Authors/Thomas Aquinas/Summa Theologiae/Part IIb/Q23

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Q22 Q24



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IIª-IIae q. 23 pr. Consequenter considerandum est de caritate. Et primo, de ipsa caritate; secundo, de dono sapientiae ei correspondente. Circa primum consideranda sunt quinque, primo, de ipsa caritate; secundo, de obiecto caritatis; tertio, de actibus eius; quarto, de vitiis oppositis; quinto, de praeceptis ad hoc pertinentibus. Circa primum est duplex consideratio, prima quidem de ipsa caritate secundum se; secunda de caritate per comparationem ad subiectum. Circa primum quaeruntur octo. Primo, utrum caritas sit amicitia. Secundo, utrum sit aliquid creatum in anima. Tertio, utrum sit virtus. Quarto, utrum sit virtus specialis. Quinto, utrum sit una virtus. Sexto, utrum sit maxima virtutum. Septimo, utrum sine ea possit esse aliqua vera virtus. Octavo, utrum sit forma virtutum. Question 23. Charity, considered in itself Is charity friendship? Is it something created in the soul? Is it a virtue? Is it a special virtue? Is it one virtue? Is it the greatest of the virtues? Is any true virtue possible without it? Is it the form of the virtues?
IIª-IIae q. 23 a. 1 arg. 1 Ad primum sic proceditur. Videtur quod caritas non sit amicitia. Nihil enim est ita proprium amicitiae sicut convivere amico; ut philosophus dicit, in VIII Ethic. Sed caritas est hominis ad Deum et ad Angelos, quorum non est cum hominibus conversatio, ut dicitur Dan. II. Ergo caritas non est amicitia. Objection 1. It would seem that charity is not friendship. For nothing is so appropriate to friendship as to dwell with one's friend, according to the Philosopher (Ethic. viii, 5). Now charity is of man towards God and the angels, "whose dwelling [Douay: 'conversation'] is not with men" (Daniel 2:11). Therefore charity is not friendship.
IIª-IIae q. 23 a. 1 arg. 2 Praeterea, amicitia non est sine reamatione, ut dicitur in VIII Ethic. Sed caritas habetur etiam ad inimicos, secundum illud Matth. V, diligite inimicos vestros. Ergo caritas non est amicitia. Objection 2. Further, there is no friendship without return of love (Ethic. viii, 2). But charity extends even to one's enemies, according to Matthew 5:44: "Love your enemies." Therefore charity is not friendship.
IIª-IIae q. 23 a. 1 arg. 3 Praeterea, amicitiae tres sunt species, secundum philosophum, in VIII Ethic., scilicet amicitia delectabilis, utilis et honesti. Sed caritas non est amicitia utilis aut delectabilis, dicit enim Hieronymus, in Epist. ad Paulinum, quae ponitur in principio Bibliae, illa est vera necessitudo, et Christi glutino copulata, quam non utilitas rei familiaris, non praesentia tantum corporum, non subdola et palpans adulatio, sed Dei timor et divinarum Scripturarum studia conciliant. Similiter etiam non est amicitia honesti, quia caritate diligimus etiam peccatores; amicitia vero honesti non est nisi ad virtuosos, ut dicitur in VIII Ethic. Ergo caritas non est amicitia. Objection 3. Further, according to the Philosopher (Ethic. viii, 3) there are three kinds of friendship, directed respectively towards the delightful, the useful, or the virtuous. Now charity is not the friendship for the useful or delightful; for Jerome says in his letter to Paulinus which is to be found at the beginning of the Bible: "True friendship cemented by Christ, is where men are drawn together, not by household interests, not by mere bodily presence, not by crafty and cajoling flattery, but by the fear of God, and the study of the Divine Scriptures." No more is it friendship for the virtuous, since by charity we love even sinners, whereas friendship based on the virtuous is only for virtuous men (Ethic. viii). Therefore charity is not friendship.
IIª-IIae q. 23 a. 1 s. c. Sed contra est quod Ioan. XV dicitur, iam non dicam vos servos, sed amicos meos. Sed hoc non dicebatur eis nisi ratione caritatis. Ergo caritas est amicitia. On the contrary, It is written (John 15:15): "I will not now call you servants . . . but My friends." Now this was said to them by reason of nothing else than charity. Therefore charity is friendship.
IIª-IIae q. 23 a. 1 co. Respondeo dicendum quod, secundum philosophum, in VIII Ethic., non quilibet amor habet rationem amicitiae, sed amor qui est cum benevolentia, quando scilicet sic amamus aliquem ut ei bonum velimus. Si autem rebus amatis non bonum velimus, sed ipsum eorum bonum velimus nobis, sicut dicimur amare vinum aut equum aut aliquid huiusmodi, non est amor amicitiae, sed cuiusdam concupiscentiae, ridiculum enim est dicere quod aliquis habeat amicitiam ad vinum vel ad equum. Sed nec benevolentia sufficit ad rationem amicitiae, sed requiritur quaedam mutua amatio, quia amicus est amico amicus. Talis autem mutua benevolentia fundatur super aliqua communicatione. Cum igitur sit aliqua communicatio hominis ad Deum secundum quod nobis suam beatitudinem communicat, super hac communicatione oportet aliquam amicitiam fundari. De qua quidem communicatione dicitur I ad Cor. I, fidelis Deus, per quem vocati estis in societatem filii eius. Amor autem super hac communicatione fundatus est caritas. Unde manifestum est quod caritas amicitia quaedam est hominis ad Deum. I answer that, According to the Philosopher (Ethic. viii, 2,3) not every love has the character of friendship, but that love which is together with benevolence, when, to wit, we love someone so as to wish good to him. If, however, we do not wish good to what we love, but wish its good for ourselves, (thus we are said to love wine, or a horse, or the like), it is love not of friendship, but of a kind of concupiscence. For it would be absurd to speak of having friendship for wine or for a horse. Yet neither does well-wishing suffice for friendship, for a certain mutual love is requisite, since friendship is between friend and friend: and this well-wishing is founded on some kind of communication. Accordingly, since there is a communication between man and God, inasmuch as He communicates His happiness to us, some kind of friendship must needs be based on this same communication, of which it is written (1 Corinthians 1:9): "God is faithful: by Whom you are called unto the fellowship of His Son." The love which is based on this communication, is charity: wherefore it is evident that charity is the friendship of man for God.
IIª-IIae q. 23 a. 1 ad 1 Ad primum ergo dicendum quod duplex est hominis vita. Una quidem exterior secundum naturam sensibilem et corporalem, et secundum hanc vitam non est nobis communicatio vel conversatio cum Deo et Angelis. Alia autem est vita hominis spiritualis secundum mentem. Et secundum hanc vitam est nobis conversatio et cum Deo et cum Angelis. In praesenti quidem statu imperfecte, unde dicitur Philipp. III, nostra conversatio in caelis est. Sed ista conversatio perficietur in patria, quando servi eius servient Deo et videbunt faciem eius, ut dicitur Apoc. ult. Et ideo hic est caritas imperfecta, sed perficietur in patria. Reply to Objection 1. Man's life is twofold. There is his outward life in respect of his sensitive and corporeal nature: and with regard to this life there is no communication or fellowship between us and God or the angels. The other is man's spiritual life in respect of his mind, and with regard to this life there is fellowship between us and both God and the angels, imperfectly indeed in this present state of life, wherefore it is written (Philippians 3:20): "Our conversation is in heaven." But this "conversation" will be perfected in heaven, when "His servants shall serve Him, and they shall see His face" (Apocalypse 22:3-4). Therefore charity is imperfect here, but will be perfected in heaven.
IIª-IIae q. 23 a. 1 ad 2 Ad secundum dicendum quod amicitia se extendit ad aliquem dupliciter. Uno modo, respectu sui ipsius, et sic amicitia nunquam est nisi ad amicum. Alio modo se extendit ad aliquem respectu alterius personae, sicut, si aliquis habet amicitiam ad aliquem hominem, ratione eius diligit omnes ad illum hominem pertinentes, sive filios sive servos sive qualitercumque ei attinentes. Et tanta potest esse dilectio amici quod propter amicum amantur hi qui ad ipsum pertinent etiam si nos offendant vel odiant. Et hoc modo amicitia caritatis se extendit etiam ad inimicos, quos diligimus ex caritate in ordine ad Deum, ad quem principaliter habetur amicitia caritatis. Reply to Objection 2. Friendship extends to a person in two ways: first in respect of himself, and in this way friendship never extends but to one's friends: secondly, it extends to someone in respect of another, as, when a man has friendship for a certain person, for his sake he loves all belonging to him, be they children, servants, or connected with him in any way. Ondeed so much do we love our friends, that for their sake we love all who belong to them, even if they hurt or hate us; so that, in this way, the friendship of charity extends even to our enemies, whom we love out of charity in relation to God, to Whom the friendship of charity is chiefly directed.
IIª-IIae q. 23 a. 1 ad 3 Ad tertium dicendum quod amicitia honesti non habetur nisi ad virtuosum sicut ad principalem personam, sed eius intuitu diliguntur ad eum attinentes etiam si non sint virtuosi. Et hoc modo caritas, quae maxime est amicitia honesti, se extendit ad peccatores, quos ex caritate diligimus propter Deum. Reply to Objection 3. The friendship that is based on the virtuous is directed to none but a virtuous man as the principal person, but for his sake we love those who belong to him, even though they be not virtuous: in this way charity, which above all is friendship based on the virtuous, extends to sinners, whom, out of charity, we love for God's sake.
IIª-IIae q. 23 a. 2 arg. 1 Ad secundum sic proceditur. Videtur quod caritas non sit aliquid creatum in anima. Dicit enim Augustinus, in VIII de Trin., qui proximum diligit, consequens est ut ipsam dilectionem diligat. Deus autem dilectio est. Consequens est ergo ut praecipue Deum diligat. Et in XV de Trin. dicit, ita dictum est, Deus caritas est, sicut dictum est, Deus spiritus est. Ergo caritas non est aliquid creatum in anima, sed est ipse Deus. Objection 1. It would seem that charity is not something created in the soul. For Augustine says (De Trin. viii, 7): "He that loveth his neighbor, consequently, loveth love itself." Now God is love. Therefore it follows that he loves God in the first place. Again he says (De Trin. xv, 17): "It was said: God is Charity, even as it was said: God is a Spirit." Therefore charity is not something created in the soul, but is God Himself.
IIª-IIae q. 23 a. 2 arg. 2 Praeterea, Deus est spiritualiter vita animae, sicut anima vita corporis, secundum illud Deut. XXX, ipse est vita tua. Sed anima vivificat corpus per seipsam. Ergo Deus vivificat animam per seipsum. Vivificat autem eam per caritatem, secundum illud I Ioan. III, nos scimus quoniam translati sumus de morte ad vitam, quoniam diligimus fratres. Ergo Deus est ipsa caritas. Objection 2. Further, God is the life of the soul spiritually just as the soul is the life of the body, according to Deuteronomy 30:20: "He is thy life." Now the soul by itself quickens the body. Therefore God quickens the soul by Himself. But He quickens it by charity, according to 1 John 3:14: "We know that we have passed from death to life, because we love the brethren." Therefore God is charity itself.
IIª-IIae q. 23 a. 2 arg. 3 Praeterea, nihil creatum est infinitae virtutis, sed magis omnis creatura est vanitas. Caritas autem non est vanitas, sed magis vanitati repugnat, et est infinitae virtutis, quia animam hominis ad bonum infinitum perducit. Ergo caritas non est aliquid creatum in anima. Objection 3. Further, no created thing is of infinite power; on the contrary every creature is vanity. But charity is not vanity, indeed it is opposed to vanity; and it is of infinite power, since it brings the human soul to the infinite good. Therefore charity is not something created in the soul.
IIª-IIae q. 23 a. 2 s. c. Sed contra est quod Augustinus dicit, in III de Doct. Christ., caritatem voco motum animi ad fruendum Deo propter ipsum. Sed motus animi est aliquid creatum in anima. Ergo et caritas est aliquid creatum in anima. On the contrary, Augustine says (De Doctr. Christ. iii, 10): "By charity I mean the movement of the soul towards the enjoyment of God for His own sake." But a movement of the soul is something created in the soul. Therefore charity is something created in the soul.
IIª-IIae q. 23 a. 2 co. Respondeo dicendum quod Magister perscrutatur hanc quaestionem in XVII dist. I Lib. Sent., et ponit quod caritas non est aliquid creatum in anima, sed est ipse spiritus sanctus mentem inhabitans. Nec est sua intentio quod iste motus dilectionis quo Deum diligimus sit ipse spiritus sanctus, sed quod iste motus dilectionis est a spiritu sancto non mediante aliquo habitu, sicut a spiritu sancto sunt alii actus virtuosi mediantibus habitibus aliarum virtutum, puta habitu spei aut fidei aut alicuius alterius virtutis. Et hoc dicebat propter excellentiam caritatis. Sed si quis recte consideret, hoc magis redundat in caritatis detrimentum. Non enim motus caritatis ita procedit a spiritu sancto movente humanam mentem quod humana mens sit mota tantum et nullo modo sit principium huius motus, sicut cum aliquod corpus movetur ab aliquo exteriori movente. Hoc enim est contra rationem voluntarii, cuius oportet principium in ipso esse, sicut supra dictum est. Unde sequeretur quod diligere non esset voluntarium. Quod implicat contradictionem, cum amor de sui ratione importet quod sit actus voluntatis. Similiter etiam non potest dici quod sic moveat spiritus sanctus voluntatem ad actum diligendi sicut movetur instrumentum quod, etsi sit principium actus, non tamen est in ipso agere vel non agere. Sic enim etiam tolleretur ratio voluntarii, et excluderetur ratio meriti, cum tamen supra habitum sit quod dilectio caritatis est radix merendi. Sed oportet quod sic voluntas moveatur a spiritu sancto ad diligendum quod etiam ipsa sit efficiens hunc actum. Nullus autem actus perfecte producitur ab aliqua potentia activa nisi sit ei connaturalis per aliquam formam quae sit principium actionis. Unde Deus, qui omnia movet ad debitos fines, singulis rebus indidit formas per quas inclinantur ad fines sibi praestitutos a Deo, et secundum hoc disponit omnia suaviter, ut dicitur Sap. VIII. Manifestum est autem quod actus caritatis excedit naturam potentiae voluntatis. Nisi ergo aliqua forma superadderetur naturali potentiae per quam inclinaretur ad dilectionis actum, secundum hoc esset actus iste imperfectior actibus naturalibus et actibus aliarum virtutum, nec esset facilis et delectabilis. Quod patet esse falsum, quia nulla virtus habet tantam inclinationem ad suum actum sicut caritas, nec aliqua ita delectabiliter operatur. Unde maxime necesse est quod ad actum caritatis existat in nobis aliqua habitualis forma superaddita potentiae naturali, inclinans ipsam ad caritatis actum, et faciens eam prompte et delectabiliter operari. I answer that, The Master looks thoroughly into this question in 17 of the First Book, and concludes that charity is not something created in the soul, but is the Holy Ghost Himself dwelling in the mind. Nor does he mean to say that this movement of love whereby we love God is the Holy Ghost Himself, but that this movement is from the Holy Ghost without any intermediary habit, whereas other virtuous acts are from the Holy Ghost by means of the habits of other virtues, for instance the habit of faith or hope or of some other virtue: and this he said on account of the excellence of charity. But if we consider the matter aright, this would be, on the contrary, detrimental to charity. For when the Holy Ghost moves the human mind the movement of charity does not proceed from this motion in such a way that the human mind be merely moved, without being the principle of this movement, as when a body is moved by some extrinsic motive power. For this is contrary to the nature of a voluntary act, whose principle needs to be in itself, as stated above (I-II, 6, 1): so that it would follow that to love is not a voluntary act, which involves a contradiction, since love, of its very nature, implies an act of the will. Likewise, neither can it be said that the Holy Ghost moves the will in such a way to the act of loving, as though the will were an instrument, for an instrument, though it be a principle of action, nevertheless has not the power to act or not to act, for then again the act would cease to be voluntary and meritorious, whereas it has been stated above (I-II, 114, 4) that the love of charity is the root of merit: and, given that the will is moved by the Holy Ghost to the act of love, it is necessary that the will also should be the efficient cause of that act. Now no act is perfectly produced by an active power, unless it be connatural to that power of reason of some form which is the principle of that action. Wherefore God, Who moves all things to their due ends, bestowed on each thing the form whereby it is inclined to the end appointed to it by Him; and in this way He "ordereth all things sweetly" (Wisdom 8:1). But it is evident that the act of charity surpasses the nature of the power of the will, so that, therefore, unless some form be superadded to the natural power, inclining it to the act of love, this same act would be less perfect than the natural acts and the acts of the other powers; nor would it be easy and pleasurable to perform. And this is evidently untrue, since no virtue has such a strong inclination to its act as charity has, nor does any virtue perform its act with so great pleasure. Therefore it is most necessary that, for us to perform the act of charity, there should be in us some habitual form superadded to the natural power, inclining that power to the act of charity, and causing it to act with ease and pleasure.
IIª-IIae q. 23 a. 2 ad 1 Ad primum ergo dicendum quod ipsa essentia divina caritas est, sicut et sapientia est, et sicut bonitas est. Unde sicut dicimur boni bonitate quae Deus est, et sapientes sapientia quae Deus est, quia bonitas qua formaliter boni sumus est participatio quaedam divinae bonitatis, et sapientia qua formaliter sapientes sumus est participatio quaedam divinae sapientiae; ita etiam caritas qua formaliter diligimus proximum est quaedam participatio divinae caritatis. Hic enim modus loquendi consuetus est apud Platonicos, quorum doctrinis Augustinus fuit imbutus. Quod quidam non advertentes ex verbis eius sumpserunt occasionem errandi. Reply to Objection 1. The Divine Essence Itself is charity, even as It is wisdom and goodness. Wherefore just as we are said to be good with the goodness which is God, and wise with the wisdom which is God (since the goodness whereby we are formally good is a participation of Divine goodness, and the wisdom whereby we are formally wise, is a share of Divine wisdom), so too, the charity whereby formally we love our neighbor is a participation of Divine charity. For this manner of speaking is common among the Platonists, with whose doctrines Augustine was imbued; and the lack of adverting to this has been to some an occasion of error.
IIª-IIae q. 23 a. 2 ad 2 Ad secundum dicendum quod Deus est vita effective et animae per caritatem et corporis per animam, sed formaliter caritas est vita animae, sicut et anima corporis. Unde per hoc potest concludi quod, sicut anima immediate unitur corpori, ita caritas animae. Reply to Objection 2. God is effectively the life both of the soul by charity, and of the body by the soul: but formally charity is the life of the soul, even as the soul is the life of the body. Consequently we may conclude from this that just as the soul is immediately united to the body, so is charity to the soul.
IIª-IIae q. 23 a. 2 ad 3 Ad tertium dicendum quod caritas operatur formaliter. Efficacia autem formae est secundum virtutem agentis qui inducit formam. Et ideo quod caritas non est vanitas, sed facit effectum infinitum dum coniungit animam Deo iustificando ipsam, hoc demonstrat infinitatem virtutis divinae, quae est caritatis auctor. Reply to Objection 3. Charity works formally. Now the efficacy of a form depends on the power of the agent, who instills the form, wherefore it is evident that charity is not vanity. But because it produces an infinite effect, since, by justifying the soul, it unites it to God, this proves the infinity of the Divine power, which is the author of charity.
IIª-IIae q. 23 a. 3 arg. 1 Ad tertium sic proceditur. Videtur quod caritas non sit virtus. Caritas enim est amicitia quaedam. Sed amicitia a philosophis non ponitur virtus, ut in libro Ethic. patet, neque enim connumeratur inter virtutes morales neque inter intellectuales. Ergo etiam neque caritas est virtus. Objection 1. It would seem that charity is not a virtue. For charity is a kind of friendship. Now philosophers do not reckon friendship a virtue, as may be gathered from Ethic. viii, 1; nor is it numbered among the virtues whether moral or intellectual. Neither, therefore, is charity a virtue.
IIª-IIae q. 23 a. 3 arg. 2 Praeterea, virtus est ultimum potentiae, ut dicitur in I de caelo. Sed caritas non est ultimum; sed magis gaudium et pax. Ergo videtur quod caritas non sit virtus; sed magis gaudium et pax. Objection 2. Further, "virtue is the ultimate limit of power" (De Coelo et Mundo i, 11). But charity is not something ultimate, this applies rather to joy and peace. Therefore it seems that charity is not a virtue, and that this should be said rather of joy and peace.
IIª-IIae q. 23 a. 3 arg. 3 Praeterea, omnis virtus est quidam habitus accidentalis. Sed caritas non est habitus accidentalis, cum sit nobilior ipsa anima; nullum autem accidens est nobilius subiecto. Ergo caritas non est virtus. Objection 3. Further, every virtue is an accidental habit. But charity is not an accidental habit, since it is a more excellent thing than the soul itself: whereas no accident is more excellent than its subject. Therefore charity is not a virtue.
IIª-IIae q. 23 a. 3 s. c. Sed contra est quod Augustinus dicit, in libro de moribus Eccles., caritas est virtus quae, cum nostra rectissima affectio est, coniungit nos Deo, qua eum diligimus. On the contrary, Augustine says (De Moribus Eccl. xi): "Charity is a virtue which, when our affections are perfectly ordered, unites us to God, for by it we love Him."
IIª-IIae q. 23 a. 3 co. Respondeo dicendum quod humani actus bonitatem habent secundum quod regulantur debita regula et mensura, et ideo humana virtus, quae est principium omnium bonorum actuum hominis, consistit in attingendo regulam humanorum actuum. Quae quidem est duplex, ut supra dictum est, scilicet humana ratio, et ipse Deus. Unde sicut virtus moralis definitur per hoc quod est secundum rationem rectam, ut patet in II Ethic., ita etiam attingere Deum constituit rationem virtutis, sicut etiam supra dictum est de fide et spe. Unde, cum caritas attingit Deum, quia coniungit nos Deo, ut patet per auctoritatem Augustini inductam; consequens est caritatem esse virtutem. I answer that, Human acts are good according as they are regulated by their due rule and measure. Wherefore human virtue which is the principle of all man's good acts consists in following the rule of human acts, which is twofold, as stated above (Question 17, Article 1), viz. human reason and God. Consequently just as moral virtue is defined as being "in accord with right reason," as stated in Ethic. ii, 6, so too, the nature of virtue consists in attaining God, as also stated above with regard to faith, (4, 5) and hope (17, 1). Wherefore, it follows that charity is a virtue, for, since charity attains God, it unites us to God, as evidenced by the authority of Augustine quoted above.
IIª-IIae q. 23 a. 3 ad 1 Ad primum ergo dicendum quod philosophus in VIII Ethic. non negat amicitiam esse virtutem, sed dicit quod est virtus vel cum virtute. Posset enim dici quod est virtus moralis circa operationes quae sunt ad alium, sub alia tamen ratione quam iustitia. Nam iustitia est circa operationes quae sunt ad alium sub ratione debiti legalis, amicitia autem sub ratione cuiusdam debiti amicabilis et moralis, vel magis sub ratione beneficii gratuiti, ut patet per philosophum, in VIII Ethic. Potest tamen dici quod non est virtus per se ab aliis distincta. Non enim habet rationem laudabilis et honesti nisi ex obiecto, secundum scilicet quod fundatur super honestate virtutum, quod patet ex hoc quod non quaelibet amicitia habet rationem laudabilis et honesti, sicut patet in amicitia delectabilis et utilis. Unde amicitia virtuosa magis est aliquid consequens ad virtutes quam sit virtus. Nec est simile de caritate, quae non fundatur principaliter super virtute humana, sed super bonitate divina. Reply to Objection 1. The Philosopher (Ethic. viii) does not deny that friendship is a virtue, but affirms that it is "either a virtue or with a virtue." For we might say that it is a moral virtue about works done in respect of another person, but under a different aspect from justice. For justice is about works done in respect of another person, under the aspect of the legal due, whereas friendship considers the aspect of a friendly and moral duty, or rather that of a gratuitous favor, as the Philosopher explains (Ethic. viii, 13). Nevertheless it may be admitted that it is not a virtue distinct of itself from the other virtues. For its praiseworthiness and virtuousness are derived merely from its object, in so far, to wit, as it is based on the moral goodness of the virtues. This is evident from the fact that not every friendship is praiseworthy and virtuous, as in the case of friendship based on pleasure or utility. Wherefore friendship for the virtuous is something consequent to virtue rather than a virtue. Moreover there is no comparison with charity since it is not founded principally on the virtue of a man, but on the goodness of God.
IIª-IIae q. 23 a. 3 ad 2 Ad secundum dicendum quod eiusdem virtutis est diligere aliquem et gaudere de illo, nam gaudium amorem consequitur, ut supra habitum est, cum de passionibus ageretur. Et ideo magis ponitur virtus amor quam gaudium, quod est amoris effectus. Ultimum autem quod ponitur in ratione virtutis non importat ordinem effectus, sed magis ordinem superexcessus cuiusdam, sicut centum librae excedunt sexaginta. Reply to Objection 2. It belongs to the same virtue to love a man and to rejoice about him, since joy results from love, as stated above (I-II, 25, 2) in the treatise on the passions: wherefore love is reckoned a virtue, rather than joy, which is an effect of love. And when virtue is described as being something ultimate, we mean that it is last, not in the order of effect, but in the order of excess, just as one hundred pounds exceed sixty.
IIª-IIae q. 23 a. 3 ad 3 Ad tertium dicendum quod omne accidens secundum suum esse est inferius substantia, quia substantia est ens per se, accidens autem in alio. Sed secundum rationem suae speciei, accidens quidem quod causatur ex principiis subiecti est indignius subiecto, sicut effectus causa. Accidens autem quod causatur ex participatione alicuius superioris naturae est dignius subiecto, inquantum est similitudo superioris naturae, sicut lux diaphano. Et hoc modo caritas est dignior anima, inquantum est participatio quaedam spiritus sancti. Reply to Objection 3. Every accident is inferior to substance if we consider its being, since substance has being in itself, while an accident has its being in another: but considered as to its species, an accident which results from the principles of its subject is inferior to its subject, even as an effect is inferior to its cause; whereas an accident that results from a participation of some higher nature is superior to its subject, in so far as it is a likeness of that higher nature, even as light is superior to the diaphanous body. On this way charity is superior to the soul, in as much as it is a participation of the Holy Ghost.
IIª-IIae q. 23 a. 4 arg. 1 Ad quartum sic proceditur. Videtur quod caritas non sit virtus specialis. Dicit enim Hieronymus, ut breviter omnem virtutis definitionem complectar, virtus est caritas, qua diligitur Deus et proximus. Et Augustinus dicit, in libro de moribus Eccles., quod virtus est ordo amoris. Sed nulla virtus specialis ponitur in definitione virtutis communis. Ergo caritas non est specialis virtus. Objection 1. It would seem that charity is not a special virtue. For Jerome says: "Let me briefly define all virtue as the charity whereby we love God" [The reference should be to Augustine, Ep. clxvii]: and Augustine says (De Moribus Eccl. xv) [De Civ. Dei xv, 22 that "virtue is the order of love." Now no special virtue is included in the definition of virtue in general. Therefore charity is not a special virtue.
IIª-IIae q. 23 a. 4 arg. 2 Praeterea, illud quod se extendit ad opera omnium virtutum non potest esse specialis virtus. Sed caritas se extendit ad opera omnium virtutum, secundum illud I ad Cor. XIII, caritas patiens est, benigna est, et cetera. Extendit etiam se ad omnia opera humana, secundum illud I ad Cor. ult., omnia opera vestra in caritate fiant. Ergo caritas non est specialis virtus. Objection 2. Further, that which extends to all works of virtue, cannot be a special virtue. But charity extends to all works of virtue, according to 1 Corinthians 13:4: "Charity is patient, is kind," etc.; indeed it extends to all human actions, according to 1 Corinthians 16:14: "Let all your things be done in charity." Therefore charity is not a special virtue.
IIª-IIae q. 23 a. 4 arg. 3 Praeterea, praecepta legis respondent actibus virtutum. Sed Augustinus, in libro de Perfect. Hum. Iust., dicit quod generalis iussio est, diliges; et generalis prohibitio, non concupisces. Ergo caritas est generalis virtus. Objection 3. Further, the precepts of the Law refer to acts of virtue. Now Augustine says (De Perfect. Human. Justit. v) that, "Thou shalt love" is "a general commandment," and "Thou shalt not covet," "a general prohibition." Therefore charity is a general virtue.
IIª-IIae q. 23 a. 4 s. c. Sed contra, nullum generale connumeratur speciali. Sed caritas connumeratur specialibus virtutibus, scilicet fidei et spei, secundum illud I ad Cor. XIII, nunc autem manent fides, spes, caritas, tria haec. Ergo caritas est virtus specialis. On the contrary, Nothing general is enumerated together with what is special. But charity is enumerated together with special virtues, viz. hope and faith, according to 1 Corinthians 13:13: "And now there remain faith, hope, charity, these three." Therefore charity is a special virtue.
IIª-IIae q. 23 a. 4 co. Respondeo dicendum quod actus et habitus specificantur per obiecta, ut ex supradictis patet. Proprium autem obiectum amoris est bonum, ut supra habitum est. Et ideo ubi est specialis ratio boni, ibi est specialis ratio amoris. Bonum autem divinum, inquantum est beatitudinis obiectum, habet specialem rationem boni. Et ideo amor caritatis, qui est amor huius boni, est specialis amor. Unde et caritas est specialis virtus. I answer that, Acts and habits are specified by their objects, as shown above (I-II, 18, 2; I-II, 54, 2). Now the proper object of love is the good, as stated above (I-II, 27, 1), so that wherever there is a special aspect of good, there is a special kind of love. But the Divine good, inasmuch as it is the object of happiness, has a special aspect of good, wherefore the love of charity, which is the love of that good, is a special kind of love. Therefore charity is a special virtue.
IIª-IIae q. 23 a. 4 ad 1 Ad primum ergo dicendum quod caritas ponitur in definitione omnis virtutis, non quia sit essentialiter omnis virtus, sed quia ab ea dependent aliqualiter omnes virtutes, ut infra dicetur. Sicut etiam prudentia ponitur in definitione virtutum moralium, ut patet in II et VI Ethic., eo quod virtutes morales dependent a prudentia. Reply to Objection 1. Charity is included in the definition of every virtue, not as being essentially every virtue, but because every virtue depends on it in a way, as we shall state further on (A7,8). On this way prudence is included in the definition of the moral virtues, as explained in Ethic. ii, vi, from the fact that they depend on prudence.
IIª-IIae q. 23 a. 4 ad 2 Ad secundum dicendum quod virtus vel ars ad quam pertinet finis ultimus, imperat virtutibus vel artibus ad quas pertinent alii fines secundarii, sicut militaris imperat equestri, ut dicitur in I Ethic. Et ideo, quia caritas habet pro obiecto ultimum finem humanae vitae, scilicet beatitudinem aeternam, ideo extendit se ad actus totius humanae vitae per modum imperii, non quasi immediate eliciens omnes actus virtutum. Reply to Objection 2. The virtue or art which is concerned about the last end, commands the virtues or arts which are concerned about other ends which are secondary, thus the military art commands the art of horse-riding (Ethic. i). Accordingly since charity has for its object the last end of human life, viz. everlasting happiness, it follows that it extends to the acts of a man's whole life, by commanding them, not by eliciting immediately all acts of virtue.
IIª-IIae q. 23 a. 4 ad 3 Ad tertium dicendum quod praeceptum de diligendo dicitur esse iussio generalis, quia ad hoc reducuntur omnia alia praecepta sicut ad finem, secundum illud I ad Tim. I, finis praecepti caritas est. Reply to Objection 3. The precept of love is said to be a general command, because all other precepts are reduced thereto as to their end, according to 1 Timothy 1:5: "The end of the commandment is charity."
IIª-IIae q. 23 a. 5 arg. 1 Ad quintum sic proceditur. Videtur quod caritas non sit una virtus. Habitus enim distinguuntur secundum obiecta. Sed duo sunt obiecta caritatis, Deus et proximus, quae in infinitum ab invicem distant. Ergo caritas non est una virtus. Objection 1. It would seem that charity is not one virtue. For habits are distinct according to their objects. Now there are two objects of charity--God and our neighbor--which are infinitely distant from one another. Therefore charity is not one virtue.
IIª-IIae q. 23 a. 5 arg. 2 Praeterea, diversae rationes obiecti diversificant habitum, etiam si obiectum sit realiter idem, ut ex supradictis patet. Sed multae sunt rationes diligendi Deum, quia ex singulis beneficiis eius perceptis debitores sumus dilectionis ipsius. Ergo caritas non est una virtus. Objection 2. Further, different aspects of the object diversify a habit, even though that object be one in reality, as shown above (17, 6; I-II, 54, 2, ad 1). Now there are many aspects under which God is an object of love, because we are debtors to His love by reason of each one of His favors. Therefore charity is not one virtue.
IIª-IIae q. 23 a. 5 arg. 3 Praeterea, sub caritate includitur amicitia ad proximum. Sed philosophus, in VIII Ethic., ponit diversas amicitiae species. Ergo caritas non est una virtus, sed multiplicatur in diversas species. Objection 3. Further, charity comprises friendship for our neighbor. But the Philosopher reckons several species of friendship (Ethic. viii, 3,11,12). Therefore charity is not one virtue, but is divided into a number of various species.
IIª-IIae q. 23 a. 5 s. c. Sed contra, sicut obiectum fidei est Deus, ita et caritatis. Sed fides est una virtus, propter unitatem divinae veritatis, secundum illud ad Ephes. IV, una fides. Ergo etiam caritas est una virtus, propter unitatem divinae bonitatis. On the contrary, Just as God is the object of faith, so is He the object of charity. Now faith is one virtue by reason of the unity of the Divine truth, according to Ephesians 4:5: "One faith." Therefore charity also is one virtue by reason of the unity of the Divine goodness.
IIª-IIae q. 23 a. 5 co. Respondeo dicendum quod caritas, sicut dictum est, est quaedam amicitia hominis ad Deum. Diversae autem amicitiarum species accipiuntur quidem uno modo secundum diversitatem finis, et secundum hoc dicuntur tres species amicitiae, scilicet amicitia utilis, delectabilis et honesti. Alio modo, secundum diversitatem communicationum in quibus amicitiae fundantur, sicut alia species amicitiae est consanguineorum, et alia concivium aut peregrinantium, quarum una fundatur super communicatione naturali, aliae super communicatione civili vel peregrinationis; ut patet per philosophum, in VIII Ethic. Neutro autem istorum modorum caritas potest dividi in plura. Nam caritatis finis est unus, scilicet divina bonitas. Est etiam et una communicatio beatitudinis aeternae, super quam haec amicitia fundatur. Unde relinquitur quod caritas est simpliciter una virtus, non distincta in plures species. I answer that, Charity, as stated above (Article 1) is a kind of friendship of man for God. Now the different species of friendship are differentiated, first of all, in respect of a diversity of end, and in this way there are three species of friendship, namely friendship for the useful, for the delightful, and for the virtuous; secondly, in respect of the different kinds of communion on which friendships are based; thus there is one species of friendship between kinsmen, and another between fellow citizens or fellow travellers, the former being based on natural communion, the latter on civil communion or on the comradeship of the road, as the Philosopher explains (Ethic. viii, 12). Now charity cannot be differentiated in either of these ways: for its end is one, namely, the goodness of God; and the fellowship of everlasting happiness, on which this friendship is based, is also one. Hence it follows that charity is simply one virtue, and not divided into several species.
IIª-IIae q. 23 a. 5 ad 1 Ad primum ergo dicendum quod ratio illa directe procederet si Deus et proximus ex aequo essent caritatis obiecta. Hoc autem non est verum, sed Deus est principale obiectum caritatis, proximus autem ex caritate diligitur propter Deum. Reply to Objection 1. This argument would hold, if God and our neighbor were equally objects of charity. But this is not true: for God is the principal object of charity, while our neighbor is loved out of charity for God's sake.
IIª-IIae q. 23 a. 5 ad 2 Ad secundum dicendum quod caritate diligitur Deus propter seipsum. Unde una sola ratio diligendi principaliter attenditur a caritate, scilicet divina bonitas, quae est eius substantia, secundum illud Psalm., confitemini domino, quoniam bonus. Aliae autem rationes ad diligendum inducentes, vel debitum dilectionis facientes, sunt secundariae et consequentes ex prima. Reply to Objection 2. God is loved by charity for His own sake: wherefore charity regards principally but one aspect of lovableness, namely God's goodness, which is His substance, according to Psalm 105:1: "Give glory to the Lord for He is good." Other reasons that inspire us with love for Him, or which make it our duty to love Him, are secondary and result from the first.
IIª-IIae q. 23 a. 5 ad 3 Ad tertium dicendum quod amicitiae humanae, de qua philosophus loquitur, est diversus finis et diversa communicatio. Quod in caritate locum non habet, ut dictum est. Et ideo non est similis ratio. Reply to Objection 3. Human friendship of which the Philosopher treats has various ends and various forms of fellowship. This does not apply to charity, as stated above: wherefore the comparison fails.
IIª-IIae q. 23 a. 6 arg. 1 Ad sextum sic proceditur. Videtur quod caritas non sit excellentissima virtutum. Altioris enim potentiae altior est virtus, sicut et altior operatio. Sed intellectus est altior voluntate, et dirigit ipsam. Ergo fides, quae est in intellectu, est excellentior caritate, quae est in voluntate. Objection 1. It would seem that charity is not the most excellent of the virtues. Because the higher power has the higher virtue even as it has a higher operation. Now the intellect is higher than the will, since it directs the will. Therefore, faith, which is in the intellect, is more excellent than charity which is in the will.
IIª-IIae q. 23 a. 6 arg. 2 Praeterea, illud per quod aliud operatur, videtur eo esse inferius, sicut minister, per quem dominus aliquid operatur, est inferior domino. Sed fides per dilectionem operatur, ut habetur ad Gal. V. Ergo fides est excellentior caritate. Objection 2. Further, the thing by which another works seems the less excellent of the two, even as a servant, by whom his master works, is beneath his master. Now "faith . . . worketh by charity," according to Galatians 5:6. Therefore faith is more excellent than charity.
IIª-IIae q. 23 a. 6 arg. 3 Praeterea, illud quod se habet ex additione ad aliud, videtur esse perfectius. Sed spes videtur se habere ex additione ad caritatem, nam caritatis obiectum est bonum, spei autem obiectum est bonum arduum. Ergo spes est excellentior caritate. Objection 3. Further, that which is by way of addition to another seems to be the more perfect of the two. Now hope seems to be something additional to charity: for the object of charity is good, whereas the object of hope is an arduous good. Therefore hope is more excellent than charity.
IIª-IIae q. 23 a. 6 s. c. Sed contra est quod dicitur I ad Cor. XIII, maior horum est caritas. On the contrary, It is written (1 Corinthians 13:13): "The greater of these is charity."
IIª-IIae q. 23 a. 6 co. Respondeo dicendum quod, cum bonum in humanis actibus attendatur secundum quod regulantur debita regula, necesse est quod virtus humana, quae est principium bonorum actuum, consistat in attingendo humanorum actuum regulam. Est autem duplex regula humanorum actuum, ut supra dictum est, scilicet ratio humana et Deus, sed Deus est prima regula, a qua etiam humana ratio regulanda est. Et ideo virtutes theologicae, quae consistunt in attingendo illam regulam primam, eo quod earum obiectum est Deus, excellentiores sunt virtutibus moralibus vel intellectualibus, quae consistunt in attingendo rationem humanam. Propter quod oportet quod etiam inter ipsas virtutes theologicas illa sit potior quae magis Deum attingit. Semper autem id quod est per se magis est eo quod est per aliud. Fides autem et spes attingunt quidem Deum secundum quod ex ipso provenit nobis vel cognitio veri vel adeptio boni, sed caritas attingit ipsum Deum ut in ipso sistat, non ut ex eo aliquid nobis proveniat. Et ideo caritas est excellentior fide et spe; et per consequens omnibus aliis virtutibus. Sicut etiam prudentia, quae attingit rationem secundum se, est excellentior quam aliae virtutes morales, quae attingunt rationem secundum quod ex ea medium constituitur in operationibus vel passionibus humanis. I answer that, Since good, in human acts, depends on their being regulated by the due rule, it must needs be that human virtue, which is a principle of good acts, consists in attaining the rule of human acts. Now the rule of human acts is twofold, as stated above (Article 3), namely, human reason and God: yet God is the first rule, whereby, even human reason must be regulated. Consequently the theological virtues, which consist in attaining this first rule, since their object is God, are more excellent than the moral, or the intellectual virtues, which consist in attaining human reason: and it follows that among the theological virtues themselves, the first place belongs to that which attains God most. Now that which is of itself always ranks before that which is by another. But faith and hope attain God indeed in so far as we derive from Him the knowledge of truth or the acquisition of good, whereas charity attains God Himself that it may rest in Him, but not that something may accrue to us from Him. Hence charity is more excellent than faith or hope, and, consequently, than all the other virtues, just as prudence, which by itself attains reason, is more excellent than the other moral virtues, which attain reason in so far as it appoints the mean in human operations or passions.
IIª-IIae q. 23 a. 6 ad 1 Ad primum ergo dicendum quod operatio intellectus completur secundum quod intellectum est in intelligente, et ideo nobilitas operationis intellectualis attenditur secundum mensuram intellectus. Operatio autem voluntatis, et cuiuslibet virtutis appetitivae, perficitur in inclinatione appetentis ad rem sicut ad terminum. Ideo dignitas operationis appetitivae attenditur secundum rem quae est obiectum operationis. Ea autem quae sunt infra animam nobiliori modo sunt in anima quam in seipsis, quia unumquodque est in aliquo per modum eius in quo est, ut habetur in libro de causis, quae vero sunt supra animam nobiliori modo sunt in seipsis quam sint in anima. Et ideo eorum quae sunt infra nos nobilior est cognitio quam dilectio, propter quod philosophus, in X Ethic., praetulit virtutes intellectuales moralibus. Sed eorum quae sunt supra nos, et praecipue dilectio Dei, cognitioni praefertur. Et ideo caritas est excellentior fide. Reply to Objection 1. The operation of the intellect is completed by the thing understood being in the intellectual subject, so that the excellence of the intellectual operation is assessed according to the measure of the intellect. On the other hand, the operation of the will and of every appetitive power is completed in the tendency of the appetite towards a thing as its term, wherefore the excellence of the appetitive operation is gauged according to the thing which is the object of the operation. Now those things which are beneath the soul are more excellent in the soul than they are in themselves, because a thing is contained according to the mode of the container (De Causis xii). On the other hand, things that are above the soul, are more excellent in themselves than they are in the soul. Consequently it is better to know than to love the things that are beneath us; for which reason the Philosopher gave the preference to the intellectual virtues over the moral virtues (Ethic. x, 7,8): whereas the love of the things that are above us, especially of God, ranks before the knowledge of such things. Therefore charity is more excellent than faith.
IIª-IIae q. 23 a. 6 ad 2 Ad secundum dicendum quod fides non operatur per dilectionem sicut per instrumentum, ut dominus per servum; sed sicut per formam propriam. Et ideo ratio non sequitur. Reply to Objection 2. Faith works by love, not instrumentally, as a master by his servant, but as by its proper form: hence the argument does not prove.
IIª-IIae q. 23 a. 6 ad 3 Ad tertium dicendum quod idem bonum est obiectum caritatis et spei, sed caritas importat unionem ad illud bonum, spes autem distantiam quandam ab eo. Et inde est quod caritas non respicit illud bonum ut arduum sicut spes, quod enim iam unitum est non habet rationem ardui. Et ex hoc apparet quod caritas est perfectior spe. Reply to Objection 3. The same good is the object of charity and of hope: but charity implies union with that good, whereas hope implies distance therefrom. Hence charity does not regard that good as being arduous, as hope does, since what is already united has not the character of arduous: and this shows that charity is more perfect than hope.
IIª-IIae q. 23 a. 7 arg. 1 Ad septimum sic proceditur. Videtur quod sine caritate possit esse aliqua vera virtus. Virtutis enim proprium est bonum actum producere. Sed illi qui non habent caritatem faciunt aliquos bonos actus, puta dum nudum vestiunt, famelicum pascunt et similia operantur. Ergo sine caritate potest esse aliqua vera virtus. Objection 1. It would seem that there can be true virtue without charity. For it is proper to virtue to produce a good act. Now those who have not charity, do some good actions, as when they clothe the naked, or feed the hungry and so forth. Therefore true virtue is possible without charity.
IIª-IIae q. 23 a. 7 arg. 2 Praeterea, caritas non potest esse sine fide, procedit enim ex fide non ficta, ut apostolus dicit, I Tim. I. Sed in infidelibus potest esse vera castitas, dum concupiscentias cohibent; et vera iustitia, dum recte iudicant. Ergo vera virtus potest esse sine caritate. Objection 2. Further, charity is not possible without faith, since it comes of "an unfeigned faith," as the Apostle says (1 Timothy 1:5). Now, in unbelievers, there can be true chastity, if they curb their concupiscences, and true justice, if they judge rightly. Therefore true virtue is possible without charity.
IIª-IIae q. 23 a. 7 arg. 3 Praeterea, scientia et ars quaedam virtutes sunt, ut patet in VI Ethic. Sed huiusmodi inveniuntur in hominibus peccatoribus non habentibus caritatem. Ergo vera virtus potest esse sine caritate. Objection 3. Further, science and art are virtues, according to Ethic. vi. But they are to be found in sinners who lack charity. Therefore true virtue can be without charity.
IIª-IIae q. 23 a. 7 s. c. Sed contra est quod apostolus dicit, I ad Cor. XIII, si distribuero in cibos pauperum omnes facultates meas, et si tradidero corpus meum ita ut ardeam, caritatem autem non habeam, nihil mihi prodest. Sed virtus vera multum prodest, secundum illud Sap. VIII, sobrietatem et iustitiam docet, prudentiam et virtutem, quibus in vita nihil est utilius hominibus. Ergo sine caritate vera virtus esse non potest. On the contrary, The Apostle says (1 Corinthians 13:3): "If I should distribute all my goods to the poor, and if I should deliver my body to be burned, and have not charity, it profiteth me nothing." And yet true virtue is very profitable, according to Wisdom 8:7: "She teacheth temperance, and prudence, and justice, and fortitude, which are such things as men can have nothing more profitable in life." Therefore no true virtue is possible without charity.
IIª-IIae q. 23 a. 7 co. Respondeo dicendum quod virtus ordinatur ad bonum, ut supra habitum est. Bonum autem principaliter est finis, nam ea quae sunt ad finem non dicuntur bona nisi in ordine ad finem. Sicut ergo duplex est finis, unus ultimus et alius proximus, ita etiam est duplex bonum, unum quidem ultimum, et aliud proximum et particulare. Ultimum quidem et principale bonum hominis est Dei fruitio, secundum illud Psalm., mihi adhaerere Deo bonum est, et ad hoc ordinatur homo per caritatem. Bonum autem secundarium et quasi particulare hominis potest esse duplex, unum quidem quod est vere bonum, utpote ordinabile, quantum est in se, ad principale bonum, quod est ultimus finis; aliud autem est bonum apparens et non verum, quia abducit a finali bono. Sic igitur patet quod virtus vera simpliciter est illa quae ordinat ad principale bonum hominis, sicut etiam philosophus, in VII Physic., dicit quod virtus est dispositio perfecti ad optimum. Et sic nulla vera virtus potest esse sine caritate. Sed si accipiatur virtus secundum quod est in ordine ad aliquem finem particularem, sic potest aliqua virtus dici sine caritate, inquantum ordinatur ad aliquod particulare bonum. Sed si illud particulare bonum non sit verum bonum, sed apparens, virtus etiam quae est in ordine ad hoc bonum non erit vera virtus, sed falsa similitudo virtutis, sicut non est vera virtus avarorum prudentia, qua excogitant diversa genera lucellorum; et avarorum iustitia, qua gravium damnorum metu contemnunt aliena; et avarorum temperantia, qua luxuriae, quoniam sumptuosa est, cohibent appetitum; et avarorum fortitudo, qua, ut ait Horatius, per mare pauperiem fugiunt, per saxa, per ignes, ut Augustinus dicit, in IV Lib. contra Iulian. Si vero illud bonum particulare sit verum bonum, puta conservatio civitatis vel aliquid huiusmodi, erit quidem vera virtus, sed imperfecta, nisi referatur ad finale et perfectum bonum. Et secundum hoc simpliciter vera virtus sine caritate esse non potest. I answer that, Virtue is ordered to the good, as stated above (I-II, 55, 4). Now the good is chiefly an end, for things directed to the end are not said to be good except in relation to the end. Accordingly, just as the end is twofold, the last end, and the proximate end, so also, is good twofold, one, the ultimate and universal good, the other proximate and particular. The ultimate and principal good of man is the enjoyment of God, according to Psalm 72:28: "It is good for me to adhere to God," and to this good man is ordered by charity. Man's secondary and, as it were, particular good may be twofold: one is truly good, because, considered in itself, it can be directed to the principal good, which is the last end; while the other is good apparently and not truly, because it leads us away from the final good. Accordingly it is evident that simply true virtue is that which is directed to man's principal good; thus also the Philosopher says (Phys. vii, text. 17) that "virtue is the disposition of a perfect thing to that which is best": and in this way no true virtue is possible without charity. If, however, we take virtue as being ordered to some particular end, then we speak of virtue being where there is no charity, in so far as it is directed to some particular good. But if this particular good is not a true, but an apparent good, it is not a true virtue that is ordered to such a good, but a counterfeit virtue. Even so, as Augustine says (Contra Julian. iv, 3), "the prudence of the miser, whereby he devises various roads to gain, is no true virtue; nor the miser's justice, whereby he scorns the property of another through fear of severe punishment; nor the miser's temperance, whereby he curbs his desire for expensive pleasures; nor the miser's fortitude, whereby as Horace, says, 'he braves the sea, he crosses mountains, he goes through fire, in order to avoid poverty'" (Epis. lib, 1; Ep. i, 45). If, on the other hand, this particular good be a true good, for instance the welfare of the state, or the like, it will indeed be a true virtue, imperfect, however, unless it be referred to the final and perfect good. Accordingly no strictly true virtue is possible without charity.
IIª-IIae q. 23 a. 7 ad 1 Ad primum ergo dicendum quod actus alicuius caritate carentis potest esse duplex. Unus quidem secundum hoc quod caritate caret, utpote cum facit aliquid in ordine ad id per quod caret caritate. Et talis actus semper est malus, sicut Augustinus dicit, in IV contra Iulian., quod actus infidelis, inquantum est infidelis, semper est peccatum; etiam si nudum operiat vel quidquid aliud huiusmodi faciat, ordinans ad finem suae infidelitatis. Alius autem potest esse actus carentis caritate non secundum id quod caritate caret, sed secundum quod habet aliquod aliud donum Dei, vel fidem vel spem, vel etiam naturae bonum, quod non totum per peccatum tollitur, ut supra dictum est. Et secundum hoc sine caritate potest quidem esse aliquis actus bonus ex suo genere, non tamen perfecte bonus, quia deest debita ordinatio ad ultimum finem. Reply to Objection 1. The act of one lacking charity may be of two kinds; one is in accordance with his lack of charity, as when he does something that is referred to that whereby he lacks charity. Such an act is always evil: thus Augustine says (Contra Julian. iv, 3) that the actions which an unbeliever performs as an unbeliever, are always sinful, even when he clothes the naked, or does any like thing, and directs it to his unbelief as end. There is, however, another act of one lacking charity, not in accordance with his lack of charity, but in accordance with his possession of some other gift of God, whether faith, or hope, or even his natural good, which is not completely taken away by sin, as stated above (10, 4; I-II, 85, 2). On this way it is possible for an act, without charity, to be generically good, but not perfectly good, because it lacks its due order to the last end.
IIª-IIae q. 23 a. 7 ad 2 Ad secundum dicendum quod, cum finis se habeat in agibilibus sicut principium in speculativis, sicut non potest esse simpliciter vera scientia si desit recta aestimatio de primo et indemonstrabili principio; ita non potest esse simpliciter vera iustitia aut vera castitas si desit ordinatio debita ad finem, quae est per caritatem, quantumcumque aliquis se recte circa alia habeat. Reply to Objection 2. Since the end is in practical matters, what the principle is in speculative matters, just as there can be no strictly true science, if a right estimate of the first indemonstrable principle be lacking, so, there can be no strictly true justice, or chastity, without that due ordering to the end, which is effected by charity, however rightly a man may be affected about other matters.
IIª-IIae q. 23 a. 7 ad 3 Ad tertium dicendum quod scientia et ars de sui ratione important ordinem ad aliquod particulare bonum, non autem ultimum finem humanae vitae, sicut virtutes morales, quae simpliciter faciunt hominem bonum, ut supra dictum est. Et ideo non est similis ratio. Reply to Objection 3. Science and art of their very nature imply a relation to some particular good, and not to the ultimate good of human life, as do the moral virtues, which make man good simply, as stated above (I-II, 56, 3). Hence the comparison fails.
IIª-IIae q. 23 a. 8 arg. 1 Ad octavum sic proceditur. Videtur quod caritas non sit forma virtutum. Forma enim alicuius rei vel est exemplaris, vel est essentialis. Sed caritas non est forma exemplaris virtutum aliarum, quia sic oporteret quod aliae virtutes essent eiusdem speciei cum ipsa. Similiter etiam non est forma essentialis aliarum virtutum, quia non distingueretur ab aliis. Ergo nullo modo est forma virtutum. Objection 1. It would seem that charity is not the true form of the virtues. Because the form of a thing is either exemplar or essential. Now charity is not the exemplar form of the other virtues, since it would follow that the other virtues are of the same species as charity: nor is it the essential form of the other virtues, since then it would not be distinct from them. Therefore it is in no way the form of the virtues.
IIª-IIae q. 23 a. 8 arg. 2 Praeterea, caritas comparatur ad alias virtutes ut radix et fundamentum, secundum illud Ephes. III, in caritate radicati et fundati. Radix autem vel fundamentum non habet rationem formae, sed magis rationem materiae, quia est prima pars in generatione. Ergo caritas non est forma virtutum. Objection 2. Further, charity is compared to the other virtues as their root and foundation, according to Ephesians 3:17: "Rooted and founded in charity." Now a root or foundation is not the form, but rather the matter of a thing, since it is the first part in the making. Therefore charity is not the form of the virtues.
IIª-IIae q. 23 a. 8 arg. 3 Praeterea, forma et finis et efficiens non incidunt in idem numero, ut patet in II Physic. Sed caritas dicitur finis et mater virtutum. Ergo non debet dici forma virtutum. Objection 3. Further, formal, final, and efficient causes do not coincide with one another (Phys. ii, 7). Now charity is called the end and the mother of the virtues. Therefore it should not be called their form.
IIª-IIae q. 23 a. 8 s. c. Sed contra est quod Ambrosius dicit caritatem esse formam virtutum. On the contrary, Ambrose [Lombard, Sent. iii, D, 23 says that charity is the form of the virtues.
IIª-IIae q. 23 a. 8 co. Respondeo dicendum quod in moralibus forma actus attenditur principaliter ex parte finis, cuius ratio est quia principium moralium actuum est voluntas, cuius obiectum et quasi forma est finis. Semper autem forma actus consequitur formam agentis. Unde oportet quod in moralibus id quod dat actui ordinem ad finem, det ei et formam. Manifestum est autem secundum praedicta quod per caritatem ordinantur actus omnium aliarum virtutum ad ultimum finem. Et secundum hoc ipsa dat formam actibus omnium aliarum virtutum. Et pro tanto dicitur esse forma virtutum, nam et ipsae virtutes dicuntur in ordine ad actus formatos. I answer that, In morals the form of an act is taken chiefly from the end. The reason of this is that the principal of moral acts is the will, whose object and form, so to speak, are the end. Now the form of an act always follows from a form of the agent. Consequently, in morals, that which gives an act its order to the end, must needs give the act its form. Now it is evident, in accordance with what has been said (7), that it is charity which directs the acts of all other virtues to the last end, and which, consequently, also gives the form to all other acts of virtue: and it is precisely in this sense that charity is called the form of the virtues, for these are called virtues in relation to "informed" acts.
IIª-IIae q. 23 a. 8 ad 1 Ad primum ergo dicendum quod caritas dicitur esse forma aliarum virtutum non quidem exemplariter aut essentialiter, sed magis effective, inquantum scilicet omnibus formam imponit secundum modum praedictum. Reply to Objection 1. Charity is called the form of the other virtues not as being their exemplar or their essential form, but rather by way of efficient cause, in so far as it sets the form on all, in the aforesaid manner.
IIª-IIae q. 23 a. 8 ad 2 Ad secundum dicendum quod caritas comparatur fundamento et radici inquantum ex ea sustentantur et nutriuntur omnes aliae virtutes, et non secundum rationem qua fundamentum et radix habent rationem causae materialis. Reply to Objection 2. Charity is compared to the foundation or root in so far as all other virtues draw their sustenance and nourishment therefrom, and not in the sense that the foundation and root have the character of a material cause.
IIª-IIae q. 23 a. 8 ad 3 Ad tertium dicendum quod caritas dicitur finis aliarum virtutum quia omnes alias virtutes ordinat ad finem suum. Et quia mater est quae in se concipit ex alio, ex hac ratione dicitur mater aliarum virtutum, quia ex appetitu finis ultimi concipit actus aliarum virtutum, imperando ipsos. Reply to Objection 3. Charity is said to be the end of other virtues, because it directs all other virtues to its own end. And since a mother is one who conceives within herself and by another, charity is called the mother of the other virtues, because, by commanding them, it conceives the acts of the other virtues, by the desire of the last end.

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