Authors/Thomas Aquinas/Summa Theologiae/Part IIb/Q26

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Q25 Q27



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IIª-IIae q. 26 pr. Deinde considerandum est de ordine caritatis. Et circa hoc quaeruntur tredecim. Primo, utrum sit aliquis ordo in caritate. Secundo, utrum homo debeat Deum diligere plus quam proximum. Tertio, utrum plus quam seipsum. Quarto, utrum se plus quam proximum. Quinto, utrum homo debeat plus diligere proximum quam corpus proprium. Sexto, utrum unum proximum plus quam alterum. Septimo, utrum plus proximum meliorem, vel sibi magis coniunctum. Octavo, utrum coniunctum sibi secundum carnis affinitatem, vel secundum alias necessitudines. Nono, utrum ex caritate plus debeat diligere filium quam patrem. Decimo, utrum magis debeat diligere matrem quam patrem. Undecimo, utrum uxorem plus quam patrem vel matrem. Duodecimo, utrum magis benefactorem quam beneficiatum. Decimotertio, utrum ordo caritatis maneat in patria. Question 26. The order of charity Is there an order in charity? Should man love God more than his neighbor? More than himself? Should he love himself more than his neighbor? Should man love his neighbor more than his own body? Should he love one neighbor more than another? Should he love more, a neighbor who is better, or one who is more closely united to him? Should he love more, one who is akin to him by blood, or one who is united to him by other ties? Should a man, out of charity, love his son more than his father? Should he love his mother more than his father? Should he love his wife more than his father or mother? Should we love those who are kind to us more than those whom we are kind to? Does the order of charity endure in heaven?
IIª-IIae q. 26 a. 1 arg. 1 Ad primum sic proceditur. Videtur quod in caritate non sit aliquis ordo. Caritas enim quaedam virtus est. Sed in aliis virtutibus non assignatur aliquis ordo. Ergo neque in caritate aliquis ordo assignari debet. Objection 1. It would seem that there is no order in charity. For charity is a virtue. But no order is assigned to the other virtues. Neither, therefore, should any order be assigned to charity.
IIª-IIae q. 26 a. 1 arg. 2 Praeterea, sicuti fidei obiectum est prima veritas, ita caritatis obiectum est summa bonitas. Sed in fide non ponitur aliquis ordo, sed omnia aequaliter creduntur. Ergo nec in caritate debet poni aliquis ordo. Objection 2. Further, just as the object of faith is the First Truth, so is the object of charity the Sovereign Good. Now no order is appointed for faith, but all things are believed equally. Neither, therefore, ought there to be any order in charity.
IIª-IIae q. 26 a. 1 arg. 3 Praeterea, caritas in voluntate est. Ordinare autem non est voluntatis, sed rationis. Ergo ordo non debet attribui caritati. Objection 3. Further, charity is in the will: whereas ordering belongs, not to the will, but to the reason. Therefore no order should be ascribed to charity.
IIª-IIae q. 26 a. 1 s. c. Sed contra est quod dicitur Cant. II, introduxit me rex in cellam vinariam; ordinavit in me caritatem. On the contrary, It is written (Canticles 2:4): "He brought me into the cellar of wine, he set in order charity in me."
IIª-IIae q. 26 a. 1 co. Respondeo dicendum quod, sicut philosophus dicit, in V Metaphys., prius et posterius dicitur secundum relationem ad aliquod principium. Ordo autem includit in se aliquem modum prioris et posterioris. Unde oportet quod ubicumque est aliquod principium, sit etiam aliquis ordo. Dictum autem est supra quod dilectio caritatis tendit in Deum sicut in principium beatitudinis, in cuius communicatione amicitia caritatis fundatur. Et ideo oportet quod in his quae ex caritate diliguntur attendatur aliquis ordo, secundum relationem ad primum principium huius dilectionis, quod est Deus. I answer that, As the Philosopher says (Metaph. v, text. 16), the terms "before" and "after" are used in reference to some principle. Now order implies that certain things are, in some way, before or after. Hence wherever there is a principle, there must needs be also order of some kind. But it has been said above (23, 1; 25, 12) that the love of charity tends to God as to the principle of happiness, on the fellowship of which the friendship of charity is based. Consequently there must needs be some order in things loved out of charity, which order is in reference to the first principle of that love, which is God.
IIª-IIae q. 26 a. 1 ad 1 Ad primum ergo dicendum quod caritas tendit in ultimum finem sub ratione finis ultimi, quod non convenit alicui alii virtuti, ut supra dictum est. Finis autem habet rationem principii in appetibilibus et in agendis, ut ex supradictis patet. Et ideo caritas maxime importat comparationem ad primum principium. Et ideo in ea maxime consideratur ordo secundum relationem ad primum principium. Reply to Objection 1. Charity tends towards the last end considered as last end: and this does not apply to any other virtue, as stated above (Question 23, Article 6). Now the end has the character of principle in matters of appetite and action, as was shown above (23, 7, ad 2; I-II, 1, ad 1). Wherefore charity, above all, implies relation to the First Principle, and consequently, in charity above all, we find an order in reference to the First Principle.
IIª-IIae q. 26 a. 1 ad 2 Ad secundum dicendum quod fides pertinet ad vim cognitivam, cuius operatio est secundum quod res cognitae sunt in cognoscente. Caritas autem est in vi affectiva, cuius operatio consistit in hoc quod anima tendit in ipsas res. Ordo autem principalius invenitur in ipsis rebus; et ex eis derivatur ad cognitionem nostram. Et ideo ordo magis appropriatur caritati quam fidei. Licet etiam in fide sit aliquis ordo, secundum quod principaliter est de Deo, secundario autem de aliis quae referuntur ad Deum. Reply to Objection 2. Faith pertains to the cognitive power, whose operation depends on the thing known being in the knower. On the other hand, charity is in an appetitive power, whose operation consists in the soul tending to things themselves. Now order is to be found in things themselves, and flows from them into our knowledge. Hence order is more appropriate to charity than to faith. And yet there is a certain order in faith, in so far as it is chiefly about God, and secondarily about things referred to God.
IIª-IIae q. 26 a. 1 ad 3 Ad tertium dicendum quod ordo pertinet ad rationem sicut ad ordinantem, sed ad vim appetitivam pertinet sicut ad ordinatam. Et hoc modo ordo in caritate ponitur. Reply to Objection 3. Order belongs to reason as the faculty that orders, and to the appetitive power as to the faculty which is ordered. It is in this way that order is stated to be in charity.
IIª-IIae q. 26 a. 2 arg. 1 Ad secundum sic proceditur. Videtur quod Deus non sit magis diligendus quam proximus. Dicitur enim I Ioan. IV, qui non diligit fratrem suum, quem videt, Deum, quem non videt, quomodo potest diligere? Ex quo videtur quod illud sit magis diligibile quod est magis visibile, nam et visio est principium amoris, ut dicitur IX Ethic. Sed Deus est minus visibilis quam proximus. Ergo etiam est minus ex caritate diligibilis. Objection 1. It would seem that God ought not to be loved more than our neighbor. For it is written (1 John 4:20): "He that loveth not his brother whom he seeth, how can he love God, Whom he seeth not?" Whence it seems to follow that the more a thing is visible the more lovable it is, since loving begins with seeing, according to Ethic. ix, 5,12. Now God is less visible than our neighbor. Therefore He is less lovable, out of charity, than our neighbor.
IIª-IIae q. 26 a. 2 arg. 2 Praeterea, similitudo est causa dilectionis, secundum illud Eccli. XIII, omne animal diligit simile sibi. Sed maior est similitudo hominis ad proximum suum quam ad Deum. Ergo homo ex caritate magis diligit proximum quam Deum. Objection 2. Further, likeness causes love, according to Sirach 13:19: "Every beast loveth its like." Now man bears more likeness to his neighbor than to God. Therefore man loves his neighbor, out of charity, more than he loves God.
IIª-IIae q. 26 a. 2 arg. 3 Praeterea, illud quod in proximo caritas diligit, Deus est; ut patet per Augustinum, in I de Doct. Christ. Sed Deus non est maior in seipso quam in proximo. Ergo non est magis diligendus in seipso quam in proximo. Ergo non debet magis diligi Deus quam proximus. Objection 3. Further, what charity loves in a neighbor, is God, according to Augustine (De Doctr. Christ. i, 22,27). Now God is not greater in Himself than He is in our neighbor. Therefore He is not more to be loved in Himself than in our neighbor. Therefore we ought not to love God more than our neighbor.
IIª-IIae q. 26 a. 2 s. c. Sed contra, illud magis est diligendum propter quod aliqua odio sunt habenda. Sed proximi sunt odio habendi propter Deum, si scilicet a Deo abducunt, secundum illud Luc. XIV, si quis venit ad me et non odit patrem et matrem et uxorem et filios et fratres et sorores, non potest meus esse discipulus. Ergo Deus est magis ex caritate diligendus quam proximus. On the contrary, A thing ought to be loved more, if others ought to be hated on its account. Now we ought to hate our neighbor for God's sake, if, to wit, he leads us astray from God, according to Luke 14:26: "If any man come to Me and hate not his father, and mother, and wife, end children, and brethren, and sisters . . . he cannot be My disciple." Therefore we ought to love God, out of charity, more than our neighbor.
IIª-IIae q. 26 a. 2 co. Respondeo dicendum quod unaquaeque amicitia respicit principaliter illud in quo principaliter invenitur illud bonum super cuius communicatione fundatur, sicut amicitia politica principalius respicit principem civitatis, a quo totum bonum commune civitatis dependet; unde et ei maxime debetur fides et obedientia a civibus. Amicitia autem caritatis fundatur super communicatione beatitudinis, quae consistit essentialiter in Deo sicut in primo principio, a quo derivatur in omnes qui sunt beatitudinis capaces. Et ideo principaliter et maxime Deus est ex caritate diligendus, ipse enim diligitur sicut beatitudinis causa; proximus autem sicut beatitudinem simul nobiscum ab eo participans. I answer that, Each kind of friendship regards chiefly the subject in which we chiefly find the good on the fellowship of which that friendship is based: thus civil friendship regards chiefly the ruler of the state, on whom the entire common good of the state depends; hence to him before all, the citizens owe fidelity and obedience. Now the friendship of charity is based on the fellowship of happiness, which consists essentially in God, as the First Principle, whence it flows to all who are capable of happiness. Therefore God ought to be loved chiefly and before all out of charity: for He is loved as the cause of happiness, whereas our neighbor is loved as receiving together with us a share of happiness from Him.
IIª-IIae q. 26 a. 2 ad 1 Ad primum ergo dicendum quod dupliciter est aliquid causa dilectionis. Uno modo, sicut id quod est ratio diligendi. Et hoc modo bonum est causa diligendi, quia unumquodque diligitur inquantum habet rationem boni. Alio modo, quia est via quaedam ad acquirendum dilectionem. Et hoc modo visio est causa dilectionis, non quidem ita quod ea ratione sit aliquid diligibile quia est visibile; sed quia per visionem perducimur ad dilectionem non ergo oportet quod illud quod est magis visibile sit magis diligibile, sed quod prius occurrat nobis ad diligendum. Et hoc modo argumentatur apostolus. Proximus enim, quia est nobis magis visibilis, primo occurrit nobis diligendus, ex his enim quae novit animus discit incognita amare, ut Gregorius dicit, in quadam homilia. Unde si aliquis proximum non diligit, argui potest quod nec Deum diligit, non propter hoc quod proximus sit magis diligibilis; sed quia prius diligendus occurrit. Deus autem est magis diligibilis propter maiorem bonitatem. Reply to Objection 1. A thing is a cause of love in two ways: first, as being the reason for loving. On this way good is the cause of love, since each thing is loved according to its measure of goodness. Secondly, a thing causes love, as being a way to acquire love. It is in this way that seeing is the cause of loving, not as though a thing were lovable according as it is visible, but because by seeing a thing we are led to love it. Hence it does not follow that what is more visible is more lovable, but that as an object of love we meet with it before others: and that is the sense of the Apostle's argument. For, since our neighbor is more visible to us, he is the first lovable object we meet with, because "the soul learns, from those things it knows, to love what it knows not," as Gregory says in a homily (In Evang. xi). Hence it can be argued that, if any man loves not his neighbor, neither does he love God, not because his neighbor is more lovable, but because he is the first thing to demand our love: and God is more lovable by reason of His greater goodness.
IIª-IIae q. 26 a. 2 ad 2 Ad secundum dicendum quod similitudo quam habemus ad Deum est prior et causa similitudinis quam habemus ad proximum, ex hoc enim quod participamus a Deo id quod ab ipso etiam proximus habet similes proximo efficimur. Et ideo ratione similitudinis magis debemus Deum quam proximum diligere. Reply to Objection 2. The likeness we have to God precedes and causes the likeness we have to our neighbor: because from the very fact that we share along with our neighbor in something received from God, we become like to our neighbor. Hence by reason of this likeness we ought to love God more than we love our neighbor.
IIª-IIae q. 26 a. 2 ad 3 Ad tertium dicendum quod Deus, secundum substantiam suam consideratus, in quocumque sit, aequalis est, quia non minuitur per hoc quod est in aliquo. Sed tamen non aequaliter habet proximus bonitatem Dei sicut habet ipsam Deus, nam Deus habet ipsam essentialiter, proximus autem participative. Reply to Objection 3. Considered in His substance, God is equally in all, in whomsoever He may be, for He is not lessened by being in anything. And yet our neighbor does not possess God's goodness equally with God, for God has it essentially, and our neighbor by participation.
IIª-IIae q. 26 a. 3 arg. 1 Ad tertium sic proceditur. Videtur quod homo non debeat ex caritate plus Deum diligere quam seipsum. Dicit enim philosophus, in IX Ethic., quod amicabilia quae sunt ad alterum veniunt ex amicabilibus quae sunt ad seipsum. Sed causa est potior effectu. Ergo maior est amicitia hominis ad seipsum quam ad quemcumque alium. Ergo magis se debet diligere quam Deum. Objection 1. It would seem that man is not bound, out of charity, to love God more than himself. For the Philosopher says (Ethic. ix, 8) that "a man's friendly relations with others arise from his friendly relations with himself." Now the cause is stronger than its effect. Therefore man's friendship towards himself is greater than his friendship for anyone else. Therefore he ought to love himself more than God.
IIª-IIae q. 26 a. 3 arg. 2 Praeterea, unumquodque diligitur inquantum est proprium bonum. Sed id quod est ratio diligendi magis diligitur quam id quod propter hanc rationem diligitur, sicut principia, quae sunt ratio cognoscendi, magis cognoscuntur. Ergo homo magis diligit seipsum quam quodcumque aliud bonum dilectum. Non ergo magis diligit Deum quam seipsum. Objection 2. Further, one loves a thing in so far as it is one's own good. Now the reason for loving a thing is more loved than the thing itself which is loved for that reason, even as the principles which are the reason for knowing a thing are more known. Therefore man loves himself more than any other good loved by him. Therefore he does not love God more than himself.
IIª-IIae q. 26 a. 3 arg. 3 Praeterea, quantum aliquis diligit Deum, tantum diligit frui eo. Sed quantum aliquis diligit frui Deo, tantum diligit seipsum, quia hoc est summum bonum quod aliquis sibi velle potest. Ergo homo non plus debet ex caritate Deum diligere quam seipsum. Objection 3. Further, a man loves God as much as he loves to enjoy God. But a man loves himself as much as he loves to enjoy God; since this is the highest good a man can wish for himself. Therefore man is not bound, out of charity, to love God more than himself.
IIª-IIae q. 26 a. 3 s. c. Sed contra est quod Augustinus dicit, in I de Doct. Christ., si teipsum non propter te debes diligere, sed propter ipsum ubi dilectionis tuae rectissimus finis est, non succenseat aliquis alius homo si et ipsum propter Deum diligas. Sed propter quod unumquodque, illud magis. Ergo magis debet homo diligere Deum quam seipsum. On the contrary, Augustine says (De Doctr. Christ. i, 22): "If thou oughtest to love thyself, not for thy own sake, but for the sake of Him in Whom is the rightest end of thy love, let no other man take offense if him also thou lovest for God's sake." Now "the cause of a thing being such is yet more so." Therefore man ought to love God more than himself.
IIª-IIae q. 26 a. 3 co. Respondeo dicendum quod a Deo duplex bonum accipere possumus, scilicet bonum naturae, et bonum gratiae. Super communicatione autem bonorum naturalium nobis a Deo facta fundatur amor naturalis, quo non solum homo in suae integritate naturae super omnia diligit Deum et plus quam seipsum, sed etiam quaelibet creatura suo modo, idest vel intellectuali vel rationali vel animali, vel saltem naturali amore, sicut lapides et alia quae cognitione carent, quia unaquaeque pars naturaliter plus amat commune bonum totius quam particulare bonum proprium. Quod manifestatur ex opere, quaelibet enim pars habet inclinationem principalem ad actionem communem utilitati totius. Apparet etiam hoc in politicis virtutibus, secundum quas cives pro bono communi et dispendia propriarum rerum et personarum interdum sustinent. Unde multo magis hoc verificatur in amicitia caritatis, quae fundatur super communicatione donorum gratiae. Et ideo ex caritate magis debet homo diligere Deum, qui est bonum commune omnium, quam seipsum, quia beatitudo est in Deo sicut in communi et fontali omnium principio qui beatitudinem participare possunt. I answer that, The good we receive from God is twofold, the good of nature, and the good of grace. Now the fellowship of natural goods bestowed on us by God is the foundation of natural love, in virtue of which not only man, so long as his nature remains unimpaired, loves God above all things and more than himself, but also every single creature, each in its own way, i.e. either by an intellectual, or by a rational, or by an animal, or at least by a natural love, as stones do, for instance, and other things bereft of knowledge, because each part naturally loves the common good of the whole more than its own particular good. This is evidenced by its operation, since the principal inclination of each part is towards common action conducive to the good of the whole. It may also be seen in civic virtues whereby sometimes the citizens suffer damage even to their own property and persons for the sake of the common good. Wherefore much more is this realized with regard to the friendship of charity which is based on the fellowship of the gifts of grace. Therefore man ought, out of charity, to love God, Who is the common good of all, more than himself: since happiness is in God as in the universal and fountain principle of all who are able to have a share of that happiness.
IIª-IIae q. 26 a. 3 ad 1 Ad primum ergo dicendum quod philosophus loquitur de amicabilibus quae sunt ad alterum in quo bonum quod est obiectum amicitiae invenitur secundum aliquem particularem modum, non autem de amicabilibus quae sunt ad alterum in quo bonum praedictum invenitur secundum rationem totius. Reply to Objection 1. The Philosopher is speaking of friendly relations towards another person in whom the good, which is the object of friendship, resides in some restricted way; and not of friendly relations with another in whom the aforesaid good resides in totality.
IIª-IIae q. 26 a. 3 ad 2 Ad secundum dicendum quod bonum totius diligit quidem pars secundum quod est sibi conveniens, non autem ita quod bonum totius ad se referat, sed potius ita quod seipsam refert in bonum totius. Reply to Objection 2. The part does indeed love the good of the whole, as becomes a part, not however so as to refer the good of the whole to itself, but rather itself to the good of the whole.
IIª-IIae q. 26 a. 3 ad 3 Ad tertium dicendum quod hoc quod aliquis velit frui Deo, pertinet ad amorem quo Deus amatur amore concupiscentiae. Magis autem amamus Deum amore amicitiae quam amore concupiscentiae, quia maius est in se bonum Dei quam participare possumus fruendo ipso. Et ideo simpliciter homo magis diligit Deum ex caritate quam seipsum. Reply to Objection 3. That a man wishes to enjoy God pertains to that love of God which is love of concupiscence. Now we love God with the love of friendship more than with the love of concupiscence, because the Divine good is greater in itself, than our share of good in enjoying Him. Hence, out of charity, man simply loves God more than himself.
IIª-IIae q. 26 a. 4 arg. 1 Ad quartum sic proceditur. Videtur quod homo ex caritate non magis debeat diligere seipsum quam proximum. Principale enim obiectum caritatis est Deus, ut supra dictum est. Sed quandoque homo habet proximum magis Deo coniunctum quam sit ipse. Ergo debet aliquis magis talem diligere quam seipsum. Objection 1. It would seem that a man ought not, out of charity, to love himself more than his neighbor. For the principal object of charity is God, as stated above (2; 25, 1,12). Now sometimes our neighbor is more closely united to God than we are ourselves. Therefore we ought to love such a one more than ourselves.
IIª-IIae q. 26 a. 4 arg. 2 Praeterea, detrimentum illius quem magis diligimus, magis vitamus. Sed homo ex caritate sustinet detrimentum pro proximo, secundum illud Proverb. XII, qui negligit damnum propter amicum, iustus est. Ergo homo debet ex caritate magis alium diligere quam seipsum. Objection 2. Further, the more we love a person, the more we avoid injuring him. Now a man, out of charity, submits to injury for his neighbor's sake, according to Proverbs 12:26: "He that neglecteth a loss for the sake of a friend, is just." Therefore a man ought, out of charity, to love his neighbor more than himself.
IIª-IIae q. 26 a. 4 arg. 3 Praeterea, I ad Cor. XIII dicitur quod caritas non quaerit quae sua sunt. Sed illud maxime amamus cuius bonum maxime quaerimus. Ergo per caritatem aliquis non amat seipsum magis quam proximum. Objection 3. Further, it is written (1 Corinthians 13:5) "charity seeketh not its own." Now the thing we love most is the one whose good we seek most. Therefore a man does not, out of charity, love himself more than his neighbor.
IIª-IIae q. 26 a. 4 s. c. Sed contra est quod dicitur Levit. XIX, et Matth. XXII, diliges proximum tuum sicut teipsum, ex quo videtur quod dilectio hominis ad seipsum est sicut exemplar dilectionis quae habetur ad alterum. Sed exemplar potius est quam exemplatum. Ergo homo ex caritate magis debet diligere seipsum quam proximum. On the contrary, It is written (Leviticus 19:18, Matthew 22:39): "Thou shalt love thy neighbor (Leviticus 19:18: 'friend') as thyself." Whence it seems to follow that man's love for himself is the model of his love for another. But the model exceeds the copy. Therefore, out of charity, a man ought to love himself more than his neighbor.
IIª-IIae q. 26 a. 4 co. Respondeo dicendum quod in homine duo sunt, scilicet natura spiritualis, et natura corporalis. Per hoc autem homo dicitur diligere seipsum quod diligit se secundum naturam spiritualem, ut supra dictum est. Et secundum hoc debet homo magis se diligere, post Deum, quam quemcumque alium. Et hoc patet ex ipsa ratione diligendi. Nam sicut supra dictum est, Deus diligitur ut principium boni super quo fundatur dilectio caritatis; homo autem seipsum diligit ex caritate secundum rationem qua est particeps praedicti boni; proximus autem diligitur secundum rationem societatis in isto bono. Consociatio autem est ratio dilectionis secundum quandam unionem in ordine ad Deum. Unde sicut unitas potior est quam unio, ita quod homo ipse participet bonum divinum est potior ratio diligendi quam quod alius associetur sibi in hac participatione. Et ideo homo ex caritate debet magis seipsum diligere quam proximum. Et huius signum est quod homo non debet subire aliquod malum peccati, quod contrariatur participationi beatitudinis, ut proximum liberet a peccato. I answer that, There are two things in man, his spiritual nature and his corporeal nature. And a man is said to love himself by reason of his loving himself with regard to his spiritual nature, as stated above (Question 25, Article 7): so that accordingly, a man ought, out of charity, to love himself more than he loves any other person. This is evident from the very reason for loving: since, as stated above (25, 1,12), God is loved as the principle of good, on which the love of charity is founded; while man, out of charity, loves himself by reason of his being a partaker of the aforesaid good, and loves his neighbor by reason of his fellowship in that good. Now fellowship is a reason for love according to a certain union in relation to God. Wherefore just as unity surpasses union, the fact that man himself has a share of the Divine good, is a more potent reason for loving than that another should be a partner with him in that share. Therefore man, out of charity, ought to love himself more than his neighbor: in sign whereof, a man ought not to give way to any evil of sin, which counteracts his share of happiness, not even that he may free his neighbor from sin.
IIª-IIae q. 26 a. 4 ad 1 Ad primum ergo dicendum quod dilectio caritatis non solum habet quantitatem a parte obiecti, quod est Deus; sed ex parte diligentis qui est ipse homo caritatem habens, sicut et quantitas cuiuslibet actionis dependet quodammodo ex ipso subiecto. Et ideo, licet proximus melior sit Deo propinquior, quia tamen non est ita propinquus caritatem habenti sicut ipse sibi, non sequitur quod magis debeat aliquis proximum quam seipsum diligere. Reply to Objection 1. The love of charity takes its quantity not only from its object which is God, but also from the lover, who is the man that has charity, even as the quantity of any action depends in some way on the subject. Wherefore, though a better neighbor is nearer to God, yet because he is not as near to the man who has charity, as this man is to himself, it does not follow that a man is bound to love his neighbor more than himself.
IIª-IIae q. 26 a. 4 ad 2 Ad secundum dicendum quod detrimenta corporalia debet homo sustinere propter amicum, et in hoc ipso seipsum magis diligit secundum spiritualem mentem, quia hoc pertinet ad perfectionem virtutis, quae est bonum mentis. Sed in spiritualibus non debet homo pati detrimentum peccando ut proximum liberet a peccato, sicut dictum est. Reply to Objection 2. A man ought to bear bodily injury for his friend's sake, and precisely in so doing he loves himself more as regards his spiritual mind, because it pertains to the perfection of virtue, which is a good of the mind. On spiritual matters, however, man ought not to suffer injury by sinning, in order to free his neighbor from sin, as stated above.
IIª-IIae q. 26 a. 4 ad 3 Ad tertium dicendum quod, sicut Augustinus dicit, in regula, quod dicitur, caritas non quaerit quae sua sunt, sic intelligitur quia communia propriis anteponit. Semper autem commune bonum est magis amabile unicuique quam proprium bonum, sicut etiam ipsi parti est magis amabile bonum totius quam bonum partiale sui ipsius, ut dictum est. Reply to Objection 3. As Augustine says in his Rule (Ep. ccxi), the saying, "'charity seeks not her own,' means that it prefers the common to the private good." Now the common good is always more lovable to the individual than his private good, even as the good of the whole is more lovable to the part, than the latter's own partial good, as stated above (Article 3).
IIª-IIae q. 26 a. 5 arg. 1 Ad quintum sic proceditur. Videtur quod homo non magis debeat diligere proximum quam corpus proprium. In proximo enim intelligitur corpus nostri proximi. Si ergo debet homo diligere proximum plus quam corpus proprium, sequitur quod plus debeat diligere corpus proximi quam corpus proprium. Objection 1. It would seem that a man is not bound to love his neighbor more than his own body. For his neighbor includes his neighbor's body. If therefore a man ought to love his neighbor more than his own body, it follows that he ought to love his neighbor's body more than his own.
IIª-IIae q. 26 a. 5 arg. 2 Praeterea, homo plus debet diligere animam propriam quam proximum, ut dictum est. Sed corpus proprium propinquius est animae nostrae quam proximus. Ergo plus debemus diligere corpus proprium quam proximum. Objection 2. Further, a man ought to love his own soul more than his neighbor's, as stated above (Article 4). Now a man's own body is nearer to his soul than his neighbor. Therefore we ought to love our body more than our neighbor.
IIª-IIae q. 26 a. 5 arg. 3 Praeterea, unusquisque exponit id quod minus amat pro eo quod magis amat. Sed non omnis homo tenetur exponere corpus proprium pro salute proximi, sed hoc est perfectorum, secundum illud Ioan. XV, maiorem caritatem nemo habet quam ut animam suam ponat quis pro amicis suis. Ergo homo non tenetur ex caritate plus diligere proximum quam corpus proprium. Objection 3. Further, a man imperils that which he loves less for the sake of what he loves more. Now every man is not bound to imperil his own body for his neighbor's safety: this belongs to the perfect, according to John 15:13: "Greater love than this no man hath, that a man lay down his life for his friends." Therefore a man is not bound, out of charity, to love his neighbor more than his own body.
IIª-IIae q. 26 a. 5 s. c. Sed contra est quod Augustinus dicit, in I de Doct. Christ., quod plus debemus diligere proximum quam corpus proprium. On the contrary, Augustine says (De Doctr. Christ. i, 27) that "we ought to love our neighbor more than our own body."
IIª-IIae q. 26 a. 5 co. Respondeo dicendum quod illud magis est ex caritate diligendum quod habet pleniorem rationem diligibilis ex caritate, ut dictum est. Consociatio autem in plena participatione beatitudinis, quae est ratio diligendi proximum, est maior ratio diligendi quam participatio beatitudinis per redundantiam, quae est ratio diligendi proprium corpus. Et ideo proximum, quantum ad salutem animae, magis debemus diligere quam proprium corpus. I answer that, Out of charity we ought to love more that which has more fully the reason for being loved out of charity, as stated above (2; 25, 12). Now fellowship in the full participation of happiness which is the reason for loving one's neighbor, is a greater reason for loving, than the participation of happiness by way of overflow, which is the reason for loving one's own body. Therefore, as regards the welfare of the soul we ought to love our neighbor more than our own body.
IIª-IIae q. 26 a. 5 ad 1 Ad primum ergo dicendum quod quia, secundum philosophum, in IX Ethic., unumquodque videtur esse id quod est praecipuum in ipso; cum dicitur proximus esse magis diligendus quam proprium corpus, intelligitur hoc quantum ad animam, quae est potior pars eius. Reply to Objection 1. According to the Philosopher (Ethic. ix, 8) a thing seems to be that which is predominant in it: so that when we say that we ought to love our neighbor more than our own body, this refers to his soul, which is his predominant part.
IIª-IIae q. 26 a. 5 ad 2 Ad secundum dicendum quod corpus nostrum est propinquius animae nostrae quam proximus quantum ad constitutionem propriae naturae. Sed quantum ad participationem beatitudinis maior est consociatio animae proximi ad animam nostram quam etiam corporis proprii. Reply to Objection 2. Our body is nearer to our soul than our neighbor, as regards the constitution of our own nature: but as regards the participation of happiness, our neighbor's soul is more closely associated with our own soul, than even our own body is.
IIª-IIae q. 26 a. 5 ad 3 Ad tertium dicendum quod cuilibet homini imminet cura proprii corporis, non autem imminet cuilibet homini cura de salute proximi, nisi forte in casu. Et ideo non est de necessitate caritatis quod homo proprium corpus exponat pro salute proximi, nisi in casu quod tenetur eius saluti providere. Sed quod aliquis sponte ad hoc se offerat, pertinet ad perfectionem caritatis. Reply to Objection 3. Every man is immediately concerned with the care of his own body, but not with his neighbor's welfare, except perhaps in cases of urgency: wherefore charity does not necessarily require a man to imperil his own body for his neighbor's welfare, except in a case where he is under obligation to do so and if a man of his own accord offer himself for that purpose, this belongs to the perfection of charity.
IIª-IIae q. 26 a. 6 arg. 1 Ad sextum sic proceditur. Videtur quod unus proximus non sit magis diligendus quam alius. Dicit enim Augustinus, in I de Doct. Christ., omnes homines aeque diligendi sunt. Sed cum omnibus prodesse non possis, his potissimum consulendum est qui pro locorum et temporum vel quarumlibet rerum opportunitatibus, constrictius tibi quasi quadam sorte iunguntur. Ergo proximorum unus non est magis diligendus quam alius. Objection 1. It would seem that we ought not to love one neighbor more than another. For Augustine says (De Doctr. Christ. i, 28): "One ought to love all men equally. Since, however, one cannot do good to all, we ought to consider those chiefly who by reason of place, time or any other circumstance, by a kind of chance, are more closely united to us." Therefore one neighbor ought not to be loved more than another.
IIª-IIae q. 26 a. 6 arg. 2 Praeterea, ubi una et eadem est ratio diligendi diversos, non debet esse inaequalis dilectio. Sed una est ratio diligendi omnes proximos, scilicet Deus; ut patet per Augustinum, in I de Doct. Christ. Ergo omnes proximos aequaliter diligere debemus. Objection 2. Further, where there is one and the same reason for loving several, there should be no inequality of love. Now there is one and the same reason for loving all one's neighbors, which reason is God, as Augustine states (De Doctr. Christ. i, 27). Therefore we ought to love all our neighbors equally.
IIª-IIae q. 26 a. 6 arg. 3 Praeterea, amare est velle bonum alicui; ut patet per philosophum, in II Rhet. Sed omnibus proximis aequale bonum volumus, scilicet vitam aeternam. Ergo omnes proximos aequaliter debemus diligere. Objection 3. Further, to love a man is to wish him good things, as the Philosopher states (Rhet. ii, 4). Now to all our neighbors we wish an equal good, viz. everlasting life. Therefore we ought to love all our neighbors equally.
IIª-IIae q. 26 a. 6 s. c. Sed contra est quod tanto unusquisque magis debet diligi, quanto gravius peccat qui contra eius dilectionem operatur. Sed gravius peccat qui agit contra dilectionem aliquorum proximorum quam qui agit contra dilectionem aliorum, unde Levit. XX praecipitur quod qui maledixerit patri aut matri, morte moriatur, quod non praecipitur de his qui alios homines maledicunt. Ergo quosdam proximorum magis debemus diligere quam alios. On the contrary, One's obligation to love a person is proportionate to the gravity of the sin one commits in acting against that love. Now it is a more grievous sin to act against the love of certain neighbors, than against the love of others. Hence the commandment (Leviticus 10:9), "He that curseth his father or mother, dying let him die," which does not apply to those who cursed others than the above. Therefore we ought to love some neighbors more than others.
IIª-IIae q. 26 a. 6 co. Respondeo dicendum quod circa hoc fuit duplex opinio. Quidam enim dixerunt quod omnes proximi sunt aequaliter ex caritate diligendi quantum ad affectum, sed non quantum ad exteriorem effectum; ponentes ordinem dilectionis esse intelligendum secundum exteriora beneficia, quae magis debemus impendere proximis quam alienis; non autem secundum interiorem affectum, quem aequaliter debemus impendere omnibus, etiam inimicis. Sed hoc irrationabiliter dicitur. Non enim minus est ordinatus affectus caritatis, qui est inclinatio gratiae, quam appetitus naturalis, qui est inclinatio naturae, utraque enim inclinatio ex divina sapientia procedit. Videmus autem in naturalibus quod inclinatio naturalis proportionatur actui vel motui qui convenit naturae uniuscuiusque, sicut terra habet maiorem inclinationem gravitatis quam aqua, quia competit ei esse sub aqua. Oportet igitur quod etiam inclinatio gratiae, quae est affectus caritatis, proportionetur his quae sunt exterius agenda, ita scilicet ut ad eos intensiorem caritatis affectum habeamus quibus convenit nos magis beneficos esse. Et ideo dicendum est quod etiam secundum affectum oportet magis unum proximorum quam alium diligere. Et ratio est quia, cum principium dilectionis sit Deus et ipse diligens, necesse est quod secundum propinquitatem maiorem ad alterum istorum principiorum maior sit dilectionis affectus, sicut enim supra dictum est, in omnibus in quibus invenitur aliquod principium, ordo attenditur secundum comparationem ad illud principium. I answer that, There have been two opinions on this question: for some have said that we ought, out of charity, to love all our neighbors equally, as regards our affection, but not as regards the outward effect. They held that the order of love is to be understood as applying to outward favors, which we ought to confer on those who are connected with us in preference to those who are unconnected, and not to the inward affection, which ought to be given equally to all including our enemies. But this is unreasonable. For the affection of charity, which is the inclination of grace, is not less orderly than the natural appetite, which is the inclination of nature, for both inclinations flow from Divine wisdom. Now we observe in the physical order that the natural inclination in each thing is proportionate to the act or movement that is becoming to the nature of that thing: thus in earth the inclination of gravity is greater than in water, because it is becoming to earth to be beneath water. Consequently the inclination also of grace which is the effect of charity, must needs be proportionate to those actions which have to be performed outwardly, so that, to wit, the affection of our charity be more intense towards those to whom we ought to behave with greater kindness. We must, therefore, say that, even as regards the affection we ought to love one neighbor more than another. The reason is that, since the principle of love is God, and the person who loves, it must needs be that the affection of love increases in proportion to the nearness to one or the other of those principles. For as we stated above (Article 1), wherever we find a principle, order depends on relation to that principle.
IIª-IIae q. 26 a. 6 ad 1 Ad primum ergo dicendum quod dilectio potest esse inaequalis dupliciter. Uno modo, ex parte eius boni quod amico optamus. Et quantum ad hoc, omnes homines aeque diligimus ex caritate, quia omnibus optamus bonum idem in genere, scilicet beatitudinem aeternam. Alio modo dicitur maior dilectio propter intensiorem actum dilectionis. Et sic non oportet omnes aeque diligere. Vel aliter dicendum quod dilectio inaequaliter potest ad aliquos haberi dupliciter. Uno modo, ex eo quod quidam diliguntur et alii non diliguntur. Et hanc inaequalitatem oportet servare in beneficentia, quia non possumus omnibus prodesse, sed in benevolentia dilectionis talis inaequalitas haberi non debet. Alia vero est inaequalitas dilectionis ex hoc quod quidam plus aliis diliguntur. Augustinus ergo non intendit hanc excludere inaequalitatem, sed primam, ut patet ex his quae de beneficentia dicit. Reply to Objection 1. Love can be unequal in two ways: first on the part of the good we wish our friend. On this respect we love all men equally out of charity: because we wish them all one same generic good, namely everlasting happiness. Secondly love is said to be greater through its action being more intense: and in this way we ought not to love all equally. Or we may reply that we have unequal love for certain persons in two ways: first, through our loving some and not loving others. As regards beneficence we are bound to observe this inequality, because we cannot do good to all: but as regards benevolence, love ought not to be thus unequal. The other inequality arises from our loving some more than others: and Augustine does not mean to exclude the latter inequality, but the former, as is evident from what he says of beneficence.
IIª-IIae q. 26 a. 6 ad 2 Ad secundum dicendum quod non omnes proximi aequaliter se habent ad Deum, sed quidam sunt ei propinquiores, propter maiorem bonitatem. Qui sunt magis diligendi ex caritate quam alii, qui sunt ei minus propinqui. Reply to Objection 2. Our neighbors are not all equally related to God; some are nearer to Him, by reason of their greater goodness, and those we ought, out of charity, to love more than those who are not so near to Him.
IIª-IIae q. 26 a. 6 ad 3 Ad tertium dicendum quod ratio illa procedit de quantitate dilectionis ex parte boni quod amicis optamus. Reply to Objection 3. This argument considers the quantity of love on the part of the good which we wish our friends.
IIª-IIae q. 26 a. 7 arg. 1 Ad septimum sic proceditur. Videtur quod magis debeamus diligere meliores quam nobis coniunctiores. Illud enim videtur esse magis diligendum quod nulla ratione debet odio haberi, quam illud quod aliqua ratione est odiendum, sicut et albius est quod est nigro impermixtius. Sed personae nobis coniunctae sunt secundum aliquam rationem odiendae, secundum illud Luc. XIV, si quis venit ad me et non odit patrem et matrem, etc., homines autem boni nulla ratione sunt odiendi. Ergo videtur quod meliores sint magis amandi quam coniunctiores. Objection 1. It would seem that we ought to love those who are better more than those who are more closely united to us. For that which is in no way hateful seems more lovable than that which is hateful for some reason: just as a thing is all the whiter for having less black mixed with it. Now those who are connected with us are hateful for some reason, according to Luke 14:26: "If any man come to Me, and hate not his father," etc. On the other hand good men are not hateful for any reason. Therefore it seems that we ought to love those who are better more than those who are more closely connected with us.
IIª-IIae q. 26 a. 7 arg. 2 Praeterea, secundum caritatem homo maxime conformatur Deo. Sed Deus diligit magis meliorem. Ergo et homo per caritatem magis debet meliorem diligere quam sibi coniunctiorem. Objection 2. Further, by charity above all, man is likened to God. But God loves more the better man. Therefore man also, out of charity, ought to love the better man more than one who is more closely united to him.
IIª-IIae q. 26 a. 7 arg. 3 Praeterea, secundum unamquamque amicitiam illud est magis amandum quod magis pertinet ad id supra quod amicitia fundatur, amicitia enim naturali magis diligimus eos qui sunt magis nobis secundum naturam coniuncti, puta parentes vel filios. Sed amicitia caritatis fundatur super communicatione beatitudinis, ad quam magis pertinent meliores quam nobis coniunctiores. Ergo ex caritate magis debemus diligere meliores quam nobis coniunctiores. Objection 3. Further, in every friendship that ought to be loved most which has most to do with the foundation of that friendship: for, by natural friendship we love most those who are connected with us by nature, our parents for instance, or our children. Now the friendship of charity is founded upon the fellowship of happiness, which has more to do with better men than with those who are more closely united to us. Therefore, out of charity, we ought to love better men more than those who are more closely connected with us.
IIª-IIae q. 26 a. 7 s. c. Sed contra est quod dicitur I ad Tim. V, si quis suorum, et maxime domesticorum curam non habet, fidem negavit et est infideli deterior. Sed interior caritatis affectio debet respondere exteriori effectui. Ergo caritas magis debet haberi ad propinquiores quam ad meliores. On the contrary, It is written (1 Timothy 5:8): "If any man have not care of his own and especially of those of his house, he hath denied the faith, and is worse than an infidel." Now the inward affection of charity ought to correspond to the outward effect. Therefore charity regards those who are nearer to us before those who are better.
IIª-IIae q. 26 a. 7 co. Respondeo dicendum quod omnis actus oportet quod proportionetur et obiecto et agenti, sed ex obiecto habet speciem, ex virtute autem agentis habet modum suae intensionis; sicut motus habet speciem ex termino ad quem est, sed intensionem velocitatis habet ex dispositione mobilis et virtute moventis. Sic igitur dilectio speciem habet ex obiecto, sed intensionem habet ex parte ipsius diligentis. Obiectum autem caritativae dilectionis Deus est; homo autem diligens est. Diversitas igitur dilectionis quae est secundum caritatem, quantum ad speciem est attendenda in proximis diligendis secundum comparationem ad Deum, ut scilicet ei qui est Deo propinquior maius bonum ex caritate velimus. Quia licet bonum quod omnibus vult caritas, scilicet beatitudo aeterna, sit unum secundum se, habet tamen diversos gradus secundum diversas beatitudinis participationes, et hoc ad caritatem pertinet, ut velit iustitiam Dei servari, secundum quam meliores perfectius beatitudinem participant. Et hoc pertinet ad speciem dilectionis, sunt enim diversae dilectionis species secundum diversa bona quae optamus his quos diligimus. Sed intensio dilectionis est attendenda per comparationem ad ipsum hominem qui diligit. Et secundum hoc illos qui sunt sibi propinquiores intensiori affectu diligit homo ad illud bonum ad quod eos diligit, quam meliores ad maius bonum. Est etiam ibi et alia differentia attendenda. Nam aliqui proximi sunt propinqui nobis secundum naturalem originem, a qua discedere non possunt, quia secundum eam sunt id quod sunt. Sed bonitas virtutis, secundum quam aliqui appropinquant Deo, potest accedere et recedere, augeri et minui, ut ex supradictis patet. Et ideo possum ex caritate velle quod iste qui est mihi coniunctus sit melior alio, et sic ad maiorem beatitudinis gradum pervenire possit. Est autem et alius modus quo plus diligimus ex caritate magis nobis coniunctos, quia pluribus modis eos diligimus. Ad eos enim qui non sunt nobis coniuncti non habemus nisi amicitiam caritatis. Ad eos vero qui sunt nobis coniuncti habemus aliquas alias amicitias, secundum modum coniunctionis eorum ad nos. Cum autem bonum super quod fundatur quaelibet alia amicitia honesta ordinetur sicut ad finem ad bonum super quod fundatur caritas, consequens est ut caritas imperet actui cuiuslibet alterius amicitiae, sicut ars quae est circa finem imperat arti quae est circa ea quae sunt ad finem. Et sic hoc ipsum quod est diligere aliquem quia consanguineus vel quia coniunctus est vel concivis, vel propter quodcumque huiusmodi aliud licitum ordinabile in finem caritatis, potest a caritate imperari. Et ita ex caritate eliciente cum imperante pluribus modis diligimus magis nobis coniunctos. I answer that, Every act should be proportionate both to its object and to the agent. But from its object it takes its species, while, from the power of the agent it takes the mode of its intensity: thus movement has its species from the term to which it tends, while the intensity of its speed arises from the disposition of the thing moved and the power of the mover. Accordingly love takes its species from its object, but its intensity is due to the lover. Now the object of charity's love is God, and man is the lover. Therefore the specific diversity of the love which is in accordance with charity, as regards the love of our neighbor, depends on his relation to God, so that, out of charity, we should wish a greater good to one who is nearer to God; for though the good which charity wishes to all, viz. everlasting happiness, is one in itself, yet it has various degrees according to various shares of happiness, and it belongs to charity to wish God's justice to be maintained, in accordance with which better men have a fuller share of happiness. And this regards the species of love; for there are different species of love according to the different goods that we wish for those whom we love. On the other hand, the intensity of love is measured with regard to the man who loves, and accordingly man loves those who are more closely united to him, with more intense affection as to the good he wishes for them, than he loves those who are better as to the greater good he wishes for them. Again a further difference must be observed here: for some neighbors are connected with us by their natural origin, a connection which cannot be severed, since that origin makes them to be what they are. But the goodness of virtue, wherein some are close to God, can come and go, increase and decrease, as was shown above (24, 4,10,11). Hence it is possible for one, out of charity, to wish this man who is more closely united to one, to be better than another, and so reach a higher degree of happiness. Moreover there is yet another reason for which, out of charity, we love more those who are more nearly connected with us, since we love them in more ways. For, towards those who are not connected with us we have no other friendship than charity, whereas for those who are connected with us, we have certain other friendships, according to the way in which they are connected. Now since the good on which every other friendship of the virtuous is based, is directed, as to its end, to the good on which charity is based, it follows that charity commands each act of another friendship, even as the art which is about the end commands the art which is about the means. Consequently this very act of loving someone because he is akin or connected with us, or because he is a fellow-countryman or for any like reason that is referable to the end of charity, can be commanded by charity, so that, out of charity both eliciting and commanding, we love in more ways those who are more nearly connected with us.
IIª-IIae q. 26 a. 7 ad 1 Ad primum ergo dicendum quod in propinquis nostris non praecipimur odire quod propinqui nostri sunt; sed hoc solum quod impediunt nos a Deo. Et in hoc non sunt propinqui, sed inimici, secundum illud Mich. VII, inimici hominis domestici eius. Reply to Objection 1. We are commanded to hate, in our kindred, not their kinship, but only the fact of their being an obstacle between us and God. In this respect they are not akin but hostile to us, according to Micah 7:6: "A men's enemies are they of his own household."
IIª-IIae q. 26 a. 7 ad 2 Ad secundum dicendum quod caritas facit hominem conformari Deo secundum proportionem, ut scilicet ita se habeat homo ad id quod suum est, sicut Deus ad id quod suum est. Quaedam enim possumus ex caritate velle, quia sunt nobis convenientia, quae tamen Deus non vult, quia non convenit ei ut ea velit, sicut supra habitum est, cum de bonitate voluntatis ageretur. Reply to Objection 2. Charity conforms man to God proportionately, by making man comport himself towards what is his, as God does towards what is His. For we may, out of charity, will certain things as becoming to us which God does not will, because it becomes Him not to will them, as stated above (I-II, 19, 10), when we were treating of the goodness of the will.
IIª-IIae q. 26 a. 7 ad 3 Ad tertium dicendum quod caritas non solum elicit actum dilectionis secundum rationem obiecti, sed etiam secundum rationem diligentis, ut dictum est. Ex quo contingit quod magis coniunctus magis amatur. Reply to Objection 3. Charity elicits the act of love not only as regards the object, but also as regards the lover, as stated above. The result is that the man who is more nearly united to us is more loved.
IIª-IIae q. 26 a. 8 arg. 1 Ad octavum sic proceditur. Videtur quod non sit maxime diligendus ille qui est nobis coniunctus secundum carnalem originem. Dicitur enim Proverb. XVIII, vir amicabilis ad societatem magis erit amicus quam frater. Et maximus Valerius dicit quod amicitiae vinculum praevalidum est, neque ulla ex parte sanguinis viribus inferius. Hoc etiam certius et exploratius, quod illud nascendi sors fortuitum opus dedit; hoc uniuscuiusque solido iudicio incoacta voluntas contrahit. Ergo illi qui sunt coniuncti sanguine non sunt magis amandi quam alii. Objection 1. It would seem that we ought not to love more those who are more closely united to us by ties of blood. For it is written (Proverbs 18:24): "A man amiable in society, shall be more friendly than a brother." Again, Valerius Maximus says (Fact. et Dict. Memor. iv 7): "The ties of friendship are most strong and in no way yield to the ties of blood." Moreover it is quite certain and undeniable, that as to the latter, the lot of birth is fortuitous, whereas we contract the former by an untrammelled will, and a solid pledge. Therefore we ought not to love more than others those who are united to us by ties of blood.
IIª-IIae q. 26 a. 8 arg. 2 Praeterea, Ambrosius dicit, in I de Offic., non minus vos diligo, quos in Evangelio genui, quam si in coniugio suscepissem. Non enim vehementior est natura ad diligendum quam gratia. Plus certe diligere debemus quos perpetuo nobiscum putamus futuros, quam quos in hoc tantum saeculo. Non ergo consanguinei sunt magis diligendi his qui sunt aliter nobis coniuncti. Objection 2. Further, Ambrose says (De Officiis i, 7): "I love not less you whom I have begotten in the Gospel, than if I had begotten you in wedlock, for nature is no more eager to love than grace." Surely we ought to love those whom we expect to be with us for ever more than those who will be with us only in this world. Therefore we should not love our kindred more than those who are otherwise connected with us.
IIª-IIae q. 26 a. 8 arg. 3 Praeterea, probatio dilectionis est exhibitio operis; ut Gregorius dicit, in homilia. Sed quibusdam magis debemus impendere dilectionis opera quam etiam consanguineis, sicut magis est obediendum in exercitu duci quam patri. Ergo illi qui sunt sanguine iuncti non sunt maxime diligendi. Objection 3. Further, "Love is proved by deeds," as Gregory states (Hom. in Evang. xxx). Now we are bound to do acts of love to others than our kindred: thus in the army a man must obey his officer rather than his father. Therefore we are not bound to love our kindred most of all.
IIª-IIae q. 26 a. 8 s. c. Sed contra est quod in praeceptis Decalogi specialiter mandatur de honoratione parentum; ut patet Exod. XX. Ergo illi qui sunt nobis coniuncti secundum carnis originem sunt a nobis specialius diligendi. On the contrary, The commandments of the decalogue contain a special precept about the honor due to our parents (Exodus 20:12). Therefore we ought to love more specially those who are united to us by ties of blood.
IIª-IIae q. 26 a. 8 co. Respondeo dicendum quod, sicut dictum est, illi qui sunt nobis magis coniuncti, sunt ex caritate magis diligendi, tum quia intensius diliguntur; tum etiam quia pluribus rationibus diliguntur. Intensio autem dilectionis est ex coniunctione dilecti ad diligentem. Et ideo diversorum dilectio est mensuranda secundum diversam rationem coniunctionis, ut scilicet unusquisque diligatur magis in eo quod pertinet ad illam coniunctionem secundum quam diligitur. Et ulterius comparanda est dilectio dilectioni secundum comparationem coniunctionis ad coniunctionem. Sic igitur dicendum est quod amicitia consanguineorum fundatur in coniunctione naturalis originis; amicitia autem concivium in communicatione civili; et amicitia commilitantium in communicatione bellica. Et ideo in his quae pertinent ad naturam plus debemus diligere consanguineos; in his autem quae pertinent ad civilem conversationem plus debemus diligere concives; et in bellicis plus commilitones. Unde et philosophus dicit, in IX Ethic., quod singulis propria et congruentia est attribuendum. Sic autem et facere videntur. Ad nuptias quidem vocant cognatos, videbitur utique et nutrimento parentibus oportere maxime sufficere, et honorem paternum. Et simile etiam in aliis. Si autem comparemus coniunctionem ad coniunctionem, constat quod coniunctio naturalis originis est prior et immobilior, quia est secundum id quod pertinet ad substantiam; aliae autem coniunctiones sunt supervenientes, et removeri possunt. Et ideo amicitia consanguineorum est stabilior. Sed aliae amicitiae possunt esse potiores secundum illud quod est proprium unicuique amicitiae. I answer that, As stated above (Article 7), we ought out of charity to love those who are more closely united to us more, both because our love for them is more intense, and because there are more reasons for loving them. Now intensity of love arises from the union of lover and beloved: and therefore we should measure the love of different persons according to the different kinds of union, so that a man is more loved in matters touching that particular union in respect of which he is loved. And, again, in comparing love to love we should compare one union with another. Accordingly we must say that friendship among blood relations is based upon their connection by natural origin, the friendship of fellow-citizens on their civic fellowship, and the friendship of those who are fighting side by side on the comradeship of battle. Wherefore in matters pertaining to nature we should love our kindred most, in matters concerning relations between citizens, we should prefer our fellow-citizens, and on the battlefield our fellow-soldiers. Hence the Philosopher says (Ethic. ix, 2) that "it is our duty to render to each class of people such respect as is natural and appropriate. This is in fact the principle upon which we seem to act, for we invite our relations to a wedding . . . It would seem to be a special duty to afford our parents the means of living . . . and to honor them." The same applies to other kinds of friendship. If however we compare union with union, it is evident that the union arising from natural origin is prior to, and more stable than, all others, because it is something affecting the very substance, whereas other unions supervene and may cease altogether. Therefore the friendship of kindred is more stable, while other friendships may be stronger in respect of that which is proper to each of them.
IIª-IIae q. 26 a. 8 ad 1 Ad primum ergo dicendum quod quia amicitia sociorum propria electione contrahitur in his quae sub nostra electione cadunt, puta in agendis, praeponderat haec dilectio dilectioni consanguineorum, ut scilicet magis cum illis consentiamus in agendis. Amicitia tamen consanguineorum est stabilior, utpote naturalior existens, et praevalet in his quae ad naturam spectant. Unde magis eis tenemur in provisione necessariorum. Reply to Objection 1. In as much as the friendship of comrades originates through their own choice, love of this kind takes precedence of the love of kindred in matters where we are free to do as we choose, for instance in matters of action. Yet the friendship of kindred is more stable, since it is more natural, and preponderates over others in matters touching nature: consequently we are more beholden to them in the providing of necessaries.
IIª-IIae q. 26 a. 8 ad 2 Ad secundum dicendum quod Ambrosius loquitur de dilectione quantum ad beneficia quae pertinent ad communicationem gratiae, scilicet de instructione morum. In hac enim magis debet homo subvenire filiis spiritualibus, quos spiritualiter genuit, quam filiis corporalibus, quibus tenetur magis providere in corporalibus subsidiis. Reply to Objection 2. Ambrose is speaking of love with regard to favors respecting the fellowship of grace, namely, moral instruction. For in this matter, a man ought to provide for his spiritual children whom he has begotten spiritually, more than for the sons of his body, whom he is bound to support in bodily sustenance.
IIª-IIae q. 26 a. 8 ad 3 Ad tertium dicendum quod ex hoc quod duci exercitus magis obeditur in bello quam patri, non probatur quod simpliciter pater minus diligatur, sed quod minus diligatur secundum quid, idest secundum dilectionem bellicae communicationis. Reply to Objection 3. The fact that in the battle a man obeys his officer rather than his father proves, that he loves his father less, not simply but relatively, i.e. as regards the love which is based on fellowship in battle.
IIª-IIae q. 26 a. 9 arg. 1 Ad nonum sic proceditur. Videtur quod homo ex caritate magis debeat diligere filium quam patrem. Illum enim magis debemus diligere cui magis debemus benefacere. Sed magis debemus benefacere filiis quam parentibus, dicit enim apostolus, II ad Cor. XII, non debent filii thesaurizare parentibus, sed parentes filiis. Ergo magis sunt diligendi filii quam parentes. Objection 1. It seems that a man ought, out of charity, to love his children more than his father. For we ought to love those more to whom we are more bound to do good. Now we are more bound to do good to our children than to our parents, since the Apostle says (2 Corinthians 12:14): "Neither ought the children to lay up for the parents, but the parents for the children." Therefore a man ought to love his children more than his parents.
IIª-IIae q. 26 a. 9 arg. 2 Praeterea, gratia perficit naturam. Sed naturaliter parentes plus diligunt filios quam ab eis diligantur; ut philosophus dicit, in VIII Ethic. Ergo magis debemus diligere filios quam parentes. Objection 2. Further, grace perfects nature. But parents naturally love their children more than these love them, as the Philosopher states (Ethic. viii, 12). Therefore a man ought to love his children more than his parents.
IIª-IIae q. 26 a. 9 arg. 3 Praeterea, per caritatem affectus hominis Deo conformatur. Sed Deus magis diligit filios quam diligatur ab eis. Ergo etiam et nos magis debemus diligere filios quam parentes. Objection 3. Further, man's affections are conformed to God by charity. But God loves His children more than they love Him. Therefore we also ought to love our children more than our parents.
IIª-IIae q. 26 a. 9 s. c. Sed contra est quod Ambrosius dicit, primo Deus diligendus est, secundo parentes, inde filii, post domestici. On the contrary, Ambrose [Origen, Hom. ii in Cant.] says: "We ought to love God first, then our parents, then our children, and lastly those of our household."
IIª-IIae q. 26 a. 9 co. Respondeo dicendum quod, sicut supra dictum est, gradus dilectionis ex duobus pensari potest. Uno modo, ex parte obiecti. Et secundum hoc id quod habet maiorem rationem boni est magis diligendum, et quod est Deo similius. Et sic pater est magis diligendus quam filius, quia scilicet patrem diligimus sub ratione principii, quod habet rationem eminentioris boni et Deo similioris. Alio modo computantur gradus dilectionis ex parte ipsius diligentis. Et sic magis diligitur quod est coniunctius. Et secundum hoc filius est magis diligendus quam pater; ut philosophus dicit, in VIII Ethic. Primo quidem, quia parentes diligunt filios ut aliquid sui existentes; pater autem non est aliquid filii; et ideo dilectio secundum quam pater diligit filium similior est dilectioni qua quis diligit seipsum. Secundo, quia parentes magis sciunt aliquos esse suos filios quam e converso. Tertio, quia filius est magis propinquus parenti, utpote pars existens, quam pater filio, ad quem habet habitudinem principii. Quarto, quia parentes diutius amaverunt, nam statim pater incipit diligere filium; filius autem tempore procedente incipit diligere patrem. Dilectio autem quanto est diuturnior, tanto est fortior, secundum illud Eccli. IX, non derelinquas amicum antiquum, novus enim non erit similis illi. I answer that, As stated above (4, ad 1; 7), the degrees of love may be measured from two standpoints. First, from that of the object. On this respect the better a thing is, and the more like to God, the more is it to be loved: and in this way a man ought to love his father more than his children, because, to wit, he loves his father as his principle, in which respect he is a more exalted good and more like God. Secondly, the degrees of love may be measured from the standpoint of the lover, and in this respect a man loves more that which is more closely connected with him, in which way a man's children are more lovable to him than his father, as the Philosopher states (Ethic. viii). First, because parents love their children as being part of themselves, whereas the father is not part of his son, so that the love of a father for his children, is more like a man's love for himself. Secondly, because parents know better that so and so is their child than vice versa. Thirdly, because children are nearer to their parents, as being part of them, than their parents are to them to whom they stand in the relation of a principle. Fourthly, because parents have loved longer, for the father begins to love his child at once, whereas the child begins to love his father after a lapse of time; and the longer love lasts, the stronger it is, according to Sirach 9:14: "Forsake not an old friend, for the new will not be like to him."
IIª-IIae q. 26 a. 9 ad 1 Ad primum ergo dicendum quod principio debetur subiectio reverentiae et honor, effectui autem proportionaliter competit recipere influentiam principii et provisionem ipsius. Et propter hoc parentibus a filiis magis debetur honor, filiis autem magis debetur cura provisionis. Reply to Objection 1. The debt due to a principle is submission of respect and honor, whereas that due to the effect is one of influence and care. Hence the duty of children to their parents consists chiefly in honor: while that of parents to their children is especially one of care.
IIª-IIae q. 26 a. 9 ad 2 Ad secundum dicendum quod pater naturaliter plus diligit filium secundum rationem coniunctionis ad seipsum. Sed secundum rationem eminentioris boni filius naturaliter plus diligit patrem. Reply to Objection 2. It is natural for a man as father to love his children more, if we consider them as closely connected with him: but if we consider which is the more exalted good, the son naturally loves his father more.
IIª-IIae q. 26 a. 9 ad 3 Ad tertium dicendum quod, sicut Augustinus dicit, in I de Doct. Christ., Deus diligit nos ad nostram utilitatem et suum honorem. Et ideo, quia pater comparatur ad nos in habitudine principii, sicut et Deus, ad patrem proprie pertinet ut ei a filiis honor impendatur, ad filium autem ut eius utilitati a parentibus provideatur. Quamvis in articulo necessitatis filius obligatus sit ex beneficiis susceptis, ut parentibus maxime provideat. Reply to Objection 3. As Augustine says (De Doctr. Christ. i, 32), God loves us for our good and for His honor. Wherefore since our father is related to us as principle, even as God is, it belongs properly to the father to receive honor from his children, and to the children to be provided by their parents with what is good for them. Nevertheless in cases of necessity the child is bound out of the favors received to provide for his parents before all.
IIª-IIae q. 26 a. 10 arg. 1 Ad decimum sic proceditur. Videtur quod homo magis debeat diligere matrem quam patrem. Ut enim philosophus dicit, in I de Gen. Animal., femina in generatione dat corpus. Sed homo non habet animam a patre, sed per creationem a Deo, ut in primo dictum est. Ergo homo plus habet a matre quam a patre. Plus ergo debet diligere matrem quam patrem. Objection 1. It would seem that a man ought to love his mother more than his father. For, as the Philosopher says (De Gener. Animal. i, 20), "the female produces the body in generation." Now man receives his soul, not from his father, but from God by creation, as stated in I, 90, 2;118. Therefore a man receives more from his mother than from his father: and consequently he ought to love her more than him.
IIª-IIae q. 26 a. 10 arg. 2 Praeterea, magis amantem debet homo magis diligere. Sed mater plus diligit filium quam pater, dicit enim philosophus, in IX Ethic., quod matres magis sunt amatrices filiorum. Laboriosior enim est generatio matrum; et magis sciunt quoniam ipsarum sunt filii quam patres. Ergo mater est magis diligenda quam pater. Objection 2. Further, where greater love is given, greater love is due. Now a mother loves her child more than the father does: for the Philosopher says (Ethic. ix, 7) that "mothers have greater love for their children. For the mother labors more in child-bearing, and she knows more surely than the father who are her children."
IIª-IIae q. 26 a. 10 arg. 3 Praeterea, ei debetur maior dilectionis affectus qui pro nobis amplius laboravit, secundum illud Rom. ult., salutate Mariam, quae multum laboravit in vobis. Sed mater plus laborat in generatione et educatione quam pater, unde dicitur Eccli. VII, gemitum matris tuae ne obliviscaris. Ergo plus debet homo diligere matrem quam patrem. Objection 3. Further, love should be more fond towards those who have labored for us more, according to Romans 16:6: "Salute Mary, who hath labored much among you." Now the mother labors more than the father in giving birth and education to her child; wherefore it is written (Sirach 7:29): "Forget not the groanings of thy mother." Therefore a man ought to love his mother more than his father.
IIª-IIae q. 26 a. 10 s. c. Sed contra est quod Hieronymus dicit, super Ezech., quod post Deum, omnium patrem, diligendus est pater, et postea addit de matre. On the contrary, Jerome says on Ezekiel 44:25 that "man ought to love God the Father of all, and then his own father," and mentions the mother afterwards.
IIª-IIae q. 26 a. 10 co. Respondeo dicendum quod in istis comparationibus id quod dicitur est intelligendum per se, ut videlicet intelligatur esse quaesitum de patre inquantum est pater, an sit plus diligendus matre inquantum est mater. Potest enim in omnibus huiusmodi tanta esse distantia virtutis et malitiae ut amicitia solvatur vel minuatur; ut philosophus dicit, in VIII Ethic. Et ideo, ut Ambrosius dicit, boni domestici sunt malis filiis praeponendi. Sed per se loquendo, pater magis est amandus quam mater. Amantur enim pater et mater ut principia quaedam naturalis originis. Pater autem habet excellentiorem rationem principii quam mater, quia pater est principium per modum agentis, mater autem magis per modum patientis et materiae. Et ideo, per se loquendo, pater est magis diligendus. I answer that, In making such comparisons as this, we must take the answer in the strict sense, so that the present question is whether the father as father, ought to be loved more than the mother as mother. The reason is that virtue and vice may make such a difference in such like matters, that friendship may be diminished or destroyed, as the Philosopher remarks (Ethic. viii, 7). Hence Ambrose [Origen, Hom. ii in Cant.] says: "Good servants should be preferred to wicked children." Strictly speaking, however, the father should be loved more than the mother. For father and mother are loved as principles of our natural origin. Now the father is principle in a more excellent way than the mother, because he is the active principle, while the mother is a passive and material principle. Consequently, strictly speaking, the father is to be loved more.
IIª-IIae q. 26 a. 10 ad 1 Ad primum ergo dicendum quod in generatione hominis mater ministrat materiam corporis informem, formatur autem per virtutem formativam quae est in semine patris. Et quamvis huiusmodi virtus non possit creare animam rationalem, disponit tamen materiam corporalem ad huiusmodi formae susceptionem. Reply to Objection 1. In the begetting of man, the mother supplies the formless matter of the body; and the latter receives its form through the formative power that is in the semen of the father. And though this power cannot create the rational soul, yet it disposes the matter of the body to receive that form.
IIª-IIae q. 26 a. 10 ad 2 Ad secundum dicendum quod hoc pertinet ad aliam rationem dilectionis, alia enim est species amicitiae qua diligimus amantem, et qua diligimus generantem. Nunc autem loquimur de amicitia quae debetur patri et matri secundum generationis rationem. Reply to Objection 2. This applies to another kind of love. For the friendship between lover and lover differs specifically from the friendship between child and parent: while the friendship we are speaking of here, is that which a man owes his father and mother through being begotten of them. The Reply to the Third Objection is evident.
IIª-IIae q. 26 a. 11 arg. 1 Ad undecimum sic proceditur. Videtur quod homo plus debeat diligere uxorem quam patrem et matrem. Nullus enim dimittit rem aliquam nisi pro re magis dilecta. Sed Gen. II dicitur quod propter uxorem relinquet homo patrem et matrem. Ergo magis debet diligere uxorem quam patrem vel matrem. Objection 1. It would seem that a man ought to love his wife more than his father and mother. For no man leaves a thing for another unless he love the latter more. Now it is written (Genesis 2:24) that "a man shell leave father and mother" on account of his wife. Therefore a man ought to love his wife more than his father and mother.
IIª-IIae q. 26 a. 11 arg. 2 Praeterea, apostolus dicit, ad Ephes. V, quod viri debent diligere uxores sicut seipsos. Sed homo magis debet diligere seipsum quam parentes. Ergo etiam magis debet diligere uxorem quam parentes. Objection 2. Further, the Apostle says (Ephesians 5:33) that a husband should "love his wife as himself." Now a man ought to love himself more than his parents. Therefore he ought to love his wife also more than his parents.
IIª-IIae q. 26 a. 11 arg. 3 Praeterea, ubi sunt plures rationes dilectionis, ibi debet esse maior dilectio. Sed in amicitia quae est ad uxorem sunt plures rationes dilectionis, dicit enim philosophus, in VIII Ethic., quod in hac amicitia videtur esse utile et delectabile et propter virtutem, si virtuosi sint coniuges. Ergo maior debet esse dilectio ad uxorem quam ad parentes. Objection 2. Further, love should be greater where there are more reasons for loving. Now there are more reasons for love in the friendship of a man towards his wife. For the Philosopher says (Ethic. viii, 12) that "in this friendship there are the motives of utility, pleasure, and also of virtue, if husband and wife are virtuous." Therefore a man's love for his wife ought to be greater than his love for his parents.
IIª-IIae q. 26 a. 11 s. c. Sed contra est quod vir debet diligere uxorem suam sicut carnem suam, ut dicitur ad Ephes. V. Sed corpus suum minus debet homo diligere quam proximum, ut supra dictum est. Inter proximos autem magis debemus diligere parentes. Ergo magis debemus diligere parentes quam uxorem. On the contrary, According to Ephesians 5:28, "men ought to love their wives as their own bodies." Now a man ought to love his body less than his neighbor, as stated above (Article 5): and among his neighbors he should love his parents most. Therefore he ought to love his parents more than his wife.
IIª-IIae q. 26 a. 11 co. Respondeo dicendum quod, sicut dictum est, gradus dilectionis attendi potest et secundum rationem boni, et secundum coniunctionem ad diligentem. Secundum igitur rationem boni, quod est obiectum dilectionis, magis sunt diligendi parentes quam uxores, quia diliguntur sub ratione principii et eminentioris cuiusdam boni. Secundum autem rationem coniunctionis magis diligenda est uxor, quia uxor coniungitur viro ut una caro existens, secundum illud Matth. XIX, itaque iam non sunt duo, sed una caro. Et ideo intensius diligitur uxor, sed maior reverentia est parentibus exhibenda. I answer that, As stated above (Article 9), the degrees of love may be taken from the good (which is loved), or from the union between those who love. On the part of the good which is the object loved, a man should love his parents more than his wife, because he loves them as his principles and considered as a more exalted good. But on the part of the union, the wife ought to be loved more, because she is united with her husband, as one flesh, according to Matthew 19:6: "Therefore now they are not two, but one flesh." Consequently a man loves his wife more intensely, but his parents with greater reverence.
IIª-IIae q. 26 a. 11 ad 1 Ad primum ergo dicendum quod non quantum ad omnia deseritur pater et mater propter uxorem, in quibusdam enim magis debet homo assistere parentibus quam uxori. Sed quantum ad unionem carnalis copulae et cohabitationis, relictis omnibus parentibus, homo adhaeret uxori. Reply to Objection 1. A man does not in all respects leave his father and mother for the sake of his wife: for in certain cases a man ought to succor his parents rather than his wife. He does however leave all his kinsfolk, and cleaves to his wife as regards the union of carnal connection and co-habitation.
IIª-IIae q. 26 a. 11 ad 2 Ad secundum dicendum quod in verbis apostoli non est intelligendum quod homo debeat diligere uxorem suam aequaliter sibi ipsi, sed quia dilectio quam aliquis habet ad seipsum est ratio dilectionis quam quis habet ad uxorem sibi coniunctam. Reply to Objection 2. The words of the Apostle do not mean that a man ought to love his wife equally with himself, but that a man's love for himself is the reason for his love of his wife, since she is one with him.
IIª-IIae q. 26 a. 11 ad 3 Ad tertium dicendum quod etiam in amicitia paterna inveniuntur multae rationes dilectionis. Et quantum ad aliquid praeponderant rationi dilectionis quae habetur ad uxorem, secundum scilicet rationem boni, quamvis illae praeponderent secundum coniunctionis rationem. Reply to Objection 3. There are also several reasons for a man's love for his father; and these, in a certain respect, namely, as regards good, are more weighty than those for which a man loves his wife; although the latter outweigh the former as regards the closeness of the union.
IIª-IIae q. 26 a. 11 ad 4 Ad quartum dicendum quod illud etiam non est sic intelligendum quod ly sicut importet aequalitatem, sed rationem dilectionis. Diligit enim homo uxorem suam principaliter ratione carnalis coniunctionis. As to the argument in the contrary sense, it must be observed that in the words quoted, the particle "as" denotes not equality of love but the motive of love. For the principal reason why a man loves his wife is her being united to him in the flesh.
IIª-IIae q. 26 a. 12 arg. 1 Ad duodecimum sic proceditur. Videtur quod homo magis debeat diligere benefactorem quam beneficiatum. Quia ut dicit Augustinus, in libro de Catechiz. Rud., nulla est maior provocatio ad amandum quam praevenire amando, nimis enim durus est animus qui dilectionem, etsi non vult impendere, nolit rependere. Sed benefactores praeveniunt nos in beneficio caritatis. Ergo benefactores maxime debemus diligere. Objection 1. It would seem that a man ought to love his benefactor more than one he has benefited. For Augustine says (De Catech. Rud. iv): "Nothing will incite another more to love you than that you love him first: for he must have a hard heart indeed, who not only refuses to love, but declines to return love already given." Now a man's benefactor forestalls him in the kindly deeds of charity. Therefore we ought to love our benefactors above all.
IIª-IIae q. 26 a. 12 arg. 2 Praeterea, tanto aliquis est magis diligendus quanto gravius homo peccat si ab eius dilectione desistat, vel contra eam agat. Sed gravius peccat qui benefactorem non diligit, vel contra eum agit, quam si diligere desinat eum cui hactenus benefecit. Ergo magis sunt amandi benefactores quam hi quibus benefacimus. Objection 2. Further, the more grievously we sin by ceasing to love a man or by working against him, the more ought we to love him. Now it is a more grievous sin to cease loving a benefactor or to work against him, than to cease loving one to whom one has hitherto done kindly actions. Therefore we ought to love our benefactors more than those to whom we are kind.
IIª-IIae q. 26 a. 12 arg. 3 Praeterea, inter omnia diligenda maxime diligendus est Deus et post eum pater, ut Hieronymus dicit. Sed isti sunt maximi benefactores. Ergo benefactor est maxime diligendus. Objection 3. Further, of all things lovable, God is to be loved most, and then one's father, as Jerome says [Comment. in Ezechiel xliv, 25]. Now these are our greatest benefactors. Therefore a benefactor should be loved above all others.
IIª-IIae q. 26 a. 12 s. c. Sed contra est quod philosophus dicit, in IX Ethic., quod benefactores magis videntur amare beneficiatos quam e converso. On the contrary, The Philosopher says (Ethic. ix, 7), that "benefactors seem to love recipients of their benefactions, rather than vice versa."
IIª-IIae q. 26 a. 12 co. Respondeo dicendum quod, sicut supra dictum est, aliquid magis diligitur dupliciter, uno quidem modo, quia habet rationem excellentioris boni; alio modo, ratione maioris coniunctionis. Primo quidem igitur modo benefactor est magis diligendus, quia, cum sit principium boni in beneficiato, habet excellentioris boni rationem; sicut et de patre dictum est. Secundo autem modo magis diligimus beneficiatos, ut philosophus probat, in IX Ethic., per quatuor rationes. Primo quidem, quia beneficiatus est quasi quoddam opus benefactoris, unde consuevit dici de aliquo, iste est factura illius. Naturale autem est cuilibet quod diligat opus suum, sicut videmus quod poetae diligunt poemata sua. Et hoc ideo quia unumquodque diligit suum esse et suum vivere, quod maxime manifestatur in suo agere. Secundo, quia unusquisque naturaliter diligit illud in quo inspicit suum bonum. Habet quidem igitur et benefactor in beneficiato aliquod bonum, et e converso, sed benefactor inspicit in beneficiato suum bonum honestum, beneficiatus in benefactore suum bonum utile. Bonum autem honestum delectabilius consideratur quam bonum utile, tum quia est diuturnius, utilitas enim cito transit, et delectatio memoriae non est sicut delectatio rei praesentis; tum etiam quia bona honesta magis cum delectatione recolimus quam utilitates quae nobis ab aliis provenerunt. Tertio, quia ad amantem pertinet agere, vult enim et operatur bonum amato, ad amatum autem pertinet pati. Et ideo excellentioris est amare. Et propter hoc ad benefactorem pertinet ut plus amet. Quarto, quia difficilius est beneficia impendere quam recipere. Ea vero in quibus laboramus magis diligimus; quae vero nobis de facili proveniunt quodammodo contemnimus. I answer that, As stated above (A9,11), a thing is loved more in two ways: first because it has the character of a more excellent good, secondly by reason of a closer connection. On the first way we ought to love our benefactor most, because, since he is a principle of good to the man he has benefited, he has the character of a more excellent good, as stated above with regard to one's father (9). In the second way, however, we love those more who have received benefactions from us, as the Philosopher proves (Ethic. ix, 7) by four arguments. First because the recipient of benefactions is the handiwork of the benefactor, so that we are wont to say of a man: "He was made by so and so." Now it is natural to a man to love his own work (thus it is to be observed that poets love their own poems): and the reason is that we love "to be" and "to live," and these are made manifest in our "action." Secondly, because we all naturally love that in which we see our own good. Now it is true that the benefactor has some good of his in the recipient of his benefaction, and the recipient some good in the benefactor; but the benefactor sees his virtuous good in the recipient, while the recipient sees his useful good in the benefactor. Now it gives more pleasure to see one's virtuous good than one's useful good, both because it is more enduring for usefulness quickly flits by, and the pleasure of calling a thing to mind is not like the pleasure of having it present and because it is more pleasant to recall virtuous goods than the profit we have derived from others. Thirdly, because is it the lover's part to act, since he wills and works the good of the beloved, while the beloved takes a passive part in receiving good, so that to love surpasses being loved, for which reason the greater love is on the part of the benefactor. Fourthly because it is more difficult to give than to receive favors: and we are most fond of things which have cost us most trouble, while we almost despise what comes easy to us.
IIª-IIae q. 26 a. 12 ad 1 Ad primum ergo dicendum quod in benefactore est ut beneficiatus provocetur ad ipsum amandum. Benefactor autem diligit beneficiatum non quasi provocatus ab illo, sed ex seipso motus. Quod autem est ex se potius est eo quod est per aliud. Reply to Objection 1. It is some thing in the benefactor that incites the recipient to love him: whereas the benefactor loves the recipient, not through being incited by him, but through being moved thereto of his own accord: and what we do of our own accord surpasses what we do through another.
IIª-IIae q. 26 a. 12 ad 2 Ad secundum dicendum quod amor beneficiati ad benefactorem est magis debitus, et ideo contrarium habet rationem maioris peccati. Sed amor benefactoris ad beneficiatum est magis spontaneus, et ideo habet maiorem promptitudinem. Reply to Objection 2. The love of the beneficiary for the benefactor is more of a duty, wherefore the contrary is the greater sin. On the other hand, the love of the benefactor for the beneficiary is more spontaneous, wherefore it is quicker to act.
IIª-IIae q. 26 a. 12 ad 3 Ad tertium dicendum quod Deus etiam plus nos diligit quam nos eum diligimus, et parentes plus diligunt filios quam ab eis diligantur. Nec tamen oportet quod quoslibet beneficiatos plus diligamus quibuslibet benefactoribus. Benefactores enim a quibus maxima beneficia recepimus, scilicet Deum et parentes, praeferimus his quibus aliqua minora beneficia impendimus. Reply to Objection 3. God also loves us more than we love Him, and parents love their children more than these love them. Yet it does not follow that we love all who have received good from us, more than any of our benefactors. For we prefer such benefactors as God and our parents, from whom we have received the greatest favors, to those on whom we have bestowed lesser benefits.
IIª-IIae q. 26 a. 13 arg. 1 Ad tertiumdecimum sic proceditur. Videtur quod ordo caritatis non remaneat in patria. Dicit enim Augustinus, in libro de vera Relig., perfecta caritas est ut plus potiora bona, et minus minora diligamus. Sed in patria erit perfecta caritas. Ergo plus diliget aliquis meliorem quam seipsum vel sibi coniunctum. Objection 1. It would seem that the order of charity does not endure in heaven. For Augustine says (De Vera Relig. xlviii): "Perfect charity consists in loving greater goods more, and lesser goods less." Now charity will be perfect in heaven. Therefore a man will love those who are better more than either himself or those who are connected with him.
IIª-IIae q. 26 a. 13 arg. 2 Praeterea, ille magis amatur cui maius bonum volumus. Sed quilibet in patria existens vult maius bonum ei qui plus bonum habet, alioquin voluntas eius non per omnia divinae voluntati conformaretur. Ibi autem plus bonum habet qui melior est. Ergo in patria quilibet magis diliget meliorem. Et ita magis alium quam seipsum, et extraneum quam propinquum. Objection 2. Further, we love more him to whom we wish a greater good. Now each one in heaven wishes a greater good for those who have more good, else his will would not be conformed in all things to God's will: and there to be better is to have more good. Therefore in heaven each one loves more those who are better, and consequently he loves others more than himself, and one who is not connected with him, more than one who is.
IIª-IIae q. 26 a. 13 arg. 3 Praeterea, tota ratio dilectionis in patria Deus erit, tunc enim implebitur quod dicitur I ad Cor. XV, ut sit Deus omnia in omnibus. Ergo magis diligitur qui est Deo propinquior. Et ita aliquis magis diliget meliorem quam seipsum, et extraneum quam coniunctum. Objection 3. Further, in heaven love will be entirely for God's sake, for then will be fulfilled the words of 1 Corinthians 15:28: "That God may be all in all." Therefore he who is nearer God will be loved more, so that a man will love a better man more than himself, and one who is not connected with him, more than one who is.
IIª-IIae q. 26 a. 13 s. c. Sed contra est quia natura non tollitur per gloriam, sed perficitur. Ordo autem caritatis supra positus ex ipsa natura procedit. Omnia autem naturaliter plus se quam alia amant. Ergo iste ordo caritatis remanebit in patria. On the contrary, Nature is not done away, but perfected, by glory. Now the order of charity given above (A2,3,4) is derived from nature: since all things naturally love themselves more than others. Therefore this order of charity will endure in heaven.
IIª-IIae q. 26 a. 13 co. Respondeo dicendum quod necesse est ordinem caritatis remanere in patria quantum ad hoc quod Deus est super omnia diligendus. Hoc enim simpliciter erit tunc, quando homo perfecte eo fruetur. Sed de ordine sui ipsius ad alios distinguendum videtur. Quia sicut supra dictum est, dilectionis gradus distingui potest vel secundum differentiam boni quod quis alii exoptat; vel secundum intensionem dilectionis. Primo quidem modo plus diliget meliores quam seipsum, minus vero minus bonos. Volet enim quilibet beatus unumquemque habere quod sibi debetur secundum divinam iustitiam, propter perfectam conformitatem voluntatis humanae ad divinam. Nec tunc erit tempus proficiendi per meritum ad maius praemium, sicut nunc accidit, quando potest homo melioris et virtutem et praemium desiderare, sed tunc voluntas uniuscuiusque infra hoc sistet quod est determinatum divinitus. Secundo vero modo aliquis plus seipsum diliget quam proximum, etiam meliorem. Quia intensio actus dilectionis provenit ex parte subiecti diligentis, ut supra dictum est. Et ad hoc etiam donum caritatis unicuique confertur a Deo, ut primo quidem mentem suam in Deum ordinet, quod pertinet ad dilectionem sui ipsius; secundario vero ordinem aliorum in Deum velit, vel etiam operetur secundum suum modum. Sed quantum ad ordinem proximorum ad invicem simpliciter quis magis diliget meliorem, secundum caritatis amorem. Tota enim vita beata consistit in ordinatione mentis ad Deum. Unde totus ordo dilectionis beatorum observabitur per comparationem ad Deum, ut scilicet ille magis diligatur et propinquior sibi habeatur ab unoquoque qui est Deo propinquior. Cessabit enim tunc provisio, quae est in praesenti vita necessaria, qua necesse est ut unusquisque magis sibi coniuncto, secundum quamcumque necessitudinem, provideat magis quam alieno; ratione cuius in hac vita ex ipsa inclinatione caritatis homo plus diligit magis sibi coniunctum, cui magis debet impendere caritatis effectum. Continget tamen in patria quod aliquis sibi coniunctum pluribus rationibus diliget, non enim cessabunt ab animo beati honestae dilectionis causae. Tamen omnibus istis rationibus praefertur incomparabiliter ratio dilectionis quae sumitur ex propinquitate ad Deum. I answer that, The order of charity must needs remain in heaven, as regards the love of God above all things. For this will be realized simply when man shall enjoy God perfectly. But, as regards the order between man himself and other men, a distinction would seem to be necessary, because, as we stated above (A7,9), the degrees of love may be distinguished either in respect of the good which a man desires for another, or according to the intensity of love itself. On the first way a man will love better men more than himself, and those who are less good, less than himself: because, by reason of the perfect conformity of the human to the Divine will, each of the blessed will desire everyone to have what is due to him according to Divine justice. Nor will that be a time for advancing by means of merit to a yet greater reward, as happens now while it is possible for a man to desire both the virtue and the reward of a better man, whereas then the will of each one will rest within the limits determined by God. But in the second way a man will love himself more than even his better neighbors, because the intensity of the act of love arises on the part of the person who loves, as stated above (A7,9). Moreover it is for this that the gift of charity is bestowed by God on each one, namely, that he may first of all direct his mind to God, and this pertains to a man's love for himself, and that, in the second place, he may wish other things to be directed to God, and even work for that end according to his capacity. As to the order to be observed among our neighbors, a man will simply love those who are better, according to the love of charity. Because the entire life of the blessed consists in directing their minds to God, wherefore the entire ordering of their love will be ruled with respect to God, so that each one will love more and reckon to be nearer to himself those who are nearer to God. For then one man will no longer succor another, as he needs to in the present life, wherein each man has to succor those who are closely connected with him rather than those who are not, no matter what be the nature of their distress: hence it is that in this life, a man, by the inclination of charity, loves more those who are more closely united to him, for he is under a greater obligation to bestow on them the effect of charity. It will however be possible in heaven for a man to love in several ways one who is connected with him, since the causes of virtuous love will not be banished from the mind of the blessed. Yet all these reasons are incomparably surpassed by that which is taken from nighness to God.
IIª-IIae q. 26 a. 13 ad 1 Ad primum ergo dicendum quod quantum ad coniunctos sibi ratio illa concedenda est. Sed quantum ad seipsum oportet quod aliquis plus se quam alios diligat, tanto magis quanto perfectior est caritas, quia perfectio caritatis ordinat hominem perfecte in Deum quod pertinet ad dilectionem sui ipsius, ut dictum est. Reply to Objection 1. This argument should be granted as to those who are connected together; but as regards man himself, he ought to love himself so much the more than others, as his charity is more perfect, since perfect charity directs man to God perfectly, and this belongs to love of oneself, as stated above.
IIª-IIae q. 26 a. 13 ad 2 Ad secundum dicendum quod ratio illa procedit de ordine dilectionis secundum gradum boni quod aliquis vult amato. Reply to Objection 2. This argument considers the order of charity in respect of the degree of good one wills the person one loves.
IIª-IIae q. 26 a. 13 ad 3 Ad tertium dicendum quod unicuique erit Deus tota ratio diligendi eo quod Deus est totum hominis bonum, dato enim, per impossibile, quod Deus non esset hominis bonum, non esset ei ratio diligendi. Et ideo in ordine dilectionis oportet quod post Deum homo maxime diligat seipsum. Reply to Objection 3. God will be to each one the entire reason of his love, for God is man's entire good. For if we make the impossible supposition that God were not man's good, He would not be man's reason for loving. Hence it is that in the order of love man should love himself more than all else after God.

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