Authors/Thomas Aquinas/Summa Theologiae/Part IIb/Q25

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IIª-IIae q. 25 pr. Deinde considerandum est de obiecto caritatis. Circa quod duo consideranda occurrunt, primo quidem de his quae sunt ex caritate diligenda; secundo, de ordine diligendorum. Circa primum quaeruntur duodecim. Primo, utrum solus Deus sit ex caritate diligendus, vel etiam proximus. Secundo, utrum caritas sit ex caritate diligenda. Tertio, utrum creaturae irrationales sint ex caritate diligendae. Quarto, utrum aliquis possit ex caritate seipsum diligere. Quinto, utrum corpus proprium. Sexto, utrum peccatores sint ex caritate diligendi. Septimo, utrum peccatores seipsos diligant. Octavo, utrum inimici sint ex caritate diligendi. Nono, utrum sint eis signa amicitiae exhibenda. Decimo, utrum Angeli sint ex caritate diligendi. Undecimo, utrum Daemones. Duodecimo, de enumeratione diligendorum ex caritate. Question 25. The object of charity Should we love God alone, out of charity, or should we love our neighbor also? Should charity be loved out of charity? Should irrational creatures be loved out of charity? May one love oneself out of charity? One's own body? Should sinners be loved out of charity? Do sinners love themselves? Should we love our enemies out of charity? Are we bound to show them tokens of friendship? Should we love the angels out of charity? Should we love the demons? How to enumerate the things we are bound to love out of charity
IIª-IIae q. 25 a. 1 arg. 1 Ad primum sic proceditur. Videtur quod dilectio caritatis sistat in Deo, et non se extendat ad proximum. Sicut enim Deo debemus amorem, ita et timorem, secundum illud Deut. X, et nunc, Israel, quid dominus Deus petit nisi ut timeas et diligas eum? Sed alius est timor quo timetur homo, qui dicitur timor humanus; et alius timor quo timetur Deus, qui est vel servilis vel filialis; ut ex supradictis patet. Ergo etiam alius est amor caritatis, quo diligitur Deus; et alius est amor quo diligitur proximus. Objection 1. It would seem that the love of charity stops at God and does not extend to our neighbor. For as we owe God love, so do we owe Him fear, according Deuteronomy 10:12: "And now Israel, what doth the Lord thy God require of thee, but that thou fear . . . and love Him?" Now the fear with which we fear man, and which is called human fear, is distinct from the fear with which we fear God, and which is either servile or filial, as is evident from what has been stated above (Question 10, Article 2). Therefore also the love with which we love God, is distinct from the love with which we love our neighbor.
IIª-IIae q. 25 a. 1 arg. 2 Praeterea, philosophus dicit, in VIII Ethic., quod amari est honorari. Sed alius est honor qui debetur Deo, qui est honor latriae; et alius est honor qui debetur creaturae, qui est honor duliae. Ergo etiam alius est amor quo diligitur Deus, et quo diligitur proximus. Objection 2. Further, the Philosopher says (Ethic. viii, 8) that "to be loved is to be honored." Now the honor due to God, which is known as "latria", is distinct from the honor due to a creature, and known as "dulia." Therefore again the love wherewith we love God, is distinct from that with which we love our neighbor.
IIª-IIae q. 25 a. 1 arg. 3 Praeterea, spes generat caritatem; ut habetur in Glossa, Matth. I. Sed spes ita habetur de Deo quod reprehenduntur sperantes in homine, secundum illud Ierem. XVII, maledictus homo qui confidit in homine. Ergo caritas ita debetur Deo quod ad proximum non se extendat. Objection 3. Further, hope begets charity, as a gloss states on Matthew 1:2. Now hope is so due to God that it is reprehensible to hope in man, according to Jeremiah 17:5: "Cursed be the man that trusteth in man." Therefore charity is so due to God, as not to extend to our neighbor.
IIª-IIae q. 25 a. 1 s. c. Sed contra est quod dicitur I Ioan. IV, hoc mandatum habemus a Deo, ut qui diligit Deum, diligat et fratrem suum. On the contrary, It is written (1 John 4:21): "This commandment we have from God, that he, who loveth God, love also his brother."
IIª-IIae q. 25 a. 1 co. Respondeo dicendum quod, sicut supra dictum est, habitus non diversificantur nisi ex hoc quod variat speciem actus, omnes enim actus unius speciei ad eundem habitum pertinent. Cum autem species actus ex obiecto sumatur secundum formalem rationem ipsius, necesse est quod idem specie sit actus qui fertur in rationem obiecti, et qui fertur in obiectum sub tali ratione, sicut est eadem specie visio qua videtur lumen, et qua videtur color secundum luminis rationem. Ratio autem diligendi proximum Deus est, hoc enim debemus in proximo diligere, ut in Deo sit. Unde manifestum est quod idem specie actus est quo diligitur Deus, et quo diligitur proximus. Et propter hoc habitus caritatis non solum se extendit ad dilectionem Dei, sed etiam ad dilectionem proximi. I answer that, As stated above (17, 6; 19, 3; I-II, 54, 3) habits are not differentiated except their acts be of different species. For every act of the one species belongs to the same habit. Now since the species of an act is derived from its object, considered under its formal aspect, it follows of necessity that it is specifically the same act that tends to an aspect of the object, and that tends to the object under that aspect: thus it is specifically the same visual act whereby we see the light, and whereby we see the color under the aspect of light. Now the aspect under which our neighbor is to be loved, is God, since what we ought to love in our neighbor is that he may be in God. Hence it is clear that it is specifically the same act whereby we love God, and whereby we love our neighbor. Consequently the habit of charity extends not only to the love of God, but also to the love of our neighbor.
IIª-IIae q. 25 a. 1 ad 1 Ad primum ergo dicendum quod proximus potest timeri dupliciter, sicut et amari. Uno modo, propter id quod est sibi proprium, puta cum aliquis timet tyrannum propter eius crudelitatem, vel cum amat ipsum propter cupiditatem acquirendi aliquid ab eo. Et talis timor humanus distinguitur a timore Dei, et similiter amor. Alio modo timetur homo et amatur propter id quod est Dei in ipso, sicut cum saecularis potestas timetur propter ministerium divinum quod habet ad vindictam malefactorum, et amatur propter iustitiam. Et talis timor hominis non distinguitur a timore Dei, sicut nec amor. Reply to Objection 1. We may fear our neighbor, even as we may love him, in two ways: first, on account of something that is proper to him, as when a man fears a tyrant on account of his cruelty, or loves him by reason of his own desire to get something from him. Such like human fear is distinct from the fear of God, and the same applies to love. Secondly, we fear a man, or love him on account of what he has of God; as when we fear the secular power by reason of its exercising the ministry of God for the punishment of evildoers, and love it for its justice: such like fear of man is not distinct from fear of God, as neither is such like love.
IIª-IIae q. 25 a. 1 ad 2 Ad secundum dicendum quod amor respicit bonum in communi, sed honor respicit proprium bonum honorati, defertur enim alicui in testimonium propriae virtutis. Et ideo amor non diversificatur specie propter diversam quantitatem bonitatis diversorum, dummodo referuntur ad aliquod unum bonum commune, sed honor diversificatur secundum propria bona singulorum. Unde eodem amore caritatis diligimus omnes proximos, inquantum referuntur ad unum bonum commune, quod est Deus, sed diversos honores diversis deferimus, secundum propriam virtutem singulorum. Et similiter Deo singularem honorem latriae exhibemus, propter eius singularem virtutem. Reply to Objection 2. Love regards good in general, whereas honor regards the honored person's own good, for it is given to a person in recognition of his own virtue. Hence love is not differentiated specifically on account of the various degrees of goodness in various persons, so long as it is referred to one good common to all, whereas honor is distinguished according to the good belonging to individuals. Consequently we love all our neighbors with the same love of charity, in so far as they are referred to one good common to them all, which is God; whereas we give various honors to various people, according to each one's own virtue, and likewise to God we give the singular honor of latria on account of His singular virtue.
IIª-IIae q. 25 a. 1 ad 3 Ad tertium dicendum quod vituperantur qui sperant in homine sicut in principali auctore salutis, non autem qui sperant in homine sicut in adiuvante ministerialiter sub Deo. Et similiter reprehensibile esset si quis proximum diligeret tanquam principalem finem, non autem si quis proximum diligat propter Deum, quod pertinet ad caritatem. Reply to Objection 3. It is wrong to hope in man as though he were the principal author of salvation, but not, to hope in man as helping us ministerially under God. On like manner it would be wrong if a man loved his neighbor as though he were his last end, but not, if he loved him for God's sake; and this is what charity does.
IIª-IIae q. 25 a. 2 arg. 1 Ad secundum sic proceditur. Videtur quod caritas non sit ex caritate diligenda. Ea enim quae sunt ex caritate diligenda, duobus praeceptis caritatis concluduntur, ut patet Matth. XXII. Sed sub neutro eorum caritas continetur, quia nec caritas est Deus nec est proximus. Ergo caritas non est ex caritate diligenda. Objection 1. It would seem that charity need not be loved out of charity. For the things to be loved out of charity are contained in the two precepts of charity (Matthew 22:37-39): and neither of them includes charity, since charity is neither God nor our neighbor. Therefore charity need not be loved out of charity.
IIª-IIae q. 25 a. 2 arg. 2 Praeterea, caritas fundatur super communicatione beatitudinis, ut supra dictum est. Sed caritas non potest esse particeps beatitudinis. Ergo caritas non est ex caritate diligenda. Objection 2. Further, charity is founded on the fellowship of happiness, as stated above (Question 23, Article 1). But charity cannot participate in happiness. Therefore charity need not be loved out of charity.
IIª-IIae q. 25 a. 2 arg. 3 Praeterea, caritas est amicitia quaedam, ut supra dictum est. Sed nullus potest habere amicitiam ad caritatem, vel ad aliquod accidens, quia huiusmodi reamare non possunt, quod est de ratione amicitiae, ut dicitur in VIII Ethic. Ergo caritas non est ex caritate diligenda. Objection 3. Further, charity is a kind of friendship, as stated above (Question 23, Article 1). But no man can have friendship for charity or for an accident, since such things cannot return love for love, which is essential to friendship, as stated in Ethic. viii. Therefore charity need not be loved out of charity.
IIª-IIae q. 25 a. 2 s. c. Sed contra est quod Augustinus dicit, VIII de Trin., qui diligit proximum, consequens est ut etiam ipsam dilectionem diligat. Sed proximus diligitur ex caritate. Ergo consequens est ut etiam caritas ex caritate diligatur. On the contrary, Augustine says (De Trin. viii, 8): "He that loves his neighbor, must, in consequence, love love itself." But we love our neighbor out of charity. Therefore it follows that charity also is loved out of charity.
IIª-IIae q. 25 a. 2 co. Respondeo dicendum quod caritas amor quidam est. Amor autem ex natura potentiae cuius est actus habet quod possit supra seipsum reflecti. Quia enim voluntatis obiectum est bonum universale, quidquid sub ratione boni continetur potest cadere sub actu voluntatis; et quia ipsum velle est quoddam bonum, potest velle se velle, sicut etiam intellectus, cuius obiectum est verum, intelligit se intelligere, quia hoc etiam est quoddam verum. Sed amor etiam ex ratione propriae speciei habet quod supra se reflectatur, quia est spontaneus motus amantis in amatum; unde ex hoc ipso quod amat aliquis, amat se amare. Sed caritas non est simplex amor, sed habet rationem amicitiae, ut supra dictum est. Per amicitiam autem amatur aliquid dupliciter. Uno modo, sicut ipse amicus ad quem amicitiam habemus et cui bona volumus. Alio modo, sicut bonum quod amico volumus. Et hoc modo caritas per caritatem amatur, et non primo, quia caritas est illud bonum quod optamus omnibus quos ex caritate diligimus. Et eadem ratio est de beatitudine et de aliis virtutibus. I answer that, Charity is love. Now love, by reason of the nature of the power whose act it is, is capable of reflecting on itself; for since the object of the will is the universal good, whatever has the aspect of good, can be the object of an act of the will: and since to will is itself a good, man can will himself to will. Even so the intellect, whose object is the true, understands that it understands, because this again is something true. Love, however, even by reason of its own species, is capable of reflecting on itself, because it is a spontaneous movement of the lover towards the beloved, wherefore from the moment a man loves, he loves himself to love. Yet charity is not love simply, but has the nature of friendship, as stated above (Question 23, Article 1). Now by friendship a thing is loved in two ways: first, as the friend for whom we have friendship, and to whom we wish good things: secondly, as the good which we wish to a friend. It is in the latter and not in the former way that charity is loved out of charity, because charity is the good which we desire for all those whom we love out of charity. The same applies to happiness, and to the other virtues.
IIª-IIae q. 25 a. 2 ad 1 Ad primum ergo dicendum quod Deus et proximus sunt illi ad quos amicitiam habemus. Sed in illorum dilectione includitur dilectio caritatis, diligimus enim proximum et Deum inquantum hoc amamus, ut nos et proximus Deum diligamus, quod est caritatem habere. Reply to Objection 1. God and our neighbor are those with whom we are friends, but love of them includes the loving of charity, since we love both God and our neighbor, in so far as we love ourselves and our neighbor to love God, and this is to love charity.
IIª-IIae q. 25 a. 2 ad 2 Ad secundum dicendum quod caritas est ipsa communicatio spiritualis vitae, per quam ad beatitudinem pervenitur. Et ideo amatur sicut bonum desideratum omnibus quos ex caritate diligimus. Reply to Objection 2. Charity is itself the fellowship of the spiritual life, whereby we arrive at happiness: hence it is loved as the good which we desire for all whom we love out of charity.
IIª-IIae q. 25 a. 2 ad 3 Ad tertium dicendum quod ratio illa procedit secundum quod per amicitiam amantur illi ad quos amicitiam habemus. Reply to Objection 3. This argument considers friendship as referred to those with whom we are friends.
IIª-IIae q. 25 a. 3 arg. 1 Ad tertium sic proceditur. Videtur quod etiam creaturae irrationales sint ex caritate diligendae. Per caritatem enim maxime conformamur Deo. Sed Deus diligit creaturas irrationales ex caritate, diligit enim omnia quae sunt, ut habetur Sap. XI; et omne quod diligit, seipso diligit, qui est caritas. Ergo et nos debemus creaturas irrationales ex caritate diligere. Objection 1. It would seem that irrational creatures also ought to be loved out of charity. For it is chiefly by charity that we are conformed to God. Now God loves irrational creatures out of charity, for He loves "all things that are" (Wisdom 11:25), and whatever He loves, He loves by Himself Who is charity. Therefore we also should love irrational creatures out of charity.
IIª-IIae q. 25 a. 3 arg. 2 Praeterea, caritas principaliter fertur in Deum, ad alia autem se extendit secundum quod ad Deum pertinent. Sed sicut creatura rationalis pertinet ad Deum inquantum habet similitudinem imaginis, ita etiam creatura irrationalis inquantum habet similitudinem vestigii. Ergo caritas etiam se extendit ad creaturas irrationales. Objection 2. Further, charity is referred to God principally, and extends to other things as referable to God. Now just as the rational creature is referable to God, in as much as it bears the resemblance of image, so too, are the irrational creatures, in as much as they bear the resemblance of a trace [Cf. I, 45, 7]. Therefore charity extends also to irrational creatures.
IIª-IIae q. 25 a. 3 arg. 3 Praeterea, sicut caritatis obiectum est Deus, ita et fidei. Sed fides se extendit ad creaturas irrationales, inquantum credimus caelum et terram esse creata a Deo, et pisces et aves esse productos ex aquis, et gressibilia animalia et plantas ex terra. Ergo caritas etiam se extendit ad creaturas irrationales. Objection 3. Further, just as the object of charity is God. so is the object of faith. Now faith extends to irrational creatures, since we believe that heaven and earth were created by God, that the fishes and birds were brought forth out of the waters, and animals that walk, and plants, out of the earth. Therefore charity extends also to irrational creatures.
IIª-IIae q. 25 a. 3 s. c. Sed contra est quod dilectio caritatis solum se extendit ad Deum et proximum. Sed nomine proximi non potest intelligi creatura irrationalis, quia non communicat cum homine in vita rationali. Ergo caritas non se extendit ad creaturas irrationales. On the contrary, The love of charity extends to none but God and our neighbor. But the word neighbor cannot be extended to irrational creatures, since they have no fellowship with man in the rational life. Therefore charity does not extend to irrational creatures.
IIª-IIae q. 25 a. 3 co. Respondeo dicendum quod caritas, secundum praedicta, est amicitia quaedam. Per amicitiam autem amatur uno quidem modo, amicus ad quem amicitia habetur; et alio modo, bona quae amico optantur. Primo ergo modo nulla creatura irrationalis potest ex caritate amari. Et hoc triplici ratione. Quarum duae pertinent communiter ad amicitiam, quae ad creaturas irrationales haberi non potest. Primo quidem, quia amicitia ad eum habetur cui volumus bonum. Non autem proprie possum bonum velle creaturae irrationali, quia non est eius proprie habere bonum, sed solum creaturae rationalis, quae est domina utendi bono quod habet per liberum arbitrium. Et ideo philosophus dicit, in II Physic., quod huiusmodi rebus non dicimus aliquid bene vel male contingere nisi secundum similitudinem. Secundo, quia omnis amicitia fundatur super aliqua communicatione vitae, nihil enim est ita proprium amicitiae sicut convivere, ut patet per philosophum, VIII Ethic. Creaturae autem irrationales non possunt communicationem habere in vita humana, quae est secundum rationem. Unde nulla amicitia potest haberi ad creaturas irrationales, nisi forte secundum metaphoram. Tertia ratio est propria caritati, quia caritas fundatur super communicatione beatitudinis aeternae, cuius creatura irrationalis capax non est. Unde amicitia caritatis non potest haberi ad creaturam irrationalem. Possunt tamen ex caritate diligi creaturae irrationales sicut bona quae aliis volumus, inquantum scilicet ex caritate volumus eas conservari ad honorem Dei et utilitatem hominum. Et sic etiam ex caritate Deus eas diligit. I answer that, According to what has been stated above (Question 13, Article 1) charity is a kind of friendship. Now the love of friendship is twofold: first, there is the love for the friend to whom our friendship is given, secondly, the love for those good things which we desire for our friend. With regard to the first, no irrational creature can be loved out of charity; and for three reasons. Two of these reasons refer in a general way to friendship, which cannot have an irrational creature for its object: first because friendship is towards one to whom we wish good things, while, properly speaking, we cannot wish good things to an irrational creature, because it is not competent, properly speaking, to possess good, this being proper to the rational creature which, through its free-will, is the master of its disposal of the good it possesses. Hence the Philosopher says (Phys. ii, 6) that we do not speak of good or evil befalling such like things, except metaphorically. Secondly, because all friendship is based on some fellowship in life; since "nothing is so proper to friendship as to live together," as the Philosopher proves (Ethic. viii, 5). Now irrational creatures can have no fellowship in human life which is regulated by reason. Hence friendship with irrational creatures is impossible, except metaphorically speaking. The third reason is proper to charity, for charity is based on the fellowship of everlasting happiness, to which the irrational creature cannot attain. Therefore we cannot have the friendship of charity towards an irrational creature. Nevertheless we can love irrational creatures out of charity, if we regard them as the good things that we desire for others, in so far, to wit, as we wish for their preservation, to God's honor and man's use; thus too does God love them out of charity.
IIª-IIae q. 25 a. 3 ad 1 Unde patet responsio ad primum. Wherefore the Reply to the First Objection is evident.
IIª-IIae q. 25 a. 3 ad 2 Ad secundum dicendum quod similitudo vestigii non causat capacitatem vitae aeternae, sicut similitudo imaginis. Unde non est similis ratio. Reply to Objection 2. The likeness by way of trace does not confer the capacity for everlasting life, whereas the likeness of image does: and so the comparison fails.
IIª-IIae q. 25 a. 3 ad 3 Ad tertium dicendum quod fides se potest extendere ad omnia quae sunt quocumque modo vera. Sed amicitia caritatis se extendit ad illa sola quae nata sunt habere bonum vitae aeternae. Unde non est simile. Reply to Objection 3. Faith can extend to all that is in any way true, whereas the friendship of charity extends only to such things as have a natural capacity for everlasting life; wherefore the comparison fails.
IIª-IIae q. 25 a. 4 arg. 1 Ad quartum sic proceditur. Videtur quod homo non diligat seipsum ex caritate. Dicit enim Gregorius, in quadam homilia, quod caritas minus quam inter duos haberi non potest. Ergo ad seipsum nullus habet caritatem. Objection 1. It would seem that a man is not bound to love himself out of charity. For Gregory says in a homily (In Evang. xvii) that there "can be no charity between less than two." Therefore no man has charity towards himself.
IIª-IIae q. 25 a. 4 arg. 2 Praeterea, amicitia de sui ratione importat reamationem et aequalitatem, ut patet in VIII Ethic., quae quidem non possunt esse homini ad seipsum. Sed caritas amicitia quaedam est, ut dictum est. Ergo ad seipsum aliquis caritatem habere non potest. Objection 2. Further, friendship, by its very nature, implies mutual love and equality (Ethic. viii, 2,7), which cannot be of one man towards himself. But charity is a kind of friendship, as stated above (Question 23, Article 1). Therefore a man cannot have charity towards himself.
IIª-IIae q. 25 a. 4 arg. 3 Praeterea, illud quod ad caritatem pertinet non potest esse vituperabile, quia caritas non agit perperam, ut dicitur I ad Cor. XIII. Sed amare seipsum est vituperabile, dicitur enim II ad Tim. III, in novissimis diebus instabunt tempora periculosa, et erunt homines amantes seipsos. Ergo homo non potest seipsum ex caritate diligere. Objection 3. Further, anything relating to charity cannot be blameworthy, since charity "dealeth not perversely" (1 Corinthians 13:4). Now a man deserves to be blamed for loving himself, since it is written (2 Timothy 3:1-2): "In the last days shall come dangerous times, men shall be lovers of themselves." Therefore a man cannot love himself out of charity.
IIª-IIae q. 25 a. 4 s. c. Sed contra est quod dicitur Levit. XIX, diliges amicum tuum sicut teipsum. Sed amicum ex caritate diligimus. Ergo et nosipsos ex caritate debemus diligere. On the contrary, It is written (Leviticus 19:18): "Thou shalt love thy friend as thyself." Now we love our friends out of charity. Therefore we should love ourselves too out of charity.
IIª-IIae q. 25 a. 4 co. Respondeo dicendum quod, cum caritas sit amicitia quaedam, sicut dictum est, dupliciter possumus de caritate loqui. Uno modo, sub communi ratione amicitiae. Et secundum hoc dicendum est quod amicitia proprie non habetur ad seipsum, sed aliquid maius amicitia, quia amicitia unionem quandam importat, dicit enim Dionysius quod amor est virtus unitiva; unicuique autem ad seipsum est unitas, quae est potior unione. Unde sicut unitas est principium unionis, ita amor quo quis diligit seipsum, est forma et radix amicitiae, in hoc enim amicitiam habemus ad alios, quod ad eos nos habemus sicut ad nosipsos; dicitur enim in IX Ethic. quod amicabilia quae sunt ad alterum veniunt ex his quae sunt ad seipsum. Sicut etiam de principiis non habetur scientia, sed aliquid maius, scilicet intellectus. Alio modo possumus loqui de caritate secundum propriam rationem ipsius, prout scilicet est amicitia hominis ad Deum principaliter, et ex consequenti ad ea quae sunt Dei. Inter quae etiam est ipse homo qui caritatem habet. Et sic inter cetera quae ex caritate diligit quasi ad Deum pertinentia, etiam seipsum ex caritate diligit. I answer that, Since charity is a kind of friendship, as stated above (Question 23, Article 1), we may consider charity from two standpoints: first, under the general notion of friendship, and in this way we must hold that, properly speaking, a man is not a friend to himself, but something more than a friend, since friendship implies union, for Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv) that "love is a unitive force," whereas a man is one with himself which is more than being united to another. Hence, just as unity is the principle of union, so the love with which a man loves himself is the form and root of friendship. For if we have friendship with others it is because we do unto them as we do unto ourselves, hence we read in Ethic. ix, 4,8, that "the origin of friendly relations with others lies in our relations to ourselves." Thus too with regard to principles we have something greater than science, namely understanding. Secondly, we may speak of charity in respect of its specific nature, namely as denoting man's friendship with God in the first place, and, consequently, with the things of God, among which things is man himself who has charity. Hence, among these other things which he loves out of charity because they pertain to God, he loves also himself out of charity.
IIª-IIae q. 25 a. 4 ad 1 Ad primum ergo dicendum quod Gregorius loquitur de caritate secundum communem amicitiae rationem. Reply to Objection 1. Gregory speaks there of charity under the general notion of friendship:
IIª-IIae q. 25 a. 4 ad 2 Et secundum hoc etiam procedit secunda ratio. and the Second Objection is to be taken in the same sense.
IIª-IIae q. 25 a. 4 ad 3 Ad tertium dicendum quod amantes seipsos vituperantur inquantum amant se secundum naturam sensibilem, cui obtemperant. Quod non est vere amare seipsum secundum naturam rationalem, ut sibi velit ea bona quae pertinent ad perfectionem rationis. Et hoc modo praecipue ad caritatem pertinet diligere seipsum. Reply to Objection 3. Those who love themselves are to be blamed, in so far as they love themselves as regards their sensitive nature, which they humor. This is not to love oneself truly according to one's rational nature, so as to desire for oneself the good things which pertain to the perfection of reason: and in this way chiefly it is through charity that a man loves himself.
IIª-IIae q. 25 a. 5 arg. 1 Ad quintum sic proceditur. Videtur quod homo non debeat corpus suum ex caritate diligere. Non enim diligimus illum cui convivere non volumus. Sed homines caritatem habentes refugiunt corporis convictum, secundum illud Rom. VII, quis me liberabit de corpore mortis huius? Et Philipp. I, desiderium habens dissolvi et cum Christo esse. Ergo corpus nostrum non est ex caritate diligendum. Objection 1. It would seem that a man ought not to love his body out of charity. For we do not love one with whom we are unwilling to associate. But those who have charity shun the society of the body, according to Romans 7:24: "Who shall deliver me from the body of this death?" and Philippians 1:23: "Having a desire to be dissolved and to be with Christ." Therefore our bodies are not to be loved out of charity.
IIª-IIae q. 25 a. 5 arg. 2 Praeterea, amicitia caritatis fundatur super communicatione divinae fruitionis. Sed huius fruitionis corpus particeps esse non potest. Ergo corpus non est ex caritate diligendum. Objection 2. Further, the friendship of charity is based on fellowship in the enjoyment of God. But the body can have no share in that enjoyment. Therefore the body is not to be loved out of charity.
IIª-IIae q. 25 a. 5 arg. 3 Praeterea, caritas, cum sit amicitia quaedam, ad eos habetur qui reamare possunt. Sed corpus nostrum non potest nos ex caritate diligere. Ergo non est ex caritate diligendum. Objection 3. Further, since charity is a kind of friendship it is towards those who are capable of loving in return. But our body cannot love us out of charity. Therefore it should not be loved out of charity.
IIª-IIae q. 25 a. 5 s. c. Sed contra est quod Augustinus, in I de Doct. Christ., ponit quatuor ex caritate diligenda, inter quae unum est corpus proprium. On the contrary, Augustine says (De Doctr. Christ. i, 23,26) that there are four things that we should love out of charity, and among them he reckons our own body.
IIª-IIae q. 25 a. 5 co. Respondeo dicendum quod corpus nostrum secundum duo potest considerari, uno modo, secundum eius naturam; alio modo, secundum corruptionem culpae et poenae. Natura autem corporis nostri non est a malo principio creata, ut Manichaei fabulantur, sed est a Deo. Unde possumus eo uti ad servitium Dei, secundum illud Rom. VI, exhibete membra vestra arma iustitiae Deo. Et ideo ex dilectione caritatis qua diligimus Deum, debemus etiam corpus nostrum diligere. Sed infectionem culpae et corruptionem poenae in corpore nostro diligere non debemus, sed potius ad eius remotionem anhelare desiderio caritatis. I answer that, Our bodies can be considered in two ways: first, in respect of their nature, secondly, in respect of the corruption of sin and its punishment. Now the nature of our body was created, not by an evil principle, as the Manicheans pretend, but by God. Hence we can use it for God's service, according to Romans 6:13: "Present . . . your members as instruments of justice unto God." Consequently, out of the love of charity with which we love God, we ought to love our bodies also, but we ought not to love the evil effects of sin and the corruption of punishment; we ought rather, by the desire of charity, to long for the removal of such things.
IIª-IIae q. 25 a. 5 ad 1 Ad primum ergo dicendum quod apostolus non refugiebat corporis communionem quantum ad corporis naturam, immo secundum hoc nolebat ab eo spoliari, secundum illud II ad Cor. V, nolumus expoliari, sed supervestiri. Sed volebat carere infectione concupiscentiae, quae remanet in corpore; et corruptione ipsius, quae aggravat animam, ne possit Deum videre. Unde signanter dixit, de corpore mortis huius. Reply to Objection 1. The Apostle did not shrink from the society of his body, as regards the nature of the body, in fact in this respect he was loth to be deprived thereof, according to 2 Corinthians 5:4: "We would not be unclothed, but clothed over." He did, however, wish to escape from the taint of concupiscence, which remains in the body, and from the corruption of the body which weighs down the soul, so as to hinder it from seeing God. Hence he says expressly: "From the body of this death."
IIª-IIae q. 25 a. 5 ad 2 Ad secundum dicendum quod corpus nostrum quamvis Deo frui non possit cognoscendo et amando ipsum, tamen per opera quae per corpus agimus ad perfectam Dei fruitionem possumus venire. Unde et ex fruitione animae redundat quaedam beatitudo ad corpus, scilicet sanitatis et incorruptionis vigor; ut Augustinus dicit, in epistola ad Diosc. Et ideo, quia corpus aliquo modo est particeps beatitudinis, potest dilectione caritatis amari. Reply to Objection 2. Although our bodies are unable to enjoy God by knowing and loving Him, yet by the works which we do through the body, we are able to attain to the perfect knowledge of God. Hence from the enjoyment in the soul there overflows a certain happiness into the body, viz., "the flush of health and incorruption," as Augustine states (Ep. ad Dioscor. cxviii). Hence, since the body has, in a fashion, a share of happiness, it can be loved with the love of charity.
IIª-IIae q. 25 a. 5 ad 3 Ad tertium dicendum quod reamatio habet locum in amicitia quae est ad alterum, non autem in amicitia quae est ad seipsum, vel secundum animam vel secundum corpus. Reply to Objection 3. Mutual love is found in the friendship which is for another, but not in that which a man has for himself, either in respect of his soul, or in respect of his body.
IIª-IIae q. 25 a. 6 arg. 1 Ad sextum sic proceditur. Videtur quod peccatores non sint ex caritate diligendi. Dicitur enim in Psalm., iniquos odio habui. Sed David caritatem habebat. Ergo ex caritate magis sunt odiendi peccatores quam diligendi. Objection 1. It would seem that we ought not to love sinners out of charity. For it is written (Psalm 118:113): "I have hated the unjust." But David had perfect charity. Therefore sinners should be hated rather than loved, out of charity.
IIª-IIae q. 25 a. 6 arg. 2 Praeterea, probatio dilectionis exhibitio est operis; ut Gregorius dicit, in homilia Pentecostes. Sed peccatoribus iusti non exhibent opera dilectionis, sed magis opera quae videntur esse odii, secundum illud Psalm., in matutino interficiebam omnes peccatores terrae. Et dominus praecepit, Exod. XXII, maleficos non patieris vivere. Ergo peccatores non sunt ex caritate diligendi. Objection 2. Further, "love is proved by deeds" as Gregory says in a homily for Pentecost (In Evang. xxx). But good men do no works of the unjust: on the contrary, they do such as would appear to be works of hate, according to Psalm 100:8: "In the morning I put to death all the wicked of the land": and God commanded (Exodus 22:18): "Wizards thou shalt not suffer to live." Therefore sinners should not be loved out of charity.
IIª-IIae q. 25 a. 6 arg. 3 Praeterea, ad amicitiam pertinet ut amicis velimus et optemus bona. Sed sancti ex caritate optant peccatoribus mala, secundum illud Psalm., convertantur peccatores in Infernum. Ergo peccatores non sunt ex caritate diligendi. Objection 3. Further, it is part of friendship that one should desire and wish good things for one's friends. Now the saints, out of charity, desire evil things for the wicked, according to Psalm 9:18: "May the wicked be turned into hell [Douay and A.V.: 'The wicked shall be,' etc. See Reply to this Objection.]." Therefore sinners should not be loved out of charity.
IIª-IIae q. 25 a. 6 arg. 4 Praeterea, proprium amicorum est de eisdem gaudere et idem velle. Sed caritas non facit velle quod peccatores volunt, neque facit gaudere de hoc de quo peccatores gaudent; sed magis facit contrarium. Ergo peccatores non sunt ex caritate diligendi. Objection 4. Further, it is proper to friends to rejoice in, and will the same things. Now charity does not make us will what sinners will, nor to rejoice in what gives them joy, but rather the contrary. Therefore sinners should not be loved out of charity.
IIª-IIae q. 25 a. 6 arg. 5 Praeterea, proprium est amicorum simul convivere, ut dicitur in VIII Ethic. Sed cum peccatoribus non est convivendum, secundum illud II ad Cor. VI, recedite de medio eorum. Ergo peccatores non sunt ex caritate diligendi. Objection 5. Further, it is proper to friends to associate together, according to Ethic. viii. But we ought not to associate with sinners, according to 2 Corinthians 6:17: "Go ye out from among them." Therefore we should not love sinners out of charity.
IIª-IIae q. 25 a. 6 s. c. Sed contra est quod Augustinus dicit, in I de Doct. Christ., quod cum dicitur, diliges proximum tuum, manifestum est omnem hominem proximum esse deputandum. Sed peccatores non desinunt esse homines, quia peccatum non tollit naturam. Ergo peccatores sunt ex caritate diligendi. On the contrary, Augustine says (De Doctr. Christ. i, 30) that "when it is said: 'Thou shalt love thy neighbor,' it is evident that we ought to look upon every man as our neighbor." Now sinners do not cease to be men, for sin does not destroy nature. Therefore we ought to love sinners out of charity.
IIª-IIae q. 25 a. 6 co. Respondeo dicendum quod in peccatoribus duo possunt considerari, scilicet natura, et culpa. Secundum naturam quidem, quam a Deo habent, capaces sunt beatitudinis, super cuius communicatione caritas fundatur, ut supra dictum est. Et ideo secundum naturam suam sunt ex caritate diligendi. Sed culpa eorum Deo contrariatur, et est beatitudinis impedimentum. Unde secundum culpam, qua Deo adversantur, sunt odiendi quicumque peccatores, etiam pater et mater et propinqui, ut habetur Luc. XIV. Debemus enim in peccatoribus odire quod peccatores sunt, et diligere quod homines sunt beatitudinis capaces. Et hoc est eos vere ex caritate diligere propter Deum. I answer that, Two things may be considered in the sinner: his nature and his guilt. According to his nature, which he has from God, he has a capacity for happiness, on the fellowship of which charity is based, as stated above (3; 23, 1,5), wherefore we ought to love sinners, out of charity, in respect of their nature. On the other hand their guilt is opposed to God, and is an obstacle to happiness. Wherefore, in respect of their guilt whereby they are opposed to God, all sinners are to be hated, even one's father or mother or kindred, according to Luke 12:26. For it is our duty to hate, in the sinner, his being a sinner, and to love in him, his being a man capable of bliss; and this is to love him truly, out of charity, for God's sake.
IIª-IIae q. 25 a. 6 ad 1 Ad primum ergo dicendum quod iniquos propheta odio habuit inquantum iniqui sunt, habens odio iniquitatem ipsorum, quod est ipsorum malum. Et hoc est perfectum odium, de quo ipse dicit, perfecto odio oderam illos. Eiusdem autem rationis est odire malum alicuius et diligere bonum eius. Unde etiam istud odium perfectum ad caritatem pertinet. Reply to Objection 1. The prophet hated the unjust, as such, and the object of his hate was their injustice, which was their evil. Such hatred is perfect, of which he himself says (Psalm 138:22): "I have hated them with a perfect hatred." Now hatred of a person's evil is equivalent to love of his good. Hence also this perfect hatred belongs to charity.
IIª-IIae q. 25 a. 6 ad 2 Ad secundum dicendum quod amicis peccantibus, sicut philosophus dicit, in IX Ethic., non sunt subtrahenda amicitiae beneficia, quousque habeatur spes sanationis eorum, sed magis est eis auxiliandum ad recuperationem virtutis quam ad recuperationem pecuniae, si eam amisissent, quanto virtus est magis amicitiae affinis quam pecunia. Sed quando in maximam malitiam incidunt et insanabiles fiunt, tunc non est eis amicitiae familiaritas exhibenda. Et ideo huiusmodi peccantes, de quibus magis praesumitur nocumentum aliorum quam eorum emendatio, secundum legem divinam et humanam praecipiuntur occidi. Et tamen hoc facit iudex non ex odio eorum, sed ex caritatis amore quo bonum publicum praefertur vitae singularis personae. Et tamen mors per iudicem inflicta peccatori prodest, sive convertatur, ad culpae expiationem; sive non convertatur, ad culpae terminationem, quia per hoc tollitur ei potestas amplius peccandi. Reply to Objection 2. As the Philosopher observes (Ethic. ix, 3), when our friends fall into sin, we ought not to deny them the amenities of friendship, so long as there is hope of their mending their ways, and we ought to help them more readily to regain virtue than to recover money, had they lost it, for as much as virtue is more akin than money to friendship. When, however, they fall into very great wickedness, and become incurable, we ought no longer to show them friendliness. It is for this reason that both Divine and human laws command such like sinners to be put to death, because there is greater likelihood of their harming others than of their mending their ways. Nevertheless the judge puts this into effect, not out of hatred for the sinners, but out of the love of charity, by reason of which he prefers the public good to the life of the individual. Moreover the death inflicted by the judge profits the sinner, if he be converted, unto the expiation of his crime; and, if he be not converted, it profits so as to put an end to the sin, because the sinner is thus deprived of the power to sin any more.
IIª-IIae q. 25 a. 6 ad 3 Ad tertium dicendum quod huiusmodi imprecationes quae in sacra Scriptura inveniuntur, tripliciter possunt intelligi. Uno modo, per modum praenuntiationis, non per modum optationis, ut sit sensus, convertantur peccatores in Infernum, idest convertentur. Alio modo, per modum optationis, ut tamen desiderium optantis non referatur ad poenam hominum, sed ad iustitiam punientis, secundum illud, laetabitur iustus cum viderit vindictam. Quia nec ipse Deus puniens laetatur in perditione impiorum, ut dicitur Sap. I, sed in sua iustitia, quia iustus dominus, et iustitias dilexit. Tertio, ut desiderium referatur ad remotionem culpae, non ad ipsam poenam, ut scilicet peccata destruantur et homines remaneant. Reply to Objection 3. Such like imprecations which we come across in Holy Writ, may be understood in three ways: first, by way of prediction, not by way of wish, so that the sense is: "May the wicked be," that is, "The wicked shall be, turned into hell." Secondly, by way of wish, yet so that the desire of the wisher is not referred to the man's punishment, but to the justice of the punisher, according to Psalm 57:11: "The just shall rejoice when he shall see the revenge," since, according to Wisdom 1:13, not even God "hath pleasure in the destruction of the wicked [Vulgate: 'living']" when He punishes them, but He rejoices in His justice, according to Psalm 10:8: "The Lord is just and hath loved justice." Thirdly, so that this desire is referred to the removal of the sin, and not to the punishment itself, to the effect, namely, that the sin be destroyed, but that the man may live.
IIª-IIae q. 25 a. 6 ad 4 Ad quartum dicendum quod ex caritate diligimus peccatores non quidem ut velimus quae ipsi volunt, vel gaudeamus de his de quibus ipsi gaudent, sed ut faciamus eos velle quod volumus, et gaudere de his de quibus gaudemus. Unde dicitur Ierem. XV, ipsi convertentur ad te, et tu non converteris ad eos. Reply to Objection 4. We love sinners out of charity, not so as to will what they will, or to rejoice in what gives them joy, but so as to make them will what we will, and rejoice in what rejoices us. Hence it is written (Jeremiah 15:19): "They shall be turned to thee, and thou shalt not to be turned to them."
IIª-IIae q. 25 a. 6 ad 5 Ad quintum dicendum quod convivere peccatoribus infirmis quidem est vitandum, propter periculum quod eis imminet ne ab eis subvertantur. Perfectis autem, de quorum corruptione non timetur, laudabile est quod cum peccatoribus conversentur, ut eos convertant. Sic enim dominus cum peccatoribus manducabat et bibebat, ut habetur Matth. IX. Convictus tamen peccatorum quantum ad consortium peccati vitandus est omnibus. Et sic dicitur II ad Cor. VI, recedite de medio eorum, et immundum ne tetigeritis, scilicet secundum peccati consensum. Reply to Objection 5. The weak should avoid associating with sinners, on account of the danger in which they stand of being perverted by them. But it is commendable for the perfect, of whose perversion there is no fear, to associate with sinners that they may convert them. For thus did Our Lord eat and drink with sinners as related by Matthew 9:11-13. Yet all should avoid the society of sinners, as regards fellowship in sin; in this sense it is written (2 Corinthians 6:17): "Go out from among them . . . and touch not the unclean thing," i.e. by consenting to sin.
IIª-IIae q. 25 a. 7 arg. 1 Ad septimum sic proceditur. Videtur quod peccatores seipsos diligant. Illud enim quod est principium peccati maxime in peccatoribus invenitur. Sed amor sui est principium peccati, dicit enim Augustinus, XIV de Civ. Dei, quod facit civitatem Babylonis. Ergo peccatores maxime amant seipsos. Objection 1. It would seem that sinners love themselves. For that which is the principle of sin, is most of all in the sinner. Now love of self is the principle of sin, since Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xiv, 28) that it "builds up the city of Babylon." Therefore sinners most of all love themselves.
IIª-IIae q. 25 a. 7 arg. 2 Praeterea, peccatum non tollit naturam. Sed hoc unicuique convenit ex sua natura quod diligat seipsum, unde etiam creaturae irrationales naturaliter appetunt proprium bonum, puta conservationem sui esse et alia huiusmodi. Ergo peccatores diligunt seipsos. Objection 2. Further, sin does not destroy nature. Now it is in keeping with nature that every man should love himself: wherefore even irrational creatures naturally desire their own good, for instance, the preservation of their being, and so forth. Therefore sinners love themselves.
IIª-IIae q. 25 a. 7 arg. 3 Praeterea, omnibus est diligibile bonum; ut Dionysius dicit, in IV cap. de Div. Nom. Sed multi peccatores reputant se bonos. Ergo multi peccatores seipsos diligunt. Objection 3. Further, good is beloved by all, as Dionysius states (Div. Nom. iv). Now many sinners reckon themselves to be good. Therefore many sinners love themselves.
IIª-IIae q. 25 a. 7 s. c. Sed contra est quod dicitur in Psalm., qui diligit iniquitatem, odit animam suam. On the contrary, It is written (Psalm 10:6): "He that loveth iniquity, hateth his own soul."
IIª-IIae q. 25 a. 7 co. Respondeo dicendum quod amare seipsum uno modo commune est omnibus; alio modo proprium est bonorum; tertio modo proprium est malorum. Quod enim aliquis amet id quod seipsum esse aestimat, hoc commune est omnibus. Homo autem dicitur esse aliquid dupliciter. Uno modo, secundum suam substantiam et naturam. Et secundum hoc omnes aestimant bonum commune se esse id quod sunt, scilicet ex anima et corpore compositos. Et sic etiam omnes homines, boni et mali, diligunt seipsos, inquantum diligunt sui ipsorum conservationem. Alio modo dicitur esse homo aliquid secundum principalitatem, sicut princeps civitatis dicitur esse civitas; unde quod principes faciunt, dicitur civitas facere. Sic autem non omnes aestimant se esse id quod sunt. Principale enim in homine est mens rationalis, secundarium autem est natura sensitiva et corporalis, quorum primum apostolus nominat interiorem hominem, secundum exteriorem, ut patet II ad Cor. IV. Boni autem aestimant principale in seipsis rationalem naturam, sive interiorem hominem, unde secundum hoc aestimant se esse quod sunt. Mali autem aestimant principale in seipsis naturam sensitivam et corporalem, scilicet exteriorem hominem. Unde non recte cognoscentes seipsos, non vere diligunt seipsos, sed diligunt id quod seipsos esse reputant. Boni autem, vere cognoscentes seipsos, vere seipsos diligunt. Et hoc probat philosophus, in IX Ethic., per quinque quae sunt amicitiae propria. Unusquisque enim amicus primo quidem vult suum amicum esse et vivere; secundo, vult ei bona; tertio, operatur bona ad ipsum; quarto, convivit ei delectabiliter; quinto, concordat cum ipso, quasi in iisdem delectatus et contristatus. Et secundum hoc boni diligunt seipsos quantum ad interiorem hominem, quia etiam volunt ipsum servari in sua integritate; et optant ei bona eius, quae sunt bona spiritualia; et etiam ad assequenda operam impendunt; et delectabiliter ad cor proprium redeunt, quia ibi inveniunt et bonas cogitationes in praesenti, et memoriam bonorum praeteritorum, et spem futurorum bonorum, ex quibus delectatio causatur; similiter etiam non patiuntur in seipsis voluntatis dissensionem, quia tota anima eorum tendit in unum. E contrario autem mali non volunt conservari integritatem interioris hominis; neque appetunt spiritualia eius bona; neque ad hoc operantur; neque delectabile est eis secum convivere redeundo ad cor, quia inveniunt ibi mala et praesentia et praeterita et futura, quae abhorrent; neque etiam sibi ipsis concordant, propter conscientiam remordentem, secundum illud Psalm., arguam te, et statuam contra faciem tuam. Et per eadem probari potest quod mali amant seipsos secundum corruptionem exterioris hominis. Sic autem boni non amant seipsos. I answer that, Love of self is common to all, in one way; in another way it is proper to the good; in a third way, it is proper to the wicked. For it is common to all for each one to love what he thinks himself to be. Now a man is said to be a thing, in two ways: first, in respect of his substance and nature, and, this way all think themselves to be what they are, that is, composed of a soul and body. On this way too, all men, both good and wicked, love themselves, in so far as they love their own preservation. Secondly, a man is said to be something in respect of some predominance, as the sovereign of a state is spoken of as being the state, and so, what the sovereign does, the state is said to do. On this way, all do not think themselves to be what they are. For the reasoning mind is the predominant part of man, while the sensitive and corporeal nature takes the second place, the former of which the Apostle calls the "inward man," and the latter, the "outward man" (2 Corinthians 4:16). Now the good look upon their rational nature or the inward man as being the chief thing in them, wherefore in this way they think themselves to be what they are. On the other hand, the wicked reckon their sensitive and corporeal nature, or the outward man, to hold the first place. Wherefore, since they know not themselves aright, they do not love themselves aright, but love what they think themselves to be. But the good know themselves truly, and therefore truly love themselves. The Philosopher proves this from five things that are proper to friendship. For in the first place, every friend wishes his friend to be and to live; secondly, he desires good things for him; thirdly, he does good things to him; fourthly, he takes pleasure in his company; fifthly, he is of one mind with him, rejoicing and sorrowing in almost the same things. On this way the good love themselves, as to the inward man, because they wish the preservation thereof in its integrity, they desire good things for him, namely spiritual goods, indeed they do their best to obtain them, and they take pleasure in entering into their own hearts, because they find there good thoughts in the present, the memory of past good, and the hope of future good, all of which are sources of pleasure. Likewise they experience no clashing of wills, since their whole soul tends to one thing. On the other hand, the wicked have no wish to be preserved in the integrity of the inward man, nor do they desire spiritual goods for him, nor do they work for that end, nor do they take pleasure in their own company by entering into their own hearts, because whatever they find there, present, past and future, is evil and horrible; nor do they agree with themselves, on account of the gnawings of conscience, according to Psalm 49:21: "I will reprove thee and set before thy face." In the same manner it may be shown that the wicked love themselves, as regards the corruption of the outward man, whereas the good do not love themselves thus.
IIª-IIae q. 25 a. 7 ad 1 Ad primum ergo dicendum quod amor sui qui est principium peccati, est ille qui est proprius malorum, perveniens usque ad contemptum Dei, ut ibi dicitur, quia mali sic etiam cupiunt exteriora bona quod spiritualia contemnunt. Reply to Objection 1. The love of self which is the principle of sin is that which is proper to the wicked, and reaches "to the contempt of God," as stated in the passage quoted, because the wicked so desire external goods as to despise spiritual goods.
IIª-IIae q. 25 a. 7 ad 2 Ad secundum dicendum quod naturalis amor, etsi non totaliter tollatur a malis, tamen in eis pervertitur per modum iam dictum. Reply to Objection 2. Although natural love is not altogether forfeited by wicked men, yet it is perverted in them, as explained above.
IIª-IIae q. 25 a. 7 ad 3 Ad tertium dicendum quod mali, inquantum aestimant se bonos, sic aliquid participant de amore sui. Nec tamen ista est vera sui dilectio, sed apparens. Quae etiam non est possibilis in his qui valde sunt mali. Reply to Objection 3. The wicked have some share of self-love, in so far as they think themselves good. Yet such love of self is not true but apparent: and even this is not possible in those who are very wicked.
IIª-IIae q. 25 a. 8 arg. 1 Ad octavum sic proceditur. Videtur quod non sit de necessitate caritatis ut inimici diligantur. Dicit enim Augustinus, in Enchirid., quod hoc tam magnum bonum, scilicet diligere inimicos, non est tantae multitudinis quantam credimus exaudiri cum in oratione dicitur, dimitte nobis debita nostra. Sed nulli dimittitur peccatum sine caritate, quia, ut dicitur Proverb. X, universa delicta operit caritas. Ergo non est de necessitate caritatis diligere inimicos. Objection 1. It would seem that charity does not require us to love our enemies. For Augustine says (Enchiridion lxxiii) that "this great good," namely, the love of our enemies, is "not so universal in its application, as the object of our petition when we say: Forgive us our trespasses." Now no one is forgiven sin without he have charity, because, according to Proverbs 10:12, "charity covereth all sins." Therefore charity does not require that we should love our enemies.
IIª-IIae q. 25 a. 8 arg. 2 Praeterea, caritas non tollit naturam. Sed unaquaeque res, etiam irrationalis, naturaliter odit suum contrarium, sicut ovis lupum, et aqua ignem. Ergo caritas non facit quod inimici diligantur. Objection 2. Further, charity does not do away with nature. Now everything, even an irrational being, naturally hates its contrary, as a lamb hates a wolf, and water fire. Therefore charity does not make us love our enemies.
IIª-IIae q. 25 a. 8 arg. 3 Praeterea, caritas non agit perperam. Sed hoc videtur esse perversum quod aliquis diligat inimicos, sicut et quod aliquis odio habeat amicos, unde II Reg. XIX exprobrando dicit Ioab ad David, diligis odientes te, et odio habes diligentes te. Ergo caritas non facit ut inimici diligantur. Objection 3. Further, charity "doth nothing perversely" (1 Corinthians 13:4). Now it seems perverse to love one's enemies, as it would be to hate one's friends: hence Joab upbraided David by saying (2 Samuel 19:6): "Thou lovest them that hate thee, and thou hatest them that love thee." Therefore charity does not make us love our enemies.
IIª-IIae q. 25 a. 8 s. c. Sed contra est quod dominus dicit, Matth. V, diligite inimicos vestros. On the contrary, Our Lord said (Matthew 4:44): "Love your enemies."
IIª-IIae q. 25 a. 8 co. Respondeo dicendum quod dilectio inimicorum tripliciter potest considerari. Uno quidem modo, ut inimici diligantur inquantum sunt inimici. Et hoc est perversum et caritati repugnans, quia hoc est diligere malum alterius. Alio modo potest accipi dilectio inimicorum quantum ad naturam, sed in universali. Et sic dilectio inimicorum est de necessitate caritatis, ut scilicet aliquis diligens Deum et proximum ab illa generalitate dilectionis proximi inimicos suos non excludat. Tertio modo potest considerari dilectio inimicorum in speciali, ut scilicet aliquis in speciali moveatur motu dilectionis ad inimicum. Et istud non est de necessitate caritatis absolute, quia nec etiam moveri motu dilectionis in speciali ad quoslibet homines singulariter est de necessitate caritatis, quia hoc esset impossibile. Est tamen de necessitate caritatis secundum praeparationem animi, ut scilicet homo habeat animum paratum ad hoc quod in singulari inimicum diligeret si necessitas occurreret. Sed quod absque articulo necessitatis homo etiam hoc actu impleat ut diligat inimicum propter Deum, hoc pertinet ad perfectionem caritatis. Cum enim ex caritate diligatur proximus propter Deum, quanto aliquis magis diligit Deum, tanto etiam magis ad proximum dilectionem ostendit, nulla inimicitia impediente. Sicut si aliquis multum diligeret aliquem hominem, amore ipsius filios eius amaret etiam sibi inimicos. Et secundum hunc modum loquitur Augustinus. I answer that, Love of one's enemies may be understood in three ways. First, as though we were to love our enemies as such: this is perverse, and contrary to charity, since it implies love of that which is evil in another. Secondly love of one's enemies may mean that we love them as to their nature, but in general: and in this sense charity requires that we should love our enemies, namely, that in loving God and our neighbor, we should not exclude our enemies from the love given to our neighbor in general. Thirdly, love of one's enemies may be considered as specially directed to them, namely, that we should have a special movement of love towards our enemies. Charity does not require this absolutely, because it does not require that we should have a special movement of love to every individual man, since this would be impossible. Nevertheless charity does require this, in respect of our being prepared in mind, namely, that we should be ready to love our enemies individually, if the necessity were to occur. That man should actually do so, and love his enemy for God's sake, without it being necessary for him to do so, belongs to the perfection of charity. For since man loves his neighbor, out of charity, for God's sake, the more he loves God, the more does he put enmities aside and show love towards his neighbor: thus if we loved a certain man very much, we would love his children though they were unfriendly towards us.
IIª-IIae q. 25 a. 8 ad 1 Unde patet responsio ad primum. This is the sense in which Augustine speaks in the passage quoted in the First Objection, the Reply to which is therefore evident.
IIª-IIae q. 25 a. 8 ad 2 Ad secundum dicendum quod unaquaeque res naturaliter odio habet id quod est sibi contrarium inquantum est sibi contrarium. Inimici autem sunt nobis contrarii inquantum sunt inimici. Unde hoc debemus in eis odio habere, debet enim nobis displicere quod nobis inimici sunt. Non autem sunt nobis contrarii inquantum homines sunt et beatitudinis capaces. Et secundum hoc debemus eos diligere. Reply to Objection 2. Everything naturally hates its contrary as such. Now our enemies are contrary to us, as enemies, wherefore this itself should be hateful to us, for their enmity should displease us. They are not, however, contrary to us, as men and capable of happiness: and it is as such that we are bound to love them.
IIª-IIae q. 25 a. 8 ad 3 Ad tertium dicendum quod diligere inimicos inquantum sunt inimici, hoc est vituperabile. Et hoc non facit caritas, ut dictum est. Reply to Objection 3. It is wrong to love one's enemies as such: charity does not do this, as stated above.
IIª-IIae q. 25 a. 9 arg. 1 Ad nonum sic proceditur. Videtur quod de necessitate caritatis sit quod aliquis homo signa vel effectus dilectionis inimico exhibeat. Dicitur enim I Ioan. III, non diligamus verbo neque lingua, sed opere et veritate. Sed opere diligit aliquis exhibendo ad eum quem diligit signa et effectus dilectionis. Ergo de necessitate caritatis est ut aliquis huiusmodi signa et effectus inimicis exhibeat. Objection 1. It would seem that charity demands of a man to show his enemy the signs or effects of love. For it is written (1 John 3:18): "Let us not love in word nor in tongue, but in deed and in truth." Now a man loves in deed by showing the one he loves signs and effects of love. Therefore charity requires that a man show his enemies such signs and effects of love.
IIª-IIae q. 25 a. 9 arg. 2 Praeterea, Matth. V dominus simul dicit, diligite inimicos vestros, et, benefacite his qui oderunt vos. Sed diligere inimicos est de necessitate caritatis. Ergo et benefacere inimicis. Objection 2. Further, Our Lord said in the same breath (Matthew 5:44): "Love your enemies," and, "Do good to them that hate you." Now charity demands that we love our enemies. Therefore it demands also that we should "do good to them."
IIª-IIae q. 25 a. 9 arg. 3 Praeterea, caritate amatur non solum Deus, sed etiam proximus. Sed Gregorius dicit, in homilia Pentecostes, quod amor Dei non potest esse otiosus, magna enim operatur, si est; si desinit operari, amor non est. Ergo caritas quae habetur ad proximum non potest esse sine operationis effectu. Sed de necessitate caritatis est ut omnis proximus diligatur, etiam inimicus. Ergo de necessitate caritatis est ut etiam ad inimicos signa et effectus dilectionis extendamus. Objection 3. Further, not only God but also our neighbor is the object of charity. Now Gregory says in a homily for Pentecost (In Evang. xxx), that "love of God cannot be idle for wherever it is it does great things, and if it ceases to work, it is no longer love." Hence charity towards our neighbor cannot be without producing works. But charity requires us to love our neighbor without exception, though he be an enemy. Therefore charity requires us to show the signs and effects of love towards our enemies.
IIª-IIae q. 25 a. 9 s. c. Sed contra est quod Matth. V, super illud, benefacite his qui oderunt vos, dicit Glossa quod benefacere inimicis est cumulus perfectionis. Sed id quod pertinet ad perfectionem caritatis non est de necessitate ipsius. Ergo non est de necessitate caritatis quod aliquis signa et effectus dilectionis inimicis exhibeat. On the contrary, A gloss on Matthew 5:44, "Do good to them that hate you," says: "To do good to one's enemies is the height of perfection" [Augustine, Enchiridion lxxiii]. Now charity does not require us to do that which belongs to its perfection. Therefore charity does not require us to show the signs and effects of love to our enemies.
IIª-IIae q. 25 a. 9 co. Respondeo dicendum quod effectus et signa caritatis ex interiori dilectione procedunt et ei proportionantur. Dilectio autem interior ad inimicum in communi quidem est de necessitate praecepti absolute; in speciali autem non absolute, sed secundum praeparationem animi, ut supra dictum est. Sic igitur dicendum est de effectu vel signo dilectionis exterius exhibendo. Sunt enim quaedam beneficia vel signa dilectionis quae exhibentur proximis in communi, puta cum aliquis orat pro omnibus fidelibus vel pro toto populo, aut cum aliquod beneficium impendit aliquis toti communitati. Et talia beneficia vel dilectionis signa inimicis exhibere est de necessitate praecepti, si enim non exhiberentur inimicis, hoc pertineret ad livorem vindictae, contra id quod dicitur Levit. XIX, non quaeres ultionem; et non eris memor iniuriae civium tuorum. Alia vero sunt beneficia vel dilectionis signa quae quis exhibet particulariter aliquibus personis. Et talia beneficia vel dilectionis signa inimicis exhibere non est de necessitate salutis nisi secundum praeparationem animi, ut scilicet subveniatur eis in articulo necessitatis, secundum illud Proverb. XXV, si esurierit inimicus tuus, ciba illum, si sitit, da illi potum. Sed quod praeter articulum necessitatis huiusmodi beneficia aliquis inimicis exhibeat, pertinet ad perfectionem caritatis, per quam aliquis non solum cavet vinci a malo, quod necessitatis est, sed etiam vult in bono vincere malum, quod est etiam perfectionis, dum scilicet non solum cavet propter iniuriam sibi illatam detrahi ad odium; sed etiam propter sua beneficia inimicum intendit pertrahere ad suum amorem. I answer that, The effects and signs of charity are the result of inward love, and are in proportion with it. Now it is absolutely necessary, for the fulfilment of the precept, that we should inwardly love our enemies in general, but not individually, except as regards the mind being prepared to do so, as explained above (Article 8). We must accordingly apply this to the showing of the effects and signs of love. For some of the signs and favors of love are shown to our neighbors in general, as when we pray for all the faithful, or for a whole people, or when anyone bestows a favor on a whole community: and the fulfilment of the precept requires that we should show such like favors or signs of love towards our enemies. For if we did not so, it would be a proof of vengeful spite, and contrary to what is written (Leviticus 19:18): "Seek not revenge, nor be mindful of the injury of thy citizens." But there are other favors or signs of love, which one shows to certain persons in particular: and it is not necessary for salvation that we show our enemies such like favors and signs of love, except as regards being ready in our minds, for instance to come to their assistance in a case of urgency, according to Proverbs 25:21: "If thy enemy be hungry, give him to eat; if he thirst, give him . . . drink." Outside cases of urgency, to show such like favors to an enemy belongs to the perfection of charity, whereby we not only beware, as in duty bound, of being overcome by evil, but also wish to overcome evil by good [Romans 12:21, which belongs to perfection: for then we not only beware of being drawn into hatred on account of the hurt done to us, but purpose to induce our enemy to love us on account of our kindliness.
IIª-IIae q. 25 a. 9 ad arg. Et per hoc patet responsio ad obiecta. This suffices for the Replies to the Objections.
IIª-IIae q. 25 a. 10 arg. 1 Ad decimum sic proceditur. Videtur quod Angelos non debeamus ex caritate diligere. Ut enim Augustinus dicit, in libro de Doct. Christ., gemina est dilectio caritatis, scilicet Dei et proximi. Sed dilectio Angelorum non continetur sub dilectione Dei, cum sint substantiae creatae, nec etiam videtur contineri sub dilectione proximi, cum non communicent nobiscum in specie. Ergo Angeli non sunt ex caritate diligendi. Objection 1. It would seem that we are not bound to love the angels out of charity. For, as Augustine says (De Doctr. Christ. i), charity is a twofold love: the love of God and of our neighbor. Now love of the angels is not contained in the love of God, since they are created substances; nor is it, seemingly, contained in the love of our neighbor, since they do not belong with us to a common species. Therefore we are not bound to love them out of charity.
IIª-IIae q. 25 a. 10 arg. 2 Praeterea, magis conveniunt nobiscum bruta animalia quam Angeli, nam nos et bruta animalia sumus in eodem genere propinquo. Sed ad bruta animalia non habemus caritatem, ut supra dictum est. Ergo etiam neque ad Angelos. Objection 2. Further, dumb animals have more in common with us than the angels have, since they belong to the same proximate genus as we do. But we have not charity towards dumb animals, as stated above (Article 3). Neither, therefore, have we towards the angels.
IIª-IIae q. 25 a. 10 arg. 3 Praeterea, nihil est ita proprium amicorum sicut convivere, ut dicitur in VIII Ethic. Sed Angeli non convivunt nobiscum, nec etiam eos videre possumus. Ergo ad eos caritatis amicitiam habere non valemus. Objection 3. Further, nothing is so proper to friends as companionship with one another (Ethic. viii, 5). But the angels are not our companions; we cannot even see them. Therefore we are unable to give them the friendship of charity.
IIª-IIae q. 25 a. 10 s. c. Sed contra est quod Augustinus dicit, in I de Doct. Christ., iam vero si vel cui praebendum, vel a quo nobis praebendum est officium misericordiae, recte proximus dicitur; manifestum est praecepto quo iubemur diligere proximum, etiam sanctos Angelos contineri, a quibus multa nobis misericordiae impenduntur officia. On the contrary, Augustine says (De Doctr. Christ. i, 30): "If the name of neighbor is given either to those whom we pity, or to those who pity us, it is evident that the precept binding us to love our neighbor includes also the holy angels from whom we receive many merciful favors."
IIª-IIae q. 25 a. 10 co. Respondeo dicendum quod amicitia caritatis, sicut supra dictum est, fundatur super communicatione beatitudinis aeternae, in cuius participatione communicant cum Angelis homines, dicitur enim Matth. XXII quod in resurrectione erunt homines sicut Angeli in caelo. Et ideo manifestum est quod amicitia caritatis etiam ad Angelos se extendit. I answer that, As stated above (Question 23, Article 1), the friendship of charity is founded upon the fellowship of everlasting happiness, in which men share in common with the angels. For it is written (Matthew 22:30) that "in the resurrection . . . men shall be as the angels of God in heaven." It is therefore evident that the friendship of charity extends also to the angels.
IIª-IIae q. 25 a. 10 ad 1 Ad primum ergo dicendum quod proximus non solum dicitur communicatione speciei, sed etiam communicatione beneficiorum pertinentium ad vitam aeternam; super qua communicatione amicitia caritatis fundatur. Reply to Objection 1. Our neighbor is not only one who is united to us in a common species, but also one who is united to us by sharing in the blessings pertaining to everlasting life, and it is on the latter fellowship that the friendship of charity is founded.
IIª-IIae q. 25 a. 10 ad 2 Ad secundum dicendum quod bruta animalia conveniunt nobiscum in genere propinquo ratione naturae sensitivae, secundum quam non sumus participes aeternae beatitudinis, sed secundum mentem rationalem; in qua communicamus cum Angelis. Reply to Objection 2. Dumb animals are united to us in the proximate genus, by reason of their sensitive nature; whereas we are partakers of everlasting happiness, by reason not of our sensitive nature but of our rational mind wherein we associate with the angels.
IIª-IIae q. 25 a. 10 ad 3 Ad tertium dicendum quod Angeli non convivunt nobis exteriori conversatione, quae nobis est secundum sensitivam naturam. Convivimus tamen Angelis secundum mentem, imperfecte quidem in hac vita, perfecte autem in patria, sicut et supra dictum est. Reply to Objection 3. The companionship of the angels does not consist in outward fellowship, which we have in respect of our sensitive nature; it consists in a fellowship of the mind, imperfect indeed in this life, but perfect in heaven, as stated above (23, 1, ad 1).
IIª-IIae q. 25 a. 11 arg. 1 Ad undecimum sic proceditur. Videtur quod Daemones ex caritate debeamus diligere. Angeli enim sunt nobis proximi inquantum communicamus cum eis in rationali mente. Sed etiam Daemones sic nobiscum communicant, quia data naturalia in eis manent integra, scilicet esse, vivere et intelligere, ut dicitur in IV cap. de Div. Nom. Ergo debemus Daemones ex caritate diligere. Objection 1. It would seem that we ought to love the demons out of charity. For the angels are our neighbors by reason of their fellowship with us in a rational mind. But the demons also share in our fellowship thus, since natural gifts, such as life and understanding, remain in them unimpaired, as Dionysius states (Div. Nom. iv). Therefore we ought to love the demons out of charity.
IIª-IIae q. 25 a. 11 arg. 2 Praeterea, Daemones differunt a beatis Angelis differentia peccati, sicut et peccatores homines a iustis. Sed iusti homines ex caritate diligunt peccatores. Ergo etiam ex caritate debent diligere Daemones. Objection 2. Further, the demons differ from the blessed angels in the matter of sin, even as sinners from just men. Now the just man loves the sinner out of charity. Therefore he ought to love the demons also out of charity.
IIª-IIae q. 25 a. 11 arg. 3 Praeterea, illi a quibus beneficia nobis impenduntur debent a nobis ex caritate diligi tanquam proximi, sicut patet ex auctoritate Augustini supra inducta. Sed Daemones nobis in multis sunt utiles, dum nos tentando nobis coronas fabricant, sicut Augustinus dicit, XI de Civ. Dei. Ergo Daemones sunt ex caritate diligendi. Objection 3. Further, we ought, out of charity, to love, as being our neighbors, those from whom we receive favors, as appears from the passage of Augustine quoted above (Article 9). Now the demons are useful to us in many things, for "by tempting us they work crowns for us," as Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xi, 17). Therefore we ought to love the demons out of charity.
IIª-IIae q. 25 a. 11 s. c. Sed contra est quod dicitur Isaiae XXVIII, delebitur foedus vestrum cum morte, et pactum vestrum cum Inferno non stabit. Sed perfectio pacis et foederis est per caritatem. Ergo ad Daemones, qui sunt Inferni incolae et mortis procuratores, caritatem habere non debemus. On the contrary, It is written (Isaiah 28:18): "Your league with death shall be abolished, and your covenant with hell shall not stand." Now the perfection of a peace and covenant is through charity. Therefore we ought not to have charity for the demons who live in hell and compass death.
IIª-IIae q. 25 a. 11 co. Respondeo dicendum quod, sicut supra dictum est, in peccatoribus ex caritate debemus diligere naturam, peccatum odire. In nomine autem Daemonis significatur natura peccato deformata. Et ideo Daemones ex caritate non sunt diligendi. Et si non fiat vis in nomine, et quaestio referatur ad illos spiritus qui Daemones dicuntur, utrum sint ex caritate diligendi, respondendum est, secundum praemissa, quod aliquid ex caritate diligitur dupliciter. Uno modo, sicut ad quem amicitia habetur. Et sic ad illos spiritus caritatis amicitiam habere non possumus. Pertinet enim ad rationem amicitiae ut amicis nostris bonum velimus. Illud autem bonum vitae aeternae quod respicit caritas, spiritibus illis a Deo aeternaliter damnatis ex caritate velle non possumus, hoc enim repugnaret caritati Dei, per quam eius iustitiam approbamus. Alio modo diligitur aliquid sicut quod volumus permanere ut bonum alterius, per quem modum ex caritate diligimus irrationales creaturas, inquantum volumus eas permanere ad gloriam Dei et utilitatem hominum, ut supra dictum est. Et per hunc modum et naturam Daemonum etiam ex caritate diligere possumus, inquantum scilicet volumus illos spiritus in suis naturalibus conservari ad gloriam Dei. I answer that, As stated above (Article 6), in the sinner, we are bound, out of charity, to love his nature, but to hate his sin. But the name of demon is given to designate a nature deformed by sin, wherefore demons should not be loved out of charity. Without however laying stress on the word, the question as to whether the spirits called demons ought to be loved out of charity, must be answered in accordance with the statement made above (A2,3), that a thing may be loved out of charity in two ways. First, a thing may be loved as the person who is the object of friendship, and thus we cannot have the friendship of charity towards the demons. For it is an essential part of friendship that one should be a well-wisher towards one's friend; and it is impossible for us, out of charity, to desire the good of everlasting life, to which charity is referred, for those spirits whom God has condemned eternally, since this would be in opposition to our charity towards God whereby we approve of His justice. Secondly, we love a thing as being that which we desire to be enduring as another's good. On this way we love irrational creatures out of charity, in as much as we wish them to endure, to give glory to God and be useful to man, as stated above (Article 3): and in this way too we can love the nature of the demons even out of charity, in as much as we desire those spirits to endure, as to their natural gifts, unto God's glory.
IIª-IIae q. 25 a. 11 ad 1 Ad primum ergo dicendum quod mens Angelorum non habet impossibilitatem ad aeternam beatitudinem habendam, sicut habet mens Daemonum. Et ideo amicitia caritatis, quae fundatur super communicatione vitae aeternae magis quam super communicatione naturae, habetur ad Angelos, non autem ad Daemones. Reply to Objection 1. The possession of everlasting happiness is not impossible for the angelic mind as it is for the mind of a demon; consequently the friendship of charity which is based on the fellowship of everlasting life, rather than on the fellowship of nature, is possible towards the angels, but not towards the demons.
IIª-IIae q. 25 a. 11 ad 2 Ad secundum dicendum quod homines peccatores in hac vita habent possibilitatem perveniendi ad beatitudinem aeternam. Quod non habent illi qui sunt in Inferno damnati; de quibus, quantum ad hoc, est eadem ratio sicut et de Daemonibus. Reply to Objection 2. In this life, men who are in sin retain the possibility of obtaining everlasting happiness: not so those who are lost in hell, who, in this respect, are in the same case as the demons.
IIª-IIae q. 25 a. 11 ad 3 Ad tertium dicendum quod utilitas quae nobis ex Daemonibus provenit non est ex eorum intentione, sed ex ordinatione divinae providentiae. Et ideo ex hoc non inducimur ad habendum amicitiam eorum, sed ad hoc quod simus Deo amici, qui eorum perversam intentionem convertit in nostram utilitatem. Reply to Objection 3. That the demons are useful to us is due not to their intention but to the ordering of Divine providence; hence this leads us to be friends, not with them, but with God, Who turns their perverse intention to our profit.
IIª-IIae q. 25 a. 12 arg. 1 Ad duodecimum sic proceditur. Videtur quod inconvenienter enumerentur quatuor ex caritate diligenda, scilicet Deus, proximus, corpus nostrum et nos ipsi. Ut enim Augustinus dicit, super Ioan., qui non diligit Deum, nec seipsum diligit. In Dei ergo dilectione includitur dilectio sui ipsius. Non ergo est alia dilectio sui ipsius, et alia dilectio Dei. Objection 1. It would seem that these four things are not rightly reckoned as to be loved out of charity, to wit: God, our neighbor, our body, and ourselves. For, as Augustine states (Tract. super Joan. lxxxiii), "he that loveth not God, loveth not himself." Hence love of oneself is included in the love of God. Therefore love of oneself is not distinct from the love of God.
IIª-IIae q. 25 a. 12 arg. 2 Praeterea, pars non debet dividi contra totum. Sed corpus nostrum est quaedam pars nostri. Non ergo debet dividi, quasi aliud diligibile, corpus nostrum a nobis ipsis. Objection 2. Further, a part ought not to be condivided with the whole. But our body is part of ourselves. Therefore it ought not to be condivided with ourselves as a distinct object of love.
IIª-IIae q. 25 a. 12 arg. 3 Praeterea, sicut nos habemus corpus, ita etiam et proximus. Sicut ergo dilectio qua quis diligit proximum, distinguitur a dilectione qua quis diligit seipsum; ita dilectio qua quis diligit corpus proximi, debet distingui a dilectione qua quis diligit corpus suum. Non ergo convenienter distinguuntur quatuor ex caritate diligenda. Objection 3. Further, just as a man has a body, so has his neighbor. Since then the love with which a man loves his neighbor, is distinct from the love with which a man loves himself, so the love with which a man loves his neighbor's body, ought to be distinct from the love with which he loves his own body. Therefore these four things are not rightly distinguished as objects to be loved out of charity.
IIª-IIae q. 25 a. 12 s. c. Sed contra est quod Augustinus dicit, in I de Doct. Christ., quatuor sunt diligenda, unum quod supra nos est, scilicet Deus; alterum quod nos sumus; tertium quod iuxta nos est, scilicet proximus; quartum quod infra nos est, scilicet proprium corpus. On the contrary, Augustine says (De Doctr. Christ. i, 23): "There are four things to be loved; one which is above us," namely God, "another, which is ourselves, a third which is nigh to us," namely our neighbor, "and a fourth which is beneath us," namely our own body.
IIª-IIae q. 25 a. 12 co. Respondeo dicendum quod, sicut dictum est, amicitia caritatis super communicatione beatitudinis fundatur. In qua quidem communicatione unum quidem est quod consideratur ut principium influens beatitudinem, scilicet Deus; aliud est beatitudinem directe participans, scilicet homo et Angelus; tertium autem est id ad quod per quandam redundantiam beatitudo derivatur, scilicet corpus humanum. Id quidem quod est beatitudinem influens est ea ratione diligibile quia est beatitudinis causa. Id autem quod est beatitudinem participans potest esse duplici ratione diligibile, vel quia est unum nobiscum; vel quia est nobis consociatum in beatitudinis participatione. Et secundum hoc sumuntur duo ex caritate diligibilia, prout scilicet homo diligit et seipsum et proximum. I answer that, As stated above (23, 1,5), the friendship of charity is based on the fellowship of happiness. Now, in this fellowship, one thing is considered as the principle from which happiness flows, namely God; a second is that which directly partakes of happiness, namely men and angels; a third is a thing to which happiness comes by a kind of overflow, namely the human body. Now the source from which happiness flows is lovable by reason of its being the cause of happiness: that which is a partaker of happiness, can be an object of love for two reasons, either through being identified with ourselves, or through being associated with us in partaking of happiness, and in this respect, there are two things to be loved out of charity, in as much as man loves both himself and his neighbor.
IIª-IIae q. 25 a. 12 ad 1 Ad primum ergo dicendum quod diversa habitudo diligentis ad diversa diligibilia facit diversam rationem diligibilitatis. Et secundum hoc, quia alia est habitudo hominis diligentis ad Deum et ad seipsum, propter hoc ponuntur duo diligibilia, cum dilectio unius sit causa dilectionis alterius. Unde, ea remota, alia removetur. Reply to Objection 1. The different relations between a lover and the various things loved make a different kind of lovableness. Accordingly, since the relation between the human lover and God is different from his relation to himself, these two are reckoned as distinct objects of love, for the love of the one is the cause of the love of the other, so that the former love being removed the latter is taken away.
IIª-IIae q. 25 a. 12 ad 2 Ad secundum dicendum quod subiectum caritatis est mens rationalis quae potest beatitudinis esse capax, ad quam corpus directe non attingit, sed solum per quandam redundantiam. Et ideo homo secundum rationalem mentem, quae est principalis in homine, alio modo se diligit secundum caritatem, et alio modo corpus proprium. Reply to Objection 2. The subject of charity is the rational mind that can be capable of obtaining happiness, to which the body does not reach directly, but only by a kind of overflow. Hence, by his reasonable mind which holds the first place in him, man, out of charity, loves himself in one way, and his own body in another.
IIª-IIae q. 25 a. 12 ad 3 Ad tertium dicendum quod homo diligit proximum et secundum animam et secundum corpus ratione cuiusdam consociationis in beatitudine. Et ideo ex parte proximi est una tantum ratio dilectionis. Unde corpus proximi non ponitur speciale diligibile. Reply to Objection 3. Man loves his neighbor, both as to his soul and as to his body, by reason of a certain fellowship in happiness. Wherefore, on the part of his neighbor, there is only one reason for loving him; and our neighbor's body is not reckoned as a special object of love.

Notes

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