, τὰ δ᾽ ὡς ὁ λόγος ἅμα. ὅτε γὰρ ὑγιαίνει ὁ ἄνθρωπος, τότε καὶ ἡ ὑγίεια ἔστιν, καὶ τὸ σχῆμα τῆς χαλκῆς σφαίρας ἅμα καὶ ἡ χαλκῆ σφαῖρα (εἰ δὲ καὶ ὕστερόν τι ὑπομένει, σκεπτέον: [25] ἐπ᾽ ἐνίων γὰρ οὐδὲν κωλύει, οἷον εἰ ἡ ψυχὴ τοιοῦτον, μὴ πᾶσα ἀλλ᾽ ὁ νοῦς: πᾶσαν γὰρ ἀδύνατον ἴσως). Moventes quidem igitur cause velut prius facte existentes, quae autem ut ratio simul. Quando enim sanatur homo, tunc et sanitas est, et figura eree spere simul et erea spera. Si autem et posterius aliquid manet, perscrutandum est. In quibusdam enim nihil prohibet, ut si anima tale, non omnis sed intellectus; omnem namque impossibile forsan. The moving causes exist as things preceding the effects, but causes in the sense of definitions are simultaneous with their effects. For when a man is healthy, then health also exists; and the shape of a bronze sphere exists at the same time as the bronze sphere. (But we must examine whether any form also survives afterwards. For in some cases there is nothing to prevent this; e.g. the soul may be of this sort-not all soul but the reason; for presumably it is impossible that all soul should survive.)
φανερὸν δὴ ὅτι οὐδὲν δεῖ διά γε ταῦτ᾽ εἶναι τὰς ἰδέας: ἄνθρωπος γὰρ ἄνθρωπον γεννᾷ, ὁ καθ᾽ ἕκαστον τὸν τινά: ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν τεχνῶν: ἡ γὰρ ἰατρικὴ τέχνη ὁ λόγος τῆς ὑγιείας [30] ἐστίν. > Palam itaque quia non oportet propter haec esse ydeas; 90 homo enim hominem generat, qui singularis aliquem. Similiter autem et in artibus; medicinalis enim ars ratio sanitatis est. Evidently then there is no necessity, on this ground at least, for the existence of the Ideas. For man is begotten by man, a given man by an individual father; and similarly in the arts; for the medical art is the formal cause of health. [70a 31]

Chapter 4

Greek Latin English
τὰ δ᾽ αἴτια καὶ αἱ ἀρχαὶ ἄλλα ἄλλων ἔστιν ὥς, ἔστι δ᾽ ὡς, ἂν καθόλου λέγῃ τις καὶ κατ᾽ ἀναλογίαν, ταὐτὰ πάντων. Causae autem et principia alia aliorum est ut, est autem ut, si quis dicat universaliter et secundum proportionem, eadem omnium. Chapter 4The causes and the principles of different things are in a sense different, but in a sense, if one speaks universally and analogically, they are the same for all.
ἀπορήσειε γὰρ ἄν τις πότερον ἕτεραι ἢ αἱ αὐταὶ ἀρχαὶ καὶ στοιχεῖα τῶν οὐσιῶν καὶ τῶν πρός τι, καὶ καθ᾽ [35] ἑκάστην δὴ τῶν κατηγοριῶν ὁμοίως. ἀλλ᾽ ἄτοπον εἰ ταὐτὰ πάντων: ἐκ τῶν αὐτῶν γὰρ ἔσται τὰ πρός τι καὶ αἱ οὐσίαι. Dubitabit autem utique aliquis utrum altera aut eadem sint principia et elementa substantiarum et eorum quae sunt ad aliquid, et cuiuslibet cathegoriarum similiter. For one might raise the question whether the principles and elements are different or the same for substances and for relative terms, and similarly in the case of each of the categories.
[1070β] [1] τί οὖν τοῦτ᾽ ἔσται; παρὰ γὰρ τὴν οὐσίαν καὶ τἆλλα τὰ κατηγορούμενα οὐδέν ἐστι κοινόν, πρότερον δὲ τὸ στοιχεῖον ἢ ὧν στοιχεῖον: ἀλλὰ μὴν οὐδ᾽ ἡ οὐσία στοιχεῖον τῶν πρός τι, οὐδὲ τούτων οὐδὲν τῆς οὐσίας. Sed inconveniens si eadem omnium; ex eisdem enim erunt quae ad aliquid et substantia. Quid igitur hoc erit? Nam extra substantiam et alia predicamenta nihil est commune; prius autem est elementum quam quorum est elementum. At vero neque substantia elementum est eorum quae ad aliquid, nec horum aliquid substantiae. But it would be paradoxical if they were the same for all. For then from the same elements will proceed relative terms [70b] and substances. What then will this common element be? For (1) (a) there is nothing common to and distinct from substance and the other categories, viz. those which are predicated; but an element is prior to the things of which it is an element. But again (b) substance is not an element in relative terms, nor is any of these an element in substance.
ἔτι πῶς ἐνδέχεται πάντων [5] εἶναι ταὐτὰ στοιχεῖα; οὐδὲν γὰρ οἷόν τ᾽ εἶναι τῶν στοιχείων τῷ ἐκ στοιχείων συγκειμένῳ τὸ αὐτό, οἷον τῷ ΒΑ τὸ Β ἢ Α (οὐδὲ δὴ τῶν νοητῶν στοιχεῖόν ἐστιν, οἷον τὸ ὂν ἢ τὸ ἕν: ὑπάρχει γὰρ ταῦτα ἑκάστῳ καὶ τῶν συνθέτων). οὐδὲν ἄρ᾽ ἔσται αὐτῶν οὔτ᾽ οὐσία οὔτε πρός τι: ἀλλ᾽ ἀναγκαῖον. οὐκ ἔστιν ἄρα [10] πάντων ταὐτὰ στοιχεῖα. Amplius quomodo contingit esse omnium elementa eadem? Nullum enim possibile esse elementorum cum ex elementis composito idem, ut ei quod est BA B aut A *; nec etiam intellectualium elementorum, ut unum aut ens, insunt enim ea singulis * compositorum. Nihil igitur erit eorum nec substantia nec ad aliquid; sed necessarium. Non sunt igitur omnium eadem elementa. Further, (2) how can all things have the same elements? For none of the elements can be the same as that which is composed of elements, e.g. b or a cannot be the same as ba. (None, therefore, of the intelligibles, e.g. being or unity, is an element; for these are predicable of each of the compounds as well.) None of the elements, then, will be either a substance or a relative term; but it must be one or other. All things, then, have not the same elements.
ἢ ὥσπερ λέγομεν, ἔστι μὲν ὥς, ἔστι δ᾽ ὡς οὔ, οἷον ἴσως τῶν αἰσθητῶν σωμάτων ὡς μὲν εἶδος τὸ θερμὸν καὶ ἄλλον τρόπον τὸ ψυχρὸν ἡ στέρησις, ὕλη δὲ τὸ δυνάμει ταῦτα πρῶτον καθ᾽ αὑτό, οὐσίαι δὲ ταῦτά τε καὶ τὰ ἐκ τούτων, ὧν ἀρχαὶ ταῦτα, ἢ εἴ τι ἐκ θερμοῦ καὶ ψυχροῦ [15] γίγνεται ἕν, οἷον σὰρξ ἢ ὀστοῦν: ἕτερον γὰρ ἀνάγκη ἐκείνων εἶναι τὸ γενόμενον. τούτων μὲν οὖν ταὐτὰ στοιχεῖα καὶ ἀρχαί (ἄλλων δ᾽ ἄλλα), πάντων δὲ οὕτω μὲν εἰπεῖν οὐκ ἔστιν, τῷ ἀνάλογον δέ, ὥσπερ εἴ τις εἴποι ὅτι ἀρχαὶ εἰσὶ τρεῖς, τὸ εἶδος καὶ ἡ στέρησις καὶ ἡ ὕλη. ἀλλ᾽ ἕκαστον τούτων ἕτερον περὶ [20] ἕκαστον γένος ἐστίν, οἷον ἐν χρώματι λευκὸν μέλαν ἐπιφάνεια: φῶς σκότος ἀήρ, ἐκ δὲ τούτων ἡμέρα καὶ νύξ. >Aut ut dicimus, est quidem ut est, est vero ut non; puta forsan sensibilium corporum ut quidem species calidum et alio modo frigidum privatio, materia vero quod potentia haec primum secundum se. Substantia vero et haec et quae ex hiis, quorum sunt principia haec, aut si quid ex calido et frigido fit unum, ut caro aut os; alterum enim necesse * ab illis esse quod factum est. Horum igitur eadem elementa et principia; aliorum vero alia. Omnium autem * ita quidem dicere non est, sed proportionabiliter, quemadmodum si quis dicat quia principia sunt tria: * species et privatio et materia. Sed horum unumquodque alterum circa genus unumquodque est, ut in colore album, nigrum, superficies; lumen, tenebre, aer, ex hiis autem dies et nox. Or, as we are wont to put it, in a sense they have and in a sense they have not; e.g. perhaps the elements of perceptible bodies are, as form, the hot, and in another sense the cold, which is the privation; and, as matter, that which directly and of itself potentially has these attributes; and substances comprise both these and the things composed of these, of which these are the principles, or any unity which is produced out of the hot and the cold, e.g. flesh or bone; for the product must be different from the elements. These things then have the same elements and principles (though specifically different things have specifically different elements); but all things have not the same elements in this sense, but only analogically; i.e. one might say that there are three principles-the form, the privation, and the matter. But each of these is different for each class; e.g. in colour they are white, black, and surface, and in day and night they are light, darkness, and air.
ἐπεὶ δὲ οὐ μόνον τὰ ἐνυπάρχοντα αἴτια, ἀλλὰ καὶ τῶν ἐκτὸς οἷον τὸ κινοῦν, δῆλον ὅτι ἕτερον ἀρχὴ καὶ στοιχεῖον, [24] αἴτια δ᾽ ἄμφω, καὶ εἰς ταῦτα διαιρεῖται ἡ ἀρχή, τὸ δ᾽ [25] ὡς κινοῦν ἢ ἱστὰν ἀρχή τις καὶ οὐσία, ὥστε στοιχεῖα μὲν κατ᾽ ἀναλογίαν τρία, αἰτίαι δὲ καὶ ἀρχαὶ τέτταρες: ἄλλο δ᾽ ἐν ἄλλῳ, καὶ τὸ πρῶτον αἴτιον ὡς κινοῦν ἄλλο ἄλλῳ. ὑγίεια, νόσος, σῶμα: τὸ κινοῦν ἰατρική. εἶδος, ἀταξία τοιαδί, πλίνθοι: τὸ κινοῦν οἰκοδομική [καὶ εἰς ταῦτα διαιρεῖται [30] ἡ ἀρχή]. Quoniam autem non solum quae insunt cause, sed * et eorum quae * extra, ut puta movens, palam quia alterum principium et elementum, cause vero ambo, et in haec dividitur principium; quod autem ut movens aut sistens principium est quoddam. quare elementa secundum analogiam tria, cause autem et principia quatuor; aliud vero in alio, et prima causa quasi movens aliud alii. Sanitas, infirmitas, corpus; movens medicativa. Species, inordinatio talis, lateres; movens edificatoria. Et in ea dividitur principium. Since not only the elements present in a thing are causes, but also something external, i.e. the moving cause, clearly while principle and element are different both are causes, and principle is divided into these two kinds; and that which acts as producing movement or rest is a principle and a substance. Therefore analogically there are three elements, and four causes and principles; but the elements are different in different things, and the proximate moving cause is different for different things. Health, disease, body; the moving cause is the medical art. Form, disorder of a particular kind, bricks; the moving cause is the building art.
ἐπεὶ δὲ τὸ κινοῦν ἐν μὲν τοῖς φυσικοῖς ἀνθρώπῳ ἄνθρωπος, ἐν δὲ τοῖς ἀπὸ διανοίας τὸ εἶδος ἢ τὸ ἐναντίον, τρόπον τινὰ τρία αἴτια ἂν εἴη, ὡδὶ δὲ τέτταρα. ὑγίεια γάρ πως ἡ ἰατρική, καὶ οἰκίας εἶδος ἡ οἰκοδομική, καὶ ἄνθρωπος ἄνθρωπον γεννᾷ: Quoniam autem movens in phisicis qui>dem * homo, in hiis autem quae a mente species aut contrarium, modo quodam * tres utique erunt cause, sic autem quatuor. Nam sanitas aliqualiter medicinalis, et domus species edificatoria, et homo hominem generat. And since the moving cause in the case of natural things is-for man, for instance, man, and in the products of thought the form or its contrary, there will be in a sense three causes, while in a sense there are four. For the medical art is in some sense health, and the building art is the form of the house, and man begets man;
ἔτι παρὰ ταῦτα τὸ ὡς [35] πρῶτον πάντων κινοῦν πάντα. Adhuc praeter haec ut primum omnium movens omnia. further, besides these there is that which as first of all things moves all things.

Chapter 5

Greek Latin English
ἐπεὶ δ᾽ ἐστὶ τὰ μὲν χωριστὰ τὰ δ᾽ οὐ χωριστά, οὐσίαι ἐκεῖνα. [1071α] [1] καὶ διὰ τοῦτο πάντων αἴτια ταὐτά, ὅτι τῶν οὐσιῶν ἄνευ οὐκ ἔστι τὰ πάθη καὶ αἱ κινήσεις. Quoniam autem sunt haec quidem separabilia haec autem inseparabilia, substantiae ille *. Et propter hoc omnium cause haec, quia sine substantiis non sunt passiones et motus. Chapter 5. Some things can exist apart and some cannot, and it is [71a] the former that are substances. And therefore all things have the same causes, because, without substances, modifications and movements do not exist.
ἔπειτα ἔσται ταῦτα ψυχὴ ἴσως καὶ σῶμα, ἢ νοῦς καὶ ὄρεξις καὶ σῶμα. Deinde erunt haec anima forsan et corpus, aut intellectus et appetitus et corpus. Further, these causes will probably be soul and body, or reason and desire and body.
ἔτι δ᾽ ἄλλον τρόπον τῷ ἀνάλογον ἀρχαὶ αἱ αὐταί, οἷον ἐνέργεια [5] καὶ δύναμις: ἀλλὰ καὶ ταῦτα ἄλλα τε ἄλλοις καὶ ἄλλως. ἐν ἐνίοις μὲν γὰρ τὸ αὐτὸ ὁτὲ μὲν ἐνεργείᾳ ἔστιν ὁτὲ δὲ δυνάμει, οἷον οἶνος ἢ σὰρξ ἢ ἄνθρωπος (πίπτει δὲ καὶ ταῦτα εἰς τὰ εἰρημένα αἴτια: ἐνεργείᾳ μὲν γὰρ τὸ εἶδος, ἐὰν ᾖ χωριστόν, καὶ τὸ ἐξ ἀμφοῖν στέρησις δέ, οἷον [10] σκότος ἢ κάμνον, δυνάμει δὲ ἡ ὕλη: τοῦτο γάρ ἐστι τὸ δυνάμενον γίγνεσθαι ἄμφω): ἄλλως δ᾽ ἐνεργείᾳ καὶ δυνάμει διαφέρει ὧν μὴ ἔστιν ἡ αὐτὴ ὕλη, ὧν <ἐνίων> οὐκ ἔστι τὸ αὐτὸ εἶδος ἀλλ᾽ ἕτερον, ὥσπερ ἀνθρώπου αἴτιον τά τε στοιχεῖα, πῦρ καὶ γῆ ὡς ὕλη καὶ τὸ ἴδιον εἶδος, καὶ ἔτι τι [15] ἄλλο ἔξω οἷον ὁ πατήρ, καὶ παρὰ ταῦτα ὁ ἥλιος καὶ ὁ λοξὸς κύκλος, οὔτε ὕλη ὄντα οὔτ᾽ εἶδος οὔτε στέρησις οὔτε ὁμοειδὲς ἀλλὰ κινοῦντα. Amplius autem alio modo proportionaliter principia eadem, ut actus et potentia; sed et haec aliaque aliis et aliter. In quibusdam quidem enim idem quandoque actu est quandoque potentia, ut vinum aut caro aut homo. Cadunt autem et haec in dictas causas. Actus quidem enim species, si sit separabilis, et quod ex ambobus, privatio vero, ut puta tenebre aut laborans; potentia autem materia; hoc enim est quod potest fieri ambo. Aliter autem actu et potestate differunt quorum non est eadem materia, quorum non est eadem species sed altera. Quemadmodum hominis causa elementa, ignis et terra ut materia et species propria; et si quid aliud extra ut pater; et praeter haec sol et obliquus circulus, neque materia entia neque species neque privatio neque conforme sed moventia. And in yet another way, analogically identical things are principles, i.e. actuality and potency; but these also are not only different for different things but also apply in different ways to them. For in some cases the same thing exists at one time actually and at another potentially, e.g. wine or flesh or man does so. (And these too fall under the above-named causes. For the form exists actually, if it can exist apart, and so does the complex of form and matter, and the privation, e.g. darkness or disease; but the matter exists potentially; for this is that which can become qualified either by the form or by the privation.) But the distinction of actuality and potentiality applies in another way to cases where the matter of cause and of effect is not the same, in some of which cases the form is not the same but different; e.g. the cause of man is (1) the elements in man (viz. fire and earth as matter, and the peculiar form), and further (2) something else outside, i.e. the father, and (3) besides these the sun and its oblique course, which are neither matter nor form nor privation of man nor of the same species with him, but moving causes.
ἔτι δὲ ὁρᾶν δεῖ ὅτι τὰ μὲν καθόλου ἔστιν εἰπεῖν, τὰ δ᾽ οὔ. πάντων δὴ πρῶται ἀρχαὶ τὸ ἐνεργείᾳ πρῶτον τοδὶ καὶ ἄλλο ὃ δυνάμει. ἐκεῖνα μὲν [20] οὖν τὰ καθόλου οὐκ ἔστιν: ἀρχὴ γὰρ τὸ καθ᾽ ἕκαστον τῶν καθ᾽ ἕκαστον: ἄνθρωπος μὲν γὰρ ἀνθρώπου καθόλου, ἀλλ᾽ οὐκ ἔστιν οὐδείς, ἀλλὰ Πηλεὺς Ἀχιλλέως σοῦ δὲ ὁ πατήρ, καὶ τοδὶ τὸ Β τουδὶ τοῦ ΒΑ, ὅλως δὲ τὸ Β τοῦ ἁπλῶς ΒΑ. ἔπειτα, εἰ δὴ τὰ τῶν οὐσιῶν, ἄλλα δὲ ἄλλων [25] αἴτια καὶ στοιχεῖα, ὥσπερ ἐλέχθη, τῶν μὴ ἐν ταὐτῷ γένει, χρωμάτων ψόφων οὐσιῶν ποσότητος, πλὴν τῷ ἀνάλογον: καὶ τῶν ἐν ταὐτῷ εἴδει ἕτερα, οὐκ εἴδει ἀλλ᾽ ὅτι τῶν καθ᾽ ἕκαστον ἄλλο, ἥ τε σὴ ὕλη καὶ τὸ εἶδος καὶ τὸ κινῆσαν καὶ ἡ ἐμή, τῷ καθόλου δὲ λόγῳ ταὐτά. >Adhuc autem videre oportet quia haec quidem universaliter est dicere, haec autem non. Omnium etiam prima principia quod actu * primum hoc et aliud quod potentia. Illa quidem igitur quae universalia non sunt; principium enim singularium singulare. Homo quidem enim hominis universaliter, sed non est nullus, verum Pileus Achillis, tui vero pater, et hoc b huius ba, totaliter vero b simpliciter ba. Deinde iam quae substantiarum; aliae autem aliorum cause et elementa, sicut dictum est, eorum quae non in eodem * genere, colorum et sonorum, substantiarum, quantitatis, praeterquam proportionaliter; et eorum quae sunt in eadem specie diversa, non specie sed quia singularium aliud, tua materia et species et movens et mea, universali autem ratione eadem *. Further, one must observe that some causes can be expressed in universal terms, and some cannot. The proximate principles of all things are the this which is proximate in actuality, and another which is proximate in potentiality. The universal causes, then, of which we spoke do not exist. For it is the individual that is the originative principle of the individuals. For while man is the originative principle of man universally, there is no universal man, but Peleus is the originative principle of Achilles, and your father of you, and this particular b of this particular ba, though b in general is the originative principle of ba taken without qualification. Further, if the causes of substances are the causes of all things, yet different things have different causes and elements, as was said; the causes of things that are not in the same class, e.g. of colours and sounds, of substances and quantities, are different except in an analogical sense; and those of things in the same species are different, not in species, but in the sense that the causes of different individuals are different, your matter and form and moving cause being different from mine, while in their universal definition they are the same.
τὸ δὲ ζητεῖν [30] τίνες ἀρχαὶ ἢ στοιχεῖα τῶν οὐσιῶν καὶ πρός τι καὶ ποιῶν, πότερον αἱ αὐταὶ ἢ ἕτεραι, δῆλον ὅτι πολλαχῶς γε λεγομένων ἔστιν ἑκάστου, διαιρεθέντων δὲ οὐ ταὐτὰ ἀλλ᾽ ἕτερα, πλὴν ὡδὶ καὶ πάντων, ὡδὶ μὲν ταὐτὰ ἢ τὸ ἀνάλογον, ὅτι ὕλη, εἶδος, στέρησις, τὸ κινοῦν, καὶ ὡδὶ τὰ τῶν οὐσιῶν [35] αἴτια ὡς αἴτια πάντων, ὅτι ἀναιρεῖται ἀναιρουμένων: ἔτι τὸ πρῶτον ἐντελεχείᾳ: ὡδὶ δὲ ἕτερα πρῶτα ὅσα τὰ ἐναντία ἃ μήτε ὡς γένη λέγεται μήτε πολλαχῶς λέγεται: καὶ ἔτι αἱ ὗλαι. [1071β] [1] τίνες μὲν οὖν αἱ ἀρχαὶ τῶν αἰσθητῶν καὶ πόσαι, καὶ πῶς αἱ αὐταὶ καὶ πῶς ἕτεραι, εἴρηται. Quaerere vero quae principia aut elementa substantiarum et ad aliquid et qualitatum, utrum eadem aut diversa, palam quia multipliciter dictorum sunt uniuscuiusque. Divisorum vero non eadem sed altera, praeterquam sic et omnium. Sic quidem eadem aut eo quod proportionaliter, quia materia, species, privatio, movens; et sic substantiarum cause ut cause omnium, quia destruuntur destructis. Amplius quod primum entelechia. > Sic autem altera prima *: quaecumque contraria quae nec ut genera dicuntur nec multipliciter dicuntur; et adhuc * materie. Quae quidem igitur principia sensibilium et quot, et quomodo eadem et quomodo altera, dictum est. And if we inquire what are the principles or elements of substances and relations and qualities-whether they are the same or different-clearly when the names of the causes are used in several senses the causes of each are the same, but when the senses are distinguished the causes are not the same but different, except that in the following senses the causes of all are the same. They are (1) the same or analogous in this sense, that matter, form, privation, and the moving cause are common to all things; and (2) the causes of substances may be treated as causes of all things in this sense, that when substances are removed all things are removed; further, (3) that which is first in respect of complete reality is the cause of all things. But in another sense there are different first causes, viz. all the contraries which are neither generic nor ambiguous terms; and, further, the matters of different things [71b] are different. We have stated, then, what are the principles of sensible things and how many they are, and in what sense they are the same and in what sense different.

Chapter 6

Greek Latin English
ἐπεὶ δ᾽ ἦσαν τρεῖς οὐσίαι, δύο μὲν αἱ φυσικαὶ μία δ᾽ ἡ ἀκίνητος, περὶ ταύτης λεκτέον ὅτι ἀνάγκη εἶναι ἀΐδιόν [5] τινα οὐσίαν ἀκίνητον. αἵ τε γὰρ οὐσίαι πρῶται τῶν ὄντων, καὶ εἰ πᾶσαι φθαρταί, πάντα φθαρτά: ἀλλ᾽ ἀδύνατον κίνησιν ἢ γενέσθαι ἢ φθαρῆναι (ἀεὶ γὰρ ἦν), οὐδὲ χρόνον. οὐ γὰρ οἷόν τε τὸ πρότερον καὶ ὕστερον εἶναι μὴ ὄντος χρόνου: καὶ ἡ κίνησις ἄρα οὕτω συνεχὴς ὥσπερ καὶ ὁ χρόνος: [10] ἢ γὰρ τὸ αὐτὸ ἢ κινήσεώς τι πάθος. κίνησις δ᾽ οὐκ ἔστι συνεχὴς ἀλλ᾽ ἢ ἡ κατὰ τόπον, καὶ ταύτης ἡ κύκλῳ. Quoniam autem tres erant substantiae, due quidem quae phisice et una quae immobilis, de hac dicendum * quia necesse * esse sempiternam aliquam substantiam immobilem. Nam substantiae prime entium, et si omnes corruptibiles, omnia corruptibilia. Sed impossibile motum aut fieri aut corrumpi (semper enim erat), nec tempus. Nec enim possibile prius et posterius esse, cum non sit tempus. Et motus ergo sic est continuus ut tempus; aut enim idem aut motus est aliqua passio. Motus autem non est continuus nisi qui secundum locum, et huius qui * circulo. Chapter 6. Since there were three kinds of substance, two of them physical and one unmovable, regarding the latter we must assert that it is necessary that there should be an eternal unmovable substance. For substances are the first of existing things, and if they are all destructible, all things are destructible. But it is impossible that movement should either have come into being or cease to be (for it must always have existed), or that time should. For there could not be a before and an after if time did not exist. Movement also is continuous, then, in the sense in which time is; for time is either the same thing as movement or an attribute of movement. And there is no continuous movement except movement in place, and of this only that which is circular is continuous.
ἀλλὰ μὴν εἰ ἔστι κινητικὸν ἢ ποιητικόν, μὴ ἐνεργοῦν δέ τι, οὐκ ἔσται κίνησις: ἐνδέχεται γὰρ τὸ δύναμιν ἔχον μὴ ἐνεργεῖν. οὐθὲν ἄρα ὄφελος οὐδ᾽ ἐὰν οὐσίας ποιήσωμεν ἀϊδίους, [15] ὥσπερ οἱ τὰ εἴδη, εἰ μή τις δυναμένη ἐνέσται ἀρχὴ μεταβάλλειν: οὐ τοίνυν οὐδ᾽ αὕτη ἱκανή, οὐδ᾽ ἄλλη οὐσία παρὰ τὰ εἴδη: εἰ γὰρ μὴ ἐνεργήσει, οὐκ ἔσται κίνησις. At vero si erit motivum aut effectivum, non operans autem aliquid, non erit motus; contingit enim potentiam habens non agere. Nihil ergo prodest, nec si substantias faciamus sempiternas, quemadmodum * qui species, si non aliqua potens inerit principium transmutari. Non igitur neque ipsa sufficiens *, nec alia substantia praeter species; nam si non egerit, non erit motus. But if there is something which is capable of moving things or acting on them, but is not actually doing so, there will not necessarily be movement; for that which has a potency need not exercise it. Nothing, then, is gained even if we suppose eternal substances, as the believers in the Forms do, unless there is to be in them some principle which can cause change; nay, even this is not enough, nor is another substance besides the Forms enough; for if it is not to act, there will be no movement.
ἔτι οὐδ᾽ εἰ ἐνεργήσει, ἡ δ᾽ οὐσία αὐτῆς δύναμις: οὐ γὰρ ἔσται κίνησις ἀΐδιος: ἐνδέχεται γὰρ τὸ δυνάμει ὂν μὴ εἶναι. δεῖ [20] ἄρα εἶναι ἀρχὴν τοιαύτην ἧς ἡ οὐσία ἐνέργεια. Adhuc neque si aget, substantia autem ipsius potentia; non enim erit motus eternus; contingit enim quod potentia est non esse. Oportet igitur esse principium tale cuius substantia actus. Further even if it acts, this will not be enough, if its essence is potency; for there will not be eternal movement, since that which is potentially may possibly not be. There must, then, be such a principle, whose very essence is actuality.
ἔτι τοίνυν ταύτας δεῖ τὰς οὐσίας εἶναι ἄνευ ὕλης: ἀϊδίους γὰρ δεῖ, εἴπερ γε καὶ ἄλλο τι ἀΐδιον. Amplius igitur tales oportet esse sub>stantias sine materia; sempiternas enim esse oportet, si et aliud aliquid * sempiternum; actu igitur. Further, then, these substances must be without matter; for they must be eternal, if anything is eternal. Therefore they must be actuality.
ἐνέργεια ἄρα. καίτοι ἀπορία: δοκεῖ γὰρ τὸ μὲν ἐνεργοῦν πᾶν δύνασθαι τὸ δὲ δυνάμενον οὐ πᾶν ἐνεργεῖν, ὥστε πρότερον εἶναι τὴν δύναμιν. Quamvis * dubitatio; videtur enim * agens quidem omne posse, * potens vero* non omne agere, quare prius * esse potentiam. Yet there is a difficulty; for it is thought that everything that acts is able to act, but that not everything that is able to act acts, so that the potency is prior.
[25] ἀλλὰ μὴν εἰ τοῦτο, οὐθὲν ἔσται τῶν ὄντων: ἐνδέχεται γὰρ δύνασθαι μὲν εἶναι μήπω δ᾽ εἶναι. καίτοι εἰ ὡς λέγουσιν οἱ θεολόγοι οἱ ἐκ νυκτὸς γεννῶντες, ἢ ὡς οἱ φυσικοὶ ὁμοῦ πάντα χρήματά φασι, τὸ αὐτὸ ἀδύνατον. πῶς γὰρ κινηθήσεται, εἰ μὴ ἔσται ἐνεργείᾳ τι αἴτιον; οὐ γὰρ ἥ γε [30] ὕλη κινήσει αὐτὴ ἑαυτήν, ἀλλὰ τεκτονική, οὐδὲ τὰ ἐπιμήνια οὐδ᾽ ἡ γῆ, ἀλλὰ τὰ σπέρματα καὶ ἡ γονή. At vero si hoc, nihil erit entium; contingit enim posse quidem esse nondum vero esse. Et etiam si ut dicunt theologi qui ex nocte * generant, aut ut phisici “ erant simul res omnes” dicunt, idem impossibile. Quomodo enim movebuntur, si non fuerit actu aliqua causa? Non enim materia ipsa se ipsam movebit, sed tectonica, nec menstrua nec terra, sed semina et genitura **. But if this is so, nothing that is need be; for it is possible for all things to be capable of existing but not yet to exist. Yet if we follow the theologians who generate the world from night, or the natural philosophers who say that all things were together , the same impossible result ensues. For how will there be movement, if there is no actually existing cause? Wood will surely not move itself-the carpenter's art must act on it; nor will the menstrual blood nor the earth set themselves in motion, but the seeds must act on the earth and the semen on the menstrual blood.
διὸ ἔνιοι ποιοῦσιν ἀεὶ ἐνέργειαν, οἷον Λεύκιππος καὶ Πλάτων: ἀεὶ γὰρ εἶναί φασι κίνησιν. ἀλλὰ διὰ τί καὶ τίνα οὐ λέγουσιν, οὐδ᾽, <εἰ> ὡδὶ <ἢ> ὡδί, τὴν αἰτίαν. οὐδὲν γὰρ ὡς [35] ἔτυχε κινεῖται, ἀλλὰ δεῖ τι ἀεὶ ὑπάρχειν, ἕσπερ νῦν φύσει μὲν ὡδί, βίᾳ δὲ ἢ ὑπὸ νοῦ ἢ ἄλλου ὡδί. (εἶτα ποία πρώτη; διαφέρει γὰρ ἀμήχανον ὅσον). ἀλλὰ μὴν οὐδὲ Πλάτωνί γε οἷόν τε λέγειν ἣν οἴεται ἐνίοτε ἀρχὴν εἶναι, [1072α] [1] τὸ αὐτὸ ἑαυτὸ κινοῦν: ὕστερον γὰρ καὶ ἅμα τῷ οὐρανῷ ἡ ψυχή, ὡς φησίν. Propter quod faciunt quidam semper actum, ut Leucippus et Plato; semper enim dicunt esse motum. Sed quare et quem non dicunt, nec sic nec causam. Nihil enim ut contingit movetur, sed oportet aliquid semper existere, quemadmodum nunc natura quidem sic, vi vero aut ab intellectu aut alio sic. Deinde qualis prior? Differt enim inaptabile quantum *. At vero neque Platoni possibile dicere quod exjstimat aliquando principium esse, quod ipsum se ipsum movens; posterius enim et simul cum celo * anima, ut ait. This is why some suppose eternal actuality-e.g. Leucippus and Plato; for they say there is always movement. But why and what this movement is they do say, nor, if the world moves in this way or that, do they tell us the cause of its doing so. Now nothing is moved at random, but there must always be something present to move it; e.g. as a matter of fact a thing moves in one way by nature, and in another by force or through the influence of reason or something else. (Further, what sort of movement is primary? This makes a vast difference.) But again for Plato, at least, it is not permissible to name here that which [72a] he sometimes supposes to be the source of movement-that which moves itself; for the soul is later, and coeval with the heavens, according to his account.
τὸ μὲν δὴ δύναμιν οἴεσθαι ἐνεργείας πρότερον ἔστι μὲν ὡς καλῶς ἔστι δ᾽ ὡς οὔ (εἴρηται δὲ πῶς): Potentiam quidem igitur existimare priorem actu est quidem ut bene, est autem ut non; dictum est autem quomodo. To suppose potency prior to actuality, then, is in a sense right, and in a sense not; and we have specified these senses.
ὅτι δ᾽ [5] ἐνέργεια πρότερον, μαρτυρεῖ Ἀναξαγόρας (ὁ γὰρ νοῦς ἐνέργεια) καὶ Ἐμπεδοκλῆς φιλίαν καὶ τὸ νεῖκος, καὶ οἱ ἀεὶ λέγοντες κίνησιν εἶναι, ὥσπερ Λεύκιππος: Quod autem actus * prius, testatur Anaxagoras (intellectus enim actus *), et Empedocles amicitiam et litem, et semper > dicentes motum esse, ut Leucippus. That actuality is prior is testified by Anaxagoras (for his reason is actuality) and by Empedocles in his doctrine of love and strife, and by those who say that there is always movement, e.g. Leucippus.
ὥστ᾽ οὐκ ἦν ἄπειρον χρόνον χάος ἢ νύξ, ἀλλὰ ταὐτὰ ἀεὶ ἢ περιόδῳ ἢ ἄλλως, εἴπερ πρότερον ἐνέργεια δυνάμεως. Quare non fuit * infinito tempore chaos aut nox, sed eadem semper * aut periodo aut aliter, si prius est actus potentia. Therefore chaos or night did not exist for an infinite time, but the same things have always existed (either passing through a cycle of changes or obeying some other law), since actuality is prior to potency.
εἰ δὴ τὸ αὐτὸ [10] ἀεὶ περιόδῳ, δεῖ τι ἀεὶ μένειν ὡσαύτως ἐνεργοῦν. εἰ δὲ μέλλει γένεσις καὶ φθορὰ εἶναι, ἄλλο δεῖ εἶναι ἀεὶ ἐνεργοῦν ἄλλως καὶ ἄλλως. ἀνάγκη ἄρα ὡδὶ μὲν καθ᾽ αὑτὸ ἐνεργεῖν ὡδὶ δὲ κατ᾽ ἄλλο: ἤτοι ἄρα καθ᾽ ἕτερον ἢ κατὰ τὸ πρῶτον. ἀνάγκη δὴ κατὰ τοῦτο: πάλιν γὰρ ἐκεῖνο [15] αὐτῷ τε αἴτιον κἀκείνῳ. οὐκοῦν βέλτιον τὸ πρῶτον: καὶ γὰρ αἴτιον ἦν ἐκεῖνο τοῦ ἀεὶ ὡσαύτως: τοῦ δ᾽ ἄλλως ἕτερον, τοῦ δ᾽ ἀεὶ ἄλλως ἄμφω δηλονότι. οὐκοῦν οὕτως καὶ ἔχουσιν αἱ κινήσεις. τί οὖν ἄλλας δεῖ ζητεῖν ἀρχάς; Si itaque idem semper periodo, oportet aliquid semper manere similiter agens. Si autem debeat fore generatio et corruptio, aliud oportet agens esse aliter et aliter. Necesse igitur sic quidem secundum se agere, sic vero secundum aliud; aut ergo secundum alterum aut secundum primum. Necesse itaque secundum hoc; iterum enim illud ipsique causa et illi. Rdignius ergo1 primum; et enim causa erat illud ipsius semper similiter; et ipsius aliter alterum, eius autem quod est semper aliter rpalam quod ambo1. Ergo si sic se habent motus, quid ergo alia oportet quaerere principia? If, then, there is a constant cycle, something must always remain, acting in the same way. And if there is to be generation and destruction, there must be something else which is always acting in different ways. This must, then, act in one way in virtue of itself, and in another in virtue of something else-either of a third agent, therefore, or of the first. Now it must be in virtue of the first. For otherwise this again causes the motion both of the second agent and of the third. Therefore it is better to say the first . For it was the cause of eternal uniformity; and something else is the cause of variety, and evidently both together are the cause of eternal variety. This, accordingly, is the character which the motions actually exhibit. What need then is there to seek for other principles?

Chapter 7

Greek Latin English
ἐπεὶ δ᾽ οὕτω τ᾽ ἐνδέχεται, καὶ εἰ μὴ οὕτως, ἐκ νυκτὸς [20] ἔσται καὶ ὁμοῦ πάντων καὶ ἐκ μὴ ὄντος, λύοιτ᾽ ἂν ταῦτα, καὶ ἔστι τι ἀεὶ κινούμενον κίνησιν ἄπαυστον, αὕτη δ᾽ ἡ κύκλῳ (καὶ τοῦτο οὐ λόγῳ μόνον ἀλλ᾽ ἔργῳ δῆλον), ὥστ᾽ ἀΐδιος ἂν εἴη ὁ πρῶτος οὐρανός. Quoniam autem ita contingit, et si non sic, ex nocte erit et “ simul omnium” et ex non ente, soluentur utique haec. Et est aliquid semper motum motu incessabili, hic autem qui circulo; et hoc non ratione solum sed opere palam. Quare sempiternum utique erit primum coelum. Chapter 7. Since (1) this is a possible account of the matter, and (2) if it were not true, the world would have proceeded out of night and all things together and out of non-being, these difficulties may be taken as solved. There is, then, something which is always moved with an unceasing motion, which is motion in a circle; and this is plain not in theory only but in fact. Therefore the first heaven must be eternal.
ἔστι τοίνυν τι καὶ ὃ κινεῖ. ἐπεὶ δὲ τὸ κινούμενον καὶ κινοῦν [καὶ] μέσον, τοίνυν [25] ἔστι τι ὃ οὐ κινούμενον κινεῖ, ἀΐδιον καὶ οὐσία καὶ ἐνέργεια οὖσα. Est igitur aliquid et quod movet **. Quoniam autem quod movetur et movens et medium, igitur est aliquid quod non motum movet, sempiternum et substantia et actus * ens. There is therefore also something which moves it. And since that which moves and is moved is intermediate, there is something which moves without being moved, being eternal, substance, and actuality.
κινεῖ δὲ ὧδε τὸ ὀρεκτὸν καὶ τὸ νοητόν: κινεῖ οὐ κινούμενα. τούτων τὰ πρῶτα τὰ αὐτά. ἐπιθυμητὸν μὲν γὰρ τὸ φαινόμενον καλόν, βουλητὸν δὲ πρῶτον τὸ ὂν καλόν: ὀρεγόμεθα δὲ διότι δοκεῖ μᾶλλον ἢ δοκεῖ διότι ὀρεγόμεθα: [30] ἀρχὴ γὰρ ἡ νόησις. νοῦς δὲ ὑπὸ τοῦ νοητοῦ κινεῖται, Movet autem sic * appetibile et intelligibile; movent non mota. Horum autem prima > eadem. Concupiscibile quidem enim * ipsum * apparens bonum, voluntabile autem primum ipsum existens bonum. Appetimus autem quia videtur magis quam videtur quia appetimus; principium enim est intelligentia. Intellectus autem ab intelligibili movetur, And the object of desire and the object of thought move in this way; they move without being moved. The primary objects of desire and of thought are the same. For the apparent good is the object of appetite, and the real good is the primary object of rational wish. But desire is consequent on opinion rather than opinion on desire; for the thinking is the starting-point. And thought is moved by the object of thought,
νοητὴ δὲ ἡ ἑτέρα συστοιχία καθ᾽ αὑτήν: καὶ ταύτης ἡ οὐσία πρώτη, καὶ ταύτης ἡ ἁπλῆ καὶ κατ᾽ ἐνέργειαν (ἔστι δὲ τὸ ἓν καὶ τὸ ἁπλοῦν οὐ τὸ αὐτό: τὸ μὲν γὰρ ἓν μέτρον σημαίνει, τὸ δὲ ἁπλοῦν πὼς ἔχον αὐτό). intelligibilis autem altera coelementatio secundum se; et huius substantia prima, et huius quae simplex et secundum actum. Est autem * unum et simplex non idem; unum enim metrum significat, simplex autem qualiter habens ipsum. and one of the two columns of opposites is in itself the object of thought; and in this, substance is first, and in substance, that which is simple and exists actually. (The one and the simple are not the same; for one means a measure, but simple means that the thing itself has a certain nature.)
ἀλλὰ μὴν καὶ τὸ καλὸν καὶ [35] τὸ δι᾽ αὑτὸ αἱρετὸν ἐν τῇ αὐτῇ συστοιχίᾳ: καὶ ἔστιν ἄριστον ἀεὶ ἢ ἀνάλογον τὸ πρῶτον. [1072β] [1] ὅτι δ᾽ ἔστι τὸ οὗ ἕνεκα ἐν τοῖς ἀκινήτοις, ἡ διαίρεσις δηλοῖ: ἔστι γὰρ τινὶ τὸ οὗ ἕνεκα <καὶ> τινός, ὧν τὸ μὲν ἔστι τὸ δ᾽ οὐκ ἔστι. κινεῖ δὴ ὡς ἐρώμενον, κινούμενα δὲ τἆλλα κινεῖ. At vero et quod bonum et quod propter ipsum eligibile in eadem coelementatione; et est optimum semper aut proportionale quod primum. Quia autem est quod cuius gratia in immobilibus, divisio ostendit. Est enim alicui quod cuius gratia, quorum hoc quidem est, illud vero non est. But the beautiful, also, and that which is in itself desirable are in the same column; and the first in any class is always best, or analogous to the best. [72b] That a final cause may exist among unchangeable entities is shown by the distinction of its meanings. For the final cause is (a) some being for whose good an action is done, and (b) something at which the action aims; and of these the latter exists among unchangeable entities though the former does not.
εἰ μὲν οὖν τι κινεῖται, ἐνδέχεται καὶ [5] ἄλλως ἔχειν, ὥστ᾽ εἰ [ἡ] φορὰ πρώτη ἡ ἐνέργειά ἐστιν, ᾗ κινεῖται ταύτῃ γε ἐνδέχεται ἄλλως ἔχειν, κατὰ τόπον, καὶ εἰ μὴ κατ᾽ οὐσίαν: ἐπεὶ δὲ ἔστι τι κινοῦν αὐτὸ ἀκίνητον ὄν, ἐνεργείᾳ ὄν, τοῦτο οὐκ ἐνδέχεται ἄλλως ἔχειν οὐδαμῶς. φορὰ γὰρ ἡ πρώτη τῶν μεταβολῶν, ταύτης δὲ ἡ κύκλῳ: ταύτην [10] δὲ τοῦτο κινεῖ. ἐξ ἀνάγκης ἄρα ἐστὶν ὄν: καὶ ᾗ ἀνάγκῃ, καλῶς, καὶ οὕτως ἀρχή. τὸ γὰρ ἀναγκαῖον τοσαυταχῶς, τὸ μὲν βίᾳ ὅτι παρὰ τὴν ὁρμήν, τὸ δὲ οὗ οὐκ ἄνευ τὸ εὖ, τὸ δὲ μὴ ἐνδεχόμενον ἄλλως ἀλλ᾽ ἁπλῶς. ἐκ τοιαύτης ἄρα ἀρχῆς ἤρτηται ὁ οὐρανὸς καὶ ἡ φύσις. Movet autem ut amatum, * moto vero alia movet. Si quidem igitur aliquid movetur, contingit aliter habere. Quare latio quae prima et actus est; secundum quod movetur hac autem contingit aliter habere, secundum locum, et si non secundum substantiam. Quoniam autem est aliquid movens ipsum immobile ens, > actu ens, hoc non contingit aliter se habere nullatenus. Latio enim prima mutationum, huius autem quae * circulo; hac autem hoc movet. Ex necessitate igitur est ens; et * necessitas bene et sic principium. Nam necessarium totiens *: hoc quidem vi quia praeter impetum, illud vero rsine quo non bene, hoc autem non contingens aliter sed simpliciter. Ex tali igitur principio dependet coelum et natura. The final cause, then, produces motion as being loved, but all other things move by being moved. Now if something is moved it is capable of being otherwise than as it is. Therefore if its actuality is the primary form of spatial motion, then in so far as it is subject to change, in this respect it is capable of being otherwise,-in place, even if not in substance. But since there is something which moves while itself unmoved, existing actually, this can in no way be otherwise than as it is. For motion in space is the first of the kinds of change, and motion in a circle the first kind of spatial motion; and this the first mover produces. The first mover, then, exists of necessity; and in so far as it exists by necessity, its mode of being is good, and it is in this sense a first principle. For the necessary has all these senses-that which is necessary perforce because it is contrary to the natural impulse, that without which the good is impossible, and that which cannot be otherwise but can exist only in a single way. On such a principle, then, depend the heavens and the world of nature.
διαγωγὴ δ᾽ [15] ἐστὶν οἵα ἡ ἀρίστη μικρὸν χρόνον ἡμῖν (οὕτω γὰρ ἀεὶ ἐκεῖνο: ἡμῖν μὲν γὰρ ἀδύνατον), Deductio autem est qualis optima, paruo tempore nobis; sic enim semper illud est, nobis quidem enim impossibile. And it is a life such as the best which we enjoy, and enjoy for but a short time (for it is ever in this state, which we cannot be),
ἐπεὶ καὶ ἡδονὴ ἡ ἐνέργεια τούτου (καὶ διὰ τοῦτο ἐγρήγορσις αἴσθησις νόησις ἥδιστον, ἐλπίδες δὲ καὶ μνῆμαι διὰ ταῦτα). ἡ δὲ νόησις ἡ καθ᾽ αὑτὴν τοῦ καθ᾽ αὑτὸ ἀρίστου, καὶ ἡ μάλιστα τοῦ μάλιστα. Quoniam et delectatio actus * huius. Et propter hoc vigilatio, * sensus, intelligentia delectabilissimum. Spes vero et memorie propter haec. intelligentia autem quae secundum se eius * quod secundum se optimum, et quae maxime eius quod * maxime. since its actuality is also pleasure. (And for this reason are waking, perception, and thinking most pleasant, and hopes and memories are so on account of these.) And thinking in itself deals with that which is best in itself, and that which is thinking in the fullest sense with that which is best in the fullest sense.
αὑτὸν [20] δὲ νοεῖ ὁ νοῦς κατὰ μετάληψιν τοῦ νοητοῦ: νοητὸς γὰρ γίγνεται θιγγάνων καὶ νοῶν, ὥστε ταὐτὸν νοῦς καὶ νοητόν. τὸ γὰρ δεκτικὸν τοῦ νοητοῦ καὶ τῆς οὐσίας νοῦς, ἐνεργεῖ δὲ ἔχων, ὥστ᾽ ἐκείνου μᾶλλον τοῦτο ὃ δοκεῖ ὁ νοῦς θεῖον ἔχειν, καὶ ἡ θεωρία τὸ ἥδιστον καὶ ἄριστον. εἰ οὖν οὕτως εὖ ἔχει, [25] ὡς ἡμεῖς ποτέ, ὁ θεὸς ἀεί, θαυμαστόν: εἰ δὲ μᾶλλον, ἔτι θαυμασιώτερον. ἔχει δὲ ὧδε. Ipsum autem intelligit intellectus secundum transumptionem intelligibilis; intelligibilis enim fit attingens et intelligens, quare idem intellectus et intelligibile. Susceptivum enim intelligibilis et substantiae * intellectus; actuatur autem habens. Quare illud magis isto quod videtur intellectus divinum habere, et speculatio delectabilissimum et optimum. Si igitur sic bene * habet > ut nos quandoque, deus semper, mirabile; si autem magis, adhuc mirabilius. Habet autem sic. And thought thinks on itself because it shares the nature of the object of thought; for it becomes an object of thought in coming into contact with and thinking its objects, so that thought and object of thought are the same. For that which is capable of receiving the object of thought, i.e. the essence, is thought. But it is active when it possesses this object. Therefore the possession rather than the receptivity is the divine element which thought seems to contain, and the act of contemplation is what is most pleasant and best. If, then, God is always in that good state in which we sometimes are, this compels our wonder; and if in a better this compels it yet more. And God is in a better state.
καὶ ζωὴ δέ γε ὑπάρχει: ἡ γὰρ νοῦ ἐνέργεια ζωή, ἐκεῖνος δὲ ἡ ἐνέργεια: ἐνέργεια δὲ ἡ καθ᾽ αὑτὴν ἐκείνου ζωὴ ἀρίστη καὶ ἀΐδιος. φαμὲν δὴ τὸν θεὸν εἶναι ζῷον ἀΐδιον ἄριστον, ὥστε ζωὴ καὶ αἰὼν συνεχὴς [30] καὶ ἀΐδιος ὑπάρχει τῷ θεῷ: τοῦτο γὰρ ὁ θεός. Et vita autem utique existit; etenim intellectus actus * vita, illud autem ipse actus; actus autem quae secundum se illius * vita optima et sempiterna. Dicimus autem deum esse animal sempiternum optimum. Quare vita et duratio continua eterna existit deo; hoc enim * deus. And life also belongs to God; for the actuality of thought is life, and God is that actuality; and God's self-dependent actuality is life most good and eternal. We say therefore that God is a living being, eternal, most good, so that life and duration continuous and eternal belong to God; for this is God.
ὅσοι δὲ ὑπολαμβάνουσιν, ὥσπερ οἱ Πυθαγόρειοι καὶ Σπεύσιππος τὸ κάλλιστον καὶ ἄριστον μὴ ἐν ἀρχῇ εἶναι, διὰ τὸ καὶ τῶν φυτῶν καὶ τῶν ζῴων τὰς ἀρχὰς αἴτια μὲν εἶναι τὸ δὲ καλὸν καὶ τέλειον ἐν τοῖς ἐκ τούτων, οὐκ ὀρθῶς οἴονται. [35] τὸ γὰρ σπέρμα ἐξ ἑτέρων ἐστὶ προτέρων τελείων, καὶ τὸ πρῶτον οὐ σπέρμα ἐστὶν ἀλλὰ τὸ τέλειον: [1073α] [1] οἷον πρότερον ἄνθρωπον ἂν φαίη τις εἶναι τοῦ σπέρματος, οὐ τὸν ἐκ τούτου γενόμενον ἀλλ᾽ ἕτερον ἐξ οὗ τὸ σπέρμα. ὅτι μὲν οὖν ἔστιν οὐσία τις ἀΐδιος καὶ ἀκίνητος καὶ κεχωρισμένη τῶν αἰσθητῶν, [5] φανερὸν ἐκ τῶν εἰρημένων: Quicumque autem putant, ut Pytagorici et Speusippus, optimum et nobilissimum non in principio esse, quia et plantarum et animalium principia cause sunt, bonum vero et perfectum in hiis quae ex hiis, non recte existimant. Nam sperma ex alteris est prioribus * perfectis, et primum non est sperma sed perfectum; ut priorem hominem dicat aliquis esse spermate, non eum qui ex hoc fit sed alterum ex quo sperma. Quod quidem igitur est substantia aliqua sempiterna et immobilis, separata a sensibilibus, manifestum ex dictis. Those who suppose, as the Pythagoreans and Speusippus do, that supreme beauty and goodness are not present in the beginning, because the beginnings both of plants and of animals are causes, but beauty and completeness are in the effects of these, are wrong in their opinion. For the seed comes from other individuals which are prior and complete, and the first thing is not seed but the complete [73a] being; e.g. we must say that before the seed there is a man,-not the man produced from the seed, but another from whom the seed comes. It is clear then from what has been said that there is a substance which is eternal and unmovable and separate from sensible things.
δέδεικται δὲ καὶ ὅτι μέγεθος οὐδὲν ἔχειν ἐνδέχεται ταύτην τὴν οὐσίαν ἀλλ᾽ ἀμερὴς καὶ ἀδιαίρετός ἐστιν (κινεῖ γὰρ τὸν ἄπειρον χρόνον, οὐδὲν δ᾽ ἔχει δύναμιν ἄπειρον πεπερασμένον: ἐπεὶ δὲ πᾶν μέγεθος ἢ ἄπειρον ἢ πεπερασμένον, πεπερασμένον μὲν διὰ τοῦτο οὐκ [10] ἂν ἔχοι μέγεθος, ἄπειρον δ᾽ ὅτι ὅλως οὐκ ἔστιν οὐδὲν ἄπειρον μέγεθος): ἀλλὰ μὴν καὶ ὅτι ἀπαθὲς καὶ ἀναλλοίωτον: πᾶσαι γὰρ αἱ ἄλλαι κινήσεις ὕστεραι τῆς κατὰ τόπον. ταῦτα μὲν οὖν δῆλα διότι τοῦτον ἔχει τὸν τρόπον. Ostensum est autem et quia magnitudinem nullam contingit habere hanc substantiam, verum sine parte et indivisibilis est. Movet enim per infinitum tempus, et non habet potentiam infinitam finitum. Quoniam autem omnis magnitudo aut infinita est aut finita, finitam quidem propter hoc utique non habebit magnitudinem, infinitam vero quia totaliter non est nulla infinita magnitudo. At vero et quia impassibilis et inalterabilis; omnes enim alii motus posteriores sunt eo qui est > secundum locum. Haec quidem igitur manifesta quia hunc habent modum. It has been shown also that this substance cannot have any magnitude, but is without parts and indivisible (for it produces movement through infinite time, but nothing finite has infinite power; and, while every magnitude is either infinite or finite, it cannot, for the above reason, have finite magnitude, and it cannot have infinite magnitude because there is no infinite magnitude at all). But it has also been shown that it is impassive and unalterable; for all the other changes are posterior to change of place. It is clear, then, why these things are as they are.

Chapter 8

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πότερον δὲ μίαν θετέον τὴν τοιαύτην οὐσίαν ἢ πλείους, [15] καὶ πόσας, δεῖ μὴ λανθάνειν, ἀλλὰ μεμνῆσθαι καὶ τὰς τῶν ἄλλων ἀποφάσεις, ὅτι περὶ πλήθους οὐθὲν εἰρήκασιν ὅ τι καὶ σαφὲς εἰπεῖν. ἡ μὲν γὰρ περὶ τὰς ἰδέας ὑπόληψις οὐδεμίαν ἔχει σκέψιν ἰδίαν (ἀριθμοὺς γὰρ λέγουσι τὰς ἰδέας οἱ λέγοντες ἰδέας, περὶ δὲ τῶν ἀριθμῶν ὁτὲ μὲν ὡς [20] περὶ ἀπείρων λέγουσιν ὁτὲ δὲ ὡς μέχρι τῆς δεκάδος ὡρισμένων: δι᾽ ἣν δ᾽ αἰτίαν τοσοῦτον τὸ πλῆθος τῶν ἀριθμῶν, οὐδὲν λέγεται μετὰ σπουδῆς ἀποδεικτικῆς): Utrum autem unam ponendum est talem substantiam aut plures, et quot, oportet non latere, sed reminisci et aliorum negationes, quia de pluralitate nihil dixerunt quod et planum * dicere. Quae enim circa ydeas existimatio nullam habet perscrutationem propriam. Numeros enim dicunt ydeas dicentes ydeas, sed de numeris quandoque quidem ut de infinitis dicunt quandoque autem ut usque ad decadem determinatis; propter quam vero causam tanta pluralitas numerorum, nihil dicitur cum studio demonstrativo. Chapter 8. But we must not ignore the question whether we have to suppose one such substance or more than one, and if the latter, how many; we must also mention, regarding the opinions expressed by others, that they have said nothing about the number of the substances that can even be clearly stated. For the theory of Ideas has no special discussion of the subject; for those who speak of Ideas say the Ideas are numbers, and they speak of numbers now as unlimited, now as limited by the number 10; but as for the reason why there should be just so many numbers, nothing is said with any demonstrative exactness.
ἡμῖν δ᾽ ἐκ τῶν ὑποκειμένων καὶ διωρισμένων λεκτέον. ἡ μὲν γὰρ ἀρχὴ καὶ τὸ πρῶτον τῶν ὄντων ἀκίνητον καὶ καθ᾽ αὑτὸ καὶ κατὰ [25] συμβεβηκός, κινοῦν δὲ τὴν πρώτην ἀΐδιον καὶ μίαν κίνησιν: ἐπεὶ δὲ τὸ κινούμενον ἀνάγκη ὑπό τινος κινεῖσθαι, καὶ τὸ πρῶτον κινοῦν ἀκίνητον εἶναι καθ᾽ αὑτό, καὶ τὴν ἀΐδιον κίνησιν ὑπὸ ἀϊδίου κινεῖσθαι καὶ τὴν μίαν ὑφ᾽ ἑνός, Nobis autem est ex suppositis * et determinatis dicendum. Principium quidem enim et primum entium est immobile et secundum se et secundum accidens, movens vero primum sempiternum et unum motum. Quoniam autem quod movetur necesse ab aliquo moveri, et primum movens immobile esse secundum se, et sempiternum motum a sempiterno moveri et unum ab uno. We however must discuss the subject, starting from the presuppositions and distinctions we have mentioned. The first principle or primary being is not movable either in itself or accidentally, but produces the primary eternal and single movement. But since that which is moved must be moved by something, and the first mover must be in itself unmovable, and eternal movement must be produced by something eternal and a single movement by a single thing,
ὁρῶμεν δὲ παρὰ τὴν τοῦ παντὸς τὴν ἁπλῆν φοράν, ἣν κινεῖν φαμὲν [30] τὴν πρώτην οὐσίαν καὶ ἀκίνητον, ἄλλας φορὰς οὔσας τὰς τῶν πλανήτων ἀϊδίους (ἀΐδιον γὰρ καὶ ἄστατον τὸ κύκλῳ σῶμα: δέδεικται δ᾽ ἐν τοῖς φυσικοῖς περὶ τούτων), ἀνάγκη καὶ τούτων ἑκάστην τῶν φορῶν ὑπ᾽ ἀκινήτου τε κινεῖσθαι καθ᾽ αὑτὴν καὶ ἀϊδίου οὐσίας. ἥ τε γὰρ τῶν ἄστρων φύσις ἀΐδιος [35] οὐσία τις οὖσα, καὶ τὸ κινοῦν ἀΐδιον καὶ πρότερον τοῦ κινουμένου, καὶ τὸ πρότερον οὐσίας οὐσίαν ἀναγκαῖον εἶναι. φανερὸν τοίνυν ὅτι τοσαύτας τε οὐσίας ἀναγκαῖον εἶναι τήν τε φύσιν ἀϊδίους καὶ ἀκινήτους καθ᾽ αὑτάς, καὶ ἄνευ μεγέθους διὰ τὴν εἰρημένην αἰτίαν πρότερον. [1073β] [1] —ὅτι μὲν οὖν εἰσὶν οὐσίαι, καὶ τούτων τις πρώτη καὶ δευτέρα κατὰ τὴν αὐτὴν τάξιν ταῖς φοραῖς τῶν ἄστρων, φανερόν: Videmus autem praeter universi simplicem lationem, quam movere dicimus primam substantiam et immobilem, alias lationes existentes planetarum sempiternas. Sempiternum enim et instabile circulare corpus; ostensum est autem in phisicis de hiis. Necesse et harum lationum unamquamque ab immobili moveri secundum se et sempiterna substantia. * Astrorum enim natura sempiterna substantia quaedam ens, et movens sempiternum et prius eo quod movetur, et quod prius substantia substantiam esse > necesse est. Palam itaque quia tot substantias est esse necesse, * natura sempiternas et immobiles secundum se et sine magnitudine, propter predictam causam. Quod quidem igitur sint substantiae, et harum quae prima et secunda secundum ordinem eundem lationibus astrorum, palam *. and since we see that besides the simple spatial movement of the universe, which we say the first and unmovable substance produces, there are other spatial movements-those of the planets-which are eternal (for a body which moves in a circle is eternal and unresting; we have proved these points in the physical treatises), each of these movements also must be caused by a substance both unmovable in itself and eternal. For the nature of the stars is eternal just because it is a certain kind of substance, and the mover is eternal and prior to the moved, and that which is prior to a substance must be a substance. Evidently, then, there must be substances which are of the same number as the movements of the stars, and in their nature eternal, and in themselves unmovable, and without magnitude, for the reason before mentioned. [73b] That the movers are substances, then, and that one of these is first and another second according to the same order as the movements of the stars, is evident.
τὸ δὲ πλῆθος ἤδη τῶν φορῶν ἐκ τῆς οἰκειοτάτης φιλοσοφίᾳ τῶν μαθηματικῶν [5] ἐπιστημῶν δεῖ σκοπεῖν, ἐκ τῆς ἀστρολογίας: αὕτη γὰρ περὶ οὐσίας αἰσθητῆς μὲν ἀϊδίου δὲ ποιεῖται τὴν θεωρίαν, αἱ δ᾽ ἄλλαι περὶ οὐδεμιᾶς οὐσίας, οἷον ἥ τε περὶ τοὺς ἀριθμοὺς καὶ τὴν γεωμετρίαν. ὅτι μὲν οὖν πλείους τῶν φερομένων αἱ φοραί, φανερὸν τοῖς καὶ μετρίως ἡμμένοις (πλείους γὰρ ἕκαστον [10] φέρεται μιᾶς τῶν πλανωμένων ἄστρων): πόσαι δ᾽ αὗται τυγχάνουσιν οὖσαι, νῦν μὲν ἡμεῖς ἃ λέγουσι τῶν μαθηματικῶν τινὲς ἐννοίας χάριν λέγομεν, ὅπως ᾖ τι τῇ διανοίᾳ πλῆθος ὡρισμένον ὑπολαβεῖν: τὸ δὲ λοιπὸν τὰ μὲν ζητοῦντας αὐτοὺς δεῖ τὰ δὲ πυνθανομένους παρὰ τῶν ζητούντων, [15] ἄν τι φαίνηται παρὰ τὰ νῦν εἰρημένα τοῖς ταῦτα πραγματευομένοις, φιλεῖν μὲν ἀμφοτέρους, πείθεσθαι δὲ τοῖς ἀκριβεστέροις. Pluralitatem vero iam lationum ex maxime propria philosophia mathematicarum scientiarum intendere oportet, ex astrologia; haec enim de substantia sensibili quidem sempiterna autem facit theoriam, aliae vero de nulla substantia, puta quae * circa numeros et geometriam, quod quidem igitur plures sint eorum quae feruntur lationes, manifestum est et parum attingentibus; pluribus enim quam una astrorum errantium unumquodque fertur. Sed quot sint hae, nunc quidem et nos quae dicunt mathematicorum quidam attentionis gratia dicimus, ut mente aliqua pluralitas determinata suscipiatur. Reliquum vero haec quidem quaerentes ipsos oportet, illa vero interrogantes a quaerentibus, si quid videatur praeter modo dicta ab ea tractantibus, amare quidem utrosque, persuaderi vero a certioribus. But in the number of the movements we reach a problem which must be treated from the standpoint of that one of the mathematical sciences which is most akin to philosophy-viz. of astronomy; for this science speculates about substance which is perceptible but eternal, but the other mathematical sciences, i.e. arithmetic and geometry, treat of no substance. That the movements are more numerous than the bodies that are moved is evident to those who have given even moderate attention to the matter; for each of the planets has more than one movement. But as to the actual number of these movements, we now-to give some notion of the subject-quote what some of the mathematicians say, that our thought may have some definite number to grasp; but, for the rest, we must partly investigate for ourselves, Partly learn from other investigators, and if those who study this subject form an opinion contrary to what we have now stated, we must esteem both parties indeed, but follow the more accurate.
Εὔδοξος μὲν οὖν ἡλίου καὶ σελήνης ἑκατέρου τὴν φορὰν ἐν τρισὶν ἐτίθετ᾽ εἶναι σφαίραις, ὧν τὴν μὲν πρώτην τὴν τῶν ἀπλανῶν ἄστρων εἶναι, τὴν δὲ δευτέραν κατὰ τὸν [20] διὰ μέσων τῶν ζῳδίων, τὴν δὲ τρίτην κατὰ τὸν λελοξωμένον ἐν τῷ πλάτει τῶν ζῳδίων (ἐν μείζονι δὲ πλάτει λελοξῶσθαι καθ᾽ ὃν ἡ σελήνη φέρεται ἢ καθ᾽ ὃν ὁ ἥλιος), τῶν δὲ πλανωμένων ἄστρων ἐν τέτταρσιν ἑκάστου σφαίραις, καὶ τούτων δὲ τὴν μὲν πρώτην καὶ δευτέραν τὴν αὐτὴν εἶναι [25] ἐκείναις (τήν τε γὰρ τῶν ἀπλανῶν τὴν ἁπάσας φέρουσαν εἶναι, καὶ τὴν ὑπὸ ταύτῃ τεταγμένην καὶ κατὰ τὸν διὰ μέσων τῶν ζῳδίων τὴν φορὰν ἔχουσαν κοινὴν ἁπασῶν εἶναι), τῆς δὲ τρίτης ἁπάντων τοὺς πόλους ἐν τῷ διὰ μέσων τῶν ζῳδίων εἶναι, τῆς δὲ τετάρτης τὴν φορὰν κατὰ τὸν λελοξωμένον [30] πρὸς τὸν μέσον ταύτης: εἶναι δὲ τῆς τρίτης σφαίρας τοὺς πόλους τῶν μὲν ἄλλων ἰδίους, τοὺς δὲ τῆς Ἀφροδίτης καὶ τοῦ Ἑρμοῦ τοὺς αὐτούς: Eudoxus quidem igitur solem et lunam utriusque lationem in tribus posuit esse speris, quarum primam aplanorum astrorum esse, secundam autem secundum eum qui per medium zodiaci, tertiam autem secundum obliquatum in latitudine animalium; in maiori autem latitudine obliquari secundum > quem luna fertur quam secundum quem sol. Errantium vero astrorum in quatuor cuiusque speris. Quarum primam quidem et secundam illis eandem esse; et enim eam quae est aplanorum quae omnes est ferens, et eam quae sub ea ordinata et secundum eum qui per medium zodiaci lationem habentem communem omnium esse. Tertie vero omnium polos in eo qui per medium animalium esse. Quarte autem lationem secundum obliquatum ad medium huius. Esse vero tertie spere polos aliorum quidem proprios, veneris vero et mercurii eosdem. Eudoxus supposed that the motion of the sun or of the moon involves, in either case, three spheres, of which the first is the sphere of the fixed stars, and the second moves in the circle which runs along the middle of the zodiac, and the third in the circle which is inclined across the breadth of the zodiac; but the circle in which the moon moves is inclined at a greater angle than that in which the sun moves. And the motion of the planets involves, in each case, four spheres, and of these also the first and second are the same as the first two mentioned above (for the sphere of the fixed stars is that which moves all the other spheres, and that which is placed beneath this and has its movement in the circle which bisects the zodiac is common to all), but the poles of the third sphere of each planet are in the circle which bisects the zodiac, and the motion of the fourth sphere is in the circle which is inclined at an angle to the equator of the third sphere; and the poles of the third sphere are different for each of the other planets, but those of Venus and Mercury are the same.
Κάλλιππος δὲ τὴν μὲν θέσιν τῶν σφαιρῶν τὴν αὐτὴν ἐτίθετο Εὐδόξῳ [τοῦτ᾽ ἔστι τῶν ἀποστημάτων τὴν τάξιν], τὸ δὲ πλῆθος τῷ μὲν τοῦ Διὸς καὶ [35] τῷ τοῦ Κρόνου τὸ αὐτὸ ἐκείνῳ ἀπεδίδου, τῷ δ᾽ ἡλίῳ καὶ τῇ σελήνῃ δύο ᾤετο ἔτι προσθετέας εἶναι σφαίρας, τὰ φαινόμενα [37] εἰ μέλλει τις ἀποδώσειν, τοῖς δὲ λοιποῖς τῶν πλανήτων ἑκάστῳ μίαν. ἀναγκαῖον δέ, εἰ μέλλουσι συντεθεῖσαι πᾶσαι τὰ φαινόμενα ἀποδώσειν, [1074α] [1] καθ᾽ ἕκαστον τῶν πλανωμένων ἑτέρας σφαίρας μιᾷ ἐλάττονας εἶναι τὰς ἀνελιττούσας καὶ εἰς τὸ αὐτὸ ἀποκαθιστάσας τῇ θέσει τὴν πρώτην σφαῖραν ἀεὶ τοῦ ὑποκάτω τεταγμένου ἄστρου: οὕτω γὰρ μόνως [5] ἐνδέχεται τὴν τῶν πλανήτων φορὰν ἅπαντα ποιεῖσθαι. ἐπεὶ οὖν ἐν αἷς μὲν αὐτὰ φέρεται σφαίραις αἱ μὲν ὀκτὼ αἱ δὲ πέντε καὶ εἴκοσίν εἰσιν, τούτων δὲ μόνας οὐ δεῖ ἀνελιχθῆναι ἐν αἷς τὸ κατωτάτω τεταγμένον φέρεται, αἱ μὲν τὰς τῶν πρώτων δύο ἀνελίττουσαι ἓξ ἔσονται, αἱ δὲ τὰς [10] τῶν ὕστερον τεττάρων ἑκκαίδεκα: ὁ δὴ ἁπασῶν ἀριθμὸς τῶν τε φερουσῶν καὶ τῶν ἀνελιττουσῶν ταύτας πεντήκοντά τε καὶ πέντε. εἰ δὲ τῇ σελήνῃ τε καὶ τῷ ἡλίῳ μὴ προστιθείη τις ἃς εἴπομεν κινήσεις, αἱ πᾶσαι σφαῖραι ἔσονται ἑπτά τε καὶ τεσσαράκοντα. τὸ μὲν οὖν πλῆθος τῶν σφαιρῶν ἔστω [15] τοσοῦτον, Callippus autem positionem quidem sperarum eandem posuit cum eudoxo, hoc est distantiarum ordinem, pluralitatem vero ei quidem quae Iovis et ei quae saturni eandem cum illo dedit, soli vero et lune duas existimabat adhuc apponendas esse speras, apparentia si quis est redditurus. Reliquis vero planetis singulis unam. Necesse autem, si simul posite omnes apparentia sunt redditure, secundum quodlibet errantium alteras speras una minores esse reuoluentes et ad idem restituentes positioni primam speram semper inferius ordinati astri; sic enim solum contingit planetarum lationem omnia facere. Quoniam ergo in quibus quidem ipsa feruntur speris hae quidem octo hae autem V et XX sunt, harum autem solas non oportet reuolui in quibus infime ordinatum fertur, quae quidem reuoluunt eas quae sunt primorum duorum sex erunt, quae autem eas quae sunt posteriorum quatuor, xvi; > omnium itaque numerus et ferentium et reuoluentium eas lv. Si autem lune et soli non addiderit quis quos diximus motus, omnes spere erunt VII et XL. Pluralitas quidem igitur sperarum tanta sit. Callippus made the position of the spheres the same as Eudoxus did, but while he assigned the same number as Eudoxus did to Jupiter and to Saturn, he thought two more spheres should be added to the sun and two to the moon, if one is to [74a] explain the observed facts; and one more to each of the other planets. But it is necessary, if all the spheres combined are to explain the observed facts, that for each of the planets there should be other spheres (one fewer than those hitherto assigned) which counteract those already mentioned and bring back to the same position the outermost sphere of the star which in each case is situated below the star in question; for only thus can all the forces at work produce the observed motion of the planets. Since, then, the spheres involved in the movement of the planets themselves are eight for Saturn and Jupiter and twenty-five for the others, and of these only those involved in the movement of the lowest-situated planet need not be counteracted the spheres which counteract those of the outermost two planets will be six in number, and the spheres which counteract those of the next four planets will be sixteen; therefore the number of all the spheres – both those which move the planets and those which counteract these – will be fifty-five. And if one were not to add to the moon and to the sun the movements we mentioned, the whole set of spheres will be forty-seven in number.
ὥστε καὶ τὰς οὐσίας καὶ τὰς ἀρχὰς τὰς ἀκινήτους [καὶ τὰς αἰσθητὰς] τοσαύτας εὔλογον ὑπολαβεῖν (τὸ γὰρ ἀναγκαῖον ἀφείσθω τοῖς ἰσχυροτέροις λέγειν): Quare et substantias et principia immobilia et sensibilia tot rationabile * existimare; necessarium enim dimittatur fortioribus dicere. Let this, then, be taken as the number of the spheres, so that the unmovable substances and principles also may probably be taken as just so many; the assertion of necessity must be left to more powerful thinkers.
εἰ δὲ μηδεμίαν οἷόν τ᾽ εἶναι φορὰν μὴ συντείνουσαν πρὸς ἄστρου φοράν, ἔτι δὲ πᾶσαν φύσιν καὶ πᾶσαν οὐσίαν ἀπαθῆ καὶ καθ᾽ [20] αὑτὴν τοῦ ἀρίστου τετυχηκυῖαν τέλος εἶναι δεῖ νομίζειν, οὐδεμία ἂν εἴη παρὰ ταύτας ἑτέρα φύσις, ἀλλὰ τοῦτον ἀνάγκη τὸν ἀριθμὸν εἶναι τῶν οὐσιῶν. εἴτε γὰρ εἰσὶν ἕτεραι, κινοῖεν ἂν ὡς τέλος οὖσαι φορᾶς: Si autem nullam possibile esse lationem non ordinatam ad astri lationem, amplius autem omnem naturam et omnem substantiam impassibilem et secundum se optimum sortitam finem esse oportet existimare, nulla erit praeter has altera natura, sed hunc substantiarum numerum est esse necesse. Si enim essent aliae, moverent utique ut finis existentes lationis, But if there can be no spatial movement which does not conduce to the moving of a star, and if further every being and every substance which is immune from change and in virtue of itself has attained to the best must be considered an end, there can be no other being apart from these we have named, but this must be the number of the substances. For if there are others, they will cause change as being a final cause of movement;
ἀλλὰ εἶναί γε ἄλλας φορὰς ἀδύνατον παρὰ τὰς εἰρημένας. τοῦτο δὲ εὔλογον ἐκ τῶν [25] φερομένων ὑπολαβεῖν. εἰ γὰρ πᾶν τὸ φέρον τοῦ φερομένου χάριν πέφυκε καὶ φορὰ πᾶσα φερομένου τινός ἐστιν, οὐδεμία φορὰ αὑτῆς ἂν ἕνεκα εἴη οὐδ᾽ ἄλλης φορᾶς, ἀλλὰ τῶν ἄστρων ἕνεκα. εἰ γὰρ ἔσται φορὰ φορᾶς ἕνεκα, καὶ ἐκείνην ἑτέρου δεήσει χάριν εἶναι: ὥστ᾽ ἐπειδὴ οὐχ οἷόν τε εἰς ἄπειρον, [30] τέλος ἔσται πάσης φορᾶς τῶν φερομένων τι θείων σωμάτων κατὰ τὸν οὐρανόν. ὅτι δὲ εἷς οὐρανός, φανερόν. sed alias quidem esse lationes impossibile est praeter dictas. Hoc autem rationabile ex latis existimare. Nam si omne ferens lati gratia natum est, et latio omnis lati est alicuius, nulla latio sui gratia erit nec alius lationis, sed astrorum gratia. Nam si fuerit latio lationis gratia, et illam alterius gratia oportebit esse. * quare quoniam non possibile est in infinitum *, finis erit omnis lationis latorum aliquid divinorum corporum secundum coelum. but there cannot he other movements besides those mentioned. And it is reasonable to infer this from a consideration of the bodies that are moved; for if everything that moves is for the sake of that which is moved, and every movement belongs to something that is moved, no movement can be for the sake of itself or of another movement, but all the movements must be for the sake of the stars. For if there is to be a movement for the sake of a movement, this latter also will have to be for the sake of something else; so that since there cannot be an infinite regress, the end of every movement will be one of the divine bodies which move through the heaven.
εἰ γὰρ πλείους οὐρανοὶ ὥσπερ ἄνθρωποι, ἔσται εἴδει μία ἡ περὶ ἕκαστον ἀρχή, ἀριθμῷ δέ γε πολλαί. ἀλλ᾽ ὅσα ἀριθμῷ πολλά, ὕλην ἔχει (εἷς γὰρ λόγος καὶ ὁ αὐτὸς πολλῶν, [35] οἷον ἀνθρώπου, Σωκράτης δὲ εἷς): τὸ δὲ τί ἦν εἶναι οὐκ ἔχει ὕλην τὸ πρῶτον: ἐντελέχεια γάρ. ἓν ἄρα καὶ λόγῳ καὶ ἀριθμῷ τὸ πρῶτον κινοῦν ἀκίνητον ὄν: καὶ τὸ κινούμενον ἄρα ἀεὶ καὶ συνεχῶς: εἷς ἄρα οὐρανὸς μόνος. Quod autem unum coelum, manifestum *. Si enim plures > essent coeli ut homines, foret principium quod circa unumquodque specie unum, numero vero multa. Sed quaecumque sunt * numero multa, materiam habent; una enim et eadem * ratio multorum, ut hominis, Socrates vero unus. Quod quid autem erat esse non habet materiam, primum; entelechia enim *. Unum igitur et ratione et numero primum movens mmobile ens; et motum ergo semper et continve unum solum; unum ergo solum coelum. Evidently there is but one heaven. For if there are many heavens as there are many men, the moving principles, of which each heaven will have one, will be one in form but in number many. But all things that are many in number have matter; for one and the same definition, e.g. that of man, applies to many things, while Socrates is one. But the primary essence has not matter; for it is complete reality. So the unmovable first mover is one both in definition and in number; so too, therefore, is that which is moved always and continuously; therefore there is one heaven alone.) [74b]
[1074β] [1] παραδέδοται δὲ παρὰ τῶν ἀρχαίων καὶ παμπαλαίων ἐν μύθου σχήματι καταλελειμμένα τοῖς ὕστερον ὅτι θεοί τέ εἰσιν οὗτοι καὶ περιέχει τὸ θεῖον τὴν ὅλην φύσιν. τὰ δὲ λοιπὰ μυθικῶς ἤδη προσῆκται πρὸς τὴν πειθὼ τῶν πολλῶν καὶ [5] πρὸς τὴν εἰς τοὺς νόμους καὶ τὸ συμφέρον χρῆσιν: ἀνθρωποειδεῖς τε γὰρ τούτους καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ζῴων ὁμοίους τισὶ λέγουσι, καὶ τούτοις ἕτερα ἀκόλουθα καὶ παραπλήσια τοῖς εἰρημένοις, ὧν εἴ τις χωρίσας αὐτὸ λάβοι μόνον τὸ πρῶτον, ὅτι θεοὺς ᾤοντο τὰς πρώτας οὐσίας εἶναι, θείως ἂν εἰρῆσθαι [10] νομίσειεν, καὶ κατὰ τὸ εἰκὸς πολλάκις εὑρημένης εἰς τὸ δυνατὸν ἑκάστης καὶ τέχνης καὶ φιλοσοφίας καὶ πάλιν φθειρομένων καὶ ταύτας τὰς δόξας ἐκείνων οἷον λείψανα περισεσῶσθαι μέχρι τοῦ νῦν. ἡ μὲν οὖν πάτριος δόξα καὶ ἡ παρὰ τῶν πρώτων ἐπὶ τοσοῦτον ἡμῖν φανερὰ μόνον. [15] Tradita sunt autem a senioribus et antiquis in fabule figura dimissa posterioribus, quia dii sunt hii et continet divinum naturam universam. Reliqua vero fabulose iam adducta sunt ad persuasionem multorum et ad oportunitatem ad leges et conferens. Conformes enim hominibus hos et aliorum animalium quibusdam similes dicunt, et hiis altera consequentia et dictis similia. A quibus si quis separans id accipiat solum quod primum, quod deos existimaverunt primas substantias esse, divine utique dictum esse putabit, et secundum verisimilitudinem saepe inventa ad possibile unaquaque et arte et philosophia et iterum corruptis, et has opiniones illorum quasi reliquias usque nunc saluatas esse. Patria quidem igitur opinio et quae a primis in tantum nobis manifesta solum. Our forefathers in the most remote ages have handed down to their posterity a tradition, in the form of a myth, that these bodies are gods, and that the divine encloses the whole of nature. The rest of the tradition has been added later in mythical form with a view to the persuasion of the multitude and to its legal and utilitarian expediency; they say these gods are in the form of men or like some of the other animals, and they say other things consequent on and similar to these which we have mentioned. But if one were to separate the first point from these additions and take it alone-that they thought the first substances to be gods, one must regard this as an inspired utterance, and reflect that, while probably each art and each science has often been developed as far as possible and has again perished, these opinions, with others, have been preserved until the present like relics of the ancient treasure. Only thus far, then, is the opinion of our ancestors and of our earliest predecessors clear to us.

Chapter 9

Greek Latin English
τὰ δὲ περὶ τὸν νοῦν ἔχει τινὰς ἀπορίας: δοκεῖ μὲν γὰρ εἶναι τῶν φαινομένων θειότατον, πῶς δ᾽ ἔχων τοιοῦτος ἂν εἴη, ἔχει τινὰς δυσκολίας. Quae autem circa intellectum habent quasdam dubitationes. Videtur quidem enim apparentium divinissimum; quomodo vero * habens tajis erit utique, habet quasdam difficul>tates. Chapter 9.The nature of the divine thought involves certain problems; for while thought is held to be the most divine of things observed by us, the question how it must be situated in order to have that character involves difficulties.
εἴτε γὰρ μηδὲν νοεῖ, τί ἂν εἴη τὸ σεμνόν, ἀλλ᾽ ἔχει ὥσπερ ἂν εἰ ὁ καθεύδων: εἴτε νοεῖ, τούτου δ᾽ ἄλλο κύριον, οὐ γάρ ἐστι τοῦτο ὅ ἐστιν αὐτοῦ ἡ [20] οὐσία νόησις, ἀλλὰ δύναμις, οὐκ ἂν ἡ ἀρίστη οὐσία εἴη: διὰ γὰρ τοῦ νοεῖν τὸ τίμιον αὐτῷ ὑπάρχει. Nam sive non intelligat, quid utique erit venerabile? Sed habet quemadmodum [ut] si dormiens *. Sive intelligat, huius vero aliud * principale, non enim est hoc quod est sua substantia intelligentia, sed potentia: non utique erit optima substantia; per intelligere enim honorabile ei inest. For if it thinks of nothing, what is there here of dignity? It is just like one who sleeps. And if it thinks, but this depends on something else, then (since that which is its substance is not the act of thinking, but a potency) it cannot be the best substance; for it is through thinking that its value belongs to it.
ἔτι δὲ εἴτε νοῦς ἡ οὐσία αὐτοῦ εἴτε νόησίς ἐστι, τί νοεῖ; ἢ γὰρ αὐτὸς αὑτὸν ἢ ἕτερόν τι: καὶ εἰ ἕτερόν τι, ἢ τὸ αὐτὸ ἀεὶ ἢ ἄλλο. Amplius autem sive intellectus sit sua substantia sive intelligentia, quid intelligit? Aut enim se ipsum aut alterum aliquid; et si alterum aliquid, aut idem semper aut aliud. Further, whether its substance is the faculty of thought or the act of thinking, what does it think of? Either of itself or of something else; and if of something else, either of the same thing always or of something different.
πότερον οὖν διαφέρει τι ἢ οὐδὲν τὸ νοεῖν τὸ καλὸν ἢ τὸ τυχόν; [25] ἢ καὶ ἄτοπον τὸ διανοεῖσθαι περὶ ἐνίων; Utrum ergo differt aliquid aut nihil *, intelligere bonum aut contingens? Aut et inconveniens * meditari de quibusdam? Does it matter, then, or not, whether it thinks of the good or of any chance thing? Are there not some things about which it is incredible that it should think?
δῆλον τοίνυν ὅτι τὸ θειότατον καὶ τιμιώτατον νοεῖ, καὶ οὐ μεταβάλλει: εἰς χεῖρον γὰρ ἡ μεταβολή, καὶ κίνησίς τις ἤδη τὸ τοιοῦτον. Palam ergo quod * divinissimum * et honoratissimum intelligit, et non transmutatur; in indignius enim * transmutatio, et motus quidam iam tale. Evidently, then, it thinks of that which is most divine and precious, and it does not change; for change would be change for the worse, and this would be already a movement.
πρῶτον μὲν οὖν εἰ μὴ νόησίς ἐστιν ἀλλὰ δύναμις, εὔλογον ἐπίπονον εἶναι τὸ συνεχὲς αὐτῷ τῆς νοήσεως: Primum quidem igitur si non est intelligentia sed potentia, rationabile est laboriosam esse ei continuationem intelligentie. First, then, if thought is not the act of thinking but a potency, it would be reasonable to suppose that the continuity of its thinking is wearisome to it.
ἔπειτα δῆλον [30] ὅτι ἄλλο τι ἂν εἴη τὸ τιμιώτερον ἢ ὁ νοῦς, τὸ νοούμενον. καὶ γὰρ τὸ νοεῖν καὶ ἡ νόησις ὑπάρξει καὶ τὸ χείριστον νοοῦντι, ὥστ᾽ εἰ φευκτὸν τοῦτο (καὶ γὰρ μὴ ὁρᾶν ἔνια κρεῖττον ἢ ὁρᾶν), οὐκ ἂν εἴη τὸ ἄριστον ἡ νόησις. αὑτὸν ἄρα νοεῖ, εἴπερ ἐστὶ τὸ κράτιστον, Deinde palam quia aliud aliquid erit * dignius * quam intellectus, scilicet intellectum. Et enim intelligere et intelligentia inerit et indignissimum intelligenti. Quare * fugiendum hoc, et enim non videre quaedam dignius quam videre; non si sit optimum * intelligentia. Se ipsum ergo intelligit, siquidem est * potentissimum *, e Secondly, there would evidently be something else more precious than thought, viz. that which is thought of. For both thinking and the act of thought will belong even to one who thinks of the worst thing in the world, so that if this ought to be avoided (and it ought, for there are even some things which it is better not to see than to see), the act of thinking cannot be the best of things. Therefore it must be of itself that the divine thought thinks (since it is the most excellent of things),
καὶ ἔστιν ἡ νόησις νοήσεως νόησις. [35] φαίνεται δ᾽ ἀεὶ ἄλλου ἡ ἐπιστήμη καὶ ἡ αἴσθησις καὶ ἡ δόξα καὶ ἡ διάνοια, αὑτῆς δ᾽ ἐν παρέργῳ. t est intelligentia intelligentia intelligentia. Videtur autem semper alius scientia et sensus et opinio et meditatio, ipsius autem in accessorio. and its thinking is a thinking on thinking. But evidently knowledge and perception and opinion and understanding have always something else as their object, and themselves only by the way.
ἔτι εἰ ἄλλο τὸ νοεῖν καὶ τὸ νοεῖσθαι, κατὰ πότερον αὐτῷ τὸ εὖ ὑπάρχει; οὐδὲ γὰρ ταὐτὸ τὸ εἶναι νοήσει καὶ νοουμένῳ. > Amplius si aliud est intelligere et intelligi, secundum quid ei ipsum bene inest? Non enim idem esse intelligentie et intellecto. Further, if thinking and being thought of are different, in respect of which does goodness belong to thought? For to be an act of thinking and to be an object of thought are not the same thing. [75a]
ἢ ἐπ᾽ ἐνίων ἡ ἐπιστήμη τὸ πρᾶγμα, [1075α] [1] ἐπὶ μὲν τῶν ποιητικῶν ἄνευ ὕλης ἡ οὐσία καὶ τὸ τί ἦν εἶναι, ἐπὶ δὲ τῶν θεωρητικῶν ὁ λόγος τὸ πρᾶγμα καὶ ἡ νόησις; οὐχ ἑτέρου οὖν ὄντος τοῦ νοουμένου καὶ τοῦ νοῦ, ὅσα μὴ ὕλην ἔχει, τὸ αὐτὸ ἔσται, καὶ ἡ [5] νόησις τῷ νοουμένῳ μία. Aut in quibusdam * scientia res. In factivis quidem sine materia, substantia enim et quod quid erat esse; in theoricis vero ratio res et intelligentia. Non altero igitur existente eo quod intelligitur et intellectu, quaecumque non materiam habent, idem erunt, et intelligentia eius quod intelligitur una. We answer that in some cases the knowledge is the object. In the productive sciences it is the substance or essence of the object, matter omitted, and in the theoretical sciences the definition or the act of thinking is the object. Since, then, thought and the object of thought are not different in the case of things that have not matter, the divine thought and its object will be the same, i.e. the thinking will be one with the object of its thought.
ἔτι δὴ λείπεται ἀπορία, εἰ σύνθετον τὸ νοούμενον: μεταβάλλοι γὰρ ἂν ἐν τοῖς μέρεσι τοῦ ὅλου. Adhuc autem restat dubitatio, si compositum est quod intelligitur; transmutabitur enim in partibus totius. A further question is left-whether the object of the divine thought is composite; for if it were, thought would change in passing from part to part of the whole.
ἢ ἀδιαίρετον πᾶν τὸ μὴ ἔχον ὕλην—ὥσπερ ὁ ἀνθρώπινος νοῦς Aut indivisibile omne quod non habet materiam, ut humanus intellectus. We answer that everything which has not matter is indivisible - as human thought,
ἢ ὅ γε τῶν συνθέτων ἔχει ἔν τινι χρόνῳ (οὐ γὰρ ἔχει τὸ εὖ ἐν τῳδὶ ἢ ἐν τῳδί, ἀλλ᾽ ἐν ὅλῳ τινὶ τὸ ἄριστον, ὂν ἄλλο τι)— [10] οὕτως δ᾽ ἔχει αὐτὴ αὑτῆς ἡ νόησις τὸν ἅπαντα αἰῶνα; Aut quod quidem compositorum, habet in aliquo tempore; non enim habet ipsum bene in hoc aut in hoc, sed in toto quodam quod optimum, ens aliud aliquid. Sic autem * habet ipsa * sui ipsius intelligentia toto eterno. or rather the thought of composite beings, is in a certain period of time (for it does not possess the good at this moment or at that, but its best, being something different from it, is attained only in a whole period of time), so throughout eternity is the thought which has itself for its object.

Chapter 10

Greek Latin English
ἐπισκεπτέον δὲ καὶ ποτέρως ἔχει ἡ τοῦ ὅλου φύσις τὸ ἀγαθὸν καὶ τὸ ἄριστον, πότερον κεχωρισμένον τι καὶ αὐτὸ καθ᾽ αὑτό, ἢ τὴν τάξιν. Perscrutandum autem est qualiter * habet totius natura bonum et optimum, utrum separatum quid et ipsum secundum se, aut ordinem. Chapter 10. We must consider also in which of two ways the nature of the universe contains the good, and the highest good, whether as something separate and by itself, or as the order of the parts.
ἢ ἀμφοτέρως ὥσπερ στράτευμα; καὶ γὰρ ἐν τῇ τάξει τὸ εὖ καὶ ὁ στρατηγός, καὶ μᾶλλον [15] οὗτος: οὐ γὰρ οὗτος διὰ τὴν τάξιν ἀλλ᾽ ἐκείνη διὰ τοῦτόν ἐστιν. Aut utroque modo sicut exercitus? Et enim in ordine ipsum bene et dux exercitus, et magis iste; non enim iste propter ordinem sed ille propter hunc est. Probably in both ways, as an army does; for its good is found both in its order and in its leader, and more in the latter; for he does not depend on the order but it depends on him.
πάντα δὲ συντέτακταί πως, ἀλλ᾽ οὐχ ὁμοίως, καὶ πλωτὰ καὶ πτηνὰ καὶ φυτά: καὶ οὐχ οὕτως ἔχει ὥστε μὴ εἶναι θατέρῳ πρὸς θάτερον μηδέν, ἀλλ᾽ ἔστι τι. πρὸς μὲν γὰρ ἓν ἅπαντα συντέτακται, ἀλλ᾽ ὥσπερ ἐν οἰκίᾳ τοῖς ἐλευθέροις [20] ἥκιστα ἔξεστιν ὅ τι ἔτυχε ποιεῖν, ἀλλὰ πάντα ἢ τὰ πλεῖστα τέτακται, τοῖς δὲ ἀνδραπόδοις καὶ τοῖς θηρίοις μικρὸν τὸ εἰς τὸ κοινόν, τὸ δὲ πολὺ ὅ τι ἔτυχεν: τοιαύτη γὰρ ἑκάστου ἀρχὴ αὐτῶν ἡ φύσις ἐστίν. λέγω δ᾽ οἷον εἴς γε τὸ διακριθῆναι ἀνάγκη ἅπασιν ἐλθεῖν, καὶ ἄλλα οὕτως ἔστιν ὧν κοινωνεῖ [25] ἅπαντα εἰς τὸ ὅλον. Omnia vero coordinata sunt aliqualiter, sed non similiter, et natatilia et volatilia et plante; et non sic se habent ut non sit alteri ad alterum nihil, sed est aliquid. Ad unum quidem enim omnia coordinata sunt. Sed quemadmodum in domo liberis > non licet quod contingit facere, sed omnia aut plurima ordinata sunt, seruis vero et bestiis parvum * quod ad commune, multum vero quod contingit; tale namque cuiusque principium ipsorum natura est. Dico autem puta ad discerni quidem necesse omnibus venire, et alia sic sunt quibus communicant omnia ad totum. And all things are ordered together somehow, but not all alike,-both fishes and fowls and plants; and the world is not such that one thing has nothing to do with another, but they are connected. For all are ordered together to one end, but it is as in a house, where the freemen are least at liberty to act at random, but all things or most things are already ordained for them, while the slaves and the animals do little for the common good, and for the most part live at random; for this is the sort of principle that constitutes the nature of each. I mean, for instance, that all must at least come to be dissolved into their elements, and there are other functions similarly in which all share for the good of the whole.
ὅσα δὲ ἀδύνατα συμβαίνει ἢ ἄτοπα τοῖς ἄλλως λέγουσι, καὶ ποῖα οἱ χαριεστέρως λέγοντες, καὶ ἐπὶ ποίων ἐλάχισται ἀπορίαι, δεῖ μὴ λανθάνειν. Quaecumque vero impossibilia accidunt aut absurda aliter dicentibus, et qualia gratiosius dicentes, et in quibus minime dubitationes, oportet non latere. We must not fail to observe how many impossible or paradoxical results confront those who hold different views from our own, and what are the views of the subtler thinkers, and which views are attended by fewest difficulties.
πάντες γὰρ ἐξ ἐναντίων ποιοῦσι πάντα. οὔτε δὲ τὸ πάντα οὔτε τὸ ἐξ ἐναντίων ὀρθῶς, οὔτ᾽ ἐν ὅσοις τὰ ἐναντία ὑπάρχει, πῶς [30] ἐκ τῶν ἐναντίων ἔσται, οὐ λέγουσιν: Omnes enim ex contrariis faciunt omnia. Neque autem quod omnia nec quod ex contrariis recte, nec in quibuscumque contraria existunt, quomodo ex contrariis erunt, non dicunt; All make all things out of contraries. But neither all things nor out of contraries is right; nor do these thinkers tell us how all the things in which the contraries are present can be made out of the contraries;
ἀπαθῆ γὰρ τὰ ἐναντία ὑπ᾽ ἀλλήλων. ἡμῖν δὲ λύεται τοῦτο εὐλόγως τῷ τρίτον τι εἶναι. οἱ δὲ τὸ ἕτερον τῶν ἐναντίων ὕλην ποιοῦσιν, ὥσπερ οἱ τὸ ἄνισον τῷ ἴσῳ ἢ τῷ ἑνὶ τὰ πολλά. λύεται δὲ καὶ τοῦτο τὸν αὐτὸν τρόπον: ἡ γὰρ ὕλη ἡ μία οὐδενὶ ἐναντίον. impassibilia namque sunt contraria ad invicem. Nobis autem solvitur hoc rationabiliter eo quod tertium aliquid sit. Alii vero * alterum * contrariorum materiam faciunt, quemadmodum qui inequale equali aut uni multa. Solvitur autem et hoc eodem modo; materia enim quae una nulli est contrarium. for contraries are not affected by one another. Now for us this difficulty is solved naturally by the fact that there is a third element. These thinkers however make one of the two contraries matter; this is done for instance by those who make the unequal matter for the equal, or the many matter for the one. But this also is refuted in the same way; for the one matter which underlies any pair of contraries is contrary to nothing.
ἔτι [35] ἅπαντα τοῦ φαύλου μεθέξει ἔξω τοῦ ἑνός: τὸ γὰρ κακὸν αὐτὸ θάτερον τῶν στοιχείων. Amplius omnia pravi participatione * extra unum; nam prauum ipsum alterum elementorum. Further, all things, except the one, will, on the view we are criticizing, partake of evil; for the bad itself is one of the two elements.
οἱ δ᾽ ἄλλοι οὐδ᾽ ἀρχὰς τὸ ἀγαθὸν καὶ τὸ κακόν: καίτοι ἐν ἅπασι μάλιστα τὸ ἀγαθὸν ἀρχή. Alii autem nec principia bonum et malum; quamvis in omnibus maxime quod bonum * principium. But the other school does not treat the good and the bad even as principles; yet in all things the good is in the highest degree a principle.
[38] οἱ δὲ τοῦτο μὲν ὀρθῶς ὅτι ἀρχήν, ἀλλὰ πῶς τὸ ἀγαθὸν ἀρχὴ οὐ λέγουσιν, πότερον ὡς τέλος ἢ ὡς κινῆσαν ἢ ὡς εἶδος. Alii vero hoc quidem recte quia principium, sed quomodo quod bonum principium non dicunt, utrum ut finis aut ut movens aut ut species. The school we first mentioned is right in saying that it is a principle, but how the good is a principle they do not say-whether as end or as mover or as form. [75b]
[1075β] [1] ἀτόπως δὲ καὶ Ἐμπεδοκλῆς: τὴν γὰρ φιλίαν ποιεῖ τὸ ἀγαθόν, αὕτη δ᾽ ἀρχὴ καὶ ὡς κινοῦσα (συνάγει γάρ) καὶ ὡς ὕλη: μόριον γὰρ τοῦ μίγματος. εἰ δὴ καὶ τῷ αὐτῷ συμβέβηκεν [5] καὶ ὡς ὕλῃ ἀρχῇ εἶναι καὶ ὡς κινοῦντι, ἀλλὰ τό γ᾽ εἶναι οὐ ταὐτό. κατὰ πότερον οὖν φιλία; ἄτοπον δὲ καὶ τὸ ἄφθαρτον εἶναι τὸ νεῖκος: τοῦτο δ᾽ ἐστὶν αὐτῷ ἡ τοῦ κακοῦ φύσις. inconvenienter autem et Empedocles. Amicitiam enim facit bonum, haec autem * principium et ut movens (congregat enim) et ut materia (pars enim mixture). Si itaque et eidem accidit ut materiam et principium esse et ut movens *, sed esse > non idem. Secundum utrum igitur amicitia? Inconveniens autem et incorruptibilem esse litem; hoc ipsum autem est mali natura. Empedocles also has a paradoxical view; for he identifies the good with love, but this is a principle both as mover (for it brings things together) and as matter (for it is part of the mixture). Now even if it happens that the same thing is a principle both as matter and as mover, still the being, at least, of the two is not the same. In which respect then is love a principle? It is paradoxical also that strife should be imperishable; the nature of his evil is just strife.
Ἀναξαγόρας δὲ ὡς κινοῦν τὸ ἀγαθὸν ἀρχήν: ὁ γὰρ νοῦς κινεῖ. ἀλλὰ κινεῖ ἕνεκά τινος, ὥστε ἕτερον, πλὴν ὡς ἡμεῖς λέγομεν: [10] ἡ γὰρ ἰατρική ἐστί πως ἡ ὑγίεια. ἄτοπον δὲ καὶ τὸ ἐναντίον μὴ ποιῆσαι τῷ ἀγαθῷ καὶ τῷ νῷ. πάντες δ᾽ οἱ τἀναντία λέγοντες οὐ χρῶνται τοῖς ἐναντίοις, ἐὰν μὴ ῥυθμίσῃ τις. Anaxagoras autem ut movens quod bonum principium ; intellectus enim movet. Sed gratia alicuius movet, quare alterum , excepto ut nos dicimus; nam medicativa est quodammodo sanitas. Inconveniens autem et contrarium non facere bono et intellectui. Anaxagoras makes the good a motive principle; for his reason moves things. But it moves them for an end, which must be something other than it, except according to our way of stating the case; for, on our view, the medical art is in a sense health. It is paradoxical also not to suppose a contrary to the good, i.e. to reason.
καὶ διὰ τί τὰ μὲν φθαρτὰ τὰ δ᾽ ἄφθαρτα, οὐδεὶς λέγει: πάντα γὰρ τὰ ὄντα ποιοῦσιν ἐκ τῶν αὐτῶν ἀρχῶν. ἔτι οἱ [15] μὲν ἐκ τοῦ μὴ ὄντος ποιοῦσι τὰ ὄντα: οἱ δ᾽ ἵνα μὴ τοῦτο ἀναγκασθῶσιν, ἓν πάντα ποιοῦσιν. Omnes autem contraria dicentes non utuntur contrariis, nisi figuret aliquis. Et quare haec quidem corruptibilia haec vero incorruptibilia, nullus dicit; omnia namque entia faciunt ex eisdem principiis. Amplius alii quidem ex non ente faciunt entia; alii autem, ut non hoc cogantur, unum omnia faciunt. But all who speak of the contraries make no use of the contraries, unless we bring their views into shape. And why some things are perishable and others imperishable, no one tells us; for they make all existing things out of the same principles. Further, some make existing things out of the nonexistent; and others to avoid the necessity of this make all things one.
ἔτι διὰ τί ἀεὶ ἔσται γένεσις καὶ τί αἴτιον γενέσεως, οὐδεὶς λέγει. Amplius propter quid semper erit generatio et quae est causa generationis, nullus dicit. Further, why should there always be becoming, and what is the cause of becoming?-this no one tells us.
καὶ τοῖς δύο ἀρχὰς ποιοῦσιν ἄλλην ἀνάγκη ἀρχὴν κυριωτέραν εἶναι, καὶ τοῖς τὰ εἴδη ἔτι ἄλλη ἀρχὴ κυριωτέρα: διὰ τί γὰρ μετέσχεν ἢ [20] μετέχει; Et duo principia facientibus aliud necesse principium principalius esse, et hiis qui species quia aliud principium principalius; propter quid enim participavit aut participat? And those who suppose two principles must suppose another, a superior principle, and so must those who believe in the Forms; for why did things come to participate, or why do they participate, in the Forms?
καὶ τοῖς μὲν ἄλλοις ἀνάγκη τῇ σοφίᾳ καὶ τῇ τιμιωτάτῃ ἐπιστήμῃ εἶναί τι ἐναντίον, ἡμῖν δ᾽ οὔ. οὐ γάρ ἐστιν ἐναντίον τῷ πρώτῳ οὐδέν: πάντα γὰρ τὰ ἐναντία ὕλην ἔχει, καὶ δυνάμει ταῦτα ἔστιν: ἡ δὲ ἐναντία ἄγνοια εἰς τὸ ἐναντίον, τῷ δὲ πρώτῳ ἐναντίον οὐδέν. Et aliis quidem necesse sapientie et honoratissime scienlie aliquid esse contrarium, nobis autem non. Non enim est contrarium primo nihil. Nam omnia contraria materiam habent, et haec potentia est; contraria autem ignorantia ad contrarium; primo vero contrarium nihil. And all other thinkers are confronted by the necessary consequence that there is something contrary to Wisdom, i.e. to the highest knowledge; but we are not. For there is nothing contrary to that which is primary; for all contraries have matter, and things that have matter exist only potentially; and the ignorance which is contrary to any knowledge leads to an object contrary to the object of the knowledge; but what is primary has no contrary.
εἴ τε μὴ ἔσται παρὰ τὰ [25] αἰσθητὰ ἄλλα, οὐκ ἔσται ἀρχὴ καὶ τάξις καὶ γένεσις καὶ τὰ οὐράνια, ἀλλ᾽ ἀεὶ τῆς ἀρχῆς ἀρχή, ὥσπερ τοῖς θεολόγοις καὶ τοῖς φυσικοῖς πᾶσιν. Amplius si non erunt praeter sensibilia alia, non erit principium et ordo et generatio et celestia, sed semper principii principium, ut theolo>gis et phisicis omnibus. Again, if besides sensible things no others exist, there will be no first principle, no order, no becoming, no heavenly bodies, but each principle will have a principle before it, as in the accounts of the theologians and all the natural philosophers.
εἰ δ᾽ ἔσται τὰ εἴδη: ἢ <οἱ> ἀριθμοί, οὐδενὸς αἴτια: εἰ δὲ μή, οὔτι κινήσεώς γε. Si autem erunt species aut numeri, nullius cause; sin autem, non quid motus. But if the Forms or the numbers are to exist, they will be causes of nothing; or if not that, at least not of movement.
ἔτι πῶς ἔσται ἐξ ἀμεγεθῶν μέγεθος καὶ συνεχές; ὁ γὰρ ἀριθμὸς οὐ ποιήσει [30] συνεχές, οὔτε ὡς κινοῦν οὔτε ὡς εἶδος. Adhuc quomodo erit ex non magnitudinibus magnitudo et continuum? Non enim numerus facit continuum, nec ut movens nec ut species. Further, how is extension, i.e. a continuum, to be produced out of unextended parts? For number will not, either as mover or as form, produce a continuum.
ἀλλὰ μὴν οὐδέν γ᾽ ἔσται τῶν ἐναντίων ὅπερ καὶ ποιητικὸν καὶ κινητικόν; ἐνδέχοιτο γὰρ ἂν μὴ εἶναι. ἀλλὰ μὴν ὕστερόν γε τὸ ποιεῖν δυνάμεως. οὐκ ἄρα ἀΐδια τὰ ὄντα. ἀλλ᾽ ἔστιν: ἀναιρετέον ἄρα τούτων τι. τοῦτο δ᾽ εἴρηται πῶς. At vero nullum erit contrariorum quod et factivum et motivum, continget enim utique non esse. At vero posterius quidem ipsum facere potentia. Non ergo sempiterna sunt entia. Sed sunt. Interimendum igitur est horum aliquid. Et hoc dictum est ut. But again there cannot be any contrary that is also essentially a productive or moving principle; for it would be possible for it not to be. Or at least its action would be posterior to its potency. The world, then, would not be eternal. But it is; one of these premisses, then, must be denied. And we have said how this must be done.
ἔτι τίνι οἱ ἀριθμοὶ ἓν ἢ ἡ [35] ψυχὴ καὶ τὸ σῶμα καὶ ὅλως τὸ εἶδος καὶ τὸ πρᾶγμα, οὐδὲν λέγει οὐδείς: οὐδ᾽ ἐνδέχεται εἰπεῖν, ἐὰν μὴ ὡς ἡμεῖς εἴπῃ, ὡς τὸ κινοῦν ποιεῖ. Adhuc quo numeri unum aut anima et corpus et totaliter species et res, nihil dicit nullus; nec contingit dicere, si non ut nos dicat quod movens facit. Further, in virtue of what the numbers, or the soul and the body, or in general the form and the thing, are one-of this no one tells us anything; nor can any one tell, unless he says, as we do, that the mover makes them one.
οἱ δὲ λέγοντες τὸν ἀριθμὸν πρῶτον τὸν μαθηματικὸν καὶ οὕτως ἀεὶ ἄλλην ἐχομένην οὐσίαν καὶ ἀρχὰς ἑκάστης ἄλλας, [1076α] [1] ἐπεισοδιώδη τὴν τοῦ παντὸς οὐσίαν ποιοῦσιν (οὐδὲν γὰρ ἡ ἑτέρα τῇ ἑτέρᾳ συμβάλλεται οὖσα ἢ μὴ οὖσα) καὶ ἀρχὰς πολλάς: τὰ δὲ ὄντα οὐ βούλεται πολιτεύεσθαι κακῶς. "οὐκ ἀγαθὸν πολυκοιρανίη: εἷς κοίρανος ἔστω." Dicentes autem numerum primum mathematicum et sic semper aliam habitam substantiam et principia cuiuslibet alia, inconnexam universi substantiam faciunt (nihil enim alia alii confert ens aut non ens) et principia multa. Entia vero non volunt disponi male, nec bonum pluralitas principatuum. Unus ergo princeps. And those who say mathematical number is first and go on to generate one kind of substance after another and give [76a] different principles for each, make the substance of the universe a mere series of episodes (for one substance has no influence on another by its existence or nonexistence), and they give us many governing principles; but the world refuses to be governed badly. The rule of many is not good; one ruler let there be.


Notes


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