Authors/Ockham/Summa Logicae/Book I/Chapter 6

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Latin English
[CAP. 6. QUOD NOMEN CONCRETUM ET ABSTRACTUM ALIQUANDO IDEM SIGNIFICANT] [Chapter 6: A concrete and an abstract name sometimes signify the same thing]
Praeter modum praedictum nominum concretorum et abstractorum sunt multi alii, quorum unus est quod nomen concretum et abstractum quandoque sunt synonyma. Sed ne in aequivoco procedatur, sciendum quod hoc nomen 'synonyma' dupliciter accipitur, scilicet stricte et large. Beyond the mode of concrete and abstract names mentioned above, there are many others, of which one is that the concrete name and the abstract name are sometimes synonyms. But, in order not to proceed in an ambiguous way, it should be known that the name ‘synonyms’ is taken in two senses, namely narrowly and broadly.
Stricte dicuntur illa synonyma quibus omnes utentes intendunt simpliciter uti pro eodem, et sic non loquor hic de synonymis . Large dicuntur illa synonyma quae simpliciter idem significant omnibus modis, ita quod nihil aliquo modo significatur per unum quin eodem modo significetur per reliquum, quamvis non omnes utentes credant ipsa idem significare sed decepti aestiment aliquid significari per unum quod non significatur per reliquum, sicut si aliqui aestimarent quod hoc nomen 'Deus' importaret unum totum et 'deitas' partem eius. Isto secundo modo intendo uti in isto capitulo, et in multis aliis, hoc nomine 'synonyma'. Synonyms in the narrow sense are those which all users intend to use without qualification for the same thing, and I am not talking about synonyms in this way here. Synonyms in the broad sense are those which signify without qualification the same in all ways, so that nothing is signified in any way by one unless it is signified in the same way by the other, even though not all users believe them to signify the same but rather, being deceived, they esteem something to be signified by the one that is not signified by the other - for example, if some persons were to suppose that the name ‘God’ conveyed a whole and ‘deity’ a part of it. I intend to use the name ‘synonym’ in this second sense in this chapter and in many others.
Et dico quod concretum et abstractum quandoque sunt synonyma, sicut secundum intentionem Philosophi ista nomina sunt synonyma 'Deus' et 'deitas', 'homo' et 'humanitas', 'animal-animalitas', 'equus' et 'equinitas'. Et hinc est quod multa nomina habemus consimilia concretis talibus, non tamen abstractis consimilia. Quamvis enim frequenter ponant hoc nomen 'humanitas' et hoc nomen 'animalitas' et quandoque hoc nomen 'equinitas' quae , correspondent quasi abstracta istis nominibus 'homo', 'animal', 'equus', tamen raro vel numquam inveniuntur talia nomina 'bovinitas', 'asineitas', 'caprineitas', 'albedineitas', 'nigredineitas', 'coloreitas', 'dulcedineitas', quamvis istis nominibus 'bos', 'asinus', 'capra', 'albedo', 'nigredo', 'color', 'dulcedo' frequenter utamur. And I say that a concrete name and the abstract name corresponding to it are sometimes synonyms. For example, according to the Philosopher’s intention, ‘God’ and ‘deity’, ‘man’ and ‘humanity’, ‘animal’ and ‘animality’, ‘horse’ and ‘horsehood’. And hence it is that we have many names similar to these concrete names, but not many similar to the abstract names. For although authorities frequently use the name ‘humanity’ and the name ‘animality’, and sometimes the name ‘horsehood’ (which correspond as abstract names to the names ‘man’, ‘animal’, ‘horse’), nevertheless names like ‘cowship’, ‘donkeyness’, ‘goathood’, ‘whitenesshood’, ‘blacknesshood’, ‘colorship’, ‘sweetnesshood’ are rarely or never found - even though we frequently use the names ‘cow’, ‘ass’, ‘goat’, ‘whiteness’, ‘blackness’, ‘sweetness’, ‘color’.
Immo sicut apud antiquos philosophos ista nomina sunt synonyma 'calor-caliditas', 'frigus-frigiditas', ita ista erunt synonyma apud eos 'equus-equinitas', 'homo-humanitas'. Nec in talibus curabant distinguere inter nomina concreta et abstracta quantum ad significationem, quamvis unum illorum haberet plures syllabas et formam abstractorum primo modo dictorum et aliud non, sed magis formam concretorum primo modo dictorum. Nec tali diversitate talium nominum utebantur nisi causa ornatus locutionis vel aliqua alia causa accidentali, sicut nec nominibus svnonymis. Indeed, just as among the ancient philosophers the names ‘heat/hotness’, ‘cold /coldness’ are synonyms, so ‘horse/horsehood’, ‘man/humanity’ were synonyms for them. Nor in such cases did they care to distinguish between concrete and abstract names with respect to their signification, even though the one had more syllables and the form of abstract names in the first of the above modes, and the other one did not but instead [had] more the [syntactical] form of concrete [names] in the first of the above modes. Nor did they employ a diversity of such names except as an ornament of speech, or for some other accidental reason, just as in the case of synonymous names.
Sub isto modo nominum concretorum et abstractorum, secundum intentionem Philosophi et Commentatoris, comprehenduntur omnia nomina substantiarum concreta et abstracta ficta ab eis, quae nec pro accidente nec pro parte nec pro toto illius quod importatur per nomen concretum secundum formam nec pro aliqua re disparata ab eo supponunt, cuiusmodi secundum eos sunt 'animalitas', 'equinitas' et huiusmodi. Non enim animalitas stat pro aliquo accidente animalis, nec pro parte nec pro aliquo toto cuius pars sit animal, nec pro re aliqua extrinseca totaliter ab animali distincta. Under this mode of concrete and abstract names (according to the intention of the Philosopher and the Commentator), are comprehended all names of substances and the abstract names contrived from them, which supposit neither for an accident nor for a part nor for the whole of that which is conveyed by a name concrete in form nor for anything disparate from it. Of which sort, according to those persons, are ‘animality’, ‘horsehood’, and suchlike. For ‘animality’ does not supposit for any accident of an animal, nor for a part of one, nor for any whole whose part is an animal, nor for any extrinsic thing totally distinct from an animal.
Sub eodem etiam modo continentur omnia nomina abstracta quae in genere quantitatis collocantur et omnia nomina quae sunt propriae passiones istorum quae in genere quantitatis continentur, et hoc secundum opinionem illorum qui ponunt quod quantitas non est alia res a substantia et qualitate, non autem secundum opinionem illorum qui ponunt quantitatem esse rem absolutam, distinctam realiter tam a substania quam a qualitate. Unde secundum primam opinionem 'quantum' et 'quantitas' sunt nomina synonyma, et similiter 'longum' et 'longitudo', 'latum' et 'latitudo', 'profundum' et 'profunditas', 'plura' et 'pluralitas', et sic de aliis. Under the same mode are also contained all abstract names gathered together in the category of quantity, and all names which are the proper attributes of things contained in the category of quantity. And this is according to the view of those who suppose that quantity is not another thing from substance and quality, although not according to the view of those who maintain that quantity is an absolute thing really distinct from substance and from quality. Thus, according to the former view, ‘quantum’ [amount] and ‘quantity’ are synonymous, and likewise ‘long’ and ‘length’, ‘broad’ and ‘breadth’, ‘deep’ and ‘depth’, ‘plural’ and ‘plurality’, and so on.
Ad eundem etiam modum reducuntur omnia nomina concreta et abstracta quae ad figuram pertinent, secundum opinionem illorum qui ponunt quod figura non est alia res a quantitate sive a substantia et qualitate, et sic de aliis speciebus qualitatis. Unde illi habent ponere quod 'figura' et 'figuratum', 'rectum' et 'rectitudo', 'curvum' et 'curvitas', 'cavum' et 'cavitas', 'simum' et 'simitas', 'angulare' et 'angulus', 'convexum' et 'convexitas' et huiusmodi sunt nomina synonyma. Et haec omnia intelligenda sunt si nullum illorum nominum includat aliquam dictionem aequivalenter quam aliud non includit. Also, all concrete and abstract names that pertain to shape are reduced to the same mode, according to the view of those who suppose that shape is not a different thing from quantity, or from substance and quality, and so also for the other species of quantity. Thus, they have to maintain that ‘figure’ and ‘figured’, ‘straight’ and ‘straightness’, ‘curved’ and ‘curvedness’‘, ‘hollow’ and ‘hollowness’, ‘snub’ and ‘snubness’ ‘angular’ and ‘angle’, ‘convex’ and ‘convexity’, and suchlike, are synonymous names. And all these are to be understood, if none of these names equivalently includes some word that the other one does not include.
Et non solum talia nomina concreta et abstracta sunt synonyma, sicut dicere habent sic opinantes, quin etiam, secundum opinionem illorum qui ponunt quod relatio non est aliqua res distincta realiter a rebus absolutis, nomina concreta et abstracta relativa sunt nomina synonyma, sicut 'pater' et 'paternitas', 'simile' et 'similitudo', 'causa' et 'causalitas', 'potentia' et 'potentialitas, 'risibile' et 'risibilitas', 'aptum' et 'aptitudo', 'habile' et 'habilitas', 'capax' et 'capacitas', duplum et 'dupleitas', 'calefactivum' et 'calefactivitas', et sic de aliis. And not only such concrete and abstract names are synonyms, as those who hold such a view have to say, but also (according to the view of those who suppose that a relation is not something really distinct from absolute things) concrete and abstract relative names are synonymous. For example, ‘father’ and ‘fatherhood’, ‘like’ and ‘likeness’, ‘cause’ and ‘causality’, ‘potency’ and ‘potentiality’, ‘capable of laughter’ and ‘capability of laughter’, ‘capable’ and ‘capacity’, ‘double’ and ‘doubleness’, ‘calefactive’ and ‘calefactivity’, and so on.
Verumtamen possent sic opinantes de relatione salvare quod talia concreta et abstracta non essent nomina synoyma, ponendo quod abstractum supponeret pro duobus simul, ut similitudo supponat pro duobus similibus. Et ita haec esset falsa 'simile est similitudo', haec tamen vera 'similia sunt similitudo'. Nevertheless, those who have this opinion of relation could save the idea that concrete and abstract names were not synonymous names by supposing that the abstract supposited for two things at once. For example, that ‘similitude’ supposit for two similar things. And thus ‘a similar thing is a similitude’ would be false, and yet ‘Similar things are a similitude’ would be true.
Possent etiam omnes praedicti opinantes salvare quod nulla nomina talia concreta et abstracta sunt synonyma per unum modum de quo dicetur inferius. Et tunc possent dicere quod semper in talibus praedicatio concreti de abstracto falsa est. Qui autem tenent praedictas opiniones et modum dicendi inferius tenere nolunt[/volunt], si dicant consequenter, concedere debent in omnibus talibus praedicationem concreti de abstracto et e converso. All those who hold the opinions above could also keep the idea that no such concrete and abstract names are synonymous by one mode which will be mentioned below. And then they could say that in such cases the predication of the concrete of the abstract is always false. But those who hold the above views and do not wish to adopt the manner of speaking below, ought in all such cases - if they are speaking consistently – to concede in all such cases the predication of the concrete of the abstract, and conversely.
(10) Unde primi opinantes concedere habent tales praedicationes 'homo est humanitas', 'animal est animalitas', et per consequens habent concedere tales 'humanitas currit', 'animalitas est alba', et sic de consimilibus. Secundi etiam habent concedere tales propositiones 'substantia est quantitas', 'qualitas est quantitas', 'substantia est longitudo', 'qualitas est latitudo', et per consequens tales 'quantitas currit', 'longitudo disputat', 'latitudo loquitur', et sic de consimilibus. Tertii autem habent concedere tales propositiones ' substantia est figura', 'curvitas est substantia', 'figura est alba', 'figura comedit', et sic de consimilibus. Quarti etiam haberent concedere tales 'relatio est substantia', 'qualitas est relatio', 'homo est relatio', 'similitudo currit', 'paternitas est filiatio', 'similitudo est dupleitas', et sic de consimilibus. Thus, those who hold the first view have to concede such predications [as] ‘A man is a humanity’, ‘An animal is an animality’, and in consequence have to concede ‘A humanity runs’, ‘An animality is white’, and so on. The persons holding the second view also have to concede such propositions [as] ‘A substance is a quantity’, ‘A quality is a quantity’, ‘A substance is a length’, ‘A quality is a breadth’, and in consequence, ‘A quantity runs’, ‘A length argues’, ‘A breadth speaks’, and so on. The persons holding the third view have to concede ‘a substance is a figure’, ‘curvedness is a substance’, ‘a figure is white’, ‘a figure eats’ and so on. The persons holding the fourth view have to concede propositions such as ‘a relation is a substance’, ‘A quality is a relation’, ‘A man is a relation’, ‘A likeness runs’, ‘A fatherhood is a filiation’, ‘A likeness is a doubleness’, and so on.
(11) Qualiter autem concedentes radices priorum opinionum possent negare tales propositiones, ostendetur inferius . Per quem etiam modum possunt negari tales propositiones 'materia est privatio ', 'aer est tenebra', 'homo est caecitas', 'anima est peccatum originale', ‘anima est ignorantia’, ‘homo est negatio’, ‘corpus Christi est mors’, non obstante quod aliqui concederent quod 'privatio', 'tenebra', caecitas et huiusmodi non importarent aliquid a parte rei, distinctum quocumque modo a subiecto, puta ab homine, materia et huiusmodi. Now, how those persons who concede the assumptions of the prior opinions could deny such propositions will be shown later. In that way they could also deny such propositions as ‘Matter is a privation’, ‘Air is a shadow’, ‘A man is a blindness’, ‘A soul is original sin’, ‘A soul is an ignorance’, ‘A man is a negation’, ‘The body of Christ is a death’ - notwithstanding that some people would concede that ‘privation’, ‘shadow’, ‘blindness’ and the like would not convey anything on the side of reality distinct in any way from the subject – i.e., from a man, matter, and the like.


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