Authors/Thomas Aquinas/Summa Theologiae/Part IIa/Q45

From The Logic Museum

Jump to: navigation, search
Q44 Q46



Latin English
Iª-IIae q. 45 pr. Deinde considerandum est de audacia. Et circa hoc quaeruntur quatuor. Primo, utrum audacia sit contraria timori. Secundo, quomodo audacia se habeat ad spem. Tertio, de causa audaciae. Quarto, de effectus ipsius. Question 45. Daring Is daring contrary to fear? How is daring related to hope? The cause of daring Its effect
Iª-IIae q. 45 a. 1 arg. 1 Ad primum sic proceditur. Videtur quod audacia non contrarietur timori. Dicit enim Augustinus, in libro octoginta trium quaest., quod audacia vitium est. Vitium autem virtuti contrariatur. Cum ergo timor non sit virtus, sed passio, videtur quod timori non contrarietur audacia. Objection 1. It would seem that daring is not contrary to fear. For Augustine says (QQ. 83, qu. 31) that "daring is a vice." Now vice is contrary to virtue. Since, therefore, fear is not a virtue but a passion, it seems that daring is not contrary to fear.
Iª-IIae q. 45 a. 1 arg. 2 Praeterea, uni unum est contrarium. Sed timori contrariatur spes. Non ergo contrariatur ei audacia. Objection 2. Further, to one thing there is one contrary. But hope is contrary to fear. Therefore daring is not contrary to fear.
Iª-IIae q. 45 a. 1 arg. 3 Praeterea, unaquaeque passio excludit passionem oppositam. Sed id quod excluditur per timorem, est securitas, dicit enim Augustinus, II Confess., quod timor securitati praecavet ergo securitas contrariatur timori. Non ergo audacia. Objection 3. Further, every passion excludes its opposite. But fear excludes safety; for Augustine says (Confess. ii, 6) that "fear takes forethought for safety." Therefore safety is contrary to fear. Therefore daring is not contrary to fear.
Iª-IIae q. 45 a. 1 s. c. Sed contra est quod philosophus dicit, in II Rhetoric., quod audacia est timori contraria. On the contrary, The Philosopher says (Rhet. ii, 5) that "daring is contrary to fear."
Iª-IIae q. 45 a. 1 co. Respondeo dicendum quod de ratione contrariorum est quod maxime a se distent, ut dicitur in X Metaphys. Illud autem quod maxime distat a timore, est audacia, timor enim refugit nocumentum futurum, propter eius victoriam super ipsum timentem; sed audacia aggreditur periculum imminens, propter victoriam sui supra ipsum periculum. Unde manifeste timori contrariatur audacia. I answer that, It is of the essence of contraries to be "farthest removed from one another," as stated in Metaph. x, 4. Now that which is farthest removed from fear, is daring: since fear turns away from the future hurt, on account of its victory over him that fears it; whereas daring turns on threatened danger because of its own victory over that same danger. Consequently it is evident that daring is contrary to fear.
Iª-IIae q. 45 a. 1 ad 1 Ad primum ergo dicendum quod ira et audacia, et omnium passionum nomina, dupliciter accipi possunt. Uno modo, secundum quod important absolute motus appetitus sensitivi in aliquod obiectum bonum vel malum, et sic sunt nomina passionum. Alio modo, secundum quod simul cum huiusmodi motu important recessum ab ordine rationis, et sic sunt nomina vitiorum. Et hoc modo loquitur Augustinus de audacia, sed nos loquimur nunc de audacia secundum primum modum. Reply to Objection 1. Anger, daring and all the names of the passions can be taken in two ways. First, as denoting absolutely movements of the sensitive appetite in respect of some object, good or bad: and thus they are names of passions. Secondly, as denoting besides this movement, a straying from the order of reason: and thus they are names of vices. It is in this sense that Augustine speaks of daring: but we are speaking of it in the first sense.
Iª-IIae q. 45 a. 1 ad 2 Ad secundum dicendum quod uni secundum idem, non sunt plura contraria, sed secundum diversa, nihil prohibet uni plura contrariari. Et sic dictum est supra quod passiones irascibilis habent duplicem contrarietatem, unam secundum oppositionem boni et mali, et sic timor contrariatur spei; aliam secundum oppositionem accessus et recessus, et sic timori contrariatur audacia, spei vero desperatio. Reply to Objection 2. To one thing, in the same respect, there are not several contraries; but in different respects nothing prevents one thing having several contraries. Accordingly it has been said above (23, 2; 40, 4) that the irascible passions admit of a twofold contrariety: one, according to the opposition of good and evil, and thus fear is contrary to hope: the other, according to the opposition of approach and withdrawal, and thus daring is contrary to fear, and despair contrary to hope.
Iª-IIae q. 45 a. 1 ad 3 Ad tertium dicendum quod securitas non significat aliquid contrarium timori, sed solam timoris exclusionem, ille enim dicitur esse securus, qui non timet. Unde securitas opponitur timori sicut privatio, audacia autem sicut contrarium. Et sicut contrarium includit in se privationem, ita audacia securitatem. Reply to Objection 3. Safety does not denote something contrary to fear, but merely the exclusion of fear: for he is said to be safe, who fears not. Wherefore safety is opposed to fear, as a privation: while daring is opposed thereto as a contrary. And as contrariety implies privation, so daring implies safety.
Iª-IIae q. 45 a. 2 arg. 1 Ad secundum sic proceditur. Videtur quod audacia non consequatur spem. Audacia enim est respectu malorum et terribilium, ut dicitur in III Ethic. Spes autem respicit bonum. Ut supra dictum est. Ergo habent diversa obiecta, et non sunt unius ordinis. Non ergo audacia consequitur spem. Objection 1. It would seem that daring does not ensue from hope. Because daring regards evil and fearful things, as stated in Ethic. iii, 7. But hope regards good things, as stated above (Question 40, Article 1). Therefore they have different objects and are not in the same order. Therefore daring does not ensue from hope.
Iª-IIae q. 45 a. 2 arg. 2 Praeterea, sicut audacia contrariatur timori, ita desperatio spei. Sed timor non sequitur desperationem, quinimmo desperatio excludit timorem. Ut philosophus dicit, in II Rhetoric. Ergo audacia non consequitur spem. Objection 2. Further, just as daring is contrary to fear, so is despair contrary to hope. But fear does not ensue from despair: in fact, despair excludes fear, as the Philosopher says (Rhet. ii, 5). Therefore daring does not result from hope.
Iª-IIae q. 45 a. 2 arg. 3 Praeterea, audacia intendit quoddam bonum, scilicet victoriam. Sed tendere in bonum arduum pertinet ad spem. Ergo audacia est idem spei. Non ergo consequitur ad spem. Objection 3. Further, daring is intent on something good, viz. victory. But it belongs to hope to tend to that which is good and difficult. Therefore daring is the same as hope; and consequently does not result from it.
Iª-IIae q. 45 a. 2 s. c. Sed contra est quod philosophus dicit, in III Ethic., quod illi qui sunt bonae spei, sunt audaces. Videtur ergo audacia consequi spem. On the contrary, The Philosopher says (Ethic. iii, 8) that "those are hopeful are full of daring." Therefore it seems that daring ensues from hope.
Iª-IIae q. 45 a. 2 co. Respondeo dicendum quod, sicut iam pluries dictum est, omnes huiusmodi passiones animae ad appetitivam potentiam pertinent. Omnis autem motus appetitivae potentiae reducitur ad prosecutionem vel fugam. Prosecutio autem vel fuga est alicuius et per se, et per accidens, per se quidem est prosecutio boni, fuga vero mali; per accidens autem potest prosecutio esse mali, propter aliquod bonum adiunctum, et fuga boni, propter aliquod malum adiunctum. Quod autem est per accidens, sequitur ad id quod est per se. Et ideo prosecutio mali, sequitur prosecutionem boni, sicut et fuga boni sequitur fugam mali. Haec autem quatuor pertinent ad quatuor passiones, nam prosecutio boni pertinet ad spem, fuga mali ad timorem, insecutio mali terribilis pertinet ad audaciam, fuga vero boni pertinet ad desperationem. Unde sequitur quod audacia consequitur ad spem, ex hoc enim quod aliquis sperat superare terribile imminens, ex hoc audacter insequitur ipsum. Ad timorem vero sequitur desperatio, ideo enim aliquis desperat, quia timet difficultatem quae est circa bonum sperandum. I answer that, As we have often stated (22, 2; 35, 1; 41, 1), all these passions belong to the appetitive power. Now every movement of the appetitive power is reducible to one either of pursuit or of avoidance. Again, pursuit or avoidance is of something either by reason of itself or by reason of something else. By reason of itself, good is the object of pursuit, and evil, the object of avoidance: but by reason of something else, evil can be the object of pursuit, through some good attaching to it; and good can be the object of avoidance, through some evil attaching to it. Now that which is by reason of something else, follows that which is by reason of itself. Consequently pursuit of evil follows pursuit of good; and avoidance of good follows avoidance of evil. Now these four things belong to four passions, since pursuit of good belongs to hope, avoidance of evil to fear, the pursuit of the fearful evil belongs to daring, and the avoidance of good to despair. It follows, therefore, that daring results from hope; since it is in the hope of overcoming the threatening object of fear, that one attacks it boldly. But despair results from fear: since the reason why a man despairs is because he fears the difficulty attaching to the good he should hope for.
Iª-IIae q. 45 a. 2 ad 1 Ad primum ergo dicendum quod ratio sequeretur, si bonum et malum essent obiecta non habentia ordinem ad invicem. Sed quia malum habet aliquem ordinem ad bonum, est enim posterius bono, sicut privatio habitu; ideo audacia, quae insequitur malum, est post spem, quae insequitur bonum. Reply to Objection 1. This argument would hold, if good and evil were not co-ordinate objects. But because evil has a certain relation to good, since it comes after good, as privation comes after habit; consequently daring which pursues evil, comes after hope which pursues good.
Iª-IIae q. 45 a. 2 ad 2 Ad secundum dicendum quod, etsi bonum simpliciter sit prius quam malum, tamen fuga per prius debetur malo quam bono, sicut insecutio per prius debetur bono quam malo. Et ideo sicut spes est prior quam audacia, ita timor est prior quam desperatio. Et sicut ex timore non semper sequitur desperatio, sed quando fuerit intensus; ita ex spe non semper sequitur audacia, sed quando fuerit vehemens. Reply to Objection 2. Although good, absolutely speaking, is prior to evil, yet avoidance of evil precedes avoidance of good; just as the pursuit of good precedes the pursuit of evil. Consequently just as hope precedes daring, so fear precedes despair. And just as fear does not always lead to despair, but only when it is intense; so hope does not always lead to daring, save only when it is strong.
Iª-IIae q. 45 a. 2 ad 3 Ad tertium dicendum quod audacia, licet sit circa malum cui coniunctum est bonum victoriae secundum aestimationem audacis, tamen respicit malum, bonum vero adiunctum respicit spes. Et similiter desperatio respicit bonum directe, quod refugit, malum vero adiunctum respicit timor. Unde, proprie loquendo, audacia non est pars spei, sed eius effectus, sicut nec desperatio est pars timoris, sed eius effectus. Et propter hoc etiam audacia principalis passio esse non potest. Reply to Objection 3. Although the object of daring is an evil to which, in the estimation of the daring man, the good of victory is conjoined; yet daring regards the evil, and hope regards the conjoined good. In like manner despair regards directly the good which it turns away from, while fear regards the conjoined evil. Hence, properly speaking, daring is not a part of hope, but its effect: just as despair is an effect, not a part, of fear. For this reason, too, daring cannot be a principal passion.
Iª-IIae q. 45 a. 3 arg. 1 Ad tertium sic proceditur. Videtur quod defectus aliquis sit causa audaciae. Dicit enim philosophus, in libro de problematibus, quod amatores vini sunt fortes et audaces. Sed ex vino sequitur defectus ebrietatis. Ergo audacia causatur ex aliquo defectu. Objection 1. It would seem that some defect is a cause of daring. For the Philosopher says (De Problem. xxvii, 4) that "lovers of wine are strong and daring." But from wine ensues the effect of drunkenness. Therefore daring is caused by a defect.
Iª-IIae q. 45 a. 3 arg. 2 Praeterea, philosophus dicit, in II Rhetoric., quod inexperti periculorum sunt audaces. Sed inexperientia defectus quidam est. Ergo audacia ex defectu causatur. Objection 2. Further, the Philosopher says (Rhet. ii, 5) that "those who have no experience of danger are bold." But want of experience is a defect. Therefore daring is caused by a defect.
Iª-IIae q. 45 a. 3 arg. 3 Praeterea, iniusta passi audaciores esse solent; sicut etiam bestiae cum percutiuntur, ut dicitur in III Ethic. Sed iniustum pati ad defectum pertinet. Ergo audacia ex aliquo defectu causatur. Objection 3. Further, those who have suffered wrongs are wont to be daring; "like the beasts when beaten," as stated in Ethic. iii, 5. But the suffering of wrongs pertains to defect. Therefore daring is caused by a defect.
Iª-IIae q. 45 a. 3 s. c. Sed contra est quod philosophus dicit, in II Rhetoric., quod causa audaciae est, cum in phantasia spes fuerit salutarium ut prope existentium, timendorum autem aut non entium, aut longe entium. Sed id quod pertinet ad defectum, vel pertinet ad salutarium remotionem, vel ad terribilium propinquitatem. Ergo nihil quod ad defectum pertinet, est causa audaciae. On the contrary, The Philosopher says (Rhet. ii, 5) that the cause of daring "is the presence in the imagination of the hope that the means of safety are nigh, and that the things to be feared are either non-existent or far off." But anything pertaining to defect implies either the removal of the means of safety, or the proximity of something to be feared. Therefore nothing pertaining to defect is a cause of daring.
Iª-IIae q. 45 a. 3 co. Respondeo dicendum quod, sicut supra dictum est, audacia consequitur spem, et contrariatur timori, unde quaecumque nata sunt causare spem, vel excludere timorem, sunt causa audaciae. Quia vero timor et spes, et etiam audacia, cum sint passiones quaedam, consistunt in motu appetitus et in quadam transmutatione corporali; dupliciter potest accipi causa audaciae, sive quantum ad provocationem spei, sive quantum ad exclusionem timoris, uno modo quidem, ex parte appetitivi motus; alio vero modo, ex parte transmutationis corporalis. Ex parte quidem appetitivi motus, qui sequitur apprehensionem, provocatur spes causans audaciam, per ea quae faciunt nos aestimare quod possibile sit adipisci victoriam; vel secundum propriam potentiam, sicut fortitudo corporis, experientia in periculis, multitudo pecuniarum, et alia huiusmodi; sive per potentiam aliorum, sicut multitudo amicorum vel quorumcumque auxiliantium, et praecipue si homo confidat de auxilio divino; unde illi qui se bene habent ad divina, audaciores sunt, ut etiam philosophus dicit, in II Rhetoric. Timor autem excluditur, secundum istum modum, per remotionem terribilium appropinquantium, puta quia homo non habet inimicos, quia nulli nocuit, quia non videt aliquod periculum imminere; illis enim videntur maxime pericula imminere, qui aliis nocuerunt. Ex parte vero transmutationis corporalis, causatur audacia per provocationem spei et exclusionem timoris, ex his quae faciunt caliditatem circa cor. Unde philosophus dicit, in libro de partibus animalium, quod illi qui habent parvum cor secundum quantitatem, sunt magis audaces; et animalia habentia magnum cor secundum quantitatem, sunt timida, quia calor naturalis non tantum potest calefacere magnum cor; sicut parvum, sicut ignis non tantum potest calefacere magnam domum, sicut parvam. Et in libro de problematibus dicit quod habentes pulmonem sanguineum, sunt audaciores, propter caliditatem cordis exinde consequentem. Et ibidem dicit quod vini amatores sunt magis audaces, propter caliditatem vini, unde et supra dictum est quod ebrietas facit ad bonitatem spei, caliditas enim cordis repellit timorem, et causat spem, propter cordis extensionem et amplificationem. I answer that, As stated above (1,2) daring results from hope and is contrary to fear: wherefore whatever is naturally apt to cause hope or banish fear, is a cause of daring. Since, however, fear and hope, and also daring, being passions, consist in a movement of the appetite, and in a certain bodily transmutation; a thing may be considered as the cause of daring in two ways, whether by raising hope, or by banishing fear; in one way, in the part of the appetitive movement; in another way, on the part of the bodily transmutation. On the part of the appetitive movement which follows apprehension, hope that leads to daring is roused by those things that make us reckon victory as possible. Such things regard either our own power, as bodily strength, experience of dangers, abundance of wealth, and the like; or they regard the powers of others, such as having a great number of friends or any other means of help, especially if a man trust in the Divine assistance: wherefore "those are more daring, with whom it is well in regard to godlike things," as the Philosopher says (Rhet. ii, 5). Fear is banished, in this way, by the removal of threatening causes of fear; for instance, by the fact that a man has not enemies, through having harmed nobody, so that he is not aware of any imminent danger; since those especially appear to be threatened by danger, who have harmed others. On the part of the bodily transmutation, daring is caused through the incitement of hope and the banishment of fear, by those things which raise the temperature about the heart. Wherefore the Philosopher says (De Part. Animal. iii, 4) that "those whose heart is small in size, are more daring; while animals whose heart is large are timid; because the natural heat is unable to give the same degree of temperature to a large as to a small heart; just as a fire does not heat a large house as well as it does a small house." He says also (De Problem. xxvii, 4), that "those whose lungs contain much blood, are more daring, through the heat in the heart that results therefrom." He says also in the same passage that "lovers of wine are more daring, on account of the heat of the wine": hence it has been said above (Question 40, Article 6) that drunkenness conduces to hope, since the heat in the heart banishes fear and raises hope, by reason of the dilatation and enlargement of the heart.
Iª-IIae q. 45 a. 3 ad 1 Ad primum ergo dicendum quod ebrietas causat audaciam, non inquantum est defectus, sed inquantum facit cordis dilatationem, et inquantum etiam facit aestimationem cuiusdam magnitudinis. Reply to Objection 1. Drunkenness causes daring, not through being a defect, but through dilating the heart: and again through making a man think greatly of himself.
Iª-IIae q. 45 a. 3 ad 2 Ad secundum dicendum quod illi qui sunt inexperti periculorum, sunt audaciores, non propter defectum, sed per accidens, inquantum scilicet, propter inexperientiam, neque debilitatem suam cognoscunt, neque praesentiam periculorum. Et ita, per subtractionem causae timoris, sequitur audacia. Reply to Objection 2. Those who have no experience of dangers are more daring, not on account of a defect, but accidentally, i.e. in so far as through being inexperienced they do not know their own failings, nor the dangers that threaten. Hence it is that the removal of the cause of fear gives rise to daring.
Iª-IIae q. 45 a. 3 ad 3 Ad tertium dicendum quod, sicut philosophus dicit in II Rhetoric., iniustum passi redduntur audaciores, quia aestimant quod Deus iniustum passis auxilium ferat. Et sic patet quod nullus defectus causat audaciam nisi per accidens, inquantum scilicet habet adiunctam aliquam excellentiam, vel veram vel aestimatam, vel ex parte sui vel ex parte alterius. Reply to Objection 3. As the Philosopher says (Rhet. ii, 5) "those who have been wronged are courageous, because they think that God comes to the assistance of those who suffer unjustly." Hence it is evident that no defect causes daring except accidentally, i.e. in so far as some excellence attaches thereto, real or imaginary, either in oneself or in another.
Iª-IIae q. 45 a. 4 arg. 1 Ad quartum sic proceditur. Videtur quod audaces non sint promptiores in principio quam in ipsis periculis. Tremor enim ex timore causatur, qui contrariatur audaciae, ut ex dictis patet. Sed audaces quandoque in principio tremunt, ut philosophus dicit, in libro de problematibus. Ergo non sunt promptiores in principio quam in ipsis periculis existentes. Objection 1. It would seem that the daring are not more eager at first than in the midst of danger. Because trembling is caused by fear, which is contrary to daring, as stated above (1; 44, 3). But the daring sometimes tremble at first, as the Philosopher says (De Problem. xxvii, 3). Therefore they are not more eager at first than in the midst of danger.
Iª-IIae q. 45 a. 4 arg. 2 Praeterea, per augmentum obiecti augetur passio, sicut si bonum est amabile, et magis bonum est magis amabile. Sed arduum est obiectum audaciae. Augmentato ergo arduo, augmentatur audacia. Sed magis fit arduum et difficile periculum, quando est praesens. Ergo debet tunc magis crescere audacia. Objection 2. Further, passion is intensified by an increase in its object: thus since a good is lovable, what is better is yet more lovable. But the object of daring is something difficult. Therefore the greater the difficulty, the greater the daring. But danger is more arduous and difficult when present. It is then therefore that daring is greatest.
Iª-IIae q. 45 a. 4 arg. 3 Praeterea, ex vulneribus inflictis provocatur ira. Sed ira causat audaciam, dicit enim philosophus, in II Rhetoric., quod ira est ausivum. Ergo quando iam sunt in ipsis periculis, et percutiuntur, videtur quod magis audaces reddantur. Objection 3. Further, anger is provoked by the infliction of wounds. But anger causes daring; for the Philosopher says (Rhet. ii, 5) that "anger makes man bold." Therefore when man is in the midst of danger and when he is being beaten, then is he most daring.
Iª-IIae q. 45 a. 4 s. c. Sed contra est quod dicitur in III Ethic., quod audaces praevolantes sunt et volentes ante pericula, in ipsis autem discedunt. On the contrary, It is said in Ethic. iii, 7 that "the daring are precipitate and full of eagerness before the danger, yet in the midst of dangers they stand aloof."
Iª-IIae q. 45 a. 4 co. Respondeo dicendum quod audacia, cum sit quidam motus appetitus sensitivi, sequitur apprehensionem sensitivae virtutis. Virtus autem sensitiva non est collativa nec inquisitiva singulorum quae circumstant rem, sed subitum habet iudicium. Contingit autem quandoque quod secundum subitam apprehensionem non possunt cognosci omnia quae difficultatem in aliquo negotio afferunt, unde surgit audaciae motus ad aggrediendum periculum. Unde quando iam experiuntur ipsum periculum, sentiunt maiorem difficultatem quam aestimaverunt. Et ideo deficiunt. Sed ratio est discussiva omnium quae afferunt difficultatem negotio. Et ideo fortes, qui ex iudicio rationis aggrediuntur pericula, in principio videntur remissi, quia non passi, sed cum deliberatione debita aggrediuntur. Quando autem sunt in ipsis periculis, non experiuntur aliquid improvisum; sed quandoque minora illis quae praecogitaverunt. Et ideo magis persistunt. Vel etiam quia propter bonum virtutis pericula aggrediuntur, cuius boni voluntas in eis perseverat, quantacumque sint pericula. Audaces autem, propter solam aestimationem facientem spem et excludentem timorem, sicut dictum est. I answer that, Daring, being a movement of the sensitive appetite, follows an apprehension of the sensitive faculty. But the sensitive faculty cannot make comparisons, nor can it inquire into circumstances; its judgment is instantaneous. Now it happens sometimes that it is impossible for a man to take note in an instant of all the difficulties of a certain situation: hence there arises the movement of daring to face the danger; so that when he comes to experience the danger, he feels the difficulty to be greater than he expected, and so gives way. On the other hand, reason discusses all the difficulties of a situation. Consequently men of fortitude who face danger according to the judgment of reason, at first seem slack, because they face the danger not from passion but with due deliberation. Yet when they are in the midst of danger, they experience nothing unforeseen, but sometimes the difficulty turns out to be less than they anticipated; wherefore they are more persevering. Moreover, it may be because they face the danger on account of the good of virtue which is the abiding object of their will, however great the danger may prove: whereas men of daring face the danger on account of a mere thought giving rise to hope and banishing fear, as stated above (Article 3).
Iª-IIae q. 45 a. 4 ad 1 Ad primum ergo dicendum quod etiam in audacibus accidit tremor, propter revocationem caloris ab exterioribus ad interiora, sicut etiam in timentibus. Sed in audacibus revocatur calor ad cor, in timentibus autem, ad inferiora. Reply to Objection 1. Trembling does occur in men of daring, on account of the heat being withdrawn from the outer to the inner parts of the body, as occurs also in those who are afraid. But in men of daring the heat withdraws to the heart; whereas in those who are afraid, it withdraws to the inferior parts.
Iª-IIae q. 45 a. 4 ad 2 Ad secundum dicendum quod obiectum amoris est simpliciter bonum, unde augmentatum simpliciter augmentat amorem. Sed obiectum audaciae est compositum ex bono et malo; et motus audaciae in malum, praesupponit motum spei in bonum. Et ideo si tantum addatur de arduitate ad periculum quod excedat spem, non sequetur motus audaciae, sed diminuetur. Si tamen sit motus audaciae, quanto maius est periculum, tanto maior audacia reputatur. Reply to Objection 2. The object of love is good simply, wherefore if it be increased, love is increased simply. But the object of daring is a compound of good and evil; and the movement of daring towards evil presupposes the movement of hope towards good. If, therefore, so much difficulty be added to the danger that it overcomes hope, the movement of daring does not ensue, but fails. But if the movement of daring does ensue, the greater the danger, the greater is the daring considered to be.
Iª-IIae q. 45 a. 4 ad 3 Ad tertium dicendum quod ex laesione non causatur ira, nisi supposita aliqua spe, ut infra dicetur. Et ideo si fuerit tantum periculum quod excedat spem victoriae, non sequetur ira. Sed verum est quod, si ira sequatur, audacia augebitur. Reply to Objection 3. Hurt does not give rise to anger unless there be some kind of hope, as we shall see later on (46, 1). Consequently if the danger be so great as to banish all hope of victory, anger does not ensue. It is true, however, that if anger does ensue, there will be greater daring.

Notes


  • [[]]
Personal tools