Authors/Thomas Aquinas/Summa Theologiae/Part IIb/Q98
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| IIª-IIae q. 98 pr. Deinde considerandum est de periurio. Et circa hoc quaeruntur quatuor. Primo, utrum falsitas requiratur ad periurium. Secundo, utrum periurium semper sit peccatum. Tertio, utrum semper sit peccatum mortale. Quarto, utrum peccet ille qui iniungit iuramentum periuro. | Question 98. Perjury 1. Is falsehood necessary for perjury? 2. Is perjury always a sin? 3. Is it always a mortal sin? 4. Is it a sin to enjoin an oath on a perjurer? |
| IIª-IIae q. 98 a. 1 arg. 1 Ad primum sic proceditur. Videtur quod falsitas eius quod iuramento confirmatur non requiratur ad periurium. Ut enim supra dictum est, sicut veritas debet concomitari iuramentum, ita etiam iudicium et iustitia. Sicut ergo incurritur periurium per defectum veritatis, ita etiam per defectum iudicii, puta cum aliquis indiscrete iurat; et per defectum iustitiae, puta cum aliquis iurat aliquid illicitum. | Objection 1. It would seem that it is not necessary for perjury that the statement confirmed on oath be false. As stated above (Question 89, Article 3), an oath should be accompanied by judgment and justice no less than by truth. Since therefore perjury is incurred through lack of truth, it is incurred likewise through lack of judgment, as when one swears indiscreetly, and through lack of justice, as when one swears to something unjust. |
| IIª-IIae q. 98 a. 1 arg. 2 Praeterea, illud per quod aliquid confirmatur potius esse videtur eo quod confirmatur per illud, sicut in syllogismo principia sunt potiora conclusione. Sed in iuramento confirmatur dictum hominis per assumptionem divini nominis. Ergo magis videtur esse periurium si aliquis iuret per falsos deos, quam si veritas desit dicto hominis quod iuramento confirmatur. | Objection 2. Further, that which confirms is more weighty than the thing confirmed thereby: thus in a syllogism the premises are more weighty than the conclusion. Now in an oath a man's statement is confirmed by calling on the name of God. Therefore perjury seems to consist in swearing by false gods rather than in a lack of truth in the human statement which is confirmed on oath. |
| IIª-IIae q. 98 a. 1 arg. 3 Praeterea, Augustinus dicit, in sermone de verbis Apost. Iacobi, homines falsum iurant vel cum fallunt, vel cum falluntur. Et ponit tria exempla. Quorum primum est, fac illum iurare qui verum putat esse pro quo iurat. Secundum est, da alium, scit falsum esse, et iurat. Tertium est, fac alium, putat esse falsum, et iurat tanquam sit verum, quod forte verum est, de quo postea subdit quod periurus est. Ergo aliquis veritatem iurans potest esse periurus. Non ergo falsitas ad periurium requiritur. | Objection 3. Further, Augustine says (De Verb. Apost. Jacobi; Serm. clxxx): "Men swear falsely both in deceiving others and when they are deceived themselves"; and he gives three examples. The first is: "Supposing a man to swear, thinking that what he swears to is true, whereas it is false"; the second is: "Take the instance of another who knows the statement to be false, and swears to it as though it were true"; and the third is: "Take another, who thinks his statement false, and swears to its being true, while perhaps it is true," of whom he says afterwards that he is a perjurer. Therefore one may be a perjurer while swearing to the truth. Therefore falsehood is not necessary for perjury. |
| IIª-IIae q. 98 a. 1 s. c. Sed contra est quod periurium definitur esse mendacium iuramento firmatum. | On the contrary, Perjury is defined "a falsehood confirmed by oath" [Hugh of St. Victor, Sum. Sent. iv, 5. |
| IIª-IIae q. 98 a. 1 co. Respondeo dicendum quod, sicut supra dictum est, morales actus ex fine speciem sortiuntur. Finis autem iuramenti est confirmatio dicti humani. Cui quidem confirmationi falsitas opponitur, per hoc enim confirmatur aliquod dictum, quod ostenditur firmiter esse verum; quod quidem non potest contingere de eo quod est falsum. Unde falsitas directe evacuat finem iuramenti. Et propter hoc a falsitate praecipue specificatur perversitas iuramenti, quae periurium dicitur. Et ideo falsitas est de ratione periurii. | I answer that, As stated above (Question 92, Article 2), moral acts take their species from their end. Now the end of an oath is the confirmation of a human assertion. To this confirmation falsehood is opposed: since an assertion is confirmed by being firmly shown to be true; and this cannot happen to that which is false. Hence falsehood directly annuls the end of an oath: and for this reason, that perversity in swearing, which is called perjury, takes its species chiefly from falsehood. Consequently falsehood is essential to perjury. |
| IIª-IIae q. 98 a. 1 ad 1 Ad primum ergo dicendum quod, sicut Hieronymus dicit, Ierem. IV, quodcumque illorum trium defuerit, periurium est. Non tamen eodem ordine. Sed primo quidem et principaliter periurium est quando deest veritas, ratione iam dicta. Secundario autem, quando deest iustitia, quicumque enim iurat illicitum, ex hoc ipso falsitatem incurrit, quia obligatus est ad hoc quod contrarium faciat. Tertio vero, quando deest iudicium, quia cum indiscrete iurat, ex hoc ipso periculo se committit falsitatem incurrendi. | Reply to Objection 1. As Jerome says on Jeremiah 4:2, "whichever of these three be lacking, there is perjury," but in different order. For first and chiefly perjury consists in a lack of truth, for the reason stated in the Article. Secondly, there is perjury when justice is lacking, for in whatever way a man swears to that which is unlawful, for this very reason he is guilty of falsehood, since he is under an obligation to do the contrary. Thirdly, there is perjury when judgment is lacking, since by the very fact that a man swears indiscreetly, he incurs the danger of lapsing into falsehood. |
| IIª-IIae q. 98 a. 1 ad 2 Ad secundum dicendum quod principia in syllogismis sunt potiora tanquam habentia rationem activi principii, ut dicitur in II Physic. Sed in moralibus actibus principalior est finis quam principium activum. Et ideo, licet sit perversum iuramentum quando aliquis verum iurat per falsos deos, tamen ab illa perversitate iuramenti periurium nominatur quae tollit iuramenti finem, falsum iurando. | Reply to Objection 2. In syllogisms the premises are of greater weight, since they are in the position of active principle, as stated in Phys. ii, 3: whereas in moral matters the end is of greater importance than the active principle. Hence though it is a perverse oath when a man swears to the truth by false gods, yet perjury takes its name from that kind of perversity in an oath, that deprives the oath of its end, by swearing what is false. |
| IIª-IIae q. 98 a. 1 ad 3 Ad tertium dicendum quod actus morales procedunt a voluntate, cuius obiectum est bonum apprehensum. Et ideo si falsum apprehendatur ut verum, erit quidem, relatum ad voluntatem, materialiter falsum, formaliter autem verum. Si autem id quod est falsum accipiatur ut falsum, erit falsum et materialiter et formaliter. Si autem id quod est verum apprehendatur ut falsum, erit verum materialiter, falsum formaliter. Et ideo in quolibet istorum casuum salvatur aliquo modo ratio periurii, propter aliquem falsitatis modum. Sed quia in unoquoque potius est id quod est formale quam id quod est materiale, non ita est periurus ille qui falsum iurat quod putat esse verum, sicut ille qui verum iurat quod putat esse falsum. Dicit enim ibi Augustinus, interest quemadmodum verbum procedat ex animo, quia ream linguam non facit nisi rea mens. | Reply to Objection 3. Moral acts proceed from the will, whose object is the apprehended good. Wherefore if the false be apprehended as true, it will be materially false, but formally true, as related to the will. If something false be apprehended as false, it will be false both materially and formally. If that which is true be apprehended as false, it will be materially true, and formally false. Hence in each of these cases the conditions required for perjury are to be found in some way, on account of some measure of falsehood. Since, however, that which is formal in anything is of greater importance than that which is material, he that swears to a falsehood thinking it true is not so much of a perjurer as he that swears to the truth thinking it false. For Augustine says (De Verb. Apost. Jacobi; Serm. clxxx): "It depends how the assertion proceeds from the mind, for the tongue is not guilty except the mind be guilty." |
| IIª-IIae q. 98 a. 2 arg. 1 Ad secundum sic proceditur. Videtur quod non omne periurium sit peccatum. Quicumque enim non implet quod iuramento firmavit, periurus esse videtur. Sed quandoque aliquis iurat se facturum aliquid illicitum, puta adulterium vel homicidium, quod si faciat, peccat. Si ergo etiam non faciendo peccaret peccato periurii, sequeretur quod esset perplexus. | Objection 1. It would seem that not all perjury is sinful. Whoever does not fulfil what he has confirmed on oath is seemingly a perjurer. Yet sometimes a man swears he will do something unlawful (adultery, for instance, or murder): and if he does it, he commits a sin. If therefore he would commit a sin even if he did it not, it would follow that he is perplexed. |
| IIª-IIae q. 98 a. 2 arg. 2 Praeterea, nullus peccat faciendo quod melius est. Sed quandoque aliquis periurando facit quod melius est, sicut cum aliquis iuravit se non intraturum religionem, vel quaecumque opera virtuosa non facturum. Ergo non omne periurium est peccatum. | Objection 2. Further, no man sins by doing what is best. Yet sometimes by committing a perjury one does what is best: as when a man swears not to enter religion, or not to do some kind of virtuous deed. Therefore not all perjury is sinful. |
| IIª-IIae q. 98 a. 2 arg. 3 Praeterea, ille qui iurat facere alterius voluntatem, nisi eam faciat, videtur incurrere periurium. Sed quandoque potest contingere quod non peccat si eius non impleat voluntatem, puta cum praecipit ei aliquid nimis durum et importabile. Ergo videtur quod non omne periurium sit peccatum. | Objection 3. Further, he that swears to do another's will would seem to be guilty of perjury unless he do it. Yet it may happen sometimes that he sins not, if he do not the man's will: for instance, if the latter order him to do something too hard and unbearable. Therefore seemingly not all perjury is sinful. |
| IIª-IIae q. 98 a. 2 arg. 4 Praeterea, iuramentum promissorium se extendit ad futura, sicut assertorium ad praeterita et praesentia. Sed potest contingere quod tollatur obligatio iuramenti per aliquid quod in futurum emergat, sicut cum aliqua civitas iurat se aliquid servaturam, et postea superveniunt novi cives qui illud non iuraverunt; vel cum aliquis canonicus iurat statuta alicuius Ecclesiae se servaturum, et postmodum aliqua fiunt de novo. Ergo videtur quod ille qui transgreditur iuramentum non peccet. | Objection 4. Further, a promissory oath extends to future, just as a declaratory oath extends to past and present things. Now the obligation of an oath may be removed by some future occurrence: thus a state may swear to fulfil some obligation, and afterwards other citizens come on the scene who did not take the oath; or a canon may swear to keep the statutes of a certain church, and afterwards new statutes are made. Therefore seemingly he that breaks an oath does not sin. |
| IIª-IIae q. 98 a. 2 s. c. Sed contra est quod Augustinus dicit, in sermone de verbis Apost. Iacobi, de periurio loquens, videtis quam ista detestanda sit belua, et de rebus humanis exterminanda. | On the contrary, Augustine says (De Verb. Apost. Jacobi; Serm. cxxx), in speaking of perjury: "See how you should detest this horrible beast and exterminate it from all human business." |
| IIª-IIae q. 98 a. 2 co. Respondeo dicendum quod, sicut supra dictum est, iurare est Deum testem invocare. Pertinet autem ad Dei irreverentiam quod aliquis eum testem invocet falsitatis, quia per hoc dat intelligere vel quod Deus veritatem non cognoscat, vel quod falsitatem testificari velit. Et ideo periurium manifeste est peccatum religioni contrarium, cuius est Deo reverentiam exhibere. | I answer that, As stated above (Question 89, Article 1), to swear is to call God as witness. Now it is an irreverence to God to call Him to witness to a falsehood, because by so doing one implies either that God ignores the truth or that He is willing to bear witness to a falsehood. Therefore perjury is manifestly a sin opposed to religion, to which it belongs to show reverence to God. |
| IIª-IIae q. 98 a. 2 ad 1 Ad primum ergo dicendum quod ille qui iurat se facturum aliquod illicitum, iurando incurrit periurium propter defectum iustitiae. Sed si non impleat quod iuravit, in hoc periurium non incurrit, quia hoc non erat tale quid quod sub iuramento cadere posset. | Reply to Objection 1. He that swears to do what is unlawful is thereby guilty of perjury through lack of justice: though, if he fails to keep his oath, he is not guilty of perjury in this respect, since that which he swore to do was not a fit matter of an oath. |
| IIª-IIae q. 98 a. 2 ad 2 Ad secundum dicendum quod ille qui iurat se non intraturum religionem, vel non daturum eleemosynam, vel aliquid huiusmodi, iurando periurium incurrit propter defectum iudicii. Et ideo quando facit id quod melius est, non est periurium, sed periurio contrarium, contrarium enim eius quod facit sub iuramento cadere non poterat. | Reply to Objection 2. A person who swears not to enter religion, or not to give an alms, or the like, is guilty of perjury through lack of judgment. Hence when he does that which is best it is not an act of perjury, but contrary thereto: for the contrary of that which he is doing could not be a matter of an oath. |
| IIª-IIae q. 98 a. 2 ad 3 Ad tertium dicendum quod cum aliquis iurat vel promittit se facturum voluntatem alterius, intelligenda est debita conditio, si scilicet id quod ei mandatur sit licitum et honestum, et portabile sive moderatum. | Reply to Objection 3. When one man swears or promises to do another's will, there is to be understood this requisite condition--that the thing commanded be lawful and virtuous, and not unbearable or immoderate. |
| IIª-IIae q. 98 a. 2 ad 4 Ad quartum dicendum quod quia iuramentum est actio personalis, ille qui de novo fit civis alicuius civitatis, non obligatur quasi iuramento ad servanda illa quae civitas se servaturam iuravit. Tenetur tamen ex quadam fidelitate, ex qua obligatur ut sicut fit socius bonorum civitatis, ita etiam fiat particeps onerum. Canonicus vero qui iurat se servaturum statuta edita in aliquo collegio, non tenetur ex iuramento ad servandum futura, nisi intenderit se obligare ad omnia statuta praeterita et futura tenetur tamen ea servare ex ipsa vi statutorum, quae habent coactivam virtutem, ut ex supradictis patet. | Reply to Objection 4. An oath is a personal act, and so when a man becomes a citizen of a state, he is not bound, as by oath, to fulfil whatever the state has sworn to do. Yet he is bound by a kind of fidelity, the nature of which obligation is that he should take his share of the state's burdens if he takes a share of its goods. The canon who swears to keep the statutes that have force in some particular "college" is not bound by his oath to keep any that may be made in the future, unless he intends to bind himself to keep all, past and future. Nevertheless he is bound to keep them by virtue of the statutes themselves, since they are possessed of coercive force, as stated above (I-II, 96, 4). |
| IIª-IIae q. 98 a. 3 arg. 1 Ad tertium sic proceditur. Videtur quod non omne periurium sit peccatum mortale. Dicitur enim extra, de iureiurando, in ea quaestione quae ponitur, an a sacramenti vinculo absolvantur qui illud inviti pro vita et rebus servandis fecerunt, nihil aliud arbitramur quam quod antecessores nostri Romani pontifices arbitrati fuisse noscuntur, qui tales a iuramenti nexibus absolverunt. Ceterum ut agatur consultius, et auferatur materia deierandi, non eis ita expresse dicatur ut iuramenta non servent, sed si non ea attenderint, non ob hoc sunt tanquam pro mortali crimine puniendi. Non ergo omne periurium est peccatum mortale. | Objection 1. It would seem that not all perjury is a mortal sin. It is laid down (Extra, De Jurejur, cap. Verum): "Referring to the question whether an oath is binding on those who have taken one in order to safeguard their life and possessions, we have no other mind than that which our predecessors the Roman Pontiffs are known to have had, and who absolved such persons from the obligations of their oath. Henceforth, that discretion may be observed, and in order to avoid occasions of perjury, let them not be told expressly not to keep their oath: but if they should not keep it, they are not for this reason to be punished as for a mortal sin." Therefore not all perjury is a mortal sin. |
| IIª-IIae q. 98 a. 3 arg. 2 Praeterea, sicut Chrysostomus dicit, maius est iurare per Deum quam per Evangelium. Sed non semper mortaliter peccat ille qui per Deum iurat aliquod falsum, puta si ex ioco, vel ex lapsu linguae, aliquis tali iuramento in communi sermone utatur. Ergo nec etiam si aliquis frangat iuramentum quod solemniter per Evangelium iurat, semper erit peccatum mortale. | Objection 2. Further, as Chrysostom [Hom. xliv in the Opus Imperfectum on St. Matthew, falsely ascribed to St. John Chrysostom] says, "it is a greater thing to swear by God than by the Gospels." Now it is not always a mortal sin to swear by God to something false; for instance, if we were to employ such an oath in fun or by a slip of the tongue in the course of an ordinary conversation. Therefore neither is it always a mortal sin to break an oath that has been taken solemnly on the Gospels. |
| IIª-IIae q. 98 a. 3 arg. 3 Praeterea, secundum iura propter periurium aliquis incurrit infamiam, ut habetur VI, qu. I, cap. infames. Non autem videtur quod propter quodlibet periurium aliquis infamiam incurrat, sicut dicitur de assertorio iuramento violato per periurium. Ergo videtur quod non omne periurium sit peccatum mortale. | Objection 3. Further, according to the Law a man incurs infamy through committing perjury (VI, qu. i, cap. Onfames). Now it would seem that infamy is not incurred through any kind of perjury, as it is prescribed in the case of a declaratory oath violated by perjury [Cap. Cum dilectus, de Ord. Cognit.]. Therefore, seemingly, not all perjury is a mortal sin. |
| IIª-IIae q. 98 a. 3 s. c. Sed contra, omne peccatum quod contrariatur praecepto divino est peccatum mortale. Sed periurium contrariatur praecepto divino, dicitur enim Levit. XIX, non periurabis in nomine meo. Ergo est peccatum mortale. | On the contrary, Every sin that is contrary to a divine precept is a mortal sin. Now perjury is contrary to a divine precept, for it is written (Leviticus 19:12): "Thou shalt not swear falsely by My name." Therefore it is a mortal sin. |
| IIª-IIae q. 98 a. 3 co. Respondeo dicendum quod, secundum doctrinam philosophi, propter quod unumquodque, illud magis. Videmus autem quod ea quae, si de se sint peccata venialia, vel etiam bona ex genere, si in contemptum Dei fiant, sunt peccata mortalia. Unde multo magis quidquid est quod de sui ratione pertinet ad contemptum Dei, est peccatum mortale. Periurium autem de sui ratione importat contemptum Dei, ex hoc enim habet rationem culpae, ut dictum est, quia ad irreverentiam Dei pertinet. Unde manifestum est quod periurium ex suo genere est peccatum mortale. | I answer that, According to the teaching of the Philosopher (Poster. i, 2), "that which causes a thing to be such is yet more so." Now we know that an action which is, by reason of its very nature, a venial sin, or even a good action, is a mortal sin if it be done out of contempt of God. Wherefore any action that of its nature, implies contempt of God is a mortal sin. Now perjury, of its very nature implies contempt of God, since, as stated above (Article 2), the reason why it is sinful is because it is an act of irreverence towards God. Therefore it is manifest that perjury, of its very nature, is a mortal sin. |
| IIª-IIae q. 98 a. 3 ad 1 Ad primum ergo dicendum quod, sicut supra dictum est, coactio non aufert iuramento promissorio vim obligandi respectu eius quod licite fieri potest. Et ideo si aliquis non impleat quod coactus iuravit, nihilominus periurium incurrit et mortaliter peccat. Potest tamen per auctoritatem summi pontificis ab obligatione iuramenti absolvi, praesertim si coactus fuerit tali metu qui cadere posset in constantem virum. Quod autem dicitur quod non sunt tales puniendi tanquam pro mortali crimine, non hoc ideo dicitur quia non peccent mortaliter, sed quia poena eis minor infligitur. | Reply to Objection 1. As stated above (89, 07, ad 3), coercion does not deprive a promissory oath of its binding force, as regards that which can be done lawfully. Wherefore he who fails to fulfil an oath which he took under coercion is guilty of perjury and sins mortally. Nevertheless the Sovereign Pontiff can, by his authority, absolve a man from an obligation even of an oath, especially if the latter should have been coerced into taking the oath through such fear as may overcome a high-principled man. When, however, it is said that these persons are not to be punished as for a mortal sin, this does not mean that they are not guilty of mortal sin, but that a lesser punishment is to be inflicted on them. |
| IIª-IIae q. 98 a. 3 ad 2 Ad secundum dicendum quod ille qui iocose periurat, non evitat divinam irreverentiam, sed quantum ad aliquid magis auget. Et ideo non excusatur a peccato mortali. Ille autem qui ex lapsu linguae falsum iurat, si quidem advertat se iurare et falsum esse quod iurat, non excusatur a peccato mortali, sicut nec a Dei contemptu. Si autem hoc non advertat, non videtur habere intentionem iurandi, et ideo a crimine periurii excusatur. Est autem gravius peccatum si quis solemniter iuret per Evangelium quam si per Deum in communi sermone iuret, tum propter scandalum; tum propter maiorem deliberationem. Quibus aequaliter hinc inde positis, gravius est si quis per Deum iurans periuret quam si periuret iurans per Evangelium. | Reply to Objection 2. He that swears falsely in fun is nonetheless irreverent to God, indeed, in a way, he is more so, and consequently is not excused from mortal sin. He that swears falsely by a slip of tongue, if he adverts to the fact that he is swearing, and that he is swearing to something false, is not excused from mortal sin, as neither is he excused from contempt of God. If, however, he does not advert to this, he would seem to have no intention of swearing, and consequently is excused from the sin of perjury. It is, however, a more grievous sin to swear solemnly by the Gospels, than to swear by God in ordinary conversation, both on account of scandal and on account of the greater deliberation. But if we consider them equally in comparison with one another, it is more grievous to commit perjury in swearing by God than in swearing by the Gospels. |
| IIª-IIae q. 98 a. 3 ad 3 Ad tertium dicendum quod non propter quodlibet peccatum mortale aliquis infamis efficitur ipso iure. Unde non sequitur, si ille qui iurat falsum iuramento assertorio non est infamis ipso iure, sed solum per sententiam definitivam latam contra eum in causa accusationis, quod propter hoc non peccet mortaliter. Ideo autem magis reputatur infamis ipso iure qui frangit iuramentum promissorium solemniter factum, quia in eius potestate remanet, postquam iuravit, ut det suo iuramento veritatem, quod non contingit in iuramento assertorio. | Reply to Objection 3. Not every sin makes a man infamous in the eye of the law. Wherefore, if a man who has sworn falsely in a declaratory oath be not infamous in the eye of the law, but only when he has been so declared by sentence in a court of law, it does not follow that he has not sinned mortally. The reason why the law attaches infamy rather to one who breaks a promissory oath taken solemnly is that he still has it in his power after he has sworn to substantiate his oath, which is not the case in a declaratory oath. |
| IIª-IIae q. 98 a. 4 arg. 1 Ad quartum sic proceditur. Videtur quod peccet ille qui iniungit iuramentum ei qui periurat. Aut enim scit eum verum iurare, aut falsum. Si scit eum verum iurare, pro nihilo ei iuramentum iniungit si autem credit eum falsum iurare, quantum est de se, inducit eum ad peccandum. Ergo videtur quod nullo modo debeat aliquis alicui iniungere iuramentum. | Objection 1. It would seem that he who demands an oath of a perjurer commits a sin. Either he knows that he swears truly, or he knows that he swears falsely. If he knows him to swear truly, it is useless for him to demand an oath: and if he believes him to swear falsely, for his own part he leads him into sin. Therefore nowise seemingly should one enjoin an oath on another person. |
| IIª-IIae q. 98 a. 4 arg. 2 Praeterea, iuramentum minus est accipere ab aliquo quam iuramentum iniungere alicui. Sed recipere iuramentum ab aliquo non videtur esse licitum, et praecipue si periuret, quia in hoc videtur consentire peccato. Ergo videtur quod multo minus liceat exigere iuramentum ab eo qui periurat. | Objection 2. Further, to receive an oath from a person is less than to impose an oath on him. Now it would seem unlawful to receive an oath from a person, especially if he swear falsely, because he would then seem to consent in his sin. Much less therefore would it seem lawful to impose an oath on one who swears falsely. |
| IIª-IIae q. 98 a. 4 arg. 3 Praeterea, dicitur Levit. V, si peccaverit anima, et audierit vocem iurantis falsum, testisque fuerit quod aut ipse vidit aut conscius est, nisi indicaverit, portabit iniquitatem suam, ex quo videtur quod aliquis sciens aliquem iurare falsum, teneatur eum accusare. Non igitur licet ab eo exigere iuramentum. | Objection 3. Further, it is written (Leviticus 5:1): "If anyone sin, and hear the voice of one swearing falsely ['Falsely' is not in the Vulgate'], and is a witness either because he himself hath seen, or is privy to it: if he do not utter it, he shall bear his iniquity." Hence it would seem that when a man knows another to be swearing falsely, he is bound to denounce him. Therefore it is not lawful to demand an oath of such a man. |
| IIª-IIae q. 98 a. 4 s. c. Sed contra, sicut peccat ille qui falsum iurat, ita ille qui per falsos deos iurat. Sed licet uti iuramento eius qui per falsos deos iurat, ut Augustinus dicit, ad Publicolam. Ergo licet iuramentum exigere ab eo qui falsum iurat. | Objection 4. On the other hand, Just as it is a sin to swear falsely so is it to swear by false gods. Yet it is lawful to take advantage of an oath of one who has sworn by false gods, as Augustine says (ad Public. Ep. xlvii). Therefore it is lawful to demand an oath from one who swears falsely. |
| IIª-IIae q. 98 a. 4 co. Respondeo dicendum quod circa eum qui exigit ab alio iuramentum, distinguendum videtur. Aut enim exigit iuramentum pro seipso propria sponte, aut exigit iuramentum pro alio ex necessitate officii sibi commissi. Et si quidem aliquis pro seipso exigit iuramentum tanquam persona privata, distinguendum videtur, ut Augustinus dicit, in sermone de periuriis. Si enim nescit eum iuraturum falsum, et ideo dicit, iura mihi, ut fides ei sit, non est peccatum, tamen est humana tentatio, quia scilicet procedit ex quadam infirmitate, qua homo dubitat alium esse verum dicturum. Et hoc est illud malum de quo dominus dicit, Matth. V, quod amplius est, a malo est. Si autem scit eum fecisse, scilicet contrarium eius quod iurat, et cogit eum iurare, homicida est. Ille enim de suo periurio se interimit, sed iste manum interficientis impressit. Si autem aliquis exigat iuramentum tanquam persona publica, secundum quod exigit ordo iuris, ad petitionem alterius, non videtur esse in culpa si ipse iuramentum exigat, sive sciat eum falsum iurare sive verum, quia non videtur ille exigere, sed ille ad cuius instantiam exigit. | I answer that, As regards a person who demands an oath from another, a distinction would seem to be necessary. For either he demands the oath on his own account and of his own accord, or he demands it on account of the exigencies of a duty imposed on him. If a man demands an oath on his own account as a private individual, we must make a distinction, as does Augustine (de Perjuriis. serm. clxxx): "For if he knows not that the man will swear falsely, and says to him accordingly: 'Swear to me' in order that he may be credited, there is no sin: yet it is a human temptation" (because, to wit, it proceeds from his weakness in doubting whether the man will speak the truth). "This is the evil whereof Our Lord says (Matthew 5:37): That which is over and above these, is of evil. But if he knows the man to have done so," i.e. the contrary of what he swears to, "and yet forces him to swear, he is a murderer: for the other destroys himself by his perjury, but it is he who urged the hand of the slayer." If, on the other hand, a man demands an oath as a public person, in accordance with the requirements of the law, on the requisition of a third person: he does not seem to be at fault, if he demands an oath of a person, whether he knows that he will swear falsely or truly, because seemingly it is not he that exacts the oath but the person at whose instance he demands it. |
| IIª-IIae q. 98 a. 4 ad 1 Ad primum ergo dicendum quod obiectio illa procedit quando pro aliquis exigit iuramentum. Et tamen non semper scit eum iurare verum, vel falsum, sed quandoque dubitat de facto, et credit eum verum iuraturum, et tunc ad maiorem certitudinem exigit iuramentum. | Reply to Objection 1. This argument avails in the case of one who demands an oath on his own account. Yet he does not always know that the other will swear truly or falsely, for at times he has doubts about the fact, and believes he will swear truly. On such a case he exacts an oath in order that he may be more certain. |
| IIª-IIae q. 98 a. 4 ad 2 Ad secundum dicendum quod, sicut Augustinus dicit, ad Publicolam, quamvis dictum sit ne iuremus, nunquam me in Scripturis sanctis legisse memini ne ab aliquo iurationem accipiamus. Unde ille qui iurationem recipit non peccat, nisi forte quando propria sponte ad iurandum cogit eum quem scit falsum iuraturum. | Reply to Objection 2. As Augustine says (ad Public. serm. xlvii), "though we are forbidden to swear, I do not remember ever to have read in the Holy Scriptures that we must not accept oaths from others." Hence he that accepts an oath does not sin, except perchance when of his own accord he forces another to swear, knowing that he will swear falsely. |
| IIª-IIae q. 98 a. 4 ad 3 Ad tertium dicendum quod, sicut Augustinus dicit, Moyses non expressit in praedicta auctoritate cui sit indicandum periurium alterius. Et ideo intelligitur quod debeat indicari talibus qui magis possunt prodesse quam obesse periuro. Similiter etiam non expressit quo ordine debeat manifestare. Et ideo videtur servandus ordo evangelicus, si sit peccatum periurii occultum, et praecipue quando non vergit in detrimentum alterius, quia in tali casu non haberet locum ordo evangelicus, ut supra dictum est. | Reply to Objection 3. As Augustine says (QQ. Super Lev, qu. i), Moses in the passage quoted did not state to whom one man had to denounce another's perjury: wherefore it must be understood that the matter had to be denounced "to those who would do the perjurer good rather than harm." Again, neither did he state in what order the denunciation was to be made: wherefore seemingly the Gospel order should be followed, if the sin of perjury should be hidden, especially when it does not tend to another person's injury: because if it did, the Gospel order would not apply to the case, as stated above (33, 07; 68, 1). |
| IIª-IIae q. 98 a. 4 ad 4 Ad quartum dicendum quod licet uti malo propter bonum, sicut et Deus utitur, non tamen licet aliquem ad malum inducere. Unde licet eius qui paratus est per falsos deos iurare, iuramentum recipere, non tamen licet eum inducere ad hoc quod per falsos deos iuret. Alia tamen ratio esse videtur in eo qui per verum Deum falsum iurat. Quia in tali iuramento deest bonum fidei, qua utitur aliquis in iuramento illius qui verum per falsos deos iurat, ut Augustinus dicit, ad Publicolam. Unde in iuramento eius qui falsum per verum Deum iurat, non videtur esse aliquod bonum quo uti liceat. | Reply to Objection 4. It is lawful to make use of an evil for the sake of good, as God does, but it is not lawful to lead anyone to do evil. Consequently it is lawful to accept the oath of one who is ready to swear by false gods, but it is not lawful to induce him to swear by false gods. Yet it seems to be different in the case of one who swears falsely by the true God, because an oath of this kind lacks the good of faith, which a man makes use of in the oath of one who swears truly by false gods, as Augustine says (ad Public. Ep. xlvii). Hence when a man swears falsely by the true God his oath seems to lack any good that one may use lawfully. |
