Authors/Thomas Aquinas/Summa Theologiae/Part IIb/Q27

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Q26 Q28



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IIª-IIae q. 27 pr. Deinde considerandum est de actu caritatis. Et primo, de principali actu caritatis, qui est dilectio; secundo, de aliis actibus vel effectibus consequentibus. Circa primum quaeruntur octo. Primo, quid sit magis proprium caritatis, utrum amari vel amare. Secundo, utrum amare, prout est actus caritatis, sit idem quod benevolentia. Tertio, utrum Deus sit propter seipsum amandus. Quarto, utrum possit in hac vita immediate amari. Quinto, utrum possit amari totaliter. Sexto, utrum eius dilectio habeat modum. Septimo, quid sit melius, utrum diligere amicum vel diligere inimicum. Octavo, quid sit melius, utrum diligere Deum vel diligere proximum. Question 27. The principle act of charity, which is to love Which is the more proper to charity, to love or to be loved? Is to love considered as an act of charity the same as goodwill? Should God be loved for His own sake? Can God be loved immediately in this life? Can God be loved wholly? Is the love of God according to measure? Which is the better, to love one's friend, or one's enemy? Which is the better, to love God, or one's neighbor?
IIª-IIae q. 27 a. 1 arg. 1 Ad primum sic proceditur. Videtur quod caritatis magis sit proprium amari quam amare. Caritas enim in melioribus melior invenitur. Sed meliores debent magis amari. Ergo caritatis magis est proprium amari. Objection 1. It would seem that it is more proper to charity to be loved than to love. For the better charity is to be found in those who are themselves better. But those who are better should be more loved. Therefore to be loved is more proper to charity.
IIª-IIae q. 27 a. 1 arg. 2 Praeterea, illud quod in pluribus invenitur videtur esse magis conveniens naturae, et per consequens melius. Sed sicut dicit philosophus, in VIII Ethic., multi magis volunt amari quam amare, propter quod amatores adulationis sunt multi. Ergo melius est amari quam amare, et per consequens magis conveniens caritati. Objection 2. Further, that which is to be found in more subjects seems to be more in keeping with nature, and, for that reason, better. Now, as the Philosopher says (Ethic. viii, 8), "many would rather be loved than love, and lovers of flattery always abound." Therefore it is better to be loved than to love, and consequently it is more in keeping with charity.
IIª-IIae q. 27 a. 1 arg. 3 Praeterea, propter quod unumquodque, illud magis. Sed homines propter hoc quod amantur, amant, dicit enim Augustinus, in libro de Catechiz. Rud., quod nulla est maior provocatio ad amandum quam praevenire amando. Ergo caritas magis consistit in amari quam in amare. Objection 3. Further, "the cause of anything being such is yet more so." Now men love because they are loved, for Augustine says (De Catech. Rud. iv) that "nothing incites another more to love you than that you love him first." Therefore charity consists in being loved rather than in loving.
IIª-IIae q. 27 a. 1 s. c. Sed contra est quod philosophus dicit, in VIII Ethic., quod magis existit amicitia in amare quam in amari. Sed caritas est amicitia quaedam. Ergo caritas magis consistit in amare quam in amari. On the contrary, The Philosopher says (Ethic. viii, 8) that friendship consists in loving rather than in being loved. Now charity is a kind of friendship. Therefore it consists in loving rather than in being loved.
IIª-IIae q. 27 a. 1 co. Respondeo dicendum quod amare convenit caritati inquantum est caritas. Caritas enim, cum sit virtus quaedam, secundum suam essentiam habet inclinationem ad proprium actum. Amari autem non est actus caritatis ipsius qui amatur, sed actus caritatis eius est amare; amari autem competit ei secundum communem rationem boni, prout scilicet ad eius bonum alius per actum caritatis movetur. Unde manifestum est quod caritati magis convenit amare quam amari, magis enim convenit unicuique quod convenit ei per se et substantialiter quam quod convenit ei per aliud. Et huius duplex est signum. Primum quidem, quia amici magis laudantur ex hoc quod amant quam ex hoc quod amantur, quinimmo si non amant et amentur, vituperantur. Secundo, quia matres, quae maxime amant, plus quaerunt amare quam amari, quaedam enim, ut philosophus dicit, in eodem libro, filios suos dant nutrici, et amant quidem, reamari autem non quaerunt, si non contingat. I answer that, To love belongs to charity as charity. For, since charity is a virtue, by its very essence it has an inclination to its proper act. Now to be loved is not the act of the charity of the person loved; for this act is to love: and to be loved is competent to him as coming under the common notion of good, in so far as another tends towards his good by an act of charity. Hence it is clear that to love is more proper to charity than to be loved: for that which befits a thing by reason of itself and its essence is more competent to it than that which is befitting to it by reason of something else. This can be exemplified in two ways. First, in the fact that friends are more commended for loving than for being loved, indeed, if they be loved and yet love not, they are blamed. Secondly, because a mother, whose love is the greatest, seeks rather to love than to be loved: for "some women," as the Philosopher observes (Ethic. viii, 8) "entrust their children to a nurse; they do love them indeed, yet seek not to be loved in return, if they happen not to be loved."
IIª-IIae q. 27 a. 1 ad 1 Ad primum ergo dicendum quod meliores ex eo quod meliores sunt, sunt magis amabiles. Sed ex eo quod in eis est perfectior caritas, sunt magis amantes, secundum tamen proportionem amati. Non enim melior minus amat id quod infra ipsum est quam amabile sit, sed ille qui est minus bonus non attingit ad amandum meliorem quantum amabilis est. Reply to Objection 1. A better man, through being better, is more lovable; but through having more perfect charity, loves more. He loves more, however, in proportion to the person he loves. For a better man does not love that which is beneath him less than it ought to be loved: whereas he who is less good fails to love one who is better, as much as he ought to be loved.
IIª-IIae q. 27 a. 1 ad 2 Ad secundum dicendum quod, sicut philosophus dicit ibidem, homines volunt amari inquantum volunt honorari. Sicut enim honor exhibetur alicui ut quoddam testimonium boni in ipso qui honoratur, ita per hoc quod aliquis amatur ostenditur in ipso esse aliquod bonum, quia solum bonum amabile est. Sic igitur amari et honorari quaerunt homines propter aliud, scilicet ad manifestationem boni in amato existentis. Amare autem quaerunt caritatem habentes secundum se, quasi ipsum sit bonum caritatis, sicut et quilibet actus virtutis est bonum virtutis illius. Unde magis pertinet ad caritatem velle amare quam velle amari. Reply to Objection 2. As the Philosopher says (Ethic. viii, 8), "men wish to be loved in as much as they wish to be honored." For just as honor is bestowed on a man in order to bear witness to the good which is in him, so by being loved a man is shown to have some good, since good alone is lovable. Accordingly men seek to be loved and to be honored, for the sake of something else, viz. to make known the good which is in the person loved. On the other hand, those who have charity seek to love for the sake of loving, as though this were itself the good of charity, even as the act of any virtue is that virtue's good. Hence it is more proper to charity to wish to love than to wish to be loved.
IIª-IIae q. 27 a. 1 ad 3 Ad tertium dicendum quod propter amari aliqui amant, non ita quod amari sit finis eius quod est amare, sed eo quod est via quaedam ad hoc inducens quod homo amet. Reply to Objection 3. Some love on account of being loved, not so that to be loved is the end of their loving, but because it is a kind of way leading a man to love.
IIª-IIae q. 27 a. 2 arg. 1 Ad secundum sic proceditur. Videtur quod amare, secundum quod est actus caritatis, nihil sit aliud quam benevolentia. Dicit enim philosophus, in II Rhet. amare est velle alicui bona. Sed hoc est benevolentia. Ergo nihil aliud est actus caritatis quam benevolentia. Objection 1. It would seem that to love, considered as an act of charity, is nothing else than goodwill. For the Philosopher says (Rhet. ii, 4) that "to love is to wish a person well"; and this is goodwill. Therefore the act of charity is nothing but goodwill.
IIª-IIae q. 27 a. 2 arg. 2 Praeterea, cuius est habitus, eius est actus. Sed habitus caritatis est in potentia voluntatis, ut supra dictum est. Ergo etiam actus caritatis est actus voluntatis. Sed non nisi in bonum tendens, quod est benevolentia. Ergo actus caritatis nihil est aliud quam benevolentia. Objection 2. Further, the act belongs to the same subject as the habit. Now the habit of charity is in the power of the will, as stated above (Question 24, Article 1). Therefore the act of charity is also an act of the will. But it tends to good only, and this is goodwill. Therefore the act of charity is nothing else than goodwill.
IIª-IIae q. 27 a. 2 arg. 3 Praeterea, philosophus, in IX Ethic., ponit quinque ad amicitiam pertinentia, quorum primum est quod homo velit amico bonum; secundum est quod velit ei esse et vivere; tertium est quod ei convivat; quartum est quod eadem eligat; quintum est quod condoleat et congaudeat. Sed prima duo ad benevolentiam pertinent. Ergo primus actus caritatis est benevolentia. Objection 3. Further, the Philosopher reckons five things pertaining to friendship (Ethic. ix, 4), the first of which is that a man should wish his friend well; the second, that he should wish him to be and to live; the third, that he should take pleasure in his company; the fourth, that he should make choice of the same things; the fifth, that he should grieve and rejoice with him. Now the first two pertain to goodwill. Therefore goodwill is the first act of charity.
IIª-IIae q. 27 a. 2 s. c. Sed contra est quod philosophus dicit, in eodem libro, quod benevolentia neque est amicitia neque est amatio, sed est amicitiae principium. Sed caritas est amicitia, ut supra dictum est. Ergo benevolentia non est idem quod dilectio, quae est caritatis actus. On the contrary, The Philosopher says (Ethic. ix, 5) that "goodwill is neither friendship nor love, but the beginning of friendship." Now charity is friendship, as stated above (Question 23, Article 1). Therefore goodwill is not the same as to love considered as an act of charity.
IIª-IIae q. 27 a. 2 co. Respondeo dicendum quod benevolentia proprie dicitur actus voluntatis quo alteri bonum volumus. Hic autem voluntatis actus differt ab actuali amore tam secundum quod est in appetitu sensitivo, quam etiam secundum quod est in appetitu intellectivo, qui est voluntas. Amor enim qui est in appetitu sensitivo passio quaedam est. Omnis autem passio cum quodam impetu inclinat in suum obiectum. Passio autem amoris hoc habet quod non subito exoritur, sed per aliquam assiduam inspectionem rei amatae. Et ideo philosophus, in IX Ethic., ostendens differentiam inter benevolentiam et amorem qui est passio, dicit quod benevolentia non habet distensionem et appetitum, idest aliquem impetum inclinationis, sed ex solo iudicio rationis homo vult bonum alicui. Similiter etiam talis amor est ex quadam consuetudine, benevolentia autem interdum oritur ex repentino, sicut accidit nobis de pugilibus qui pugnant, quorum alterum vellemus vincere. Sed amor qui est in appetitu intellectivo etiam differt a benevolentia. Importat enim quandam unionem secundum affectus amantis ad amatum, inquantum scilicet amans aestimat amatum quodammodo ut unum sibi, vel ad se pertinens, et sic movetur in ipsum. Sed benevolentia est simplex actus voluntatis quo volumus alicui bonum, etiam non praesupposita praedicta unione affectus ad ipsum. Sic igitur in dilectione, secundum quod est actus caritatis, includitur quidem benevolentia, sed dilectio sive amor addit unionem affectus. Et propter hoc philosophus dicit ibidem quod benevolentia est principium amicitiae. I answer that, Goodwill properly speaking is that act of the will whereby we wish well to another. Now this act of the will differs from actual love, considered not only as being in the sensitive appetite but also as being in the intellective appetite or will. For the love which is in the sensitive appetite is a passion. Now every passion seeks its object with a certain eagerness. And the passion of love is not aroused suddenly, but is born of an earnest consideration of the object loved; wherefore the Philosopher, showing the difference between goodwill and the love which is a passion, says (Ethic. ix, 5) that goodwill does not imply impetuosity or desire, that is to say, has not an eager inclination, because it is by the sole judgment of his reason that one man wishes another well. Again such like love arises from previous acquaintance, whereas goodwill sometimes arises suddenly, as happens to us if we look on at a boxing-match, and we wish one of the boxers to win. But the love, which is in the intellective appetite, also differs from goodwill, because it denotes a certain union of affections between the lover and the beloved, in as much as the lover deems the beloved as somewhat united to him, or belonging to him, and so tends towards him. On the other hand, goodwill is a simple act of the will, whereby we wish a person well, even without presupposing the aforesaid union of the affections with him. Accordingly, to love, considered as an act of charity, includes goodwill, but such dilection or love adds union of affections, wherefore the Philosopher says (Ethic. ix, 5) that "goodwill is a beginning of friendship."
IIª-IIae q. 27 a. 2 ad 1 Ad primum ergo dicendum quod philosophus ibi definit amare non ponens totam rationem ipsius, sed aliquid ad rationem eius pertinens in quo maxime manifestatur dilectionis actus. Reply to Objection 1. The Philosopher, by thus defining "to love," does not describe it fully, but mentions only that part of its definition in which the act of love is chiefly manifested.
IIª-IIae q. 27 a. 2 ad 2 Ad secundum dicendum quod dilectio est actus voluntatis in bonum tendens, sed cum quadam unione ad amatum, quae quidem in benevolentia non importatur. Reply to Objection 2. To love is indeed an act of the will tending to the good, but it adds a certain union with the beloved, which union is not denoted by goodwill.
IIª-IIae q. 27 a. 2 ad 3 Ad tertium dicendum quod intantum illa quae philosophus ibi ponit ad amicitiam pertinent, inquantum proveniunt ex amore quem quis habet ad seipsum, ut ibidem dicitur, ut scilicet haec omnia aliquis erga amicum agat sicut ad seipsum. Quod pertinet ad praedictam unionem affectus. Reply to Objection 3. These things mentioned by the Philosopher belong to friendship because they arise from a man's love for himself, as he says in the same passage, in so far as a man does all these things in respect of his friend, even as he does them to himself: and this belongs to the aforesaid union of the affections.
IIª-IIae q. 27 a. 3 arg. 1 Ad tertium sic proceditur. Videtur quod Deus non propter seipsum, sed propter aliud diligatur ex caritate. Dicit enim Gregorius, in quadam homilia, ex his quae novit animus discit incognita amare. Vocat autem incognita intelligibilia et divina, cognita autem sensibilia. Ergo Deus est propter alia diligendus. Objection 1. It would seem that God is loved out of charity, not for Himself but for the sake of something else. For Gregory says in a homily (In Evang. xi): "The soul learns from the things it knows, to love those it knows not," where by things unknown he means the intelligible and the Divine, and by things known he indicates the objects of the senses. Therefore God is to be loved for the sake of something else.
IIª-IIae q. 27 a. 3 arg. 2 Praeterea, amor sequitur cognitionem. Sed Deus per aliud cognoscitur, secundum illud Rom. I. Invisibilia Dei per ea quae facta sunt intellecta conspiciuntur. Ergo etiam propter aliud amatur, et non propter se. Objection 2. Further, love follows knowledge. But God is known through something else, according to Romans 1:20: "The invisible things of God are clearly seen, being understood by the things that are made." Therefore He is also loved on account of something else and not for Himself.
IIª-IIae q. 27 a. 3 arg. 3 Praeterea, spes generat caritatem, ut dicitur in Glossa Matth. I. Timor etiam caritatem introducit; ut Augustinus dicit, super Prim. Canonic. Ioan. Sed spes expectat aliquid adipisci a Deo, timor autem refugit aliquid quod a Deo infligi potest. Ergo videtur quod Deus propter aliquod bonum speratum, vel propter aliquod malum timendum sit amandus. Non ergo est amandus propter seipsum. Objection 3. Further, "hope begets charity" as a gloss says on Matthew 1:1, and "fear leads to charity," according to Augustine in his commentary on the First Canonical Epistle of John (In prim. canon. Joan. Tract. ix). Now hope looks forward to obtain something from God, while fear shuns something which can be inflicted by God. Therefore it seems that God is to be loved on account of some good we hope for, or some evil to be feared. Therefore He is not to be loved for Himself.
IIª-IIae q. 27 a. 3 s. c. Sed contra est quod, sicut Augustinus dicit, in I de Doct. Christ., frui est amore inhaerere alicui propter seipsum. Sed Deo fruendum est, ut in eodem libro dicitur. Ergo Deus diligendus est propter seipsum. On the contrary, According to Augustine (De Doctr. Christ. i), to enjoy is to cleave to something for its own sake. Now "God is to be enjoyed" as he says in the same book. Therefore God is to be loved for Himself.
IIª-IIae q. 27 a. 3 co. Respondeo dicendum quod ly propter importat habitudinem alicuius causae. Est autem quadruplex genus causae, scilicet finalis, formalis, efficiens et materialis, ad quam reducitur etiam materialis dispositio, quae non est causa simpliciter, sed secundum quid. Et secundum haec quatuor genera causarum dicitur aliquid propter alterum diligendum. Secundum quidem genus causae finalis, sicut diligimus medicinam propter sanitatem. Secundum autem genus causae formalis, sicut diligimus hominem propter virtutem, quia scilicet virtute formaliter est bonus, et per consequens diligibilis. Secundum autem causam efficientem, sicut diligimus aliquos inquantum sunt filii talis patris. Secundum autem dispositionem, quae reducitur ad genus causae materialis, dicimur aliquid diligere propter id quod nos disposuit ad eius dilectionem, puta propter aliqua beneficia suscepta, quamvis postquam iam amare incipimus, non propter illa beneficia amemus amicum, sed propter eius virtutem. Primis igitur tribus modis Deum non diligimus propter aliud, sed propter seipsum. Non enim ordinatur ad aliud sicut ad finem, sed ipse est finis ultimus omnium. Neque etiam informatur aliquo alio ad hoc quod sit bonus, sed eius substantia est eius bonitas, secundum quam exemplariter omnia bona sunt. Neque iterum ei ab altero bonitas inest, sed ab ipso omnibus aliis. Sed quarto modo potest diligi propter aliud, quia scilicet ex aliquibus aliis disponimur ad hoc quod in Dei dilectione proficiamus, puta per beneficia ab eo suscepta, vel etiam per praemia sperata, vel per poenas quas per ipsum vitare intendimus. I answer that, The preposition "for" denotes a relation of causality. Now there are four kinds of cause, viz., final, formal, efficient, and material, to which a material disposition also is to be reduced, though it is not a cause simply but relatively. According to these four different causes one thing is said to be loved for another. On respect of the final cause, we love medicine, for instance, for health; in respect of the formal cause, we love a man for his virtue, because, to wit, by his virtue he is formally good and therefore lovable; in respect of the efficient cause, we love certain men because, for instance, they are the sons of such and such a father; and in respect of the disposition which is reducible to the genus of a material cause, we speak of loving something for that which disposed us to love it, e.g. we love a man for the favors received from him, although after we have begun to love our friend, we no longer love him for his favors, but for his virtue. Accordingly, as regards the first three ways, we love God, not for anything else, but for Himself. For He is not directed to anything else as to an end, but is Himself the last end of all things; nor does He require to receive any form in order to be good, for His very substance is His goodness, which is itself the exemplar of all other good things; nor again does goodness accrue to Him from aught else, but from Him to all other things. On the fourth way, however, He can be loved for something else, because we are disposed by certain things to advance in His love, for instance, by favors bestowed by Him, by the rewards we hope to receive from Him, or even by the punishments which we are minded to avoid through Him.
IIª-IIae q. 27 a. 3 ad 1 Ad primum ergo dicendum quod ex his quae animus novit discit incognita amare, non quod cognita sint ratio diligendi ipsa incognita per modum causae formalis vel finalis vel efficientis, sed quia per hoc homo disponitur ad amandum incognita. Reply to Objection 1. From the things it knows the soul learns to love what it knows not, not as though the things it knows were the reason for its loving things it knows not, through being the formal, final, or efficient cause of this love, but because this knowledge disposes man to love the unknown.
IIª-IIae q. 27 a. 3 ad 2 Ad secundum dicendum quod cognitio Dei acquiritur quidem per alia, sed postquam iam cognoscitur, non per alia cognoscitur, sed per seipsum; secundum illud Ioan. IV. Iam non propter tuam loquelam credimus, ipsi enim vidimus, et scimus quia hic est vere salvator mundi. Reply to Objection 2. Knowledge of God is indeed acquired through other things, but after He is known, He is no longer known through them, but through Himself, according to John 4:42: "We now believe, not for thy saying: for we ourselves have heard Him, and know that this is indeed the Saviour of the world."
IIª-IIae q. 27 a. 3 ad 3 Ad tertium dicendum quod spes et timor ducunt ad caritatem per modum dispositionis cuiusdam, ut ex supradictis patet. Reply to Objection 3. Hope and fear lead to charity by way of a certain disposition, as was shown above (17, 8; 19, 4,7,10).
IIª-IIae q. 27 a. 4 arg. 1 Ad quartum sic proceditur. Videtur quod Deus in hac vita non possit immediate amari. Incognita enim amari non possunt; ut Augustinus dicit, X de Trin. Sed Deum non cognoscimus immediate in hac vita, quia videmus nunc per speculum in aenigmate, ut dicitur I ad Cor. XIII. Ergo neque etiam eum immediate amamus. Objection 1. It would seem that God cannot be loved immediately in this life. For the "unknown cannot be loved" as Augustine says (De Trin. x, 1). Now we do not know God immediately in this life, since "we see now through a glass, in a dark manner" (1 Corinthians 13:12). Neither, therefore, do we love Him immediately.
IIª-IIae q. 27 a. 4 arg. 2 Praeterea, qui non potest quod minus est non potest quod maius est. Sed maius est amare Deum quam cognoscere ipsum, qui enim adhaeret Deo per amorem unus spiritus cum illo fit, ut dicitur I ad Cor. VI. Sed homo non potest Deum cognoscere immediate. Ergo multo minus amare. Objection 2. Further, he who cannot do what is less, cannot do what is more. Now it is more to love God than to know Him, since "he who is joined" to God by love, is "one spirit with Him" (1 Corinthians 6:17). But man cannot know God immediately. Therefore much less can he love Him immediately.
IIª-IIae q. 27 a. 4 arg. 3 Praeterea, homo a Deo disiungitur per peccatum, secundum illud Isaiae LIX, peccata vestra diviserunt inter vos et Deum vestrum. Sed peccatum magis est in voluntate quam in intellectu. Ergo minus potest homo Deum diligere immediate quam immediate eum cognoscere. Objection 3. Further, man is severed from God by sin, according to Isaiah 59:2: "Your iniquities have divided between you and your God." Now sin is in the will rather than in the intellect. Therefore man is less able to love God immediately than to know Him immediately.
IIª-IIae q. 27 a. 4 s. c. Sed contra est quod cognitio Dei, quia est mediata, dicitur aenigmatica, et evacuatur in patria, ut patet I ad Cor. XIII. Sed caritas non evacuatur, ut dicitur I ad Cor. XIII. Ergo caritas viae immediate Deo adhaeret. On the contrary, Knowledge of God, through being mediate, is said to be "enigmatic," and "falls away" in heaven, as stated in 1 Corinthians 13:12. But charity "does not fall away" as stated in the same passage (1 Corinthians 13:12). Therefore the charity of the way adheres to God immediately.
IIª-IIae q. 27 a. 4 co. Respondeo dicendum quod, sicut supra dictum est, actus cognitivae virtutis perficitur per hoc quod cognitum est in cognoscente, actus autem virtutis appetitivae perficitur per hoc quod appetitus inclinatur in rem ipsam. Et ideo oportet quod motus appetitivae virtutis sit in res secundum conditionem ipsarum rerum, actus autem cognitivae virtutis est secundum modum cognoscentis. Est autem ipse ordo rerum talis secundum se quod Deus est propter seipsum cognoscibilis et diligibilis, utpote essentialiter existens ipsa veritas et bonitas, per quam alia et cognoscuntur et amantur. Sed quoad nos, quia nostra cognitio a sensu ortum habet, prius sunt cognoscibilia quae sunt sensui propinquiora; et ultimus terminus cognitionis est in eo quod est maxime a sensu remotum. Secundum hoc ergo dicendum est quod dilectio, quae est appetitivae virtutis actus, etiam in statu viae tendit in Deum primo, et ex ipso derivatur ad alia, et secundum hoc caritas Deum immediate diligit, alia vero mediante Deo. In cognitione vero est e converso, quia scilicet per alia Deum cognoscimus, sicut causam per effectus, vel per modum eminentiae aut negationis ut patet per Dionysium, in libro de Div. Nom. I answer that, As stated above (I, 82, 3; 84, 7), the act of a cognitive power is completed by the thing known being in the knower, whereas the act of an appetitive power consists in the appetite being inclined towards the thing in itself. Hence it follows that the movement of the appetitive power is towards things in respect of their own condition, whereas the act of a cognitive power follows the mode of the knower. Now in itself the very order of things is such, that God is knowable and lovable for Himself, since He is essentially truth and goodness itself, whereby other things are known and loved: but with regard to us, since our knowledge is derived through the senses, those things are knowable first which are nearer to our senses, and the last term of knowledge is that which is most remote from our senses. Accordingly, we must assert that to love which is an act of the appetitive power, even in this state of life, tends to God first, and flows on from Him to other things, and in this sense charity loves God immediately, and other things through God. On the other hand, with regard to knowledge, it is the reverse, since we know God through other things, either as a cause through its effects, or by way of pre-eminence or negation as Dionysius states (Div. Nom. i; cf. I, 12, 12).
IIª-IIae q. 27 a. 4 ad 1 Ad primum ergo dicendum quod quamvis incognita amari non possint, tamen non oportet quod sit idem ordo cognitionis et dilectionis. Nam dilectio est cognitionis terminus. Et ideo ubi desinit cognitio, scilicet in ipsa re quae per aliam cognoscitur, ibi statim dilectio incipere potest. Reply to Objection 1. Although the unknown cannot be loved, it does not follow that the order of knowledge is the same as the order of love, since love is the term of knowledge, and consequently, love can begin at once where knowledge ends, namely in the thing itself which is known through another thing.
IIª-IIae q. 27 a. 4 ad 2 Ad secundum dicendum quod quia dilectio Dei est maius aliquid quam eius cognitio, maxime secundum statum viae, ideo praesupponit ipsam. Et quia cognitio non quiescit in rebus creatis, sed per eas in aliud tendit, in illo dilectio incipit, et per hoc ad alia derivatur, per modum cuiusdam circulationis, dum cognitio, a creaturis incipiens, tendit in Deum; et dilectio, a Deo incipiens sicut ab ultimo fine, ad creaturas derivatur. Reply to Objection 2. Since to love God is something greater than to know Him, especially in this state of life, it follows that love of God presupposes knowledge of God. And because this knowledge does not rest in creatures, but, through them, tends to something else, love begins there, and thence goes on to other things by a circular movement so to speak; for knowledge begins from creatures, tends to God, and love begins with God as the last end, and passes on to creatures.
IIª-IIae q. 27 a. 4 ad 3 Ad tertium dicendum quod per caritatem tollitur aversio a Deo quae est per peccatum; non autem per solam cognitionem. Et ideo caritas est quae, diligendo, animam immediate Deo coniungit spiritualis vinculo unionis. Reply to Objection 3. Aversion from God, which is brought about by sin, is removed by charity, but not by knowledge alone: hence charity, by loving God, unites the soul immediately to Him with a chain of spiritual union.
IIª-IIae q. 27 a. 5 arg. 1 Ad quintum sic proceditur. Videtur quod Deus non possit totaliter amari. Amor enim sequitur cognitionem. Sed Deus non potest totaliter a nobis cognosci, quia hoc esset eum comprehendere. Ergo non potest a nobis totaliter amari. Objection 1. It would seem that God cannot be loved wholly. For love follows knowledge. Now God cannot be wholly known by us, since this would imply comprehension of Him. Therefore He cannot be wholly loved by us.
IIª-IIae q. 27 a. 5 arg. 2 Praeterea, amor est unio quaedam, ut patet per Dionysium, IV cap. de Div. Nom. Sed cor hominis non potest ad Deum uniri totaliter, quia Deus est maior corde nostro, ut dicitur I Ioan. III. Ergo Deus non potest totaliter amari. Objection 2. Further, love is a kind of union, as Dionysius shows (Div. Nom. iv). But the heart of man cannot be wholly united to God, because "God is greater than our heart" (1 John 3:20). Therefore God cannot be loved wholly.
IIª-IIae q. 27 a. 5 arg. 3 Praeterea, Deus seipsum totaliter amat. Si igitur ab aliquo alio totaliter amatur, aliquis alius diligit Deum tantum quantum ipse se diligit. Hoc autem est inconveniens. Ergo Deus non potest totaliter diligi ab aliqua creatura. Objection 3. Further, God loves Himself wholly. If therefore He be loved wholly by another, this one will love Him as much as God loves Himself. But this is unreasonable. Therefore God cannot be wholly loved by a creature.
IIª-IIae q. 27 a. 5 s. c. Sed contra est quod dicitur Deut. VI, diliges dominum Deum tuum ex toto corde tuo. On the contrary, It is written (Deuteronomy 6:5): "Thou shalt love the Lord thy God with thy whole heart."
IIª-IIae q. 27 a. 5 co. Respondeo dicendum quod, cum dilectio intelligatur quasi medium inter amantem et amatum, cum quaeritur an Deus possit totaliter diligi, tripliciter potest intelligi. Uno modo, ut modus totalitatis referatur ad rem dilectam. Et sic Deus est totaliter diligendus, quia totum quod ad Deum pertinet homo diligere debet. Alio modo potest intelligi ita quod totalitas referatur ad diligentem. Et sic etiam Deus totaliter diligi debet, quia ex toto posse suo debet homo diligere Deum, et quidquid habet ad Dei amorem ordinare, secundum illud Deut. VI, diliges dominum Deum tuum ex toto corde tuo. Tertio modo potest intelligi secundum comparationem diligentis ad rem dilectam, ut scilicet modus diligentis adaequet modum rei dilectae. Et hoc non potest esse. Cum enim unumquodque intantum diligibile sit inquantum est bonum, Deus, cuius bonitas est infinita, est infinite diligibilis, nulla autem creatura potest Deum infinite diligere, quia omnis virtus creaturae, sive naturalis sive infusa, est finita. I answer that, Since love may be considered as something between lover and beloved, when we ask whether God can be wholly loved, the question may be understood in three ways, first so that the qualification "wholly" be referred to the thing loved, and thus God is to be loved wholly, since man should love all that pertains to God. Secondly, it may be understood as though "wholly" qualified the lover: and thus again God ought to be loved wholly, since man ought to love God with all his might, and to refer all he has to the love of God, according to Deuteronomy 6:5: "Thou shalt love the Lord thy God with thy whole heart." Thirdly, it may be understood by way of comparison of the lover to the thing loved, so that the mode of the lover equal the mode of the thing loved. This is impossible: for, since a thing is lovable in proportion to its goodness, God is infinitely lovable, since His goodness is infinite. Now no creature can love God infinitely, because all power of creatures, whether it be natural or infused, is finite.
IIª-IIae q. 27 a. 5 ad 1 Et per hoc patet responsio ad obiecta. Nam primae tres obiectiones procedunt secundum hunc tertium sensum, ultima autem ratio procedit in sensu secundo. This suffices for the Replies to the Objections, because the first three objections consider the question in this third sense, while the last takes it in the second sense.
IIª-IIae q. 27 a. 6 arg. 1 Ad sextum sic proceditur. Videtur quod divinae dilectionis sit aliquis modus habendus. Ratio enim boni consistit in modo, specie et ordine, ut patet per Augustinum, in libro de Nat. boni. Sed dilectio Dei est optimum in homine, secundum illud ad Coloss. III, super omnia caritatem habete. Ergo dilectio Dei debet modum habere. Objection 1. It would seem that we ought to observe some mode in loving God. For the notion of good consists in mode, species and order, as Augustine states (De Nat. Boni iii, iv). Now the love of God is the best thing in man, according to Colossians 3:14: "Above all . . . things, have charity." Therefore there ought to be a mode of the love of God.
IIª-IIae q. 27 a. 6 arg. 2 Praeterea, Augustinus dicit, in libro de Morib. Eccles., dic mihi, quaeso te, quis sit diligendi modus. Vereor enim ne plus minusve quam oportet inflammer desiderio et amore domini mei frustra autem quaereret modum nisi esset aliquis divinae dilectionis modus. Ergo est aliquis modus divinae dilectionis. Objection 2. Further, Augustine says (De Morib. Eccl. viii): "Prithee, tell me which is the mode of love. For I fear lest I burn with the desire and love of my Lord, more or less than I ought." But it would be useless to seek the mode of the Divine love, unless there were one. Therefore there is a mode of the love of God.
IIª-IIae q. 27 a. 6 arg. 3 Praeterea, sicut Augustinus dicit, IV super Gen. ad Litt., modus est quem unicuique propria mensura praefigit. Sed mensura voluntatis humanae, sicut et actionis exterioris, est ratio. Ergo sicut in exteriori effectu caritatis oportet habere modum a ratione praestitum, secundum illud Rom. XII, rationabile obsequium vestrum; ita etiam ipsa interior dilectio Dei debet modum habere. Objection 3. Further, as Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. iv, 3), "the measure which nature appoints to a thing, is its mode." Now the measure of the human will, as also of external action, is the reason. Therefore just as it is necessary for the reason to appoint a mode to the exterior effect of charity, according to Romans 12:1: "Your reasonable service," so also the interior love of God requires a mode.
IIª-IIae q. 27 a. 6 s. c. Sed contra est quod Bernardus dicit, in libro de diligendo Deum, quod causa diligendi Deum Deus est; modus, sine modo diligere. On the contrary, Bernard says (De Dilig. Deum 1) that "God is the cause of our loving God; the measure is to love Him without measure."
IIª-IIae q. 27 a. 6 co. Respondeo dicendum quod, sicut patet ex inducta auctoritate Augustini, modus importat quandam mensurae determinationem. Haec autem determinatio invenitur et in mensura et in mensurato, aliter tamen et aliter. In mensura enim invenitur essentialiter, quia mensura secundum seipsam est determinativa et modificativa aliorum, in mensuratis autem invenitur mensura secundum aliud, idest inquantum attingunt mensuram. Et ideo in mensura nihil potest accipi immodificatum, sed res mensurata est immodificata nisi mensuram attingat, sive deficiat sive excedat. In omnibus autem appetibilibus et agibilibus mensura est finis, quia eorum quae appetimus et agimus oportet propriam rationem ex fine accipere, ut patet per philosophum, in II Physic. Et ideo finis secundum seipsum habet modum, ea vero quae sunt ad finem habent modum ex eo quod sunt fini proportionata. Et ideo, sicut philosophus dicit, in I Polit., appetitus finis in omnibus artibus est absque fine et termino, eorum autem quae sunt ad finem est aliquis terminus. Non enim medicus imponit aliquem terminum sanitati, sed facit eam perfectam quantumcumque potest, sed medicinae imponit terminum; non enim dat tantum de medicina quantum potest, sed secundum proportionem ad sanitatem; quam quidem proportionem si medicina excederet, vel ab ea deficeret, esset immoderata. Finis autem omnium actionum humanarum et affectionum est Dei dilectio, per quam maxime attingimus ultimum finem, ut supra dictum est. Et ideo in dilectione Dei non potest accipi modus sicut in re mensurata, ut sit in ea accipere plus et minus, sed sicut invenitur modus in mensura, in qua non potest esse excessus, sed quanto plus attingitur regula, tanto melius est. Et ita quanto plus Deus diligitur, tanto est dilectio melior. I answer that, As appears from the words of Augustine quoted above (Objection 3) mode signifies a determination of measure; which determination is to be found both in the measure and in the thing measured, but not in the same way. For it is found in the measure essentially, because a measure is of itself the determining and modifying rule of other things; whereas in the things measured, it is found relatively, that is in so far as they attain to the measure. Hence there can be nothing unmodified in the measure whereas the thing measured is unmodified if it fails to attain to the measure, whether by deficiency or by excess. Now in all matters of appetite and action the measure is the end, because the proper reason for all that we desire or do should be taken from the end, as the Philosopher proves (Phys. ii, 9). Therefore the end has a mode by itself, while the means take their mode from being proportionate to the end. Hence, according to the Philosopher (Polit. i, 3), "in every art, the desire for the end is endless and unlimited," whereas there is a limit to the means: thus the physician does not put limits to health, but makes it as perfect as he possibly can; but he puts a limit to medicine, for he does not give as much medicine as he can, but according as health demands so that if he give too much or too little, the medicine would be immoderate. Again, the end of all human actions and affections is the love of God, whereby principally we attain to our last end, as stated above (Question 23, Article 6), wherefore the mode in the love of God, must not be taken as in a thing measured where we find too much or too little, but as in the measure itself, where there cannot be excess, and where the more the rule is attained the better it is, so that the more we love God the better our love is.
IIª-IIae q. 27 a. 6 ad 1 Ad primum ergo dicendum quod illud quod est per se potius est eo quod est per aliud. Et ideo bonitas mensurae, quae per se habet modum, potior est quam bonitas mensurati, quod habet modum per aliud. Et sic etiam caritas, quae habet modum sicut mensura, praeeminet aliis virtutibus, quae habent modum sicut mensuratae. Reply to Objection 1. That which is so by its essence takes precedence of that which is so through another, wherefore the goodness of the measure which has the mode essentially, takes precedence of the goodness of the thing measured, which has its mode through something else; and so too, charity, which has a mode as a measure has, stands before the other virtues, which have a mode through being measured.
IIª-IIae q. 27 a. 6 ad 2 Ad secundum dicendum quod Augustinus ibidem subiungit quod modus diligendi Deum est ut ex toto corde diligatur, idest ut diligatur quantumcumque potest diligi. Et hoc pertinet ad modum qui convenit mensurae. Reply to Objection 2. As Augustine adds in the same passage, "the measure of our love for God is to love Him with our whole heart," that is to love Him as much as He can be loved, and this belongs to the mode which is proper to the measure.
IIª-IIae q. 27 a. 6 ad 3 Ad tertium dicendum quod affectio illa cuius obiectum subiacet iudicio rationis, est ratione mensuranda. Sed obiectum divinae dilectionis, quod est Deus, excedit iudicium rationis. Et ideo non mensuratur ratione, sed rationem excedit. Nec est simile de interiori actu caritatis et exterioribus actibus. Nam interior actus caritatis habet rationem finis, quia ultimum bonum hominis consistit in hoc quod anima Deo inhaereat, secundum illud Psalm., mihi adhaerere Deo bonum est. Exteriores autem actus sunt sicut ad finem. Et ideo sunt commensurandi et secundum caritatem et secundum rationem. Reply to Objection 3. An affection, whose object is subject to reason's judgment, should be measured by reason. But the object of the Divine love which is God surpasses the judgment of reason, wherefore it is not measured by reason but transcends it. Nor is there parity between the interior act and external acts of charity. For the interior act of charity has the character of an end, since man's ultimate good consists in his soul cleaving to God, according to Psalm 72:28: "It is good for me to adhere to my God"; whereas the exterior acts are as means to the end, and so have to be measured both according to charity and according to reason.
IIª-IIae q. 27 a. 7 arg. 1 Ad septimum sic proceditur. Videtur quod magis meritorium sit diligere inimicum quam amicum. Dicitur enim Matth. V, si diligitis eos qui vos diligunt, quam mercedem habebitis? Diligere ergo amicum non meretur mercedem. Sed diligere inimicum meretur mercedem, ut ibidem ostenditur. Ergo magis est meritorium diligere inimicos quam diligere amicos. Objection 1. It would seem more meritorious to love an enemy than to love a friend. For it is written (Matthew 5:46): "If you love them that love you, what reward shall you have?" Therefore it is not deserving of reward to love one's friend: whereas, as the same passage proves, to love one's enemy is deserving of a reward. Therefore it is more meritorious to love one's enemy than to love one's friend.
IIª-IIae q. 27 a. 7 arg. 2 Praeterea, tanto aliquid est magis meritorium quanto ex maiori caritate procedit. Sed diligere inimicum est perfectorum filiorum Dei, ut Augustinus dicit, in Enchirid., diligere autem amicum est etiam caritatis imperfectae. Ergo maioris meriti est diligere inimicum quam diligere amicum. Objection 2. Further, an act is the more meritorious through proceeding from a greater charity. But it belongs to the perfect children of God to love their enemies, whereas those also who have imperfect charity love their friends. Therefore it is more meritorious to love one's enemy than to love one's friend.
IIª-IIae q. 27 a. 7 arg. 3 Praeterea, ubi est maior conatus ad bonum, ibi videtur esse maius meritum, quia unusquisque propriam mercedem accipiet secundum suum laborem, ut dicitur I Cor. III. Sed maiori conatu indiget homo ad hoc quod diligat inimicum quam ad hoc quod diligat amicum, quia difficilius est. Ergo videtur quod diligere inimicum sit magis meritorium quam diligere amicum. Objection 3. Further, where there is more effort for good, there seems to be more merit, since "every man shall receive his own reward according to his own labor" (1 Corinthians 3:8). Now a man has to make a greater effort to love his enemy than to love his friend, because it is more difficult. Therefore it seems more meritorious to love one's enemy than to love one's friend.
IIª-IIae q. 27 a. 7 s. c. Sed contra est quia illud quod est melius est magis meritorium. Sed melius est diligere amicum, quia melius est diligere meliorem; amicus autem, qui amat, est melior quam inimicus, qui odit. Ergo diligere amicum est magis meritorium quam diligere inimicum. On the contrary, The better an action is, the more meritorious it is. Now it is better to love one's friend, since it is better to love a better man, and the friend who loves you is better than the enemy who hates you. Therefore it is more meritorious to love one's friend than to love one's enemy.
IIª-IIae q. 27 a. 7 co. Respondeo dicendum quod ratio diligendi proximum ex caritate Deus est, sicut supra dictum est. Cum ergo quaeritur quid sit melius, vel magis meritorium, utrum diligere amicum vel inimicum, dupliciter istae dilectiones comparari possunt, uno modo, ex parte proximi qui diligitur; alio modo, ex parte rationis propter quam diligitur. Primo quidem modo dilectio amici praeeminet dilectioni inimici. Quia amicus et melior est et magis coniunctus; unde est materia magis conveniens dilectioni; et propter hoc actus dilectionis super hanc materiam transiens melior est. Unde et eius oppositum est deterius, peius enim est odire amicum quam inimicum. Secundo autem modo dilectio inimici praeeminet, propter duo. Primo quidem, quia dilectionis amici potest esse alia ratio quam Deus, sed dilectionis inimici solus Deus est ratio. Secundo quia, supposito quod uterque propter Deum diligatur, fortior ostenditur esse Dei dilectio quae animum hominis ad remotiora extendit, scilicet usque ad dilectionem inimicorum, sicut virtus ignis tanto ostenditur esse fortior quanto ad remotiora diffundit suum calorem. Tanto etiam ostenditur divina dilectio esse fortior quanto propter ipsam difficiliora implemus, sicut et virtus ignis tanto est fortior quanto comburere potest materiam minus combustibilem. Sed sicut idem ignis in propinquiora fortius agit quam in remotiora, ita etiam caritas ferventius diligit coniunctos quam remotos. Et quantum ad hoc dilectio amicorum, secundum se considerata, est ferventior et melior quam dilectio inimicorum. I answer that, God is the reason for our loving our neighbor out of charity, as stated above (Question 25, Article 1). When therefore it is asked which is better or more meritorious, to love one's friend or one's enemy, these two loves may be compared in two ways, first, on the part of our neighbor whom we love, secondly, on the part of the reason for which we love him. In the first way, love of one's friend surpasses love of one's enemy, because a friend is both better and more closely united to us, so that he is a more suitable matter of love and consequently the act of love that passes over this matter, is better, and therefore its opposite is worse, for it is worse to hate a friend than an enemy. In the second way, however, it is better to love one's enemy than one's friend, and this for two reasons. First, because it is possible to love one's friend for another reason than God, whereas God is the only reason for loving one's enemy. Secondly, because if we suppose that both are loved for God, our love for God is proved to be all the stronger through carrying a man's affections to things which are furthest from him, namely, to the love of his enemies, even as the power of a furnace is proved to be the stronger, according as it throws its heat to more distant objects. Hence our love for God is proved to be so much the stronger, as the more difficult are the things we accomplish for its sake, just as the power of fire is so much the stronger, as it is able to set fire to a less inflammable matter. Yet just as the same fire acts with greater force on what is near than on what is distant, so too, charity loves with greater fervor those who are united to us than those who are far removed; and in this respect the love of friends, considered in itself, is more ardent and better than the love of one's enemy.
IIª-IIae q. 27 a. 7 ad 1 Ad primum ergo dicendum quod verbum domini est per se intelligendum. Tunc enim dilectio amicorum apud Deum mercedem non habet, quando propter hoc solum amantur quia amici sunt, et hoc videtur accidere quando sic amantur amici quod inimici non diliguntur. Est tamen meritoria amicorum dilectio si propter Deum diligantur, et non solum quia amici sunt. Reply to Objection 1. The words of Our Lord must be taken in their strict sense: because the love of one's friends is not meritorious in God's sight when we love them merely because they are our friends: and this would seem to be the case when we love our friends in such a way that we love not our enemies. On the other hand the love of our friends is meritorious, if we love them for God's sake, and not merely because they are our friends.
IIª-IIae q. 27 a. 7 ad 2 Ad alia patet responsio per ea quae dicta sunt. Nam duae rationes sequentes procedunt ex parte rationis diligendi; ultima vero ex parte eorum qui diliguntur. The Reply to the other Objections is evident from what has been said in the article, because the two arguments that follow consider the reason for loving, while the last considers the question on the part of those who are loved.
IIª-IIae q. 27 a. 8 arg. 1 Ad octavum sic proceditur. Videtur quod magis sit meritorium diligere proximum quam diligere Deum. Illud enim videtur esse magis meritorium quod apostolus magis elegit. Sed apostolus praeelegit dilectionem proximi dilectioni Dei, secundum illud ad Rom. IX, optabam anathema esse a Christo pro fratribus meis. Ergo magis est meritorium diligere proximum quam diligere Deum. Objection 1. It would seem that it is more meritorious to love one's neighbor than to love God. For the more meritorious thing would seem to be what the Apostle preferred. Now the Apostle preferred the love of our neighbor to the love of God, according to Romans 9:3: "I wished myself to be an anathema from Christ for my brethren." Therefore it is more meritorious to love one's neighbor than to love God.
IIª-IIae q. 27 a. 8 arg. 2 Praeterea, minus videtur esse meritorium aliquo modo diligere amicum, ut dictum est. Sed Deus maxime est amicus, qui prior dilexit nos, ut dicitur I Ioan. IV. Ergo diligere eum videtur esse minus meritorium. Objection 2. Further, in a certain sense it seems to be less meritorious to love one's friend, as stated above (Article 7). Now God is our chief friend, since "He hath first loved us" (1 John 4:10). Therefore it seems less meritorious to love God.
IIª-IIae q. 27 a. 8 arg. 3 Praeterea, illud quod est difficilius videtur esse virtuosius et magis meritorium, quia virtus est circa difficile et bonum, ut dicitur in II Ethic. Sed facilius est diligere Deum quam proximum, tum quia naturaliter omnia Deum diligunt; tum quia in Deo nihil occurrit quod non sit diligendum, quod circa proximum non contingit. Ergo magis est meritorium diligere proximum quam diligere Deum. Objection 3. Further, whatever is more difficult seems to be more virtuous and meritorious since "virtue is about that which is difficult and good" (Ethic. ii, 3). Now it is easier to love God than to love one's neighbor, both because all things love God naturally, and because there is nothing unlovable in God, and this cannot be said of one's neighbor. Therefore it is more meritorious to love one's neighbor than to love God.
IIª-IIae q. 27 a. 8 s. c. Sed contra, propter quod unumquodque, illud magis. Sed dilectio proximi non est meritoria nisi propter hoc quod proximus diligitur propter Deum. Ergo dilectio Dei est magis meritoria quam dilectio proximi. On the contrary, That on account of which a thing is such, is yet more so. Now the love of one's neighbor is not meritorious, except by reason of his being loved for God's sake. Therefore the love of God is more meritorious than the love of our neighbor.
IIª-IIae q. 27 a. 8 co. Respondeo dicendum quod comparatio ista potest intelligi dupliciter. Uno modo, ut seorsum consideretur utraque dilectio. Et tunc non est dubium quod dilectio Dei est magis meritoria, debetur enim ei merces propter seipsam, quia ultima merces est frui Deo, in quem tendit divinae dilectionis motus. Unde et diligenti Deum merces promittitur, Ioan. XIV, si quis diligit me, diligetur a patre meo, et manifestabo ei meipsum. Alio modo potest attendi ista comparatio ut dilectio Dei accipiatur secundum quod solus diligitur; dilectio autem proximi accipiatur secundum quod proximus diligitur propter Deum. Et sic dilectio proximi includet dilectionem Dei, sed dilectio Dei non includet dilectionem proximi. Unde erit comparatio dilectionis Dei perfectae, quae extendit se etiam ad proximum, ad dilectionem Dei insufficientem et imperfectam, quia hoc mandatum habemus a Deo, ut qui diligit Deum, diligat et fratrem suum. Et in hoc sensu dilectio proximi praeeminet. I answer that, This comparison may be taken in two ways. First, by considering both loves separately: and then, without doubt, the love of God is the more meritorious, because a reward is due to it for its own sake, since the ultimate reward is the enjoyment of God, to Whom the movement of the Divine love tends: hence a reward is promised to him that loves God (John 14:21): "He that loveth Me, shall be loved of My Father, and I will . . . manifest Myself to him." Secondly, the comparison may be understood to be between the love of God alone on the one side, and the love of one's neighbor for God's sake, on the other. On this way love of our neighbor includes love of God, while love of God does not include love of our neighbor. Hence the comparison will be between perfect love of God, extending also to our neighbor, and inadequate and imperfect love of God, for "this commandment we have from God, that he, who loveth God, love also his brother" (1 John 4:21).
IIª-IIae q. 27 a. 8 ad 1 Ad primum ergo dicendum quod secundum unam Glossae expositionem, hoc apostolus tunc non optabat quando erat in statu gratiae, ut scilicet separaretur a Christo pro fratribus suis, sed hoc optaverat quando erat in statu infidelitatis. Unde in hoc non est imitandus. Vel potest dici, sicut dicit Chrysostomus, in libro de Compunct., quod per hoc non ostenditur quod apostolus plus diligeret proximum quam Deum, sed quod plus diligebat Deum quam seipsum. Volebat enim ad tempus privari fruitione divina, quod pertinet ad dilectionem sui, ad hoc quod honor Dei procuraretur in proximis, quod pertinet ad dilectionem Dei. Reply to Objection 1. According to one gloss, the Apostle did not desire this, viz. to be severed from Christ for his brethren, when he was in a state of grace, but had formerly desired it when he was in a state of unbelief, so that we should not imitate him in this respect. We may also reply, with Chrysostom (De Compunct. i, 8) [Hom. xvi in Ep. ad Rom.] that this does not prove the Apostle to have loved his neighbor more than God, but that he loved God more than himself. For he wished to be deprived for a time of the Divine fruition which pertains to love of one self, in order that God might be honored in his neighbor, which pertains to the love of God.
IIª-IIae q. 27 a. 8 ad 2 Ad secundum dicendum quod dilectio amici pro tanto est quandoque minus meritoria quia amicus diligitur propter seipsum, et ita deficit a vera ratione amicitiae caritatis, quae Deus est. Et ideo quod Deus diligatur propter seipsum non diminuit meritum, sed hoc constituit totam meriti rationem. Reply to Objection 2. A man's love for his friends is sometimes less meritorious in so far as he loves them for their sake, so as to fall short of the true reason for the friendship of charity, which is God. Hence that God be loved for His own sake does not diminish the merit, but is the entire reason for merit.
IIª-IIae q. 27 a. 8 ad 3 Ad tertium dicendum quod plus facit ad rationem meriti et virtutis bonum quam difficile. Unde non oportet quod omne difficilius sit magis meritorium, sed quod sic est difficilius ut etiam sit melius. Reply to Objection 3. The "good" has, more than the "difficult," to do with the reason of merit and virtue. Therefore it does not follow that whatever is more difficult is more meritorious, but only what is more difficult, and at the same time better.

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