Authors/Ockham/Summa Logicae/Book I/Chapter 5

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Latin English
[CAP.5. DE DIVISIONE NOMINIS PER CONCRETUM ET ABSTRACTUM] [Chapter 5. On the division of names into concrete and abstract.]
Omissis autem aliis partibus orationis, de nominibus est dicendum, et primo de divisione nominis per concretum et abstractum est disserendum. But omitting the other parts of speech, we should talk about names, and first we should discuss the division of the name into concrete and abstract names.
Et est advertendum quod concretum et abstractum sunt nomina consimile principium secundum vocem habentia, sed non consimiliter terminantur, sicut patet quod 'iustus' et 'iustitia', 'fortis' et 'fortitudo' , 'animal' et 'animalitas' a simili littera vel syllaba incipiunt, sed non terminantur in consimilem. Et semper vel frequenter abstractum plures habet syllabas quam concretum, sicut in praedictis exemplis apparet. Concretum etiam, ut frequenter, est adiectivum et abstractum substantivum. It should be noted that ‘concrete’ and ‘abstract’ are names that have a similar beginning verbally, but not similar endings. E.g. it is clear that ‘just’ and ‘justice’, ‘strong’ and ‘strength’, ‘animal’ and ‘animality’ begin with a similar letter or syllable, but do not end in a similar way. The abstract name always or mostly has more syllables than the concrete name, as is apparent in the above examples. Also, in many cases the concrete name is an adjective and the abstract a substantive.
Nominum autem concretorum et abstractorum multi sunt modi. Quandoque enim concretum aliquam rem significat vel connotat sive importat seu dat intelligere, pro qua etiam supponit, quam abstractum nullo modo significat nec per consequens aliquo modo supponit pro eadem, sicut se habent 'iustus' et 'iustitia', 'album' et 'albedo' et consimilia. Nam 'iustus' vere supponit pro homine quando dicitur 'iustus est virtuosus'; non enim potest supponere pro iustitia, quia iustitia quamvis sit virtus non tamen est virtuosa. Hoc nomen vero 'iustitia' supponit pro qualitate et non pro homine. Et propter hoc accidit quod praedicatio talis concreti de abstracto est impossibilis, quia semper concretum tale et abstractum pro distinctis rebus supponunt. Now there are many kinds of concrete and abstract names. Sometimes the concrete name signifies something, or connotes or conveys or gives the understanding of, and even supposits for something, which the abstract name in no way signifies nor as a consequence supposits for in any way. ‘Just’ and ‘justice’, ‘white’ and ‘whiteness’, and suchlike are related in this way. For ‘a just [person]’ truly supposits for a man when someone says ‘The just [person] is virtuous’, for it cannot supposit for justice, because justice, although it is a virtue, is nevertheless not virtuous. But the name ‘justice’ supposits for a quality and not for a man. And because of this it happens that the predication of such a concrete name of the abstract name is impossible. For such a concrete and the abstract always supposit for distinct things.
Sunt autem, ad praesens, tres species seu differentiae talium nominum inferiores. Prima est quando abstractum supponit pro accidente vel est de talibus 'albedo-album', 'calor-calidum', 'sciens-scientia', loquendo de creaturis. Et sic de aliis. Nam in omnibus talibus abstractum supponit pro accidente inhaerente subiecto et concretum supponit pro subiecto eiusdem. E converso autem accidit de talibus 'ignis-igneus', nam 'ignis' supponit pro subiecto et 'igneus', quod est concretum, pro accidente eiusdem. Dicimus enim quod calor est igneus et non ignis; similiter dicimus quod ista scientia est humana et non homo. There are, for the present, three inferior species or differentiae of such names. The first is when the abstract supposits for an accident or for such forms as ‘whiteness/white-thing’, ‘heat/hot-thing’, ‘knowing/knowledge’, speaking about created things, and so on. In all such cases, the abstract name supposits for an accident inhering in a subject, and the concrete name supposits for the subject of the same. But it happens the other way around in ‘fire/fiery’, for ‘fire’ supposits for the subject, and ‘fiery’, which is the concrete, for an accident of the same thing. For we say that heat is fiery, and not fire. Similarly, we say that knowledge is human and not a man.
Secunda differentia talium nominum est quando concretum supponit pro parte et abstractum pro toto vel e converso sicut in istis 'anima-animatum'; homo enim est animatus et non anima, et ita 'animatum' supponit pro homine et anima pro parte eius. Hic autem 'anima est humana' et 'anima non est homo', 'homo', quod est abstractum, supponit pro toto et humanum pro anima, quae est pars. The second differentia of such names is when the concrete name supposits for a part and the abstract for the whole, or conversely. For example, in ‘soul/en-souled’ . For man is en-souled and not a soul, and so ‘en-souled’ supposits for a man, and ‘soul’ for a part of him. But in ‘A soul is human’ and ‘A soul is not a man’, ‘man’, which is the abstract, supposits for the whole, and ‘human’ for the soul, which is a part.
Est autem advertendum quod quandoque idem concretum accipitur aequivoce, quia quandoque idem concretum est tam in prima quam in secunda differentia, sicut hoc nomen 'animatum' potest supponere pro toto, quia dicimus quod homo est animatus ; et potest supponere pro subiecto recipiente animain, quia dicimus quod corpus, quod est altera pars, est animatum. Et sicut est de isto nomine ita est de multis aliis, quod sic possunt aequivoce accipi. But notice that sometimes the same concrete name is taken equivocally, for sometimes the same concrete name is in the first differentia as well as the second. For example, the name ‘en-souled’ can supposit for a whole, because we say that a man is en-souled. It can also supposit for a subject that receives a soul, for we say that a body, which is the other part of the [body-soul] composite, is en-souled. And just as it is with this name, so it is with many others that can be taken equivocally in this way.
Tertia differentia talium nominum est quando concretum et abstractum supponunt pro distinctis rebus, quarum tamen neutra est subiectum nec pars alterius. Et hoc contingit fieri multis modis: nam tales res quandoque se habent sicut causa et effectus, sicut dicimus quod hoc opus est humanum et non homo; quandoque sicut signum et significatum, sicut dicimus quod differentia hominis est differentia essentialis, non quia est essentia, sed quia est signum alicuius partis essentiae; quandoque sicut locus et locatum, sicut dicimus quod iste est Anglicus et non Anglia. Multis etiam aliis modis contingit hoc fieri, quae discutienda ingeniosis dimitto. The third differentia of such names is when the concrete and the abstract name supposit for different things, of which neither is the subject or a part of the other. This can happen in many ways. For such things are sometimes related as cause and effect (such as when we say that this work is human, and not a man); sometimes as sign and signified (for example, such as when we say that the differentia of a man is an essential difference, not because it is an essence but because it is a sign of some part of the essence; sometimes as location and located (for example, we say that he is English, and not that he is England). This can also happen in many other way, which I leave to the ingenious to discuss.
Et sicut in primis duobus modis aliquod concretum supponit pro parte vel pro forma et abstractum pro toto vel subiecto, et aliquando accidit e converso, ita est in proposito. Nam quandoque concretum supponit pro effectu vel significato et abstractum pro causa vel signo, etaliquando e converso. Et sic est de ceteris contentis sub isto modo. And just as in the first two modes, some concrete name supposits for a part or for a form and the abstract name for the whole or the subject, also sometimes it happens conversely, so in the present case. For sometimes the concrete name supposits for the effect or the significate and the abstract name for the cause or the sign, and sometimes the other way around. So it is for the others contained under this mode.
Et sicut contingit idem nomen esse concretum primis duobus modis, sed tunc accipitur aequivoce, ita contingit idem concretum esse concretum primo modo et tertio, immo omnibus tribus modis potest esse concretum. Et ideo isti tres modi inferiores ad primum modum principalem non sic distinguuntur quod unus eorum universaliter negetur a reliquo, sed sic quod quilibet ab alio particulariter amovetur, quod sufficit ad distinctionem talium. Similiter etiam non est inconveniens quod idem nomen respectu diversorum sit concretum et abstractum. Just as it can happen that the same name is concrete in the first two modes, but then is understood equivocally, so it can happen that the same concrete name is concrete in the first mode and the third. Indeed, it can be concrete in all three modes. Therefore, these three modes, inferior to the first principal mode, are not distinguished in such a way that the one of them is denied universally of the other, but rather so that each of them is separated from the other in a particular way. This is sufficient for the distinction among such modes. Similarly, there is nothing inappropriate in the same name being concrete and abstract, with respect to diverse cases.
(10) Sciendum est quod quandoque habemus concretum aequivaIenter, cui tamen nullum abstractum propter, penuriam nominum correspondet, sicut est de hoc nomine 'studiosus' quando accipitur pro virtuoso. It should be known that sometimes we have the equivalent of a concrete name, for which, however, there is no corresponding abstract name because of the poverty of names. This is the case for the name ‘zealous’, when it is taken for the virtuous.
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