Authors/Thomas Aquinas/Summa Theologiae/Part IIb/Q24

From The Logic Museum

Jump to: navigation, search
Q23 Q25



Latin English
IIª-IIae q. 24 pr. Deinde considerandum est de caritate in comparatione ad subiectum. Et circa hoc quaeruntur duodecim. Primo, utrum caritas sit in voluntate tanquam in subiecto. Secundo, utrum caritas causetur in homine ex actibus praecedentibus, vel ex infusione divina. Tertio, utrum infundatur secundum capacitatem naturalium. Quarto, utrum augeatur in habente ipsam. Quinto, utrum augeatur per additionem. Sexto, utrum quolibet actu augeatur. Septimo, utrum augeatur in infinitum. Octavo, utrum caritas viae possit esse perfecta. Nono, de diversis gradibus caritatis. Decimo, utrum caritas possit diminui. Undecimo, utrum caritas semel habita possit amitti. Duodecimo, utrum amittatur per unum actum peccati mortalis. Question 24. The subject of charity Is charity in the will as its subject? Is charity caused in man by preceding acts or by a Divine infusion? Is it infused according to the capacity of our natural gifts? Does it increase in the person who has it? Does it increase by addition? Does it increase by every act? Does it increase indefinitely? Can the charity of a wayfarer be perfect? The various degrees of charity Can charity diminish? Can charity be lost after it has been possessed? Is it lost through one mortal sin?
IIª-IIae q. 24 a. 1 arg. 1 Ad primum sic proceditur. Videtur quod voluntas non sit subiectum caritatis. Caritas enim amor quidam est. Sed amor, secundum philosophum, est in concupiscibili. Ergo et caritas est in concupiscibili, et non in voluntate. Objection 1. It would seem that the will is not the subject of charity. For charity is a kind of love. Now, according to the Philosopher (Topic. ii, 3) love is in the concupiscible part. Therefore charity is also in the concupiscible and not in the will.
IIª-IIae q. 24 a. 1 arg. 2 Praeterea, caritas est principalissima virtutum, ut supra dictum est. Sed subiectum virtutis est ratio. Ergo videtur quod caritas sit in ratione, et non in voluntate. Objection 2. Further, charity is the foremost of the virtues, as stated above (Question 23, Article 6). But the reason is the subject of virtue. Therefore it seems that charity is in the reason and not in the will.
IIª-IIae q. 24 a. 1 arg. 3 Praeterea, caritas se extendit ad omnes actus humanos, secundum illud I ad Cor. ult., omnia vestra in caritate fiant. Sed principium humanorum actuum est liberum arbitrium. Ergo videtur quod caritas maxime sit in libero arbitrio sicut in subiecto, et non in voluntate. Objection 3. Further, charity extends to all human acts, according to 1 Corinthians 16:14: "Let all your things be done in charity." Now the principle of human acts is the free-will. Therefore it seems that charity is chiefly in the free-will as its subject and not in the will.
IIª-IIae q. 24 a. 1 s. c. Sed contra est quod obiectum caritatis est bonum, quod etiam est obiectum voluntatis. Ergo caritas est in voluntate sicut in subiecto. On the contrary, The object of charity is the good, which is also the object of the will. Therefore charity is in the will as its subject.
IIª-IIae q. 24 a. 1 co. Respondeo dicendum quod, cum duplex sit appetitus, scilicet sensitivus et intellectivus, qui dicitur voluntas, ut in primo habitum est; utriusque obiectum est bonum, sed diversimode. Nam obiectum appetitus sensitivi est bonum per sensum apprehensum, obiectum vero appetitus intellectivi, vel voluntatis, est bonum sub communi ratione boni, prout est apprehensibile ab intellectu. Caritatis autem obiectum non est aliquod bonum sensibile, sed bonum divinum, quod solo intellectu cognoscitur. Et ideo caritatis subiectum non est appetitus sensitivus, sed appetitus intellectivus, idest voluntas. I answer that, Since, as stated in I, 80, 2, the appetite is twofold, namely the sensitive, and the intellective which is called the will, the object of each is the good, but in different ways: for the object of the sensitive appetite is a good apprehended by sense, whereas the object of the intellective appetite or will is good under the universal aspect of good, according as it can be apprehended by the intellect. Now the object of charity is not a sensible good, but the Divine good which is known by the intellect alone. Therefore the subject of charity is not the sensitive, but the intellective appetite, i.e. the will.
IIª-IIae q. 24 a. 1 ad 1 Ad primum ergo dicendum quod concupiscibilis est pars appetitus sensitivi, non autem appetitus intellectivi, ut in primo ostensum est. Unde amor qui est in concupiscibili est amor sensitivi boni. Ad bonum autem divinum, quod est intelligibile, concupiscibilis se extendere non potest, sed sola voluntas. Et ideo concupiscibilis subiectum caritatis esse non potest. Reply to Objection 1. The concupiscible is a part of the sensitive, not of the intellective appetite, as proved in I, 81, 2: wherefore the love which is in the concupiscible, is the love of sensible good: nor can the concupiscible reach to the Divine good which is an intelligible good; the will alone can. Consequently the concupiscible cannot be the subject of charity.
IIª-IIae q. 24 a. 1 ad 2 Ad secundum dicendum quod voluntas etiam, secundum philosophum, in III de anima, in ratione est. Et ideo per hoc quod caritas est in voluntate non est aliena a ratione. Tamen ratio non est regula caritatis, sicut humanarum virtutum, sed regulatur a Dei sapientia, et excedit regulam rationis humanae, secundum illud Ephes. III, supereminentem scientiae caritatem Christi. Unde non est in ratione neque sicut in subiecto, sicut prudentia; neque sicut in regulante, sicut iustitia vel temperantia; sed solum per quandam affinitatem voluntatis ad rationem. Reply to Objection 2. According to the Philosopher (De Anima iii, 9), the will also is in the reason: wherefore charity is not excluded from the reason through being in the will. Yet charity is regulated, not by the reason, as human virtues are, but by God's wisdom, and transcends the rule of human reason, according to Ephesians 3:19: "The charity of Christ, which surpasseth all knowledge." Hence it is not in the reason, either as its subject, like prudence is, or as its rule, like justice and temperance are, but only by a certain kinship of the will to the reason.
IIª-IIae q. 24 a. 1 ad 3 Ad tertium dicendum quod liberum arbitrium non est alia potentia a voluntate, ut in primo dictum est. Et tamen caritas non est in voluntate secundum rationem liberi arbitrii, cuius actus est eligere, electio enim est eorum quae sunt ad finem, voluntas autem est ipsius finis, ut dicitur in III Ethic. Unde caritas, cuius obiectum est finis ultimus, magis debet dici esse in voluntate quam in libero arbitrio. Reply to Objection 3. As stated in I, 83, 4, the free-will is not a distinct power from the will. Yet charity is not in the will considered as free-will, the act of which is to choose. For choice is of things directed to the end, whereas the will is of the end itself (Ethic. iii, 2). Hence charity, whose object is the last end, should be described as residing in the will rather than in the free-will.
IIª-IIae q. 24 a. 2 arg. 1 Ad secundum sic proceditur. Videtur quod caritas non causetur in nobis ex infusione. Illud enim quod est commune omnibus creaturis, naturaliter hominibus inest. Sed sicut Dionysius dicit, in IV cap. de Div. Nom., omnibus diligibile et amabile est bonum divinum, quod est obiectum caritatis. Ergo caritas inest nobis naturaliter, et non ex infusione. Objection 1. It would seem that charity is not caused in us by infusion. For that which is common to all creatures, is in man naturally. Now, according to Dionysius (Div. Nom. iv), the "Divine good", which is the object of charity, "is for all an object of dilection and love." Therefore charity is in us naturally, and not by infusion.
IIª-IIae q. 24 a. 2 arg. 2 Praeterea, quanto aliquid est magis diligibile, tanto facilius diligi potest. Sed Deus est maxime diligibilis, cum sit summe bonus. Ergo facilius est ipsum diligere quam alia. Sed ad alia diligenda non indigemus aliquo habitu infuso. Ergo nec etiam ad diligendum Deum. Objection 2. Further, the more lovable a thing is the easier it is to love it. Now God is supremely lovable, since He is supremely good. Therefore it is easier to love Him than other things. But we need no infused habit in order to love other things. Neither, therefore, do we need one in order to love God.
IIª-IIae q. 24 a. 2 arg. 3 Praeterea, apostolus dicit, I ad Tim. I, finis praecepti est caritas de corde bono et conscientia pura et fide non ficta. Sed haec tria pertinent ad actus humanos. Ergo caritas causatur in nobis ex actibus praecedentibus, et non ex infusione. Objection 3. Further, the Apostle says (1 Timothy 1:5): "The end of the commandment is charity from a pure heart, and a good conscience, and an unfeigned faith." Now these three have reference to human acts. Therefore charity is caused in us from preceding acts, and not from infusion.
IIª-IIae q. 24 a. 2 s. c. Sed contra est quod apostolus dicit, Rom. V, caritas Dei diffusa est in cordibus nostris per spiritum sanctum, qui datus est nobis. On the contrary, The Apostle says (Romans 5:5): "The charity of God is poured forth in our hearts by the Holy Ghost, Who is given to us."
IIª-IIae q. 24 a. 2 co. Respondeo dicendum quod, sicut dictum est, caritas est amicitia quaedam hominis ad Deum fundata super communicationem beatitudinis aeternae. Haec autem communicatio non est secundum bona naturalia, sed secundum dona gratuita, quia, ut dicitur Rom. VI, gratia Dei vita aeterna. Unde et ipsa caritas facultatem naturae excedit. Quod autem excedit naturae facultatem non potest esse neque naturale neque per potentias naturales acquisitum, quia effectus naturalis non transcendit suam causam. Unde caritas non potest neque naturaliter nobis inesse, neque per vires naturales est acquisita, sed per infusionem spiritus sancti, qui est amor patris et filii, cuius participatio in nobis est ipsa caritas creata, sicut supra dictum est. I answer that, As stated above (Question 23, Article 1), charity is a friendship of man for God, founded upon the fellowship of everlasting happiness. Now this fellowship is in respect, not of natural, but of gratuitous gifts, for, according to Romans 6:23, "the grace of God is life everlasting": wherefore charity itself surpasses our natural facilities. Now that which surpasses the faculty of nature, cannot be natural or acquired by the natural powers, since a natural effect does not transcend its cause. Therefore charity can be in us neither naturally, nor through acquisition by the natural powers, but by the infusion of the Holy Ghost, Who is the love of the Father and the Son, and the participation of Whom in us is created charity, as stated above (Question 23, Article 2).
IIª-IIae q. 24 a. 2 ad 1 Ad primum ergo dicendum quod Dionysius loquitur de dilectione Dei quae fundatur super communicatione naturalium bonorum, et ideo naturaliter omnibus inest. Sed caritas fundatur super quadam communicatione supernaturali. Unde non est similis ratio. Reply to Objection 1. Dionysius is speaking of the love of God, which is founded on the fellowship of natural goods, wherefore it is in all naturally. On the other hand, charity is founded on a supernatural fellowship, so the comparison fails.
IIª-IIae q. 24 a. 2 ad 2 Ad secundum dicendum quod sicut Deus secundum se est maxime cognoscibilis, non tamen nobis, propter defectum nostrae cognitionis, quae dependet a rebus sensibilibus; ita etiam Deus in se est maxime diligibilis inquantum est obiectum beatitudinis, sed hoc modo non est maxime diligibilis a nobis, propter inclinationem affectus nostri ad visibilia bona. Unde oportet quod ad Deum hoc modo maxime diligendum nostris cordibus caritas infundatur. Reply to Objection 2. Just as God is supremely knowable in Himself yet not to us, on account of a defect in our knowledge which depends on sensible things, so too, God is supremely lovable in Himself, in as much as He is the object of happiness. But He is not supremely lovable to us in this way, on account of the inclination of our appetite towards visible goods. Hence it is evident that for us to love God above all things in this way, it is necessary that charity be infused into our hearts.
IIª-IIae q. 24 a. 2 ad 3 Ad tertium dicendum quod cum caritas dicitur in nobis procedere ex corde bono et conscientia pura et fide non ficta, hoc referendum est ad actum caritatis, qui ex praemissis excitatur. Vel etiam hoc dicitur quia huiusmodi actus disponunt hominem ad recipiendum caritatis infusionem. Et similiter etiam dicendum est de eo quod Augustinus dicit, quod timor introducit caritatem, et de hoc quod dicitur in Glossa Matth. I, quod fides generat spem, et spes caritatem. Reply to Objection 3. When it is said that in us charity proceeds from "a pure heart, and a good conscience, and an unfeigned faith," this must be referred to the act of charity which is aroused by these things. Or again, this is said because the aforesaid acts dispose man to receive the infusion of charity. The same remark applies to the saying of Augustine (Tract. ix in prim. canon. Joan.): "Fear leads to charity," and of a gloss on Matthew 1:2: "Faith begets hope, and hope charity."
IIª-IIae q. 24 a. 3 arg. 1 Ad tertium sic proceditur. Videtur quod caritas infundatur secundum quantitatem naturalium. Dicitur enim Matth. XXV quod dedit unicuique secundum propriam virtutem. Sed caritatem nulla virtus praecedit in homine nisi naturalis, quia sine caritate nulla est virtus, ut dictum est. Ergo secundum capacitatem virtutis naturalis infunditur homini caritas a Deo. Objection 1. It would seem that charity is infused according to the capacity of our natural gifts. For it is written (Matthew 25:15) that "He gave to every one according to his own virtue [Douay: 'proper ability']." Now, in man, none but natural virtue precedes charity, since there is no virtue without charity, as stated above (Question 23, Article 7). Therefore God infuses charity into man according to the measure of his natural virtue.
IIª-IIae q. 24 a. 3 arg. 2 Praeterea, omnium ordinatorum ad invicem secundum proportionatur primo, sicut videmus quod in rebus materialibus forma proportionatur materiae, et in donis gratuitis gloria proportionatur gratiae. Sed caritas, cum sit perfectio naturae, comparatur ad capacitatem naturalem sicut secundum ad primum. Ergo videtur quod caritas infundatur secundum naturalium capacitatem. Objection 2. Further, among things ordained towards one another, the second is proportionate to the first: thus we find in natural things that the form is proportionate to the matter, and in gratuitous gifts, that glory is proportionate to grace. Now, since charity is a perfection of nature, it is compared to the capacity of nature as second to first. Therefore it seems that charity is infused according to the capacity of nature.
IIª-IIae q. 24 a. 3 arg. 3 Praeterea, homines et Angeli secundum eandem rationem caritatem participant, quia in utrisque est similis beatitudinis ratio, ut habetur Matth. XXII, et Luc. XX. Sed in Angelis caritas et alia dona gratuita sunt data secundum capacitatem naturalium; ut Magister dicit, III dist. II Lib. Sent. Ergo idem etiam videtur esse in hominibus. Objection 3. Further, men and angels partake of happiness according to the same measure, since happiness is alike in both, according to Matthew 22:30 and Luke 20:36. Now charity and other gratuitous gifts are bestowed on the angels, according to their natural capacity, as the Master teaches (Sent. ii, D, 3). Therefore the same apparently applies to man.
IIª-IIae q. 24 a. 3 s. c. Sed contra est quod dicitur Ioan. III, spiritus ubi vult spirat; et I ad Cor. XII, haec omnia operatur unus et idem spiritus, dividens singulis prout vult. Ergo caritas datur non secundum capacitatem naturalium, sed secundum voluntatem spiritus sua dona distribuentis. On the contrary, It is written (John 3:8): "The Spirit breatheth where He will," and (1 Corinthians 12:11): "All these things one and the same Spirit worketh, dividing to every one according as He will." Therefore charity is given, not according to our natural capacity, but according as the Spirit wills to distribute His gifts.
IIª-IIae q. 24 a. 3 co. Respondeo dicendum quod uniuscuiusque quantitas dependet a propria causa rei, quia universalior causa effectum maiorem producit. Caritas autem, cum superexcedat proportionem naturae humanae, ut dictum est, non dependet ex aliqua naturali virtute, sed ex sola gratia spiritus sancti eam infundentis. Et ideo quantitas caritatis non dependet ex conditione naturae vel ex capacitate naturalis virtutis, sed solum ex voluntate spiritus sancti distribuentis sua dona prout vult. Unde et apostolus dicit, ad Ephes. IV, unicuique nostrum data est gratia secundum mensuram donationis Christi. I answer that, The quantity of a thing depends on the proper cause of that thing, since the more universal cause produces a greater effect. Now, since charity surpasses the proportion of human nature, as stated above (Article 2) it depends, not on any natural virtue, but on the sole grace of the Holy Ghost Who infuses charity. Wherefore the quantity of charity depends neither on the condition of nature nor on the capacity of natural virtue, but only on the will of the Holy Ghost Who "divides" His gifts "according as He will." Hence the Apostle says (Ephesians 4:7): "To every one of us is given grace according to the measure of the giving of Christ."
IIª-IIae q. 24 a. 3 ad 1 Ad primum ergo dicendum quod illa virtus secundum quam sua dona Deus dat unicuique, est dispositio vel praeparatio praecedens, sive conatus gratiam accipientis. Sed hanc etiam dispositionem vel conatum praevenit spiritus sanctus, movens mentem hominis vel plus vel minus secundum suam voluntatem. Unde et apostolus dicit, ad Coloss. I, qui dignos nos fecit in partem sortis sanctorum in lumine. Reply to Objection 1. The virtue in accordance with which God gives His gifts to each one, is a disposition or previous preparation or effort of the one who receives grace. But the Holy Ghost forestalls even this disposition or effort, by moving man's mind either more or less, according as He will. Wherefore the Apostle says (Colossians 1:12): "Who hath made us worthy to be partakers of the lot of the saints in light."
IIª-IIae q. 24 a. 3 ad 2 Ad secundum dicendum quod forma non excedit proportionem materiae, sed sunt eiusdem generis. Similiter etiam gratia et gloria ad idem genus referuntur, quia gratia nihil est aliud quam quaedam inchoatio gloriae in nobis. Sed caritas et natura non pertinent ad idem genus. Et ideo non est similis ratio. Reply to Objection 2. The form does not surpass the proportion of the matter. On like manner grace and glory are referred to the same genus, for grace is nothing else than a beginning of glory in us. But charity and nature do not belong to the same genus, so that the comparison fails.
IIª-IIae q. 24 a. 3 ad 3 Ad tertium dicendum quod Angelus est naturae intellectualis, et secundum suam conditionem competit ei ut totaliter feratur in omne id in quod fertur, ut in primo habitum est. Et ideo in superioribus Angelis fuit maior conatus et ad bonum in perseverantibus et ad malum in cadentibus. Et ideo superiorum Angelorum persistentes facti sunt meliores et cadentes facti sunt peiores aliis. Sed homo est rationalis naturae, cui competit esse quandoque in potentia et quandoque in actu. Et ideo non oportet quod feratur totaliter in id in quod fertur; sed eius qui habet meliora naturalia potest esse minor conatus, et e converso. Et ideo non est simile. Reply to Objection 3. The angel's is an intellectual nature, and it is consistent with his condition that he should be borne wholly whithersoever he is borne, as stated in I, 61, 6. Hence there was a greater effort in the higher angels, both for good in those who persevered, and for evil in those who fell, and consequently those of the higher angels who remained steadfast became better than the others, and those who fell became worse. But man's is a rational nature, with which it is consistent to be sometimes in potentiality and sometimes in act: so that it is not necessarily borne wholly whithersoever it is borne, and where there are greater natural gifts there may be less effort, and vice versa. Thus the comparison fails.
IIª-IIae q. 24 a. 4 arg. 1 Ad quartum sic proceditur. Videtur quod caritas augeri non possit. Nihil enim augetur nisi quantum. Duplex autem est quantitas, scilicet dimensiva, et virtualis. Quarum prima caritati non convenit, cum sit quaedam spiritualis perfectio. Virtualis autem quantitas attenditur secundum obiecta, secundum quae caritas non crescit, quia minima caritas diligit omnia quae sunt ex caritate diligenda. Ergo caritas non augetur. Objection 1. It would seem that charity cannot increase. For nothing increases save what has quantity. Now quantity is twofold, namely dimensive and virtual. The former does not befit charity which is a spiritual perfection, while virtual quantity regards the objects in respect of which charity does not increase, since the slightest charity loves all that is to be loved out of charity. Therefore charity does not increase.
IIª-IIae q. 24 a. 4 arg. 2 Praeterea, illud quod est in termino non recipit augmentum. Sed caritas est in termino, quasi maxima virtutum existens et summus amor optimi boni. Ergo caritas augeri non potest. Objection 2. Further, that which consists in something extreme receives no increase. But charity consists in something extreme, being the greatest of the virtues, and the supreme love of the greatest good. Therefore charity cannot increase.
IIª-IIae q. 24 a. 4 arg. 3 Praeterea, augmentum quidam motus est. Ergo quod augetur movetur. Quod ergo augetur essentialiter movetur essentialiter. Sed non movetur essentialiter nisi quod corrumpitur vel generatur. Ergo caritas non potest augeri essentialiter, nisi forte de novo generetur vel corrumpatur, quod est inconveniens. Objection 3. Further, increase is a kind of movement. Therefore wherever there is increase there is movement, and if there be increase of essence there is movement of essence. Now there is no movement of essence save either by corruption or generation. Therefore charity cannot increase essentially, unless it happen to be generated anew or corrupted, which is unreasonable.
IIª-IIae q. 24 a. 4 s. c. Sed contra est quod Augustinus dicit, super Ioan., quod caritas meretur augeri, ut aucta mereatur et perfici. On the contrary, Augustine says (Tract. lxxiv in Joan.) [Cf. Ep. clxxxv.] that "charity merits increase that by increase it may merit perfection."
IIª-IIae q. 24 a. 4 co. Respondeo dicendum quod caritas viae potest augeri. Ex hoc enim dicimur esse viatores quod in Deum tendimus, qui est ultimus finis nostrae beatitudinis. In hac autem via tanto magis procedimus quanto Deo magis propinquamus, cui non appropinquatur passibus corporis, sed affectibus mentis. Hanc autem propinquitatem facit caritas, quia per ipsam mens Deo unitur. Et ideo de ratione caritatis viae est ut possit augeri, si enim non posset augeri, iam cessaret viae processus. Et ideo apostolus caritatem viam nominat, dicens I ad Cor. XII, adhuc excellentiorem viam vobis demonstro. I answer that, The charity of a wayfarer can increase. For we are called wayfarers by reason of our being on the way to God, Who is the last end of our happiness. On this way we advance as we get nigh to God, Who is approached, "not by steps of the body but by the affections of the soul" [St. Augustine, Tract. in Joan. xxxii]: and this approach is the result of charity, since it unites man's mind to God. Consequently it is essential to the charity of a wayfarer that it can increase, for if it could not, all further advance along the way would cease. Hence the Apostle calls charity the way, when he says (1 Corinthians 12:31): "I show unto you yet a more excellent way."
IIª-IIae q. 24 a. 4 ad 1 Ad primum ergo dicendum quod caritati non convenit quantitas dimensiva, sed solum quantitas virtualis. Quae non solum attenditur secundum numerum obiectorum, ut scilicet plura vel pauciora diligantur, sed etiam secundum intensionem actus, ut magis vel minus aliquid diligatur. Et hoc modo virtualis quantitas caritatis augetur. Reply to Objection 1. Charity is not subject to dimensive, but only to virtual quantity: and the latter depends not only on the number of objects, namely whether they be in greater number or of greater excellence, but also on the intensity of the act, namely whether a thing is loved more, or less; it is in this way that the virtual quantity of charity increases.
IIª-IIae q. 24 a. 4 ad 2 Ad secundum dicendum quod caritas est in summo ex parte obiecti, inquantum scilicet eius obiectum est summum bonum, et ex hoc sequitur quod ipsa sit excellentior aliis virtutibus. Sed non est omnis caritas in summo quantum ad intensionem actus. Reply to Objection 2. Charity consists in an extreme with regard to its object, in so far as its object is the Supreme Good, and from this it follows that charity is the most excellent of the virtues. Yet not every charity consists in an extreme, as regards the intensity of the act.
IIª-IIae q. 24 a. 4 ad 3 Ad tertium dicendum quod quidam dixerunt caritatem non augeri secundum suam essentiam, sed solum secundum radicationem in subiecto, vel secundum fervorem. Sed hi propriam vocem ignoraverunt. Cum enim sit accidens, eius esse est inesse, unde nihil est aliud ipsam secundum essentiam augeri quam eam magis inesse subiecto, quod est eam magis radicari in subiecto. Similiter etiam ipsa essentialiter est virtus ordinata ad actum, unde idem est ipsam augeri secundum essentiam et ipsam habere efficaciam ad producendum ferventioris dilectionis actum. Augetur ergo essentialiter non quidem ita quod esse incipiat vel esse desinat in subiecto, sicut obiectio procedit, sed ita quod magis in subiecto esse incipiat. Reply to Objection 3. Some have said that charity does not increase in its essence, but only as to its radication in its subject, or according to its fervor. But these people did not know what they were talking about. For since charity is an accident, its being is to be in something. So that an essential increase of charity means nothing else but that it is yet more in its subject, which implies a greater radication in its subject. Furthermore, charity is essentially a virtue ordained to act, so that an essential increase of charity implies ability to produce an act of more fervent love. Hence charity increases essentially, not by beginning anew, or ceasing to be in its subject, as the objection imagines, but by beginning to be more and more in its subject.
IIª-IIae q. 24 a. 5 arg. 1 Ad quintum sic proceditur. Videtur quod caritas augeatur per additionem. Sicut enim est augmentum secundum quantitatem corporalem, ita secundum quantitatem virtualem. Sed augmentum quantitatis corporalis fit per additionem, dicit enim philosophus, in I de Gen., quod augmentum est praeexistenti magnitudini additamentum. Ergo etiam augmentum caritatis, quod est secundum virtualem quantitatem, erit per additionem. Objection 1. It would seem that charity increases by addition. For just as increase may be in respect of bodily quantity, so may it be according to virtual quantity. Now increase in bodily quantity results from addition; for the Philosopher says (De Gener. i, 5) that "increase is addition to pre-existing magnitude." Therefore the increase of charity which is according to virtual quantity is by addition.
IIª-IIae q. 24 a. 5 arg. 2 Praeterea, caritas in anima est quoddam spirituale lumen, secundum illud I Ioan. II, qui diligit fratrem suum in lumine manet. Sed lumen crescit in aere per additionem, sicut in domo lumen crescit alia candela superaccensa. Ergo etiam caritas crescit in anima per additionem. Objection 2. Further, charity is a kind of spiritual light in the soul, according to 1 John 2:10: "He that loveth his brother abideth in the light." Now light increases in the air by addition; thus the light in a house increases when another candle is lit. Therefore charity also increases in the soul by addition.
IIª-IIae q. 24 a. 5 arg. 3 Praeterea, augere caritatem ad Deum pertinet, sicut et ipsam creare, secundum illud II ad Cor. IX, augebit incrementa frugum iustitiae vestrae. Sed Deus primo infundendo caritatem aliquid facit in anima quod ibi prius non erat. Ergo etiam augendo caritatem aliquid ibi facit quod prius non erat. Ergo caritas augetur per additionem. Objection 3. Further, the increase of charity is God's work, even as the causing of it, according to 2 Corinthians 9:10: "He will increase the growth of the fruits of your justice." Now when God first infuses charity, He puts something in the soul that was not there before. Therefore also, when He increases charity, He puts something there which was not there before. Therefore charity increases by addition.
IIª-IIae q. 24 a. 5 s. c. Sed contra est quod caritas est forma simplex. Simplex autem simplici additum non facit aliquid maius, ut probatur in VI Physic. Ergo caritas non augetur per additionem. On the contrary, Charity is a simple form. Now nothing greater results from the addition of one simple thing to another, as proved in Phys. iii, text. 59, and Metaph. ii, 4. Therefore charity does not increase by addition.
IIª-IIae q. 24 a. 5 co. Respondeo dicendum quod omnis additio est alicuius ad aliquid. Unde in omni additione oportet saltem praeintelligere distinctionem eorum quorum unum additur alteri, ante ipsam additionem. Si igitur caritas addatur caritati, oportet praesupponi caritatem additam ut distinctam a caritate cui additur, non quidem ex necessitate secundum esse, sed saltem secundum intellectum. Posset enim Deus etiam quantitatem corporalem augere addendo aliquam magnitudinem non prius existentem, sed tunc creatam, quae quamvis prius non fuerit in rerum natura, habet tamen in se unde eius distinctio intelligi possit a quantitate cui additur. Si igitur caritas addatur caritati, oportet praesupponere, ad minus secundum intellectum, distinctionem unius caritatis ab alia. Distinctio autem in formis est duplex, una quidem secundum speciem; alia autem secundum numerum. Distinctio quidem secundum speciem in habitibus est secundum diversitatem obiectorum, distinctio vero secundum numerum est secundum diversitatem subiecti. Potest igitur contingere quod aliquis habitus per additionem augeatur dum extenditur ad quaedam obiecta ad quae prius se non extendebat, et sic augetur scientia geometriae in eo qui de novo incipit scire aliqua geometricalia quae prius nesciebat. Hoc autem non potest dici de caritate, quia etiam minima caritas se extendit ad omnia illa quae sunt ex caritate diligenda. Non ergo talis additio in augmento caritatis potest intelligi praesupposita distinctione secundum speciem caritatis additae ad eam cui superadditur. Relinquitur ergo, si fiat additio caritatis ad caritatem, quod hoc fit praesupposita distinctione secundum numerum, quae est secundum diversitatem subiectorum, sicut albedo augetur per hoc quod album additur albo, quamvis hoc augmento non fiat aliquid magis album. Sed hoc in proposito dici non potest. Quia subiectum caritatis non est nisi mens rationalis, unde tale caritatis augmentum fieri non posset nisi per hoc quod una mens rationalis alteri adderetur, quod est impossibile. Quamvis etiam si esset possibile tale augmentum, faceret maiorem diligentem, non autem magis diligentem. Relinquitur ergo quod nullo modo caritas augeri potest per additionem caritatis ad caritatem, sicut quidam ponunt. Sic ergo caritas augetur solum per hoc quod subiectum magis ac magis participat caritatem, idest secundum quod magis reducitur in actum illius et magis subditur illi. Hic enim est modus augmenti proprius cuiuslibet formae quae intenditur, eo quod esse huiusmodi formae totaliter consistit in eo quod inhaeret susceptibili. Et ideo, cum magnitudo rei consequitur esse ipsius, formam esse maiorem hoc est eam magis inesse susceptibili, non autem aliam formam advenire. Hoc enim esset si forma haberet aliquam quantitatem ex seipsa, non per comparationem ad subiectum. Sic igitur et caritas augetur per hoc quod intenditur in subiecto, et hoc est ipsam augeri secundum essentiam, non autem per hoc quod caritas addatur caritati. I answer that, Every addition is of something to something else: so that in every addition we must at least presuppose that the things added together are distinct before the addition. Consequently if charity be added to charity, the added charity must be presupposed as distinct from charity to which it is added, not necessarily by a distinction of reality, but at least by a distinction of thought. For God is able to increase a bodily quantity by adding a magnitude which did not exist before, but was created at that very moment; which magnitude, though not pre-existent in reality, is nevertheless capable of being distinguished from the quantity to which it is added. Wherefore if charity be added to charity we must presuppose the distinction, at least logical, of the one charity from the other. Now distinction among forms is twofold: specific and numeric. Specific distinction of habits follows diversity of objects, while numeric distinction follows distinction of subjects. Consequently a habit may receive increase through extending to objects to which it did not extend before: thus the science of geometry increases in one who acquires knowledge of geometrical matters which he ignored hitherto. But this cannot be said of charity, for even the slightest charity extends to all that we have to love by charity. Hence the addition which causes an increase of charity cannot be understood, as though the added charity were presupposed to be distinct specifically from that to which it is added. It follows therefore that if charity be added to charity, we must presuppose a numerical distinction between them, which follows a distinction of subjects: thus whiteness receives an increase when one white thing is added to another, although such an increase does not make a thing whiter. This, however, does not apply to the case in point, since the subject of charity is none other than the rational mind, so that such like an increase of charity could only take place by one rational mind being added to another; which is impossible. Moreover, even if it were possible, the result would be a greater lover, but not a more loving one. It follows, therefore, that charity can by no means increase by addition of charity to charity, as some have held to be the case. Accordingly charity increases only by its subject partaking of charity more and more subject thereto. For this is the proper mode of increase in a form that is intensified, since the being of such a form consists wholly in its adhering to its subject. Consequently, since the magnitude of a thing follows on its being, to say that a form is greater is the same as to say that it is more in its subject, and not that another form is added to it: for this would be the case if the form, of itself, had any quantity, and not in comparison with its subject. Therefore charity increases by being intensified in its subject, and this is for charity to increase in its essence; and not by charity being added to charity.
IIª-IIae q. 24 a. 5 ad 1 Ad primum ergo dicendum quod quantitas corporalis habet aliquid inquantum est quantitas; et aliquid inquantum est forma accidentalis. Inquantum est quantitas, habet quod sit distinguibilis secundum situm vel secundum numerum. Et ideo hoc modo consideratur augmentum magnitudinis per additionem; ut patet in animalibus. Inquantum vero est forma accidentalis, est distinguibilis solum secundum subiectum. Et secundum hoc habet proprium augmentum, sicut et aliae formae accidentales, per modum intensionis eius in subiecto, sicut patet in his quae rarefiunt, ut probat philosophus, in IV Physic. Et similiter etiam scientia habet quantitatem, inquantum est habitus, ex parte obiectorum. Et sic augetur per additionem, inquantum aliquis plura cognoscit. Habet etiam quantitatem, inquantum est quaedam forma accidentalis, ex eo quod inest subiecto. Et secundum hoc augetur in eo qui certius eadem scibilia cognoscit nunc quam prius. Similiter etiam et caritas habet duplicem quantitatem. Sed secundum eam quae est ex parte obiecti, non augetur, ut dictum est. Unde relinquitur quod per solam intensionem augeatur. Reply to Objection 1. Bodily quantity has something as quantity, and something else, in so far as it is an accidental form. As quantity, it is distinguishable in respect of position or number, and in this way we have the increase of magnitude by addition, as may be seen in animals. But in so far as it is an accidental form, it is distinguishable only in respect of its subject, and in this way it has its proper increase, like other accidental forms, by way of intensity in its subject, for instance in things subject to rarefaction, as is proved in Phys. iv, 9. On like manner science, as a habit, has its quantity from its objects, and accordingly it increases by addition, when a man knows more things; and again, as an accidental form, it has a certain quantity through being in its subject, and in this way it increase in a man who knows the same scientific truths with greater certainty now than before. On the same way charity has a twofold quantity; but with regard to that which it has from its object, it does not increase, as stated above: hence it follows that it increases solely by being intensified.
IIª-IIae q. 24 a. 5 ad 2 Ad secundum dicendum quod additio luminis ad lumen potest intelligi in aere propter diversitatem luminarium causantium lumen. Sed talis distinctio non habet locum in proposito, quia non est nisi unum luminare influens lumen caritatis. Reply to Objection 2. The addition of light to light can be understood through the light being intensified in the air on account of there being several luminaries giving light: but this distinction does not apply to the case in point, since there is but one luminary shedding forth the light of charity.
IIª-IIae q. 24 a. 5 ad 3 Ad tertium dicendum quod infusio caritatis importat quandam mutationem secundum habere caritatem et non habere, et ideo oportet quod aliquid adveniat quod prius non infuit. Sed augmentatio caritatis importat mutationem secundum minus aut magis habere. Et ideo non oportet quod aliquid insit quod prius non infuerit, sed quod magis insit quod prius minus inerat. Et hoc est quod facit Deus caritatem augendo, scilicet quod magis insit, et quod perfectius similitudo spiritus sancti participetur in anima. Reply to Objection 3. The infusion of charity denotes a change to the state of "having" charity from the state of "not having it," so that something must needs come which was not there before. On the other hand, the increase of charity denotes a change to "more having" from "less having," so that there is need, not for anything to be there that was not there before, but for something to be more there that previously was less there. This is what God does when He increases charity, that is He makes it to have a greater hold on the soul, and the likeness of the Holy Ghost to be more perfectly participated by the soul.
IIª-IIae q. 24 a. 6 arg. 1 Ad sextum sic proceditur. Videtur quod quolibet actu caritatis caritas augeatur. Quod enim potest id quod maius est, potest id quod minus est. Sed quilibet actus caritatis meretur vitam aeternam, quae maius est quam simplex caritatis augmentum, quia vita aeterna includit caritatis perfectionem. Ergo multo magis quilibet actus caritatis caritatem auget. Objection 1. It would seem that charity increases through every act of charity. For that which can do what is more, can do what is less. But every act of charity can merit everlasting life; and this is more than a simple addition of charity, since it includes the perfection of charity. Much more, therefore, does every act of charity increase charity.
IIª-IIae q. 24 a. 6 arg. 2 Praeterea, sicuti habitus virtutum acquisitarum generatur ex actibus, ita etiam augmentum caritatis causatur per actus caritatis. Sed quilibet actus virtuosus operatur ad virtutis generationem. Ergo etiam quilibet actus caritatis operatur ad caritatis augmentum. Objection 2. Further, just as the habits of acquired virtue are engendered by acts, so too an increase of charity is caused by an act of charity. Now each virtuous act conduces to the engendering of virtue. Therefore also each virtuous act of charity conduces to the increase of charity.
IIª-IIae q. 24 a. 6 arg. 3 Praeterea, Gregorius dicit quod in via Dei stare retrocedere est. Sed nullus, dum movetur actu caritatis, retrocedit. Ergo quicumque movetur actu caritatis, procedit in via Dei. Ergo quolibet actu caritatis caritas augetur. Objection 3. Further, Gregory [St. Bernard, Serm. ii in Festo Purif.] says that "to stand still in the way to God is to go back." Now no man goes back when he is moved by an act of charity. Therefore whoever is moved by an act of charity goes forward in the way to God. Therefore charity increases through every act of charity.
IIª-IIae q. 24 a. 6 s. c. Sed contra est quod effectus non excedit virtutem causae. Sed quandoque aliquis actus caritatis cum aliquo tepore vel remissione emittitur. Non ergo perducit ad excellentiorem caritatem, sed magis disponit ad minorem. On the contrary, The effect does not surpass the power of its cause. But an act of charity is sometimes done with tepidity or slackness. Therefore it does not conduce to a more excellent charity, rather does it dispose one to a lower degree.
IIª-IIae q. 24 a. 6 co. Respondeo dicendum quod augmentum spirituale caritatis quodammodo simile est augmento corporali. Augmentum autem corporale in animalibus et plantis non est motus continuus, ita scilicet quod, si aliquid tantum augetur in tanto tempore, necesse sit quod proportionaliter in qualibet parte illius temporis aliquid augeatur, sicut contingit in motu locali, sed per aliquod tempus natura operatur disponens ad augmentum et nihil augens actu, et postmodum producit in effectum id ad quod disposuerat, augendo animal vel plantam in actu. Ita etiam non quolibet actu caritatis caritas actu augetur, sed quilibet actus caritatis disponit ad caritatis augmentum, inquantum ex uno actu caritatis homo redditur promptior iterum ad agendum secundum caritatem; et, habilitate crescente, homo prorumpit in actum ferventiorem dilectionis, quo conetur ad caritatis profectum; et tunc caritas augetur in actu. I answer that, The spiritual increase of charity is somewhat like the increase of a body. Now bodily increase in animals and plants is not a continuous movement, so that, to wit, if a thing increase so much in so much time, it need to increase proportionally in each part of that time, as happens in local movement; but for a certain space of time nature works by disposing for the increase, without causing any actual increase, and afterwards brings into effect that to which it had disposed, by giving the animal or plant an actual increase. On like manner charity does not actually increase through every act of charity, but each act of charity disposes to an increase of charity, in so far as one act of charity makes man more ready to act again according to charity, and this readiness increasing, man breaks out into an act of more fervent love, and strives to advance in charity, and then his charity increases actually.
IIª-IIae q. 24 a. 6 ad 1 Ad primum ergo dicendum quod quilibet actus caritatis meretur vitam aeternam, non quidem statim exhibendam, sed suo tempore. Similiter etiam quilibet actus caritatis meretur caritatis augmentum, non tamen statim augetur, sed quando aliquis conatur ad huiusmodi augmentum. Reply to Objection 1. Every act of charity merits everlasting life, which, however, is not to be bestowed then and there, but at its proper time. On like manner every act of charity merits an increase of charity; yet this increase does not take place at once, but when we strive for that increase.
IIª-IIae q. 24 a. 6 ad 2 Ad secundum dicendum quod etiam in generatione virtutis acquisitae non quilibet actus complet generationem virtutis, sed quilibet operatur ad eam ut disponens, et ultimus, qui est perfectior, agens in virtute omnium praecedentium, reducit eam in actum. Sicut etiam est in multis guttis cavantibus lapidem. Reply to Objection 2. Even when an acquired virtue is being engendered, each act does not complete the formation of the virtue, but conduces towards that effect by disposing to it, while the last act, which is the most perfect, and acts in virtue of all those that preceded it, reduces the virtue into act, just as when many drops hollow out a stone.
IIª-IIae q. 24 a. 6 ad 3 Ad tertium dicendum quod in via Dei procedit aliquis non solum dum actu caritas eius augetur, sed etiam dum disponitur ad augmentum. Reply to Objection 3. Man advances in the way to God, not merely by actual increase of charity, but also by being disposed to that increase.
IIª-IIae q. 24 a. 7 arg. 1 Ad septimum sic proceditur. Videtur quod caritas non augeatur in infinitum. Omnis enim motus est ad aliquem finem et terminum, ut dicitur in II Metaphys. Sed augmentum caritatis est quidam motus. Ergo tendit ad aliquem finem et terminum. Non ergo caritas in infinitum augetur. Objection 1. It would seem that charity does not increase indefinitely. For every movement is towards some end and term, as stated in Metaph. ii, text. 8,9. But the increase of charity is a movement. Therefore it tends to an end and term. Therefore charity does not increase indefinitely.
IIª-IIae q. 24 a. 7 arg. 2 Praeterea, nulla forma excedit capacitatem sui subiecti. Sed capacitas creaturae rationalis, quae est subiectum caritatis, est finita. Ergo caritas in infinitum augeri non potest. Objection 2. Further, no form surpasses the capacity of its subject. But the capacity of the rational creature who is the subject of charity is finite. Therefore charity cannot increase indefinitely.
IIª-IIae q. 24 a. 7 arg. 3 Praeterea, omne finitum per continuum augmentum potest pertingere ad quantitatem alterius finiti quantumcumque maioris, nisi forte id quod accrescit per augmentum semper sit minus et minus; sicut philosophus dicit, in III Physic., quod si uni lineae addatur quod subtrahitur ab alia linea quae in infinitum dividitur, in infinitum additione facta, nunquam pertingetur ad quandam determinatam quantitatem quae est composita ex duabus lineis, scilicet divisa et ea cui additur quod ex alia subtrahitur. Quod in proposito non contingit, non enim necesse est ut secundum caritatis augmentum sit minus quam prius; sed magis probabile est quod sit aequale aut maius. Cum ergo caritas patriae sit quiddam finitum, si caritas viae in infinitum augeri potest, sequitur quod caritas viae possit adaequare caritatem patriae, quod est inconveniens. Non ergo caritas viae in infinitum potest augeri. Objection 3. Further, every finite thing can, by continual increase, attain to the quantity of another finite thing however much greater, unless the amount of its increase be ever less and less. Thus the Philosopher states (Phys. iii, 6) that if we divide a line into an indefinite number of parts, and take these parts away and add them indefinitely to another line, we shall never arrive at any definite quantity resulting from those two lines, viz. the one from which we subtracted and the one to which we added what was subtracted. But this does not occur in the case in point: because there is no need for the second increase of charity to be less than the first, since rather is it probable that it would be equal or greater. As, therefore, the charity of the blessed is something finite, if the charity of the wayfarer can increase indefinitely, it would follow that the charity of the way can equal the charity of heaven; which is absurd. Therefore the wayfarer's charity cannot increase indefinitely.
IIª-IIae q. 24 a. 7 s. c. Sed contra est quod apostolus dicit, ad Philipp. III. Non quod iam acceperim, aut iam perfectus sim, sequor autem si quo modo comprehendam. Ubi dicit Glossa, nemo fidelium, etsi multum profecerit, dicat, sufficit mihi. Qui enim hoc dicit, exit de via ante finem. Ergo semper in via caritas potest magis ac magis augeri. On the contrary, The Apostle says (Philippians 3:12): "Not as though I had already attained, or were already perfect; but I follow after, if I may, by any means apprehend," on which words a gloss says: "Even if he has made great progress, let none of the faithful say: 'Enough.' For whosoever says this, leaves the road before coming to his destination." Therefore the wayfarer's charity can ever increase more and more.
IIª-IIae q. 24 a. 7 co. Respondeo dicendum quod terminus augmento alicuius formae potest praefigi tripliciter. Uno modo, ex ratione ipsius formae, quae habet terminatam mensuram, ad quam cum perventum fuerit, non potest ultra procedi in forma, sed si ultra processum fuerit, pervenietur ad aliam formam, sicut patet in pallore, cuius terminos per continuam alterationem aliquis transit, vel ad albedinem vel ad nigredinem perveniens. Alio modo, ex parte agentis, cuius virtus non se extendit ad ulterius augendum formam in subiecto. Tertio, ex parte subiecti, quod non est capax amplioris perfectionis. Nullo autem istorum modorum imponitur terminus augmento caritatis in statu viae. Ipsa enim caritas secundum rationem propriae speciei terminum augmenti non habet, est enim participatio quaedam infinitae caritatis, quae est spiritus sanctus. Similiter etiam causa augens caritatem est infinitae virtutis, scilicet Deus. Similiter etiam ex parte subiecti terminus huic augmento praefigi non potest, quia semper, caritate excrescente, superexcrescit habilitas ad ulterius augmentum. Unde relinquitur quod caritatis augmento nullus terminus praefigi possit in hac vita. I answer that, A term to the increase of a form may be fixed in three ways: first by reason of the form itself having a fixed measure, and when this has been reached it is no longer possible to go any further in that form, but if any further advance is made, another form is attained. And example of this is paleness, the bounds of which may, by continual alteration, be passed, either so that whiteness ensues, or so that blackness results. Secondly, on the part of the agent, whose power does not extend to a further increase of the form in its subject. Thirdly, on the part of the subject, which is not capable of ulterior perfection. Now, in none of these ways, is a limit imposed to the increase of man's charity, while he is in the state of the wayfarer. For charity itself considered as such has no limit to its increase, since it is a participation of the infinite charity which is the Holy Ghost. On like manner the cause of the increase of charity, viz. God, is possessed of infinite power. Furthermore, on the part of its subject, no limit to this increase can be determined, because whenever charity increases, there is a corresponding increased ability to receive a further increase. It is therefore evident that it is not possible to fix any limits to the increase of charity in this life.
IIª-IIae q. 24 a. 7 ad 1 Ad primum ergo dicendum quod augmentum caritatis est ad aliquem finem, sed ille finis non est in hac vita, sed in futura. Reply to Objection 1. The increase of charity is directed to an end, which is not in this, but in a future life.
IIª-IIae q. 24 a. 7 ad 2 Ad secundum dicendum quod capacitas creaturae spiritualis per caritatem augetur, quia per ipsam cor dilatatur, secundum illud II ad Cor. VI, cor nostrum dilatatum est. Et ideo adhuc ulterius manet habilitas ad maius augmentum. Reply to Objection 2. The capacity of the rational creature is increased by charity, because the heart is enlarged thereby, according to 2 Corinthians 6:11: "Our heart is enlarged"; so that it still remains capable of receiving a further increase.
IIª-IIae q. 24 a. 7 ad 3 Ad tertium dicendum quod ratio illa procedit in his quae habent quantitatem eiusdem rationis, non autem in his quae habent diversam rationem quantitatis; sicut linea, quantumcumque crescat, non attingit quantitatem superficiei. Non est autem eadem ratio quantitatis caritatis viae, quae sequitur cognitionem fidei, et caritatis patriae, quae sequitur visionem apertam. Unde ratio non sequitur. Reply to Objection 3. This argument holds good in those things which have the same kind of quantity, but not in those which have different kinds: thus however much a line may increase it does not reach the quantity of a superficies. Now the quantity of a wayfarer's charity which follows the knowledge of faith is not of the same kind as the quantity of the charity of the blessed, which follows open vision. Hence the argument does not prove.
IIª-IIae q. 24 a. 8 arg. 1 Ad octavum sic proceditur. Videtur quod caritas in hac vita non possit esse perfecta. Maxime enim haec perfectio in apostolis fuisset. Sed in eis non fuit, dicit enim apostolus, ad Philipp. III, non quod iam conprehenderim aut perfectus sim. Ergo caritas in hac vita perfecta esse non potest. Objection 1. It would seem that charity cannot be perfect in this life. For this would have been the case with the apostles before all others. Yet it was not so, since the Apostle says (Philippians 3:12): "Not as though I had already attained, or were already perfect." Therefore charity cannot be perfect in this life.
IIª-IIae q. 24 a. 8 arg. 2 Praeterea, Augustinus dicit, in libro octoginta trium quaest., quod nutrimentum caritatis est diminutio cupiditatis; perfectio, nulla cupiditas. Sed hoc non potest esse in hac vita, in qua sine peccato vivere non possumus, secundum illud I Ioan. I, si dixerimus quia peccatum non habemus, nos ipsos seducimus, omne autem peccatum ex aliqua inordinata cupiditate procedit. Ergo in hac vita caritas perfecta esse non potest. Objection 2. Further, Augustine says (Qq. lxxxiii, qu. 36) that "whatever kindles charity quenches cupidity, but where charity is perfect, cupidity is done away altogether." But this cannot be in this world, wherein it is impossible to live without sin, according to 1 John 1:8: "If we say that we have no sin, we deceive ourselves." Now all sin arises from some inordinate cupidity. Therefore charity cannot be perfect in this life.
IIª-IIae q. 24 a. 8 arg. 3 Praeterea, illud quod iam perfectum est non habet ulterius crescere. Sed caritas in hac vita semper potest augeri, ut dictum est. Ergo caritas in hac vita non potest esse perfecta. Objection 3. Further, what is already perfect cannot be perfected any more. But in this life charity can always increase, as stated above (Article 7). Therefore charity cannot be perfect in this life.
IIª-IIae q. 24 a. 8 s. c. Sed contra est quod Augustinus dicit, super Prim. Canonic. Ioan., caritas cum fuerit roborata, perficitur, cum ad perfectionem pervenerit, dicit, cupio dissolvi et esse cum Christo. Sed hoc possibile est in hac vita, sicut in Paulo fuit. Ergo caritas in hac vita potest esse perfecta. On the contrary, Augustine says (In prim. canon. Joan. Tract. v) "Charity is perfected by being strengthened; and when it has been brought to perfection, it exclaims, 'I desire to be dissolved and to be with Christ.'" Now this is possible in this life, as in the case of Paul. Therefore charity can be perfect in this life.
IIª-IIae q. 24 a. 8 co. Respondeo dicendum quod perfectio caritatis potest intelligi dupliciter, uno modo, ex parte diligibilis; alio modo, ex parte diligentis. Ex parte quidem diligibilis perfecta est caritas ut diligatur aliquid quantum diligibile est. Deus autem tantum diligibilis est quantum bonus est. Bonitas autem eius est infinita. Unde infinite diligibilis est. Nulla autem creatura potest eum diligere infinite, cum quaelibet virtus creata sit finita. Unde per hunc modum nullius creaturae caritas potest esse perfecta, sed solum caritas Dei, qua seipsum diligit. Ex parte vero diligentis caritas dicitur perfecta quando aliquis secundum totum suum posse diligit. Quod quidem contingit tripliciter. Uno modo, sic quod totum cor hominis actualiter semper feratur in Deum. Et haec est perfectio caritatis patriae, quae non est possibilis in hac vita, in qua impossibile est, propter humanae vitae infirmitatem, semper actu cogitare de Deo et moveri dilectione ad ipsum. Alio modo, ut homo studium suum deputet ad vacandum Deo et rebus divinis, praetermissis aliis nisi quantum necessitas praesentis vitae requirit. Et ista est perfectio caritatis quae est possibilis in via, non tamen est communis omnibus caritatem habentibus. Tertio modo, ita quod habitualiter aliquis totum cor suum ponat in Deo, ita scilicet quod nihil cogitet vel velit quod sit divinae dilectioni contrarium. Et haec perfectio est communis omnibus caritatem habentibus. I answer that, The perfection of charity may be understood in two ways: first with regard to the object loved, secondly with regard to the person who loves. With regard to the object loved, charity is perfect, if the object be loved as much as it is lovable. Now God is as lovable as He is good, and His goodness is infinite, wherefore He is infinitely lovable. But no creature can love Him infinitely since all created power is finite. Consequently no creature's charity can be perfect in this way; the charity of God alone can, whereby He loves Himself. On the part of the person who loves, charity is perfect, when he loves as much as he can. This happens in three ways. First, so that a man's whole heart is always actually borne towards God: this is the perfection of the charity of heaven, and is not possible in this life, wherein, by reason of the weakness of human life, it is impossible to think always actually of God, and to be moved by love towards Him. Secondly, so that man makes an earnest endeavor to give his time to God and Divine things, while scorning other things except in so far as the needs of the present life demand. This is the perfection of charity that is possible to a wayfarer; but is not common to all who have charity. Thirdly, so that a man gives his whole heart to God habitually, viz. by neither thinking nor desiring anything contrary to the love of God; and this perfection is common to all who have charity.
IIª-IIae q. 24 a. 8 ad 1 Ad primum ergo dicendum quod apostolus negat de se perfectionem patriae. Unde Glossa ibi dicit quod perfectus erat viator, sed nondum ipsius itineris perfectione perventor. Reply to Objection 1. The Apostle denies that he has the perfection of heaven, wherefore a gloss on the same passage says that "he was a perfect wayfarer, but had not yet achieved the perfection to which the way leads."
IIª-IIae q. 24 a. 8 ad 2 Ad secundum dicendum quod hoc dicitur propter peccata venialia. Quae non contrariantur habitui caritatis, sed actui, et ita non repugnant perfectioni viae, sed perfectioni patriae. Reply to Objection 2. This is said on account of venial sins, which are contrary, not to the habit, but to the act of charity: hence they are incompatible, not with the perfection of the way, but with that of heaven.
IIª-IIae q. 24 a. 8 ad 3 Ad tertium dicendum quod perfectio viae non est perfectio simpliciter. Et ideo semper habet quo crescat. Reply to Objection 3. The perfection of the way is not perfection simply, wherefore it can always increase.
IIª-IIae q. 24 a. 9 arg. 1 Ad nonum sic proceditur. Videtur quod inconvenienter distinguantur tres gradus caritatis, scilicet caritas incipiens, proficiens et perfecta. Inter principium enim caritatis et eius ultimam perfectionem sunt multi gradus medii. Non ergo unum solum medium debuit poni. Objection 1. It would seem unfitting to distinguish three degrees of charity, beginning, progress, and perfection. For there are many degrees between the beginning of charity and its ultimate perfection. Therefore it is not right to put only one.
IIª-IIae q. 24 a. 9 arg. 2 Praeterea, statim cum caritas incipit esse, incipit etiam proficere non ergo debet distingui caritas proficiens a caritate incipiente. Objection 2. Further, charity begins to progress as soon as it begins to be. Therefore we ought not to distinguish between charity as progressing and as beginning.
IIª-IIae q. 24 a. 9 arg. 3 Praeterea, quantumcumque aliquis habeat in hoc mundo caritatem perfectam, potest etiam eius caritas augeri, ut dictum est. Sed caritatem augeri est ipsam proficere. Ergo caritas perfecta non debet distingui a caritate proficiente. Inconvenienter igitur praedicti tres gradus caritatis assignantur. Objection 3. Further, in this world, however perfect a man's charity may be, it can increase, as stated above (Article 7). Now for charity to increase is to progress. Therefore perfect charity ought not to be distinguished from progressing charity: and so the aforesaid degrees are unsuitably assigned to charity.
IIª-IIae q. 24 a. 9 s. c. Sed contra est quod Augustinus dicit, super Prim. Canonic. Ioan., caritas cum fuerit nata, nutritur, quod pertinet ad incipientes; cum fuerit nutrita, roboratur, quod pertinet ad proficientes; cum fuerit roborata, perficitur, quod pertinet ad perfectos. Ergo est triplex gradus caritatis. On the contrary, Augustine says (In prim. canon. Joan. Tract. v) "As soon as charity is born it takes food," which refers to beginners, "after taking food, it waxes strong," which refers to those who are progressing, "and when it has become strong it is perfected," which refers to the perfect. Therefore there are three degrees of charity.
IIª-IIae q. 24 a. 9 co. Respondeo dicendum quod spirituale augmentum caritatis considerari potest quantum ad aliquid simile corporali hominis augmento. Quod quidem quamvis in plurimas partes distingui possit, habet tamen aliquas determinatas distinctiones secundum determinatas actiones vel studia ad quae homo perducitur per augmentum, sicut infantilis aetas dicitur antequam habeat usum rationis; postea autem distinguitur alius status hominis quando iam incipit loqui et ratione uti; iterum tertius status eius est pubertatis, quando iam incipit posse generare; et sic inde quousque perveniatur ad perfectum. Ita etiam et diversi gradus caritatis distinguuntur secundum diversa studia ad quae homo perducitur per caritatis augmentum. Nam primo quidem incumbit homini studium principale ad recedendum a peccato et resistendum concupiscentiis eius, quae in contrarium caritatis movent. Et hoc pertinet ad incipientes, in quibus caritas est nutrienda vel fovenda ne corrumpatur. Secundum autem studium succedit, ut homo principaliter intendat ad hoc quod in bono proficiat. Et hoc studium pertinet ad proficientes, qui ad hoc principaliter intendunt ut in eis caritas per augmentum roboretur. Tertium autem studium est ut homo ad hoc principaliter intendat ut Deo inhaereat et eo fruatur. Et hoc pertinet ad perfectos, qui cupiunt dissolvi et esse cum Christo. Sicut etiam videmus in motu corporali quod primum est recessus a termino; secundum autem est appropinquatio ad alium terminum; tertium autem quies in termino. I answer that, The spiritual increase of charity may be considered in respect of a certain likeness to the growth of the human body. For although this latter growth may be divided into many parts, yet it has certain fixed divisions according to those particular actions or pursuits to which man is brought by this same growth. Thus we speak of a man being an infant until he has the use of reason, after which we distinguish another state of man wherein he begins to speak and to use his reason, while there is again a third state, that of puberty when he begins to acquire the power of generation, and so on until he arrives at perfection. In like manner the divers degrees of charity are distinguished according to the different pursuits to which man is brought by the increase of charity. For at first it is incumbent on man to occupy himself chiefly with avoiding sin and resisting his concupiscences, which move him in opposition to charity: this concerns beginners, in whom charity has to be fed or fostered lest it be destroyed: in the second place man's chief pursuit is to aim at progress in good, and this is the pursuit of the proficient, whose chief aim is to strengthen their charity by adding to it: while man's third pursuit is to aim chiefly at union with and enjoyment of God: this belongs to the perfect who "desire to be dissolved and to be with Christ." In like manner we observe in local motion that at first there is withdrawal from one term, then approach to the other term, and thirdly, rest in this term.
IIª-IIae q. 24 a. 9 ad 1 Ad primum ergo dicendum quod omnis illa determinata distinctio quae potest accipi in augmento caritatis, comprehenditur sub istis tribus quae dicta sunt. Sicut etiam omnis divisio continuorum comprehenditur sub tribus his, principio, medio et fine; ut philosophus dicit, in I de caelo. Reply to Objection 1. All these distinct degrees which can be discerned in the increase of charity, are comprised in the aforesaid three, even as every division of continuous things is included in these three--the beginning, the middle, and the end, as the Philosopher states (De Coelo i, 1).
IIª-IIae q. 24 a. 9 ad 2 Ad secundum dicendum quod illis in quibus caritas incipit, quamvis proficiant, principalior tamen cura imminet ut resistant peccatis, quorum impugnatione inquietantur. Sed postea, hanc impugnationem minus sentientes, iam quasi securius ad profectum intendunt; ex una tamen parte facientes opus, et ex alia parte habentes manum ad gladium, ut dicitur in Esdra de aedificatoribus Ierusalem. Reply to Objection 2. Although those who are beginners in charity may progress, yet the chief care that besets them is to resist the sins which disturb them by their onslaught. Afterwards, however, when they come to feel this onslaught less, they begin to tend to perfection with greater security; yet with one hand doing the work, and with the other holding the sword as related in Nehemiah 4:17 about those who built up Jerusalem.
IIª-IIae q. 24 a. 9 ad 3 Ad tertium dicendum quod perfecti etiam in caritate proficiunt, sed non est ad hoc principalis eorum cura, sed iam eorum studium circa hoc maxime versatur ut Deo inhaereant. Et quamvis hoc etiam quaerant et incipientes et proficientes, tamen magis sentiunt circa alia sollicitudinem, incipientes quidem de vitatione peccatorum, proficientes vero de profectu virtutum. Reply to Objection 3. Even the perfect make progress in charity: yet this is not their chief care, but their aim is principally directed towards union with God. And though both the beginner and the proficient seek this, yet their solicitude is chiefly about other things, with the beginner, about avoiding sin, with the proficient, about progressing in virtue.
IIª-IIae q. 24 a. 10 arg. 1 Ad decimum sic proceditur. Videtur quod caritas possit diminui. Contraria enim nata sunt fieri circa idem. Sed diminutio et augmentum sunt contraria. Cum igitur caritas augeatur, ut dictum est supra, videtur quod etiam possit diminui. Objection 1. It would seem that charity can decrease. For contraries by their nature affect the same subject. Now increase and decrease are contraries. Since then charity increases, as stated above (Article 4), it seems that it can also decrease.
IIª-IIae q. 24 a. 10 arg. 2 Praeterea, Augustinus, X Confess., ad Deum loquens, dicit, minus te amat qui tecum aliquid amat. Et in libro octogintatrium quaest. dicit quod nutrimentum caritatis est diminutio cupiditatis, ex quo videtur quod etiam e converso augmentum cupiditatis sit diminutio caritatis. Sed cupiditas, qua amatur aliquid aliud quam Deus, potest in homine crescere. Ergo caritas potest diminui. Objection 2. Further, Augustine, speaking to God, says (Confess. x) "He loves Thee less, who loves aught besides Thee": and (Qq. lxxxiii, qu. 36) he says that "what kindles charity quenches cupidity." For this it seems to follow that, on the contrary, what arouses cupidity quenches charity. But cupidity, whereby a man loves something besides God, can increase in man. Therefore charity can decrease.
IIª-IIae q. 24 a. 10 arg. 3 Praeterea, sicut Augustinus dicit, VIII super Gen. ad Litt., non ita Deus operatur hominem iustum iustificando eum, ut, si abscesserit, maneat in absente quod fecit, ex quo potest accipi quod eodem modo Deus operatur in homine caritatem eius conservando, quo operatur primo ei caritatem infundendo. Sed in prima caritatis infusione minus se praeparanti Deus minorem caritatem infundit. Ergo etiam in conservatione caritatis minus se praeparanti minorem caritatem conservat. Potest ergo caritas diminui. Objection 3. Further, as Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. viii, 12) "God makes the just man, by justifying him, but in such a way, that if the man turns away from God, he no longer retains the effect of the Divine operation." From this we may gather that when God preserves charity in man, He works in the same way as when He first infuses charity into him. Now at the first infusion of charity God infuses less charity into him that prepares himself less. Therefore also in preserving charity, He preserves less charity in him that prepares himself less. Therefore charity can decrease.
IIª-IIae q. 24 a. 10 s. c. Sed contra est quod caritas in Scriptura igni comparatur, secundum illud Cant. VIII, lampades eius, scilicet caritatis, lampades ignis atque flammarum. Sed ignis, quandiu manet, semper ascendit. Ergo caritas, quandiu manet, ascendere potest; sed descendere, idest diminui, non potest. On the contrary, In Scripture, charity is compared to fire, according to Canticles 8:6: "The lamps thereof," i.e. of charity, "are fire and flames." Now fire ever mounts upward so long as it lasts. Therefore as long as charity endures, it can ascend, but cannot descend, i.e. decrease.
IIª-IIae q. 24 a. 10 co. Respondeo dicendum quod quantitas caritatis quam habet in comparatione ad obiectum proprium, minui non potest, sicut nec augeri, ut supra dictum est. Sed cum augeatur secundum quantitatem quam habet per comparationem ad subiectum, hic oportet considerare utrum ex hac parte diminui possit. Si autem diminuatur, oportet quod vel diminuatur per aliquem actum; vel per solam cessationem ab actu. Per cessationem quidem ab actu diminuuntur virtutes ex actibus acquisitae, et quandoque etiam corrumpuntur, ut supra dictum est, unde de amicitia philosophus dicit, in VIII Ethic., quod multas amicitias inappellatio solvit, idest non appellare amicum vel non colloqui ei. Sed hoc ideo est quia conservatio uniuscuiusque rei dependet ex sua causa; causa autem virtutis acquisitae est actus humanus; unde, cessantibus humanis actibus, virtus acquisita diminuitur et tandem totaliter corrumpitur. Sed hoc in caritate locum non habet, quia caritas non causatur ab humanis actibus, sed solum a Deo, ut supra dictum est. Unde relinquitur quod etiam cessante actu, propter hoc nec diminuitur nec corrumpitur, si desit peccatum in ipsa cessatione. Relinquitur ergo quod diminutio caritatis non possit causari nisi vel a Deo, vel ab aliquo peccato. A Deo quidem non causatur aliquis defectus in nobis nisi per modum poenae, secundum quod subtrahit gratiam in poenam peccati. Unde nec ei competit diminuere caritatem nisi per modum poenae. Poena autem debetur peccato. Unde relinquitur quod, si caritas diminuatur, quod causa diminutionis eius sit peccatum, vel effective vel meritorie. Neutro autem modo peccatum mortale diminuit caritatem, sed totaliter corrumpit ipsam, et effective, quia omne peccatum mortale contrariatur caritati, ut infra dicetur; et etiam meritorie, quia qui peccando mortaliter aliquid contra caritatem agit, dignum est ut Deus ei subtrahat caritatem. Similiter etiam nec per peccatum veniale caritas diminui potest, neque effective, neque meritorie. Effective quidem non, quia ad ipsam caritatem non attingit. Caritas enim est circa finem ultimum, veniale autem peccatum est quaedam inordinatio circa ea quae sunt ad finem. Non autem diminuitur amor finis ex hoc quod aliquis inordinationem aliquam committit circa ea quae sunt ad finem, sicut aliquando contingit quod aliqui infirmi, multum amantes sanitatem, inordinate tamen se habent circa diaetae observationem; sicut etiam et in speculativis falsae opiniones circa ea quae deducuntur ex principiis, non diminuunt certitudinem principiorum. Similiter etiam veniale peccatum non meretur diminutionem caritatis. Cum enim aliquis delinquit in minori, non meretur detrimentum pati in maiori. Deus enim non plus se avertit ab homine quam homo se avertit ab ipso. Unde qui inordinate se habet circa ea quae sunt ad finem, non meretur detrimentum pati in caritate, per quam ordinatur ad ultimum finem. Unde consequens est quod caritas nullo modo diminui possit, directe loquendo. Potest tamen indirecte dici diminutio caritatis dispositio ad corruptionem ipsius, quae fit vel per peccata venialia; vel etiam per cessationem ab exercitio operum caritatis. I answer that, The quantity which charity has in comparison with its proper object, cannot decrease, even as neither can it increase, as stated above (4, ad 2). Since, however, it increases in that quantity which it has in comparison with its subject, here is the place to consider whether it can decrease in this way. Now, if it decrease, this must needs be either through an act, or by the mere cessation from act. It is true that virtues acquired through acts decrease and sometimes cease altogether through cessation from act, as stated above (I-II, 53, 3). Wherefore the Philosopher says, in reference to friendship (Ethic. viii, 5) "that want of intercourse," i.e. the neglect to call upon or speak with one's friends, "has destroyed many a friendship." Now this is because the safe-keeping of a thing depends on its cause, and the cause of human virtue is a human act, so that when human acts cease, the virtue acquired thereby decreases and at last ceases altogether. Yet this does not occur to charity, because it is not the result of human acts, but is caused by God alone, as stated above (Article 2). Hence it follows that even when its act ceases, it does not for this reason decrease, or cease altogether, unless the cessation involves a sin. The consequence is that a decrease of charity cannot be caused except either by God or by some sinful act. Now no defect is caused in us by God, except by way of punishment, in so far as He withdraws His grace in punishment of sin. Hence He does not diminish charity except by way of punishment: and this punishment is due on account of sin. It follows, therefore, that if charity decrease, the cause of this decrease must be sin either effectively or by way of merit. But mortal sin does not diminish charity, in either of these ways, but destroys it entirely, both effectively, because every mortal sin is contrary to charity, as we shall state further on (12), and by way of merit, since when, by sinning mortally, a man acts against charity, he deserves that God should withdraw charity from him. In like manner, neither can venial sin diminish charity either effectively or by way of merit. Not effectively, because it does not touch charity, since charity is about the last end, whereas venial sin is a disorder about things directed to the end: and a man's love for the end is none the less through his committing an inordinate act as regards the things directed to the end. Thus sick people sometimes, though they love health much, are irregular in keeping to their diet: and thus again, in speculative sciences, the false opinions that are derived from the principles, do not diminish the certitude of the principles. So too, venial sin does not merit diminution of charity; for when a man offends in a small matter he does not deserve to be mulcted in a great matter. For God does not turn away from man, more than man turns away from Him: wherefore he that is out of order in respect of things directed to the end, does not deserve to be mulcted in charity whereby he is ordered to the last end. The consequence is that charity can by no means be diminished, if we speak of direct causality, yet whatever disposes to its corruption may be said to conduce indirectly to its diminution, and such are venial sins, or even the cessation from the practice of works of charity.
IIª-IIae q. 24 a. 10 ad 1 Ad primum ergo dicendum quod contraria sunt circa idem quando subiectum aequaliter se habet ad utrumque contrariorum. Sed caritas non eodem modo se habet ad augmentum et diminutionem, potest enim habere causam augentem, sed non potest habere causam minuentem, sicut dictum est. Unde ratio non sequitur. Reply to Objection 1. Contraries affect the same subject when that subject stands in equal relation to both. But charity does not stand in equal relation to increase and decrease. For it can have a cause of increase, but not of decrease, as stated above. Hence the argument does not prove.
IIª-IIae q. 24 a. 10 ad 2 Ad secundum dicendum quod duplex est cupiditas. Una quidem qua finis in creaturis constituitur. Et haec totaliter mortificat caritatem, cum sit venenum ipsius, ut Augustinus dicit ibidem. Et hoc facit quod Deus minus ametur, scilicet quam debet amari ex caritate, non quidem caritatem diminuendo, sed eam totaliter tollendo. Et sic intelligendum est quod dicitur, minus te amat qui tecum aliquid amat, subditur enim, quod non propter te amat. Quod non contingit in peccato veniali, sed solum in mortali, quod enim amatur in peccato veniali, propter Deum amatur habitu, etsi non actu. Est autem alia cupiditas venialis peccati, quae semper diminuitur per caritatem, sed tamen talis cupiditas caritatem diminuere non potest, ratione iam dicta. Reply to Objection 2. Cupidity is twofold, one whereby man places his end in creatures, and this kills charity altogether, since it is its poison, as Augustine states (Confess. x). This makes us love God less (i.e. less than we ought to love Him by charity), not indeed by diminishing charity but by destroying it altogether. It is thus that we must understand the saying: "He loves Thee less, who loves aught beside Thee," for he adds these words, "which he loveth not for Thee." This does not apply to venial sin, but only to mortal sin: since that which we love in venial sin, is loved for God's sake habitually though not actually. There is another cupidity, that of venial sin, which is always diminished by charity: and yet this cupidity cannot diminish charity, for the reason given above.
IIª-IIae q. 24 a. 10 ad 3 Ad tertium dicendum quod in infusione caritatis requiritur motus liberi arbitrii, sicut supra dictum est. Et ideo illud quod diminuit intensionem liberi arbitrii, dispositive operatur ad hoc quod caritas infundenda sit minor. Sed ad conservationem caritatis non requiritur motus liberi arbitrii, alioquin non remaneret in dormientibus. Unde per impedimentum intensionis motus liberi arbitrii non diminuitur caritas. Reply to Objection 3. A movement of the free-will is requisite in the infusion of charity, as stated above (I-II, 113, 3). Wherefore that which diminishes the intensity of the free-will conduces dispositively to a diminution in the charity to be infused. On the other hand, no movement of the free-will is required for the safe-keeping of charity, else it would not remain inn us while we sleep. Hence charity does not decrease on account of an obstacle on the part of the intensity of the free-will's movement.
IIª-IIae q. 24 a. 11 arg. 1 Ad undecimum sic proceditur. Videtur quod caritas semel habita non possit amitti. Si enim amittitur, non amittitur nisi propter peccatum. Sed ille qui habet caritatem non potest peccare. Dicitur enim I Ioan. III, omnis enim qui natus est ex Deo, peccatum non facit, quia semen ipsius in eo manet, et non potest peccare, quoniam ex Deo natus est. Caritatem autem non habent nisi filii Dei, ipsa enim est quae distinguit inter filios regni et filios perditionis, ut Augustinus dicit, in XV de Trin. Ergo ille qui habet caritatem non potest eam amittere. Objection 1. It would seem that we cannot lose charity when once we have it. For if we lose it, this can only be through sin. Now he who has charity cannot sin, for it is written (1 John 3:9): "Whosoever is born of God, committeth not sin; for His seed abideth in him, and he cannot sin, because he is born of God." But none save the children of God have charity, for it is this which distinguishes "the children of God from the children of perdition," as Augustine says (De Trin. xv, 17). Therefore he that has charity cannot lose it.
IIª-IIae q. 24 a. 11 arg. 2 Praeterea, Augustinus dicit, in VIII de Trin., quod dilectio, si non est vera, dilectio dicenda non est. Sed sicut ipse dicit in Epist. ad Iulianum comitem, caritas quae deseri potest, nunquam vera fuit. Ergo neque caritas fuit. Si ergo caritas semel habeatur, nunquam amittitur. Objection 2. Further, Augustine says (De Trin. viii, 7) that "if love be not true, it should not be called love." Now, as he says again in a letter to Count Julian, "charity which can fail was never true." [The quotation is from De Salutaribus Documentis ad quemdam comitem, vii., among the works of Paul of Friuli, more commonly known as Paul the Deacon, a monk of Monte Cassino.] Therefore it was no charity at all. Therefore, when once we have charity, we cannot lose it.
IIª-IIae q. 24 a. 11 arg. 3 Praeterea, Gregorius dicit, in homilia Pentecostes, quod amor Dei magna operatur, si est, si desinit operari, caritas non est. Sed nullus magna operando amittit caritatem. Ergo, si caritas insit, amitti non potest. Objection 3. Further, Gregory says in a homily for Pentecost (In Evang. xxx) that "God's love works great things where it is; if it ceases to work it is not charity." Now no man loses charity by doing great things. Therefore if charity be there, it cannot be lost.
IIª-IIae q. 24 a. 11 arg. 4 Praeterea, liberum arbitrium non inclinatur ad peccatum nisi per aliquod motivum ad peccandum. Sed caritas excludit omnia motiva ad peccandum, et amorem sui, et cupiditatem, et quidquid aliud huiusmodi est. Ergo caritas amitti non potest. Objection 4. Further, the free-will is not inclined to sin unless by some motive for sinning. Now charity excludes all motives for sinning, both self-love and cupidity, and all such things. Therefore charity cannot be lost.
IIª-IIae q. 24 a. 11 s. c. Sed contra est quod dicitur Apoc. II, habeo adversum te pauca, quod caritatem primam reliquisti. On the contrary, It is written (Apocalypse 2:4): "I have somewhat against thee, because thou hast left thy first charity."
IIª-IIae q. 24 a. 11 co. Respondeo dicendum quod per caritatem spiritus sanctus in nobis habitat, ut ex supradictis patet. Tripliciter ergo possumus considerare caritatem. Uno modo, ex parte spiritus sancti moventis animam ad diligendum Deum. Et ex hac parte caritas impeccabilitatem habet ex virtute spiritus sancti, qui infallibiliter operatur quodcumque voluerit. Unde impossibile est haec duo simul esse vera, quod spiritus sanctus aliquem velit movere ad actum caritatis, et quod ipse caritatem amittat peccando, nam donum perseverantiae computatur inter beneficia Dei quibus certissime liberantur quicumque liberantur, ut Augustinus dicit, in libro de Praed. Sanct. Alio modo potest considerari caritas secundum propriam rationem. Et sic caritas non potest nisi illud quod pertinet ad caritatis rationem. Unde caritas nullo modo potest peccare, sicut nec calor potest infrigidare; et sicut etiam iniustitia non potest bonum facere, ut Augustinus dicit, in libro de Serm. Dom. in monte. Tertio modo potest considerari caritas ex parte subiecti, quod est vertibile secundum arbitrii libertatem. Potest autem attendi comparatio caritatis ad hoc subiectum et secundum universalem rationem qua comparatur forma ad materiam; et secundum specialem rationem qua comparatur habitus ad potentiam. Est autem de ratione formae quod sit in subiecto amissibiliter quando non replet totam potentialitatem materiae, sicut patet in formis generabilium et corruptibilium. Quia materia horum sic recipit unam formam quod remanet in ea potentia ad aliam formam, quasi non repleta tota materiae potentialitate per unam formam; et ideo una forma potest amitti per acceptionem alterius. Sed forma corporis caelestis, quia replet totam materiae potentialitatem, ita quod non remanet in ea potentia ad aliam formam, inamissibiliter inest. Sic igitur caritas patriae, quia replet totam potentialitatem rationalis mentis, inquantum scilicet omnis actualis motus eius fertur in Deum, inamissibiliter habetur. Caritas autem viae non sic replet potentialitatem sui subiecti, quia non semper actu fertur in Deum. Unde quando actu in Deum non fertur, potest aliquid occurrere per quod caritas amittatur. Habitui vero proprium est ut inclinet potentiam ad agendum quod convenit habitui inquantum facit id videri bonum quod ei convenit, malum autem quod ei repugnat. Sicut enim gustus diiudicat sapores secundum suam dispositionem, ita mens hominis diiudicat de aliquo faciendo secundum suam habitualem dispositionem, unde et philosophus dicit, in III Ethic., quod qualis unusquisque est, talis finis videtur ei. Ibi ergo caritas inamissibiliter habetur, ubi id quod convenit caritati non potest videri nisi bonum, scilicet in patria, ubi Deus videtur per essentiam, quae est ipsa essentia bonitatis. Et ideo caritas patriae amitti non potest. Caritas autem viae, in cuius statu non videtur ipsa Dei essentia, quae est essentia bonitatis, potest amitti. I answer that, The Holy Ghost dwells in us by charity, as shown above (2; Q 23,24). We can, accordingly, consider charity in three ways: first on the part of the Holy Ghost, Who moves the soul to love God, and in this respect charity is incompatible with sin through the power of the Holy Ghost, Who does unfailingly whatever He wills to do. Hence it is impossible for these two things to be true at the same time--that the Holy Ghost should will to move a certain man to an act of charity, and that this man, by sinning, should lose charity. For the gift of perseverance is reckoned among the blessings of God whereby "whoever is delivered, is most certainly delivered," as Augustine says in his book on the Predestination of the saints (De Dono Persev. xiv). Secondly, charity may be considered as such, and thus it is incapable of anything that is against its nature. Wherefore charity cannot sin at all, even as neither can heat cool, nor unrighteousness do good, as Augustine says (De Serm. Dom. in Monte ii, 24). Thirdly, charity can be considered on the part of its subject, which is changeable on account of the free-will. Moreover charity may be compared with this subject, both from the general point of view of form in comparison with matter, and from the specific point of view of habit as compared with power. Now it is natural for a form to be in its subject in such a way that it can be lost, when it does not entirely fill the potentiality of matter: this is evident in the forms of things generated and corrupted, because the matter of such things receives one form in such a way, that it retains the potentiality to another form, as though its potentiality were not completely satisfied with the one form. Hence the one form may be lost by the other being received. On the other hand the form of a celestial body which entirely fills the potentiality of its matter, so that the latter does not retain the potentiality to another form, is in its subject inseparably. Accordingly the charity of the blessed, because it entirely fills the potentiality of the rational mind, since every actual movement of that mind is directed to God, is possessed by its subject inseparably: whereas the charity of the wayfarer does not so fill the potentiality of its subject, because the latter is not always actually directed to God: so that when it is not actually directed to God, something may occur whereby charity is lost. It is proper to a habit to incline a power to act, and this belongs to a habit, in so far as it makes whatever is suitable to it, to seem good, and whatever is unsuitable, to seem evil. For as the taste judges of savors according to its disposition, even so does the human mind judge of things to be done, according to its habitual disposition. Hence the Philosopher says (Ethic. iii, 5) that "such as a man is, so does the end appear to him." Accordingly charity is inseparable from its possessor, where that which pertains to charity cannot appear otherwise than good, and that is in heaven, where God is seen in His Essence, which is the very essence of goodness. Therefore the charity of heaven cannot be lost, whereas the charity of the way can, because in this state God is not seen in His Essence, which is the essence of goodness.
IIª-IIae q. 24 a. 11 ad 1 Ad primum ergo dicendum quod auctoritas illa loquitur secundum potestatem spiritus sancti, cuius conservatione a peccato immunes redduntur quos ipse movet quantum ipse voluerit. Reply to Objection 1. The passage quoted speaks from the point of view of the power of the Holy Ghost, by Whose safeguarding, those whom He wills to move are rendered immune from sin, as much as He wills.
IIª-IIae q. 24 a. 11 ad 2 Ad secundum dicendum quod caritas quae deseri potest ex ipsa ratione caritatis, vera caritas non est. Hoc enim esset si hoc in suo amore haberet, quod ad tempus amaret et postea amare desineret quod non esset verae dilectionis. Sed si caritas amittatur ex mutabilitate subiecti, contra propositum caritatis, quod in suo actu includitur; hoc non repugnat veritati caritatis. Reply to Objection 2. The charity which can fail by reason of itself is no true charity; for this would be the case, were its love given only for a time, and afterwards were to cease, which would be inconsistent with true love. If, however, charity be lost through the changeableness of the subject, and against the purpose of charity included in its act, this is not contrary to true charity.
IIª-IIae q. 24 a. 11 ad 3 Ad tertium dicendum quod amor Dei semper magna operatur in proposito, quod pertinet ad rationem caritatis. Non tamen semper magna operatur in actu, propter conditionem subiecti. Reply to Objection 3. The love of God ever works great things in its purpose, which is essential to charity; but it does not always work great things in its act, on account of the condition of its subject.
IIª-IIae q. 24 a. 11 ad 4 Ad quartum dicendum quod caritas, secundum rationem sui actus, excludit omne motivum ad peccandum. Sed quandoque contingit quod caritas actu non agit. Et tunc potest intervenire aliquod motivum ad peccandum, cui si consentiatur, caritas amittitur. Reply to Objection 4. Charity by reason of its act excludes every motive for sinning. But it happens sometimes that charity is not acting actually, and then it is possible for a motive to intervene for sinning, and if we consent to this motive, we lose charity.
IIª-IIae q. 24 a. 12 arg. 1 Ad duodecimum sic proceditur. Videtur quod caritas non amittatur per unum actum peccati mortalis. Dicit enim Origenes, in I Periarch., si aliquando satietas capit aliquem ex his qui in summo perfectoque constiterint gradu, non arbitror quod ad subitum quis evacuetur aut decidat, sed paulatim ac per partes eum decidere necesse est. Sed homo decidit caritatem amittens. Ergo caritas non amittitur per unum solum actum peccati mortalis. Objection 1. It would seem that charity is not lost through one mortal sin. For Origen says (Peri Archon i): "When a man who has mounted to the stage of perfection, is satiated, I do not think that he will become empty or fall away suddenly; but he must needs do so gradually and by little and little." But man falls away by losing charity. Therefore charity is not lost through only one mortal sin.
IIª-IIae q. 24 a. 12 arg. 2 Praeterea, Leo Papa dicit, in Serm. de passione, alloquens Petrum, vidit in te dominus non fidem victam, non dilectionem aversam, sed constantiam fuisse turbatam. Abundavit fletus, ubi non defecit affectus, et fons caritatis lavit verba formidinis. Et ex hoc accepit Bernardus quod dixit in Petro caritatem non fuisse extinctam, sed sopitam. Sed Petrus, negando Christum, peccavit mortaliter. Ergo caritas non amittitur per unum actum peccati mortalis. Objection 2. Further, Pope Leo in a sermon on the Passion (60) addresses Peter thus: "Our Lord saw in thee not a conquered faith, not an averted love, but constancy shaken. Tears abounded where love never failed, and the words uttered in trepidation were washed away by the fount of charity." From this Bernard [William of St. Thierry, De Nat. et Dig. Amoris. vi.] drew his assertion that "charity in Peter was not quenched, but cooled." But Peter sinned mortally in denying Christ. Therefore charity is not lost through one mortal sin.
IIª-IIae q. 24 a. 12 arg. 3 Praeterea, caritas est fortior quam virtus acquisita. Sed habitus virtutis acquisitae non tollitur per unum actum peccati contrarium. Ergo multo minus caritas tollitur per unum actum peccati mortalis contrarium. Objection 3. Further, charity is stronger than an acquired virtue. Now a habit of acquired virtue is not destroyed by one contrary sinful act. Much less, therefore, is charity destroyed by one contrary mortal sin.
IIª-IIae q. 24 a. 12 arg. 4 Praeterea, caritas importat dilectionem Dei et proximi. Sed aliquis committens aliquod peccatum mortale retinet dilectionem Dei et proximi, ut videtur, inordinatio enim affectionis circa ea quae sunt ad finem non tollit amorem finis, ut supra dictum est. Ergo potest remanere caritas ad Deum, existente peccato mortali per inordinatam affectionem circa aliquod temporale bonum. Objection 4. Further, charity denotes love of God and our neighbor. Now, seemingly, one may commit a mortal sin, and yet retain the love of God and one's neighbor; because an inordinate affection for things directed to the end, does not remove the love for the end, as stated above (Article 10). Therefore charity towards God can endure, though there be a mortal sin through an inordinate affection for some temporal good.
IIª-IIae q. 24 a. 12 arg. 5 Praeterea, virtutis theologicae obiectum est ultimus finis. Sed aliae virtutes theologicae, scilicet fides et spes, non excluduntur per unum actum peccati mortalis, immo remanent informes. Ergo etiam caritas potest remanere informis, etiam uno peccato mortali perpetrato. Objection 5. Further, the object of a theological virtue is the last end. Now the other theological virtues, namely faith and hope, are not done away by one mortal sin, in fact they remain though lifeless. Therefore charity can remain without a form, even when a mortal sin has been committed.
IIª-IIae q. 24 a. 12 s. c. Sed contra, per peccatum mortale fit homo dignus morte aeterna, secundum illud Rom. VI, stipendia peccati mors. Sed quilibet habens caritatem habet meritum vitae aeternae, dicitur enim Ioan. XIV, si quis diligit me, diligetur a patre meo, et ego diligam eum, et manifestabo ei meipsum; in qua quidem manifestatione vita aeterna consistit, secundum illud Ioan. XVII, haec est vita aeterna, ut cognoscant te, verum Deum, et quem misisti, Iesum Christum. Nullus autem potest esse simul dignus vita aeterna et morte aeterna. Ergo impossibile est quod aliquis habeat caritatem cum peccato mortali. Tollitur ergo caritas per unum actum peccati mortalis. On the contrary, By mortal sin man becomes deserving of eternal death, according to Romans 6:23: "The wages of sin is death." On the other hand whoever has charity is deserving of eternal life, for it is written (John 14:21): "He that loveth Me, shall be loved by My Father: and I will love Him, and will manifest Myself to him," in which manifestation everlasting life consists, according to John 17:3: "This is eternal life; that they may know Thee the . . . true God, and Jesus Christ Whom Thou hast sent." Now no man can be worthy, at the same time, of eternal life and of eternal death. Therefore it is impossible for a man to have charity with a mortal sin. Therefore charity is destroyed by one mortal sin.
IIª-IIae q. 24 a. 12 co. Respondeo dicendum quod unum contrarium per aliud contrarium superveniens tollitur. Quilibet autem actus peccati mortalis contrariatur caritati secundum propriam rationem, quae consistit in hoc quod Deus diligatur super omnia, et quod homo totaliter se illi subiiciat, omnia sua referendo in ipsum. Est igitur de ratione caritatis ut sic diligat Deum quod in omnibus velit se ei subiicere, et praeceptorum eius regulam in omnibus sequi, quidquid enim contrariatur praeceptis eius, manifeste contrariatur caritati. Unde de se habet quod caritatem excludere possit. Et si quidem caritas esset habitus acquisitus ex virtute subiecti dependens, non oporteret quod statim per unum actum contrarium tolleretur. Actus enim non directe contrariatur habitui, sed actui, conservatio autem habitus in subiecto non requirit continuitatem actus, unde ex superveniente contrario actu non statim habitus acquisitus excluditur. Sed caritas, cum sit habitus infusus, dependet ex actione Dei infundentis, qui sic se habet in infusione et conservatione caritatis sicut sol in illuminatione aeris, ut dictum est. Et ideo, sicut lumen statim cessaret esse in aere quod aliquod obstaculum poneretur illuminationi solis, ita etiam caritas statim deficit esse in anima quod aliquod obstaculum ponitur influentiae caritatis a Deo in animam. Manifestum est autem quod per quodlibet mortale peccatum, quod divinis praeceptis contrariatur, ponitur praedictae infusioni obstaculum, quia ex hoc ipso quod homo eligendo praefert peccatum divinae amicitiae, quae requirit ut Dei voluntatem sequamur, consequens est ut statim per unum actum peccati mortalis habitus caritatis perdatur. Unde et Augustinus dicit, VIII super Gen. ad Litt., quod homo, Deo sibi praesente, illuminatur; absente autem, continuo tenebratur; a quo non locorum intervallis, sed voluntatis aversione disceditur. I answer that, That one contrary is removed by the other contrary supervening. Now every mortal sin is contrary to charity by its very nature, which consists in man's loving God above all things, and subjecting himself to Him entirely, by referring all that is his to God. It is therefore essential to charity that man should so love God as to wish to submit to Him in all things, and always to follow the rule of His commandments; since whatever is contrary to His commandments is manifestly contrary to charity, and therefore by its very nature is capable of destroying charity. If indeed charity were an acquired habit dependent on the power of its subject, it would not necessarily be removed by one mortal sin, for act is directly contrary, not to habit but to act. Now the endurance of a habit in its subject does not require the endurance of its act, so that when a contrary act supervenes the acquired habit is not at once done away. But charity, being an infused habit, depends on the action of God Who infuses it, Who stands in relation to the infusion and safekeeping of charity, as the sun does to the diffusion of light in the air, as stated above (10, Objection 3). Consequently, just as the light would cease at once in the air, were an obstacle placed to its being lit up by the sun, even so charity ceases at once to be in the soul through the placing of an obstacle to the outpouring of charity by God into the soul. Now it is evident that through every mortal sin which is contrary to God's commandments, an obstacle is placed to the outpouring of charity, since from the very fact that a man chooses to prefer sin to God's friendship, which requires that we should obey His will, it follows that the habit of charity is lost at once through one mortal sin. Hence Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. viii, 12) that "man is enlightened by God's presence, but he is darkened at once by God's absence, because distance from Him is effected not by change of place but by aversion of the will."
IIª-IIae q. 24 a. 12 ad 1 Ad primum ergo dicendum quod verbum Origenis potest uno modo sic intelligi quod homo qui est in statu perfecto non subito procedit in actum peccati mortalis, sed ad hoc disponitur per aliquam negligentiam praecedentem. Unde et peccata venialia dicuntur esse dispositio ad mortale, sicut supra dictum est. Sed tamen per unum actum peccati mortalis, si eum commiserit, decidit, caritate amissa. Sed quia ipse subdit, si aliquis brevis lapsus acciderit, et cito resipiscat, non penitus ruere videtur, potest aliter dici quod ipse intelligit eum penitus evacuari et decidere qui sic decidit ut ex malitia peccet. Quod non statim in viro perfecto a principio contingit. Reply to Objection 1. This saying of Origen may be understood, in one way, that a man who is in the state of perfection, does not suddenly go so far as to commit a mortal sin, but is disposed thereto by some previous negligence, for which reason venial sins are said to be dispositions to mortal sin, as stated above (I-II, 88, 3). Nevertheless he falls, and loses charity through the one mortal sin if he commits it. Since, however, he adds: "If some slight slip should occur, and he recover himself quickly he does not appear to fall altogether," we may reply in another way, that when he speaks of a man being emptied and falling away altogether, he means one who falls so as to sin through malice; and this does not occur in a perfect man all at once.
IIª-IIae q. 24 a. 12 ad 2 Ad secundum dicendum quod caritas amittitur dupliciter. Uno modo, directe, per actualem contemptum. Et hoc modo Petrus caritatem non amisit. Alio modo, indirecte, quando committitur aliquod contrarium caritati propter aliquam passionem concupiscentiae vel timoris. Et hoc modo Petrus, contra caritatem faciens, caritatem amisit, sed eam cito recuperavit. Reply to Objection 2. Charity may be lost in two ways; first, directly, by actual contempt, and, in this way, Peter did not lose charity. Secondly, indirectly, when a sin is committed against charity, through some passion of desire or fear; it was by sinning against charity in this way, that Peter lost charity; yet he soon recovered it.
IIª-IIae q. 24 a. 12 ad 3 The Reply to the Third Objection is evident from what has been said.
IIª-IIae q. 24 a. 12 ad 4 Ad quartum dicendum quod non quaelibet inordinatio affectionis quae est circa ea quae sunt ad finem, idest circa bona creata, constituit peccatum mortale, sed solum quando est talis inordinatio quae repugnat divinae voluntati. Et hoc directe contrariatur caritati, ut dictum est. Reply to Objection 4. Not every inordinate affection for things directed to the end, i.e., for created goods, constitutes a mortal sin, but only such as is directly contrary to the Divine will; and then the inordinate affection is contrary to charity, as stated.
IIª-IIae q. 24 a. 12 ad 5 Ad quintum dicendum quod caritas importat unionem quandam ad Deum, non autem fides neque spes. Omne autem peccatum mortale consistit in aversione a Deo, ut supra dictum est. Et ideo omne peccatum mortale contrariatur caritati. Non autem omne peccatum mortale contrariatur fidei vel spei, sed quaedam determinata peccata, per quae habitus fidei et spei tollitur, sicut et per omne peccatum mortale habitus caritatis. Unde patet quod caritas non potest remanere informis, cum sit ultima forma virtutum, ex hoc quod respicit Deum in ratione finis ultimi, ut dictum est. Reply to Objection 5. Charity denotes union with God, whereas faith and hope do not. Now every mortal sin consists in aversion from God, as stated above (Gen. ad lit. viii, 12). Consequently every moral sin is contrary to charity, but not to faith and hope, but only certain determinate sins, which destroy the habit of faith or of hope, even as charity is destroyed by every moral sin. Hence it is evident that charity cannot remain lifeless, since it is itself the ultimate form regarding God under the aspect of last end as stated above (Question 23, Article 8).

Notes


  • [[]]
Personal tools