Authors/Duns Scotus/Ordinatio/Ordinatio II/D2/P1Q2

• I. To the Affirmative Side of the Question A. The Opinion of Others
• B. Rejection of the Opinion
• C. Instance against the Rejection of the Opinion
• D. Response to the Instance
• II. To the Negative Side of the Question
• III. To the Principal Arguments

Latin	English
	Question Two: Whether in an Angel actually Existing there is Need to posit Something Measuring its Existence that is Other than that very Existence
84 Secundo quaero utrum in angelo actualiter exsistente necesse sit ponere aliquid mensurans exsistentiam eius (vel durationem exsistentiae eius), aliud ab ipsa exsistentia. ƿ	84. Secondly I ask whether in an angel actually existing there is need to posit something measuring its existence (or the duration of its existence [n.1]) that is other than that existence itself.
85 Quod sic: Tempus differt a motu per hoc quod mensurat ipsum (Sicut probat Philosophus IV Physicorum, per hoc quod 'tempus neque est velox neque tardum, motus autem dicitur velox vel tardus', et per alias rationes); igitur a simili, aliquid est aliud ab exsistentia aeviterni mensurans ipsum.	85. That there is: Time differs from motion by the fact that it measures motion (as the Philosopher proves in Physics 4.10.218b13-18 by the fact that 'time is neither quick nor slow but motion is said to be quick or slow', and by other reasons); therefore, by likeness, there is something other than the existence of the aeviternal that measures it.
86 Secundo sic: quantitas permanens et successiva sunt eiusdem generis, - igitur utraque est aliquid aliud a suo subiecto, maxime si illud pertinet ad genus substantiae; igitur sicut quantitas permanens est aliud ab eo cuius est mensura, ita etiam quantitas successiva.	86. Secondly as follows: permanent quantity and successive quantity belong to the same genus - therefore each is something other than its subject, especially if the subject belongs to the genus of substance; therefore just as permanent quantity is other than that of which it is the measure, so also is successive quantity [cf. nn.1-2].
87 Contra: De illo 'alio' quaero, quo durat in esse? Si se ipso, igitur pari ratione ipsa exsistentia poterit durare se ipsa formaliter, quia illud 'aliud' non est perfectius ipsa actuali eius exsistentia, cum sit quasi passio eius. Si autem alio a se 'absoluto' durat in esse, erit processus in infinitum in mensuratis et mensuris.	87. On the contrary: About this 'other' I ask by what it endures in being. If by itself then, by parity of reasoning, existence itself will be able to endure by itself formally, because this 'other' is not more perfect than that very actual existence, since it is as it were the property of it. But if it endures in being by an absolute other than itself, there will be an infinite regress in measures and things measured.
	I. To the Affirmative Side of the Question A. The Opinion of Others
88 Respondeo. Prima opinio in praecedente quaestione debet concedere ƿpartem affermativam, quia aevum vere ponit rationem mensurae, et proprie quantitatem, - et ita differt ab exsistentia angeli, quae non est in se formaliter quanta, sed indivisibilis.	88. My response. The first opinion in the preceding question [n.11] should concede the affirmative side, because aeviternity [according to this opinion] truly posits the idea of measure and quantity in its proper sense [n.48] - and so aeviternity differs from the existence of an angel, which existence is not in itself formally an extension, a quantum, but is indivisible.
89 Similiter, in illa exsistentia succedunt sibi invicem 'nunc' aevi alia et alia; igitur utrumque differt ab ipsa exsistentia angeli sicut quoddam absolutum (secundum illam positionem), quia sicut indivisibilia de genere quantitatis.	89. Likewise, in that existence one 'now' of aeviternity succeeds to another; therefore both 'nows' differ from the existence of an angel as something absolute (according to this position [nn.19, 49-51, 58]), because they are quasi-indivisibles of the genus of quantity.
90 Similiter aliqui - tenentes secundam opinionem in praecedente quaestione (de indivisibilitate aevi) - dicunt ipsum aevum ƿpertinere ad genus quantitatis, non sicut divisibile sed sicut indivisibile in genere illo; ita quod ex multis indivisibilibus eiusdem speciei, mensurantibus scilicet exsistentias plurium aeviternorum eiusdem speciei, potest componi quantitas discreta, quae sit numerus et mensura in aeviternis sicut numerus in corporalibus est ex unitatibus discretis in eis (pro hoc adducunt rationes, - quaere).	90. Likewise some - holding the second opinion in the preceding question (about the indivisibility of aeviternity [nn.39, 42, 33]) - say that aeviternity itself belongs to the genus of quantity, not as a divisible but as an indivisible in that genus; such that from many indivisibles of the same species, measuring namely the existences of several aeviternal things of the same species, a discrete quantity can be composed, which is the number and measure in aeviternal things, just as number in corporeal things is composed of the discrete unities in those things (for this they adduce reasons - look for them).
	B. Rejection of the Opinion
91 Contra istud arguitur, sicut argutum est prius in quaestione 5 primae distinctionis huius II (in solutione principali), sic: Illud quod - si esset distinctum ab aliquo - esset posterius eo naturaliter, necessario est idem illi si incompossibile est illud esse sine eo. Igitur si incompossibile est angelum esse sine aliquo extrinseco (quod sit mensura actualis exsistentiae eius), cum illud - si esset aliud - esset posterius naturaliter ipsa exsistentia actuali angeli, sequitur quod non est aliud ab exsistentia eius; aut si est aliud, et per consequens posterius, poterit actualis exsistentia eius absque contradictione esse sine eo, - et ita non est necessarium ponere illud.	91. Against this [nn.88-90] there is, as was argued before in 2 d.1 n.262, an argument as follows: That which, if it were distinct from something, would be naturally posterior to it, is necessarily the same as that something if it is incompossible for it to be without it. Therefore, if it is incompossible for an angel to be without some extrinsic thing (which thing would be the measure of his actual existence), then, since that extrinsic thing, if it were other, would be naturally posterior to the actual existence of the angel, the consequence is that it is not other than his existence; or if it is other, and consequently posterior, the angel's actual existence will, without contradiction, be able to be without it - and thus there is no necessity to posit it.
92 Confirmatur ratio ista (et illa similiter de qua fit mentio quaeƿstione 5 distinctionis 1 huius II), quia distinctio aliquorum quorum unum proprie inest alteri, non concluditur nisi vel ex distinctione actuali, vel potentiali, vel quia sic se habent ad invicem sicut aliqua quorum unum est separabile ab alio.	92. There is a confirmation of this reason (and it is like the one that mention was made of above at d.1 n.262), that a distinction between things, one of which is properly present in the other, is not deduced save from an actual or potential distinction, or because the things are disposed to each other as those things are of which one is separable from the other.
93 Hoc tertium addo, quia secundum Aristotelem, VII Metaphysicae cap. 'De partibus definitionis', parabola Socratis iunioris multos seduxit a veritate, dicentis quod 'si non esset circulus nisi in aere, non propter hoc esset aes in definitione circuli', et a simili inferentis quod 'non oportet carnes esse de definitione hominis, licet homo non sit sine carnibus', - dato, inquam, quod esset impossibilis separatio istorum ab invicem. Si tamen ista sic se habeant ad invicem sicut aliqua quorum est possibilis separatio, concluditur ista esse distincta: puta si ex propria ratione circuli et trianguli, carnis et ligni, concludatur circulum sic se habere ad liƿgnum sicut triangulum ad carnem, et probetur separabilitas ex una parte, - concludetur distinctio ex alia parte, et quod inseparabilitas ex illa parte non est ex propria ratione, sed ex aliquo extrinseco.	93. I add this third point, that according to Aristotle, Metaphysics 7.11.1036b22-28 'On the parts of Definition', many have been seduced from the truth by comparison of the younger Socrates who said that 'if were no circles save bronze ones, bronze would not for this reason fall into the definition of circle', and inferred by similitude that 'flesh should not fall into the definition of man, even though there is no man without flesh' -when it is given, I say, that a separation of these [man and flesh] from each other is impossible. However if these are disposed to each other as are things of which the separation is possible, then the conclusion is that they are separable; for example, if from the proper idea of circle and triangle, of flesh and wood, the conclusion is drawn that circle is disposed to wood as triangle is to flesh, and if separability is proved on the one side, then a distinction will be proved on the other side, and proved that inseparability on that other side is not from its proper idea but from something extrinsic.
94 Accipio igitur quod nihil potest concludi 'distinctum ab alio' nisi vel propter separationem actualem, vel potentialem, vel propter proportionem istorum ad aliqua alia quorum alterum est ab altero separabile. Sed in proposito nullum istorum contingit. Non enim (per te) est hic aliqua separatio, actualis vel potentialis. Nec ista se habent ad invicem sicut aliqua distincta et separabilia, quia nihil distinctum ab aliquo realiter, sine quo non potest esse sine contradictione, est prius eo, sed vel posterius eo naturaliter, vel simul natura cum eo; istud autem quod ponitur 'aliud', - si esset, esset posterius naturaliter; ergo etc.	94. I take, therefore, that nothing can be proved to be distinct from another thing save because of their actual or potential separation, or because of a proportion of them to some other things of which one is separable from the other. But in the issue at hand [sc. the measure of the existence of angels] none of this holds. For there is not here (for you [sc. those who hold the first or second opinions in the previous question]) any separation, whether actual or potential. Nor are these things [sc. an angel's existence and the measure of it] disposed to each other as distinct and separable things are, because nothing distinct really from another thing, without which it cannot be without contradiction, is prior to it, but either naturally posterior or simultaneous in nature with it; but this thing which is posited as 'other' [sc. the measure of an angel's existence], if it existed, would be naturally posterior to the angel; therefore etc. [n.91].
	C. Instance against the Rejection of the Opinion
95 Instatur contra istud, quia 'nunc secundum substantiam' se habet ad substantiam mobilis, sicut istud quod ponitur mensura ƿdurationis exsistentiae angelorum se habet ad illam exsistentiam, quia sicut ista exsistentia manet eadem, mensurata hoc indivisibili, ita ponitur ex alia parte de 'nunc' et de substantia mobilis; et tamen ex illa parte invenitur distinctio inter substantiam ipsius mobilis et substantiam ipsius 'nunc'; igitur et hic.	95. There is objected against this [sc. that there is no distinction between the existence of an angel and the measure of it], that 'the now as to substance' is disposed to the substance of a movable thing as that which is posited to be the measure of the duration of the existence of angels is disposed to that existence - because, just as the existence, measured by this indivisible measure, remains the same, so the like is posited on the side of the 'now' and the substance of a movable thing; and yet on this side is found a distinction between the substance of the very movable thing and the substance of the 'now'; therefore here too.
96 Quod autem debeat poni aliquod tale 'nunc' mensurans mobile, idem secundum substantiam, videtur esse de intentione Philosophi IV Physicorum: ibi videtur quasi solvere quaestionem quam movet de 'nunc', dicendo quod est 'unum et idem secundum substantiam, differens secundum esse'.	96. Now that one should posit some such 'now' measuring the movable thing, the same as it in substance, seems to follow from the intention of the Philosopher in Physics 4.10.281a8-11; there he seems to solve as it were the question he is moving about the 'now', by saying that it is 'one and the same as to substance, but different as to being'.
	D. Response to the Instance
97 Istam instantiam excludo sic: Primo ostendo quod illud quod supponit de 'nunc secundum substantiam' sit falsum et contra intentionem Philosophi, quia Philosophus probat quod (('nunc' sequitur illud quod fertur)), per hoc quod ((eo quod fertur cognoscimus 'prius' et 'posterius' in motu)), et ipso 'nunc' cognoscimus 'prius' et 'posterius' in tempore. Sed haec non sunt vera de mobili secundum subƿstantiam, sed secundum quod est sub mutatione alia et alia, quia si accipiatur mobile secundum substantiam absolute, non cognoscitur eo 'prius' et 'posterius' in motu.	97. I exclude this objection [n.95] as follows: First I show that what it supposes about 'the now as to substance' is false and is against the Philosopher's intention - because the Philosopher proves [Physics 4.11.219b22-25] that "'the now' follows what is being moved" by the fact that "we learn from what is being moved the 'before' and 'after' in motion," and that from this 'now' we learn the 'before' and 'after' in time. But this is not true of the movable as to substance, but as it is under different changes, because, if the movable is taken as to substance absolutely, we do not from it learn the 'before' and 'after' in motion.
98 Similiter, Philosophus - in secunda proprietate de 'nunc' dicit quod non est sine tempore nec e conversol, quia motus non est sine mobili nec e converso; et sicut motus ad mobile, ita numerus motus ad numerum sive unitatem mobilis. Falsum est autem quod mobile secundum substantiam suam non possit esse sine motu, sed praecise verum est de mobili ut est sub mutatione; si igitur alterum sit mobile in toto motu, igitur et 'nunc' sibi correspondens.	98. Likewise, the Philosopher says [Physics 4.11.219b33-20a4], as to the second property about the 'now', that it is not without time nor vice versa, because motion is not without the movable nor vice versa; and as motion is to the movable, so the number of motion is to the number or unity of the movable. But that the movable cannot, as to its substance, be without motion is false, but it is true of the movable precisely as it exists under change; therefore if the latter is a movable in the whole motion, then so is the 'now' corresponding to it.
99 Praeterea, quomodo posset ipsum 'nunc indivisibile' fluere secundum diversa esse (quae necessario essent indivisibilia), quin totus fluxus eius componeretur ex indivisibilibus? Probat enim Philosophus ex intentione VI Physicorum, quod indivisibile non potest moveri, quia tunc motus eius componeretur ex indivisibilibus, quia prius pertransiret minus vel aequale sibi, quam ƿmaius; igitur tempus esset compositum ex indivisibilibus, quod est contra Philosophum.	99. Further, how could the 'indivisible now' flow according to different existences (which would necessarily be indivisible), without its whole flow being a composite of indivisibles? For the Philosopher proves, from his intention in Physics 6.10.241a6-14, that the indivisible cannot move, because then its motion would be composed of indivisibles, because a lesser or equal part of it would pass by before a greater did; therefore time would be a composite of indivisibles, which is against the Philosopher [Physics 6.9.239b8-9].
100 Ad hoc sunt duae rationes Philosophi, quarum una talis est: 'illa dicuntur simul, quae sunt in eodem indivisibili' etc.	100. To prove this [sc. that an indivisible 'now' cannot flow according to different existences] there are two reasons from the Philosopher [Physics 4.10.218a21-30], one of which is of this sort: 'those things are said to be at once which are in the same indivisible instant etc.'
101 Alia est, quia 'cuiuslibet continui sunt duo termini distincti' etc., - quam rationem declaro sic: Quia 'nunc secundum substantiam', si est ipsa substantia mobilis, non est nisi contendere de verbis. Si autem est aliud ab ipsa (puta aliquod indivisibile de genere quantitatis), quaero cuius continui sit terminus vel cuius discreti pars, - quia omne indivisibile quod est per se de genere quantitatis, vel est terminus continui vel ƿpars discreti. Si ponatur pars discreti, igitur ponitur tempus discretum, quod Philosophus non concessit; si ponatur terminus continui, igitur oportet quod sit aliud et aliud (secundum quod terminat aliam et aliam partem continui), quia impossibile est 'idem secundum substantiam' esse per se terminum alicuius quantitatis et principium eiusdem.	101. The other reason is that 'of any continuous thing there are two distinct terms etc.' - which reason I clarify as follows: Because to ask whether the substance itself of the 'now as to substance' is movable is only to dispute about words. But if the 'now' is other than the substance (namely, something indivisible in the genus of quantity), I ask of which continuous thing or of which discrete part it is the term - because everything indivisible that is per se in the genus of quantity is either a term of continuous quantity or a part of discrete quantity. If the now is part of discrete quantity then time is discrete, which the Philosopher did not concede [n.99]; if it is a term of continuous quantity, then it must be two (according as it is the term of this and of that part of the continuous), because it is impossible for 'the same thing as to substance' to be per se the end and the beginning of one and the same quantity.
102 Et si dicas quod 'terminat secundum diversa esse', - cum ista accidant illi 'nunc' eidem secundum substantiam (quia per te illud manet idem sub diversis esse, et per consequens ista accidunt sibi), et omne indivisibile de genere quantitatis per se terminat quantitatem (vel est pars discreti), sequitur quod illud non sit indivisibile per se de genere quantitatis, cum non per se terminet.	102. And if you say that it is the term 'according to diverse existences' - then since those existences are accidents of the 'now' the same in substance (because for you it remains the same under diverse existences [n.95], and consequently those existences are accidents of it), and since everything indivisible in the genus of quantity is the per se term of a quantity (or is a part of what is discrete), it follows that that 'now' is not an indivisible per se in the genus of quantity, since it is not per se a term.
103 Praeterea, ista 'esse' quaero cuius generis sunt? Si sint indivisibilia de genere quantitatis, igitur sufficiunt ad terminandum proprium continuum absque illo 'nunc secundum substantiam', quod est inconveniens (probatio consequentiae, quia nullum indivisibile per se terminat 'quia est terminus alterius indivisibilis'). Si autem ƿsunt alterius generis, puta qualitatis, - igitur qualitas erit per se ratio terminandi continuum in genere quantitatis.	103. Further, I ask to what genus those 'existences' belong. If they are indivisibles of the genus of quantity, then they are sufficient to be the terms of the continuous proper without the 'now as to substance', which is unacceptable (the proof of the consequence is that nothing indivisible is per se a term 'because there is a term of a second indivisible'). But if they belong to another genus, namely of quality - then a quality will be per se the idea of terminating the continuous in the genus of quantity.
104 Et praeterea, quomodo non mutaretur ipsum 'nunc secundum substantiam' secundum diversa esse? Et tunc oporteret eius et suorum mensuram quaerere, et sic in infinitum.	104. And further, how would the 'now as to substance' not undergo change according to diverse existences? And then one would have to ask about the measure of it and of its changes, and so on ad infinitum.
105 Praeterea, aut illud 'nunc secundum substantiam' idem est in quolibet motu, aut praecise in uno?	105. Further, is the 'now as to substance' the same in any motion whatever or in a single one precisely?
106 Ad Philosophum dico quod non intendit 'nunc' manere idem secundum substantiam, sed oppositum sequitur ex dictis eius; sed quodcumque 'unum nunc', consideratum secundum se, est idem, et hoc dicitur esse 'idem secundum substantiam', - consideratum autem in ordine ad tempus praeteritum et futurum, cum sit terminus praeteriti et initium futuri, dicitur 'distingui secundum esse'.	106. To the Philosopher [n.96] I say that he does not intend the 'now' to remain the same in substance, but the opposite follows from what he said; but any 'single now', considered in itself, is the same, and this is said to be 'the same in substance' - but considered in order to past and future time, since it is the end of the past and the beginning of the future, it is said 'to be distinguished in being' [Physics 4.13.222a10-15].
107 Et ad hoc declarandum, est illud simile de mobili, quod manet idem: non quidem mobile ut absolute praecedit mutationem (quia per hoc, 'nunc' non est mensura eius, nec pertinens ad tempus), sed mobile ut est sub una mutatione est 'idem secundum substantiam', - hoc est, secundum esse illius mutationis consideratae secundum se; et est 'aliud secundum esse', - hoc est, ut sub illa muƿtatione terminat praeteritum et initiat futurum, et secundum hoc dicitur alibi et alibi esse. Non quidem actu, sed in uno 'ubi' medio inter extrema (in quantum illud terminat motum secundum prius 'ubi' et inchoat motum secundum posterius 'ubi') dicitur 'alibi et alibi', quia 'mutari' est habere aliquid utriusque extremi; unde Philosophus VI Physicorum vult quod quamvis aliquid sit in uno medio, tamen illud est 'aliud' secundum utrumque extremum.	107. And to make this clear, there is the likeness about the movable thing, that it remains the same [n.95]; not indeed the movable thing as it absolutely precedes change (for in that case, the 'now' is not the measure of it and it does not belong to time [nn.97-98]), but the movable thing as it is under a change is 'the same as to substance' - that is, according to the being of the change considered in itself -, and is 'different as to being' -that is, as under the change it is the term of the past and the beginning of the future, and in this respect it is said to be here and to be there. Not indeed actually so, but in one intermediate 'where' between the extremes (insofar as this intermediate 'where' ends the motion as to the prior 'where' and begins the motion as to the later 'where') - in this it is said to be here and there, because 'to change' is to have something of both extremes; hence the Philosopher in Physics 6.4.234b17-19 maintains that, although something may be in a single intermediate, yet it is 'other' according to each extreme.
108 Sed quomodo ex hoc solvetur illa quaestio Philosophi, quam movet IV Physicorum, 'utrum idem nunc secundum substantiam, maneat in toto tempore, vel non'? Dico quod sicut quaestionem illam 'utrum tempus sit' numquam solvit expresse, sed aliqua dicit ex quibus potest colligi eius solutio, - ita et in isto: si enim quodcumque 'unum mobile' praecise habeat identitatem secundum substantiam (hoc est, ad se) et distinctionem secundum esse (hoc est, secundum ordinem ad aliam et aliam partem motus), eodem modo de instanti respectu partium temporis; et non est tanta identitas instantis in toto tempore quanta est unius instantis; igitur instans in toto tempore vere est 'aliud et aliud' secundum substantiam. ƿ	108. But how will this solve the question of the Philosopher, which he moves in the Physics [n.96], 'whether the same 'now' in substance remains in the whole time or not'? I say that the Philosopher nowhere expressly solves this other question, about 'whether time is', but he does say a few things from which its solution can be collected [Physics 4.10.217b31-18a8] - and so it is in the case of this question: for if any movable thing whatever has sameness precisely as to substance (that is, relative to itself) and difference as to being (that is, in its order to different parts of motion), then things are the same about an instant with respect to the parts of time; and there is not as much sameness to the instant in the whole of time as there is to one instant; therefore the instant in the whole of time is 'different things' as to substance.
109 Dico tunc ad instantiam quod si aliquod 'nunc' similiter se habet ad substantiam mobilis sicut aevum ad substantiam angeli, illud 'nunc' non est aliud ab illa substantia, nec est aliquod indivisibile de genere quantitatis; et si fingatur aliquod 'nunc' de genere quantitatis mensurare mobile secundum substantiam, sic nihil tale est in angelo actualiter exsistente, sicut probatum est prius.	109. I say then to the objection [n.95], that if any 'now' is similarly disposed to the substance of the movable thing as aeviternity is to the substance of an angel, then that 'now' is not other than that substance, nor is it an indivisible in the genus of quantity; and if some 'now' in the genus of quantity is imagined for measuring the movable thing as to substance, then there is no such thing in an angel actually existing, as was proved before [n.91].
110 Sed contra istud arguo sic: Mobile potest considerari tripliciter: vel ut est sub terminis mutationum, vel ut est sub medio mutationum, vel ut est prius motu et mutatione (possibile tamen recipere ista). Primo modo correspondent sibi diversa 'nunc' secundum esse, secundo modo correspondet sibi tempus medium inter illa 'nunc', - igitur tertio modo correspondebit sibi aliqua propria mensura; sed haec non est nisi 'nunc secundum substantiam'; igitur etc.	110. But I argue against this [sc. the imagining of a now in the genus of quantity etc., n.109] as follows: The movable thing can be considered in three ways: either as it exists under the end points of change, or as it exists under the in-between of change, or as it is prior to motion and change (though able to receive them). In the first way there correspond to it diverse 'nows' as to being, in the second way there corresponds to it the time between those 'nows' - so in the third way there will correspond to it some proper measure, but this measure is only the 'now as to substance'; therefore etc.
111 Respondeo. Si oportet tempus differre a motu, et per consequens instans a mutatione, - non est similis ratio quod ponatur aliquid differens ab ipsa exsistentia angeli uniformi, quod sit mensura eius. Nam si tempus differat a motu, hoc ideo est quia partes eiusdem proporƿtionis alicuius motus non necessario sunt aequales in numero et quantitate partibus eiusdem proportionis temporis; nulla autem quantitas est eadem quantitati alteri nisi partes eiusdem proportionis in ea sint aequales partibus eiusdem proportionis in reliquo, et hoc aequales tam in numero quam in magnitudine (loquendo autem de quantitate quae est in motu, hoc habet ex parte magnitudinis seu formae secundum quam est motus). Possunt tamen aliquae partes motus, puta decem partes integrantes totum motum, esse cum decem partibus temporis, - sed non sunt eaedem eis, quia cum eisdem partibus temporis possent esse plures partes motus aequales prioribus partibus motus, vel iterum tot: quia si dupla virtus moveret idem mobile et per consequens duplo velocius, nulla pars erit in motu tardiore quae non sit in motu velociore (loquendo de partibus quas habet in magnitudine, secundum formam secundum quam est), quia movens mobile motu velociore non facit simul pertransire aliquas partes magnitudinis, sed praecise alterum post alterum; igitur tot partes sunt in motu velociore et tantae (loquendo de ista quantitate), quot et quantae sunt in motu tardiore. Non potest autem idem tempus esse (habens easdem partes) cum isto motu et cum illo motu; igitur illae partes temporis non erunt eaedem nec partibus istius motus nec illius, quia non in eadem proportione se habentes ad totum et aequales istis partibus totius. ƿ	111. I reply. If time has to differ from motion, and consequently the instant has to differ from change, yet there is not a like reason for positing something different from the existence itself of a uniform angel in order to be measure of it. For if time differs from motion, the reason for this is that the parts of the same proportion of some motion are not necessarily equal in number and quantity to the parts of the same proportion of time; but no quantity is the same as another quantity unless the parts of the same proportion in it are equal to the parts of the same proportion in the other quantity, and that equal both in number and in magnitude (though, when speaking of the quantity that is in motion, it has this from the part of the magnitude or form by which it is motion). However, parts of a motion, to wit ten parts integrally forming a whole motion, can exist with ten parts of time, and yet they are not the same as the parts of time, because there could exist, along with the same parts of time, a greater number of parts of motion equal in magnitude to the prior parts of the motion, or as many again; for if a double force were to move the same movable thing, and consequently move it twice as quickly, there will be no part in the slower motion that does not exist in the quicker motion (speaking of the parts that the motion has in magnitude, according to the form according to which it is a magnitude), because what moves a movable thing with a quicker motion does not make any parts of the magnitude pass by simultaneously but makes them precisely pass by one after the other; therefore there are as many and as large parts in a quicker motion (speaking of this quantity) as there are in a slower motion. But the same time (possessing the same parts) cannot exist along with the former motion and also with the latter; therefore the parts of time will not be the same as the parts either of the former or of the latter, because the parts of time are not disposed to the whole in the same proportion as, and equal with, those other parts of the whole.
112 Si hoc esset verum, ex hoc concluderetur quod indivisibile unius quantitatis non est indivisibile alterius quantitatis, sed ex hoc non sequitur quod in aliquo 'semper permanente secundum esse uniforme' oporteat ponere aliquid aliud a se, quia ibi non tenet ratio de illis magnitudinibus nec partibus earum. Est igitur fallacia consequentis, a minore affirmative arguendo: 'si mutatio et motus habent mensuras alias a se, igitur et ipsa substantia - quae prior est motu et mutatione - habet mensuram aliam a se'; minus enim videtur esse distinctio (sive non identitas) in permanente, quam in fluxu (sive in motu) et eius mensura.	112. If this is true, the conclusion from it is that an indivisible of one quantity is not the indivisible of another quantity, but the conclusion from this conclusion is not that in anything 'that remains always uniform in being' one must posit something else different from it, because there the argument about the magnitudes and their parts does not hold. There is then a fallacy of the consequent involved in arguing affirmatively from the lesser thing: 'if change and motion have measures other than themselves, then the substance too itself - which is prior to motion and change - has a measure other than itself [n.110]; for there seems to be less distinction (or lack of sameness) in a permanent thing than in a thing in flux (or in motion) and its measure.
113 Si tamen placet dare aliquam mensuram illi mobili secundum quod est in se prius motu et mutatione, - illa mensura erit aevum, sicut patebit in quaestione de mensura operationum angeli.	113. But if one is pleased to grant some measure to the movable thing insofar as it is in itself prior to motion and change, then that measure will be aeviternity, as will be plain in the question about the measure of the operations of an angel [nn.167, 171-76].
114 Et si quaeras aliam mensuram eius in quantum est in se et in quantum est susceptivum motus et mutationis, dico quod non est aliud, quia subiectum secundum illud quod est in se est susceptivum suae propriae passionis, - et similiter, si qua sit mensura, eadem est; unde non est alia mensura superficiei in quantum superficies est et in quantum est susceptiva albedinis et nigredinis. Ita dico quod si substantia primi mobilis (vel cuiuscumque alterius) mensuretur aevo, non est alia mensura eius in quantum est prior motu naturaliter et mutatione, et in quantum est receptiva motus et mutationis. ƿ	114. And if you look for another measure of it insofar as it is in itself and insofar as it is susceptive of motion and change, I say that it is not other, because the subject insofar as it is in itself is susceptive of its proper accident - and likewise, if there is any measure, it is the same; hence there is not another measure of a surface insofar as it is a surface and insofar as it is susceptive of whiteness and blackness. So I say that if the substance of the first movable (or of any other movable) is measured by aeviternity, there is no other measure of it insofar as it is naturally prior to motion and change and insofar as it is receptive of motion and change.
115 Quod si dicas quod in quantum quiescens est, habebit aliam mensuram quam aevum, - hoc falsum est, sicut patebit ibi.	115. But if you say that insofar as it is at rest it will have a measure other than aeviternity, this is false as will be clear later [nn.167, 171-76].
	II. To the Negative Side of the Question
116 Ad secundam partem quaestionis qua quaeritur 'an debeat poni in angelo exsistente aliquid mensurans eius exsistentiam', dico quod 'mensurare' est quantitatem ignotam certificare per quantitatem magis notam; certificatio autem potest fieri per quantitatem exsistentem in re vel in imaginatione:	116. As to the second side of the question wherein is asked 'whether there should be posited in an existing angel something measuring his existence' [nn.84, 87], I say that 'to measure' is to make an unknown quantity certain through a more known quantity; but making certain can be done by a quantity existing in reality or in imagination.
117 In imaginatione: sicut si aliquis artifex peritus, per aliquam quantitatem - quam habet in sua imaginatione - mensurat quantitatem quamcumque sibi occurrentem.	117. In imagination as when a skilled artisan measures by a quantity that he has in his imagination some quantity that is presented to him.
118 Aliquando autem potest fieri per quantitatem aliquam in re, et hoc tripliciter: Vel excedentem, - et tunc certificatur intellectus de quantitate minore per accessum eius ad quantitatem maiorem, vel recessum ab ea. Et hoc modo mensura ponitur in quiditatibus rerum, et mensura est perfectior mensurato et debet esse naturaliter notior eo, - sicut albedo ponitur mensura in genere colorum et dicitur prima mensura omnium quae sunt in genere illo. ƿ	118. But sometimes the measuring can be done by some real quantity, and that in three ways: Either by an exceeding quantity, and then the intellect is made certain about a lesser quantity through its approach to or departure from a greater quantity. And in this way is a measure imposed on the quiddities of things, and the measure is more perfect than the measured and must be naturally more known than it - the way whiteness is imposed as the measure in the genus of colors and is called the first measure in everything that is in that genus [Metaphysics 10.2.1053b28-34, 54a9-13].
119 Alio modo, quantitas nota minor est et pars quantitatis maioris (quae est magis ignota), - et tunc illa quantitas minor per sui replicationem mensurat ipsum totum maius. Et hoc modo minor motus potest esse mensura maioris motus, ex natura rei.	119. In another way the known quantity is lesser and part of the greater quantity (which is less known), and then the lesser quantity measures the larger whole by reduplication of itself. And in this way a lesser motion can, from the nature of the thing, be the measure of a greater motion.
120 Tertio modo, mensuratur quantitas ignota per aliam quantitatem notam aequalem sibi, - et hoc fit per applicationem sive superpositionem; et quia illud quod est primo mensura ex natura rei, debet esse notius naturaliter ipso mensurato, ideo in isto modo unum aequalium non est mensura alterius nisi illud fuerit notius ex natura rei. Et hoc modo tempus, si est alia quantitas a motu et notior eo, potest esse mensura motus ex natura rei.	120. In a third way an unknown quantity is measured by some known quantity that is equal to it, and this is done by applying or superimposing it; and because that which, from the nature of the thing, is the measure first should be naturally more known than the thing measured, so in this way one of the equals is not the measure of the other unless it were, from the nature of the thing, more known. And in this way time, if it is a quantity other than motion and more known than it, can be from the nature of the thing the measure of motion.
121 Alicui tamen intellectui potest illud esse mensura quod ex natura rei non est mensura: puta, si alicui sit nota quantitas ulnae et quantitas panni ignota, potest sibi tunc quantitas ulnae (quia nota est) esse mensura quantitatis panni, licet ex natura rei neutra quantitas habeat maiorem certitudinem alia. ƿ	121. However, for some intellect what is not the measure by the nature of the thing can be a measure; for example, if the length of the arm is known to someone and the length of a piece of cloth unknown, the length of the arm (because it is known) can be for him the measure of the length of the cloth, although neither length has, from the nature of the thing, greater certitude than the other.
122 Ad propositum igitur applicando, dico quod in actuali exsistentia angeli non oportet quaerere aliquam mensuram intrinsecam, aliam a natura ipsius rei mensuratae, quia - sicut probatum est iam - nihil est ibi aliud realiter a natura rei mensuratae; mensura autem ex natura rei est aliud a mensurato, - et patet quod si poneretur in angelo aliqua mensura, non poneretur in eo nisi hoc tertio modo (neque enim est excedens, neque excessa, sed aequalis). Neque etiam illa exsistentia videtur posse esse mensura sui ipsius, sicut in aliis 'quantitas ut distincte cognita' potest esse mensura sui ipsius secundum partes suas confuse cognitas; non ita est hic, cum ista exsistentia sit indivisibilis, non potens continere partes confuse in se, cum non habeat eas.	122. Applying this then to the issue at hand, I say that in the actual existence of an angel there is no need to look for some intrinsic measure different from the nature of the thing itself that is measured, because - as was already proved [n.91] - nothing is there really other than the nature of the measured thing; but a measure is, from the nature of the thing, other than the thing measured, and plainly, if some measure were posited in an angel, it would not be posited in him save in the third way (for it neither exceeds nor is exceeded but is equal [nn.118-120]). And in addition, the existence of an angel does not seem able to be its own measure the way that in other things a quantity more distinctly known can be the measure of itself as to its own confusedly known parts; it is not so with an angel, since his existence is indivisible and cannot contain parts confusedly in itself, since it has no parts.
123 Simpliciter igitur non est necesse in angelo exsistente ponere aliquid aliud ab actuali eius exsistentia, quod sit mensura illius exsistentiae actualis. Et si non est pluralitas ponenda absque necessitate, et hic non sit necessitas, non videtur hic esse ponenda pluralitas; non solum autem non est necesse ponere aliquid absolutum pro mensura, sed etiam nec relationem aliquam, quia non est necesse hic aliam relationem ponere quam illam quae est ad causam effiƿcientem vel conservantem, - et illa non est aliud a fundamento (ex quaestione 5 primae distinctionis huius II).	123. Likewise therefore, there is no need to posit in an existing angel anything to be the measure of actual existence other than his actual existence. And if plurality is not to be posited without necessity, and here there is no necessity, plurality does not seem it should here be posited; but not only is it not necessary to posit anything absolute as measure, it is also not necessary to posit any relation other than relation to the efficient or conserving cause - and that relation is not different from the foundation (from 2 d.1 q.5 nn.260-71).
	III. To the Principal Arguments
124 Ad primum principale patet quod consequentia non valet de tempore et motu comparando ad exsistentiam angeli (et ratio prius dicta est, respondendo ad unum argumentum), quia illud quod concluderet differentiam motus et temporis, non concludit hic esse aliquid distinctum et aliud ab exsistentia actuali angeli; ideo nec mensuram.	124. As to the first principal argument [n.85], it is plain that the consequence about time and motion is not valid when making comparison with the existence of an angel (and the reason was stated before, when replying to an argument [nn.110-112]), because an argument that would prove a difference between motion and time [n.111] does not here prove that there exists anything distinct and different from the actual existence of an angel; so neither that there is any measure distinct and different.
125 Ad secundum patet quod non conceditur aliquid esse in actuali exsistentia angeli, quod sit proprie quantitas, nec indivisibile de genere quantitatis, - quia sola exsistentia videtur posse nosci, absque omni alio addito.	125. As to the second [n.86], it is plain that nothing is conceded to be in the actual existence of an angel that may properly be a quantity or an indivisible in the genus of quantity - because his existence seems able to be known by itself without anything else added.