Authors/Aristotle/metaphysics/l6

From The Logic Museum

Jump to: navigation, search


Contents

Chapter 1

Greek Latin English
METHAPHISICE ARISTOTILIS LIBER SEXTUS Aristotle Metaphysics Book 6 (E)
[1025β] [3] αἱ ἀρχαὶ καὶ τὰ αἴτια ζητεῖται τῶν ὄντων, δῆλον δὲ ὅτι ᾗ ὄντα. ἔστι γάρ τι αἴτιον ὑγιείας καὶ εὐεξίας, καὶ τῶν [5] μαθηματικῶν εἰσὶν ἀρχαὶ καὶ στοιχεῖα καὶ αἴτια, καὶ ὅλως δὲ πᾶσα ἐπιστήμη διανοητικὴ ἢ μετέχουσά τι διανοίας περὶ αἰτίας καὶ ἀρχάς ἐστιν ἢ ἀκριβεστέρας ἢ ἁπλουστέρας. > Principia et causae quaeruntur entium, palam autem quod in quantum entia. Est enim aliqua causa sanitatis et convalescentiae, sunt etiam mathematicorum principia et elementa et causae, et totaliter omnis scientia intellectualis participans aliquid intellectus circa causas et principia est aut certiora aut simpliciora. Chapter 1. WE are seeking the principles and the causes of the things that are, and obviously of them qua being. For, while there is a cause of health and of good condition, and the objects of mathematics have first principles and elements and causes, and in general every science which is ratiocinative or at all involves reasoning deals with causes and principles, more or less precise,
ἀλλὰ πᾶσαι αὗται περὶ ὄν τι καὶ γένος τι περιγραψάμεναι περὶ τούτου πραγματεύονται, ἀλλ᾽ οὐχὶ περὶ ὄντος ἁπλῶς οὐδὲ ᾗ [10] ὄν, οὐδὲ τοῦ τί ἐστιν οὐθένα λόγον ποιοῦνται, ἀλλ᾽ ἐκ τούτου, αἱ μὲν αἰσθήσει ποιήσασαι αὐτὸ δῆλον αἱ δ᾽ ὑπόθεσιν λαβοῦσαι τὸ τί ἐστιν, οὕτω τὰ καθ᾽ αὑτὰ ὑπάρχοντα τῷ γένει περὶ ὅ εἰσιν ἀποδεικνύουσιν ἢ ἀναγκαιότερον ἢ μαλακώτερον: διόπερ φανερὸν ὅτι οὐκ ἔστιν ἀπόδειξις οὐσίας οὐδὲ τοῦ τί ἐστιν [15] ἐκ τῆς τοιαύτης ἐπαγωγῆς, ἀλλά τις ἄλλος τρόπος τῆς δηλώσεως. ὁμοίως δὲ οὐδ᾽ εἰ ἔστιν ἢ μὴ ἔστι τὸ γένος περὶ ὃ πραγματεύονται οὐδὲν λέγουσι, διὰ τὸ τῆς αὐτῆς εἶναι διανοίας τό τε τί ἐστι δῆλον ποιεῖν καὶ εἰ ἔστιν. Sed omnes iste circa unum quid et genus aliquod circumscripte de hoc tractant, sed non de ente simpliciter nec in quantum est ens, nec de ipso quod quid est nullam rationem faciunt; sed ex hoc, aliae quidem sensu facientes ipsum manifestum aliae autem suppositionem accipientes quod quid est, sic que secundum se insunt generi circa quod sunt demonstrant aut magis necessarie aut infirmius. Quapropter palam quia non est demonstratio substantiae nec eius quod quid est ex tali inductione, sed quidam alius modus ostensionis. Similiter autem nec si est aut non est genus circa quod versantur nihil dicunt, propter eiusdem rationis esse ipsum * quod quid est manifestum facere et si est hoc. all these sciences mark off some particular being – some genus, and inquire into this, but not into being simply nor qua being, nor do they offer any discussion of the essence of the things of which they treat; but starting from the essence – some making it plain to the senses, others assuming it as a hypothesis – they then demonstrate, more or less cogently, the essential attributes of the genus with which they deal. It is obvious, therefore, that such an induction yields no demonstration of substance or of the essence, but some other way of exhibiting it. And similarly the sciences omit the question whether the genus with which they deal exists or does not exist, because it belongs to the same kind of thinking to show what it is and that it is.
ἐπεὶ δὲ καὶ ἡ φυσικὴ ἐπιστήμη τυγχάνει οὖσα περὶ γένος τι τοῦ ὄντος (περὶ [20] γὰρ τὴν τοιαύτην ἐστὶν οὐσίαν ἐν ᾗ ἡ ἀρχὴ τῆς κινήσεως καὶ στάσεως ἐν αὐτῇ), δῆλον ὅτι οὔτε πρακτική ἐστιν οὔτε ποιητική (τῶν μὲν γὰρ ποιητῶν ἐν τῷ ποιοῦντι ἡ ἀρχή, ἢ νοῦς ἢ τέχνη ἢ δύναμίς τις, τῶν δὲ πρακτῶν ἐν τῷ πράττοντι, ἡ προαίρεσις: τὸ αὐτὸ γὰρ τὸ πρακτὸν καὶ προαιρετόν), [25] ὥστε εἰ πᾶσα διάνοια ἢ πρακτικὴ ἢ ποιητικὴ ἢ θεωρητική, ἡ φυσικὴ θεωρητική τις ἂν εἴη, ἀλλὰ θεωρητικὴ περὶ τοιοῦτον ὂν ὅ ἐστι δυνατὸν κινεῖσθαι, καὶ περὶ οὐσίαν τὴν κατὰ τὸν λόγον ὡς ἐπὶ τὸ πολὺ ὡς οὐ χωριστὴν μόνον. Quoniam vero phisica scientia est circa genus quoddam entis (nam circa talem est substantiam in qua est principium motus et status in ea), palam quia neque activa est neque factiva. Factivarum enim in faciente principium, aut intellectus aut > ars aut potentia quaedam, activarum vero quae in agente proheresis; idem enim agibile et eligibile. Quare si omnis scientia aut activa aut factiva aut theorica, phisica theorica quaedam est; sed theorica circa tale ens quod est possibile moveri, et circa substantiam quae secundum rationem ut secundum magis non separabilem solum. And since natural science, like other sciences, is in fact about one class of being, i.e. to that sort of substance which has the principle of its movement and rest present in itself, evidently it is neither practical nor productive. For in the case of things made the principle is in the maker – it is either reason or art or some faculty, while in the case of things done it is in the doer – viz. will, for that which is done and that which is willed are the same. Therefore, if all thought is either practical or productive or theoretical, physics must be a theoretical science, but it will theorize about such being as admits of being moved, and about substance-as-defined for the most part only as not separable from matter.
δεῖ δὲ τὸ τί ἦν εἶναι καὶ τὸν λόγον πῶς ἐστὶ μὴ λανθάνειν, ὡς ἄνευ γε [30] τούτου τὸ ζητεῖν μηδέν ἐστι ποιεῖν. ἔστι δὲ τῶν ὁριζομένων καὶ τῶν τί ἐστι τὰ μὲν ὡς τὸ σιμὸν τὰ δ᾽ ὡς τὸ κοῖλον. διαφέρει δὲ ταῦτα ὅτι τὸ μὲν σιμὸν συνειλημμένον ἐστὶ μετὰ τῆς ὕλης (ἔστι γὰρ τὸ σιμὸν κοίλη ῥίς), ἡ δὲ κοιλότης ἄνευ ὕλης αἰσθητῆς. [1026α] [1] εἰ δὴ πάντα τὰ φυσικὰ ὁμοίως τῷ σιμῷ λέγονται, οἷον ῥὶς ὀφθαλμὸς πρόσωπον σὰρξ ὀστοῦν, ὅλως ζῷον, φύλλον ῥίζα φλοιός, ὅλως φυτόν (οὐθενὸς γὰρ ἄνευ κινήσεως ὁ λόγος αὐτῶν, ἀλλ᾽ ἀεὶ ἔχει ὕλην), δῆλον πῶς δεῖ ἐν τοῖς φυσικοῖς τὸ τί ἐστι ζητεῖν καὶ ὁρίζεσθαι, [5] καὶ διότι καὶ περὶ ψυχῆς ἐνίας θεωρῆσαι τοῦ φυσικοῦ, ὅση μὴ ἄνευ τῆς ὕλης ἐστίν. ὅτι μὲν οὖν ἡ φυσικὴ θεωρητική ἐστι, φανερὸν ἐκ τούτων: Oportet autem quid erat esse et rationem quomodo est non latere, tamquam sine hoc quaerere nihil 30 facere sit. Diffinientium autem et ipsorum quid est haec quidem ita sunt ut simum illa vero ut concauum. Differunt autem haec quia simum quidem conceptum est cum materia (est enim simum * nasus concavus), concavitas vero sine materia sensibili. Si igitur omnia phisica similiter simo dicuntur, ut nasus, oculus, facies, caro, os, totaliter animal, folium, radix, cortex, totaliter planta (nullius enim ipsorum sine motu ratio, sed semper habet materiam), palam quomodo oportet in phisicis ipsum quid est quaerere et diffinire. Ideoque et de anima quadam est speculari phisici, quaecumque non sine materia est. Ergo quia est phisica theorica, manifestum ex hiis. Now, we must not fail to notice the mode of being of the essence and of its definition, for, without this, inquiry is but idle. Of things defined, i.e. of whats , some are like snub , and some like concave . And these differ because snub is bound up with matter (for what is snub is a concave nose), while concavity is independent of perceptible matter. If then all natural things are a analogous [26a] to the snub in their nature; e.g. nose, eye, face, flesh, bone, and, in general, animal; leaf, root, bark, and, in general, plant (for none of these can be defined without reference to movement – they always have matter), it is clear how we must seek and define the what in the case of natural objects, and also that it belongs to the student of nature to study even soul in a certain sense, i.e. so much of it as is not independent of matter. That physics, then, is a theoretical science, is plain from these considerations.
ἀλλ᾽ ἔστι καὶ ἡ μαθηματικὴ θεωρητική: ἀλλ᾽ εἰ ἀκινήτων καὶ χωριστῶν ἐστί, νῦν ἄδηλον, ὅτι μέντοι ἔνια μαθήματα ᾗ ἀκίνητα καὶ ᾗ χωριστὰ [10] θεωρεῖ, δῆλον. Sed est et mathematica theorica *. Sed si immobilium et separabilium est, nunc adhuc non manifestum; quia tamen quaedam mathematica in quantum * immobilia et in quantum separabilia speculatur, palam. Mathematics also, however, is theoretical; but whether its objects are immovable and separable from matter, is not at present clear; still, it is clear that some mathematical theorems consider them qua immovable and qua separable from matter.
εἰ δέ τί ἐστιν ἀΐδιον καὶ ἀκίνητον καὶ χωριστόν, φανερὸν ὅτι θεωρητικῆς τὸ γνῶναι, οὐ μέντοι φυσικῆς γε (περὶ κινητῶν γάρ τινων ἡ φυσική) οὐδὲ μαθηματικῆς, ἀλλὰ προτέρας ἀμφοῖν. ἡ μὲν γὰρ φυσικὴ περὶ χωριστὰ μὲν ἀλλ᾽ οὐκ ἀκίνητα, τῆς δὲ μαθηματικῆς ἔνια [15] περὶ ἀκίνητα μὲν οὐ χωριστὰ δὲ ἴσως ἀλλ᾽ ὡς ἐν ὕλῃ: ἡ δὲ πρώτη καὶ περὶ χωριστὰ καὶ ἀκίνητα. ἀνάγκη δὲ πάντα μὲν τὰ αἴτια ἀΐδια εἶναι, μάλιστα δὲ ταῦτα: ταῦτα γὰρ αἴτια τοῖς φανεροῖς τῶν θείων. Si vero est immobile aliquid et sempiternum et separabile, palam quia est theorice id nosse, non tamen phisice (nam de mobilibus quibusdam est phisica) nec mathematice, sed * prioris ambarum. Phisica namque circa inseparabilia quidem sed non immobilia, mathematice autem quaedam circa immobilia quidem sed inseparabilia forsan, verum quasi in materia; prima vero * circa separabilia et > immobilia. Necesse vero omnes quidem causas sempiternas, et maxime has; hae namque causae manifestis sensibilium *. But if there is something which is eternal and immovable and separable, clearly the knowledge of it belongs to a theoretical science, – not, however, to physics (for physics deals with certain movable things) nor to mathematics, but to a science prior to both. For physics deals with things which exist separately but are not immovable, and some parts of mathematics deal with things which are immovable but presumably do not exist separately, but as embodied in matter; while the first science deals with things which both exist separately and are immovable. Now all causes must be eternal, but especially these; for they are the causes that operate on so much of the divine as appears to us.
ὥστε τρεῖς ἂν εἶεν φιλοσοφίαι θεωρητικαί, μαθηματική, φυσική, θεολογική Quare tres erunt philosophiae theorice: mathematica, phisica, theologia. There must, then, be three theoretical philosophies, mathematics, physics, and what we may call theology,
(οὐ γὰρ [20] ἄδηλον ὅτι εἴ που τὸ θεῖον ὑπάρχει, ἐν τῇ τοιαύτῃ φύσει ὑπάρχει), Non enim immanifestum quia si alicubi divinum existit, in tali natura existit; since it is obvious that if the divine is present anywhere, it is present in things of this sort.
καὶ τὴν τιμιωτάτην δεῖ περὶ τὸ τιμιώτατον γένος εἶναι. αἱ μὲν οὖν θεωρητικαὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἐπιστημῶν αἱρετώταται, αὕτη δὲ τῶν θεωρητικῶν. et honorabilissimam scientiam oportet circa honorabilissimum genus esse. Ergo theorice aliis scientiis desiderabiliores sunt, haec autem theoricis. And the highest science must deal with the highest genus. Thus, while the theoretical sciences are more to be desired than the other sciences, this is more to be desired than the other theoretical sciences.
ἀπορήσειε γὰρ ἄν τις πότερόν ποθ᾽ ἡ πρώτη φιλοσοφία καθόλου ἐστὶν ἢ περί τι γένος [25] καὶ φύσιν τινὰ μίαν (οὐ γὰρ ὁ αὐτὸς τρόπος οὐδ᾽ ἐν ταῖς μαθηματικαῖς, ἀλλ᾽ ἡ μὲν γεωμετρία καὶ ἀστρολογία περί τινα φύσιν εἰσίν, ἡ δὲ καθόλου πασῶν κοινή): Dubitabit enim [/autem] utique aliquis utrum prima philosophia sit universalis aut circa aliquod genus et naturam unam; non enim idem modus nec in mathematicis, quia geometria et astrologia circa aliquam naturam sunt, illa vero universaliter omnium est communis. For one might raise the question whether first philosophy is universal, or deals with one genus, i.e. some one kind of being; for not even the mathematical sciences are all alike in this respect, – geometry and astronomy deal with a certain particular kind of thing, while universal mathematics applies alike to all.
εἰ μὲν οὖν μὴ ἔστι τις ἑτέρα οὐσία παρὰ τὰς φύσει συνεστηκυίας, ἡ φυσικὴ ἂν εἴη πρώτη ἐπιστήμη: εἰ δ᾽ ἔστι τις οὐσία ἀκίνητος, [30] αὕτη προτέρα καὶ φιλοσοφία πρώτη, καὶ καθόλου οὕτως ὅτι πρώτη: καὶ περὶ τοῦ ὄντος ᾗ ὂν ταύτης ἂν εἴη θεωρῆσαι, καὶ τί ἐστι καὶ τὰ ὑπάρχοντα ᾗ ὄν. Si quidem igitur non est aliqua altera substantia praeter natura consistentes, phisica utique erit prima scientia. Sed si est aliqua substantia immobilis, haec prior et philosophia prima, et universalis sic quia prima; et de ente in quantum ens huius utique erit speculari, et quae est et quae insunt in quantum ens. We answer that if there is no substance other than those which are formed by nature, natural science will be the first science; but if there is an immovable substance, the science of this must be prior and must be first philosophy, and universal in this way, because it is first. And it will belong to this to consider being qua being – both what it is and the attributes which belong to it qua being.

Chapter 2

Greek Latin English
ἀλλ᾽ ἐπεὶ τὸ ὂν τὸ ἁπλῶς λεγόμενον λέγεται πολλαχῶς, ὧν ἓν μὲν ἦν τὸ κατὰ συμβεβηκός, ἕτερον δὲ τὸ [35] ὡς ἀληθές, καὶ τὸ μὴ ὂν ὡς τὸ ψεῦδος, παρὰ ταῦτα δ᾽ ἐστὶ τὰ σχήματα τῆς κατηγορίας (οἷον τὸ μὲν τί, τὸ δὲ ποιόν, τὸ δὲ ποσόν, τὸ δὲ πού, τὸ δὲ ποτέ, καὶ εἴ τι ἄλλο σημαίνει τὸν τρόπον τοῦτον), [1026β] [1] ἔτι παρὰ ταῦτα πάντα τὸ δυνάμει καὶ ἐνεργείᾳ: Sed quoniam ens simpliciter dictum dicitur multipliciter, quorum unum quidem erat quod secundum accidens, et aliud quod ut verum et non ens ut falsum, praeter haec autem sunt figure cathegorie (ut quid, quale, quantum, ubi, quando, et si quid aliud significat hoc modo), amplius praeter haec omnia quod * potestate et actu: Chapter 2. But since the unqualified term being has several meanings, of which one was seen to be the accidental, and another the true ( non-being being the false), while besides these there are the figures of predication (e.g. the what , quality, quantity, place, time, and any similar meanings which being [26b] may have), and again besides all these there is that which is potentially or actually:
ἐπεὶ δὴ πολλαχῶς λέγεται τὸ ὄν, πρῶτον περὶ τοῦ κατὰ συμβεβηκὸς λεκτέον, ὅτι οὐδεμία ἐστὶ περὶ αὐτὸ θεωρία. σημεῖον δέ: οὐδεμιᾷ γὰρ ἐπιστήμῃ ἐπιμελὲς [5] περὶ αὐτοῦ οὔτε πρακτικῇ οὔτε ποιητικῇ οὔτε θεωρητικῇ. οὔτε γὰρ ὁ ποιῶν οἰκίαν ποιεῖ ὅσα συμβαίνει ἅμα τῇ οἰκίᾳ γιγνομένῃ (ἄπειρα γάρ ἐστιν: τοῖς μὲν γὰρ ἡδεῖαν τοῖς δὲ βλαβερὰν τοῖς δ᾽ ὠφέλιμον οὐθὲν εἶναι κωλύει τὴν ποιηθεῖσαν, καὶ ἑτέραν ὡς εἰπεῖν πάντων τῶν ὄντων: ὧν οὐθενός [10] ἐστιν ἡ οἰκοδομικὴ ποιητική), τὸν αὐτὸν δὲ τρόπον οὐδ᾽ ὁ γεωμέτρης θεωρεῖ τὰ οὕτω συμβεβηκότα τοῖς σχήμασιν, οὐδ᾽ εἰ ἕτερόν ἐστι τρίγωνον καὶ τρίγωνον δύο ὀρθὰς ἔχον. quoniam itaque multipliciter dicitur ens, primum de eo quod secundum accidens est dicendum, quia nulla est circa id speculatio. Signum autem: nulla enim scientia studiosa est de eo, neque activa neque factiva nec theorica. non enim faciens domum facit quaecumque accidunt simul > domui facte; infinita enim sunt: hiis quidem enim voluptuosam illis autem nocivam aliis autem utilem nihil esse prohibet factam, et alteram ut est dicere ab omnibus entibus; quorum nullius est edificativa factiva. Eodem vero modo nec geometer speculatur sic accidentia figuris, nec si alterum est trigonum et trigonum duos rectos habens. since being has many meanings, we must say regarding the accidental, that there can be no scientific treatment of it. This is confirmed by the fact that no science practical, productive, or theoretical troubles itself about it. For on the one hand he who produces a house does not produce all the attributes that come into being along with the house; for these are innumerable; the house that has been made may quite well be pleasant for some people, hurtful for some, and useful to others, and different – to put it shortly from all things that are; and the science of building does not aim at producing any of these attributes. And in the same way the geometer does not consider the attributes which attach thus to figures, nor whether triangle is different from triangle whose angles are equal to two right angles.
καὶ τοῦτ᾽ εὐλόγως συμπίπτει: ὥσπερ γὰρ ὄνομά τι μόνον τὸ συμβεβηκός ἐστιν. Et hoc rationabiliter concidit; quemadmodum enim nomine solum accidens est. And this happens naturally enough; for the accidental is practically a mere name.
διὸ Πλάτων τρόπον τινὰ οὐ κακῶς τὴν σοφιστικὴν [15] περὶ τὸ μὴ ὂν ἔταξεν. εἰσὶ γὰρ οἱ τῶν σοφιστῶν λόγοι περὶ τὸ συμβεβηκὸς ὡς εἰπεῖν μάλιστα πάντων, πότερον ἕτερον ἢ ταὐτὸν μουσικὸν καὶ γραμματικόν, καὶ μουσικὸς Κορίσκος καὶ Κορίσκος, καὶ εἰ πᾶν ὃ ἂν ᾖ, μὴ ἀεὶ δέ, γέγονεν, ὥστ᾽ εἰ μουσικὸς ὢν γραμματικὸς γέγονε, καὶ γραμματικὸς [20] ὢν μουσικός, καὶ ὅσοι δὴ ἄλλοι τοιοῦτοι τῶν λόγων εἰσίν: φαίνεται γὰρ τὸ συμβεβηκὸς ἐγγύς τι τοῦ μὴ ὄντος. Unde Plato modo quodam non male sophisticam circa non ens ordinavit. Sunt enim sophistarum rationes circa accidens ut est dicere maxime omnium: utrum diversum an idem musicum et gramaticum, et musicus Coriscus et Coriscus, et si omne quod est et non semper, factum est, quare si musicus ens gramaticus est factus, et gramaticus ens * musicus, et quaecumque aliae rationum tales sunt; videtur enim accidens propinquum quid non enti. And so Plato was in a sense not wrong in ranking sophistic as dealing with that which is not. For the arguments of the sophists deal, we may say, above all with the accidental; e.g. the question whether musical and lettered are different or the same, and whether musical Coriscus and Coriscus are the same, and whether "everything which is, but is not eternal, has come to be", with the paradoxical conclusion that if one who was musical has come to be lettered, he must also have been lettered and have come to be musical, and all the other arguments of this sort; the accidental is obviously akin to non-being.
δῆλον δὲ καὶ ἐκ τῶν τοιούτων λόγων: τῶν μὲν γὰρ ἄλλον τρόπον ὄντων ἔστι γένεσις καὶ φθορά, τῶν δὲ κατὰ συμβεβηκὸς οὐκ ἔστιν. Palam autem et ex huiusmodi rationibus: nam alio modo entium generatio est et corruptio, eorum vero quae sunt secundum accidens non est. And this is clear also from arguments such as the following: things which are in another sense come into being and pass out of being by a process, but things which are accidentally do not.
ἀλλ᾽ ὅμως λεκτέον ἔτι περὶ τοῦ συμβεβηκότος [25] ἐφ᾽ ὅσον ἐνδέχεται, τίς ἡ φύσις αὐτοῦ καὶ διὰ τίν᾽ αἰτίαν ἔστιν: ἅμα γὰρ δῆλον ἴσως ἔσται καὶ διὰ τί ἐπιστήμη οὐκ ἔστιν αὐτοῦ. At tamen dicendum est amplius de accidente in quantum contingit, quae eius natura et propter quam causam est; simul enim forsan palam erit et quare eius non est scientia. But still we must, as far as we can, say further, regarding the accidental, what its nature is and from what cause it proceeds; for it will perhaps at the same time become clear why there is no science of it.
ἐπεὶ οὖν ἐστὶν ἐν τοῖς οὖσι τὰ μὲν ἀεὶ ὡσαύτως ἔχοντα καὶ ἐξ ἀνάγκης, οὐ τῆς κατὰ τὸ βίαιον λεγομένης ἀλλ᾽ ἣν λέγομεν τῷ μὴ ἐνδέχεσθαι ἄλλως, τὰ δ᾽ [30] ἐξ ἀνάγκης μὲν οὐκ ἔστιν οὐδ᾽ ἀεί, ὡς δ᾽ ἐπὶ τὸ πολύ, αὕτη ἀρχὴ καὶ αὕτη αἰτία ἐστὶ τοῦ εἶναι τὸ συμβεβηκός: Quoniam igitur sunt in entibus haec quidem semper similiter se habentia et ex necessitate, * non secundum vim dicta sed quam dicimus in non contingere aliter, illa vero ex necessitate quidem non sunt nec semper, sed quasi secundum magis, hoc principium et haec causa est eius quod est accidens esse; Since, among things which are, some are always in the same state and are of necessity (not necessity in the sense of compulsion but that which we assert of things because they cannot be otherwise), and some are not of necessity nor always, but for the most part, this is the principle and this the cause of the existence of the accidental;
ὃ γὰρ [32] ἂν ᾖ μήτ᾽ ἀεὶ μήθ᾽ ὡς ἐπὶ τὸ πολύ, τοῦτό φαμεν συμβεβηκὸς εἶναι. οἷον ἐπὶ κυνὶ ἂν χειμὼν γένηται καὶ ψῦχος, τοῦτο συμβῆναί φαμεν, ἀλλ᾽ οὐκ ἂν πνῖγος καὶ ἀλέα, ὅτι [35] τὸ μὲν ἀεὶ ἢ ὡς ἐπὶ τὸ πολὺ τὸ δ᾽ οὔ. καὶ τὸν ἄνθρωπον λευκὸν εἶναι συμβέβηκεν (οὔτε γὰρ ἀεὶ οὔθ᾽ ὡς ἐπὶ τὸ πολύ), ζῷον δ᾽ οὐ κατὰ συμβεβηκός. καὶ τὸ ὑγιάζειν δὲ τὸν οἰκοδόμον συμβεβηκός, [1027α] [1] ὅτι οὐ πέφυκε τοῦτο ποιεῖν οἰκοδόμος ἀλλὰ ἰατρός, ἀλλὰ συνέβη ἰατρὸν εἶναι τὸν οἰκοδόμον. καὶ ὀψοποιὸς ἡδονῆς στοχαζόμενος ποιήσειεν ἄν τι ὑγιεινόν, ἀλλ᾽ οὐ κατὰ τὴν ὀψοποιητικήν: διὸ συνέβη, φαμέν, καὶ [5] ἔστιν ὡς ποιεῖ, ἁπλῶς δ᾽ οὔ. τῶν μὲν γὰρ ἄλλων [ἐνίοτε] δυνάμεις εἰσὶν αἱ ποιητικαί, τῶν δ᾽ οὐδεμία τέχνη οὐδὲ δύναμις ὡρισμένη: τῶν γὰρ κατὰ συμβεβηκὸς ὄντων ἢ γιγνομένων καὶ τὸ αἴτιόν ἐστι κατὰ συμβεβηκός. quod enim nec semper nec quasi secundum magis est, hoc dicimus accidens esse. Ut * sub cane si fuerit hyemps et frigus, hoc accidere dicimus, sed non si estuatio et calor, quia hoc * quidem semper aut * secundum magis illud vero non. Et hominem album esse accidit (nec enim semper nec secundum > magis), animal vero non secundum accidens. Et edificatorem sanitatem facere accidens, quia non est natus hoc facere edificator sed medicus, sed accidit medicum esse edificatorem. Et coquus voluptatem * coniectans faciet utique alicui salubre, sed non secundum pulmentariam; quapropter accidens dicimus, et est ut facit, simpliciter autem non. Aliorum enim aliae quandoque potentie factive sunt, horum vero nulla ars nec potentia determinata; nam secundum accidens entium aut factorum causa est secundum accidens. for that which is neither always nor for the most part, we call accidental. For instance, if in the dog-days there is wintry and cold weather, we say this is an accident, but not if there is sultry heat, because the latter is always or for the most part so, but not the former. And it is an accident that a man is pale (for this is neither always nor for the most part so), but it is not by accident that he is an animal. And [27a] that the builder produces health is an accident, because it is the nature not of the builder but of the doctor to do this, – but the builder happened to be a doctor. Again, a confectioner, aiming at giving pleasure, may make something wholesome, but not in virtue of the confectioner's art; and therefore we say it was an accident , and while there is a sense in which he makes it, in the unqualified sense he does not. For to other things answer faculties productive of them, but to accidental results there corresponds no determinate art nor faculty; for of things which are or come to be by accident, the cause also is accidental.
ὥστ᾽ ἐπεὶ οὐ πάντα ἐστὶν ἐξ ἀνάγκης καὶ ἀεὶ ἢ ὄντα ἢ γιγνόμενα, ἀλλὰ τὰ [10] πλεῖστα ὡς ἐπὶ τὸ πολύ, ἀνάγκη εἶναι τὸ κατὰ συμβεβηκὸς ὄν: οἷον οὔτ᾽ ἀεὶ οὔθ᾽ ὡς ἐπὶ τὸ πολὺ ὁ λευκὸς μουσικός ἐστιν, ἐπεὶ δὲ γίγνεταί ποτε, κατὰ συμβεβηκὸς ἔσται (εἰ δὲ μή, πάντ᾽ ἔσται ἐξ ἀνάγκης): ὥστε ἡ ὕλη ἔσται αἰτία ἡ ἐνδεχομένη παρὰ τὸ ὡς ἐπὶ τὸ πολὺ ἄλλως τοῦ συμβεβηκότος. [15] ἀρχὴν δὲ τηνδὶ ληπτέον, πότερον οὐδέν ἐστιν οὔτ᾽ αἰεὶ οὔθ᾽ ὡς ἐπὶ τὸ πολύ. ἢ τοῦτο ἀδύνατον; ἔστιν ἄρα τι παρὰ ταῦτα τὸ ὁπότερ᾽ ἔτυχε καὶ κατὰ συμβεβηκός. ἀλλὰ πότερον τὸ ὡς ἐπὶ τὸ πολύ, τὸ δ᾽ ἀεὶ οὐθενὶ ὑπάρχει, ἢ ἔστιν ἄττα ἀΐδια; περὶ μὲν οὖν τούτων ὕστερον σκεπτέον, Quare quoniam quidem non omnia sunt ex necessitate et semper aut entia aut quae fiunt, sed plurima secundum magis, necesse esse quod secundum accidens est ens; ut nec semper nec secundum magis albus musicus est, quoniam vero fit aliquando, secundum accidens erit (si autem non, omnia erunt ex necessitate). Quare materia erit causa contingens praeter quod * ut in pluribus aliter accidentis. Principium autem hoc oportet sumere, utrum nihil est nec semper nec secundum magis, aut hoc impossibile. Est igitur aliquid praeter haec quod utcumque contingit et secundum accidens. Sed utrum hoc quod * ut in pluribus et quod semper nulli insunt, aut * sunt quaedam sempiterna? De hiis quidem igitur posterius perscrutandum est. Therefore, since not all things either are or come to be of necessity and always, but, the majority of things are for the most part, the accidental must exist; for instance a pale man is not always nor for the most part musical, but since this sometimes happens, it must be accidental (if not, everything will be of necessity). The matter, therefore, which is capable of being otherwise than as it usually is, must be the cause of the accidental. And we must take as our starting-point the question whether there is nothing that is neither always nor for the most part. Surely this is impossible. There is, then, besides these something which is fortuitous and accidental. But while the usual exists, can nothing be said to be always, or are there eternal things? This must be considered later,
ὅτι δ᾽ [20] ἐπιστήμη οὐκ ἔστι τοῦ συμβεβηκότος φανερόν: ἐπιστήμη μὲν γὰρ πᾶσα ἢ τοῦ ἀεὶ ἢ τοῦ ὡς ἐπὶ τὸ πολύ—πῶς γὰρ ἢ μαθήσεται ἢ διδάξει ἄλλον; δεῖ γὰρ ὡρίσθαι ἢ τῷ ἀεὶ ἢ τῷ ὡς ἐπὶ τὸ πολύ, οἷον ὅτι ὠφέλιμον τὸ μελίκρατον τῷ πυρέττοντι ὡς ἐπὶ τὸ πολύ—τὸ δὲ παρὰ τοῦτο οὐχ ἕξει λέγειν, [25] πότε οὔ, οἷον νουμηνίᾳ: ἢ γὰρ ἀεὶ ἢ ὡς ἐπὶ τὸ πολὺ καὶ τὸ τῇ νουμηνίᾳ: τὸ δὲ συμβεβηκός ἐστι παρὰ ταῦτα. τί μὲν οὖν ἐστὶ τὸ συμβεβηκὸς καὶ διὰ τίν᾽ αἰτίαν καὶ ὅτι ἐπιστήμη οὐκ ἔστιν αὐτοῦ, εἴρηται. Quod autem scientia non est accidentis, palam; scientia namque omnis aut est eius quod est semper aut eius quod secundum magis — Etenim quomodo docebitur aut docebit alium? Oportet enim diffiniri aut per semper aut per magis, ut quia utile mellicratum febricitanti ut secundum magis. Quod autem * praeter hoc non habebit dicere quando *, puta noua luna; aut enim semper aut ut in pluribus et quod noua luna; accidens autem est praeter haec. Quid quidem igitur est accidens et propter quam causam et quia scientia non est eius, dictum est. but that there is no science of the accidental is obvious; for all science is either of that which is always or of that which is for the most part. (For how else is one to learn or to teach another? The thing must be determined as occurring either always or for the most part, e.g. that honey-water is useful for a patient in a fever is true for the most part.) But that which is contrary to the usual law science will be unable to state, i.e. when the thing does not happen, e.g. on the day of new moon ; for even that which happens on the day of new moon happens then either always or for the most part; but the accidental is contrary to such laws. We have stated, then, what the accidental is, and from what cause it arises, and that there is no science which deals with it.

Chapter 3

Greek Latin English
ὅτι δ᾽ εἰσὶν ἀρχαὶ καὶ αἴτια γενητὰ καὶ φθαρτὰ [30] ἄνευ τοῦ γίγνεσθαι καὶ φθείρεσθαι, φανερόν. εἰ γὰρ μὴ τοῦτ᾽, ἐξ ἀνάγκης πάντ᾽ ἔσται, εἰ τοῦ γιγνομένου καὶ φθειρομένου μὴ κατὰ συμβεβηκὸς αἴτιόν τι ἀνάγκη εἶναι. πότερον γὰρ ἔσται τοδὶ ἢ οὔ; ἐάν γε τοδὶ γένηται: εἰ δὲ μή, οὔ. τοῦτο δὲ ἐὰν ἄλλο. καὶ οὕτω δῆλον ὅτι ἀεὶ χρόνου ἀφαιρουμένου ἀπὸ πεπερασμένου χρόνου ἥξει ἐπὶ τὸ νῦν, [1027β] [1] ὥστε ὁδὶ ἀποθανεῖται [νόσῳ ἢ] βίᾳ, ἐάν γε ἐξέλθῃ: τοῦτο δὲ ἐὰν διψήσῃ: τοῦτο δὲ ἐὰν ἄλλο: καὶ οὕτως ἥξει εἰς ὃ νῦν ὑπάρχει, ἢ εἰς τῶν γεγονότων τι. οἷον ἐὰν διψήσῃ: τοῦτο δὲ εἰ ἐσθίει δριμέα: [5] τοῦτο δ᾽ ἤτοι ὑπάρχει ἢ οὔ: ὥστ᾽ ἐξ ἀνάγκης ἀποθανεῖται ἢ οὐκ ἀποθανεῖται. ὁμοίως δὲ κἂν ὑπερπηδήσῃ τις εἰς τὰ γενόμενα, ὁ αὐτὸς λόγος: ἤδη γὰρ ὑπάρχει τοῦτο ἔν τινι, λέγω δὲ τὸ γεγονός: ἐξ ἀνάγκης ἄρα πάντα ἔσται τὰ ἐσόμενα, οἷον τὸ ἀποθανεῖν τὸν ζῶντα: ἤδη γάρ τι γέγονεν, [10] οἷον τὰ ἐναντία ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ. ἀλλ᾽ εἰ νόσῳ ἢ βίᾳ, οὔπω, ἀλλ᾽ ἐὰν τοδὶ γένηται. δῆλον ἄρα ὅτι μέχρι τινὸς βαδίζει ἀρχῆς, αὕτη δ᾽ οὐκέτι εἰς ἄλλο. > Quod autem sint principia et causae generabilia et corruptibilia sine generari et corrumpi, palam. Si enim non hoc, ex necessitate omnia erunt, si eius quod fit et corrumpitur non secundum accidens causam aliquam necesse est esse. Vtrum enim erit hoc aut non? Si hoc fiat; si autem non, non. Hoc autem si aliud. Et ita manifestum quia semper tempore ablato a finito tempore veniet usque ad nunc. Quare hic moritur infirmitate aut vi, si exit; hoc autem si sitit; sed hoc si aliud; et ita veniet ad quod nunc est, aut in factorum aliquid; ut si sitit; hoc autem si comedit mordicantia; sed hoc aut est aut non; quare ex necessitate morietur aut non morietur. Similiter autem et si supersiliat aliquis ad facta, eadem ratio; iam enim est hoc in aliquo, dico autem factum. Ex necessitate ergo omnia erunt quae futura, ut moriturum fore viventem; iam enim aliquid factum est, ut contraria in eodem corpore. Sed si infirmitate aut vi, nondum, nisi hoc factum fuerit. Chapter 3. That there are principles and causes which are generable and destructible without ever being in course of being generated or destroyed, is obvious. For otherwise all things will be of necessity, since that which is being generated or destroyed must have a cause which is not accidentally its cause. Will A exist or not? It will if B happens; and if not, not. And B will exist if C happens. And thus if time is constantly subtracted from a limited extent of time, one will obviously come to the present. [27b] This man, then, will die by violence, if he goes out; and he will do this if he gets thirsty; and he will get thirsty if something else happens; and thus we shall come to that which is now present, or to some past event. For instance, he will go out if he gets thirsty; and he will get thirsty if he is eating pungent food; and this is either the case or not; so that he will of necessity die, or of necessity not die. And similarly if one jumps over to past events, the same account will hold good; for this – I mean the past condition – is already present in something. Everything, therefore, that will be, will be of necessity; e.g. it is necessary that he who lives shall one day die; for already some condition has come into existence, e.g. the presence of contraries in the same body. But whether he is to die by disease or by violence is not yet determined, but depends on the happening of something else.
ἔσται οὖν ἡ τοῦ ὁπότερ᾽ ἔτυχεν αὕτη, καὶ αἴτιον τῆς γενέσεως αὐτῆς ἄλλο οὐθέν. Palam ergo quia usque ad aliquod vadit principium, hoc autem non adhuc ad aliud. Erit ergo quod eius quod utcumque evenit ipsum, et causa generationis ipsius nulla. Clearly then the process goes back to a certain starting-point, but this no longer points to something further. This then will be the starting-point for the fortuitous, and will have nothing else as cause of its coming to be.
ἀλλ᾽ εἰς ἀρχὴν ποίαν καὶ αἴτιον ποῖον ἡ ἀναγωγὴ ἡ [15] τοιαύτη, πότερον ὡς εἰς ὕλην ἢ ὡς εἰς τὸ οὗ ἕνεκα ἢ ὡς εἰς τὸ κινῆσαν, μάλιστα σκεπτέον. Sed ad principium quale et causam qualem reductio talis, utrum ut ad materiam aut ut ad id quod cuius gratia aut ut ad movens, maxime perscrutandum. But to what sort of starting-point and what sort of cause we thus refer the fortuitous – whether to matter or to the purpose or to the motive power, must be carefully considered.

Chapter 4

Greek Latin English
περὶ μὲν οὖν τοῦ κατὰ συμβεβηκὸς ὄντος ἀφείσθω (διώρισται γὰρ ἱκανῶς): Ergo de ente secundum accidens praetermittatur; determinatum enim est sufficienter. Chapter 4 Let us dismiss accidental being; for we have sufficiently determined its nature.
τὸ δὲ ὡς ἀληθὲς ὄν, καὶ μὴ ὂν ὡς ψεῦδος, ἐπειδὴ παρὰ σύνθεσίν ἐστι καὶ διαίρεσιν, τὸ δὲ σύνολον [20] περὶ μερισμὸν ἀντιφάσεως (τὸ μὲν γὰρ ἀληθὲς τὴν κατάφασιν ἐπὶ τῷ συγκειμένῳ ἔχει τὴν δ᾽ ἀπόφασιν ἐπὶ τῷ διῃρημένῳ, τὸ δὲ ψεῦδος τούτου τοῦ μερισμοῦ τὴν ἀντίφασιν: Quod autem * ut verum ens et non ens ut falsum, quoniam secundum compositionem est et * divisionem, totaliter vero circa partitionem contradictionis; verum quidem enim affirmationem in composito habet negationem vero in disiuncto, sed falsum huius partitionis > * contradictionem. But since that which is in the sense of being true, or is not in the sense of being false, depends on combination and separation, and truth and falsity together depend on the allocation of a pair of contradictory judgements (for the true judgement affirms where the subject and predicate really are combined, and denies where they are separated, while the false judgement has the opposite of this allocation;
πῶς δὲ τὸ ἅμα ἢ τὸ χωρὶς νοεῖν συμβαίνει, ἄλλος λόγος, λέγω δὲ τὸ ἅμα καὶ τὸ χωρὶς ὥστε μὴ τὸ ἐφεξῆς [25] ἀλλ᾽ ἕν τι γίγνεσθαι): Quomodo autem quod simul aut quod separatim intelligere accidit, alius * sermo; dico autem quod simul et quod separatim ut non eo quod consequenter sed in unum aliquid fieri. it is another question, how it happens that we think things together or apart; by together and apart I mean thinking them so that there is no succession in the thoughts but they become a unity);
οὐ γάρ ἐστι τὸ ψεῦδος καὶ τὸ ἀληθὲς ἐν τοῖς πράγμασιν, οἷον τὸ μὲν ἀγαθὸν ἀληθὲς τὸ δὲ κακὸν εὐθὺς ψεῦδος, ἀλλ᾽ ἐν διανοίᾳ, περὶ δὲ τὰ ἁπλᾶ καὶ τὰ τί ἐστιν οὐδ᾽ ἐν διανοίᾳ: ὅσα μὲν οὖν δεῖ θεωρῆσαι περὶ τὸ οὕτως ὂν καὶ μὴ ὄν, ὕστερον ἐπισκεπτέον: Non enim est falsum et verum in rebus, ut quod quidem bonum verum quod autem malum falsum, sed in mente; circa vero simplicia et quid est nec in mente est. Ergo quaecumque oportet speculari circa sic ens et non ens, posterius perscrutandum est. for falsity and truth are not in things – it is not as if the good were true, and the bad were in itself false – but in thought; while with regard to simple concepts and whats falsity and truth do not exist even in thought – this being so, we must consider later what has to be discussed with regard to that which is or is not in this sense.
ἐπεὶ δὲ ἡ συμπλοκή [30] ἐστιν καὶ ἡ διαίρεσις ἐν διανοίᾳ ἀλλ᾽ οὐκ ἐν τοῖς πράγμασι, τὸ δ᾽ οὕτως ὂν ἕτερον ὂν τῶν κυρίως (ἢ γὰρ τὸ τί ἐστιν ἢ ὅτι ποιὸν ἢ ὅτι ποσὸν ἤ τι ἄλλο συνάπτει ἢ ἀφαιρεῖ ἡ διάνοια), τὸ μὲν ὡς συμβεβηκὸς καὶ τὸ ὡς ἀληθὲς ὂν ἀφετέον—τὸ γὰρ αἴτιον τοῦ μὲν ἀόριστον τοῦ δὲ τῆς διανοίας τι πάθος, [1028α] [1] καὶ ἀμφότερα περὶ τὸ λοιπὸν γένος τοῦ ὄντος, καὶ οὐκ ἔξω δηλοῦσιν οὖσάν τινα φύσιν τοῦ ὄντος—διὸ ταῦτα μὲν ἀφείσθω, σκεπτέον δὲ τοῦ ὄντος αὐτοῦ τὰ αἴτια καὶ τὰς ἀρχὰς ᾗ ὄν. [φανερὸν δ᾽ ἐν οἷς διωρισάμεθα περὶ [5] τοῦ ποσαχῶς λέγεται ἕκαστον, ὅτι πολλαχῶς λέγεται τὸ ὄν.] Quoniam autem complexio est et divisio in mente et non in rebus, quod autem * ita ens alterum * ens a propriis (aut enim quod quid est aut quia quale * aut quia quantum aut si quid aliud copulat aut dividit mens), quod quidem ut accidens et quod ut verum ens praetermittendum. Causa enim huius quidem indefinita illius vero mentis aliqua passio, et utraque circa reliquum genus entis, et non extra ostendunt entem aliquam naturam entis. Quapropter ea quidem praetermittantur, perscrutande vero sunt entis ipsius causae et principia in quantum ens *. Palam autem in quibus determinavimus de * quotiens unumquodque dicitur, quia multipliciter dicitur ens. Significat enim hoc quidem quid est. But since the combination and the separation are in thought and not in the things, and that which is in this sense is a different sort of being from the things that are in the full sense (for the thought attaches or removes either the subject's what or its having a certain quality or quantity or something else), that which is accidentally and that which is in the sense of being true must be dismissed. For the cause of the former is indeterminate, and that of the latter is some affection of the thought [28a], and both are related to the remaining genus of being, and do not indicate the existence of any separate class of being. Therefore let these be dismissed, and let us consider the causes and the principles of being itself, qua being. (It was clear in our discussion of the various meanings of terms, that being has several meanings.)


Notes


  • [[]]
Personal tools