Authors/Thomas Aquinas/Summa Theologiae/Part IIa/Q37

• Question 37.1 Effects of pain or sorrow
• Question 37.2
• Question 37.3
• Question 37.4

Latin	English
Iª-IIae q. 37 pr. Deinde considerandum est de effectibus doloris vel tristitiae. Et circa hoc quaeruntur quatuor. Primo, utrum dolor auferat facultatem addiscendi. Secundo, utrum aggravatio animi sit effectus tristitiae vel doloris. Tertio, utrum tristitia vel dolor debilitet omnem operationem. Quarto, utrum tristitia noceat corpori magis quam aliae passiones animae.	Question 37. The effects of pain or sorrow Does pain deprive one of the power to learn? Is the effect of sorrow or pain to burden the soul? Does sorrow or pain weaken all activity? Is sorrow more harmful to the body than all the other passions of the soul?
Iª-IIae q. 37 a. 1 arg. 1 Ad primum sic proceditur. Videtur quod dolor non auferat facultatem addiscendi. Dicitur enim Isaiae XXVI, cum feceris iudicia tua in terra, iustitiam discent omnes habitatores orbis. Et infra, in tribulatione murmuris doctrina tua eis, sed ex iudiciis Dei, et tribulatione, sequitur dolor seu tristitia in cordibus hominum. Ergo dolor vel tristitia non tollit, sed magis auget facultatem addiscendi.	Objection 1. It would seem that pain does not deprive one of the power to learn. For it is written (Isaiah 26:9): "When Thou shalt do Thy judgments on the earth, the inhabitants of the world shall learn justice": and further on (verse 16): "In the tribulation of murmuring Thy instruction was with them." But the judgments of God and tribulation cause sorrow in men's hearts. Therefore pain or sorrow, far from destroying, increases the power of learning.
Iª-IIae q. 37 a. 1 arg. 2 Praeterea, Isaiae XXVIII, dicitur, quem docebit scientiam? Et quem intelligere faciet auditum? Ablactatos a lacte, avulsos ab uberibus idest a delectationibus. Sed dolor et tristitia maxime tollunt delectationes, impedit enim tristitia omnem delectationem, ut dicitur in VII Ethic.; et Eccli. XI dicitur quod malitia unius horae oblivionem facit luxuriae maximae. Ergo dolor non tollit, sed magis praebet facultatem addiscendi.	Objection 2. Further, it is written (Isaiah 28:9): "Whom shall He teach knowledge? And whom shall He make to understand the hearing? Them that are weaned from the milk, that are drawn away from the breasts," i.e. from pleasures. But pain and sorrow are most destructive of pleasure; since sorrow hinders all pleasure, as stated in Ethic. vii, 4: and (Sirach 11:29) it is stated that "the affliction of an hour maketh one forget great delights." Therefore pain, instead of taking away, increases the faculty of learning.
Iª-IIae q. 37 a. 1 arg. 3 Praeterea, tristitia interior praeeminet dolori exteriori, ut supra dictum est. Sed simul cum tristitia potest homo addiscere. Ergo multo magis simul cum dolore corporali.	Objection 3. Further, inward sorrow surpasses outward pain, as stated above (Question 35, Article 7). But man can learn while sorrowful. Much more, therefore, can he learn while in bodily pain.
Iª-IIae q. 37 a. 1 s. c. Sed contra est quod Augustinus dicit, in I Soliloq., quanquam acerrimo dolore dentium his diebus torquerer, non quidem sinebar animo volvere nisi ea quae iam forte didiceram. A discendo autem penitus impediebar, ad quod mihi tota intentione animi opus erat.	On the contrary, Augustine says (Soliloq. i, 12): "Although during those days I was tormented with a violent tooth-ache, I was not able to turn over in my mind other things than those I had already learnt; and as to learning anything, I was quite unequal to it, because it required undivided attention."
Iª-IIae q. 37 a. 1 co. Respondeo dicendum quod, quia omnes potentiae animae in una essentia animae radicantur, necesse est quod, quando intentio animae vehementer trahitur ad operationem unius potentiae, retrahatur ab operatione alterius, unius enim animae non potest esse nisi una intentio. Et propter hoc, si aliquid ad se trahat totam intentionem animae, vel magnam partem ipsius, non compatitur secum aliquid aliud quod magnam attentionem requirat. Manifestum est autem quod dolor sensibilis maxime trahit ad se intentionem animae, quia naturaliter unumquodque tota intentione tendit ad repellendum contrarium, sicut etiam in rebus naturalibus apparet. Similiter etiam manifestum est quod ad addiscendum aliquid de novo, requiritur studium et conatus cum magna intentione, ut patet per illud quod dicitur Prov. II, si quaesieris sapientiam quasi pecuniam, et sicut thesauros effoderis eam, tunc intelliges disciplinam. Et ideo si sit dolor intensus, impeditur homo ne tunc aliquid addiscere possit. Et tantum potest intendi, quod nec etiam, instante dolore, potest homo aliquid considerare etiam quod prius scivit. In hoc tamen attenditur diversitas secundum diversitatem amoris quem homo habet ad addiscendum vel considerandum, qui quanto maior fuerit, magis retinet intentionem animi, ne omnino feratur ad dolorem.	I answer that, Since all the powers of the soul are rooted in the one essence of the soul, it must needs happen, when the intention of the soul is strongly drawn towards the action of one power, that it is withdrawn from the action of another power: because the soul, being one, can only have one intention. The result is that if one thing draws upon itself the entire intention of the soul, or a great portion thereof, anything else requiring considerable attention is incompatible therewith. Now it is evident that sensible pain above all draws the soul's attention to itself; because it is natural for each thing to tend wholly to repel whatever is contrary to it, as may be observed even in natural things. It is likewise evident that in order to learn anything new, we require study and effort with a strong intention, as is clearly stated in Proverbs 2:4-5: "If thou shalt seek wisdom as money, and shall dig for her as for a treasure, then shalt thou understand learning" [Vulgate: 'the fear of the Lord']. Consequently if the pain be acute, man is prevented at the time from learning anything: indeed it can be so acute, that, as long as it lasts, a man is unable to give his attention even to that which he knew already. However a difference is to be observed according to the difference of love that a man has for learning or for considering: because the greater his love, the more will he retain the intention of his mind so as to prevent it from turning entirely to the pain.
Iª-IIae q. 37 a. 1 ad 1 Ad primum ergo dicendum quod tristitia moderata, quae excludit evagationem animi, potest conferre ad disciplinam suscipiendam, et praecipue eorum per quae homo sperat se posse a tristitia liberari. Et hoc modo in tribulatione murmuris homines doctrinam Dei magis recipiunt.	Reply to Objection 1. Moderate sorrow, that does not cause the mind to wander, can conduce to the acquisition of learning especially in regard to those things by which a man hopes to be freed from sorrow. And thus, "in the tribulation of murmuring," men are more apt to be taught by God.
Iª-IIae q. 37 a. 1 ad 2 Ad secundum dicendum quod tam delectatio quam dolor, inquantum ad se trahunt animae intentionem, impediunt considerationem rationis, unde in VII Ethic. dicitur quod impossibile est in ipsa delectatione venereorum, aliquid intelligere. Sed tamen dolor magis trahit ad se intentionem animae quam delectatio, sicut etiam videmus in rebus naturalibus, quod actio corporis naturalis magis intenditur in contrarium; sicut aqua calefacta magis patitur a frigido, ut fortius congeletur. Si ergo dolor seu tristitia fuerit moderata, per accidens potest conferre ad addiscendum, inquantum aufert superabundantiam delectationum. Sed per se impedit, et si intendatur, totaliter aufert.	Reply to Objection 2. Both pleasure and pain, in so far as they draw upon themselves the soul's intention, hinder the reason from the act of consideration, wherefore it is stated in Ethic. vii, 11 that "in the moment of sexual pleasure, a man cannot understand anything." Nevertheless pain attracts the soul's intention more than pleasure does: thus we observe in natural things that the action of a natural body is more intense in regard to its contrary; for instance, hot water is more accessible to the action of cold, and in consequence freezes harder. If therefore pain or sorrow be moderate, it can conduce accidentally to the facility of learning, in so far as it takes away an excess of pleasure. But, of itself, it is a hindrance; and if it be intense, it prevents it altogether.
Iª-IIae q. 37 a. 1 ad 3 Ad tertium dicendum quod dolor exterior accidit ex laesione corporali, et ita magis habet transmutationem corporalem adiunctam quam dolor interior, qui tamen est maior secundum illud quod est formale in dolore, quod est ex parte animae. Et ideo dolor corporalis magis impedit contemplationem, quae requirit omnimodam quietem, quam dolor interior. Et tamen etiam dolor interior, si multum intendatur, ita trahit intentionem, ut non possit homo de novo aliquid addiscere. Unde et Gregorius propter tristitiam intermisit Ezechielis expositionem.	Reply to Objection 3. External pain arises from hurt done to the body, so that it involves bodily transmutation more than inward sorrow does: and yet the latter is greater in regard to the formal element of pain, which belongs to the soul. Consequently bodily pain is a greater hindrance to contemplation which requires complete repose, than inward sorrow is. Nevertheless if inward sorrow be very intense, it attracts the intention, so that man is unable to learn anything for the first time: wherefore on account of sorrow Gregory interrupted his commentary on Ezechiel (Hom. xxii in Ezechiel).
Iª-IIae q. 37 a. 2 arg. 1 Ad secundum sic proceditur. Videtur quod aggravatio animi non sit effectus tristitiae. Dicit enim apostolus, II ad Cor. VII, ecce hoc ipsum, contristari vos secundum Deum, quantam in vobis operatur sollicitudinem, sed defensionem, sed indignationem, et cetera. Sed sollicitudo et indignatio ad quandam erectionem animi pertinent, quae aggravationi opponitur. Non ergo aggravatio est effectus tristitiae.	Objection 1. It would seem that it is not an effect of sorrow to burden the soul. For the Apostle says (2 Corinthians 7:11): "Behold this self-same thing, that you were made sorrowful according to God, how great carefulness it worketh in you: yea, defence, yea indignation," etc. Now carefulness and indignation imply that the soul is uplifted, which is contrary to being depressed. Therefore depression is not an effect of sorrow.
Iª-IIae q. 37 a. 2 arg. 2 Praeterea, tristitia delectationi opponitur. Sed effectus delectationis est dilatatio, cui non opponitur aggravatio, sed constrictio. Ergo effectus tristitiae non debet poni aggravatio.	Objection 2. Further, sorrow is contrary to pleasure. But the effect of pleasure is expansion: the opposite of which is not depression but contraction. Therefore depression should not be reckoned as an effect of sorrow.
Iª-IIae q. 37 a. 2 arg. 3 Praeterea, ad tristitiam pertinet absorbere, ut patet per illud quod apostolus dicit, II ad Cor. II, ne forte abundantiori tristitia absorbeatur qui est eiusmodi. Sed quod aggravatur, non absorbetur, quinimmo sub aliquo ponderoso deprimitur; quod autem absorbetur, intra absorbens includitur. Ergo aggravatio non debet poni effectus tristitiae.	Objection 3. Further, sorrow consumes those who are inflicted therewith, as may be gathered from the words of the Apostle (2 Corinthians 2:7): "Lest perhaps such an one be swallowed up with overmuch sorrow." But that which is depressed is not consumed; nay, it is weighed down by something heavy, whereas that which is consumed enters within the consumer. Therefore depression should not be reckoned an effect of sorrow.
Iª-IIae q. 37 a. 2 s. c. Sed contra est quod Gregorius Nyssenus et Damascenus ponunt tristitiam aggravantem.	On the contrary, Gregory of Nyssa [Nemesius, De Nat. Hom. xix.] and Damascene (De Fide Orth. ii, 14) speak of "depressing sorrow."
Iª-IIae q. 37 a. 2 co. Respondeo dicendum quod effectus passionum animae quandoque metaphorice nominantur, secundum similitudinem sensibilium corporum, eo quod motus appetitus animalis sunt similes inclinationibus appetitus naturalis. Et per hunc modum fervor attribuitur amori, dilatatio delectationi, et aggravatio tristitiae. Dicitur enim homo aggravari, ex eo quod aliquo pondere impeditur a proprio motu. Manifestum est autem ex praedictis quod tristitia contingit ex aliquo malo praesenti. Quod quidem, ex hoc ipso quod repugnat motui voluntatis, aggravat animum, inquantum impedit ipsum ne fruatur eo quod vult. Et si quidem non sit tanta vis mali contristantis ut auferat spem evadendi, licet animus aggravetur quantum ad hoc, quod in praesenti non potitur eo quod vult; remanet tamen motus ad repellendum nocivum contristans. Si vero superexcrescat vis mali intantum ut spem evasionis excludat, tunc simpliciter impeditur etiam interior motus animi angustiati, ut neque hac neque illac divertere valeat. Et quandoque etiam impeditur exterior motus corporis, ita quod remaneat homo stupidus in seipso.	I answer that, The effects of the soul's passions are sometimes named metaphorically, from a likeness to sensible bodies: for the reason that the movements of the animal appetite are like the inclinations of the natural appetite. And in this way fervor is ascribed to love, expansion to pleasure, and depression to sorrow. For a man is said to be depressed, through being hindered in his own movement by some weight. Now it is evident from what has been said above (23, 4; 25, 4; 36, 01) that sorrow is caused by a present evil: and this evil, from the very fact that it is repugnant to the movement of the will, depresses the soul, inasmuch as it hinders it from enjoying that which it wishes to enjoy. And if the evil which is the cause of sorrow be not so strong as to deprive one of the hope of avoiding it, although the soul be depressed in so far as, for the present, it fails to grasp that which it craves for; yet it retains the movement whereby to repulse that evil. If, on the other hand, the strength of the evil be such as to exclude the hope of evasion, then even the interior movement of the afflicted soul is absolutely hindered, so that it cannot turn aside either this way or that. Sometimes even the external movement of the body is paralyzed, so that a man becomes completely stupefied.
Iª-IIae q. 37 a. 2 ad 1 Ad primum ergo dicendum quod illa erectio animi provenit ex tristitia quae est secundum Deum, propter spem adiunctam de remissione peccati.	Reply to Objection 1. That uplifting of the soul ensues from the sorrow which is according to God, because it brings with it the hope of the forgiveness of sin.
Iª-IIae q. 37 a. 2 ad 2 Ad secundum dicendum quod, quantum ad motum appetitivum pertinet, ad idem refertur constrictio et aggravatio. Ex hoc enim quod aggravatur animus, ut ad exteriora libere progredi non possit, ad seipsum retrahitur, quasi in seipso constrictus.	Reply to Objection 2. As far as the movement of the appetite is concerned, contraction and depression amount to the same: because the soul, through being depressed so as to be unable to attend freely to outward things, withdraws to itself, closing itself up as it were.
Iª-IIae q. 37 a. 2 ad 3 Ad tertium dicendum quod tristitia absorbere hominem dicitur, quando sic totaliter vis contristantis mali afficit animam, ut omnem spem evasionis excludat. Et sic etiam eodem modo aggravat et absorbet. Quaedam enim se consequuntur in his quae metaphorice dicuntur, quae sibi repugnare videntur, si secundum proprietatem accipiantur.	Reply to Objection 3. Sorrow is said to consume man, when the force of the afflicting evil is such as to shut out all hope of evasion: and thus also it both depresses and consumes at the same time. For certain things, taken metaphorically, imply one another, which taken literally, appear to exclude one another.
Iª-IIae q. 37 a. 3 arg. 1 Ad tertium sic proceditur. Videtur quod tristitia non impediat omnem operationem. Sollicitudo enim ex tristitia causatur, ut patet per auctoritatem apostoli inductam. Sed sollicitudo adiuvat ad bene operandum, unde apostolus dicit, II ad Tim. II, sollicite cura teipsum exhibere operarium inconfusibilem. Ergo tristitia non impedit operationem, sed magis adiuvat ad bene operandum.	Objection 1. It would seem that sorrow does not weaken all activity. Because carefulness is caused by sorrow, as is clear from the passage of the Apostle quoted above (02, Objection 1). But carefulness conduces to good work: wherefore the Apostle says (2 Timothy 2:15): "Carefully study to present thyself . . . a workman that needeth not to be ashamed." Therefore sorrow is not a hindrance to work, but helps one to work well.
Iª-IIae q. 37 a. 3 arg. 2 Praeterea, tristitia causat in multis concupiscentiam, ut dicitur in VII Ethic. Sed concupiscentia facit ad intensionem operationis. Ergo et tristitia.	Objection 2. Further, sorrow causes desire in many cases, as stated in Ethic. vii, 14. But desire causes intensity of action. Therefore sorrow does too.
Iª-IIae q. 37 a. 3 arg. 3 Praeterea, sicut quaedam operationes propriae sunt gaudentium, ita etiam quaedam operationes his qui tristantur, sicut lugere. Sed unumquodque augetur ex sibi convenienti. Ergo aliquae operationes non impediuntur, sed meliorantur propter tristitiam.	Objection 3. Further, as some actions are proper to the joyful, so are others proper to the sorrowful; for instance, to mourn. Now a thing is improved by that which is suitable to it. Therefore certain actions are not hindered but improved by reason of sorrow.
Iª-IIae q. 37 a. 3 s. c. Sed contra est quod philosophus dicit, in X Ethic., quod delectatio perficit operationem, sed e contrario tristitia impedit.	On the contrary, The Philosopher says (Ethic. x, 4) that "pleasure perfects action," whereas on the other hand, "sorrow hinders it" (Ethic. x, 5).
Iª-IIae q. 37 a. 3 co. Respondeo dicendum quod, sicut iam dictum est, tristitia quandoque non ita aggravat vel absorbet animum, ut omnem motum interiorem et exteriorem excludat; sed aliqui motus quandoque ex ipsa tristitia causantur. Sic ergo operatio ad tristitiam dupliciter potest comparari. Uno modo, sicut ad id de quo est tristitia. Et sic tristitia quamlibet operationem impedit, nunquam enim illud quod cum tristitia facimus, ita bene facimus sicut illud quod facimus cum delectatione, vel sine tristitia. Cuius ratio est, quia voluntas est causa operationis humanae, unde quando operatio est de qua aliquis contristatur, necesse est quod actio debilitetur. Alio modo comparatur operatio ad tristitiam sicut ad principium et causam. Et sic necesse est quod operatio talis ex tristitia augeatur, sicut quanto aliquis magis tristatur de re aliqua, tanto magis conatur ad expellendam tristitiam, dummodo remaneat spes expellendi, alioquin nullus motus vel operatio ex tristitia causaretur.	I answer that, As stated above (Article 2), sorrow at times does not depress or consume the soul, so as to shut out all movement, internal or external; but certain movements are sometimes caused by sorrow itself. Accordingly action stands in a twofold relation to sorrow. First, as being the object of sorrow: and thus sorrow hinders any action: for we never do that which we do with sorrow, so well as that which we do with pleasure, or without sorrow. The reason for this is that the will is the cause of human actions: and consequently when we do something that gives pain, the action must of necessity be weakened in consequence. Secondly, action stands in relation to sorrow, as to its principle and cause: and such action must needs be improved by sorrow: thus the more one sorrows on account of a certain thing, the more one strives to shake off sorrow, provided there is a hope of shaking it off: otherwise no movement or action would result from that sorrow.
Iª-IIae q. 37 a. 3 ad arg. Et per hoc patet responsio ad obiecta.	From what has been said the replies to the objections are evident.
Iª-IIae q. 37 a. 4 arg. 1 Ad quartum sic proceditur. Videtur quod tristitia non inferat maxime corpori nocumentum. Tristitia enim habet esse spirituale in anima. Sed ea quae habent tantum esse spirituale, non causant transmutationem corporalem, sicut patet de intentionibus colorum quae sunt in aere, a quibus nullum corpus coloratur. Ergo tristitia non facit aliquod corporale nocumentum.	Objection 1. It would seem that sorrow is not most harmful to the body. For sorrow has a spiritual existence in the soul. But those things which have only a spiritual existence do not cause a transmutation in the body: as is evident with regard to the images of colors, which images are in the air and do not give color to bodies. Therefore sorrow is not harmful to the body.
Iª-IIae q. 37 a. 4 arg. 2 Praeterea, si facit aliquod corporale nocumentum, hoc non est nisi inquantum habet corporalem transmutationem adiunctam. Sed corporalis transmutatio invenitur in omnibus animae passionibus, ut supra dictum est. Ergo non magis tristitia quam aliae animae passiones, corpori nocet.	Objection 2. Further if it be harmful to the body, this can only be due to its having a bodily transmutation in conjunction with it. But bodily transmutation takes place in all the passions of the soul, as stated above (22, 1,3). Therefore sorrow is not more harmful to the body than the other passions of the soul.
Iª-IIae q. 37 a. 4 arg. 3 Praeterea, philosophus dicit, in VII Ethic., quod irae et concupiscentiae quibusdam insanias faciunt, quod videtur esse maximum nocumentum, cum ratio sit excellentissimum eorum quae sunt in homine. Desperatio etiam videtur esse magis nociva quam tristitia, cum sit causa tristitiae. Ergo tristitia non magis nocet corpori quam aliae animae passiones.	Objection 3. Further, the Philosopher says (Ethic. vii, 3) that "anger and desire drive some to madness": which seems to be a very great harm, since reason is the most excellent thing in man. Moreover, despair seems to be more harmful than sorrow; for it is the cause of sorrow. Therefore sorrow is not more harmful to the body than the other passions of the soul.
Iª-IIae q. 37 a. 4 s. c. Sed contra est quod dicitur Prov. XVII, animus gaudens aetatem floridam facit, spiritus tristis exsiccat ossa. Et Prov. XXV, sicut tinea vestimento, et vermis ligno, ita tristitia viri nocet cordi. Et Eccli. XXXVIII, a tristitia festinat mors.	On the contrary, It is written (Proverbs 17:22): "A joyful mind maketh age flourishing: a sorrowful spirit drieth up the bones": and (Proverbs 25:20): "As a moth doth by a garment, and a worm by the wood: so the sadness of a man consumeth the heart": and (Sirach 38:19): "Of sadness cometh death."
Iª-IIae q. 37 a. 4 co. Respondeo dicendum quod tristitia, inter omnes animae passiones, magis corpori nocet. Cuius ratio est, quia tristitia repugnat humanae vitae quantum ad speciem sui motus; et non solum quantum ad mensuram seu quantitatem, sicut aliae animae passiones. Consistit enim humana vita in quadam motione, quae a corde in cetera membra diffunditur, quae quidem motio convenit naturae humanae secundum aliquam determinatam mensuram. Si ergo ista motio procedat ultra mensuram debitam, repugnabit humanae vitae secundum quantitatis mensuram; non autem secundum similitudinem speciei. Si autem impediatur processus huius motionis, repugnabit vitae secundum suam speciem. Est autem attendendum in omnibus animae passionibus, quod transmutatio corporalis, quae est in eis materialis, est conformis et proportionata motui appetitus, qui est formalis, sicut in omnibus materia proportionatur formae. Illae ergo animae passiones quae important motum appetitus ad prosequendum aliquid, non repugnant vitali motioni secundum speciem, sed possunt repugnare secundum quantitatem, ut amor, gaudium, desiderium, et huiusmodi. Et ideo ista secundum speciem suam iuvant naturam corporis, sed propter excessum possunt nocere. Passiones autem quae important motum appetitus cum fuga vel retractione quadam, repugnant vitali motioni non solum secundum quantitatem, sed etiam secundum speciem motus, et ideo simpliciter nocent, sicut timor et desperatio, et prae omnibus tristitia, quae aggravat animum ex malo praesenti, cuius est fortior impressio quam futuri.	I answer that, Of all the soul's passions, sorrow is most harmful to the body. The reason of this is because sorrow is repugnant to man's life in respect of the species of its movement, and not merely in respect of its measure or quantity, as is the case with the other passions of the soul. For man's life consists in a certain movement, which flows from the heart to the other parts of the body: and this movement is befitting to human nature according to a certain fixed measure. Consequently if this movement goes beyond the right measure, it will be repugnant to man's life in respect of the measure of quantity; but not in respect of its specific character: whereas if this movement be hindered in its progress, it will be repugnant to life in respect of its species. Now it must be noted that, in all the passions of the soul, the bodily transmutation which is their material element, is in conformity with and in proportion to the appetitive movement, which is the formal element: just as in everything matter is proportionate to form. Consequently those passions that imply a movement of the appetite in pursuit of something, are not repugnant to the vital movement as regards its species, but they may be repugnant thereto as regards its measure: such are love, joy, desire and the like; wherefore these passions conduce to the well-being of the body; though, if they be excessive, they may be harmful to it. On the other hand, those passions which denote in the appetite a movement of flight or contraction, are repugnant to the vital movement, not only as regards its measure, but also as regards its species; wherefore they are simply harmful: such are fear and despair, and above all sorrow which depresses the soul by reason of a present evil, which makes a stronger impression than future evil.
Iª-IIae q. 37 a. 4 ad 1 Ad primum ergo dicendum quod, quia anima naturaliter movet corpus, spiritualis motus animae naturaliter est causa transmutationis corporalis. Nec est simile de spiritualibus intentionibus, quae non habent naturaliter ordinem movendi alia corpora, quae non sunt nata moveri ab anima.	Reply to Objection 1. Since the soul naturally moves the body, the spiritual movement of the soul is naturally the cause of bodily transmutation. Nor is there any parallel with spiritual images, because they are not naturally ordained to move such other bodies as are not naturally moved by the soul.
Iª-IIae q. 37 a. 4 ad 2 Ad secundum dicendum quod aliae passiones habent transmutationem corporalem conformem, secundum suam speciem, motioni vitali, sed tristitia contrariam, ut supra dictum est.	Reply to Objection 2. Other passions imply a bodily transmutation which is specifically in conformity with the vital movement: whereas sorrow implies a transmutation that is repugnant thereto, as stated above.
Iª-IIae q. 37 a. 4 ad 3 Ad tertium dicendum quod ex leviori causa impeditur usus rationis quam corrumpatur vita, cum videamus multas aegritudines usum rationis tollere, quae nondum adimunt vitam. Et tamen timor et ira maxime nocumentum corporale afferunt ex permixtione tristitiae, propter absentiam eius quod cupitur. Ipsa etiam tristitia quandoque rationem aufert, sicut patet in his qui propter dolorem in melancholiam vel in maniam incidunt.	Reply to Objection 3. A lesser cause suffices to hinder the use of reason, than to destroy life: since we observe that many ailments deprive one of the use of reason, before depriving one of life. Nevertheless fear and anger cause very great harm to the body, by reason of the sorrow which they imply, and which arises from the absence of the thing desired. Moreover sorrow too sometimes deprives man of the use of reason: as may be seen in those who through sorrow become a prey to melancholy or madness.