Authors/Thomas Aquinas/Summa Theologiae/Part IIb/Q22

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Q21 Q23



Latin English
IIª-IIae q. 22 pr. Deinde considerandum est de praeceptis pertinentibus ad spem et timorem. Et circa hoc quaeruntur duo. Primo, de praeceptis pertinentibus ad spem. Secundo, de praeceptis pertinentibus ad timorem. Question 22. The precepts relating to hope and fear The precepts relating to hope The precepts relating to fear
IIª-IIae q. 22 a. 1 arg. 1 Ad primum sic proceditur. Videtur quod nullum praeceptum sit dandum pertinens ad virtutem spei. Quod enim potest sufficienter fieri per unum, non oportet quod ad id aliquid aliud inducatur. Sed ad sperandum bonum sufficienter homo inducitur ex ipsa naturali inclinatione. Ergo non oportet quod ad hoc inducatur homo per legis praeceptum. Objection 1. It would seem that no precept should be given relating to the virtue of hope. For when an effect is sufficiently procured by one cause, there is no need to induce it by another. Now man is sufficiently induced by his natural inclination to hope for good. Therefore there is no need of a precept of the Law to induce him to do this.
IIª-IIae q. 22 a. 1 arg. 2 Praeterea, cum praecepta dentur de actibus virtutum, principalia praecepta debent dari de actibus principalium virtutum. Sed inter omnes virtutes principaliores sunt tres virtutes theologicae, scilicet spes, fides et caritas. Cum igitur principalia legis praecepta sint praecepta Decalogi, ad quae omnia alia reducuntur, ut supra habitum est; videtur quod, si de spe daretur aliquod praeceptum, quod deberet inter praecepta Decalogi contineri. Non autem continetur. Ergo videtur quod nullum praeceptum in lege debeat dari de actu spei. Objection 2. Further, since precepts are given about acts of virtue, the chief precepts are about the acts of the chief virtues. Now the chief of all the virtues are the three theological virtues, viz. hope, faith and charity. Consequently, as the chief precepts of the Law are those of the decalogue, to which all others may be reduced, as stated above (I-II, 100, 3), it seems that if any precept of hope were given, it should be found among the precepts of the decalogue. But it is not to be found there. Therefore it seems that the Law should contain no precept of hope.
IIª-IIae q. 22 a. 1 arg. 3 Praeterea, eiusdem rationis est praecipere actum virtutis et prohibere actum vitii oppositi. Sed non invenitur aliquod praeceptum datum per quod prohibeatur desperatio, quae est opposita spei. Ergo videtur quod nec de spe conveniat aliquod praeceptum dari. Objection 3. Further, to prescribe an act of virtue is equivalent to a prohibition of the act of the opposite vice. Now no precept is to be found forbidding despair which is contrary to hope. Therefore it seems that the Law should contain no precept of hope.
IIª-IIae q. 22 a. 1 s. c. Sed contra est quod Augustinus dicit, super illud Ioan. XV, hoc est praeceptum meum, ut diligatis invicem, de fide nobis quam multa mandata sunt; quam multa de spe. Ergo de spe convenit aliqua praecepta dari. On the contrary, Augustine says on John 15:12, "This is My commandment, that you love one another" (Tract. lxxxiii in Joan.): "How many things are commanded us about faith! How many relating to hope!" Therefore it is fitting that some precepts should be given about hope.
IIª-IIae q. 22 a. 1 co. Respondeo dicendum quod praeceptorum quae in sacra Scriptura inveniuntur quaedam sunt de substantia legis; quaedam vero sunt praeambula ad legem. Praeambula quidem sunt ad legem illa quibus non existentibus lex locum habere non potest. Huiusmodi autem sunt praecepta de actu fidei et de actu spei, quia per actum fidei mens hominis inclinatur ut recognoscat auctorem legis talem cui se subdere debeat; per spem vero praemii homo inducitur ad observantiam praeceptorum. Praecepta vero de substantia legis sunt quae homini iam subiecto et ad obediendum parato imponuntur, pertinentia ad rectitudinem vitae. Et ideo huiusmodi praecepta statim in ipsa legis latione proponuntur per modum praeceptorum. Spei vero et fidei praecepta non erant proponenda per modum praeceptorum, quia nisi homo iam crederet et speraret, frustra ei lex proponeretur. Sed sicut praeceptum fidei proponendum fuit per modum denuntiationis vel commemorationis, ut supra dictum est; ita etiam praeceptum spei in prima legis latione proponendum fuit per modum promissionis, qui enim obedientibus praemia promittit, ex hoc ipso incitat ad spem. Unde omnia promissa quae in lege continentur sunt spei excitativa. Sed quia, lege iam posita, pertinet ad sapientes viros ut non solum inducant homines ad observantiam praeceptorum, sed etiam multo magis ad conservandum legis fundamentum; ideo post primam legis lationem in sacra Scriptura multipliciter inducuntur homines ad sperandum, etiam per modum admonitionis vel praecepti, et non solum per modum promissionis, sicut in lege, sicut patet in Psalm., sperate in eo omnes congregationes populi, et in multis aliis Scripturae locis. I answer that, Among the precepts contained in Holy Writ, some belong to the substance of the Law, others are preambles to the Law. The preambles to the Law are those without which no law is possible: such are the precepts relating to the act of faith and the act of hope, because the act of faith inclines man's mind so that he believes the Author of the Law to be One to Whom he owes submission, while, by the hope of a reward, he is induced to observe the precepts. The precepts that belong to the substance of the Law are those which relate to right conduct and are imposed on man already subject and ready to obey: wherefore when the Law was given these precepts were set forth from the very outset under form of a command. Yet the precepts of hope and faith were not to be given under the form of a command, since, unless man already believed and hoped, it would be useless to give him the Law: but, just as the precept of faith had to be given under the form of an announcement or reminder, as stated above (Question 16, Article 1), so too, the precept of hope, in the first promulgation of the Law, had to be given under the form of a promise. For he who promises rewards to them that obey him, by that very fact, urges them to hope: hence all the promises contained in the Law are incitements to hope. Since, however, when once the Law has been given, it is for a wise man to induce men not only to observe the precepts, but also, and much more, to safeguard the foundation of the Law, therefore, after the first promulgation of the Law, Holy Writ holds out to man many inducements to hope, even by way of warning or command, and not merely by way of promise, as in the Law; for instance, in the Psalm 61:9: "Hope [Douay: 'Trust'] in Him all ye congregation of the people," and in many other passages of the Scriptures.
IIª-IIae q. 22 a. 1 ad 1 Ad primum ergo dicendum quod natura sufficienter inclinat ad sperandum bonum naturae humanae proportionatum. Sed ad sperandum supernaturale bonum oportuit hominem induci auctoritate legis divinae, partim quidem promissis, partim autem admonitionibus vel praeceptis. Et tamen ad ea etiam ad quae naturalis ratio inclinat, sicut sunt actus virtutum moralium, necessarium fuit praecepta legis divinae dari, propter maiorem firmitatem; et praecipue quia naturalis ratio hominis obtenebrata erat per concupiscentias peccati. Reply to Objection 1. Nature inclines us to hope for the good which is proportionate to human nature; but for man to hope for a supernatural good he had to be induced by the authority of the Divine law, partly by promises, partly by admonitions and commands. Nevertheless there was need for precepts of the Divine law to be given even for those things to which natural reason inclines us, such as the acts of the moral virtues, for sake of insuring a greater stability, especially since the natural reason of man was clouded by the lusts of sin.
IIª-IIae q. 22 a. 1 ad 2 Ad secundum dicendum quod praecepta Decalogi pertinent ad primam legis lationem. Et ideo inter praecepta Decalogi non fuit dandum praeceptum aliquod de spe, sed suffecit per aliquas promissiones positas inducere ad spem, ut patet in primo et quarto praecepto. Reply to Objection 2. The precepts of the law of the decalogue belong to the first promulgation of the Law: hence there was no need for a precept of hope among the precepts of the decalogue, and it was enough to induce men to hope by the inclusion of certain promises, as in the case of the first and fourth commandments.
IIª-IIae q. 22 a. 1 ad 3 Ad tertium dicendum quod in illis ad quorum observationem homo tenetur ex ratione debiti, sufficit praeceptum affirmativum dari de eo quod faciendum est, in quibus prohibitiones eorum quae sunt vitanda intelliguntur. Sicut datur praeceptum de honoratione parentum, non autem prohibetur quod parentes dehonorentur, nisi per hoc quod dehonorantibus poena adhibetur in lege. Et quia debitum est ad humanam salutem ut speret homo de Deo, fuit ad hoc homo inducendus aliquo praedictorum modorum quasi affirmative, in quo intelligeretur prohibitio oppositi. Reply to Objection 3. In those observances to which man is bound as under a duty, it is enough that he receive an affirmative precept as to what he has to do, wherein is implied the prohibition of what he must avoid doing: thus he is given a precept concerning the honor due to parents, but not a prohibition against dishonoring them, except by the law inflicting punishment on those who dishonor their parents. And since in order to be saved it is man's duty to hope in God, he had to be induced to do so by one of the above ways, affirmatively, so to speak, wherein is implied the prohibition of the opposite.
IIª-IIae q. 22 a. 2 arg. 1 Ad secundum sic proceditur. Videtur quod de timore non fuerit dandum aliquod praeceptum in lege. Timor enim Dei est de his quae sunt praeambula ad legem, cum sit initium sapientiae. Sed ea quae sunt praeambula ad legem non cadunt sub praeceptis legis. Ergo de timore non est dandum aliquod praeceptum legis. Objection 1. It would seem that, in the Law, there should not have been given a precept of fear. For the fear of God is about things which are a preamble to the Law, since it is the "beginning of wisdom." Now things which are a preamble to the Law do not come under a precept of the Law. Therefore no precept of fear should be given in the Law.
IIª-IIae q. 22 a. 2 arg. 2 Praeterea, posita causa ponitur effectus. Sed amor est causa timoris, omnis enim timor ex aliquo amore procedit, ut Augustinus dicit, in libro octoginta trium quaest. Ergo, posito praecepto de amore, superfluum fuisset praecipere timorem. Objection 2. Further, given the cause, the effect is also given. Now love is the cause of fear, since "every fear proceeds from some kind of love," as Augustine states (Qq. lxxxiii, qu. 33). Therefore given the precept of love, it would have been superfluous to command fear.
IIª-IIae q. 22 a. 2 arg. 3 Praeterea, timori aliquo modo opponitur praesumptio. Sed nulla prohibitio invenitur in lege de praesumptione data. Ergo videtur quod nec de timore aliquod praeceptum dari debuerit. Objection 3. Further, presumption, in a way, is opposed to fear. But the Law contains no prohibition against presumption. Therefore it seems that neither should any precept of fear have been given.
IIª-IIae q. 22 a. 2 s. c. Sed contra est quod dicitur Deut. X, et nunc, Israel, quid dominus Deus tuus petit a te, nisi ut timeas dominum Deum tuum? Sed illud a nobis requirit quod nobis praecipit observandum. Ergo sub praecepto cadit quod aliquis timeat Deum. On the contrary, It is written (Deuteronomy 10:12): "And now, Israel, what doth the Lord thy God require of thee, but that thou fear the Lord thy God?" But He requires of us that which He commands us to do. Therefore it is a matter of precept that man should fear God.
IIª-IIae q. 22 a. 2 co. Respondeo dicendum quod duplex est timor, scilicet servilis et filialis. Sicut autem aliquis inducitur ad observantiam praeceptorum legis per spem praemiorum, ita etiam inducitur ad legis observantiam per timorem poenarum, qui est timor servilis. Et ideo sicut, secundum praedicta, in ipsa legis latione non fuit praeceptum dandum de actu spei, sed ad hoc fuerunt homines inducendi per promissa; ita nec de timore qui respicit poenam fuit praeceptum dandum per modum praecepti, sed ad hoc fuerunt homines inducendi per comminationem poenarum. Quod fuit factum et in ipsis praeceptis Decalogi, et postmodum consequenter in secundariis legis praeceptis. Sed sicut sapientes et prophetae consequenter, intendentes homines stabilire in obedientia legis, documenta tradiderunt de spe per modum admonitionis vel praecepti, ita etiam et de timore. Sed timor filialis, qui reverentiam exhibet Deo, est quasi quoddam genus ad dilectionem Dei, et principium quoddam omnium eorum quae in Dei reverentiam observantur. Et ideo de timore filiali dantur praecepta in lege sicut et de dilectione, quia utrumque est praeambulum ad exteriores actus qui praecipiuntur in lege, ad quos pertinent praecepta Decalogi. Et ideo in auctoritate legis inducta requiritur ab homine timor, et ut ambulet in viis Dei colendo ipsum, et ut diligat ipsum. I answer that, Fear is twofold, servile and filial. Now just as man is induced, by the hope of rewards, to observe precepts of law, so too is he induced thereto by the fear of punishment, which fear is servile. And just as according to what has been said (1), in the promulgation of the Law there was no need for a precept of the act of hope, and men were to be induced thereto by promises, so neither was there need for a precept, under form of command, of fear which regards punishment, and men were to be induced thereto by the threat of punishment: and this was realized both in the precepts of the decalogue, and afterwards, in due sequence, in the secondary precepts of the Law. Yet, just as wise men and the prophets who, consequently, strove to strengthen man in the observance of the Law, delivered their teaching about hope under the form of admonition or command, so too did they in the matter of fear. On the other hand filial fear which shows reverence to God, is a sort of genus in respect of the love of God, and a kind of principle of all observances connected with reverence for God. Hence precepts of filial fear are given in the Law, even as precepts of love, because each is a preamble to the external acts prescribed by the Law and to which the precepts of the decalogue refer. Hence in the passage quoted in the argument, "On the contrary," man is required "to have fear, to walk in God's ways," by worshipping Him, and "to love Him."
IIª-IIae q. 22 a. 2 ad 1 Ad primum ergo dicendum quod timor filialis est quoddam praeambulum ad legem non sicut extrinsecum aliquid, sed sicut principium legis, sicut etiam dilectio. Et ideo de utroque dantur praecepta, quae sunt quasi quaedam principia communia totius legis. Reply to Objection 1. Filial fear is a preamble to the Law, not as though it were extrinsic thereto, but as being the beginning of the Law, just as love is. Hence precepts are given of both, since they are like general principles of the whole Law.
IIª-IIae q. 22 a. 2 ad 2 Ad secundum dicendum quod ex amore sequitur timor filialis, sicut etiam et alia bona opera quae ex caritate fiunt. Et ideo sicut post praeceptum caritatis dantur praecepta de aliis actibus virtutum, ita etiam simul dantur praecepta de timore et amore caritatis. Sicut etiam in scientiis demonstrativis non sufficit ponere principia prima, nisi etiam ponantur conclusiones quae ex his sequuntur vel proxime vel remote. Reply to Objection 2. From love proceeds filial fear as also other good works that are done from charity. Hence, just as after the precept of charity, precepts are given of the other acts of virtue, so at the same time precepts are given of fear and of the love of charity, just as, in demonstrative sciences, it is not enough to lay down the first principles, unless the conclusions also are given which follow from them proximately or remotely.
IIª-IIae q. 22 a. 2 ad 3 Ad tertium dicendum quod inductio ad timorem sufficit ad excludendum praesumptionem, sicut etiam inductio ad spem sufficit ad excludendum desperationem, ut dictum est. Reply to Objection 3. Inducement to fear suffices to exclude presumption, even as inducement to hope suffices to exclude despair, as stated above (1, ad 3).

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