Authors/Thomas Aquinas/Summa Theologiae/Part IIb/Q99

• Question 99.1 Sacrilege
• Question 99.2
• Question 99.3
• Question 99.4

Latin	English
IIª-IIae q. 99 pr. Deinde considerandum est de vitiis ad irreligiositatem pertinentibus quibus rebus sacris irreverentia exhibetur. Et primo, de sacrilegio; secundo, de simonia. Circa primum quaeruntur quatuor. Primo, quid sit sacrilegium. Secundo, utrum sit speciale peccatum. Tertio, de speciebus sacrilegii. Quarto, de poena sacrilegii.	Question 99. Sacrilege 1. What is sacrilege? 2. Is it a special sin? 3. The species of sacrilege 4. The punishment of sacrilege
IIª-IIae q. 99 a. 1 arg. 1 Ad primum sic proceditur. Videtur quod sacrilegium non sit sacrae rei violatio. Dicitur enim XVII, qu. IV, committunt sacrilegium qui de principis iudicio disputant, dubitantes an is dignus sit honore quem princeps elegerit. Sed hoc ad nullam rem sacram pertinere videtur. Ergo sacrilegium non importat sacrae rei violationem.	Objection 1. It would seem that sacrilege is not the violation of a sacred thing. It is stated (XVII, qu. iv [Append. Gratian, on can. Si quis suadente]): "They are guilty of sacrilege who disagree about the sovereign's decision, and doubt whether the person chosen by the sovereign be worthy of honor." Now this seems to have no connection with anything sacred. Therefore sacrilege does not denote the violation of something sacred.
IIª-IIae q. 99 a. 1 arg. 2 Praeterea, ibidem subditur quod si quis permiserit Iudaeos officia publica exercere, velut in sacrilegum excommunicatio proferatur. Sed officia publica non videntur ad aliquod sacrum pertinere. Ergo videtur quod sacrilegium non importet violationem alicuius sacri.	Objection 2. Further, it is stated further on [Append. Gratian, on can. Constituit.] that if any man shall allow the Jews to hold public offices, "he must be excommunicated as being guilty of sacrilege." Yet public offices have nothing to do with anything sacred. Therefore it seems that sacrilege does not denote the violation of a sacred thing.
IIª-IIae q. 99 a. 1 arg. 3 Praeterea, maior est virtus Dei quam virtus hominis. Sed res sacrae a Deo sanctitatem obtinent. Non ergo possunt per hominem violari. Et ita sacrilegium non videtur esse sacrae rei violatio.	Objection 3. Further, God's power is greater than man's. Now sacred things receive their sacred character from God. Therefore they cannot be violated by man: and so a sacrilege would not seem to be the violation of a sacred thing.
IIª-IIae q. 99 a. 1 s. c. Sed contra est quod Isidorus dicit, in libro Etymol., quod sacrilegus dicitur ab eo quod sacra legit, idest furatur.	On the contrary, Isidore says (Etym. x) that "a man is said to be sacrilegious because he selects," i.e. steals, "sacred things."
IIª-IIae q. 99 a. 1 co. Respondeo dicendum quod, sicut ex praedictis patet, sacrum dicitur aliquid ex eo quod ad divinum cultum ordinatur. Sicut autem ex eo quod aliquid ordinatur in finem bonum, sortitur rationem boni; ita etiam ex hoc quod aliquid deputatur ad cultum Dei, efficitur quoddam divinum, et sic ei quaedam reverentia debetur quae refertur in Deum. Et ideo omne illud quod ad irreverentiam rerum sacrarum pertinet, ad iniuriam Dei pertinet, et habet sacrilegii rationem.	I answer that, As stated above (81, 5; I-II, 101, 4), a thing is called "sacred" through being deputed to the divine worship. Now just as a thing acquires an aspect of good through being deputed to a good end, so does a thing assume a divine character through being deputed to the divine worship, and thus a certain reverence is due to it, which reverence is referred to God. Therefore whatever pertains to irreverence for sacred things is an injury to God, and comes under the head of sacrilege.
IIª-IIae q. 99 a. 1 ad 1 Ad primum ergo dicendum quod, secundum philosophum, in I Ethic., bonum commune gentis est quoddam divinum. Et ideo antiquitus rectores reipublicae divini vocabantur, quasi divinae providentiae ministri, secundum illud Sap. VI, cum essetis ministri regni illius, non recte iudicastis. Et sic, per quandam nominis extensionem, illud quod pertinet ad reverentiam principis, scilicet disputare de eius iudicio, an oporteat ipsum sequi, secundum quandam similitudinem sacrilegium dicitur.	Reply to Objection 1. According to the Philosopher (Ethic. i, 2) the common good of the nation is a divine thing, wherefore in olden times the rulers of a commonwealth were called divines, as being the ministers of divine providence, according to Wisdom 6:5, "Being ministers of His kingdom, you have not judged rightly." Hence by an extension of the term, whatever savors of irreverence for the sovereign, such as disputing his judgment, and questioning whether one ought to follow it, is called sacrilege by a kind of likeness.
IIª-IIae q. 99 a. 1 ad 2 Ad secundum dicendum quod populus Christianus per fidem et sacramenta Christi sanctificatus est, secundum illud I ad Cor. VI, sed abluti estis, sed sanctificati estis. Et ideo I Pet. II dicitur, vos estis genus electum, regale sacerdotium, gens sancta, populus acquisitionis. Et ita id quod fit in iniuriam populi Christiani, scilicet quod infideles ei praeficiantur, pertinet ad irreverentiam sacrae rei. Unde rationabiliter sacrilegium dicitur.	Reply to Objection 2. Christians are sanctified by faith and the sacraments of Christ, according to 1 Corinthians 6:11, "But you are washed, but you are sanctified." Wherefore it is written (1 Peter 2:9): "You are a chosen generation, a kingly priesthood, a holy nation, a purchased people." Therefore any injury inflicted on the Christian people, for instance that unbelievers should be put in authority over it, is an irreverence for a sacred thing, and is reasonably called a sacrilege.
IIª-IIae q. 99 a. 1 ad 3 Ad tertium dicendum quod violatio hic large dicitur quaecumque irreverentia vel exhonoratio. Sicut autem honor est in honorante, non autem in eo qui honoratur, ut dicitur in I Ethic.; ita etiam irreverentia est in eo qui irreverenter se habet, quamvis etiam nihil noceat ei cui irreverentiam exhibet. Quantum ergo est in ipso, rem sacram violat, licet illa non violetur.	Reply to Objection 3. Violation here means any kind of irreverence or dishonor. Now as "honor is in the person who honors and not in the one who is honored" (Ethic. i, 5), so again irreverence is in the person who behaves irreverently even though he do no harm to the object of his irreverence. Hence, so far he is concerned, he violates the sacred thing, though the latter be not violated in itself.
IIª-IIae q. 99 a. 2 arg. 1 Ad secundum sic proceditur. Videtur quod sacrilegium non sit speciale peccatum. Dicitur enim XVII, qu. IV, committunt sacrilegium qui in divinae legis sanctitatem aut nesciendo committunt, aut negligendo violant et offendunt. Sed hoc fit per omne peccatum, nam peccatum est dictum vel factum vel concupitum contra legem Dei, ut Augustinus dicit, XXII contra Faustum. Ergo sacrilegium est generale peccatum.	Objection 1. It would seem that sacrilege not a special sin. It is stated (XVII, qu. iv) "They are guilty of sacrilege who through ignorance sin against the sanctity of the law, violate and defile it by their negligence." But this is done in every sin, because sin is "a word, deed or desire contrary to the law of God," according to Augustine (Contra Faust. xxi, 27). Therefore sacrilege is a general sin.
IIª-IIae q. 99 a. 2 arg. 2 Praeterea, nullum speciale peccatum continetur sub diversis generibus peccatorum. Sed sacrilegium sub diversis generibus peccatorum continetur, puta sub homicidio, si quis sacerdotem occidat; sub luxuria, si quis virginem sacratam violet, vel quamcumque mulierem in loco sacro; sub furto, si quis rem sacram furatus fuerit. Ergo sacrilegium non est speciale peccatum.	Objection 2. Further, no special sin is comprised under different kinds of sin. Now sacrilege comprised under different kinds of sin, for instance under murder, if one kill a priest under lust, as the violation of a consecrate virgin, or of any woman in a sacred place under theft, if one steal a sacred thing. Therefore sacrilege is not a special sin.
IIª-IIae q. 99 a. 2 arg. 3 Praeterea, omne speciale peccatum invenitur distinctum ab aliis peccatis, ut de iniustitia speciali philosophus dicit, in V Ethic. Sed sacrilegium non videtur inveniri absque aliis peccatis, sed quandoque coniungitur furto, quandoque homicidio, ut dictum est. Non ergo est speciale peccatum.	Objection 3. Further, every special sin is to found apart from other sins as the Philosopher states, in speaking of special justice (Ethic. v, 11). But, seemingly, sacrilege is not to be found apart from other sins; for it is sometimes united to theft, sometimes to murder, as stated in the preceding objection. Therefore it is not a special sin.
IIª-IIae q. 99 a. 2 s. c. Sed contra est quod opponitur speciali virtuti, scilicet religioni, ad quam pertinet revereri Deum et divina. Ergo sacrilegium est speciale peccatum.	On the contrary, That which is opposed to a special virtue is a special sin. But sacrilege is opposed to a special virtue, namely religion, to which it belongs to reverence God and divine things. Therefore sacrilege is a special sin.
IIª-IIae q. 99 a. 2 co. Respondeo dicendum quod ubicumque invenitur specialis ratio deformitatis, ibi necesse est quod sit speciale peccatum, quia species cuiuslibet rei praecipue attenditur secundum formalem rationem ipsius, non autem secundum materiam vel subiectum. In sacrilegio autem invenitur specialis ratio deformitatis, quia scilicet violatur res sacra per aliquam irreverentiam. Et ideo est speciale peccatum. Et opponitur religioni. Sicut enim Damascenus dicit, in IV Lib., purpura, regale indumentum facta, honoratur et glorificatur, et si quis hanc perforaverit, morte damnatur, quasi contra regem agens. Ita etiam si quis rem sacram violat, ex hoc ipso contra Dei reverentiam agit, et sic per irreligiositatem peccat.	I answer that, Wherever we find a special aspect of deformity, there must needs be a special sin; because the species of a thing is derived chiefly from its formal aspect, and not from its matter or subject. Now in sacrilege we find a special aspect of deformity, namely, the violation of a sacred thing by treating it irreverently. Hence it is a special sin. Moreover, it is opposed to religion. For according to Damascene (De Fide Orth. iv, 3), "When the purple has been made into a royal robe, we pay it honor and homage, and if anyone dishonor it he is condemned to death," as acting against the king: and in the same way if a man violate a sacred thing, by so doing his behavior is contrary to the reverence due to God and consequently he is guilty of irreligion.
IIª-IIae q. 99 a. 2 ad 1 Ad primum ergo dicendum quod illi dicuntur in divinae legis sanctitatem committere qui legem Dei impugnant, sicut haeretici et blasphemi. Qui ex hoc quod Deo non credunt, incurrunt infidelitatis peccatum, ex hoc vero quod divinae legis verba pervertunt, sacrilegium incurrunt.	Reply to Objection 1. Those are said to sin against the sanctity of the divine law who assail God's law, as heretics and blasphemers do. These are guilty of unbelief, through not believing in God; and of sacrilege, through perverting the words of the divine law.
IIª-IIae q. 99 a. 2 ad 2 Ad secundum dicendum quod nihil prohibet unam specialem rationem peccati in pluribus peccatorum generibus inveniri, secundum quod diversa peccata ad finem unius peccati ordinantur, prout etiam in virtutibus apparet quibus imperatur ab una virtute. Et hoc modo quocumque genere peccati aliquis faciat contra reverentiam debitam sacris rebus, sacrilegium formaliter committit, licet materialiter sint ibi diversa genera peccatorum.	Reply to Objection 2. Nothing prevents one specific kind of sin being found in various generic kinds of sin, inasmuch as various sins are directed to the end of one sin, just as happens in the case of virtues commanded by one virtue. On this way, by whatever kind of sin a man acts counter to reverence due to sacred things, he commits a sacrilege formally; although his act contains various kinds of sin materially.
IIª-IIae q. 99 a. 2 ad 3 Ad tertium dicendum quod sacrilegium interdum invenitur separatum ab aliis peccatis, eo quod actus non habet aliam deformitatem nisi quia res sacra violatur, puta si aliquis iudex rapiat aliquem de loco sacro, quem in aliis locis licite capere posset.	Reply to Objection 3. Sacrilege is sometimes found apart from other sins, through its act having no other deformity than the violation of a sacred thing: for instance, if a judge were to take a person from a sacred place for he might lawfully have taken him from elsewhere.
IIª-IIae q. 99 a. 3 arg. 1 Ad tertium sic proceditur. Videtur quod species sacrilegii non distinguantur secundum res sacras. Materialis enim diversitas non diversificat speciem, si sit eadem ratio formalis. Sed in violatione quarumcumque rerum sacrarum videtur esse eadem ratio formalis peccati, et quod non sit diversitas nisi materialis. Ergo per hoc non diversificantur sacrilegii species.	Objection 1. It would seem that the species of sacrilege are not distinguished according to the sacred things. Material diversity does not differentiate species, if the formal aspect remains the same. Now there would seem to be the same formal aspect of sin in all violations of sacred things, and that the only difference is one of matter. Therefore the species of sacrilege are not distinguished thereby.
IIª-IIae q. 99 a. 3 arg. 2 Praeterea, non videtur esse possibile quod aliqua sint eiusdem speciei, et tamen specie differant. Sed homicidium et furtum et illicitus concubitus sunt diversae species peccatorum. Ergo non possunt convenire in una specie sacrilegii. Et ita videtur quod sacrilegii species distinguantur secundum diversas species aliorum peccatorum, et non secundum diversitatem rerum sacrarum.	Objection 2. Further, it does not seem possible that things belonging to the same species should at the same time differ specifically. Now murder, theft, and unlawful intercourse, are different species of sin. Therefore they cannot belong to the one same species of sacrilege: and consequently it seems that the species of sacrilege are distinguished in accordance with the species of other sins, and not according to the various sacred things.
IIª-IIae q. 99 a. 3 arg. 3 Praeterea, inter res sacras connumerantur etiam personae sacrae. Si ergo una species sacrilegii esset qua violatur persona sacra, sequeretur quod omne peccatum quod persona sacra committit esset sacrilegium, quia per quodlibet peccatum violatur persona peccantis. Non ergo species sacrilegii accipiuntur secundum res sacras.	Objection 3. Further, among sacred things sacred persons are reckoned. If, therefore, one species of sacrilege arises from the violation of a sacred person, it would follow that every sin committed by a sacred person is a sacrilege, since every sin violates the person of the sinner. Therefore the species of sacrilege are not reckoned according to the sacred things.
IIª-IIae q. 99 a. 3 s. c. Sed contra est quod actus et habitus distinguuntur secundum obiecta. Sed res sacra est obiectum sacrilegii. Ut dictum est. Ergo species sacrilegii distinguuntur secundum differentiam rerum sacrarum.	On the contrary, Acts and habits are distinguished by their objects. Now the sacred thing is the object of sacrilege, as stated above (Article 1). Therefore the species of sacrilege are distinguished according to the sacred things.
IIª-IIae q. 99 a. 3 co. Respondeo dicendum quod, sicut dictum est, peccatum sacrilegii in hoc consistit quod aliquis irreverenter se habet ad rem sacram. Debetur autem reverentia rei sacrae ratione sanctitatis. Et ideo secundum diversam rationem sanctitatis rerum sacrarum quibus irreverentia exhibetur, necesse est quod sacrilegii species distinguantur, et tanto sacrilegium est gravius quanto res sacra in quam peccatur maiorem obtinet sanctitatem. Attribuitur autem sanctitas et personis sacris, idest divino cultui dedicatis, et locis sacris, et rebus quibusdam aliis sacris. Sanctitas autem loci ordinatur ad sanctitatem hominis, qui in loco sacro cultum exhibet Deo, dicitur enim II Machab. V, non propter locum gentem, sed propter gentem dominus locum elegit. Et ideo gravius peccatum est sacrilegium quo peccatur contra personam sacram quam quo peccatur contra locum sacrum. Sunt tamen in utraque sacrilegii specie diversi gradus, secundum differentiam personarum et locorum sacrorum. Similiter etiam et tertia species sacrilegii, quae circa alias res sacras committitur, diversos habet gradus, secundum differentiam sacrarum rerum. Inter quas summum locum obtinent ipsa sacramenta, quibus homo sanctificatur, quorum praecipuum est Eucharistiae sacramentum, quod continet ipsum Christum. Et ideo sacrilegium quod contra hoc sacramentum committitur gravissimum est inter omnia. Post sacramenta autem, secundum locum tenent vasa consecrata ad sacramentorum susceptionem; et ipsae imagines sacrae, et sanctorum reliquiae, in quibus quodammodo ipsae personae sanctorum venerantur vel dehonorantur. Deinde ea quae pertinent ad ornatum Ecclesiae et ministrorum. Deinde ea quae sunt deputata ad sustentationem ministrorum, sive sint mobilia sive immobilia. Quicumque autem contra quodcumque praedictorum peccat, crimen sacrilegii incurrit.	I answer that, As stated above (Article 1), the sin of sacrilege consists in the irreverent treatment of a sacred thing. Now reverence is due to a sacred thing by reason of its holiness: and consequently the species of sacrilege must needs be distinguished according to the different aspects of sanctity in the sacred things which are treated irreverently: for the greater the holiness ascribed to the sacred thing that is sinned against, the more grievous the sacrilege. Now holiness is ascribed, not only to sacred persons, namely, those who are consecrated to the divine worship, but also to sacred places and to certain other sacred things. And the holiness of a place is directed to the holiness of man, who worships God in a holy place. For it is written (2 Maccabees 5:19): "God did not choose the people for the place's sake, but the place for the people's sake." Hence sacrilege committed against a sacred person is a graver sin than that which is committed against a sacred place. Yet in either species there are various degrees of sacrilege, according to differences of sacred persons and places. In like manner the third species of sacrilege, which is committed against other sacred things, has various degrees, according to the differences of sacred things. Among these the highest place belongs to the sacraments whereby man is sanctified: chief of which is the sacrament of the Eucharist, for it contains Christ Himself. Wherefore the sacrilege that is committed against this sacrament is the gravest of all. The second place, after the sacraments, belongs to the vessels consecrated for the administration of the sacraments; also sacred images, and the relics of the saints, wherein the very persons of the saints, so to speak, are reverenced and honored. After these come things connected with the apparel of the Church and its ministers; and those things, whether movable or immovable, that are deputed to the upkeep of the ministers. And whoever sins against any one of the aforesaid incurs the crime of sacrilege.
IIª-IIae q. 99 a. 3 ad 1 Ad primum ergo dicendum quod non est in omnibus praedictis eadem ratio sanctitatis. Et ideo differentia sacrarum rerum non solum est differentia materialis, sed formalis.	Reply to Objection 1. There is not the same aspect of holiness in all the aforesaid: wherefore the diversity of sacred things is not only a material, but also a formal difference.
IIª-IIae q. 99 a. 3 ad 2 Ad secundum dicendum quod nihil prohibet aliqua duo secundum aliquid esse unius speciei, et secundum aliud diversarum, sicut Socrates et Plato conveniunt in specie animalis, differunt autem in specie colorati, si unus sit albus et alius niger. Et similiter etiam possibile est aliqua duo peccata differre specie secundum materiales actus, convenire autem in specie secundum unam rationem formalem sacrilegii, puta si quis sanctimonialem violaverit verberando, vel concumbendo.	Reply to Objection 2. Nothing hinders two things from belonging to one species in one respect, and to different species in another respect. Thus Socrates and Plato belong to the one species, "animal," but differ in the species "colored thing," if one be white and the other black. On like manner it is possible for two sins to differ specifically as to their material acts, and to belong to the same species as regards the one formal aspect of sacrilege: for instance, the violation of a nun by blows or by copulation.
IIª-IIae q. 99 a. 3 ad 3 Ad tertium dicendum quod omne peccatum quod sacra persona committit, materialiter quidem et quasi per accidens est sacrilegium, unde Hieronymus dicit quod nugae in ore sacerdotis sacrilegium sunt vel blasphemia. Formaliter autem et proprie illud solum peccatum sacrae personae sacrilegium est quod agitur directe contra eius sanctitatem, puta si virgo Deo dicata fornicetur; et eadem ratio est in aliis.	Reply to Objection 3. Every sin committed by a sacred person is a sacrilege materially and accidentally as it were. Hence Jerome [The quotation is from St. Bernard, De Consideration, ii, 13 says that "a trifle on a priest's lips is a sacrilege or a blasphemy." But formally and properly speaking a sin committed by a sacred person is a sacrilege only when it is committed against his holiness, for instance if a virgin consecrated to God be guilty of fornication: and the same is to be said of other instances.
IIª-IIae q. 99 a. 4 arg. 1 Ad quartum sic proceditur. Videtur quod poena sacrilegii non debeat esse pecuniaria. Poena enim pecuniaria non solet imponi pro culpa criminali. Sed sacrilegium est culpa criminalis, unde capitali sententia punitur secundum leges civiles. Ergo sacrilegium non debet puniri poena pecuniaria.	Objection 1. It would seem that the punishment of sacrilege should not be pecuniary. A pecuniary punishment is not wont to be inflicted for a criminal fault. But sacrilege is a criminal fault, wherefore it is punished by capital sentence according to civil law [Dig. xlviii, 13; Cod. i, 3, de Episc. et Cleric.]. Therefore sacrilege should not be awarded a pecuniary punishment.
IIª-IIae q. 99 a. 4 arg. 2 Praeterea, idem peccatum non debet duplici poena puniri, secundum illud Nahum I, non consurget duplex tribulatio. Sed poena sacrilegii est excommunicatio, maior quidem si violentia inferatur in personam sacram, vel si aliquis incendat vel frangat Ecclesiam; minor autem in aliis sacrilegiis. Ergo non debet sacrilegium puniri poena pecuniaria.	Objection 2. Further, the same sin should not receive a double punishment, according to Nahum 1:9, "There shall not rise a double affliction." But sacrilege is punished with excommunication; major excommunication, for violating a sacred person, and for burning or destroying a church, and minor excommunication for other sacrileges. Therefore sacrilege should not be awarded a pecuniary punishment.
IIª-IIae q. 99 a. 4 arg. 3 Praeterea, apostolus dicit, I ad Thess. II, non fuimus aliquando in occasione avaritiae. Sed hoc videtur ad occasionem avaritiae pertinere quod poena pecuniaria exigatur pro violatione rei sacrae. Ergo non videtur talis poena esse conveniens sacrilegii.	Objection 3. Further, the Apostle says (1 Thessalonians 2:5): "Neither have we taken an occasion of covetousness." But it seems to involve an occasion of covetousness that a pecuniary punishment should be exacted for the violation of a sacred thing. Therefore this does not seem to be a fitting punishment of sacrilege.
IIª-IIae q. 99 a. 4 s. c. Sed contra est quod dicitur XVII, qu. IV, si quis contumax vel superbus fugitivum servum de atrio Ecclesiae per vim abstraxerit, nongentos solidos componat. Et ibidem postea dicitur, quisquis inventus fuerit reus sacrilegii, triginta libras argenti examinati purissimi componat.	On the contrary, It is written [XVII, qu. iv, can. Si quis contumax]: "If anyone contumaciously or arrogantly take away by force an escaped slave from the confines of a church he shall pay nine hundred soldi": and again further on (XVII, qu. iv, can. Quisquis inventus, can. 21): "Whoever is found guilty of sacrilege shall pay thirty pounds of tried purest silver."
IIª-IIae q. 99 a. 4 co. Respondeo dicendum quod in poenis infligendis duo sunt consideranda. Primo quidem, aequalitas, ad hoc quod poena sit iusta, ut scilicet in quo quis peccat, per hoc torqueatur, ut dicitur Sap. XI. Et hoc modo conveniens poena sacrilegi, qui sacris iniuriam infert est excommunicatio, per quam a sacris arcetur. Secundo autem consideratur utilitas, nam poenae quasi medicinae quaedam infliguntur, ut his territi homines a peccando desistant. Sacrilegus autem, qui sacra non reveretur, non sufficienter videtur a peccando arceri per hoc quod ei sacra interdicuntur, de quibus non curat. Et ideo secundum leges humanas adhibetur capitis poena; secundum vero Ecclesiae sententiam, quae mortem corporalem non infligit, adhibetur pecuniaria poena, ut saltem poenis temporalibus homines a sacrilegiis revocentur.	I answer that, In the award of punishments two points must be considered. First equality, in order that the punishment may be just, and that "by what things a man sinneth by the same . . . he may be tormented" (Wisdom 11:17). On this respect the fitting punishment of one guilty of sacrilege, since he has done an injury to a sacred thing, is excommunication [Append. Gratian. on can. Si quis contumax, quoted above] whereby sacred things are withheld from him. The second point to be considered is utility. For punishments are inflicted as medicines, that men being deterred thereby may desist from sin. Now it would seem that the sacrilegious man, who reverences not sacred things, is not sufficiently deterred from sinning by sacred things being withheld from him, since he has no care for them. Wherefore according to human laws he is sentenced to capital punishment, and according to the statutes of the Church, which does not inflict the death of the body, a pecuniary punishment is inflicted, in order that men may be deterred from sacrilege, at least by temporal punishments.
IIª-IIae q. 99 a. 4 ad 1 Ad primum ergo dicendum quod Ecclesia corporalem mortem non infligit, sed loco eius infligit excommunicationem.	Reply to Objection 1. The Church inflicts not the death of the body, but excommunication in its stead.
IIª-IIae q. 99 a. 4 ad 2 Ad secundum dicendum quod necesse est duas poenas adhiberi quando per unam non sufficienter revocatur aliquis a peccando. Et ideo oportuit, supra poenam excommunicationis, adhibere aliquam temporalem poenam, ad coercendum homines qui spiritualia contemnunt.	Reply to Objection 2. When one punishment is not sufficient to deter a man from sin, a double punishment must be inflicted. Wherefore it was necessary to inflict some kind of temporal punishment in addition to the punishment of excommunication, in order to coerce those who despise spiritual things.
IIª-IIae q. 99 a. 4 ad 3 Ad tertium dicendum quod si pecunia exigeretur sine rationabili causa, hoc videretur ad occasionem avaritiae pertinere. Sed quando exigitur ad hominum correctionem, habet manifestam utilitatem. Et ideo non pertinet ad occasionem avaritiae.	Reply to Objection 3. If money were exacted without a reasonable cause, this would seem to involve an occasion of covetousness. But when it is exacted for the purpose of man's correction, it has a manifest utility, and consequently involves no occasion of avarice.