Authors/Aristotle/metaphysics/l5

From The Logic Museum

Jump to: navigation, search


Chapter 1 Beginning

Greek Latin English
METHAPHISICE ARISTOTILIS LIBER QUINTUS Aristotle Metaphysics Book 5 (D)
[1012β] [34] ἀρχὴ λέγεται ἡ μὲν ὅθεν ἄν τις τοῦ πράγματος [35] κινηθείη πρῶτον, οἷον τοῦ μήκους καὶ ὁδοῦ ἐντεῦθεν μὲν αὕτη ἀρχή, ἐξ ἐναντίας δὲ ἑτέρα: [1013α] [1] ἡ δὲ ὅθεν ἂν κάλλιστα ἕκαστον γένοιτο, οἷον καὶ μαθήσεως οὐκ ἀπὸ τοῦ πρώτου καὶ τῆς τοῦ πράγματος ἀρχῆς ἐνίοτε ἀρκτέον ἀλλ᾽ ὅθεν ῥᾷστ᾽ ἂν μάθοι: ἡ δὲ ὅθεν πρῶτον γίγνεται ἐνυπάρχοντος, οἷον ὡς πλοίου [5] τρόπις καὶ οἰκίας θεμέλιος, καὶ τῶν ζῴων οἱ μὲν καρδίαν οἱ δὲ ἐγκέφαλον οἱ δ᾽ ὅ τι ἂν τύχωσι τοιοῦτον ὑπολαμβάνουσιν: ἡ δὲ ὅθεν γίγνεται πρῶτον μὴ ἐνυπάρχοντος καὶ ὅθεν πρῶτον ἡ κίνησις πέφυκεν ἄρχεσθαι καὶ ἡ μεταβολή, οἷον τὸ τέκνον ἐκ τοῦ πατρὸς καὶ τῆς μητρὸς καὶ ἡ μάχη [10] ἐκ τῆς λοιδορίας: ἡ δὲ οὗ κατὰ προαίρεσιν κινεῖται τὰ κινούμενα καὶ μεταβάλλει τὰ μεταβάλλοντα, ὥσπερ αἵ τε κατὰ πόλεις ἀρχαὶ καὶ αἱ δυναστεῖαι καὶ αἱ βασιλεῖαι καὶ τυραννίδες ἀρχαὶ λέγονται καὶ αἱ τέχναι, καὶ τούτων αἱ ἀρχιτεκτονικαὶ μάλιστα. ἔτι ὅθεν γνωστὸν τὸ πρᾶγμα [15] πρῶτον, καὶ αὕτη ἀρχὴ λέγεται τοῦ πράγματος, οἷον τῶν ἀποδείξεων αἱ ὑποθέσεις. ἰσαχῶς δὲ καὶ τὰ αἴτια λέγεται: πάντα γὰρ τὰ αἴτια ἀρχαί. > Principium dicitur aliud quidem unde utique aliquid rei movebitur primum, ut longitudinis et vie hinc quidem rhoc principium1, ex opposito autem alterum. Aliud unde utique optime fiet unumquodque, ut doctrine non a primo et rei principio aliquando inchoandum est sed unde facillime utique addiscet. Aliud unde primum generatur inexistente, ut navis sedile et domus fundamentum, et animalium alii cor alii cerebrum alii quodcumque sortiantur tale putant. Aliud * unde fit primum non inexistente et unde primum motus natus initiari et permutatio, ut puer ex patre et matre et bellum ex conuicio. Aliud cuius secundum voluntatem moventur quae moventur et mutantur quae mutantur, ut secundum civitates principatus et potestates et imperia et tyrannides; principia dicuntur et artes, et harum architectonice maxime. Amplius unde cognoscibilis res * primum, et hoc principium dicitur re, ut demonstrationum suppositiones. Totiens autem et causae dicun>tur; omnes enim causae principia. Chapter 1. BEGINNING means (1) that part of a thing from which one would start first, e.g a line or a road has a beginning [13a] in either of the contrary directions. (2) That from which each thing would best be originated, e.g. even in learning we must sometimes begin not from the first point and the beginning of the subject, but from the point from which we should learn most easily. (3) That from which, as an immanent part, a thing first comes to be, e,g, as the keel of a ship and the foundation of a house, while in animals some suppose the heart, others the brain, others some other part, to be of this nature. (4) That from which, not as an immanent part, a thing first comes to be, and from which the movement or the change naturally first begins, as a child comes from its father and its mother, and a fight from abusive language. (5) That at whose will that which is moved is moved and that which changes changes, e.g. the magistracies in cities, and oligarchies and monarchies and tyrannies, are called arhchai, and so are the arts, and of these especially the architectonic arts. (6) That from which a thing can first be known, – this also is called the beginning of the thing, e.g. the hypotheses are the beginnings of demonstrations. (Causes are spoken of in an equal number of senses; for all causes are beginnings.)
πασῶν μὲν οὖν κοινὸν τῶν ἀρχῶν τὸ πρῶτον εἶναι ὅθεν ἢ ἔστιν ἢ γίγνεται ἢ γιγνώσκεται: τούτων δὲ αἱ μὲν ἐνυπάρχουσαί εἰσιν αἱ δὲ [20] ἐκτός. διὸ ἥ τε φύσις ἀρχὴ καὶ τὸ στοιχεῖον καὶ ἡ διάνοια καὶ ἡ προαίρεσις καὶ οὐσία καὶ τὸ οὗ ἕνεκα: πολλῶν γὰρ καὶ τοῦ γνῶναι καὶ τῆς κινήσεως ἀρχὴ τἀγαθὸν καὶ τὸ καλόν. Omnium igitur principiorum commune est primum esse unde aut est aut fit aut cognoscitur. Horum autem haec quidem inexistentia sunt illa vero extra. Quapropter et natura principium et elementum et mens et voluntas et substantia et quod * cuius causa; multorum enim et cognitionis et motus principium est bonum et malum. It is common, then, to all beginnings to be the first point from which a thing either is or comes to be or is known; but of these some are immanent in the thing and others are outside. Hence the nature of a thing is a beginning, and so is the element of a thing, and thought and will, and essence, and the final cause – for the good and the beautiful are the beginning both of the knowledge and of the movement of many things.

Chapter 2 Cause

Greek Latin English
αἴτιον λέγεται ἕνα μὲν τρόπον ἐξ οὗ γίγνεταί τι ἐνυπάρχοντος, [25] οἷον ὁ χαλκὸς τοῦ ἀνδριάντος καὶ ὁ ἄργυρος τῆς φιάλης καὶ τὰ τούτων γένη: ἄλλον δὲ τὸ εἶδος καὶ τὸ παράδειγμα, τοῦτο δ᾽ ἐστὶν ὁ λόγος τοῦ τί ἦν εἶναι καὶ τὰ τούτου γένη (οἷον τοῦ διὰ πασῶν τὸ δύο πρὸς ἓν καὶ ὅλως ὁ ἀριθμός) καὶ τὰ μέρη τὰ ἐν τῷ λόγῳ. ἔτι ὅθεν ἡ [30] ἀρχὴ τῆς μεταβολῆς ἡ πρώτη ἢ τῆς ἠρεμήσεως, οἷον ὁ βουλεύσας αἴτιος, καὶ ὁ πατὴρ τοῦ τέκνου καὶ ὅλως τὸ ποιοῦν τοῦ ποιουμένου καὶ τὸ μεταβλητικὸν τοῦ μεταβάλλοντος. ἔτι ὡς τὸ τέλος: τοῦτο δ᾽ ἐστὶ τὸ οὗ ἕνεκα, οἷον τοῦ περιπατεῖν ἡ ὑγίεια. διὰ τί γὰρ περιπατεῖ; φαμέν. ἵνα ὑγιαίνῃ. καὶ [35] εἰπόντες οὕτως οἰόμεθα ἀποδεδωκέναι τὸ αἴτιον. καὶ ὅσα δὴ κινήσαντος ἄλλου μεταξὺ γίγνεται τοῦ τέλους, [1013β] [1] οἷον τῆς ὑγιείας ἡ ἰσχνασία ἢ ἡ κάθαρσις ἢ τὰ φάρμακα ἢ τὰ ὄργανα: πάντα γὰρ ταῦτα τοῦ τέλους ἕνεκά ἐστι, διαφέρει δὲ ἀλλήλων ὡς ὄντα τὰ μὲν ὄργανα τὰ δ᾽ ἔργα. τὰ μὲν οὖν αἴτια σχεδὸν τοσαυταχῶς λέγεται, Causa vero dicitur uno quidem modo ex quo fit aliquid * inexistente, ut es statue et argentum fiale et horum genera. alio vero species et exemplar; hoc autem est ratio ipsius quid erat esse et huius genera (ut eius quod diapason duo ad unum et totaliter numerus) et partes quae in ratione. Amplius unde principium permutationis primum aut quietis, ut consiliator causa, et pater pueri et omnino efficiens facti et permutans permutati. Amplius ut finis; hoc autem est quod * cuius causa, ut ambulandi sanitas. Nam propter quid ambulat? Dicimus: ut sanetur; et dicentes ita putamus reddidisse causam. Et quaecumque movente alio intermedia fiunt finis, ut sanitatis attenuatio aut purgatio aut pharmaca aut organa; haec namque omnia finis gratia sunt, differunt autem ab invicem tamquam entia haec quidem ut organa illa vero ut opera. Chapter 2. Cause means (1) that from which, as immanent material, a thing comes into being, e.g. the bronze is the cause of the statue and the silver of the saucer, and so are the classes which include these. (2) The form or pattern, i.e. the definition of the essence, and the classes which include this (e.g. the ratio 2:1 and number in general are causes of the octave), and the parts included in the definition. (3) That from which the change or the resting from change first begins; e.g. the adviser is a cause of the action, and the father a cause of the child, and in general the maker a cause of the thing made and the change-producing of the changing. (4) The end, i.e. that for the sake of which a thing is; e.g. health is the cause of walking. For "Why does one walk?" we say; "that one may be healthy"; and in speaking thus we think we have given the cause. The same is true of all the means that intervene before the end, when something else has put the process in motion, as e.g. [13b] thinning or purging or drugs or instruments intervene before health is reached; for all these are for the sake of the end, though they differ from one another in that some are instruments and others are actions.
συμβαίνει δὲ πολλαχῶς [5] λεγομένων τῶν αἰτίων καὶ πολλὰ τοῦ αὐτοῦ αἴτια εἶναι οὐ κατὰ συμβεβηκός (οἷον τοῦ ἀνδριάντος καὶ ἡ ἀνδριαντοποιητικὴ καὶ ὁ χαλκὸς οὐ καθ᾽ ἕτερόν τι ἀλλ᾽ ᾗ ἀνδριάς: ἀλλ᾽ οὐ τὸν αὐτὸν τρόπον ἀλλὰ τὸ μὲν ὡς ὕλη τὸ δ᾽ ὡς ὅθεν ἡ κίνησις), Ergo causae fere totiens dicuntur. Accidit autem multotiens dictis causis et multas eiusdem esse causas non secundum accidens, ut statue statue factiva et es non secundum aliquid aliud sed in quantum statua; sed non eodem modo, sed hoc quidem ut materia illud vero ut unde motus. These, then, are practically all the senses in which causes are spoken of, and as they are spoken of in several senses it follows both that there are several causes of the same thing, and in no accidental sense (e.g. both the art of sculpture and the bronze are causes of the statue not in respect of anything else but qua statue; not, however, in the same way, but the one as matter and the other as source of the movement),
καὶ ἀλλήλων αἴτια (οἷον τὸ πονεῖν [10] τῆς εὐεξίας καὶ αὕτη τοῦ πονεῖν: ἀλλ᾽ οὐ τὸν αὐτὸν τρόπον ἀλλὰ τὸ μὲν ὡς τέλος τὸ δ᾽ ὡς ἀρχὴ κινήσεως). Et ad invicem causae sunt, ut laborare causa est euexie et * haec laborandi; sed non eodem modo, verum hoc quidem ut finis illud vero ut principium motus. and that things can be causes of one another (e.g. exercise of good condition, and the latter of exercise; not, however, in the same way, but the one as end and the other as source of movement).
ἔτι δὲ ταὐτὸ τῶν ἐναντίων ἐστίν: ὃ γὰρ παρὸν αἴτιον τουδί, τοῦτ᾽ ἀπὸν αἰτιώμεθα ἐνίοτε τοῦ ἐναντίου, οἷον τὴν ἀπουσίαν τοῦ κυβερνήτου τῆς ἀνατροπῆς, οὗ ἦν ἡ παρουσία αἰτία τῆς [15] σωτηρίας: ἄμφω δέ, καὶ ἡ παρουσία καὶ ἡ στέρησις, αἴτια ὡς κινοῦντα. Amplius autem idem quandoque contrariorum est causa; quod enim presens huius est causa, hoc absens causamur quandoque de contrario, ut absentiam gubernatoris deperditio>nis, cuius erat presentia causa salutis; utraque vero, et presentia et privatio, causae sunt ut moventes. Again, the same thing is the cause of contraries; for that which when present causes a particular thing, we sometimes charge, when absent, with the contrary, e.g. we impute the shipwreck to the absence of the steersman, whose presence was the cause of safety; and both the presence and the privation are causes as sources of movement.
ἅπαντα δὲ τὰ νῦν εἰρημένα αἴτια εἰς τέτταρας τρόπους πίπτει τοὺς φανερωτάτους. τὰ μὲν γὰρ στοιχεῖα τῶν συλλαβῶν καὶ ἡ ὕλη τῶν σκευαστῶν καὶ τὸ πῦρ καὶ ἡ γῆ καὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα πάντα τῶν σωμάτων καὶ τὰ [20] μέρη τοῦ ὅλου καὶ αἱ ὑποθέσεις τοῦ συμπεράσματος ὡς τὸ [21] ἐξ οὗ αἴτιά ἐστιν: τούτων δὲ τὰ μὲν ὡς τὸ ὑποκείμενον, οἷον τὰ μέρη, τὰ δὲ ὡς τὸ τί ἦν εἶναι, τό τε ὅλον καὶ ἡ σύνθεσις καὶ τὸ εἶδος. τὸ δὲ σπέρμα καὶ ὁ ἰατρὸς καὶ ὁ βουλεύσας καὶ ὅλως τὸ ποιοῦν, πάντα ὅθεν ἡ ἀρχὴ τῆς μεταβολῆς [25] ἢ στάσεως. τὰ δ᾽ ὡς τὸ τέλος καὶ τἀγαθὸν τῶν ἄλλων: τὸ γὰρ οὗ ἕνεκα βέλτιστον καὶ τέλος τῶν ἄλλων ἐθέλει εἶναι: διαφερέτω δὲ μηδὲν αὐτὸ εἰπεῖν ἀγαθὸν ἢ φαινόμενον ἀγαθόν. Omnes vero causae dictae in quatuor modos cadunt manifestissimos. Nam elementa sillabarum et materia factorum et ignis et terra et talia omnia corporum et partes totius et suppositiones conclusionis ut ex quo causae sunt. Horum autem haec quidem quasi subiectum, ut partes; illa vero ut quod quid erat esse: et totum et compositio et species. Sperma vero et medicus et consiliator et omnino efficiens, omnia unde principium permutationis aut status. Alia vero ut finis et bonum aliorum; nam quod cuius causa optimum et finis aliorum vult esse; nil autem differat dicere sive bonum sive apparens bonum. All the causes now mentioned fall under four senses which are the most obvious. For the letters are the cause of syllables, and the material is the cause of manufactured things, and fire and earth and all such things are the causes of bodies, and the parts are causes of the whole, and the hypotheses are causes of the conclusion, in the sense that they are that out of which these respectively are made; but of these some are cause as the substratum (e.g. the parts), others as the essence (the whole, the synthesis, and the form). The semen, the physician, the adviser, and in general the agent, are all sources of change or of rest. The remainder are causes as the end and the good of the other things; for that for the sake of which other things are tends to be the best and the end of the other things; let us take it as making no difference whether we call it good or apparent good.
τὰ μὲν οὖν αἴτια ταῦτα καὶ τοσαῦτά ἐστι τῷ εἴδει, τρόποι δὲ τῶν αἰτίων ἀριθμῷ μέν [30] εἰσι πολλοί, κεφαλαιούμενοι δὲ καὶ οὗτοι ἐλάττους. λέγονται γὰρ αἴτια πολλαχῶς, καὶ αὐτῶν τῶν ὁμοειδῶν προτέρως καὶ ὑστέρως ἄλλο ἄλλου, οἷον ὑγιείας ὁ ἰατρὸς καὶ ὁ τεχνίτης, καὶ τοῦ διὰ πασῶν τὸ διπλάσιον καὶ ἀριθμός, καὶ ἀεὶ τὰ περιέχοντα ὁτιοῦν τῶν καθ᾽ ἕκαστα. Causae quidem igitur hae et tot sunt specie. Modi vero causarum numero quidem multi sunt, capitulati vero et hii pauciores. Dicuntur enim causae multipliciter, et ipsarum eiusdem speciei prius et posterius alia quam alia, ut sanitatis medicus et artifex, et eius quod dyapason duplum et numerus, et semper continentia quodcumque singularium. These, then, are the causes, and this is the number of their kinds, but the varieties of causes are many in number, though when summarized these also are comparatively few. Causes are spoken of in many senses, and even of those which are of the same kind some are causes in a prior and others in a posterior sense, e.g. both the physician and the professional man are causes of health, and both the ratio 2:1 and number are causes of the octave, and the classes that include any particular cause are always causes of the particular effect.
ἔτι δ᾽ ὡς τὸ συμβεβηκὸς [35] καὶ τὰ τούτων γένη, οἷον ἀνδριάντος ἄλλως Πολύκλειτος καὶ ἄλλως ἀνδριαντοποιός, ὅτι συμβέβηκε τῷ ἀνδριαντοποιῷ Πολυκλείτῳ εἶναι: [1014α] [1] καὶ τὰ περιέχοντα δὲ τὸ συμβεβηκός, οἷον ἄνθρωπος αἴτιος ἀνδριάντος, ἢ καὶ ὅλως ζῷον, ὅτι ὁ Πολύκλειτος ἄνθρωπος ὁ δὲ ἄνθρωπος ζῷον. ἔστι δὲ καὶ τῶν συμβεβηκότων ἄλλα ἄλλων πορρώτερον καὶ [5] ἐγγύτερον, οἷον εἰ ὁ λευκὸς καὶ ὁ μουσικὸς αἴτιος λέγοιτο τοῦ ἀνδριάντος, ἀλλὰ μὴ μόνον Πολύκλειτος ἢ ἄνθρωπος. παρὰ πάντα δὲ καὶ τὰ οἰκείως λεγόμενα καὶ τὰ κατὰ συμβεβηκός, τὰ μὲν ὡς δυνάμενα λέγεται τὰ δ᾽ ὡς ἐνεργοῦντα, οἷον τοῦ οἰκοδομεῖσθαι οἰκοδόμος ἢ οἰκοδομῶν οἰκοδόμος. [10] ὁμοίως δὲ λεχθήσεται καὶ ἐφ᾽ ὧν αἴτια τὰ αἴτια τοῖς εἰρημένοις, οἷον τοῦδε τοῦ ἀνδριάντος ἢ ἀνδριάντος ἢ ὅλως εἰκόνος, καὶ χαλκοῦ τοῦδε ἢ χαλκοῦ ἢ ὅλως ὕλης: καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν συμβεβηκότων ὡσαύτως. ἔτι δὲ συμπλεκόμενα καὶ ταῦτα κἀκεῖνα λεχθήσεται, οἷον οὐ Πολύκλειτος οὐδὲ ἀνδριαντοποιὸς [15] ἀλλὰ Πολύκλειτος ἀνδριαντοποιός. Amplius autem ut accidens et horum genera, veluti statue aliter Policlitus et aliter statue factor, quia accidit statue factori Policlitum esse. Et continentia autem accidens, ut homo causa statue aut et totaliter animal, quia Policlitus homo et homo animal. Sunt autem et accidentium alia aliis remotius et propinquius, ut si albus et musicus causa dicuntur statue, et non solum Policlitus aut homo. Praeter omnia autem et proprie dicta et secundum accidens, haec quidem ut potentia dicuntur illa vero ut agentia, ut ipsius edificari edificator aut edificans edificator. Similiter autem dicuntur et in quibus causae causae dictis, ut huius statue aut statue aut omnino ymaginis, aut eris huius aut eris aut omnino materie; et in accidentibus similiter. Amplius autem > complexa et haec et illa dicuntur, ut nec Policlitus nec statue factor, sed Policlitus statue factor. Again, there are accidental causes and the classes which include these; e.g. while in one sense the sculptor causes the statue, in another sense Polyclitus causes it, because the sculptor happens to be [14a] Polyclitus; and the classes that include the accidental cause are also causes, e.g. man – or in general animal – is the cause of the statue, because Polyclitus is a man, and man is an animal. Of accidental causes also some are more remote or nearer than others, as, for instance, if the white and the musical were called causes of the statue, and not only Polyclitus or man . But besides all these varieties of causes, whether proper or accidental, some are called causes as being able to act, others as acting; e.g. the cause of the house's being built is a builder, or a builder who is building. The same variety of language will be found with regard to the effects of causes; e.g. a thing may be called the cause of this statue or of a statue or in general of an image, and of this bronze or of bronze or of matter in general; and similarly in the case of accidental effects. Again, both accidental and proper causes may be spoken of in combination; e.g. we may say not Polyclitus nor the sculptor but Polyclitus the sculptor .
ἀλλ᾽ ὅμως ἅπαντά γε ταῦτ᾽ ἐστὶ τὸ μὲν πλῆθος ἕξ, λεγόμενα δὲ διχῶς: ἢ γὰρ ὡς τὸ καθ᾽ ἕκαστον ἢ ὡς τὸ γένος, ἢ ὡς τὸ συμβεβηκὸς ἢ ὡς τὸ γένος τοῦ συμβεβηκότος, ἢ ὡς συμπλεκόμενα ταῦτα ἢ ὡς ἁπλῶς λεγόμενα, πάντα δὲ ἢ ὡς [20] ἐνεργοῦντα ἢ κατὰ δύναμιν. διαφέρει δὲ τοσοῦτον, ὅτι τὰ μὲν ἐνεργοῦντα καὶ τὰ καθ᾽ ἕκαστον ἅμα ἔστι καὶ οὐκ ἔστι καὶ ὧν αἴτια, οἷον ὅδε ὁ ἰατρεύων τῷδε τῷ ὑγιαζομένῳ καὶ ὅδε ὁ οἰκοδόμος τῷδε τῷ οἰκοδομουμένῳ, τὰ δὲ κατὰ δύναμιν οὐκ ἀεί: φθείρεται γὰρ οὐχ ἅμα ἡ οἰκία καὶ ὁ [25] οἰκοδόμος. At tamen omnia haec sunt pluralitate sex, dupliciter autem dicta. Aut enim ut singulare aut ut genus, et ipsius secundum se aut secundum accidens aut ut genus accidentis, aut ut complexa haec aut ut simpliciter dicta. Amplius ut agentia aut secundum potentiam. Differunt autem in tantum, quod agentia quidem et singularia simul sunt et non sunt, et ipsa et quorum causae, ut hic medens cum hoc conualescente et hic edificator cum hoc edificio. Quod autem secundum potestatem non semper; corrumpuntur enim non simul domus et edificator. Yet all these are but six in number, while each is spoken of in two ways; for (A) they are causes either as the individual, or as the genus, or as the accidental, or as the genus that includes the accidental, and these either as combined, or as taken simply; and (B) all may be taken as acting or as having a capacity. But they differ inasmuch as the acting causes, i.e. the individuals, exist, or do not exist, simultaneously with the things of which they are causes, e.g. this particular man who is healing, with this particular man who is recovering health, and this particular builder with this particular thing that is being built; but the potential causes are not always in this case; for the house does not perish at the same time as the builder.

Chapter 3 Element

Greek Latin English
στοιχεῖον λέγεται ἐξ οὗ σύγκειται πρώτου ἐνυπάρχοντος ἀδιαιρέτου τῷ εἴδει εἰς ἕτερον εἶδος, οἷον φωνῆς στοιχεῖα ἐξ ὧν σύγκειται ἡ φωνὴ καὶ εἰς ἃ διαιρεῖται ἔσχατα, ἐκεῖνα δὲ μηκέτ᾽ εἰς ἄλλας φωνὰς ἑτέρας τῷ [30] εἴδει αὐτῶν, ἀλλὰ κἂν διαιρῆται, τὰ μόρια ὁμοειδῆ, οἷον ὕδατος τὸ μόριον ὕδωρ, ἀλλ᾽ οὐ τῆς συλλαβῆς. ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ τὰ τῶν σωμάτων στοιχεῖα λέγουσιν οἱ λέγοντες εἰς ἃ διαιρεῖται τὰ σώματα ἔσχατα, ἐκεῖνα δὲ μηκέτ᾽ εἰς ἄλλα εἴδει διαφέροντα: καὶ εἴτε ἓν εἴτε πλείω τὰ τοιαῦτα, [35] ταῦτα στοιχεῖα λέγουσιν. παραπλησίως δὲ καὶ τὰ τῶν διαγραμμάτων στοιχεῖα λέγεται, καὶ ὅλως τὰ τῶν ἀποδείξεων: αἱ γὰρ πρῶται ἀποδείξεις καὶ ἐν πλείοσιν ἀποδείξεσιν ἐνυπάρχουσαι, [1014β] [1] αὗται στοιχεῖα τῶν ἀποδείξεων λέγονται: εἰσὶ δὲ τοιοῦτοι συλλογισμοὶ οἱ πρῶτοι ἐκ τῶν τριῶν δι᾽ ἑνὸς μέσου. Elementum dicitur ex quo componitur primo inexistente indivisibili specie in aliam speciem, ut vocis elementa ex quibus vox componitur et in quae dividitur ultima, illa vero non adhuc in alias voces ab ipsis specie diversas. Sed et si dividantur, particule eiusdem speciei, ut aque particula aqua; sed non sillabe. Similiter autem et corporum elementa dicunt dicentes in quae dividuntur corpora ultima, illa autem non adhuc in alia specie differentia corpora; et sive unum sive plura talia, haec elementa dicunt. Propinque autem et quae dyagrammatum dicuntur elementa, et omnino quae demonstrationum; nam prime demonstrationes et in pluribus demonstrationibus exis>tentes, hae elementa demonstrationum dicuntur; sunt autem tales sillogismi primi rex tribus * per unum medium. Chapter 3. Element means (1) the primary component immanent in a thing, and indivisible in kind into other kinds; e.g. the elements of speech are the parts of which speech consists and into which it is ultimately divided, while they are no longer divided into other forms of speech different in kind from them. If they are divided, their parts are of the same kind, as a part of water is water (while a part of the syllable is not a syllable). Similarly those who speak of the elements of bodies mean the things into which bodies are ultimately divided, while they are no longer divided into other things differing in kind; and whether the things of this sort are one or more, they call these elements. The so-called elements of geometrical proofs, and in general the elements of demonstrations, have a similar character; for the primary demonstrations, each of which is implied in [14b] many demonstrations, are called elements of demonstrations; and the primary syllogisms, which have three terms and proceed by means of one middle, are of this nature.
καὶ μεταφέροντες δὲ στοιχεῖον καλοῦσιν ἐντεῦθεν ὃ ἂν ἓν ὂν καὶ μικρὸν ἐπὶ πολλὰ ᾖ χρήσιμον, [5] διὸ καὶ τὸ μικρὸν καὶ ἁπλοῦν καὶ ἀδιαίρετον στοιχεῖον λέγεται. ὅθεν ἐλήλυθε τὰ μάλιστα καθόλου στοιχεῖα εἶναι, ὅτι ἕκαστον αὐτῶν ἓν ὂν καὶ ἁπλοῦν ἐν πολλοῖς ὑπάρχει ἢ πᾶσιν ἢ ὅτι πλείστοις, καὶ τὸ ἓν καὶ τὴν στιγμὴν ἀρχάς τισι δοκεῖν εἶναι. ἐπεὶ οὖν τὰ καλούμενα γένη [10] καθόλου καὶ ἀδιαίρετα (οὐ γὰρ ἔστι λόγος αὐτῶν), στοιχεῖα τὰ γένη λέγουσί τινες, καὶ μᾶλλον ἢ τὴν διαφορὰν ὅτι καθόλου μᾶλλον τὸ γένος: ᾧ μὲν γὰρ ἡ διαφορὰ ὑπάρχει, καὶ τὸ γένος ἀκολουθεῖ, ᾧ δὲ τὸ γένος, οὐ παντὶ ἡ διαφορά. ἁπάντων δὲ κοινὸν τὸ εἶναι στοιχεῖον ἑκάστου τὸ [15] πρῶτον ἐνυπάρχον ἑκάστῳ. Et transferentes autem elementum vocant hinc: quodcumquae unum ens et parvum ad multa fuerit utile; quapropter et parvum et simplex et indivisibile dicitur elementum. Unde venit maxime universalia elementa esse, quia unumquodque eorum unum ens et simplex in multis inest aut omnibus aut quam plurimis, et unum et punctum principia quibusdam videri esse. Quoniam ergo vocata genera universalia * et indivisibilia (una enim est ipsorum ratio), elementa genera dicunt aliqui, no et magis quam differentiam, quoniam universale magis genus; nam cui differentia inest, et genus * sequitur, sed cui genus, non omne differentia. Omnium autem commune * esse elementum cuiuslibet quod primo inest cuique. (2) People also transfer the word element from this meaning and apply it to that which, being one and small, is useful for many purposes; for which reason what is small and simple and indivisible is called an element. Hence come the facts that the most universal things are elements (because each of them being one and simple is present in a plurality of things, either in all or in as many as possible), and that unity and the point are thought by some to be first principles. Now, since the so-called genera are universal and indivisible (for there is no definition of them), some say the genera are elements, and more so than the differentia, because the genus is more universal; for where the differentia is present, the genus accompanies it, but where the genus is present, the differentia is not always so. It is common to all the meanings that the element of each thing is the first component immanent in each.

Chapter 4 Nature

Greek Latin English
φύσις λέγεται ἕνα μὲν τρόπον ἡ τῶν φυομένων γένεσις, οἷον εἴ τις ἐπεκτείνας λέγοι τὸ υ, ἕνα δὲ ἐξ οὗ φύεται πρώτου τὸ φυόμενον ἐνυπάρχοντος: ἔτι ὅθεν ἡ κίνησις ἡ πρώτη ἐν ἑκάστῳ τῶν φύσει ὄντων ἐν αὐτῷ ᾗ αὐτὸ [20] ὑπάρχει: φύεσθαι δὲ λέγεται ὅσα αὔξησιν ἔχει δι᾽ ἑτέρου τῷ ἅπτεσθαι καὶ συμπεφυκέναι ἢ προσπεφυκέναι ὥσπερ τὰ ἔμβρυα: διαφέρει δὲ σύμφυσις ἁφῆς, ἔνθα μὲν γὰρ οὐδὲν παρὰ τὴν ἁφὴν ἕτερον ἀνάγκη εἶναι, ἐν δὲ τοῖς συμπεφυκόσιν ἔστι τι ἓν τὸ αὐτὸ ἐν ἀμφοῖν ὃ ποιεῖ ἀντὶ τοῦ [25] ἅπτεσθαι συμπεφυκέναι καὶ εἶναι ἓν κατὰ τὸ συνεχὲς καὶ ποσόν, ἀλλὰ μὴ κατὰ τὸ ποιόν. ἔτι δὲ φύσις λέγεται ἐξ οὗ πρώτου ἢ ἔστιν ἢ γίγνεταί τι τῶν φύσει ὄντων, ἀρρυθμίστου ὄντος καὶ ἀμεταβλήτου ἐκ τῆς δυνάμεως τῆς αὑτοῦ, οἷον ἀνδριάντος καὶ τῶν σκευῶν τῶν χαλκῶν ὁ χαλκὸς ἡ [30] φύσις λέγεται, τῶν δὲ ξυλίνων ξύλον: ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἄλλων: ἐκ τούτων γάρ ἐστιν ἕκαστον διασωζομένης τῆς πρώτης ὕλης: τοῦτον γὰρ τὸν τρόπον καὶ τῶν φύσει ὄντων τὰ στοιχεῖά φασιν εἶναι φύσιν, οἱ μὲν πῦρ οἱ δὲ γῆν οἱ δ᾽ ἀέρα οἱ δ᾽ ὕδωρ οἱ δ᾽ ἄλλο τι τοιοῦτον λέγοντες, οἱ δ᾽ [35] ἔνια τούτων οἱ δὲ πάντα ταῦτα. ἔτι δ᾽ ἄλλον τρόπον λέγεται ἡ φύσις ἡ τῶν φύσει ὄντων οὐσία, οἷον οἱ λέγοντες τὴν φύσιν εἶναι τὴν πρώτην σύνθεσιν, [1015α] [1] ἢ ὥσπερ Ἐμπεδοκλῆς λέγει ὅτι φύσις ; οὐδενὸς ἔστιν ἐόντων, ἀλλὰ μόνον μῖξίς τε διάλλαξίς τε μιγέντων ἔστι, φύσις δ᾽ ἐπὶ τοῖς ὀνομάζεται ἀνθρώποισιν.

διὸ καὶ ὅσα φύσει ἔστιν ἢ γίγνεται, ἤδη ὑπάρχοντος ἐξ οὗ πέφυκε γίγνεσθαι ἢ εἶναι, οὔπω φαμὲν [5] τὴν φύσιν ἔχειν ἐὰν μὴ ἔχῃ τὸ εἶδος καὶ τὴν μορφήν. φύσει μὲν οὖν τὸ ἐξ ἀμφοτέρων τούτων ἐστίν, οἷον τὰ ζῷα καὶ τὰ μόρια αὐτῶν:

Natura vero dicitur uno quidem modo nascentium generatio, ut si quis extendens dicat le Y. Vno vero ex quo generatur primum quod nascitur inexistente. Amplius unde motus primus in quolibet natura entium * in ipso in quantum ipsum existit. Nasci vero dicuntur quaecumque augmentum habent per alterum in tangendo et * connasci aut adnasci, ut embria. differt autem connascentia a tactu; hic enim nihil praeter tactum alterum * necesse esse, in simul natis autem est aliquid unum idem in ambobus quod facit pro tangi simul nasci et unum esse secundum continuum et quantum, sed non secundum quale. Amplius autem natura dicitur ex quo primo aut est aut fit aliquid entium natura, inordinato existente et immutabili a sua propria potestate, ut statue et uasorum ereorum es natura dicitur, et ligneorum lignum, similiter autem et > in aliis; ex hiis enim est unumquodque saluata prima materia. Hoc enim modo et existentium natura elementa dicunt esse naturam, alii ignem, alii terram, alii aquam, alii aerem, alii aliud aliquid tale dicentes, alii quaedam horum alii vero hec omnia. amplius autem alio modo dicitur natura existentium natura substantia, ut dicentes naturam primam compositionem esse, * ut Empedocles dicit quod “ natura nullius est inexistentium, sed solum mixtio et permutatio permixtorum est, natura vero in hominibus nominatur”. Quapropter et quaecumque natura sunt aut fiunt, iam existente ex quo * nata sunt fieri aut esse, non dicimus naturam habere, si non habent speciem et formam. natura quidem igitur quod ex hiis utrisque est, ut animalia et eorum partes. Chapter 4. Nature means (1) the genesis of growing things – the meaning which would be suggested if one were to pronounce the u in phusis long. (2) That immanent part of a growing thing, from which its growth first proceeds. (3) The source from which the primary movement in each natural object is present in it in virtue of its own essence. Those things are said to grow which derive increase from something else by contact and either by organic unity, or by organic adhesion as in the case of embryos. Organic unity differs from contact; for in the latter case there need not be anything besides the contact, but in organic unities there is something identical in both parts, which makes them grow together instead of merely touching, and be one in respect of continuity and quantity, though not of quality.(4) Nature means the primary material of which any natural object consists or out of which it is made, which is relatively unshaped and cannot be changed from its own potency, as e.g. bronze is said to be the nature of a statue and of bronze utensils, and wood the nature of wooden things; and so in all other cases; for when a product is made out of these materials, the first matter is preserved throughout. For it is in this way that people call the elements of natural objects also their nature, some naming fire, others earth, others air, others water, others something else of the sort, and some naming more than one of these, and others all of them. (5) Nature means the essence of natural objects, as with those who say the nature is the primary mode of composition, or as Empedocles says: [15a] "Nothing that is has a nature, But only mixing and parting of the mixed, And nature is but a name given them by men". Hence as regards the things that are or come to be by nature, though that from which they naturally come to be or are is already present, we say they have not their nature yet, unless they have their form or shape. That which comprises both of these exists by nature, e.g. the animals and their parts;
φύσις δὲ ἥ τε πρώτη ὕλη (καὶ αὕτη διχῶς, ἢ ἡ πρὸς αὐτὸ πρώτη ἢ ἡ ὅλως πρώτη, οἷον τῶν χαλκῶν ἔργων πρὸς αὐτὰ μὲν πρῶτος ὁ χαλκός, ὅλως δ᾽ [10] ἴσως ὕδωρ, εἰ πάντα τὰ τηκτὰ ὕδωρ) καὶ τὸ εἶδος καὶ ἡ οὐσία: τοῦτο δ᾽ ἐστὶ τὸ τέλος τῆς γενέσεως. μεταφορᾷ δ᾽ ἤδη καὶ ὅλως πᾶσα οὐσία φύσις λέγεται διὰ ταύτην, ὅτι καὶ ἡ φύσις οὐσία τίς ἐστιν. * Natura autem materia prima; et haec dupliciter, aut quae ad ipsum prima aut omnino prima, ut operum ereorum ad ipsa quidem primum es, totaliter vero forsan aqua, si omnia liquabilia aqua. Et species et substantia; hoc autem est finis generationis. Methaphora vero iam et omnino omnis substantia natura dicitur propter hanc, quia et natura substantia quaedam est. and not only is the first matter nature (and this in two senses, either the first, counting from the thing, or the first in general; e.g. in the case of works in bronze, bronze is first with reference to them, but in general perhaps water is first, if all things that can be melted are water), but also the form or essence, which is the end of the process of becoming. (6) By an extension of meaning from this sense of nature every essence in general has come to be called a nature , because the nature of a thing is one kind of essence.
ἐκ δὴ τῶν εἰρημένων ἡ πρώτη φύσις καὶ κυρίως λεγομένη ἐστὶν ἡ οὐσία ἡ τῶν ἐχόντων [15] ἀρχὴν κινήσεως ἐν αὑτοῖς ᾗ αὐτά: ἡ γὰρ ὕλη τῷ ταύτης δεκτικὴ εἶναι λέγεται φύσις, καὶ αἱ γενέσεις καὶ τὸ φύεσθαι τῷ ἀπὸ ταύτης εἶναι κινήσεις. καὶ ἡ ἀρχὴ τῆς κινήσεως τῶν φύσει ὄντων αὕτη ἐστίν, ἐνυπάρχουσά πως ἢ δυνάμει ἢ ἐντελεχείᾳ. [20] Ex dictis igitur prima natura et proprie dicta est substantia quae principium motus habentium in se in quantum ipsa; materia namque, quia huius est susceptiva, esse dicitur natura, et generationes et nasci, quia sunt ab hac motus. Et principium motus natura existentium haec est, inexistens aut potestate aut actu. From what has been said, then, it is plain that nature in the primary and strict sense is the essence of things which have in themselves, as such, a source of movement; for the matter is called the nature because it is qualified to receive this, and processes of becoming and growing are called nature because they are movements proceeding from this. And nature in this sense is the source of the movement of natural objects, being present in them somehow, either potentially or in complete reality.

Chapter 5 Necessary

Greek Latin English
ἀναγκαῖον λέγεται οὗ ἄνευ οὐκ ἐνδέχεται ζῆν ὡς συναιτίου (οἷον τὸ ἀναπνεῖν καὶ ἡ τροφὴ τῷ ζῴῳ ἀναγκαῖον, ἀδύνατον γὰρ ἄνευ τούτων εἶναι), Necessarium dicitur sine quo non contingit vivere quasi concausali, ut respirare et cibus animali necessarium; nam sine hiis esse est impossibile. Chapter 5. We call necessary (1) (a) that without which, as a condition, a thing cannot live; e.g. breathing and food are necessary for an animal; for it is incapable of existing without these;
καὶ ὧν ἄνευ τὸ ἀγαθὸν μὴ ἐνδέχεται ἢ εἶναι ἢ γενέσθαι, ἢ τὸ κακὸν ἀποβαλεῖν ἢ στερηθῆναι (οἷον τὸ πιεῖν τὸ φάρμακον ἀναγκαῖον [25] ἵνα μὴ κάμνῃ, καὶ τὸ πλεῦσαι εἰς Αἴγιναν ἵνα ἀπολάβῃ τὰ χρήματα). Et sine quibus bonum non contingit aut esse aut fieri, aut aliquod malum expellere aut privari, > veluti bibere farmacum necessarium ut non laboret, et ad eginam navigare ut pecuniam recipiat. (b) the conditions without which good cannot be or come to be, or without which we cannot get rid or be freed of evil; e.g. drinking the medicine is necessary in order that we may be cured of disease, and a man _ s sailing to Aegina is necessary in order that he may get his money.
ἔτι τὸ βίαιον καὶ ἡ βία: τοῦτο δ᾽ ἐστὶ τὸ παρὰ τὴν ὁρμὴν καὶ τὴν προαίρεσιν ἐμποδίζον καὶ κωλυτικόν, τὸ γὰρ βίαιον ἀναγκαῖον λέγεται, διὸ καὶ λυπηρόν (ὥσπερ καὶ Εὔηνός φησι πᾶν γὰρ ἀναγκαῖον πρᾶγμ᾽ ἀνιαρὸν [30] ἔφυ),

καὶ ἡ βία ἀνάγκη τις (ὥσπερ καὶ Σοφοκλῆς λέγει [31] ἀλλ᾽ ἡ βία με ταῦτ᾽ ἀναγκάζει ποιεῖν),

  1. 954;αὶ δοκεῖ ἡ ἀνάγκη ἀμετάπειστόν τι εἶναι, ὀρθῶς: ἐναντίον γὰρ τῇ κατὰ τὴν προαίρεσιν κινήσει καὶ κατὰ τὸν λογισμόν.
Amplius vim faciens et vis; hoc autem est quod praeter impetum et preuoluntatem impediens et prohibens. Violentum enim necessarium dicitur, quapropter et triste, sicut et euenus ait: “ omnis enim res necessaria tristis est *”. Et vis necessitas quaedam, ut sophocles dicit: “sed vis me haec facere cogit”. Et videtur necessitas non increpabile aliquid esse, recte; contrarium enim * motui secundum prevoluntatem et secundum cogitationem. (2) The compulsory and compulsion, i.e. that which impedes and tends to hinder, contrary to impulse and purpose. For the compulsory is called necessary (whence the necessary is painful, as Evenus says: 'For every necessary thing is ever irksome'), and compulsion is a form of necessity, as Sophocles says: "But force necessitates me to this act" . And necessity is held to be something that cannot be persuaded – and rightly, for it is contrary to the movement which accords with purpose and with reasoning.
ἔτι τὸ μὴ ἐνδεχόμενον ἄλλως ἔχειν ἀναγκαῖόν φαμεν οὕτως [35] ἔχειν: καὶ κατὰ τοῦτο τὸ ἀναγκαῖον καὶ τἆλλα λέγεταί πως ἅπαντα ἀναγκαῖα: Amplius quod non contingit aliter se habere necessarium dicimus sic se habere. (3) We say that that which cannot be otherwise is necessarily as it is.
τό τε γὰρ βίαιον ἀναγκαῖον λέγεται ἢ ποιεῖν ἢ πάσχειν τότε, [1015β] [1] ὅταν μὴ ἐνδέχηται κατὰ τὴν ὁρμὴν διὰ τὸ βιαζόμενον, ὡς ταύτην ἀνάγκην οὖσαν δι᾽ ἣν μὴ ἐνδέχεται ἄλλως, καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν συναιτίων τοῦ ζῆν καὶ τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ ὡσαύτως: ὅταν γὰρ μὴ ἐνδέχηται ἔνθα [5] μὲν τὸ ἀγαθὸν ἔνθα δὲ τὸ ζῆν καὶ τὸ εἶναι ἄνευ τινῶν, ταῦτα ἀναγκαῖα καὶ ἡ αἰτία ἀνάγκη τίς ἐστιν αὕτη. Et secundum hoc necessarium et alia dicuntur aliqualiter oinnia necessaria; violentum enim necessarium dicitur aut facere aut pati tunc, quando non contingit secundum impetum propter cogens, ut hanc necessitatem existentem propter quam non contingit aliter. Et in concausalibus vivendi et boni similiter; nam cum non contingit hic quidem bonum illic vero vivere et esse sine aliquibus, haec necessaria; causa necessitas quaedam est haec. And from this sense of necessary all the others are somehow derived; for a thing is said to do or suffer what [15b] is necessary in the sense of compulsory, only when it cannot act according to its impulse because of the compelling forces – which implies that necessity is that because of which a thing cannot be otherwise; and similarly as regards the conditions of life and of good; for when in the one case good, in the other life and being, are not possible without certain conditions, these are necessary, and this kind of cause is a sort of necessity.
ἔτι ἡ ἀπόδειξις τῶν ἀναγκαίων, ὅτι οὐκ ἐνδέχεται ἄλλως ἔχειν, εἰ ἀποδέδεικται ἁπλῶς: τούτου δ᾽ αἴτια τὰ πρῶτα, εἰ ἀδύνατον ἄλλως ἔχειν ἐξ ὧν ὁ συλλογισμός. Amplius demonstratio necessariorum est, quia non contingit aliter se habere, si demonstratum est simpliciter; huius autem causa est quae prima sunt, si impossibile est aliter se habere ex quibus est sillogismus. Again, demonstration is a necessary thing because the conclusion cannot be otherwise, if there has been demonstration in the unqualified sense; and the causes of this necessity are the first premisses, i.e. the fact that the propositions from which the syllogism proceeds cannot be otherwise.
τῶν μὲν [10] δὴ ἕτερον αἴτιον τοῦ ἀναγκαῖα εἶναι, τῶν δὲ οὐδέν, ἀλλὰ διὰ ταῦτα ἕτερά ἐστιν ἐξ ἀνάγκης. ὥστε τὸ πρῶτον καὶ κυρίως ἀναγκαῖον τὸ ἁπλοῦν ἐστίν: τοῦτο γὰρ οὐκ ἐνδέχεται πλεοναχῶς ἔχειν, ὥστ᾽ οὐδὲ ἄλλως καὶ ἄλλως: ἤδη γὰρ πλεοναχῶς ἂν ἔχοι. εἰ ἄρα ἔστιν ἄττα ἀΐδια καὶ ἀκίνητα, [15] οὐδὲν ἐκείνοις ἐστὶ βίαιον οὐδὲ παρὰ φύσιν. horum quidem itaque altera causa essendi necessaria *, horum autem nulla, sed propter haec alia sunt ex necessitate. quare primum et proprie necessarium quod simplex est; hoc enim non contingit pluribus modis habere, quare nec aliter et aliter; iam enim pluribus modis utique haberet. Ergo si qua sunt sempiterna et immobilia, nihil illis est violentum nec praeter naturam. Now some things owe their necessity to something other than themselves; others do not, but are themselves the source of necessity in other things. Therefore the necessary in the primary and strict sense is the simple; for this does not admit of more states than one, so that it cannot even be in one state and also in another; for if it did it would already be in more than one. If, then, there are any things that are eternal and unmovable, nothing compulsory or against their nature attaches to them.

Chapter 6 One

Greek Latin English
ἓν λέγεται τὸ μὲν κατὰ συμβεβηκὸς τὸ δὲ καθ᾽ αὑτό, κατὰ συμβεβηκὸς μὲν οἷον Κορίσκος καὶ τὸ μουσικόν, καὶ Κορίσκος μουσικός (ταὐτὸ γὰρ εἰπεῖν Κορίσκος καὶ τὸ μουσικόν, καὶ Κορίσκος μουσικός), καὶ τὸ μουσικὸν καὶ τὸ [20] δίκαιον, καὶ μουσικὸς <Κορίσκος> καὶ δίκαιος Κορίσκος: πάντα γὰρ ταῦτα ἓν λέγεται κατὰ συμβεβηκός, τὸ μὲν δίκαιον καὶ τὸ μουσικὸν ὅτι μιᾷ οὐσίᾳ συμβέβηκεν, τὸ δὲ μουσικὸν καὶ Κορίσκος ὅτι θάτερον θατέρῳ συμβέβηκεν: ὁμοίως δὲ τρόπον τινὰ καὶ ὁ μουσικὸς Κορίσκος τῷ Κορίσκῳ ἓν ὅτι θάτερον [25] τῶν μορίων θατέρῳ συμβέβηκε τῶν ἐν τῷ λόγῳ, οἷον τὸ μουσικὸν τῷ Κορίσκῳ: καὶ ὁ μουσικὸς Κορίσκος δικαίῳ Κορίσκῳ ὅτι ἑκατέρου μέρος τῷ αὐτῷ ἑνὶ συμβέβηκεν ἕν. ὡσαύτως δὲ κἂν ἐπὶ γένους κἂν ἐπὶ τῶν καθόλου τινὸς ὀνομάτων λέγηται τὸ συμβεβηκός, οἷον ὅτι ἄνθρωπος τὸ αὐτὸ [30] καὶ μουσικὸς ἄνθρωπος: ἢ γὰρ ὅτι τῷ ἀνθρώπῳ μιᾷ οὔσῃ οὐσίᾳ συμβέβηκε τὸ μουσικόν, ἢ ὅτι ἄμφω τῶν καθ᾽ ἕκαστόν τινι συμβέβηκεν, οἷον Κορίσκῳ. πλὴν οὐ τὸν αὐτὸν τρόπον ἄμφω ὑπάρχει, ἀλλὰ τὸ μὲν ἴσως ὡς γένος καὶ ἐν τῇ οὐσίᾳ τὸ δὲ ὡς ἕξις ἢ πάθος τῆς οὐσίας. ὅσα μὲν [35] οὖν κατὰ συμβεβηκὸς λέγεται ἕν, τοῦτον τὸν τρόπον λέγεται: Unum dicitur aliud secundum accidens aliud secundum se. Secundum accidens quidem ut Coriscus et musicum, et Coriscus musicus (idem enim est dicere Coriscus et musicum et Coriscus musicus), et musicum et iustum, et musicus iustus > Coriscus. Omnia enim haec unum dicuntur secundum accidens, iustum quidem et musicum, quia uni substantiae acciderunt, musicum vero et Coriscus, quia alterum alteri accidit. Similiter autem et modo quodam musicus Coriscus cum Corisco unum, quia altera partium alteri accidit earum quae sunt * in oratione, ut musicum Corisco. Et musicus Coriscus iusto Corisco, quia utriusque pars eidem uni accidit, unum. Nihil enim differt quam Corisco musicum accidere. Similiter autem sive in genere sive in universalis * alicuius nominibus dicatur accidens, ut quia homo idem * et musicus homo; aut enim quia homini uni existenti substantiae accidit musicum, aut quia ambo singularium alicui accidunt, ut Corisco. Tamen non eodem modo ambo insunt, sed hoc quidem forsan ut genus et in substantia, illud vero * ut habitus aut passio substantiae. Chapter 6. One means (1) that which is one by accident, (2) that which is one by its own nature. (1) Instances of the accidentally one are Coriscus and what is musical , and musical Coriscus (for it is the same thing to say Coriscus and what is musical , and musical Coriscus ), and what is musical and what is just , and musical Coriscus and just Coriscus . For all of these are called one by virtue of an accident, what is just and what is musical because they are accidents of one substance, what is musical and Coriscus because the one is an accident of the other; and similarly in a sense musical Coriscus is one with Coriscus because one of the parts of the phrase is an accident of the other, i.e. musical is an accident of Coriscus; and musical Coriscus is one with just Coriscus because one part of each is an accident of one and the same subject. The case is similar if the accident is predicated of a genus or of any universal name, e.g. if one says that man is the same as musical man ; for this is either because musical is an accident of man, which is one substance, or because both are accidents of some individual, e.g. Coriscus. Both, however, do not belong to him in the same way, but one presumably as genus and included in his substance, the other as a state or affection of the substance.
τῶν δὲ καθ᾽ ἑαυτὰ ἓν λεγομένων τὰ μὲν λέγεται τῷ συνεχῆ εἶναι, οἷον φάκελος δεσμῷ καὶ ξύλα κόλλῃ: [1016α] [1] καὶ γραμμή, κἂν κεκαμμένη ᾖ, συνεχὴς δέ, μία λέγεται, ὥσπερ καὶ τῶν μερῶν ἕκαστον, οἷον σκέλος καὶ βραχίων. αὐτῶν δὲ τούτων μᾶλλον ἓν τὰ φύσει συνεχῆ ἢ τέχνῃ. [5] συνεχὲς δὲ λέγεται οὗ κίνησις μία καθ᾽ αὑτὸ καὶ μὴ οἷόν τε ἄλλως: μία δ᾽ οὗ ἀδιαίρετος, ἀδιαίρετος δὲ κατὰ χρόνον. Ergo quaecumque secundum accidens dicuntur unum, hoc modo dicuntur. Secundum se vero unum dictorum alia dicuntur eo quod continua sint, ut honus * vinculo et ligna cum visco; et linea, et si flexa sit, continua autem, una dicitur, sicut et partium singule, tibia et brachium. Ipsorum autem horum magis unum * natura continua quam arte. Continuum vero dicitur cuius motus * unus secundum se et non possibile aliter; unus autem cuius indivisibilis, indivisibilis autem secundum tempus. The things, then, that are called one in virtue of an accident, are called so in this way. (2) Of things that are called one in virtue of their own nature some (a) are so called because [16a] they are continuous, e.g. a bundle is made one by a band, and pieces of wood are made one by glue; and a line, even if it is bent, is called one if it is continuous, as each part of the body is, e.g. the leg or the arm. Of these themselves, the continuous by nature are more one than the continuous by art. A thing is called continuous which has by its own nature one movement and cannot have any other; and the movement is one when it is indivisible, and it is indivisible in respect of time.
καθ᾽ αὑτὰ δὲ συνεχῆ ὅσα μὴ ἁφῇ ἕν: εἰ γὰρ θείης ἁπτόμενα ἀλλήλων ξύλα, οὐ φήσεις ταῦτα εἶναι ἓν οὔτε ξύλον οὔτε σῶμα οὔτ᾽ ἄλλο συνεχὲς οὐδέν. τά τε δὴ ὅλως συνεχῆ [10] ἓν λέγεται κἂν ἔχῃ κάμψιν, καὶ ἔτι μᾶλλον τὰ μὴ ἔχοντα κάμψιν, οἷον κνήμη ἢ μηρὸς σκέλους, ὅτι ἐνδέχεται μὴ μίαν εἶναι τὴν κίνησιν τοῦ σκέλους. καὶ ἡ εὐθεῖα τῆς κεκαμμένης μᾶλλον ἕν: τὴν δὲ κεκαμμένην καὶ ἔχουσαν γωνίαν καὶ μίαν καὶ οὐ μίαν λέγομεν, ὅτι ἐνδέχεται καὶ μὴ ἅμα τὴν [15] κίνησιν αὐτῆς εἶναι καὶ ἅμα: τῆς δ᾽ εὐθείας ἀεὶ ἅμα, καὶ οὐδὲν μόριον ἔχον μέγεθος τὸ μὲν ἠρεμεῖ τὸ δὲ κινεῖται, ὥσπερ τῆς κεκαμμένης. Secundum se autem continua quaecumque non tactu sunt unum; nam si ponis se tangentia ligna, non dices haec unum esse nec lignum nec corpus nec aliud continuum nullum. Quae itaque omnino sunt continua unum dicuntur quamvis reflexionem habeant, et adhuc magis quae non habent reflexionem, ut tibia aut crus quam skelos, quia contingit > non unum esse motum skeli. Et recta quam flexa magis unum. Reflexam vero et angulum habentem unam et non unam dicimus, quia contingit et non simul esse motum eius et simul recte vero semper simul, et nulla pars habens magnitudinem haec quidem quiescit illa vero movetur, quemadmodum reflexe. Those things are continuous by their own nature which are one not merely by contact; for if you put pieces of wood touching one another, you will not say these are one piece of wood or one body or one continuum of any other sort. Things, then, that are continuous in any way called one, even if they admit of being bent, and still more those which cannot be bent; e.g. the shin or the thigh is more one than the leg, because the movement of the leg need not be one. And the straight line is more one than the bent; but that which is bent and has an angle we call both one and not one, because its movement may be either simultaneous or not simultaneous; but that of the straight line is always simultaneous, and no part of it which has magnitude rests while another moves, as in the bent line.
ἔτι ἄλλον τρόπον ἓν λέγεται τῷ τὸ ὑποκείμενον τῷ εἴδει εἶναι ἀδιάφορον: ἀδιάφορον δ᾽ ὧν ἀδιαίρετον τὸ εἶδος κατὰ τὴν αἴσθησιν: τὸ δ᾽ ὑποκείμενον [20] ἢ τὸ πρῶτον ἢ τὸ τελευταῖον πρὸς τὸ τέλος: καὶ γὰρ οἶνος εἷς λέγεται καὶ ὕδωρ ἕν, ᾗ ἀδιαίρετον κατὰ τὸ εἶδος, καὶ οἱ χυμοὶ πάντες λέγονται ἕν (οἷον ἔλαιον οἶνος) καὶ τὰ τηκτά, ὅτι πάντων τὸ ἔσχατον ὑποκείμενον τὸ αὐτό: ὕδωρ γὰρ ἢ ἀὴρ πάντα ταῦτα. Amplius alio modo dicitur * eo quod subiectum sit specie * indifferens; indifferens vero quorum indivisibilis * species secundum sensum. Subiectum autem aut primum aut ultimum ad finem. Vinum enim unum dicitur et aqua una in quantum * indivisibile secundum speciem, et iiquores omnes unum dicuntur (ut oleum, vinum) et fluida, quia omnium ultimum subiectum * idem; nam aqua aut aer omnia haec sunt. (b)(i) Things are called one in another sense because their substratum does not differ in kind; it does not differ in the case of things whose kind is indivisible to sense. The substratum meant is either the nearest to, or the farthest from, the final state. For, one the one hand, wine is said to be one and water is said to be one, qua indivisible in kind; and, on the other hand, all juices, e.g. oil and wine, are said to be one, and so are all things that can be melted, because the ultimate substratum of all is the same; for all of these are water or air.
λέγεται δ᾽ ἓν καὶ ὧν τὸ γένος ἓν [25] διαφέρον ταῖς ἀντικειμέναις διαφοραῖς—καὶ ταῦτα λέγεται πάντα ἓν ὅτι τὸ γένος ἓν τὸ ὑποκείμενον ταῖς διαφοραῖς (οἷον ἵππος ἄνθρωπος κύων ἕν τι ὅτι πάντα ζῷα), καὶ τρόπον δὴ παραπλήσιον ὥσπερ ἡ ὕλη μία. ταῦτα δὲ ὁτὲ μὲν οὕτως ἓν λέγεται, ὁτὲ δὲ τὸ ἄνω γένος ταὐτὸν λέγεται [30] —ἂν ᾖ τελευταῖα τοῦ γένους εἴδη—τὸ ἀνωτέρω τούτων, οἷον τὸ ἰσοσκελὲς καὶ τὸ ἰσόπλευρον ταὐτὸ καὶ ἓν σχῆμα ὅτι ἄμφω τρίγωνα: τρίγωνα δ᾽ οὐ ταὐτά. Dicuntur autem unum et quorum genus unum differens oppositis differentiis. Et haec dicuntur omnia unum quia genus unum quod subicitur differentiis, ut equus, homo, canis unum quid, quia omnia animalia. Et modo itaque simili sicut materia una. Haec autem quandoque quidem ita unum dicuntur, quandoque vero genere superiore quod idem dicitur, si sint ultime species generis superiores hiis; ut isoskeles et isopleurus rsunt una et eadem1 figura, quia ambo triangulus; sed trianguli non iidem. (ii) Those things also are called one whose genus is one though distinguished by opposite differentiae – these too are all called one because the genus which underlies the differentiae is one (e.g. horse, man, and dog form a unity, because all are animals), and indeed in a way similar to that in which the matter is one. These are sometimes called one in this way, but sometimes it is the higher genus that is said to be the same (if they are infimae species of their genus) – the genus above the proximate genera; e.g. the isosceles and the equilateral are one and the same figure because both are triangles; but they are not the same triangles.
ἔτι δὲ ἓν λέγεται ὅσων ὁ λόγος ὁ τὸ τί ἦν εἶναι λέγων ἀδιαίρετος πρὸς ἄλλον τὸν δηλοῦντα [τί ἦν εἶναι] τὸ πρᾶγμα (αὐτὸς γὰρ καθ᾽ αὑτὸν [35] πᾶς λόγος διαιρετός). οὕτω γὰρ καὶ τὸ ηὐξημένον καὶ φθῖνον ἕν ἐστιν, ὅτι ὁ λόγος εἷς, ὥσπερ ἐπὶ τῶν ἐπιπέδων ὁ τοῦ εἴδους. Amplius autem unum dicuntur quorumcumque ratio quae quod quid erat esse dicit indivisibilis est ad aliam significantem quid erat esse rem (ipsa enim secundum se omnis ratio divisibilis). Sic enim augmentatum et minutum unum sunt, quia ratio una, sicut in superficiebus quae speciei una. (c) Two things are called one, when the definition which states the essence of one is indivisible from another definition which shows us the other (though in itself every definition is divisible). Thus even that which has increased or is diminishing is one, because its definition is one, as, in [16b] the case of plane figures, is the definition of their form.
[1016β] [1] ὅλως δὲ ὧν ἡ νόησις ἀδιαίρετος ἡ νοοῦσα τὸ τί ἦν εἶναι, καὶ μὴ δύναται χωρίσαι μήτε χρόνῳ μήτε τόπῳ μήτε λόγῳ, μάλιστα ταῦτα ἕν, καὶ τούτων ὅσα οὐσίαι: Omnino vero > quorum intelligentia indivisibilis intelligens quid erat esse, et non potest separari neque tempore neque loco neque ratione, maxime haec unum, et horum quaecumque substantia. In general those things the thought of whose essence is indivisible, and cannot separate them either in time or in place or in definition, are most of all one, and of these especially those which are substances.
καθόλου γὰρ ὅσα μὴ ἔχει διαίρεσιν, ᾗ μὴ ἔχει, ταύτῃ ἓν λέγεται, [5] οἷον εἰ ᾗ ἄνθρωπος μὴ ἔχει διαίρεσιν, εἷς ἄνθρωπος, εἰ δ᾽ ᾗ ζῷον, ἓν ζῷον, εἰ δὲ ᾗ μέγεθος, ἓν μέγεθος. τὰ μὲν οὖν πλεῖστα ἓν λέγεται τῷ ἕτερόν τι ἢ ποιεῖν ἢ ἔχειν ἢ πάσχειν ἢ πρός τι εἶναι ἕν, τὰ δὲ πρώτως λεγόμενα ἓν ὧν ἡ οὐσία μία, μία δὲ ἢ συνεχείᾳ ἢ εἴδει ἢ λόγῳ: καὶ γὰρ [10] ἀριθμοῦμεν ὡς πλείω ἢ τὰ μὴ συνεχῆ ἢ ὧν μὴ ἓν τὸ εἶδος ἢ ὧν ὁ λόγος μὴ εἷς. Universaliter enim quaecumque non habent divisionem, in quantum non habent, sic unum dicuntur; ut si in quantum homo non habet divisionem, unus homo, si vero in quantum animal, unum animal, et si in quantum magnitudo, una magnitudo. Plurima quidem igitur unum dicuntur per alterum aliquid facere aut pati aut habere aut ad aliquid esse unum, quae autem primo dicuntur unum quorum substantia una, una vero aut continuatione aut specie aut ratione; et enim numeramus ut plura aut quae non continua aut quorum non una species aut quorum ratio non una. For in general those things that do not admit of division are called one in so far as they do not admit of it; e.g. if two things are indistinguishable qua man, they are one kind of man; if qua animal, one kind of animal; if qua magnitude, one kind of magnitude. Now most things are called one because they either do or have or suffer or are related to something else that is one, but the things that are primarily called one are those whose substance is one, – and one either in continuity or in form or in definition; for we count as more than one either things that are not continuous, or those whose form is not one, or those whose definition is not one.
ἔτι δ᾽ ἔστι μὲν ὡς ὁτιοῦν ἕν φαμεν εἶναι ἂν ᾖ ποσὸν καὶ συνεχές, ἔστι δ᾽ ὡς οὔ, ἂν μή τι ὅλον ᾖ, τοῦτο δὲ ἂν μὴ τὸ εἶδος ἔχῃ ἕν: οἷον οὐκ ἂν φαῖμεν ὁμοίως ἓν ἰδόντες ὁπωσοῦν τὰ μέρη συγκείμενα τοῦ ὑποδήματος, [15] ἐὰν μὴ διὰ τὴν συνέχειαν, ἀλλ᾽ ἐὰν οὕτως ὥστε ὑπόδημα εἶναι καὶ εἶδός τι ἔχειν ἤδη ἕν: διὸ καὶ ἡ τοῦ κύκλου μάλιστα μία τῶν γραμμῶν, ὅτι ὅλη καὶ τέλειός ἐστιν. Amplius autem est quidem ut quodcumque unum continuitate dicimus esse, si sit quantum et continuum, est autem ut non, si non aliquod totum sit, hoc autem si non speciem habeat unam; ut non utique dicemus rsimiliter unum videntes1 qualitercumque partes compositas calciamenti, nisi propter continuitatem, sed si sic ut calciamentum sit et 1016b 15 speciem habeat aliquam iam unam. Quapropter et quae circuli maxime una linearum, quia tota et perfecta est. While in a sense we call anything one if it is a quantity and continuous, in a sense we do not unless it is a whole, i.e. unless it has unity of form; e.g. if we saw the parts of a shoe put together anyhow we should not call them one all the same (unless because of their continuity); we do this only if they are put together so as to be a shoe and to have already a certain single form. This is why the circle is of all lines most truly one, because it is whole and complete.
τὸ δὲ ἑνὶ εἶναι ἀρχῇ τινί ἐστιν ἀριθμοῦ εἶναι: τὸ γὰρ πρῶτον μέτρον ἀρχή, ᾧ γὰρ πρώτῳ γνωρίζομεν, τοῦτο πρῶτον μέτρον [20] ἑκάστου γένους: ἀρχὴ οὖν τοῦ γνωστοῦ περὶ ἕκαστον τὸ ἕν. οὐ ταὐτὸ δὲ ἐν πᾶσι τοῖς γένεσι τὸ ἕν. ἔνθα μὲν γὰρ δίεσις ἔνθα δὲ τὸ φωνῆεν ἢ ἄφωνον: βάρους δὲ ἕτερον καὶ κινήσεως ἄλλο. πανταχοῦ δὲ τὸ ἓν ἢ τῷ ποσῷ ἢ τῷ εἴδει ἀδιαίρετον. τὸ μὲν οὖν κατὰ τὸ ποσὸν ἀδιαίρετον, [25] τὸ μὲν πάντῃ καὶ ἄθετον λέγεται μονάς, τὸ δὲ πάντῃ καὶ θέσιν ἔχον στιγμή, τὸ δὲ μοναχῇ γραμμή, τὸ δὲ διχῇ ἐπίπεδον, τὸ δὲ πάντῃ καὶ τριχῇ διαιρετὸν κατὰ τὸ ποσὸν σῶμα: καὶ ἀντιστρέψαντι δὴ τὸ μὲν διχῇ διαιρετὸν ἐπίπεδον, τὸ δὲ μοναχῇ γραμμή, τὸ δὲ μηδαμῇ διαιρετὸν κατὰ [30] τὸ ποσὸν στιγμὴ καὶ μονάς, ἡ μὲν ἄθετος μονὰς ἡ δὲ θετὸς στιγμή. Uni vero esse principium alicui est numero esse; prima namque mensura principium; nam quo primo cognoscimus, hoc est prima mensura cuiusque generis; principium ergo cognoscibilis circa quodlibet unum. Non idem autem in omnibus generibus * unum. Hic quidem enim est diesis, illic autem vocalis aut consonans; gravitatis autem alterum et motus aliud. Vbique vero unum aut quantitate aut specie indivisibile. * secundum quantum quidem igitur et in quantum quantum > indivisibile: quod quidem omnino et sine positione dicitur unitas, quod autem omnino et positionem habens punctum; quod autem secundum unum linea, quod vero secundum duo superficies, omnino vero et tripliciter divisibile secundum quantitatem corpus. Facta autem conversione: dualiter quidem divisibile superficies, unice autem linea, nullatenus divisibile secundum quantitatem punctum et unitas; hoc quidem non habens positionem unitas, illud vero habens positionem punctum. (3) The essence of what is one is to be some kind of beginning of number; for the first measure is the beginning, since that by which we first know each class is the first measure of the class; the one, then, is the beginning of the knowable regarding each class. But the one is not the same in all classes. For here it is a quarter-tone, and there it is the vowel or the consonant; and there is another unit of weight and another of movement. But everywhere the one is indivisible either in quantity or in kind. Now that which is indivisible in quantity is called a unit if it is not divisible in any dimension and is without position, a point if it is not divisible in any dimension and has position, a line if it is divisible in one dimension, a plane if in two, a body if divisible in quantity in all i.e. in three dimensions. And, reversing the order, that which is divisible in two dimensions is a plane, that which is divisible in one a line, that which is in no way divisible in quantity is a point or a unit, – that which has not position a unit, that which has position a point.
ἔτι δὲ τὰ μὲν κατ᾽ ἀριθμόν ἐστιν ἕν, τὰ δὲ κατ᾽ εἶδος, τὰ δὲ κατὰ γένος, τὰ δὲ κατ᾽ ἀναλογίαν, ἀριθμῷ μὲν ὧν ἡ ὕλη μία, εἴδει δ᾽ ὧν ὁ λόγος εἷς, γένει δ᾽ ὧν τὸ αὐτὸ σχῆμα τῆς κατηγορίας, κατ᾽ ἀναλογίαν δὲ ὅσα ἔχει ὡς [35] ἄλλο πρὸς ἄλλο. ἀεὶ δὲ τὰ ὕστερα τοῖς ἔμπροσθεν ἀκολουθεῖ, οἷον ὅσα ἀριθμῷ καὶ εἴδει ἕν, ὅσα δ᾽ εἴδει οὐ πάντα ἀριθμῷ: [1017α] [1] ἀλλὰ γένει πάντα ἓν ὅσαπερ καὶ εἴδει, ὅσα δὲ γένει οὐ πάντα [2] εἴδει ἀλλ᾽ ἀναλογίᾳ: ὅσα δὲ ἀνολογίᾳ οὐ πάντα γένει. Amplius autem alia secundum numerum sunt unum, alia secundum speciem, alia secundum genus, alia secundum analogiam; numero quidem quorum materia una, specie quorum ratio una, genere quorum eadem figura predicationis, secundum proportionem quaecumque se habent ut aliud ad aliud. Semper itaque posteriora precedentia sequuntur, ut quaecumque numero specie unum, sed quaecumque specie non omnia numero; sed genere omnia unum quaecumque et specie, quaecumque vero genere non omnia specie sed proportione; et quaecumque unum proportione non omnia genere. Again, some things are one in number, others in species, others in genus, others by analogy; in number those whose matter is one, in species those whose definition is one, in genus those to which the same figure of predication applies, by analogy those which are related as a third thing is to a fourth. The latter kinds of unity are always found when the former are; e.g. things that are one in number are also one in species, while things that are one in species are not [17a] all one in number; but things that are one in species are all one in genus, while things that are so in genus are not all one in species but are all one by analogy; while things that are one by analogy are not all one in genus.
φανερὸν δὲ καὶ ὅτι τὰ πολλὰ ἀντικειμένως λεχθήσεται τῷ ἑνί: τὰ μὲν γὰρ τῷ μὴ συνεχῆ εἶναι, τὰ δὲ τῷ διαιρετὴν [5] ἔχειν τὴν ὕλην κατὰ τὸ εἶδος, ἢ τὴν πρώτην ἢ τὴν τελευταίαν, τὰ δὲ τῷ τοὺς λόγους πλείους τοὺς τί ἦν εἶναι λέγοντας. Palam autem et quod multa opposite dicentur uni; nam alia non existendo continua, alia in habendo materiam divisibilem secundum speciem, aut primam aut ultimam, alia in habendo rationes plures quid erat esse dicentes. Evidently many will have meanings opposite to those of one ; some things are many because they are not continuous, others because their matter – either the proximate matter or the ultimate – is divisible in kind, others because the definitions which state their essence are more than one.

Chapter 7 Being

Greek Latin English
τὸ ὂν λέγεται τὸ μὲν κατὰ συμβεβηκὸς τὸ δὲ καθ᾽ αὑτό, Ens dicitur hoc quidem secundum accidens illud vero secundum se. Chapter 7. Things are said to be (1) in an accidental sense, (2) by their own nature.
κατὰ συμβεβηκὸς μέν, οἷον τὸν δίκαιον μουσικὸν εἶναί φαμεν καὶ τὸν ἄνθρωπον μουσικὸν καὶ τὸν μουσικὸν [10] ἄνθρωπον, παραπλησίως λέγοντες ὡσπερεὶ τὸν μουσικὸν οἰκοδομεῖν ὅτι συμβέβηκε τῷ οἰκοδόμῳ μουσικῷ εἶναι ἢ τῷ μουσικῷ οἰκοδόμῳ (τὸ γὰρ τόδε εἶναι τόδε σημαίνει τὸ συμβεβηκέναι τῷδε τόδε), οὕτω δὲ καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν εἰρημένων: τὸν γὰρ ἄνθρωπον ὅταν μουσικὸν λέγωμεν καὶ τὸν μουσικὸν ἄνθρωπον, [15] ἢ τὸν λευκὸν μουσικὸν ἢ τοῦτον λευκόν, τὸ μὲν ὅτι ἄμφω τῷ αὐτῷ συμβεβήκασι, τὸ δ᾽ ὅτι τῷ ὄντι συμβέβηκε, τὸ δὲ μουσικὸν ἄνθρωπον ὅτι τούτῳ τὸ μουσικὸν συμβέβηκεν (οὕτω δὲ λέγεται καὶ τὸ μὴ λευκὸν εἶναι, ὅτι ᾧ συμβέβηκεν, ἐκεῖνο ἔστιν): τὰ μὲν οὖν κατὰ συμβεβηκὸς [20] εἶναι λεγόμενα οὕτω λέγεται ἢ διότι τῷ αὐτῷ ὄντι ἄμφω ὑπάρχει, ἢ ὅτι ὄντι ἐκείνῳ ὑπάρχει, ἢ ὅτι αὐτὸ ἔστιν ᾧ ὑπάρχει οὗ αὐτὸ κατηγορεῖται: Secundum accidens quidem, ut iustum musicum esse dicimus et hominem musicum et musicum hominem, similiter dicentes ut musicum edificare, quia accidit edificatori musicum esse aut musico edificatorem; hoc enim esse hoc significat accidere hoc huic. Sic autem et in dictis; hominem quando musicum dicimus et musicum hominem, aut album musicum > aut hunc album: hoc quidem quia ambo eidem acciderunt, illud vero quia enti accidit *, hoc autem musicum hominem quia huic musicum accidit (sic autem dicitur et album esse, quia cui accidit, ille est). Quae quidem igitur secundum accidens esse dicuntur sic dicuntur aut eo quod eidem enti ambo insunt, aut quia enti illud inest, aut quia ipsum est cui inest de quo ipsum predicatur. (1) In an accidental sense, e.g. we say "the righteous doer is musical" , and "the man is musical" , and "the musician is a man" , just as we say "the musician builds" , because the builder happens to be musical or the musician to be a builder; for here "one thing is another" means "one is an accident of another" . So in the cases we have mentioned; for when we say "the man is musical" and "the musician is a man" , or "he who is pale is musical" or "the musician is pale" , the last two mean that both attributes are accidents of the same thing; the first that the attribute is an accident of that which is, while "the musical is a man" means that musical is an accident of a man. (In this sense, too, the not-pale is said to be, because that of which it is an accident is.) Thus when one thing is said in an accidental sense to be another, this is either because both belong to the same thing, and this is, or because that to which the attribute belongs is, or because the subject which has as an attribute that of which it is itself predicated, itself is.
καθ᾽ αὑτὰ δὲ εἶναι λέγεται ὅσαπερ σημαίνει τὰ σχήματα τῆς κατηγορίας: ὁσαχῶς γὰρ λέγεται, τοσαυταχῶς τὸ εἶναι σημαίνει. ἐπεὶ οὖν τῶν [25] κατηγορουμένων τὰ μὲν τί ἐστι σημαίνει, τὰ δὲ ποιόν, τὰ δὲ ποσόν, τὰ δὲ πρός τι, τὰ δὲ ποιεῖν ἢ πάσχειν, τὰ δὲ πού, τὰ δὲ ποτέ, ἑκάστῳ τούτων τὸ εἶναι ταὐτὸ σημαίνει: οὐθὲν γὰρ διαφέρει τὸ ἄνθρωπος ὑγιαίνων ἐστὶν ἢ τὸ ἄνθρωπος ὑγιαίνει, οὐδὲ τὸ ἄνθρωπος βαδίζων ἐστὶν ἢ τέμνων τοῦ ἄνθρωπος [30] βαδίζει ἢ τέμνει, ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἄλλων. Secundum se vero esse dicuntur quaecumque significant figuras predicationis; quotiens enim dicitur, totiens esse significat. Quoniam ergo predicatorum alia quid est significant, alia quale, alia quantum, alia ad aliquid, alia facere, alia pati, alia ubi, alia quando, horum unicuique esse idem significant. Nil enim refert ‘homo conualescens esf aut ‘homo convalescit’, vel ‘homo vadens est aut secans’ aut ‘hominem vadere aut secare’; similiter autem et in aliis. (2) The kinds of essential being are precisely those that are indicated by the figures of predication; for the senses of being are just as many as these figures. Since, then, some predicates indicate what the subject is, others its quality, others quantity, others relation, others activity or passivity, others its where , others its when, being has a meaning answering to each of these. For there is no difference between the man is recovering and the man recovers , nor between the man is walking or cutting and the man walks or cuts ; and similarly in all other cases.
ἔτι τὸ εἶναι σημαίνει καὶ τὸ ἔστιν ὅτι ἀληθές, τὸ δὲ μὴ εἶναι ὅτι οὐκ ἀληθὲς ἀλλὰ ψεῦδος, ὁμοίως ἐπὶ καταφάσεως καὶ ἀποφάσεως, οἷον ὅτι ἔστι Σωκράτης μουσικός, ὅτι ἀληθὲς τοῦτο, ἢ ὅτι ἔστι Σωκράτης οὐ λευκός, ὅτι ἀληθές: τὸ δ᾽ οὐκ [35] ἔστιν ἡ διάμετρος σύμμετρος, ὅτι ψεῦδος. Amplius esse et est significant quia verum, ** non esse autem quia non verum sed falsum, similiter in affirmatione et negatione; ut quod ‘est Socrates musicus’ quia hoc verum, aut quod ‘est Socrates non albus’, quod * verum; hoc autem ‘non est dyameter incommensurabilis’, quod falsum. (3) Again, being and is mean that a statement is true, not being that it is not true but falses – and this alike in the case of affirmation and of negation; e.g. Socrates is musical means that this is true, or Socrates is not-pale means that this is true; but the diagonal of the square is not commensurate with the side means that it is false to say it is.
[1017β] [1] ἔτι τὸ εἶναι σημαίνει καὶ τὸ ὂν τὸ μὲν δυνάμει ῥητὸν τὸ δ᾽ ἐντελεχείᾳ τῶν εἰρημένων τούτων: ὁρῶν τε γὰρ εἶναί φαμεν καὶ τὸ δυνάμει ὁρῶν καὶ τὸ ἐντελεχείᾳ, καὶ [τὸ] ἐπίστασθαι ὡσαύτως καὶ τὸ δυνάμενον χρῆσθαι τῇ ἐπιστήμῃ καὶ τὸ [5] χρώμενον, καὶ ἠρεμοῦν καὶ ᾧ ἤδη ὑπάρχει ἠρεμία καὶ τὸ δυνάμενον ἠρεμεῖν. ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν οὐσιῶν: καὶ γὰρ Ἑρμῆν ἐν τῷ λίθῳ φαμὲν εἶναι, καὶ τὸ ἥμισυ τῆς γραμμῆς, καὶ σῖτον τὸν μήπω ἁδρόν. πότε δὲ δυνατὸν καὶ πότε οὔπω, ἐν ἄλλοις διοριστέον. [10] Amplius esse significat et ens: ens hoc quidem potestate dicibile illud vero actu. Horum dictorum terminorum enim esse dicimus: et quod potestate est dicibile terminorum et quod est actu; et scire similiter: et potens uti scientia et utens; et quiescens: et cui iam inest quies et potens quiescere. Similiter autem et in substantiis; et enim Mercurium in lapide dicimus esse, et medietatem lineae, et frumentum nondum perfectum. Quando vero potens et quando nondum, in aliis determinandum. (4) Again, being and that which is mean that some [17b] of the things we have mentioned are potentially, others in complete reality. For we say both of that which sees potentially and of that which sees actually, that it is seeing , and both of that which can actualize its knowledge and of that which is actualizing it, that it knows, and both of that to which rest is already present and of that which can rest, that it rests. And similarly in the case of substances; we say the Hermes is in the stone, and the half of the line is in the line, and we say of that which is not yet ripe that it is corn. When a thing is potential and when it is not yet potential must be explained elsewhere.

Chapter 8 Substance

Greek Latin English
οὐσία λέγεται τά τε ἁπλᾶ σώματα, οἷον γῆ καὶ πῦρ καὶ ὕδωρ καὶ ὅσα τοιαῦτα, καὶ ὅλως σώματα καὶ τὰ ἐκ τούτων συνεστῶτα ζῷά τε καὶ δαιμόνια καὶ τὰ μόρια τούτων: ἅπαντα δὲ ταῦτα λέγεται οὐσία ὅτι οὐ καθ᾽ ὑποκειμένου λέγεται ἀλλὰ κατὰ τούτων τὰ ἄλλα. > Substantia dicitur et simplicia corpora, ut terra et ignis et aqua et quaecumque talia, et universaliter corpora et ex hiis consistentia, animalia et demonia et partes horum; haec autem omnia dicuntur substantia, quia non de subiecto dicuntur sed de hiis alia. Chapter 8. We call substance (1) the simple bodies, i.e. earth and fire and water and everything of the sort, and in general bodies and the things composed of them, both animals and divine beings, and the parts of these. All these are called substance because they are not predicated of a subject but everything else is predicated of them.
ἄλλον δὲ [15] τρόπον ὃ ἂν ᾖ αἴτιον τοῦ εἶναι, ἐνυπάρχον ἐν τοῖς τοιούτοις ὅσα μὴ λέγεται καθ᾽ ὑποκειμένου, οἷον ἡ ψυχὴ τῷ ζῴῳ. Alio vero modo quodcumque fuerit causa essendi, inexistens in talibus quaecumque non dicuntur de subiecto, ut anima * animali. (2) That which, being present in such things as are not predicated of a subject, is the cause of their being, as the soul is of the being of an animal.
ἔτι ὅσα μόρια ἐνυπάρχοντά ἐστιν ἐν τοῖς τοιούτοις ὁρίζοντά τε καὶ τόδε τι σημαίνοντα, ὧν ἀναιρουμένων ἀναιρεῖται τὸ ὅλον, οἷον ἐπιπέδου σῶμα, ὥς φασί τινες, καὶ ἐπίπεδον [20] γραμμῆς: καὶ ὅλως ὁ ἀριθμὸς δοκεῖ εἶναί τισι τοιοῦτος (ἀναιρουμένου τε γὰρ οὐδὲν εἶναι, καὶ ὁρίζειν πάντα): Amplius quaecumque particule existentes sunt in talibus et terminantes et hoc aliquid significantes, quibus destructis destruitur totum, ut superficie corpus, ut dicunt quidam, et superficies linea; et totaliter numerus videtur esse quibusdam talis; nam destructo nihil esse, et terminare omnia. (3) The parts which are present in such things, limiting them and marking them as individuals, and by whose destruction the whole is destroyed, as the body is by the destruction of the plane, as some say, and the plane by the destruction of the line; and in general number is thought by some to be of this nature; for if it is destroyed, they say, nothing exists, and it limits all things.
ἔτι τὸ τί ἦν εἶναι, οὗ ὁ λόγος ὁρισμός, καὶ τοῦτο οὐσία λέγεται ἑκάστου. Amplius quod quid erat esse, cuius ratio est diffinitio, et hoc substantia dicitur uniuscuiusque. (4) The essence, the formula of which is a definition, is also called the substance of each thing.
συμβαίνει δὴ κατὰ δύο τρόπους τὴν οὐσίαν λέγεσθαι, τό θ᾽ ὑποκείμενον ἔσχατον, ὃ μηκέτι κατ᾽ ἄλλου λέγεται, καὶ ὃ [25] ἂν τόδε τι ὂν καὶ χωριστὸν ᾖ: τοιοῦτον δὲ ἑκάστου ἡ μορφὴ καὶ τὸ εἶδος. Accidit itaque secundum duos modos substantiam dici: subiectum ultimum quod non adhuc de alio dicitur, et quodcumque hoc aliquid ens et separabile fuerit; tale vero uniuscuiusque forma et species. It follows, then, that substance has two senses, (A) ultimate substratum, which is no longer predicated of anything else, and (B) that which, being a this , is also separable and of this nature is the shape or form of each thing.

Chapter 9 The same

Greek Latin English
ταὐτὰ λέγεται τὰ μὲν κατὰ συμβεβηκός, οἷον τὸ λευκὸν καὶ τὸ μουσικὸν τὸ αὐτὸ ὅτι τῷ αὐτῷ συμβέβηκε, καὶ ἄνθρωπος καὶ μουσικὸν ὅτι θάτερον θατέρῳ συμβέβηκεν, [30] τὸ δὲ μουσικὸν ἄνθρωπος ὅτι τῷ ἀνθρώπῳ συμβέβηκεν: ἑκατέρῳ δὲ τοῦτο καὶ τούτῳ ἑκάτερον ἐκείνων, καὶ γὰρ τῷ ἀνθρώπῳ τῷ μουσικῷ καὶ ὁ ἄνθρωπος καὶ τὸ μουσικὸν ταὐτὸ λέγεται, καὶ τούτοις ἐκεῖνο (διὸ καὶ πάντα ταῦτα καθόλου οὐ λέγεται: οὐ γὰρ ἀληθὲς εἰπεῖν ὅτι πᾶς ἄνθρωπος ταὐτὸ [35] καὶ τὸ μουσικόν: τὰ γὰρ καθόλου καθ᾽ αὑτὰ ὑπάρχει, τὰ δὲ συμβεβηκότα οὐ καθ᾽ αὑτά: [1018α] [1] ἀλλ᾽ ἐπὶ τῶν καθ᾽ ἕκαστα ἁπλῶς λέγεται: ταὐτὸ γὰρ δοκεῖ Σωκράτης καὶ Σωκράτης εἶναι μουσικός: τὸ δὲ Σωκράτης οὐκ ἐπὶ πολλῶν, διὸ οὐ πᾶς Σωκράτης λέγεται ὥσπερ πᾶς ἄνθρωπος): καὶ τὰ μὲν οὕτως [5] λέγεται ταὐτά, Eadem vero dicuntur haec quidem secundum accidens, ut album et musicum idem quia eidem accidunt, et homo et musicum quia alterum alteri accidit, musicum autem homo quia musicum homini accidit; utrique autem hoc et horum utrumque illi, et enim homini musico et homo et musicum idem dicitur, et hiis illud. Quapropter et omnia haec universaliter non dicuntur; non enim est verum dicere quia omnis homo idem et musicum (nam universalia secundum se existunt, accidentia autem non secundum se); sed in singularibus simpliciter dicuntur. Idem enim videtur Socrates et Socrates esse musicus; nam Socrates non in multis, propter quod non ‘omnis Socrates’ dici>tur quemadmodum ‘omnis homo' Chapter 9. The same means (1) that which is the same in an accidental sense, e.g. the pale and the musical are the same because they are accidents of the same thing, and a man and musical because the one is an accident of the other; and the musical is a man because it is an accident of the man. (The complex entity is the same as either of the simple ones and each of these is the same as it; for both the man and the musical are said to be the same as the musical man , and this the same as they.) This is why all of these statements are made not universally; for it is not true to say that every man is the same as the musical (for universal attributes belong to things in virtue of [18a] their own nature, but accidents do not belong to them in virtue of their own nature); but of the individuals the statements are made without qualification. For Socrates and musical Socrates are thought to be the same; but Socrates is not predicable of more than one subject, and therefore we do not say every Socrates as we say every man .
τὰ δὲ καθ᾽ αὑτὰ ὁσαχῶσπερ καὶ τὸ ἕν: καὶ γὰρ ὧν ἡ ὕλη μία ἢ εἴδει ἢ ἀριθμῷ ταὐτὰ λέγεται καὶ ὧν ἡ οὐσία μία, ὥστε φανερὸν ὅτι ἡ ταυτότης ἑνότης τίς ἐστιν ἢ πλειόνων τοῦ εἶναι ἢ ὅταν χρῆται ὡς πλείοσιν, οἷον ὅταν λέγῃ αὐτὸ αὑτῷ ταὐτόν: ὡς δυσὶ γὰρ χρῆται αὐτῷ. et haec quidem sic dicuntur eadem. Alia vero secundum se quaecumque quemadmodum et unum; et enim quorum materia una aut specie aut numero eadem dicuntur, et quorum substantia una. Quare palam quia ydemptitas unitas quaedam est aut plurium essendi * aut quando utitur ut pluribus, veluti quando dixerit ipsum ipsi idem; nam ut duobus utitur eodem. Some things are said to be the same in this sense, others (2) are the same by their own nature, in as many senses as that which is one by its own nature is so; for both the things whose matter is one either in kind or in number, and those whose essence is one, are said to be the same. Clearly, therefore, sameness is a unity of the being either of more than one thing or of one thing when it is treated as more than one, ie. when we say a thing is the same as itself; for we treat it as two.
ἕτερα [10] δὲ λέγεται ὧν ἢ τὰ εἴδη πλείω ἢ ἡ ὕλη ἢ ὁ λόγος τῆς οὐσίας: καὶ ὅλως ἀντικειμένως τῷ ταὐτῷ λέγεται τὸ ἕτερον. Diversa vero dicuntur quorum aut species sunt plures aut materia aut ratio substantiae; et omnino opposite eidem dicitur diversum. Things are called other if either their kinds or their matters or the definitions of their essence are more than one; and in general other has meanings opposite to those of the same .
διάφορα δὲ λέγεται ὅς᾽ ἕτερά ἐστι τὸ αὐτό τι ὄντα, μὴ μόνον ἀριθμῷ ἀλλ᾽ ἢ εἴδει ἢ γένει ἢ ἀναλογίᾳ: ἔτι ὧν ἕτερον τὸ γένος, καὶ τὰ ἐναντία, καὶ ὅσα ἔχει ἐν τῇ οὐσίᾳ [15] τὴν ἑτερότητα. Differentia vero dicuntur quaecumque diversa sunt idem aliquid entia, et non solum numero sed aut specie aut genere aut proportione. Amplius quorum diversum genus, et contraria, et quaecumque habent in substantia diversitatem. Different is applied (1) to those things which though other are the same in some respect, only not in number but either in species or in genus or by analogy; (2) to those whose genus is other, and to contraries, and to an things that have their otherness in their essence.
ὅμοια λέγεται τά τε πάντῃ ταὐτὸ πεπονθότα, καὶ τὰ πλείω ταὐτὰ πεπονθότα ἢ ἕτερα, καὶ ὧν ἡ ποιότης μία: Similia dicuntur quae idem * passa, et plura idem passa aut diversa, et quorum qualitas una; Those things are called like which have the same attributes in every respect, and those which have more attributes the same than different, and those whose quality is one;
καὶ καθ᾽ ὅσα ἀλλοιοῦσθαι ἐνδέχεται τῶν ἐναντίων, τούτων τὸ πλείω ἔχον ἢ κυριώτερα ὅμοιον τούτῳ. ἀντικειμένως δὲ τοῖς ὁμοίοις τὰ ἀνόμοια. [20] et secundum quaecumque alterari contingit contrariorum, horum quod plura habet aut magis propria huic est simile. Opposite vero similibus dissimilia. and that which shares with another thing the greater number or the more important of the attributes (each of them one of two contraries) in respect of which things are capable of altering, is like that other thing. The senses of unlike are opposite to those of like .

Chapter 10 Opposite

Greek Latin English
ἀντικείμενα λέγεται ἀντίφασις καὶ τἀναντία καὶ τὰ πρός τι καὶ στέρησις καὶ ἕξις καὶ ἐξ ὧν καὶ εἰς ἃ ἔσχατα αἱ γενέσεις καὶ φθοραί: Opposita dicuntur contradictio et contraria et ad aliquid et privatio et habitus et ex quibus et ad quae ultima, ut generationes et corruptiones; Chapter 10. The term opposite is applied to contradictories, and to contraries, and to relative terms, and to privation and possession, and to the extremes from which and into which generation and dissolution take place;
καὶ ὅσα μὴ ἐνδέχεται ἅμα παρεῖναι τῷ ἀμφοῖν δεκτικῷ, ταῦτα ἀντικεῖσθαι λέγεται ἢ αὐτὰ ἢ ἐξ ὧν ἐστίν. φαιὸν γὰρ καὶ λευκὸν ἅμα τῷ [25] αὐτῷ οὐχ ὑπάρχει: διὸ ἐξ ὧν ἐστὶν ἀντίκειται. et quaecumque non contingunt simul adesse amborum susceptibili, haec opponi dicuntur aut ipsa aut ex quibus sunt. Nam pallidum et album simul eidem non insunt; propter quod ex quibus sunt opponuntur hiis. and the attributes that cannot be present at the same time in that which is receptive of both, are said to be opposed, – either themselves of their constituents. Grey and white colour do not belong at the same time to the same thing; hence their constituents are opposed.
ἐναντία λέγεται τά τε μὴ δυνατὰ ἅμα τῷ αὐτῷ παρεῖναι τῶν διαφερόντων κατὰ γένος, καὶ τὰ πλεῖστον διαφέροντα τῶν ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ γένει, καὶ τὰ πλεῖστον διαφέροντα τῶν ἐν ταὐτῷ δεκτικῷ, καὶ τὰ πλεῖστον διαφέροντα τῶν ὑπὸ τὴν αὐτὴν [30] δύναμιν, καὶ ὧν ἡ διαφορὰ μεγίστη ἢ ἁπλῶς ἢ κατὰ γένος ἢ κατ᾽ εἶδος. Contraria dicuntur quae non possunt simul adesse eidem differentium secundum genus, et quae plurimum differunt eorum quae sunt in eodem genere, et quae plurimum differunt eo quod in eodem susceptibili, et quae plurimum differunt > eorum quae sunt sub eadem potestate, et quorum differentia maxima aut simpliciter aut secundum genus aut secundum speciem. The term contrary is applied (1) to those attributes differing in genus which cannot belong at the same time to the same subject, (2) to the most different of the things in the same genus, (3) to the most different of the attributes in the same recipient subject, (4) to the most different of the things that fall under the same faculty, (5) to the things whose difference is greatest either absolutely or in genus or in species.
τὰ δ᾽ ἄλλα ἐναντία λέγεται τὰ μὲν τῷ τὰ τοιαῦτα ἔχειν, τὰ δὲ τῷ δεκτικὰ εἶναι τῶν τοιούτων, τὰ δὲ τῷ ποιητικὰ ἢ παθητικὰ εἶναι τῶν τοιούτων, ἢ ποιοῦντα ἢ πάσχοντα, ἢ ἀποβολαὶ ἢ λήψεις, ἢ ἕξεις ἢ στερήσεις [35] εἶναι τῶν τοιούτων. Alia vero contraria dicuntur haec quidem in talia habere, alia in talium susceptiva esse, alia in activa aut passiva esse talium, aut agentia aut patientia, aut abiectiones aut acceptiones, aut habitus aut privationes esse talium. The other things that are called contrary are so called, some because they possess contraries of the above kind, some because they are receptive of such, some because they are productive of or susceptible to such, or are producing or suffering them, or are losses or acquisitions, or possessions or privations, of such.
ἐπεὶ δὲ τὸ ἓν καὶ τὸ ὂν πολλαχῶς λέγεται, ἀκολουθεῖν ἀνάγκη καὶ τἆλλα ὅσα κατὰ ταῦτα λέγεται, ὥστε καὶ τὸ ταὐτὸν καὶ τὸ ἕτερον καὶ τὸ ἐναντίον, ὥστ᾽ εἶναι ἕτερον καθ᾽ ἑκάστην κατηγορίαν. Quoniam autem ens et unum multipliciter dicitur, sequi est necesse et alia quaecumque secundum haec dicuntur, quare et idem et diversum et contrarium, ut sit diversum secundum unamquamquae cathegoriam. Since one and being have many senses, the other terms which are derived from these, and therefore same , other , and contrary , must correspond, so that they must be different for each category.
τερα δὲ τῷ εἴδει λέγεται ὅσα τε ταὐτοῦ γένους ὄντα μὴ ὑπάλληλά ἐστι, [1018β] [1] καὶ ὅσα ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ γένει ὄντα διαφορὰν ἔχει, καὶ ὅσα ἐν τῇ οὐσίᾳ ἐναντίωσιν ἔχει: καὶ τὰ ἐναντία ἕτερα τῷ εἴδει ἀλλήλων ἢ πάντα ἢ τὰ λεγόμενα πρώτως, καὶ ὅσων ἐν τῷ [5] τελευταίῳ τοῦ γένους εἴδει οἱ λόγοι ἕτεροι (οἷον ἄνθρωπος καὶ ἵππος ἄτομα τῷ γένει οἱ δὲ λόγοι ἕτεροι αὐτῶν), καὶ ὅσα ἐν τῇ αὐτῇ οὐσίᾳ ὄντα ἔχει διαφοράν. ταὐτὰ δὲ τῷ εἴδει τὰ ἀντικειμένως λεγόμενα τούτοις. Diversa vero specie dicuntur quaecumque eiusdem generis existentia non sub invicem sunt, et quaecumque in eodem genere existentia differentiam habent, et quaecumque in substantia contrarietatem habent; et contraria diversa sunt specie ab invicem aut omnia aut dicta primum, et quorumcumque in finali generis specie rationes diverse (ut homo et equus individua genere et rationes eorum diverse), et quaecumque in eadem substantia entia differentiam habent. Eadem vero specie opposite hiis dicta. The term other in species is applied to things which being of the same genus are not subordinate the one to the [18b] other, or which being in the same genus have a difference, or which have a contrariety in their substance; and contraries are other than one another in species (either all contraries or those which are so called in the primary sense), and so are those things whose definitions differ in the infima species of the genus (e.g. man and horse are indivisible in genus, but their definitions are different), and those which being in the same substance have a difference. The same in species has the various meanings opposite to these.

Chapter 11 Prior, posterior

Greek Latin English
πρότερα καὶ ὕστερα λέγεται ἔνια μέν, ὡς ὄντος τινὸς [10] πρώτου καὶ ἀρχῆς ἐν ἑκάστῳ γένει, τῷ ἐγγύτερον <εἶναι> ἀρχῆς τινὸς ὡρισμένης ἢ ἁπλῶς καὶ τῇ φύσει ἢ πρός τι ἢ ποὺ ἢ ὑπό τινων, Priora et posteriora dicuntur quaedam quidem, tamquam existente aliquo primo et principio in unoquoque genere, quod propinquius principio cuidam determinato aut simpliciter et natura aut ad aliquid aut * ubi aut ab aliquibus; Chapter 11. The words prior and posterior are applied (1) to some things (on the assumption that there is a first, i.e. a beginning, in each class) because they are nearer some beginning determined either absolutely and by nature, or by reference to something or in some place or by certain people;
οἷον τὰ μὲν κατὰ τόπον τῷ εἶναι ἐγγύτερον ἢ φύσει τινὸς τόπου ὡρισμένου (οἷον τοῦ μέσου ἢ τοῦ ἐσχάτου) ἢ πρὸς τὸ τυχόν, τὸ δὲ πορρώτερον ὕστερον: ut haec quidem * secundum locum in existendo propinquius aut natura alicui loco determinato (ut medio aut ultimo) aut sicut evenit; quod vero remotius posterius. e.g. things are prior in place because they are nearer either to some place determined by nature (e.g. the middle or the last place), or to some chance object; and that which is farther is posterior.
τὰ δὲ κατὰ [15] χρόνον (τὰ μὲν γὰρ τῷ πορρώτερον τοῦ νῦν, οἷον ἐπὶ τῶν γενομένων, πρότερον γὰρ τὰ Τρωϊκὰ τῶν Μηδικῶν ὅτι πορρώτερον ἀπέχει τοῦ νῦν: τὰ δὲ τῷ ἐγγύτερον τοῦ νῦν, οἷον ἐπὶ τῶν μελλόντων, πρότερον γὰρ Νέμεα Πυθίων ὅτι ἐγγύτερον τοῦ νῦν τῷ νῦν ὡς ἀρχῇ καὶ πρώτῳ χρησαμένων): Alia secundum tempus; haec quidem enim eo quod remotiora a * nunc, ut in factis (priora namque troica medis, quia remotiora a * nunc), haec autem eo quod propinquius * nunc, ut in futuris (prius enim Nemia Pythion, quia propinquius nunc, * ipso nunc ut principio et primo usis). Other things are prior in time; some by being farther from the present, i.e. in the case of past events (for the Trojan war is prior to the Persian, because it is farther from the present), others by being nearer the present, i.e. in the case of future events (for the Nemean games are prior to the Pythian, if we treat the present as beginning and first point, because they are nearer the present).
τὰ [20] δὲ κατὰ κίνησιν (τὸ γὰρ ἐγγύτερον τοῦ πρώτου κινήσαντος πρότερον, οἷον παῖς ἀνδρός: ἀρχὴ δὲ καὶ αὕτη τις ἁπλῶς): τὰ δὲ κατὰ δύναμιν (τὸ γὰρ ὑπερέχον τῇ δυνάμει πρότερον, καὶ τὸ δυνατώτερον: τοιοῦτον δ᾽ ἐστὶν οὗ κατὰ τὴν προαίρεσιν ἀνάγκη ἀκολουθεῖν θάτερον καὶ τὸ ὕστερον, ὥστε μὴ κινοῦντός [25] τε ἐκείνου μὴ κινεῖσθαι καὶ κινοῦντος κινεῖσθαι: ἡ δὲ προαίρεσις ἀρχή): Alia secundum motum; propinquius enim primo moventi est prius, ut puer viro; principium autem et hoc quoddam simpli>citer *. Alia secundum potestatem; excedens enim potestate prius *, et quod * potentius; tale vero est cuius secundum preuoluntatem sequi est necesse alterum et posterius, ut non movente illo non moveatur et movente moveatur; et est prevoluntas principium. Other things are prior in movement; for that which is nearer the first mover is prior (e.g. the boy is prior to the man); and the prime mover also is a beginning absolutely. Others are prior in power; for that which exceeds in power, i.e. the more powerful, is prior; and such is that according to whose will the other – i.e. the posterior – must follow, so that if the prior does not set it in motion the other does not move, and if it sets it in motion it does move; and here will is a beginning.
τὰ δὲ κατὰ τάξιν (ταῦτα δ᾽ ἐστὶν ὅσα πρός τι ἓν ὡρισμένον διέστηκε κατά τινα λόγον, οἷον παραστάτης τριτοστάτου πρότερον καὶ παρανήτη νήτης: ἔνθα μὲν γὰρ ὁ κορυφαῖος ἔνθα δὲ ἡ μέση ἀρχή): ταῦτα μὲν οὖν πρότερα [30] τοῦτον λέγεται τὸν τρόπον, Alia secundum ordinem; haec autem sunt quaecumque ad aliquid unum determinatum distant secundum rationem, ut parastata tritostata prius et paraniti nitis; hic quidem enim qui summus hic autem quae media principium. Haec quidem igitur priora dicuntur hoc modo. Others are prior in arrangement; these are the things that are placed at intervals in reference to some one definite thing according to some rule, e.g. in the chorus the second man is prior to the third, and in the lyre the second lowest string is prior to the lowest; for in the one case the leader and in the other the middle string is the beginning.
ἄλλον δὲ τρόπον τὸ τῇ γνώσει πρότερον ὡς καὶ ἁπλῶς πρότερον. τούτων δὲ ἄλλως τὰ κατὰ τὸν λόγον καὶ τὰ κατὰ τὴν αἴσθησιν. κατὰ μὲν γὰρ τὸν λόγον τὰ καθόλου πρότερα κατὰ δὲ τὴν αἴσθησιν τὰ καθ᾽ ἕκαστα: Alio vero modo quod cognitione est prius ut et simpliciter prius. Horum autem aliter et quae secundum rationem et quae secundum sensum. Nam secundum rationem universalia priora, secundum autem sensum singularia. These, then, are called prior in this sense, but (2) in another sense that which is prior for knowledge is treated as also absolutely prior; of these, the things that are prior in definition do not coincide with those that are prior in relation to perception. For in definition universals are prior, in relation to perception individuals.
καὶ κατὰ τὸν λόγον δὲ τὸ συμβεβηκὸς τοῦ ὅλου [35] πρότερον, οἷον τὸ μουσικὸν τοῦ μουσικοῦ ἀνθρώπου: οὐ γὰρ ἔσται ὁ λόγος ὅλος ἄνευ τοῦ μέρους: καίτοι οὐκ ἐνδέχεται μουσικὸν εἶναι μὴ ὄντος μουσικοῦ τινός. Et secundum rationem accidens toto prius, ut musicum musico homine; non enim erit ratio tota sine parte; equidem non contingit musicum esse non existente aliquo musico. And in definition also the accident is prior to the whole, e.g. musical to musical man , for the definition cannot exist as a whole without the part; yet musicalness cannot exist unless there is some one who is musical.
ἔτι πρότερα λέγεται τὰ τῶν προτέρων πάθη, οἷον εὐθύτης λειότητος: τὸ μὲν γὰρ γραμμῆς καθ᾽ αὑτὴν πάθος τὸ δὲ ἐπιφανείας. [1019α] [1] τὰ μὲν δὴ οὕτω λέγεται πρότερα καὶ ὕστερα, Amplius priora dicuntur priorum passiones, ut rectitudo levitate; hoc enim lineae secundum se passio est illud vero superficiei. (3) The attributes of prior things are called prior, e.g. straightness is prior to smoothness; for one is an attribute of a line as such, and the other of a surface.
τὰ δὲ κατὰ φύσιν καὶ οὐσίαν, ὅσα ἐνδέχεται εἶναι ἄνευ ἄλλων, ἐκεῖνα δὲ ἄνευ ἐκείνων μή: ᾗ διαιρέσει ἐχρήσατο Πλάτων. (ἐπεὶ δὲ τὸ εἶναι [5] πολλαχῶς, πρῶτον μὲν τὸ ὑποκείμενον πρότερον, διὸ ἡ οὐσία πρότερον, ἔπειτα ἄλλως τὰ κατὰ δύναμιν καὶ κατ᾽ ἐντελέχειαν: τὰ μὲν γὰρ κατὰ δύναμιν πρότερά ἐστι τὰ δὲ κατὰ ἐντελέχειαν, οἷον κατὰ δύναμιν μὲν ἡ ἡμίσεια τῆς ὅλης καὶ τὸ μόριον τοῦ ὅλου καὶ ἡ ὕλη τῆς οὐσίας, κατ᾽ [10] ἐντελέχειαν δ᾽ ὕστερον: διαλυθέντος γὰρ κατ᾽ ἐντελέχειαν ἔσται.) Haec quidem itaque sic dicuntur priora et posteriora.Alia vero secundum naturam et substantiam, quaecumque contingit esse sine aliis et illa non sine illis; qua divisione usus est Plato. Quoniam autem esse multipliciter, primum quidem subiectum prius, propter quod et substantia prius, deinde aliter quae * secundum potentiam et secundum actum; nam alia secundum potestatem priora sunt alia secundum actum, ut secundum potestatem quidem dimidietas toto et pars toto et materia substantia, secundum actum vero posterius; nam dissoluti secundum actum erunt. [19a] Some things then are called prior and posterior in this sense, others (4) in respect of nature and substance, i.e. those which can be without other things, while the others cannot be without them, – a distinction which Plato used. (If we consider the various senses of being , firstly the subject is prior, so that substance is prior; secondly, according as potency or complete reality is taken into account, different things are prior, for some things are prior in respect of potency, others in respect of complete reality, e.g. in potency the half line is prior to the whole line, and the part to the whole, and the matter to the concrete substance, but in complete reality these are posterior; for it is only when the whole has been dissolved that they will exist in complete reality.)
τρόπον δή τινα πάντα τὰ πρότερον καὶ ὕστερον λεγόμενα κατὰ ταῦτα λέγεται: τὰ μὲν γὰρ κατὰ γένεσιν ἐνδέχεται ἄνευ τῶν ἑτέρων εἶναι, οἷον τὸ ὅλον τῶν μορίων, τὰ δὲ κατὰ φθοράν, οἷον τὸ μόριον τοῦ ὅλου. ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ τἆλλα. [15] Modo itaque quodam omnia prius et posterius dicta secundum haec dicuntur; haec quidem enim secundum generationem sine aliis esse contingit, ut totum partibus, haec autem secundum corruptionem, ut pars toto. Similiter autem et alia. In a sense, therefore, all things that are called prior and posterior are so called with reference to this fourth sense; for some things can exist without others in respect of generation, e.g. the whole without the parts, and others in respect of dissolution, e.g. the part without the whole. And the same is true in all other cases.

Chapter 12 Potency

Greek Latin English
δύναμις λέγεται ἡ μὲν ἀρχὴ κινήσεως ἢ μεταβολῆς ἡ ἐν ἑτέρῳ ἢ ᾗ ἕτερον, οἷον ἡ οἰκοδομικὴ δύναμίς ἐστιν ἣ οὐχ ὑπάρχει ἐν τῷ οἰκοδομουμένῳ, ἀλλ᾽ ἡ ἰατρικὴ δύναμις οὖσα ὑπάρχοι ἂν ἐν τῷ ἰατρευομένῳ, ἀλλ᾽ οὐχ ᾗ ἰατρευόμενος. > Potestas dicitur haec quidem principium motus aut mutationis aut in altero aut in quantum alterum; ut edificativa potestas est quae non existit in edificato, sed ars medicinalis potestas ens * existet utique in sanato, sed non in quantum sanatum est. Chapter 12. Potency means (1) a source of movement or change, which is in another thing than the thing moved or in the same thing qua other; e.g. the art of building is a potency which is not in the thing built, while the art of healing, which is a potency, may be in the man healed, but not in him qua healed.
ἡ μὲν οὖν ὅλως ἀρχὴ μεταβολῆς ἢ κινήσεως λέγεται δύναμις [20] ἐν ἑτέρῳ ἢ ᾗ ἕτερον, ἡ δ᾽ ὑφ᾽ ἑτέρου ἢ ᾗ ἕτερον (καθ᾽ ἣν γὰρ τὸ πάσχον πάσχει τι, ὁτὲ μὲν ἐὰν ὁτιοῦν, δυνατὸν αὐτό φαμεν εἶναι παθεῖν, ὁτὲ δ᾽ οὐ κατὰ πᾶν πάθος ἀλλ᾽ ἂν ἐπὶ τὸ βέλτιον): Ergo totaliter principium mutationis aut motus dicitur potestas in altero aut in quantum * alterum. Haec autem ab altero aut in quantum alterum; secundum quam enim patiens patitur aliquid, quandoque quidem si quodcumque pati sit possibile dicimus esse autopathein, quandoque autem non secundum omnem passionem sed si ad melius. Potency then means the source, in general, of change or movement in another thing or in the same thing qua other, and also (2) the source of a thing's being moved by another thing or by itself qua other. For in virtue of that principle, in virtue of which a patient suffers anything, we call it capable of suffering; and this we do sometimes if it suffers anything at all, sometimes not in respect of everything it suffers, but only if it suffers a change for the better.
ἔτι ἡ τοῦ καλῶς τοῦτ᾽ ἐπιτελεῖν ἢ κατὰ προαίρεσιν: ἐνίοτε γὰρ τοὺς μόνον ἂν πορευθέντας ἢ εἰπόντας, μὴ [25] καλῶς δὲ ἢ μὴ ὡς προείλοντο, οὔ φαμεν δύνασθαι λέγειν ἢ βαδίζειν: ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ ἐπὶ τοῦ πάσχειν. Adhuc aut ut bene hoc efficiatur aut secundum voluntatem; quandoque enim solum utique ambulantes aut loquentes, non bene autem aut non ut vellent, non dicimus posse loqui aut ambulare. Similiter autem et in pati. (3) The capacity of performing this well or according to intention; for sometimes we say of those who merely can walk or speak but not well or not as they intend, that they cannot speak or walk. So too (4) in the case of passivity.
ἔτι ὅσαι ἕξεις καθ᾽ ἃς ἀπαθῆ ὅλως ἢ ἀμετάβλητα ἢ μὴ ῥᾳδίως ἐπὶ τὸ χεῖρον εὐμετακίνητα, δυνάμεις λέγονται: κλᾶται μὲν γὰρ καὶ συντρίβεται καὶ κάμπτεται καὶ ὅλως φθείρεται οὐ τῷ [30] δύνασθαι ἀλλὰ τῷ μὴ δύνασθαι καὶ ἐλλείπειν τινός: ἀπαθῆ δὲ τῶν τοιούτων ἃ μόλις καὶ ἠρέμα πάσχει διὰ δύναμιν καὶ τῷ δύνασθαι καὶ τῷ ἔχειν πώς. Amplius quicumque habitus secundum quos impassibilia omnino aut immutabilia aut non facile in peius mobilia, potestates dicuntur; franguntur enim et conteruntur, curuantur et omnino corrumpuntur non per posse sed per non posse et * deficere in aliquo, impassibilia vero talium aut vix et modicum patiuntur propter potentiam et posse et aliqualiter habere. (5) The states in virtue of which things are absolutely impassive or unchangeable, or not easily changed for the worse, are called potencies; for things are broken and crushed and bent and in general destroyed not by having a potency but by not having one and by lacking something, and things are impassive with respect to such processes if they are scarcely and slightly affected by them, because of a potency and because they can do something and are in some positive state.
λεγομένης δὲ τῆς δυνάμεως τοσαυταχῶς, καὶ τὸ δυνατὸν ἕνα μὲν τρόπον λεχθήσεται τὸ ἔχον κινήσεως ἀρχὴν ἢ μεταβολῆς (καὶ γὰρ [35] τὸ στατικὸν δυνατόν τι) ἐν ἑτέρῳ ἢ ᾗ ἕτερον, ἕνα δ᾽ ἐὰν ἔχῃ τι αὐτοῦ ἄλλο δύναμιν τοιαύτην, Dicta vero potestate totiens, et potens uno quidem modo dicetur quod habet motus principium aut mutationis (et enim sistitivum potens aliquid in altero aut in quantum * alterum); uno vero si quid ab ipso aliud potestatem habet talem. Potency having this variety of meanings, so too the potent or capable in one sense will mean that which can begin a movement (or a change in general, for even that which can bring things to rest is a potent thing) in another thing or in itself qua other; and in one sense [19b] that over which something else has such a potency;
[1019β] [1] ἕνα δ᾽ ἐὰν ἔχῃ μεταβάλλειν ἐφ᾽ ὁτιοῦν δύναμιν, εἴτ᾽ ἐπὶ τὸ χεῖρον εἴτ᾽ ἐπὶ τὸ βέλτιον (καὶ γὰρ τὸ φθειρόμενον δοκεῖ δυνατὸν εἶναι φθείρεσθαι, ἢ οὐκ ἂν φθαρῆναι εἰ ἦν ἀδύνατον: νῦν δὲ ἔχει τινὰ [5] διάθεσιν καὶ αἰτίαν καὶ ἀρχὴν τοῦ τοιούτου πάθους: ὁτὲ μὲν δὴ τῷ ἔχειν τι δοκεῖ, ὁτὲ δὲ τῷ ἐστερῆσθαι τοιοῦτον εἶναι: Uno autem si habet permutari in quodlibet * potestatem, sive > in peius sive in melius. Et enim corruptibile videtur esse possibile corrumpi, aut non utique corrumpi si erat impossibile; nunc autem dispositionem quandam habet et causam et principium talis passionis. Aliquando quidem itaque per habere aliquid videtur, aliquando per privari tale esse; and in one sense that which has a potency of changing into something, whether for the worse or for the better (for even that which perishes is thought to be capable of perishing, for it would not have perished if it had not been capable of it; but, as a matter of fact, it has a certain disposition and cause and principle which fits it to suffer this; sometimes it is thought to be of this sort because it has something, sometimes because it is deprived of something;
εἰ δ᾽ ἡ στέρησίς ἐστιν ἕξις πως, πάντα τῷ ἔχειν ἂν εἴη τι, [εἰ δὲ μὴ] ὥστε τῷ τε ἔχειν ἕξιν τινὰ καὶ ἀρχήν ἐστι δυνατὸν [ὁμωνύμως] καὶ τῷ ἔχειν τὴν τούτου στέρησιν, εἰ ἐνδέχεται [10] ἔχειν στέρησιν: <εἰ δὲ μή, ὁμωνύμως>): si autem privatio est habitus aliquo modo, omnia in habendo utique erunt aliquid. Equivoce vero dicimus ens, quare in habendo habitum quendam et principium est possibile et habendo huius privationem, si contingit habere privationem. but if privation is in a sense having or habit , everything will be capable by having something, so that things are capable both by having a positive habit and principle, and by having the privation of this, if it is possible to have a privation;
ἕνα δὲ τῷ μὴ ἔχειν αὐτοῦ δύναμιν ἢ ἀρχὴν ἄλλο ἢ ᾗ ἄλλο φθαρτικήν. ἕνα δὲ τῷ μὴ ἔχειν αὐτοῦ δύναμιν ἢ ἀρχὴν ἄλλο ἢ ᾗ ἄλλο φθαρτικήν. ἕνα δὲ τῷ μὴ ἔχειν αὐτοῦ δύναμιν ἢ ἀρχὴν ἄλλο ἢ ᾗ ἄλλο φθαρτικήν. Uno in non habendo ipsius potestatem aut principium in alio in quantum est aliud corruptivum. and if privation is not in a sense habit , capable is used in two distinct senses); and a thing is capable in another sense because neither any other thing, nor itself qua other, has a potency or principle which can destroy it.
ἔτι δὲ ταῦτα πάντα ἢ τῷ μόνον ἂν συμβῆναι γενέσθαι ἢ μὴ γενέσθαι, ἢ τῷ καλῶς. καὶ γὰρ ἐν τοῖς ἀψύχοις ἔνεστιν ἡ τοιαύτη δύναμις, οἷον ἐν τοῖς ὀργάνοις: τὴν μὲν γὰρ δύνασθαί φασι [15] φθέγγεσθαι λύραν, τὴν δ᾽ οὐδέν, ἂν ᾖ μὴ εὔφωνος. Amplius autem haec omnia aut in solum accidere fieri aut non fieri, aut in bene. Nam in inanimatis inest talis potestas, ut in organis; aliam enim dicunt posse sonare liram, aliam non, si est non bene sonans. Again, all of these are capable either merely because the thing might chance to happen or not to happen, or because it might do so well. This sort of potency is found even in lifeless things, e.g. in instruments; for we say one lyre can speak, and another cannot speak at all, if it has not a good tone.
ἀδυναμία δὲ ἐστὶ στέρησις δυνάμεως καὶ τῆς τοιαύτης ἀρχῆς οἵα εἴρηται, ἢ ὅλως ἢ τῷ πεφυκότι ἔχειν, ἢ καὶ ὅτε πέφυκεν ἤδη ἔχειν: οὐ γὰρ ὁμοίως ἂν φαῖεν ἀδύνατον εἶναι γεννᾶν παῖδα καὶ ἄνδρα καὶ εὐνοῦχον. Impotentia autem est privatio potentiae et talis principii sublatio quaedam qualis dicta est, aut omnino aut apto nato habere aut quando aptum natum est iam habere; non enim similiter dicunt impossibile generare puerum et virum * eunuchum. Incapacity is privation of capacity – i.e. of such a principle as has been described either in general or in the case of something that would naturally have the capacity, or even at the time when it would naturally already have it; for the senses in which we should call a boy and a man and a eunuch incapable of begetting are distinct.
ἔτι δὲ καθ᾽ ἑκατέραν [20] δύναμιν ἔστιν ἀδυναμία ἀντικειμένη, τῇ τε μόνον κινητικῇ καὶ τῇ καλῶς κινητικῇ. Amplius autem secundum alteram potentiam est impotentia opposita, ei quae solum * motive et ei quae bene motive. Again, to either kind of capacity there is an opposite incapacity – both to that which only can produce movement and to that which can produce it well.
καὶ ἀδύνατα δὴ τὰ μὲν κατὰ τὴν ἀδυναμίαν ταύτην λέγεται, τὰ δὲ ἄλλον τρόπον, οἷον δυνατόν τε καὶ ἀδύνατον, ἀδύνατον μὲν οὗ τὸ ἐναντίον ἐξ ἀνάγκης ἀληθές (οἷον τὸ τὴν διάμετρον σύμμετρον εἶναι [25] ἀδύνατον ὅτι ψεῦδος τὸ τοιοῦτον οὗ τὸ ἐναντίον οὐ μόνον ἀληθὲς ἀλλὰ καὶ ἀνάγκη [ἀσύμμετρον εἶναι]: τὸ ἄρα σύμμετρον οὐ μόνον ψεῦδος ἀλλὰ καὶ ἐξ ἀνάγκης ψεῦδος): Et impossibilia vero haec quidem secundum impotentiam hanc dicuntur, alia alio modo, puta possibile et impossibile. Impossibile quidem cuius contrarium ex necessitate verum, ut dyametrum commensurabilem esse est impossibile, quia falsum quod tale cuius contrarium non solum verum sed et necesse non commensurabile esse; ergo commensurabile non solum falsum sed ex necessitate falsum. Some things, then, are called adunata in virtue of this kind of incapacity, while others are so in another sense; i.e. both dunaton and adunaton are used as follows. The impossible is that of which the contrary is of necessity true, e.g. that the diagonal of a square is commensurate with the side is impossible, because such a statement is a falsity of which the contrary is not only true but also necessary; that it is commensurate, then, is not only false but also of necessity false.
τὸ δ᾽ ἐναντίον τούτῳ, τὸ δυνατόν, ὅταν μὴ ἀναγκαῖον ᾖ τὸ ἐναντίον ψεῦδος εἶναι, οἷον τὸ καθῆσθαι ἄνθρωπον δυνατόν: οὐ [30] γὰρ ἐξ ἀνάγκης τὸ μὴ καθῆσθαι ψεῦδος. τὸ μὲν οὖν δυνατὸν ἕνα μὲν τρόπον, ὥσπερ εἴρηται, τὸ μὴ ἐξ ἀνάγκης ψεῦδος σημαίνει, ἕνα δὲ τὸ ἀληθές [εἶναι], ἕνα δὲ τὸ ἐνδεχόμενον ἀληθὲς εἶναι. Contrarium vero huic, possibile, quando non necesse fuerit contrarium falsum esse, ut sedere hominem possibile; non enim ex necessitate non sedere falsum. > ergo possibile quidem uno modo, sicut dictum est, quod non ex necessitate falsum significat, alio vero verum esse, alio contingens verum iam. The contrary of this, the possible, is found when it is not necessary that the contrary is false, e.g. that a man should be seated is possible; for that he is not seated is not of necessity false. The possible, then, in one sense, as has been said, means that which is not of necessity false; in one, that which is true; in one, that which may be true.
κατὰ μεταφορὰν δὲ ἡ ἐν γεωμετρίᾳ λέγεται δύναμις. ταῦτα μὲν οὖν τὰ δυνατὰ οὐ κατὰ δύναμιν: Secundum methaphoram autem quae * in geometria dicitur potentia. Haec quidem igitur possibilia non secundum potentiam. A potency or power in geometry is so called by a change of meaning. – These senses of capable or possible involve no reference to potency.
[35] τὰ δὲ λεγόμενα κατὰ δύναμιν πάντα λέγεται πρὸς τὴν πρώτην [μίαν]: [1020α] [1] αὕτη δ᾽ ἐστὶν ἀρχὴ μεταβολῆς ἐν ἄλλῳ ἢ ᾗ ἄλλο. τὰ γὰρ ἄλλα λέγεται δυνατὰ τῷ τὰ μὲν ἔχειν αὐτῶν ἄλλο τι τοιαύτην δύναμιν τὰ δὲ μὴ ἔχειν τὰ δὲ ὡδὶ ἔχειν. ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ τὰ ἀδύνατα. ὥστε ὁ κύριος ὅρος [5] τῆς πρώτης δυνάμεως ἂν εἴη ἀρχὴ μεταβλητικὴ ἐν ἄλλῳ ἢ ᾗ ἄλλο. Quae vero secundum potentiam omnia dicuntur ad primam unam; haec autem est principium mutationis in alio * in quantum aliud. Alia namque dicuntur possibilia, haec quidem eorum in habendo aliud aliquid talem potentiam, illa vero in non habendo, alia in sic habendo. Similiter autem et impossibilia. Quare propria diffinitio prime potentie utique erit: principium permutativum in alio in quantum aliud. But the senses which involve a reference to potency all refer to the primary [20a] kind of potency; and this is a source of change in another thing or in the same thing qua other. For other things are called capable , some because something else has such a potency over them, some because it has not, some because it has it in a particular way. The same is true of the things that are incapable. Therefore the proper definition of the primary kind of potency will be a source of change in another thing or in the same thing qua other .

Chapter 13 Quantum

Greek Latin English
ποσὸν λέγεται τὸ διαιρετὸν εἰς ἐνυπάρχοντα ὧν ἑκάτερον ἢ ἕκαστον ἕν τι καὶ τόδε τι πέφυκεν εἶναι. πλῆθος μὲν οὖν ποσόν τι ἐὰν ἀριθμητὸν ᾖ, μέγεθος δὲ ἂν μετρητὸν [10] ᾖ. Quantum dicitur quod est divisibile in ea quae insunt, quorum utrumque aut singulum unum aliquid et hoc aliquid * natum est esse. Multitudo ergo quantum aliquid si numerabilis fuerit, magnitudo autem si mensurabilis fuerit. Chapter 13. Quantum means that which is divisible into two or more constituent parts of which each is by nature a one and a this . A quantum is a plurality if it is numerable, a magnitude if it is a measurable.
λέγεται δὲ πλῆθος μὲν τὸ διαιρετὸν δυνάμει εἰς μὴ συνεχῆ, μέγεθος δὲ τὸ εἰς συνεχῆ: μεγέθους δὲ τὸ μὲν ἐφ᾽ ἓν συνεχὲς μῆκος τὸ δ᾽ ἐπὶ δύο πλάτος τὸ δ᾽ ἐπὶ τρία βάθος. τούτων δὲ πλῆθος μὲν τὸ πεπερασμένον ἀριθμὸς μῆκος δὲ γραμμὴ πλάτος δὲ ἐπιφάνεια βάθος δὲ σῶμα. Dicitur autem multitudo quidem * divisibile potestate in non continua, magnitudo autem quod in continua; magnitudinis vero quae quidem ad unum continua longitudo, quae autem ad duo latitudo, quae autem ad tria profunditas. Horum autem pluralitas quidem finita numerus, sed longitudo linea et latitudo superficies et profundum corpus. Plurality means that which is divisible potentially into non-continuous parts, magnitude that which is divisible into continuous parts; of magnitude, that which is continuous in one dimension is length; in two breadth, in three depth. Of these, limited plurality is number, limited length is a line, breadth a surface, depth a solid.
ἔτι τὰ [15] μὲν λέγεται καθ᾽ αὑτὰ ποσά, τὰ δὲ κατὰ συμβεβηκός, οἷον ἡ μὲν γραμμὴ ποσόν τι καθ᾽ ἑαυτό, τὸ δὲ μουσικὸν κατὰ συμβεβηκός. Amplius alia dicuntur secundum se quanta quaedam, alia secundum accidens, ut linea quantum aliquid secundum se, musicum vero secundum accidens. Again, some things are called quanta in virtue of their own nature, others incidentally; e.g. the line is a quantum by its own nature, the musical is one incidentally.
τῶν δὲ καθ᾽ αὑτὰ τὰ μὲν κατ᾽ οὐσίαν ἐστίν, οἷον ἡ γραμμὴ ποσόν τι (ἐν γὰρ τῷ λόγῳ τῷ [19] τί ἐστι λέγοντι τὸ ποσόν τι ὑπάρχει), τὰ δὲ πάθη καὶ ἕξεις [20] τῆς τοιαύτης ἐστὶν οὐσίας, οἷον τὸ πολὺ καὶ τὸ ὀλίγον, καὶ μακρὸν καὶ βραχύ, καὶ πλατὺ καὶ στενόν, καὶ βαθὺ καὶ ταπεινόν, καὶ βαρὺ καὶ κοῦφον, καὶ τὰ ἄλλα τὰ τοιαῦτα. ἔστι δὲ καὶ τὸ μέγα καὶ τὸ μικρὸν καὶ μεῖζον καὶ ἔλαττον, καὶ καθ᾽ αὑτὰ καὶ πρὸς ἄλληλα λεγόμενα, τοῦ [25] ποσοῦ πάθη καθ᾽ αὑτά: μεταφέρονται μέντοι καὶ ἐπ᾽ ἄλλα ταῦτα τὰ ὀνόματα. Eorum vero quae secundum se sunt alia secundum substantiam sunt, ut linea quantum quid (nam in ratione quid est dicente quantum quid existit), alia passiones et habitus talis sunt substantiae, ut multum et paucum, et productum et breve, et latum et strictum, et profundum et humile, et grave et leve, et alia talia. Sunt autem et magnum et parvum et maius et minus, et secundum se et ad invicem dicta, quanti passiones secundum se; transferuntur etiam et > ad alia haec nomina. Of the things that are quanta by their own nature some are so as substances, e.g. the line is a quantum (for a certain kind of quantum is present in the definition which states what it is), and others are modifications and states of this kind of substance, e.g. much and little, long and short, broad and narrow, deep and shallow, heavy and light, and all other such attributes. And also great and small, and greater and smaller, both in themselves and when taken relatively to each other, are by their own nature attributes of what is quantitative; but these names are transferred to other things also.
τῶν δὲ κατὰ συμβεβηκὸς λεγομένων ποσῶν τὰ μὲν οὕτως λέγεται ὥσπερ ἐλέχθη ὅτι τὸ μουσικὸν ποσὸν καὶ τὸ λευκὸν τῷ εἶναι ποσόν τι ᾧ ὑπάρχουσι, τὰ δὲ ὡς κίνησις καὶ χρόνος: καὶ γὰρ ταῦτα πός᾽ ἄττα λέγεται [30] καὶ συνεχῆ τῷ ἐκεῖνα διαιρετὰ εἶναι ὧν ἐστὶ ταῦτα πάθη. λέγω δὲ οὐ τὸ κινούμενον ἀλλ᾽ ὃ ἐκινήθη: τῷ γὰρ ποσὸν εἶναι ἐκεῖνο καὶ ἡ κίνησις ποσή, ὁ δὲ χρόνος τῷ ταύτην. Secundum accidens vero dictorum quantorum hoc quidem sic dicitur sicut dictum est quia musicum quantum * et album per esse quantum quid cui insunt, haec autem ut motus et tempus; et enim haec quanta quaedam dicuntur et continua eo quod illa divisibilia sint quorum sunt haec passiones. Dico autem non quod movetur sed quod motum est; nam per esse quantum illud et motus est quantus, tempus vero per * ipsum. Of things that are quanta incidentally, some are so called in the sense in which it was said that the musical and the white were quanta, viz. because that to which musicalness and whiteness belong is a quantum, and some are quanta in the way in which movement and time are so; for these also are called quanta of a sort and continuous because the things of which these are attributes are divisible. I mean not that which is moved, but the space through which it is moved; for because that is a quantum movement also is a quantum, and because this is a quantum time is one.

Chapter 14 Quality

Greek Latin English
[τὸ] ποιὸν λέγεται ἕνα μὲν τρόπον ἡ διαφορὰ τῆς οὐσίας, οἷον ποιόν τι ἄνθρωπος ζῷον ὅτι δίπουν, ἵππος δὲ τετράπουν, [35] καὶ κύκλος ποιόν τι σχῆμα ὅτι ἀγώνιον, ὡς τῆς διαφορᾶς τῆς κατὰ τὴν οὐσίαν ποιότητος οὔσης: [1020β] [1] —ἕνα μὲν δὴ τρόπον τοῦτον λέγεται ἡ ποιότης διαφορὰ οὐσίας, Quale dicitur * uno quidem modo differentia substantiae, ut quale quid homo animal quia bipes, equus vero quadrupes, et circulus qualis quaedam figura quia agonion, quasi differentia secundum substantiam qualitate existente. Uno quidem itaque modo hoc dicitur qualitas differentia substantiae. Chapter 14. Quality means (1) the differentia of the essence, e.g. man is an animal of a certain quality because he is two-footed, and the horse is so because it is four-footed; and a circle is a figure of particular quality because it is without [20b] angles, – which shows that the essential differentia is a quality. This, then, is one meaning of quality – the differentia of the essence,
ἕνα δὲ ὡς τὰ ἀκίνητα καὶ τὰ μαθηματικά, ὥσπερ οἱ ἀριθμοὶ ποιοί τινες, οἷον οἱ σύνθετοι καὶ μὴ μόνον ἐφ᾽ ἓν ὄντες ἀλλ᾽ ὧν μίμημα [5] τὸ ἐπίπεδον καὶ τὸ στερεόν (οὗτοι δ᾽ εἰσὶν οἱ ποσάκις ποσοὶ ἢ ποσάκις ποσάκις ποσοί), καὶ ὅλως ὃ παρὰ τὸ ποσὸν ὑπάρχει ἐν τῇ οὐσίᾳ: οὐσία γὰρ ἑκάστου ὃ ἅπαξ, οἷον τῶν ἓξ οὐχ ὃ δὶς ἢ τρὶς εἰσὶν ἀλλ᾽ ὃ ἅπαξ: ἓξ γὰρ ἅπαξ ἕξ. Alio vero ut immobilia et mathematica, sicut numeri quales quidam, quemadmodum compositi et non solum ad unum entes sed quorum imitatio superficies et solidum (hii vero sunt quotiens quanti aut quotiens quotiens quanti), et totaliter quod praeter quantitatem existit in substantia; nam substantia cuiuslibet quod semel, ut ipsorum sex non qui bis aut ter sunt sed qui semel; sex enim semel sex. but (2) there is another sense in which it applies to the unmovable objects of mathematics, the sense in which the numbers have a certain quality, e.g. the composite numbers which are not in one dimension only, but of which the plane and the solid are copies (these are those which have two or three factors); and in general that which exists in the essence of numbers besides quantity is quality; for the essence of each is what it is once, e.g. that of is not what it is twice or thrice, but what it is once; for 6 is once 6.
ἔτι ὅσα πάθη τῶν κινουμένων οὐσιῶν, οἷον θερμότης καὶ ψυχρότης, [10] καὶ λευκότης καὶ μελανία, καὶ βαρύτης καὶ κουφότης, καὶ ὅσα τοιαῦτα, καθ᾽ ἃ λέγονται καὶ ἀλλοιοῦσθαι τὰ σώματα μεταβαλλόντων. Amplius quaecumque passiones earum quae moventur substantiarum, ut calor et frigiditas, et albedo et nigredo, et gravitas et levitas, et quaecumque talia, secundum quae dicuntur mutari corpora permutantium. (3) All the modifications of substances that move (e.g. heat and cold, whiteness and blackness, heaviness and lightness, and the others of the sort) in virtue of which, when they change, bodies are said to alter.
ἔτι κατ᾽ ἀρετὴν καὶ κακίαν καὶ ὅλως τὸ κακὸν καὶ ἀγαθόν. Amplius secundum virtutem et vitium et omnino bonum et malum. (4) Quality in respect of virtue and vice, and in general, of evil and good.
σχεδὸν δὴ κατὰ δύο τρόπους λέγοιτ᾽ ἂν τὸ ποιόν, καὶ τούτων ἕνα τὸν κυριώτατον: πρώτη μὲν γὰρ [15] ποιότης ἡ τῆς οὐσίας διαφορά (ταύτης δέ τι καὶ ἡ ἐν τοῖς ἀριθμοῖς ποιότης μέρος: διαφορὰ γάρ τις οὐσιῶν, ἀλλ᾽ ἢ οὐ κινουμένων ἢ οὐχ ᾗ κινούμενα), τὰ δὲ πάθη τῶν κινουμένων ᾗ κινούμενα, καὶ αἱ τῶν κινήσεων διαφοραί. ἀρετὴ δὲ καὶ κακία τῶν παθημάτων μέρος τι: διαφορὰς γὰρ δηλοῦσι τῆς [20] κινήσεως καὶ τῆς ἐνεργείας, καθ᾽ ἃς ποιοῦσιν ἢ πάσχουσι καλῶς ἢ φαύλως τὰ ἐν κινήσει ὄντα: τὸ μὲν γὰρ ὡδὶ δυνάμενον κινεῖσθαι ἢ ἐνεργεῖν ἀγαθὸν τὸ δ᾽ ὡδὶ καὶ ἐναντίως μοχθηρόν. μάλιστα δὲ τὸ ἀγαθὸν καὶ τὸ κακὸν σημαίνει τὸ ποιὸν ἐπὶ τῶν ἐμψύχων, καὶ τούτων μάλιστα ἐπὶ τοῖς ἔχουσι [25] προαίρεσιν. Fere itaque secundum duos modos dicetur quale, et horum uno principalissimo. Prima quidem qualitas substantiae differentia, huius autem quaedam et quae in numeris qualitas pars; > nam differentia quaedam substantiarum, sed aut non motorum aut non in quantum sunt mota. Haec autem passiones motorum in quantum mota, et motuum differentie. Virtus autem et vitium passionum pars quaedam; differentias enim ostendunt motus et actus, secundum quos faciunt aut patiuntur bene aut prave quae sunt in motu; possibile namque sic moveri aut agere bonum, quod autem sic et contrarie prauum. Maxime vero bonum et malum significant quale in animatis, et horum maxime in habentibus proheresim. Quality, then, seems to have practically two meanings, and one of these is the more proper. The primary quality is the differentia of the essence, and of this the quality in numbers is a part; for it is a differentia of essences, but either not of things that move or not of them qua moving. Secondly, there are the modifications of things that move, qua moving, and the differentiae of movements. Virtue and vice fall among these modifications; for they indicate differentiae of the movement or activity, according to which the things in motion act or are acted on well or badly; for that which can be moved or act in one way is good, and that which can do so in another the contrary way is vicious. Good and evil indicate quality especially in living things, and among these especially in those which have purpose.

Chapter 15 Relative

Greek Latin English
πρός τι λέγεται τὰ μὲν ὡς διπλάσιον πρὸς ἥμισυ καὶ τριπλάσιον πρὸς τριτημόριον, καὶ ὅλως πολλαπλάσιον πρὸς πολλοστημόριον καὶ ὑπερέχον πρὸς ὑπερεχόμενον: τὰ δ᾽ ὡς τὸ θερμαντικὸν πρὸς τὸ θερμαντὸν καὶ τὸ τμητικὸν πρὸς τὸ [30] τμητόν, καὶ ὅλως τὸ ποιητικὸν πρὸς τὸ παθητικόν: τὰ δ᾽ ὡς τὸ μετρητὸν πρὸς τὸ μέτρον καὶ ἐπιστητὸν πρὸς ἐπιστήμην καὶ αἰσθητὸν πρὸς αἴσθησιν. Ad aliquid dicuntur alia ut duplum ad dimidium et triplum ad tertiam partem, et totaliter multiplicatum ad multiplicati partem et continens ad contentum. Alia ut calefactivum ad calefactibile et sectivum ad secabile, et omne activum ad passivum. Alia ut mensurabile ad mensuram et scibile ad scientiam et sensibile ad sensum. Chapter 15. Things are relative (1) as double to half, and treble to a third, and in general that which contains something else many times to that which is contained many times in something else, and that which exceeds to that which is exceeded; (2) as that which can heat to that which can be heated, and that which can cut to that which can be cut, and in general the active to the passive; (3) as the measurable to the measure, and the knowable to knowledge, and the perceptible to perception.
λέγεται δὲ τὰ μὲν πρῶτα κατ᾽ ἀριθμὸν ἢ ἁπλῶς ἢ ὡρισμένως, πρὸς αὐτοὺς ἢ πρὸς ἕν (οἷον τὸ μὲν διπλάσιον πρὸς ἓν ἀριθμὸς ὡρισμένος, τὸ δὲ πολλαπλάσιον [35] κατ᾽ ἀριθμὸν πρὸς ἕν, οὐχ ὡρισμένον δέ, οἷον τόνδε ἢ τόνδε: [1021α] [1] τὸ δὲ ἡμιόλιον πρὸς τὸ ὑφημιόλιον κατ᾽ ἀριθμὸν πρὸς ἀριθμὸν ὡρισμένον: τὸ δ᾽ ἐπιμόριον πρὸς τὸ ὑπεπιμόριον κατὰ ἀόριστον, ὥσπερ τὸ πολλαπλάσιον πρὸς τὸ ἕν: τὸ δ᾽ ὑπερέχον πρὸς τὸ ὑπερεχόμενον ὅλως ἀόριστον κατ᾽ ἀριθμόν: [5] ὁ γὰρ ἀριθμὸς σύμμετρος, κατὰ μὴ συμμέτρου δὲ ἀριθμὸς οὐ λέγεται, τὸ δὲ ὑπερέχον πρὸς τὸ ὑπερεχόμενον τοσοῦτόν τέ ἐστι καὶ ἔτι, τοῦτο δ᾽ ἀόριστον: ὁπότερον γὰρ ἔτυχέν ἐστιν, ἢ ἴσον ἢ οὐκ ἴσον): ταῦτά τε οὖν τὰ πρός τι πάντα κατ᾽ ἀριθμὸν λέγεται καὶ ἀριθμοῦ πάθη, Dicuntur autem prima quidem secundum numerum aut simpliciter aut determinate, ad ipsos aut ad unum. Ut duplum quidem ad unum numerus determinatus; multiplex vero secundum numerum ad unum, non determinatum autem, ut hunc aut hunc; emiolium autem ad subemiolium secundum numerum ad numerum determinatum; superparticulare autem ad subsuperparticulare secundum indeterminatos, ut multiplex ad unum . Continens autem ad contentum omnino indeterminatum secundum numerum; numerus enim commensurabilis, secundum non commensurabilem autem numerum dicuntur; > continens enim ad contentum tantumque est et amplius, hoc autem indeterminatum; quodcumque enim evenit est, aut equale aut non equale. Haec igitur ad aliquid omnia secundum numerum dicuntur et numeri passiones. (1) Relative terms of the first kind are numerically related either indefinitely or definitely, to numbers themselves or to 1. E.g. the double is in a definite numerical relation to 1, and that which is many times as great is in a numerical, but not a definite, relation to 1, i.e. not in this [21a] or in that numerical relation to it; the relation of that which is half as big again as something else to that something is a definite numerical relation to a number; that which is n+1/n times something else is in an indefinite relation to that something, as that which is many times as great is in an indefinite relation to 1; the relation of that which exceeds to that which is exceeded is numerically quite indefinite; for number is always commensurate, and number is not predicated of that which is not commensurate, but that which exceeds is, in relation to that which is exceeded, so much and something more; and this something is indefinite; for it can, indifferently, be either equal or not equal to that which is exceeded. – All these relations, then, are numerically expressed and are determinations of number,
καὶ ἔτι τὸ ἴσον καὶ [10] ὅμοιον καὶ ταὐτὸ κατ᾽ ἄλλον τρόπον (κατὰ γὰρ τὸ ἓν λέγεται πάντα, ταὐτὰ μὲν γὰρ ὧν μία ἡ οὐσία, ὅμοια δ᾽ ὧν ἡ ποιότης μία, ἴσα δὲ ὧν τὸ ποσὸν ἕν: τὸ δ᾽ ἓν τοῦ ἀριθμοῦ ἀρχὴ καὶ μέτρον, ὥστε ταῦτα πάντα πρός τι λέγεται κατ᾽ ἀριθμὸν μέν, οὐ τὸν αὐτὸν δὲ τρόπον): Et amplius equale et simile et idem secundum alium modum; secundum enim unum dicuntur omnia. Eadem namque quorum una est substantia, similia vero quorum qualitas est una, equalia vero quorum quantitas est una; unum autem numeri principium et metrum, quare haec omnia ad aliquid dicuntur secundum numerum quidem, non eodem autem modo. and so in another way are the equal and the like and the same. For all refer to unity. Those things are the same whose substance is one; those are like whose quality is one; those are equal whose quantity is one; and 1 is the beginning and measure of number, so that all these relations imply number, though not in the same way.
τὰ δὲ [15] ποιητικὰ καὶ παθητικὰ κατὰ δύναμιν ποιητικὴν καὶ παθητικὴν καὶ ἐνεργείας τὰς τῶν δυνάμεων, οἷον τὸ θερμαντικὸν πρὸς τὸ θερμαντὸν ὅτι δύναται, καὶ πάλιν τὸ θερμαῖνον πρὸς τὸ θερμαινόμενον καὶ τὸ τέμνον πρὸς τὸ τεμνόμενον ὡς ἐνεργοῦντα. τῶν δὲ κατ᾽ ἀριθμὸν οὐκ εἰσὶν ἐνέργειαι ἀλλ᾽ [20] ἢ ὃν τρόπον ἐν ἑτέροις εἴρηται: αἱ δὲ κατὰ κίνησιν ἐνέργειαι οὐχ ὑπάρχουσιν. τῶν δὲ κατὰ δύναμιν καὶ κατὰ χρόνους ἤδη λέγονται πρός τι οἷον τὸ πεποιηκὸς πρὸς τὸ πεποιημένον καὶ τὸ ποιῆσον πρὸς τὸ ποιησόμενον. οὕτω γὰρ καὶ πατὴρ υἱοῦ λέγεται πατήρ: τὸ μὲν γὰρ πεποιηκὸς τὸ δὲ πεπονθός [25] τί ἐστιν. ἔτι ἔνια κατὰ στέρησιν δυνάμεως, ὥσπερ τὸ ἀδύνατον καὶ ὅσα οὕτω λέγεται, οἷον τὸ ἀόρατον. Activa vero et passiva secundum potentiam activam et passivam sunt et actiones potentiarum; ut calefactivum ad calefactibile quia potest, et iterum calefaciens ad id quod calefit et secans ad id quod secatur tamquam agentia. Eorum vero quae sunt secundum numerum non sunt actiones sed aut quomodo in aliis dictum est; quae autem secundum motum actiones non existunt. Eorum autem quae secundum potentiam et secundum tempora iam dicuntur ad aliquid, ut quod fecit ad factum * et facturum ad faciendum. Sic enim pater filii dicitur pater; hoc quidem enim fecit, illud autem passum quid est. Amplius quaedam secundum privationem potentie, ut impossibile et quaecumque sic dicuntur, ut invisibile. (2) Things that are active or passive imply an active or a passive potency and the actualizations of the potencies; e.g. that which is capable of heating is related to that which is capable of being heated, because it can heat it, and, again, that which heats is related to that which is heated and that which cuts to that which is cut, in the sense that they actually do these things. But numerical relations are not actualized except in the sense which has been elsewhere stated; actualizations in the sense of movement they have not. Of relations which imply potency some further imply particular periods of time, e.g. that which has made is relative to that which has been made, and that which will make to that which will be made. For it is in this way that a father is called the father of his son; for the one has acted and the other has been acted on in a certain way. Further, some relative terms imply privation of potency, i.e. incapable and terms of this sort, e.g. invisible .
τὰ μὲν οὖν κατ᾽ ἀριθμὸν καὶ δύναμιν λεγόμενα πρός τι πάντα ἐστὶ πρός τι τῷ ὅπερ ἐστὶν ἄλλου λέγεσθαι αὐτὸ ὅ ἐστιν, ἀλλὰ μὴ τῷ ἄλλο πρὸς ἐκεῖνο: τὸ δὲ μετρητὸν καὶ τὸ ἐπιστητὸν καὶ τὸ [30] διανοητὸν τῷ ἄλλο πρὸς αὐτὸ λέγεσθαι πρός τι λέγονται. τό τε γὰρ διανοητὸν σημαίνει ὅτι ἔστιν αὐτοῦ διάνοια, οὐκ ἔστι δ᾽ ἡ διάνοια πρὸς τοῦτο οὗ ἐστὶ διάνοια (δὶς γὰρ ταὐτὸν εἰρημένον ἂν εἴη), ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ τινός ἐστιν ἡ ὄψις ὄψις, οὐχ οὗ ἐστὶν ὄψις (καίτοι γ᾽ ἀληθὲς τοῦτο εἰπεῖν) ἀλλὰ πρὸς χρῶμα ἢ πρὸς ἄλλο τι τοιοῦτον. ἐκείνως δὲ δὶς τὸ αὐτὸ λεχθήσεται, ὅτι ἐστὶν οὗ ἐστὶν ἡ ὄψις. [1021β] [1] τὰ μὲν οὖν καθ᾽ ἑαυτὰ λεγόμενα πρός τι τὰ μὲν οὕτω λέγεται, Secundum numerum quidem igitur et potentiam dicta ad aliquid omnia sunt ad aliquid eo quod quod quidem est alterius dicitur ipsum quod est, sed non eo quod aliud ad illud; mensurabile vero et scibile et intellectuale eo quod aliud ad ipsum dicitur ad aliquid dicuntur. Nam intellectuale significat quia ipsius est intellectus, non est autem intellectus ad hoc cuius est intellectus; bis enim idem dictum utique erit. Similiter autem et alicuius visus est visus, non cuius est > visus (* quamvis verum hoc dicere) sed ad colorem aut ad aliud aliquid tale. Illo vero modo bis idem dicetur: quia est visus cuius est visus. Relative terms which imply number or potency, therefore, are all relative because their very essence includes in its nature a reference to something else, not because something else involves a reference to it; but (3) that which is measurable or knowable or thinkable is called relative because something else involves a reference to it. For that which is thinkable implies that the thought of it is possible, but the thought is not relative to that of which it is the thought ; for we should then have said the same thing twice. Similarly sight is the sight of something, not of that of which it is the sight (though of course it is true [21b] to say this); in fact it is relative to colour or to something else of the sort. But according to the other way of speaking the same thing would be said twice, – the sight is of that of which it is.
τὰ δὲ ἂν τὰ [5] γένη αὐτῶν ᾖ τοιαῦτα, οἷον ἡ ἰατρικὴ τῶν πρός τι ὅτι τὸ γένος αὐτῆς ἡ ἐπιστήμη δοκεῖ εἶναι πρός τι: ἔτι καθ᾽ ὅσα τὰ ἔχοντα λέγεται πρός τι, οἷον ἰσότης ὅτι τὸ ἴσον καὶ ὁμοιότης ὅτι τὸ ὅμοιον: Secundum se quidem igitur dicta ad aliquid haec quidem sic dicuntur, illa vero si ipsorum genera sint talia, ut medicina eorum quae ad aliquid quia ipsius genus scientia videtur esse eorum quae ad aliquid. Amplius secundum quaecumque habentia dicuntur ad aliquid, ut equalitas quia equale et similitudo quia simile. Things that are by their own nature called relative are called so sometimes in these senses, sometimes if the classes that include them are of this sort; e.g. medicine is a relative term because its genus, science, is thought to be a relative term. Further, there are the properties in virtue of which the things that have them are called relative, e.g. equality is relative because the equal is, and likeness because the like is.
τὰ δὲ κατὰ συμβεβηκός, οἷον ἅνθρωπος πρός τι ὅτι συμβέβηκεν αὐτῷ διπλασίῳ εἶναι, [10] τοῦτο δ᾽ ἐστὶ τῶν πρός τι: ἢ τὸ λευκόν, εἰ τῷ αὐτῷ συμβέβηκε διπλασίῳ καὶ λευκῷ εἶναι. Alia vero secundum accidens, ut homo ad aliquid quia ei accidit duplum esse, hoc autem est eorum quae ad aliquid; aut album, si accidit eidem album * et duplum esse. Other things are relative by accident; e.g. a man is relative because he happens to be double of something and double is a relative term; or the white is relative, if the same thing happens to be double and white.

Chapter 16 Complete

Greek Latin English
τέλειον λέγεται ἓν μὲν οὗ μὴ ἔστιν ἔξω τι λαβεῖν μηδὲ ἓν μόριον (οἷον χρόνος τέλειος ἑκάστου οὗτος οὗ μὴ ἔστιν ἔξω λαβεῖν χρόνον τινὰ ὃς τούτου μέρος ἐστὶ τοῦ χρόνου), καὶ τὸ [15] κατ᾽ ἀρετὴν καὶ τὸ εὖ μὴ ἔχον ὑπερβολὴν πρὸς τὸ γένος, οἷον τέλειος ἰατρὸς καὶ τέλειος αὐλητὴς ὅταν κατὰ τὸ εἶδος τῆς οἰκείας ἀρετῆς μηθὲν ἐλλείπωσιν (οὕτω δὲ μεταφέροντες καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν κακῶν λέγομεν συκοφάντην τέλειον καὶ κλέπτην τέλειον, ἐπειδὴ καὶ ἀγαθοὺς λέγομεν αὐτούς, οἷον κλέπτην [20] ἀγαθὸν καὶ συκοφάντην ἀγαθόν: καὶ ἡ ἀρετὴ τελείωσίς τις: ἕκαστον γὰρ τότε τέλειον καὶ οὐσία πᾶσα τότε τελεία, ὅταν κατὰ τὸ εἶδος τῆς οἰκείας ἀρετῆς μηδὲν ἐλλείπῃ μόριον τοῦ κατὰ φύσιν μεγέθους): Perfectum vero dicitur unum quidem cuius non est extra aliquid accipere nullam particulam, ut tempus perfectum uniuscuiusque hoc extra quod non est accipere tempus aliquod quod sit huius temporis pars. Et quod * secundum virtutem et quod eius quod bene non habens excedentiam ad genus, ut perfectus medicus et perfectus fistulator quando secundum speciem proprie virtutis in nullo deficiunt. Sic autem transferentes et ad mala dicimus calumpniatorem perfectum et latronem perfectum, quoniam et bonos dicimus ipsos, ut latronem bonum et calumpniatorem bonum. * et virtus perfectio quaedam; unumquodque enim tunc perfectum et substantia omnis tunc perfecta, quando secundum speciem proprie virtutis * nulla defecerit pars * eius quae secundum naturam magnitudinis. Chapter 16. What is called complete is (1) that outside which it is not possible to find any, even one, of its parts; e.g. the complete time of each thing is that outside which it is not possible to find any time which is a part proper to it. (2) That which in respect of excellence and goodness cannot be excelled in its kind; e.g. we have a complete doctor or a complete flute-player, when they lack nothing in respect of the form of their proper excellence. And thus, transferring the word to bad things, we speak of a complete scandal-monger and a complete thief; indeed we even call them good, i.e. a good thief and a good scandal-monger. And excellence is a completion; for each thing is complete and every substance is complete, when in respect of the form of its proper excellence it lacks no part of its natural magnitude.
ἔτι οἷς ὑπάρχει τὸ τέλος, σπουδαῖον <ὄν>, ταῦτα λέγεται τέλεια: κατὰ γὰρ τὸ ἔχειν τὸ [25] τέλος τέλεια, ὥστ᾽ ἐπεὶ τὸ τέλος τῶν ἐσχάτων τί ἐστι, καὶ ἐπὶ τὰ φαῦλα μεταφέροντες λέγομεν τελείως ἀπολωλέναι καὶ τελείως ἐφθάρθαι, ὅταν μηδὲν ἐλλείπῃ τῆς φθορᾶς καὶ τοῦ κακοῦ ἀλλ᾽ ἐπὶ τῷ ἐσχάτῳ ᾖ: διὸ καὶ ἡ τελευτὴ κατὰ μεταφορὰν λέγεται τέλος, ὅτι ἄμφω ἔσχατα: τέλος δὲ [30] καὶ τὸ οὗ ἕνεκα ἔσχατον. Amplius quibus inest finis studiosus, haec dicuntur perfecta; secundum habere enim finem perfecta. Quare quoniam finis ultimorum aliquid est, et ad praua transferentes dicimus perfecte perditum esse et perfecte corruptum esse, quando nil deest corruptionis et mali sed in ultimo est. Quapropter et mors secundum methaphoram dicitur finis, quia ambo ultima. Finis autem et cuius causa ultimum. (3) The things which have attained their end, this being good, are called complete; for things are complete in virtue of having attained their end. Therefore, since the end is something ultimate, we transfer the word to bad things and say a thing has been completely spoilt, and completely destroyed, when it in no wise falls short of destruction and badness, but is at its last point. This is why death, too, is by a figure of speech called the end, because both are last things. But the ultimate purpose is also an end.
τὰ μὲν οὖν καθ᾽ αὑτὰ λεγόμενα τέλεια τοσαυταχῶς λέγεται, τὰ μὲν τῷ κατὰ τὸ εὖ μηδὲν ἐλλείπειν μηδ᾽ ἔχειν ὑπερβολὴν μηδὲ ἔξω τι λαβεῖν, τὰ δ᾽ [33] ὅλως κατὰ τὸ μὴ ἔχειν ὑπερβολὴν ἐν ἑκάστῳ γένει μηδ᾽ εἶναί τι ἔξω: > Secundum se dicta quidem igitur perfecta totiens dicuntur, alia quidem quia secundum bene in nullo deficiunt nec yperbolem habent nec extra aliquid accipitur, alia omnino secundum quod non habent yperbolem in unoquoque genere nec aliquid est extra. Things, then, that are called complete in virtue of their own nature are so called in all these senses, some because in respect of goodness they lack nothing and cannot be excelled and no part proper to them can be found outside them, others in general because they cannot be exceeded in their several classes and no part proper to them is out[22a]side them;
[1022α] [1] τὰ δὲ ἄλλα ἤδη κατὰ ταῦτα τῷ ἢ ποιεῖν τι τοιοῦτον ἢ ἔχειν ἢ ἁρμόττειν τούτῳ ἢ ἁμῶς γέ πως λέγεσθαι πρὸς τὰ πρώτως λεγόμενα τέλεια. Alia vero iam * secundum ipsa aut in faciendo aliquid tale aut habendo aut congruendo tali aut in aliter qualiter dici ad primo dicta perfecta. the others presuppose these first two kinds, and are called complete because they either make or have something of the sort or are adapted to it or in some way or other involve a reference to the things that are called complete in the primary sense.

Chapter 17 Limit

Greek Latin English
πέρας λέγεται τό τε ἔσχατον ἑκάστου καὶ οὗ ἔξω μηδὲν [5] ἔστι λαβεῖν πρώτου καὶ οὗ ἔσω πάντα πρώτου, Terminus dicitur quod est cuiuslibet ultimum et cuius extra nihil est accipere primi et cuius infra omnia primi. Chapter 17. Limit means (1) the last point of each thing, i.e. the first point beyond which it is not possible to find any part, and the first point within which every part is;
καὶ ὃ ἂν ᾖ εἶδος μεγέθους ἢ ἔχοντος μέγεθος, καὶ τὸ τέλος ἑκάστου (τοιοῦτον δ᾽ ἐφ᾽ ὃ ἡ κίνησις καὶ ἡ πρᾶξις, καὶ οὐκ ἀφ᾽ οὗ—ὁτὲ δὲ ἄμφω, καὶ ἀφ᾽ οὗ καὶ ἐφ᾽ ὃ καὶ τὸ οὗ ἕνεκα), καὶ ἡ οὐσία ἡ ἑκάστου καὶ τὸ τί ἦν εἶναι ἑκάστῳ: τῆς γνώσεως γὰρ τοῦτο [10] πέρας: εἰ δὲ τῆς γνώσεως, καὶ τοῦ πράγματος. Et quodcumque fuerit species magnitudinis aut habentis magnitudinem. Et finis cuiusque, tale vero ad quod motus et actus et non a quo; et quandoque ambo, et a quo et in quod. Et cuius causa. Et substantia cuiuslibet et quod quid erat esse cuique; cognitionis enim hoc terminus; si autem cognitionis, et rei. (2) the form, whatever it may be, of a spatial magnitude or of a thing that has magnitude; (3) the end of each thing (and of this nature is that towards which the movement and the action are, not that from which they are – though sometimes it is both, that from which and that to which the movement is, i.e. the final cause); (4) the substance of each thing, and the essence of each; for this is the limit of knowledge; and if of knowledge, of the object also.
ὥστε φανερὸν ὅτι ὁσαχῶς τε ἡ ἀρχὴ λέγεται, τοσαυταχῶς καὶ τὸ πέρας, καὶ ἔτι πλεοναχῶς: ἡ μὲν γὰρ ἀρχὴ πέρας τι, τὸ δὲ πέρας οὐ πᾶν ἀρχή. Quare palam quia quotiens principium dicitur totiens terminus, et adhuc amplius; principium enim terminus quidam est, sed terminus non omnis principium. Evidently, therefore, limit has as many senses as beginning , and yet more; for the beginning is a limit, but not every limit is a beginning.

Chapter 18 That in virtue of which

Greek Latin English
τὸ καθ᾽ ὃ λέγεται πολλαχῶς, ἕνα μὲν τρόπον τὸ εἶδος [15] καὶ ἡ οὐσία ἑκάστου πράγματος, οἷον καθ᾽ ὃ ἀγαθός, αὐτὸ ἀγαθόν, ἕνα δὲ ἐν ᾧ πρώτῳ πέφυκε γίγνεσθαι, οἷον τὸ χρῶμα ἐν τῇ ἐπιφανείᾳ. τὸ μὲν οὖν πρώτως λεγόμενον καθ᾽ ὃ τὸ εἶδός ἐστι, δευτέρως δὲ ὡς ἡ ὕλη ἑκάστου καὶ τὸ ὑποκείμενον ἑκάστῳ πρῶτον. ὅλως δὲ τὸ καθ᾽ ὃ ἰσαχῶς καὶ [20] τὸ αἴτιον ὑπάρξει: κατὰ τί γὰρ ἐλήλυθεν ἢ οὗ ἕνεκα ἐλήλυθε λέγεται, καὶ κατὰ τί παραλελόγισται ἢ συλλελόγισται, ἢ τί τὸ αἴτιον τοῦ συλλογισμοῦ ἢ παραλογισμοῦ. ἔτι δὲ τὸ καθ᾽ ὃ τὸ κατὰ θέσιν λέγεται, καθ᾽ ὃ ἕστηκεν ἢ καθ᾽ ὃ βαδίζει: πάντα γὰρ ταῦτα τόπον σημαίνει καὶ θέσιν. * Secundum quod dicitur multipliciter, uno quidem modo species et substantia cuiusque rei, ut secundum quod bonus per se bonum, alio vero in quo primo aptum natum est fieri, ut color in superficie. Primo quidem igitur dictum secundum quod species est, secundo autem ut materia cuiusque et subiectum unicuique primum. Omnino vero ipsum secundum quod totiens et causa existet; nam secundum quid venit aut cuius causa venit dicitur, et secundum quid paralogizatum est aut sillogizatum est aut quia causa sillogismi * aut > paralogismi. Amplius secundum quod quod secundum positionem dicitur, secundum quod stetit aut secundum quod uadit; haec namque omnia positionem significant et locum. Chapter 18. That in virtue of which has several meanings: (1) the form or substance of each thing, e.g. that in virtue of which a man is good is the good itself, (2) the proximate subject in which it is the nature of an attribute to be found, e.g. colour in a surface. That in virtue of which , then, in the primary sense is the form, and in a secondary sense the matter of each thing and the proximate substratum of each. In general that in virtue of which will found in the same number of senses as cause ; for we say indifferently (3) in virtue of what has he come? or for what end has he come? ; and (4) in virtue of what has he inferred wrongly, or inferred? or "what is the cause of the inference, or of the wrong inference?" Further (5) Kath _ d is used in reference to position, e.g. at which he stands or along which he walks; for all such phrases indicate place and position.
ὥστε καὶ [25] τὸ καθ᾽ αὑτὸ πολλαχῶς ἀνάγκη λέγεσθαι. ἓν μὲν γὰρ καθ᾽ αὑτὸ τὸ τί ἦν εἶναι ἑκάστῳ, οἷον ὁ Καλλίας καθ᾽ αὑτὸν Καλλίας καὶ τὸ τί ἦν εἶναι Καλλίᾳ: ἓν δὲ ὅσα ἐν τῷ τί ἐστιν ὑπάρχει, οἷον ζῷον ὁ Καλλίας καθ᾽ αὑτόν: ἐν γὰρ τῷ λόγῳ ἐνυπάρχει τὸ ζῷον: ζῷον γάρ τι ὁ Καλλίας. ἔτι [30] δὲ εἰ ἐν αὑτῷ δέδεκται πρώτῳ ἢ τῶν αὑτοῦ τινί, οἷον ἡ ἐπιφάνεια λευκὴ καθ᾽ ἑαυτήν, καὶ ζῇ ὁ ἄνθρωπος καθ᾽ αὑτόν: ἡ γὰρ ψυχὴ μέρος τι τοῦ ἀνθρώπου, ἐν ᾗ πρώτῃ τὸ ζῆν. ἔτι οὗ μὴ ἔστιν ἄλλο αἴτιον: τοῦ γὰρ ἀνθρώπου πολλὰ αἴτια, τὸ ζῷον, τὸ δίπουν, ἀλλ᾽ ὅμως καθ᾽ αὑτὸν ἄνθρωπος ὁ ἄνθρωπός [35] ἐστιν. ἔτι ὅσα μόνῳ ὑπάρχει καὶ ᾗ μόνον δι᾽ αὐτὸ κεχωρισμένον καθ᾽ αὑτό. [1022β] [1] Quare et secundum se multipliciter dici est necesse. Uno quidem enim secundum se quod quid erat esse unicuique, ut Callias * et quod quid erat esse Calliam. Alio vero quaecumque in eo quod quid est existunt, ut animal Callias secundum se; nam in ratione inest animal; animal enim quoddam Callias. amplius autem si in ipso ostensum est primo aut in ipsius aliquo, ut superficies alba secundum se, et vivens secundum se homo; anima namque pars quaedam est hominis, in qua prima est ipsum vivere. Amplius cuius non est aliqua alia causa; hominis enim multe sunt causae, animal, bipes, at tamen secundum se homo homo est. Amplius quaecumque soli insunt, et in quantum solum quia separatum secundum se. Therefore "in virtue of itself" must likewise have several meanings. The following belong to a thing in virtue of itself: (1) the essence of each thing, e.g. Callias is in virtue of himself Callias and what it was to be Callias; (2) whatever is present in the what , e.g. Callias is in virtue of himself an animal. For animal is present in his definition; Callias is a particular animal. (3) Whatever attribute a thing receives in itself directly or in one of its parts; e.g. a surface is white in virtue of itself, and a man is alive in virtue of himself; for the soul, in which life directly resides, is a part of the man. (4) That which has no cause other than itself; man has more than one cause animal, two-footed but yet man is man in virtue of himself. (5) Whatever attributes belong to a thing alone, and in so far as they belong to it merely by virtue of itself considered apart by itself.

Chapter 19 Disposition

Greek Latin English
διάθεσις λέγεται τοῦ ἔχοντος μέρη τάξις ἢ κατὰ τόπον ἢ κατὰ δύναμιν ἢ κατ᾽ εἶδος: θέσιν γὰρ δεῖ τινὰ εἶναι, ὥσπερ καὶ τοὔνομα δηλοῖ ἡ διάθεσις. Dispositio dicitur habentis partes ordo aut secundum locum aut secundum potentiam aut secundum speciem; positionem enim oportet quandam esse, sicut et ipsum hoc nomen ostendit dispositio. Chapter 19. [22b] Disposition means the arrangement of that which has parts, in respect either of place or of potency or of kind; for there must be a certain position, as even the word disposition shows.

Chapter 20 Having

Greek Latin English
ξις δὲ λέγεται ἕνα μὲν τρόπον οἷον ἐνέργειά τις τοῦ [5] ἔχοντος καὶ ἐχομένου, ὥσπερ πρᾶξίς τις ἢ κίνησις (ὅταν γὰρ τὸ μὲν ποιῇ τὸ δὲ ποιῆται, ἔστι ποίησις μεταξύ: οὕτω καὶ τοῦ ἔχοντος ἐσθῆτα καὶ τῆς ἐχομένης ἐσθῆτος ἔστι μεταξὺ ἕξις): ταύτην μὲν οὖν φανερὸν ὅτι οὐκ ἐνδέχεται ἔχειν ἕξιν (εἰς ἄπειρον γὰρ βαδιεῖται, εἰ τοῦ ἐχομένου ἔσται ἔχειν τὴν [10] ἕξιν), ἄλλον δὲ τρόπον ἕξις λέγεται διάθεσις καθ᾽ ἣν ἢ εὖ ἢ κακῶς διάκειται τὸ διακείμενον, καὶ ἢ καθ᾽ αὑτὸ ἢ πρὸς ἄλλο, οἷον ἡ ὑγίεια ἕξις τις: διάθεσις γάρ ἐστι τοιαύτη. ἔτι ἕξις λέγεται ἂν ᾖ μόριον διαθέσεως τοιαύτης: διὸ καὶ ἡ τῶν μερῶν ἀρετὴ ἕξις τίς ἐστιν. [15] Habitus vero dicitur uno quidem modo tamquam actio quaedam habentis et habiti, ut actus quidam aut motus. Nam quando hoc quidem facit illud vero fit, est factio intermedia; sic et habentis uestem et habite uestis est intermedius habitus. Hanc quidem igitur manifestum quod non contingit habere habitum; in infinitum enim uadet, si habiti fuerit habere habitum. Alio vero modo habitus dispositio dicitur secundum quam bene aut male disponitur dispositum, et aut secundum se aut ad aliud, ut sanitas habitus quidam; dispositio namque talis. Amplius habitus dicitur, si est pars dispositionis talis; quapropter et partium virtus habitus quidam est. Chapter 20. Having means (1) a kind of activity of the haver and of what he has – something like an action or movement. For when one thing makes and one is made, between them there is a making; so too between him who has a garment and the garment which he has there is a having. This sort of having, then, evidently we cannot have; for the process will go on to infinity, if it is to be possible to have the having of what we have. (2) Having or habit means a disposition according to which that which is disposed is either well or ill disposed, and either in itself or with reference to something else; e.g. health is a habit ; for it is such a disposition. (3) We speak of a habit if there is a portion of such a disposition; and so even the excellence of the parts is a habit of the whole thing.

Chapter 21 Affection

Greek Latin English
πάθος λέγεται ἕνα μὲν τρόπον ποιότης καθ᾽ ἣν ἀλλοιοῦσθαι ἐνδέχεται, οἷον τὸ λευκὸν καὶ τὸ μέλαν, καὶ γλυκὺ καὶ πικρόν, καὶ βαρύτης καὶ κουφότης, καὶ ὅσα ἄλλα τοιαῦτα: ἕνα δὲ αἱ τούτων ἐνέργειαι καὶ ἀλλοιώσεις ἤδη. ἔτι τούτων μᾶλλον αἱ βλαβεραὶ ἀλλοιώσεις καὶ κινήσεις, [20] καὶ μάλιστα αἱ λυπηραὶ βλάβαι. ἔτι τὰ μεγέθη τῶν συμφορῶν καὶ λυπηρῶν πάθη λέγεται. > Passio dicitur uno quidem modo qualitas secundum quam alterari contingit, ut album et nigrum, et dulce et amarum, et gravitas et levitas, et quaecumque * alia talia. Alio vero horum actiones et alterationes iam. Amplius horum magis nocive alterationes et motus, et maxime tristes nocive. amplius magnitudines calamitatum et tristium passiones dicuntur. Chapter 21. Affection means (1) a quality in respect of which a thing can be altered, e.g. white and black, sweet and bitter, heaviness and lightness, and all others of the kind. (2) The actualization of these – the already accomplished alterations.(3) Especially, injurious alterations and movements, and, above all painful injuries.(4) Misfortunes and painful experiences when on a large scale are called affections.

Chapter 22 Privation

Greek Latin English
στέρησις λέγεται ἕνα μὲν τρόπον ἂν μὴ ἔχῃ τι τῶν πεφυκότων ἔχεσθαι, κἂν μὴ αὐτὸ ᾖ πεφυκὸς ἔχειν, οἷον φυτὸν ὀμμάτων ἐστερῆσθαι λέγεται: ἕνα δὲ ἂν πεφυκὸς [25] ἔχειν, ἢ αὐτὸ ἢ τὸ γένος, μὴ ἔχῃ, οἷον ἄλλως ἄνθρωπος ὁ τυφλὸς ὄψεως ἐστέρηται καὶ ἀσπάλαξ, τὸ μὲν κατὰ τὸ γένος τὸ δὲ καθ᾽ αὑτό. ἔτι ἂν πεφυκὸς καὶ ὅτε πέφυκεν ἔχειν μὴ ἔχῃ: ἡ γὰρ τυφλότης στέρησίς τις, τυφλὸς δ᾽ οὐ κατὰ πᾶσαν ἡλικίαν, ἀλλ᾽ ἐν ᾗ πέφυκεν ἔχειν, ἂν μὴ ἔχῃ. [30] ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ ἐν ᾧ ἂν ᾖ <πεφυκὸς> καὶ καθ᾽ ὃ καὶ πρὸς ὃ καὶ ὥς, ἂν μὴ ἔχῃ [πεφυκός]. ἔτι ἡ βιαία ἑκάστου ἀφαίρεσις στέρησις λέγεται. Privatio dicitur uno quidem modo, si non habet aliquid * natorum haberi, et si non ipsum sit aptum natum habere, ut oculis privari dicitur planta. Alio vero si aptum natum habere, aut ipsum aut genus, non habet, ut aliter homo cecus visu privari dicitur et talpa; hoc quidem secundum genus illud vero secundum se. Amplius si aptum natum et quando aptum natum est habere, non habet; caecitas enim privatio quaedam est, sed cecus non est secundum omnem etatem, sed in qua aptum natum est habere, si non habet. Similiter autem et in quocumque fuerit et secundum quod et ad quod et ut, si non habet aptum natum. Amplius cuiusque per vim ablatio privatio dicitur. Chapter 22. We speak of privation (1) if something has not one of the attributes which a thing might naturally have, even if this thing itself would not naturally have it; e.g. a plant is said to be deprived of eyes.(2) If, though either the thing itself or its genus would naturally have an attribute, it has it not; e.g. a blind man and a mole are in different senses deprived of sight; the latter in contrast with its genus, the former in contrast with his own normal nature.(3) If, though it would naturally have the attribute, and when it would naturally have it, it has it not; for blindness is a privation, but one is not blind at any and every age, but only if one has not sight at the age at which one would naturally have it. Similarly a thing is called blind if it has not sight in the medium in which, and in respect of the organ in respect of which, and with reference to the object with reference to which, and in the circumstances in which, it would naturally have it.(4) The violent taking away of anything is called privation.
καὶ ὁσαχῶς δὲ αἱ ἀπὸ τοῦ <α> ἀποφάσεις λέγονται, τοσαυταχῶς καὶ αἱ στερήσεις λέγονται: ἄνισον μὲν γὰρ τῷ μὴ ἔχειν ἰσότητα πεφυκὸς λέγεται, ἀόρατον δὲ [35] καὶ τῷ ὅλως μὴ ἔχειν χρῶμα καὶ τῷ φαύλως, καὶ ἄπουν καὶ τῷ μὴ ἔχειν ὅλως πόδας καὶ τῷ φαύλους. ἔτι καὶ τῷ μικρὸν ἔχειν, οἷον τὸ ἀπύρηνον: [1023α] [1] τοῦτο δ᾽ ἐστὶ τὸ φαύλως πως ἔχειν. ἔτι τῷ μὴ ῥᾳδίως ἢ τῷ μὴ καλῶς, οἷον τὸ ἄτμητον οὐ μόνον τῷ μὴ τέμνεσθαι ἀλλὰ καὶ τῷ μὴ ῥᾳδίως ἢ μὴ καλῶς. ἔτι τῷ πάντῃ μὴ ἔχειν: τυφλὸς γὰρ οὐ λέγεται ὁ [5] ἑτερόφθαλμος ἀλλ᾽ ὁ ἐν ἀμφοῖν μὴ ἔχων ὄψιν: διὸ οὐ πᾶς ἀγαθὸς ἢ κακός, ἢ δίκαιος ἢ ἄδικος, ἀλλὰ καὶ τὸ μεταξύ. Et quotiens autem ab eo quod a negationes dicuntur, totiens et privationes dicuntur; nam inequale non habere equalitatem aptum * natum dicitur, inuisibile vero et eo quod omnino non habeat colorem et eo quod turpiter, et sine pede et eo quod non habeat omnino pedes et eo quod turpes. Amplius et eo quod parum habeat, ut non igneum; hoc autem > est in prave aliquo modo habere. Amplius quod non facile aut non bene, ut insecabile non solum quia non secatur sed quia non facile aut quia non bene. Amplius omnino non habere; cecus enim non dicitur monoculus sed qui in ambobus non habet visum. Propter quod non omnis bonus aut malus, aut iustus aut iniustus, sed et * medium. Indeed there are just as many kinds of privations as there are of words with negative prefixes; for a thing is called unequal because it has not equality though it would naturally have it, and invisible either because it has no colour at all or because it has a poor colour, and apodous either because it has no feet at all or because it has imperfect feet. Again, a privative term may be used because the thing has [23a] little of the attribute (and this means having it in a sense imperfectly), e.g. kernel-less ; or because it has it not easily or not well (e.g. we call a thing uncuttable not only if it cannot be cut but also if it cannot be cut easily or well); or because it has not the attribute at all; for it is not the one-eyed man but he who is sightless in both eyes that is called blind. This is why not every man is good or bad , just or unjust , but there is also an intermediate state.

Chapter 23 To have

Greek Latin English
τὸ ἔχειν λέγεται πολλαχῶς, ἕνα μὲν τρόπον τὸ ἄγειν κατὰ τὴν αὑτοῦ φύσιν ἢ κατὰ τὴν αὑτοῦ ὁρμήν, διὸ [10] λέγεται πυρετός τε ἔχειν τὸν ἄνθρωπον καὶ οἱ τύραννοι τὰς πόλεις καὶ τὴν ἐσθῆτα οἱ ἀμπεχόμενοι: ἕνα δ᾽ ἐν ᾧ ἄν τι ὑπάρχῃ ὡς δεκτικῷ, οἷον ὁ χαλκὸς ἔχει τὸ εἶδος τοῦ ἀνδριάντος καὶ τὴν νόσον τὸ σῶμα: ἕνα δὲ ὡς τὸ περιέχον τὰ περιεχόμενα: ἐν ᾧ γάρ ἐστι περιέχοντι, ἔχεσθαι ὑπὸ [15] τούτου λέγεται, οἷον τὸ ἀγγεῖον ἔχειν τὸ ὑγρόν φαμεν καὶ τὴν πόλιν ἀνθρώπους καὶ τὴν ναῦν ναύτας, οὕτω δὲ καὶ τὸ ὅλον ἔχειν τὰ μέρη. ἔτι τὸ κωλῦον κατὰ τὴν αὑτοῦ ὁρμήν τι κινεῖσθαι ἢ πράττειν ἔχειν λέγεται τοῦτο αὐτό, οἷον καὶ οἱ κίονες τὰ ἐπικείμενα βάρη, καὶ ὡς οἱ ποιηταὶ [20] τὸν Ἄτλαντα ποιοῦσι τὸν οὐρανὸν ἔχειν ὡς συμπεσόντ᾽ ἂν ἐπὶ τὴν γῆν, ὥσπερ καὶ τῶν φυσιολόγων τινές φασιν: τοῦτον δὲ τὸν τρόπον καὶ τὸ συνέχον λέγεται ἃ συνέχει ἔχειν, ὡς διαχωρισθέντα ἂν κατὰ τὴν αὑτοῦ ὁρμὴν ἕκαστον. καὶ τὸ ἔν τινι δὲ εἶναι ὁμοτρόπως λέγεται καὶ ἑπομένως τῷ [25] ἔχειν. Habere multipliciter dicitur; uno quidem * ducere secundum suam naturam aut secundum suum impetum, propter quod febris dicitur habere hominem et tyranni civitates et vestimentum induti. Alio in quo utique aliquid extiterit ut susceptibili, ut es habet speciem statue et infirmitatem corpus. Alio ut continens contentum; nam in quo est contentum *, haberi ab hoc dicitur, ut lagenam habere humidum dicimus et civitatem homines et navem nautas; sic autem et totum habet partes. Amplius * prohibens secundum suum impetum aliquid moveri aut operari habere dicitur hoc ipsum, ut columpne ponderosa superposita, ut poete Athlantem faciunt celum habere tamquam casurum super terram, quemadmodum phisiologorum quidam dicunt. Hoc autem modo continens dicitur quae continet habere, quasi separata utique secundum suum impetum singula. Et in aliquo autem esse simili modo dicitur et consequenter ipsi habere. Chapter 23. To have or hold means many things:(1) to treat a thing according to one's own nature or according to one's own impulse; so that fever is said to have a man, and tyrants to have their cities, and people to have the clothes they wear.(2) That in which a thing is present as in something receptive of it is said to have the thing; e.g. the bronze has the form of the statue, and the body has the disease.(3) As that which contains holds the things contained; for a thing is said to be held by that in which it is as in a container; e.g. we say that the vessel holds the liquid and the city holds men and the ship sailors; and so too that the whole holds the parts. (4) That which hinders a thing from moving or acting according to its own impulse is said to hold it, as pillars hold the incumbent weights, and as the poets make Atlas hold the heavens, implying that otherwise they would collapse on the earth, as some of the natural philosophers also say. In this way also that which holds things together is said to hold the things it holds together, since they would otherwise separate, each according to its own impulse. Being in something has similar and corresponding meanings to holding or having .

Chapter 24 To come from

Greek Latin English
τὸ ἔκ τινος εἶναι λέγεται ἕνα μὲν τρόπον ἐξ οὗ ἐστὶν ὡς ὕλης, καὶ τοῦτο διχῶς, ἢ κατὰ τὸ πρῶτον γένος ἢ κατὰ τὸ ὕστατον εἶδος, οἷον ἔστι μὲν ὡς ἅπαντα τὰ τηκτὰ ἐξ ὕδατος, ἔστι δ᾽ ὡς ἐκ χαλκοῦ ὁ ἀνδριάς: ἕνα δ᾽ ὡς ἐκ τῆς [30] πρώτης κινησάσης ἀρχῆς (οἷον ἐκ τίνος ἡ μάχη; ἐκ λοιδορίας, ὅτι αὕτη ἀρχὴ τῆς μάχης): ἕνα δ᾽ ἐκ τοῦ συνθέτου ἐκ τῆς ὕλης καὶ τῆς μορφῆς, ὥσπερ ἐκ τοῦ ὅλου τὰ μέρη καὶ ἐκ τῆς Ἰλιάδος τὸ ἔπος καὶ ἐκ τῆς οἰκίας οἱ λίθοι: τέλος μὲν γάρ ἐστιν ἡ μορφή, τέλειον δὲ τὸ ἔχον τέλος. [35] τὰ δὲ ὡς ἐκ τοῦ μέρους τὸ εἶδος, οἷον ἅνθρωπος ἐκ τοῦ δίποδος καὶ ἡ συλλαβὴ ἐκ τοῦ στοιχείου: ἄλλως γὰρ τοῦτο καὶ ὁ ἀνδριὰς ἐκ χαλκοῦ: [1023β] [1] ἐκ τῆς αἰσθητῆς γὰρ ὕλης ἡ συνθετὴ οὐσία, ἀλλὰ καὶ τὸ εἶδος ἐκ τῆς τοῦ εἴδους ὕλης. τὰ μὲν οὖν οὕτω λέγεται, τὰ δ᾽ ἐὰν κατὰ μέρος τι τούτων τις ὑπάρχῃ τῶν τρόπων, οἷον ἐκ πατρὸς καὶ μητρὸς τὸ τέκνον [5] καὶ ἐκ γῆς τὰ φυτά, ὅτι ἔκ τινος μέρους αὐτῶν. ἕνα δὲ μεθ᾽ ὃ τῷ χρόνῳ, οἷον ἐξ ἡμέρας νὺξ καὶ ἐξ εὐδίας χειμών, ὅτι τοῦτο μετὰ τοῦτο: τούτων δὲ τὰ μὲν τῷ ἔχειν μεταβολὴν εἰς ἄλληλα οὕτω λέγεται, ὥσπερ καὶ τὰ νῦν εἰρημένα, τὰ δὲ τῷ κατὰ τὸν χρόνον ἐφεξῆς μόνον, οἷον ἐξ ἰσημερίας [10] ἐγένετο ὁ πλοῦς ὅτι μετ᾽ ἰσημερίαν ἐγένετο, καὶ ἐκ Διονυσίων Θαργήλια ὅτι μετὰ τὰ Διονύσια. Ex aliquo esse dicitur uno quidem modo ex quo est ut materia; et hoc dupliciter, aut secundum primum genus aut secundum ultimam speciem, puta sunt quidem ut omnia liquabilia ex aqua, est autem veluti ex ere statua. Alio vero ex primo movente principio; ut ex quo pugna? Ex conuicio, hoc enim est principium pugne. Alio ex composito ex materia et forma, ut ex toto partes et ex Yliade versus et ex domo lapides; finis enim est forma, perfectum vero habens finem. Haec autem ut ex parte species, ut homo ex bipede et sillaba ex elemento; aliter enim hoc et statua ex ere; nam ex sensibili materia est > composita substantia, sed et species ex speciei materia. Haec quidem igitur sic dicuntur. Alia vero si secundum partem aliquam horum aliquis extiterit modorum, ut ex patre et matre puer et ex terra plante, quia ex aliqua parte ipsorum. Alio vero post quod tempore, ut ex die nox, ex serenitate hyemps, quia hoc post hoc. Horum autem haec quidem quia habent transmutationem ad invicem ita dicuntur, ut et quae nunc sunt dicta, haec autem eo quod secundum tempus consequenter solum, ut ex equinoctio fiebat navigatio quia post equinoctium fiebat, * et ex Dyonisiis targelia quia post Dyonisia. Chapter 24. To come from something means (1) to come from something as from matter, and this in two senses, either in respect of the highest genus or in respect of the lowest species; e.g. in a sense all things that can be melted come from water, but in a sense the statue comes from bronze.(2) As from the first moving principle; e.g. what did the fight come from? From abusive language, because this was the origin of the fight.(3) From the compound of matter and shape, as the parts come from the whole, and the verse from the Iliad, and the stones from the house; (in every such case the whole is a compound of matter and shape,) for the shape is the end, and only that which attains an end is complete.(4) As the form from its part, e.g. man from two-footed and syllable from letter ; for this is a different sense from that in which the statue comes [23b] from bronze; for the composite substance comes from the sensible matter, but the form also comes from the matter of the form.Some things, then, are said to come from something else in these senses; but (5) others are so described if one of these senses is applicable to a part of that other thing; e.g. the child comes from its father and mother, and plants come from the earth, because they come from a part of those things.(6) It means coming after a thing in time, e.g. night comes from day and storm from fine weather, because the one comes after the other. Of these things some are so described because they admit of change into one another, as in the cases now mentioned; some merely because they are successive in time, e.g. the voyage took place from the equinox, because it took place after the equinox, and the festival of the Thargelia comes from the Dionysia, because after the Dionysia.

Chapter 25 Part

Greek Latin English
μέρος λέγεται ἕνα μὲν τρόπον εἰς ὃ διαιρεθείη ἂν τὸ ποσὸν ὁπωσοῦν (ἀεὶ γὰρ τὸ ἀφαιρούμενον τοῦ ποσοῦ ᾗ ποσὸν μέρος λέγεται ἐκείνου, οἷον τῶν τριῶν τὰ δύο μέρος λέγεταί [15] πως), ἄλλον δὲ τρόπον τὰ καταμετροῦντα τῶν τοιούτων μόνον: διὸ τὰ δύο τῶν τριῶν ἔστι μὲν ὡς λέγεται μέρος, ἔστι δ᾽ ὡς οὔ. ἔτι εἰς ἃ τὸ εἶδος διαιρεθείη ἂν ἄνευ τοῦ ποσοῦ, καὶ ταῦτα μόρια λέγεται τούτου: διὸ τὰ εἴδη τοῦ γένους φασὶν εἶναι μόρια. ἔτι εἰς ἃ διαιρεῖται ἢ ἐξ ὧν σύγκειται [20] τὸ ὅλον, ἢ τὸ εἶδος ἢ τὸ ἔχον τὸ εἶδος, οἷον τῆς σφαίρας τῆς χαλκῆς ἢ τοῦ κύβου τοῦ χαλκοῦ καὶ ὁ χαλκὸς μέρος (τοῦτο δ᾽ ἐστὶν ἡ ὕλη ἐν ᾗ τὸ εἶδος) καὶ ἡ γωνία μέρος. ἔτι τὰ ἐν τῷ λόγῳ τῷ δηλοῦντι ἕκαστον, καὶ ταῦτα μόρια τοῦ ὅλου: διὸ τὸ γένος τοῦ εἴδους καὶ μέρος λέγεται, ἄλλως δὲ τὸ [25] εἶδος τοῦ γένους μέρος. Pars dicitur uno quidem modo in quam dividetur utique quantum quantacumque; semper enim ablatum a quanto in quantum quantum pars illius dicitur, ut trium duo pars dicuntur aliqualiter. Alio vero modo quae talia mensurant solum; propter quod duo trium sunt quidem ut dicitur pars, sunt autem ut non. Amplius in quae dividetur utique species sine quantitate, et haec partes huius dicuntur; quare species generis dicunt esse partes. Amplius in quae dividitur aliquid aut ex quibus componitur totum, aut species aut habens speciem, ut spere eree aut cubi erei et es pars * (hoc autem est materia in qua species) et angulus pars. Amplius quae sunt in ratione unumquodque ostendente, et haec partes * totius; propter quod genus speciei et pars dicitur, aliter autem species generis pars. Chapter 25. Part means (1) (a) that into which a quantum can in any way be divided; for that which is taken from a quantum qua quantum is always called a part of it, e.g. two is called in a sense a part of three. It means (b), of the parts in the first sense, only those which measure the whole; this is why two, though in one sense it is, in another is not, called a part of three.(2) The elements into which a kind might be divided apart from the quantity are also called parts of it; for which reason we say the species are parts of the genus.(3) The elements into which a whole is divided, or of which it consists – the whole meaning either the form or that which has the form; e.g. of the bronze sphere or of the bronze cube both the bronze – i.e. the matter in which the form is – and the characteristic angle are parts.(4) The elements in the definition which explains a thing are also parts of the whole; this is why the genus is called a part of the species, though in another sense the species is part of the genus.

Chapter 26 Whole

Greek Latin English
ὅλον λέγεται οὗ τε μηθὲν ἄπεστι μέρος ἐξ ὧν λέγεται ὅλον φύσει, καὶ τὸ περιέχον τὰ περιεχόμενα ὥστε ἕν τι εἶναι ἐκεῖνα: Totum dicitur et cuius nulla pars abest ex quibus * dicitur totum natura, et continens contenta ut unum aliquid > sunt illa; Chapter 26. A whole means (1) that from which is absent none of the parts of which it is said to be naturally a whole, and (2) that which so contains the things it contains that they form a unity;
τοῦτο δὲ διχῶς: ἢ γὰρ ὡς ἕκαστον ἓν ἢ ὡς ἐκ τούτων τὸ ἕν. hoc autem dupliciter; aut enim ut unumquodque unum aut ut ex hiis unum. and this in two senses – either as being each severally one single thing, or as making up the unity between them.
τὸ μὲν γὰρ καθόλου, καὶ τὸ ὅλως λεγόμενον [30] ὡς ὅλον τι ὄν, οὕτως ἐστὶ καθόλου ὡς πολλὰ περιέχον τῷ κατηγορεῖσθαι καθ᾽ ἑκάστου καὶ ἓν ἅπαντα εἶναι ὡς ἕκαστον, οἷον ἄνθρωπον ἵππον θεόν, διότι ἅπαντα ζῷα: Universale quidem enim, et quod totaliter dicitur ut totum aliquid ens, sic est universale quasi multa continens in predicari de unoquoque et unum omnia esse ut unumquodque, puta hominem, equum, deum, quia omnia animalia. For (a) that which is true of a whole class and is said to hold good as a whole (which implies that it is a kind whole) is true of a whole in the sense that it contains many things by being predicated of each, and by all of them, e.g. man, horse, god, being severally one single thing, because all are living things.
τὸ δὲ συνεχὲς καὶ πεπερασμένον, ὅταν ἕν τι ἐκ πλειόνων ᾖ, ἐνυπαρχόντων μάλιστα μὲν δυνάμει, εἰ δὲ μή, ἐνεργείᾳ. Continuum vero et finitum, quando unum aliquid ex pluribus est quae insunt maxime quidem ** potentia, si autem non et energia. But (b) the continuous and limited is a whole, when it is a unity consisting of several parts, especially if they are present only potentially, but, failing this, even if they are present actually.
τούτων [35] δ᾽ αὐτῶν μᾶλλον τὰ φύσει ἢ τέχνῃ τοιαῦτα, ὥσπερ καὶ ἐπὶ τοῦ ἑνὸς ἐλέγομεν, ὡς οὔσης τῆς ὁλότητος ἑνότητός τινος. Horum vero eorundem magis quae sunt natura quam arte talia, quemadmodum et in uno dicimus, tamquam existente totalitate unione aliqua. Of these things themselves, those which are so by nature are wholes in a higher degree than those which are so by art, as we said in the case of unity also, wholeness being in fact a sort of oneness.
[1024α] [1] ἔτι τοῦ ποσοῦ ἔχοντος δὲ ἀρχὴν καὶ μέσον καὶ ἔσχατον, ὅσων μὲν μὴ ποιεῖ ἡ θέσις διαφοράν, πᾶν λέγεται, ὅσων δὲ ποιεῖ, ὅλον. ὅσα δὲ ἄμφω ἐνδέχεται, καὶ ὅλα καὶ πάντα: ἔστι δὲ ταῦτα ὅσων ἡ μὲν φύσις ἡ αὐτὴ μένει τῇ μεταθέσει, ἡ [5] δὲ μορφὴ οὔ, οἷον κηρὸς καὶ ἱμάτιον: καὶ γὰρ ὅλον καὶ πᾶν λέγεται: ἔχει γὰρ ἄμφω. ὕδωρ δὲ καὶ ὅσα ὑγρὰ καὶ ἀριθμὸς πᾶν μὲν λέγεται, ὅλος δ᾽ ἀριθμὸς καὶ ὅλον ὕδωρ οὐ λέγεται, ἂν μὴ μεταφορᾷ. πάντα δὲ λέγεται ἐφ᾽ οἷς τὸ πᾶν ὡς ἐφ᾽ ἑνί, ἐπὶ τούτοις τὸ πάντα ὡς ἐπὶ διῃρημένοις: [10] πᾶς οὗτος ὁ ἀριθμός, πᾶσαι αὗται αἱ μονάδες. Amplius quanto habente principium et medium et ultimum, quorum quidem non facit positio differentiam, omne dicitur, quorum vero facit, totum. Et quaecumque ambo, dicuntur et totum et omne. Sunt autem haec quorumcumque natura quidem eadem manet transpositione, forma vero non, ut cera et uestis; et enim totum et omne dicuntur, habent enim ambo. Aqua vero et quaecumque sunt humida et numerus omne quidem dicuntur, totus vero numerus et tota aqua non dicitur nisi methaphora, omnia vero dicuntur in quibus ‘omne’ ut in uno, in hiis ‘omnia’ ut in divisis: omnis hic numerus, omnes hae unitates. [24a] Again (3) of quanta that have a beginning and a middle and an end, those to which the position does not make a difference are called totals, and those to which it does, wholes. Those which admit of both descriptions are both wholes and totals. These are the things whose nature remains the same after transposition, but whose form does not, e.g. wax or a coat; they are called both wholes and totals; for they have both characteristics. Water and all liquids and number are called totals, but the whole number or the whole water one does not speak of, except by an extension of meaning. To things, to which qua one the term total is applied, the term all is applied when they are treated as separate; this total number, all these units.

Chapter 27 Mutilated

Greek Latin English
κολοβὸν δὲ λέγεται τῶν ποσῶν οὐ τὸ τυχόν, ἀλλὰ μεριστόν τε δεῖ αὐτὸ εἶναι καὶ ὅλον. τά τε γὰρ δύο οὐ κολοβὰ θατέρου ἀφαιρουμένου ἑνός (οὐ γὰρ ἴσον τὸ καλόβωμα καὶ τὸ λοιπὸν οὐδέποτ᾽ ἐστίν) οὐδ᾽ ὅλως ἀριθμὸς οὐδείς: καὶ [15] γὰρ τὴν οὐσίαν δεῖ μένειν: εἰ κύλιξ κολοβός, ἔτι εἶναι κύλικα: ὁ δὲ ἀριθμὸς οὐκέτι ὁ αὐτός. πρὸς δὲ τούτοις κἂν ἀνομοιομερῆ ᾖ, οὐδὲ ταῦτα πάντα (ὁ γὰρ ἀριθμὸς ἔστιν ὡς καὶ ἀνόμοια ἔχει μέρη, οἷον δυάδα τριάδα), ἀλλ᾽ ὅλως ὧν μὴ ποιεῖ ἡ θέσις διαφορὰν οὐδὲν κολοβόν, οἷον ὕδωρ ἢ πῦρ, [20] ἀλλὰ δεῖ τοιαῦτα εἶναι ἃ κατὰ τὴν οὐσίαν θέσιν ἔχει. ἔτι συνεχῆ: ἡ γὰρ ἁρμονία ἐξ ἀνομοίων μὲν καὶ θέσιν ἔχει, κολοβὸς δὲ οὐ γίγνεται. Colobon vero dicitur quantorum non quodcumque, sed partibile oportet illud esse et totum. Nam duo non sunt coloba altero ablato uno (non enim equale coloboma et reliquum numquam est) nec totaliter numerus nullus; et enim sub>stantiam oportet manere; si calix colobos, adhuc oportet esse calicem, numerus autem non adhuc * idem. Ad haec autem et si partium dissimilium sint, nec haec omnia (numerus enim est ut dissimiles habet partes, ut dualitatem et trinitatem), sed * totaliter quorum non facit positio differentiam nullum est colobon, ut aqua aut ignis; sed oportet talia esse quae in substantia positionem habeant. Amplius continua; nam armonia est ex eis quae sunt dissimilium partium et positionem habent, coloba autem non fit. Chapter 27. It is not any chance quantitative thing that can be said to be mutilated ; it must be a whole as well as divisible. For not only is two not mutilated if one of the two ones is taken away (for the part removed by mutilation is never equal to the remainder), but in general no number is thus mutilated; for it is also necessary that the essence remain; if a cup is mutilated, it must still be a cup; but the number is no longer the same. Further, even if things consist of unlike parts, not even these things can all be said to be mutilated, for in a sense a number has unlike parts (e.g. two and three) as well as like; but in general of the things to which their position makes no difference, e.g. water or fire, none can be mutilated; to be mutilated, things must be such as in virtue of their essence have a certain position. Again, they must be continuous; for a musical scale consists of unlike parts and has position, but cannot become mutilated.
πρὸς δὲ τούτοις οὐδ᾽ ὅσα ὅλα, οὐδὲ ταῦτα ὁτουοῦν μορίου στερήσει κολοβά. οὐ γὰρ δεῖ οὔτε τὰ κύρια τῆς οὐσίας οὔτε τὰ ὁπουοῦν ὄντα: οἷον ἂν τρυπηθῇ ἡ [25] κύλιξ, οὐ κολοβός, ἀλλ᾽ ἂν τὸ οὖς ἢ ἀκρωτήριόν τι, καὶ ὁ ἄνθρωπος οὐκ ἐὰν σάρκα ἢ τὸν σπλῆνα, ἀλλ᾽ ἐὰν ἀκρωτήριόν τι, καὶ τοῦτο οὐ πᾶν ἀλλ᾽ ὃ μὴ ἔχει γένεσιν ἀφαιρεθὲν ὅλον. διὰ τοῦτο οἱ φαλακροὶ οὐ κολοβοί. Ad haec autem nec quaelibet tota, nec haec cuiuscumque particule privatione coloba. Non enim oportet neque quae * principalia substantiae nec * ubicumque entia; ut si perforetur calix, non colobos, sed si auris aut extremitas aliqua, et homo non si carnem aut splenem, sed si extremitatem, et hoc non omne sed quae non habet generationem ablata tota. Quapropter calui non sunt colobi. Besides, not even the things that are wholes are mutilated by the privation of any part. For the parts removed must be neither those which determine the essence nor any chance parts, irrespective of their position; e.g. a cup is not mutilated if it is bored through, but only if the handle or a projecting part is removed, and a man is mutilated not if the flesh or the spleen is removed, but if an extremity is, and that not every extremity but one which when completely removed cannot grow again. Therefore baldness is not a mutilation.

Chapter 28 Genus

Greek Latin English
γένος λέγεται τὸ μὲν ἐὰν ᾖ ἡ γένεσις συνεχὴς τῶν τὸ [30] εἶδος ἐχόντων τὸ αὐτό, οἷον λέγεται ἕως ἂν ἀνθρώπων γένος ᾖ, ὅτι ἕως ἂν ᾖ ἡ γένεσις συνεχὴς αὐτῶν: τὸ δὲ ἀφ᾽ οὗ ἂν ὦσι πρώτου κινήσαντος εἰς τὸ εἶναι: οὕτω γὰρ λέγονται Ἕλληνες τὸ γένος οἱ δὲ Ἴωνες, τῷ οἱ μὲν ἀπὸ Ἕλληνος οἱ δὲ ἀπὸ Ἴωνος εἶναι πρώτου γεννήσαντος: καὶ μᾶλλον οἱ ἀπὸ [35] τοῦ γεννήσαντος ἢ τῆς ὕλης (λέγονται γὰρ καὶ ἀπὸ τοῦ θήλεος τὸ γένος, οἷον οἱ ἀπὸ Πύρρας). [1024β] [1] ἔτι δὲ ὡς τὸ ἐπίπεδον τῶν σχημάτων γένος τῶν ἐπιπέδων καὶ τὸ στερεὸν τῶν στερεῶν: ἕκαστον γὰρ τῶν σχημάτων τὸ μὲν ἐπίπεδον τοιονδὶ τὸ δὲ στερεόν ἐστι τοιονδί: τοῦτο δ᾽ ἐστὶ τὸ ὑποκείμενον ταῖς διαφοραῖς. ἔτι ὡς ἐν τοῖς λόγοις τὸ πρῶτον ἐνυπάρχον, ὃ [5] λέγεται ἐν τῷ τί ἐστι, τοῦτο γένος, οὗ διαφοραὶ λέγονται αἱ ποιότητες. τὸ μὲν οὖν γένος τοσαυταχῶς λέγεται, τὸ μὲν κατὰ γένεσιν συνεχῆ τοῦ αὐτοῦ εἴδους, τὸ δὲ κατὰ τὸ πρῶτον κινῆσαν ὁμοειδές, τὸ δ᾽ ὡς ὕλη: οὗ γὰρ ἡ διαφορὰ καὶ ἡ ποιότης ἐστί, τοῦτ᾽ ἔστι τὸ ὑποκείμενον, ὃ λέγομεν ὕλην. * Genus dicitur hoc quidem si sit generatio continua speciem eandem habentium, ut dicitur ‘donec utique hominum genus sit, quia donec est generatio continua ipsorum. Illud vero a quo sunt primo movente ad esse; sic enim dicuntur ellines genere et iones, quia hii ab elline et illi a ione primo generante. Et magis qui a generante quam qui a materia; dicuntur enim et a femina genere, ut a pirra, amplius autem ut superficies figurarum genus superficialium et solidum solidarum; figurarum enim unaqueque haec quidem superficies talis haec autem solidum tale; hoc autem est quod subicitur differentiis. Amplius ut in rationibus quod primum inest, quod > dicitur in eo quod quid est, hoc genus, cuius differentie dicuntur qualitates. Genus igitur totiens dicitur: aliud quidem secundum generationem continuam eiusdem speciei, aliud quidem secundum primum movens eiusdem speciei, aliud ut materia; cuius enim differentia et qualitas est, hoc est subiectum, quod dicimus materiam. Chapter 28. The term race or genus is used (1) if generation of things which have the same form is continuous, e.g. while the race of men lasts means "while the generation of them goes on continuously".(2) It is used with reference to that which first brought things into existence; for it is thus that some are called Hellenes by race and others Ionians, because the former proceed from Hellen and the latter from Ion as their first begetter. And the word is used in reference to the begetter more than to the matter, though people also get a race-name from the female, e.g. the descendants of Pyrrha .(3) There is genus in the sense in which [24b] plane is the genus of plane figures and solid of solids; for each of the figures is in the one case a plane of such and such a kind, and in the other a solid of such and such a kind; and this is what underlies the differentiae. Again (4) in definitions the first constituent element, which is included in the what , is the genus, whose differentiae the qualities are said to be Genus then is used in all these ways, (1) in reference to continuous generation of the same kind, (2) in reference to the first mover which is of the same kind as the things it moves, (3) as matter; for that to which the differentia or quality belongs is the substratum, which we call matter.
ἕτερα [10] δὲ τῷ γένει λέγεται ὧν ἕτερον τὸ πρῶτον ὑποκείμενον καὶ μὴ ἀναλύεται θάτερον εἰς θάτερον μηδ᾽ ἄμφω εἰς ταὐτόν, οἷον τὸ εἶδος καὶ ἡ ὕλη ἕτερον τῷ γένει, καὶ ὅσα καθ᾽ ἕτερον σχῆμα κατηγορίας τοῦ ὄντος λέγεται (τὰ μὲν γὰρ τί ἐστι σημαίνει τῶν ὄντων τὰ δὲ ποιόν τι τὰ δ᾽ ὡς διῄρηται [15] πρότερον): οὐδὲ γὰρ ταῦτα ἀναλύεται οὔτ᾽ εἰς ἄλληλα οὔτ᾽ εἰς ἕν τι. Diversa vero * genere dicuntur quorum diversum primum * subiectum et non resolvitur alterum in alterum nec ambo in idem, ut species et materia diversum genere, et quaecumque secundum diversam figuram cathegorie entis dicuntur (alia namque quid est significant entium, alia quale quid, alia ut divisum est prius); nec enim haec resoluuntur neque in invicem neque in unum aliquod. Those things are said to be other in genus whose proximate substratum is different, and which are not analysed the one into the other nor both into the same thing (e.g. form and matter are different in genus); and things which belong to different categories of being (for some of the things that are said to be signify essence, others a quality, others the other categories we have before distinguished); these also are not analysed either into one another or into some one thing.

Chapter 29 False

Greek Latin English
τὸ ψεῦδος λέγεται ἄλλον μὲν τρόπον ὡς πρᾶγμα ψεῦδος, καὶ τούτου τὸ μὲν τῷ μὴ συγκεῖσθαι ἢ ἀδύνατον εἶναι συντεθῆναι (ὥσπερ λέγεται τὸ τὴν διάμετρον εἶναι [20] σύμμετρον ἢ τὸ σὲ καθῆσθαι: τούτων γὰρ ψεῦδος τὸ μὲν ἀεὶ τὸ δὲ ποτέ: οὕτω γὰρ οὐκ ὄντα ταῦτα), τὰ δὲ ὅσα ἔστι μὲν ὄντα, πέφυκε μέντοι φαίνεσθαι ἢ μὴ οἷά ἐστιν ἢ ἃ μὴ ἔστιν (οἷον ἡ σκιαγραφία καὶ τὰ ἐνύπνια: ταῦτα γὰρ ἔστι μέν τι, ἀλλ᾽ οὐχ ὧν ἐμποιεῖ τὴν φαντασίαν): πράγματα [25] μὲν οὖν ψευδῆ οὕτω λέγεται, ἢ τῷ μὴ εἶναι αὐτὰ ἢ τῷ τὴν ἀπ᾽ αὐτῶν φαντασίαν μὴ ὄντος εἶναι: Falsum dicitur uno modo ut res falsa, et huius hoc quidem per non componi aut per impossibile esse componi, sicut dicitur dyametrum esse commensurabilem aut te sedere; horum enim falsum hoc quidem semper illud vero quandoque; sic enim non * entia haec. Alia vero quae sunt quidem entia, et apta nata sunt * videri aut non qualia sunt aut quae non sunt, ut scyagraphia et sompnia; haec namque sunt aliquid quidem, sed non quorum faciunt phantasiam. Res ergo false sic dicuntur, aut quia non sunt ipse aut quia ab eis phantasia non entis est. Chapter 29. The false means (1) that which is false as a thing, and that (a) because it is not put together or cannot be put together, e.g. that the diagonal of a square is commensurate with the side or that you are sitting ; for one of these is false always, and the other sometimes; it is in these two senses that they are non-existent. (b) There are things which exist, but whose nature it is to appear either not to be such as they are or to be things that do not exist, e.g. a sketch or a dream; for these are something, but are not the things the appearance of which they produce in us. We call things false in this way, then, – either because they themselves do not exist, or because the appearance which results from them is that of something that does not exist.
λόγος δὲ ψευδὴς ὁ τῶν μὴ ὄντων, ᾗ ψευδής, διὸ πᾶς λόγος ψευδὴς ἑτέρου ἢ οὗ ἐστὶν ἀληθής, οἷον ὁ τοῦ κύκλου ψευδὴς τριγώνου. ἑκάστου δὲ λόγος ἔστι μὲν ὡς εἷς, ὁ τοῦ τί ἦν εἶναι, ἔστι δ᾽ ὡς [30] πολλοί, ἐπεὶ ταὐτό πως αὐτὸ καὶ αὐτὸ πεπονθός, οἷον Σωκράτης καὶ Σωκράτης μουσικός (ὁ δὲ ψευδὴς λόγος οὐθενός ἐστιν ἁπλῶς λόγος): διὸ Ἀντισθένης ᾤετο εὐήθως μηθὲν ἀξιῶν λέγεσθαι πλὴν τῷ οἰκείῳ λόγῳ, ἓν ἐφ᾽ ἑνός: ἐξ ὧν συνέβαινε μὴ εἶναι ἀντιλέγειν, σχεδὸν δὲ μηδὲ ψεύδεσθαι. ἔστι [35] δ᾽ ἕκαστον λέγειν οὐ μόνον τῷ αὐτοῦ λόγῳ ἀλλὰ καὶ τῷ ἑτέρου, ψευδῶς μὲν καὶ παντελῶς, ἔστι δ᾽ ὡς καὶ ἀληθῶς, ὥσπερ τὰ ὀκτὼ διπλάσια τῷ τῆς δυάδος λόγῳ. [1025α] [1] τὰ μὲν οὖν οὕτω λέγεται ψευδῆ, Ratio vero falsa quae est non entium, in quantum falsa; unde omnis ratio falsa alterius quam * cuius est vera, ut quae circuli falsa trigoni. Cuiuslibet autem ratio est quidem ut una, quae * eius quod quid erat esse, est autem ut multe, quoniam idem aliqualiter ipsum * et ipsum passum, ut Socrates et Socrates musicus. Falsa autem ratio nullius est simpliciter ratio. Quapropter antistenes opinatus est fatue nihil dici > dignatus nisi propria ratione, unum in uno; ex quibus accidit non esse contradicere, fere autem neque mentiri. Est autem unumquodque dicere non solum sua ratione sed et ea quae alterius, falso quidem et omnino, est autem ut et vere, sicut octo dupla dualitatis ratione. (2) A false account is the account of non-existent objects, in so far as it is false. Hence every account is false when applied to something other than that of which it is true; e.g. the account of a circle is false when applied to a triangle. In a sense there is one account of each thing, i.e. the account of its essence, but in a sense there are many, since the thing itself and the thing itself with an attribute are in a sense the same, e.g. Socrates and musical Socrates (a false account is not the account of anything, except in a qualified sense). Hence Antisthenes was too simple-minded when he claimed that nothing could be described except by the account proper to it, – one predicate to one subject; from which the conclusion used to be drawn that there could be no contradiction, and almost that there could be no error. But it is possible to describe each thing not only by the account of itself, but also by that of something else. This may be done altogether falsely indeed, but there is also a way in which it may be done truly; e.g. eight may be described as a double number by the use of the definition of two.
ἄνθρωπος δὲ ψευδὴς ὁ εὐχερὴς καὶ προαιρετικὸς τῶν τοιούτων λόγων, μὴ δι᾽ ἕτερόν τι ἀλλὰ δι᾽ αὐτό, καὶ ὁ ἄλλοις ἐμποιητικὸς τῶν τοιούτων λόγων, [5] ὥσπερ καὶ τὰ πράγματά φαμεν ψευδῆ εἶναι ὅσα ἐμποιεῖ φαντασίαν ψευδῆ. Haec quidem igitur ita dicuntur falsa. Homo autem falsus qui promptus et electivus talium rationum, non propter aliud aliquid sed propter id ipsum, et qui aliis talium factor rationum, sicut res dicimus esse falsas quaecumque falsam faciunt phantasiam. [25a] These things, then, are called false in these senses, but (3) a false man is one who is ready at and fond of such accounts, not for any other reason but for their own sake, and one who is good at impressing such accounts on other people, just as we say things are which produce a false appearance.
διὸ ὁ ἐν τῷ Ἱππίᾳ λόγος παρακρούεται ὡς ὁ αὐτὸς ψευδὴς καὶ ἀληθής. τὸν δυνάμενον γὰρ ψεύσασθαι λαμβάνει ψευδῆ (οὗτος δ᾽ ὁ εἰδὼς καὶ ὁ φρόνιμος): Quare et in Ippia oratio refutatur ut eadem vera et falsa. Potentem enim mentiri accipit falsum, hic autem sciens et prudens. This is why the proof in the Hippias that the same man is false and true is misleading.
ἔτι τὸν ἑκόντα φαῦλον βελτίω. τοῦτο δὲ ψεῦδος [10] λαμβάνει διὰ τῆς ἐπαγωγῆς—ὁ γὰρ ἑκὼν χωλαίνων τοῦ ἄκοντος κρείττων—τὸ χωλαίνειν τὸ μιμεῖσθαι λέγων, ἐπεὶ εἴ γε χωλὸς ἑκών, χείρων ἴσως, ὥσπερ ἐπὶ τοῦ ἤθους, καὶ οὗτος. Amplius volentem prava meliorem. Hoc autem falsum accipit per inductionem; nam voluntarius claudicans non voluntario * melior, claudicare imitari dicens; quoniam si claudus voluntarius, deterior forsan, sicut in more et hoc. For it assumes that he is false who can deceive (i.e. the man who knows and is wise); and further that he who is willingly bad is better. This is a false result of induction – for a man who limps willingly is better than one who does so unwillingly – by limping Plato means mimicking a limp , for if the man were lame willingly, he would presumably be worse in this case as in the corresponding case of moral character.

Chapter 30 Accident

Greek Latin English
συμβεβηκὸς λέγεται ὃ ὑπάρχει μέν τινι καὶ ἀληθὲς [15] εἰπεῖν, οὐ μέντοι οὔτ᾽ ἐξ ἀνάγκης οὔτε <ὡς> ἐπὶ τὸ πολύ, οἷον εἴ τις ὀρύττων φυτῷ βόθρον εὗρε θησαυρόν. τοῦτο τοίνυν συμβεβηκὸς τῷ ὀρύττοντι τὸν βόθρον, τὸ εὑρεῖν θησαυρόν: οὔτε γὰρ ἐξ ἀνάγκης τοῦτο ἐκ τούτου ἢ μετὰ τοῦτο, οὔθ᾽ ὡς ἐπὶ τὸ πολὺ ἄν τις φυτεύῃ θησαυρὸν εὑρίσκει. καὶ μουσικός γ᾽ [20] ἄν τις εἴη λευκός: ἀλλ᾽ ἐπεὶ οὔτε ἐξ ἀνάγκης οὔθ᾽ ὡς ἐπὶ τὸ πολὺ τοῦτο γίγνεται, συμβεβηκὸς αὐτὸ λέγομεν. ὥστ᾽ ἐπεὶ ἔστιν ὑπάρχον τι καὶ τινί, καὶ ἔνια τούτων καὶ ποὺ καὶ ποτέ, ὅ τι ἂν ὑπάρχῃ μέν, ἀλλὰ μὴ διότι τοδὶ ἦν ἢ νῦν ἢ ἐνταῦθα, συμβεβηκὸς ἔσται. οὐδὲ δὴ αἴτιον ὡρισμένον οὐδὲν [25] τοῦ συμβεβηκότος ἀλλὰ τὸ τυχόν: τοῦτο δ᾽ ἀόριστον. συνέβη τῳ εἰς Αἴγιναν ἐλθεῖν, εἰ μὴ διὰ τοῦτο ἀφίκετο ὅπως ἐκεῖ ἔλθῃ, ἀλλ᾽ ὑπὸ χειμῶνος ἐξωσθεὶς ἢ ὑπὸ λῃστῶν ληφθείς. γέγονε μὲν δὴ ἢ ἔστι τὸ συμβεβηκός, ἀλλ᾽ οὐχ ᾗ αὐτὸ ἀλλ᾽ ᾗ ἕτερον: ὁ γὰρ χειμὼν αἴτιος τοῦ μὴ ὅπου ἔπλει ἐλθεῖν, [30] τοῦτο δ᾽ ἦν Αἴγινα. λέγεται δὲ καὶ ἄλλως συμβεβηκός, οἷον ὅσα ὑπάρχει ἑκάστῳ καθ᾽ αὑτὸ μὴ ἐν τῇ οὐσίᾳ ὄντα, οἷον τῷ τριγώνῳ τὸ δύο ὀρθὰς ἔχειν. καὶ ταῦτα μὲν ἐνδέχεται ἀΐδια εἶναι, ἐκείνων δὲ οὐδέν. λόγος δὲ τούτου ἐν ἑτέροις. Accidens dicitur quod inest alicui et verum est dicere, non tamen neque ex necessitate nec secundum magis, puta iam aliquis fodiens plante fossam thesaurum invenit. Hoc igitur accidens fodienti fossam, invenire thesaurum; nec enim ex necessitate hoc ex hoc aut post hoc, nec ut secundum magis si quis plantat inveniet thesaurum. Et musicus utique quis erit albus; sed quoniam nec ex necessitate nec ut secundum magis hoc fit, accidens ipsum dicimus. Quare quoniam est existens aliquid et alicui, et horum quaedam et alicubi et quandoque, quodcumque extiterit quidem, sed non quia hoc * aut nunc aut hic, accidens erit. Nec est aliqua causa determinata accidentis sed contingens; hoc autem * indeterminatum. > Accidit enim alicui eginam venire, * si non propter hoc advenit ut illuc veniat, sed ab hyeme expulsus aut a latronibus captus. Evenit quidem et est accidens, at non in quantum ipsum sed in quantum alterum; hyemps enim est causa veniendi non quo navigabat, hoc autem erat egina. Dicitur et aliter accidens, ut quaecumque existunt unicuique secundum se non in substantia entia, velut * triangulo duos rectos habere. Et haec quidem contingit sempiterna esse, illorum vero nullum. Huius autem ratio * in aliis. Chapter 30. Accident means (1) that which attaches to something and can be truly asserted, but neither of necessity nor usually, e.g. if some one in digging a hole for a plant has found treasure. This – the finding of treasure – is for the man who dug the hole an accident; for neither does the one come of necessity from the other or after the other, nor, if a man plants, does he usually find treasure. And a musical man might be pale; but since this does not happen of necessity nor usually, we call it an accident. Therefore since there are attributes and they attach to subjects, and some of them attach to these only in a particular place and at a particular time, whatever attaches to a subject, but not because it was this subject, or the time this time, or the place this place, will be an accident. Therefore, too, there is no definite cause for an accident, but a chance cause, i.e. an indefinite one. Going to Aegina was an accident for a man, if he went not in order to get there, but because he was carried out of his way by a storm or captured by pirates. The accident has happened or exists, – not in virtue of the subject's nature, however, but of something else; for the storm was the cause of his coming to a place for which he was not sailing, and this was Aegina. Accident has also (2) another meaning, i.e. all that attaches to each thing in virtue of itself but is not in its essence, as having its angles equal to two right angles attaches to the triangle. And accidents of this sort may be eternal, but no accident of the other sort is. This is explained elsewhere.


Notes


  • [[]]
Personal tools