Authors/Thomas Aquinas/Summa Theologiae/Part IIa/Q36

• Question 36.1 Causes of pain or sorrow
• Question 36.2
• Question 36.3
• Question 36.4

Latin	English
Iª-IIae q. 36 pr. Deinde considerandum est de causis tristitiae. Et circa hoc quaeruntur quatuor. Primo, utrum causa doloris sit bonum amissum, vel magis malum coniunctum. Secundo, utrum concupiscentia sit causa doloris. Tertio, utrum appetitus unitatis sit causa doloris. Quarto, utrum potestas cui resisti non potest, sit causa doloris.	Question 36. The causes of sorrow or pain Is sorrow caused by the loss of a good or rather by the presence of an evil? Is desire a cause of sorrow? Is the craving for unity a cause of sorrow? Is an irresistible power a cause of sorrow?
Iª-IIae q. 36 a. 1 arg. 1 Ad primum sic proceditur. Videtur quod bonum amissum sit magis causa doloris quam malum coniunctum. Dicit enim Augustinus, in libro de octo quaestionibus Dulcitii, dolorem esse de amissione bonorum temporalium. Eadem ergo ratione, quilibet dolor ex amissione alicuius boni contingit.	Objection 1. It would seem that sorrow is caused by the loss of a good rather than by the presence of an evil. For Augustine says (De viii QQ. Dulcit. qu. 1) that sorrow is caused by the loss of temporal goods. Therefore, in like manner, every sorrow is caused by the loss of some good.
Iª-IIae q. 36 a. 1 arg. 2 Praeterea, supra dictum est quod dolor qui delectationi contrariatur, est de eodem de quo est delectatio. Sed delectatio est de bono, sicut supra dictum est. Ergo dolor est principaliter de amissione boni.	Objection 2. Further, it was said above (Question 35, Article 4) that the sorrow which is contrary to a pleasure, has the same object as that pleasure. But the object of pleasure is good, as stated above (23, 4; 31, 1; 35, 3). Therefore sorrow is caused chiefly by the loss of good.
Iª-IIae q. 36 a. 1 arg. 3 Praeterea, secundum Augustinum, XIV de Civ. Dei, amor est causa tristitiae, sicut et aliarum affectionum animae. Sed obiectum amoris est bonum. Ergo dolor vel tristitia magis respicit bonum amissum quam malum coniunctum.	Objection 3. Further, according to Augustine (De Civ. Dei xiv, 7,9), love is the cause of sorrow, as of the other emotions of the soul. But the object of love is good. Therefore pain or sorrow is felt for the loss of good rather than for an evil that is present.
Iª-IIae q. 36 a. 1 s. c. Sed contra est quod Damascenus dicit, in II libro, quod expectatum malum timorem constituit, praesens vero tristitiam.	On the contrary, Damascene says (De Fide Orth. ii, 12) that "the dreaded evil gives rise to fear, the present evil is the cause of sorrow."
Iª-IIae q. 36 a. 1 co. Respondeo dicendum quod, si hoc modo se haberent privationes in apprehensione animae, sicut se habent in ipsis rebus, ista quaestio nullius momenti esse videretur. Malum enim, ut in primo libro habitum est, est privatio boni, privatio autem, in rerum natura, nihil est aliud quam carentia oppositi habitus, secundum hoc ergo, idem esset tristari de bono amisso, et de malo habito. Sed tristitia est motus appetitus apprehensionem sequentis. In apprehensione autem ipsa privatio habet rationem cuiusdam entis, unde dicitur ens rationis. Et sic malum, cum sit privatio, se habet per modum contrarii. Et ideo, quantum ad motum appetitivum, differt utrum respiciat principalius malum coniunctum, vel bonum amissum. Et quia motus appetitus animalis hoc modo se habet in operibus animae, sicut motus naturalis in rebus naturalibus; ex consideratione naturalium motuum veritas accipi potest. Si enim accipiamus in motibus naturalibus accessum et recessum, accessus per se respicit id quod est conveniens naturae; recessus autem per se respicit id quod est contrarium; sicut grave per se recedit a loco superiori, accedit autem naturaliter ad locum inferiorem. Sed si accipiamus causam utriusque motus, scilicet gravitatem, ipsa gravitas per prius inclinat ad locum deorsum, quam retrahat a loco sursum, a quo recedit ut deorsum tendat. Sic igitur, cum tristitia in motibus appetitivis se habeat per modum fugae vel recessus, delectatio autem per modum prosecutionis vel accessus; sicut delectatio per prius respicit bonum adeptum, quasi proprium obiectum, ita tristitia respicit malum coniunctum. Sed causa delectationis et tristitiae, scilicet amor, per prius respicit bonum quam malum. Sic ergo eo modo quo obiectum est causa passionis, magis proprie est causa tristitiae vel doloris malum coniunctum, quam bonum amissum.	I answer that, If privations, as considered by the mind, were what they are in reality, this question would seem to be of no importance. For, as stated in the I, 14, 10 and I, 48, 3, evil is the privation of good: and privation is in reality nothing else than the lack of the contrary habit; so that, in this respect, to sorrow for the loss of good, would be the same as to sorrow for the presence of evil. But sorrow is a movement of the appetite in consequence of an apprehension: and even a privation, as apprehended, has the aspect of a being, wherefore it is called "a being of reason." And in this way evil, being a privation, is regarded as a "contrary." Accordingly, so far as the movement of the appetite is concerned, it makes a difference which of the two it regards chiefly, the present evil or the good which is lost. Again, since the movement of the animal appetite holds the same place in the actions of the soul, as natural movement in natural things; the truth of the matter is to be found by considering natural movements. For if, in natural movements, we observe those of approach and withdrawal, approach is of itself directed to something suitable to nature; while withdrawal is of itself directed to something contrary to nature; thus a heavy body, of itself, withdraws from a higher place, and approaches naturally to a lower place. But if we consider the cause of both these movements, viz. gravity, then gravity itself inclines towards the lower place more than it withdraws from the higher place, since withdrawal from the latter is the reason for its downward tendency. Accordingly, since, in the movements of the appetite, sorrow is a kind of flight or withdrawal, while pleasure is a kind of pursuit or approach; just as pleasure regards first the good possessed, as its proper object, so sorrow regards the evil that is present. On the other hand love, which is the cause of pleasure and sorrow, regards good rather than evil: and therefore, forasmuch as the object is the cause of a passion, the present evil is more properly the cause of sorrow or pain, than the good which is lost.
Iª-IIae q. 36 a. 1 ad 1 Ad primum ergo dicendum quod ipsa amissio boni apprehenditur sub ratione mali, sicut et amissio mali apprehenditur sub ratione boni. Et ideo Augustinus dicit dolorem provenire ex amissione temporalium bonorum.	Reply to Objection 1. The loss itself of good is apprehended as an evil, just as the loss of evil is apprehended as a good: and in this sense Augustine says that pain results from the loss of temporal goods.
Iª-IIae q. 36 a. 1 ad 2 Ad secundum dicendum quod delectatio et dolor ei contrarius respiciunt idem, sed sub contraria ratione, nam si delectatio est de praesentia alicuius, tristitia est de absentia eiusdem. In uno autem contrariorum includitur privatio alterius, ut patet in X Metaphys. Et inde est quod tristitia quae est de contrario, est quodammodo de eodem sub contraria ratione.	Reply to Objection 2. Pleasure and its contrary pain have the same object, but under contrary aspects: because if the presence of a particular thin be the object of pleasure, the absence of that same thing is the object of sorrow. Now one contrary includes the privation of the other, as stated in Metaph. x, 4: and consequently sorrow in respect of one contrary is, in a way, directed to the same thing under a contrary aspect.
Iª-IIae q. 36 a. 1 ad 3 Ad tertium dicendum quod, quando ex una causa proveniunt multi motus, non oportet quod omnes principalius respiciant illud quod principalius respicit causa, sed primus tantum. Unusquisque autem aliorum principalius respicit illud quod est ei conveniens secundum propriam rationem.	Reply to Objection 3. When many movements arise from one cause, it does not follow that they all regard chiefly that which the cause regards chiefly, but only the first of them. And each of the others regards chiefly that which is suitable to it according to its own nature.
Iª-IIae q. 36 a. 2 arg. 1 Ad secundum sic proceditur. Videtur quod concupiscentia non sit causa doloris seu tristitiae. Tristitia enim per se respicit malum, ut dictum est. Concupiscentia autem est motus quidam appetitus in bonum. Motus autem qui est in unum contrarium, non est causa motus qui respicit aliud contrarium. Ergo concupiscentia non est causa doloris.	Objection 1. It would seem that desire is not a cause of pain or sorrow. Because sorrow of itself regards evil, as stated above (Article 1): whereas desire is a movement of the appetite towards good. Now movement towards one contrary is not a cause of movement towards the other contrary. Therefore desire is not a cause of pain.
Iª-IIae q. 36 a. 2 arg. 2 Praeterea, dolor, secundum Damascenum, est de praesenti, concupiscentia autem est de futuro. Ergo concupiscentia non est causa doloris.	Objection 2. Further, pain, according to Damascene (De Fide Orth. ii, 12), is caused by something present; whereas the object of desire is something future. Therefore desire is not a cause of pain.
Iª-IIae q. 36 a. 2 arg. 3 Praeterea, id quod est per se delectabile, non est causa doloris. Sed concupiscentia est secundum seipsam delectabilis, ut philosophus dicit, in I Rhetoric. Ergo concupiscentia non est causa doloris seu tristitiae.	Objection 3. Further, that which is pleasant in itself is not a cause of pain. But desire is pleasant in itself, as the Philosopher says (Rhet. i, 11). Therefore desire is not a cause of pain or sorrow.
Iª-IIae q. 36 a. 2 s. c. Sed contra est quod Augustinus dicit, in Enchirid., subintrantibus ignorantia agendarum rerum, et concupiscentia noxiarum, comites subinferuntur error et dolor. Sed ignorantia est causa erroris. Ergo concupiscentia est causa doloris.	On the contrary, Augustine says (Enchiridion xxiv): "When ignorance of things necessary to be done, and desire of things hurtful, found their way in: error and pain stole an entrance in their company." But ignorance is the cause of error. Therefore desire is a cause of sorrow.
Iª-IIae q. 36 a. 2 co. Respondeo dicendum quod tristitia est motus quidam appetitus animalis. Motus autem appetitivus habet, sicut dictum est, similitudinem appetitus naturalis. Cuius duplex causa assignari potest, una per modum finis; alia sicut unde est principium motus. Sicut descensionis corporis gravis causa sicut finis, est locus deorsum, principium autem motus est inclinatio naturalis, quae est ex gravitate. Causa autem motus appetitivi per modum finis, est eius obiectum. Et sic supra dictum est quod causa doloris seu tristitiae est malum coniunctum. Causa autem sicut unde est principium talis motus, est interior inclinatio appetitus. Qui quidem per prius inclinatur ad bonum; et ex consequenti ad repudiandum malum contrarium. Et ideo huiusmodi motus appetitivi primum principium est amor, qui est prima inclinatio appetitus ad bonum consequendum, secundum autem principium est odium, quod est inclinatio prima appetitus ad malum fugiendum. Sed quia concupiscentia vel cupiditas est primus effectus amoris, quo maxime delectamur, ut supra dictum est; ideo frequenter Augustinus cupiditatem vel concupiscentiam pro amore ponit, ut etiam supra dictum est. Et hoc modo concupiscentiam dicit esse universalem causam doloris. Sed ipsa concupiscentia, secundum propriam rationem considerata, est interdum causa doloris. Omne enim quod impedit motum ne perveniat ad terminum, est contrarium motui. Illud autem quod est contrarium motui appetitus, est contristans. Et sic per consequens concupiscentia fit causa tristitiae, inquantum de retardatione boni concupiti, vel totali ablatione, tristamur. Universalis autem causa doloris esse non potest, quia magis dolemus de subtractione bonorum praesentium, in quibus iam delectamur, quam futurorum, quae concupiscimus.	I answer that, Sorrow is a movement of the animal appetite. Now, as stated above (Article 1), the appetitive movement is likened to the natural appetite; a likeness, that may be assigned to a twofold cause; one, on the part of the end, the other, on the part of the principle of movement. Thus, on the part of the end, the cause of a heavy body's downward movement is the lower place; while the principle of that movement is a natural inclination resulting from gravity. Now the cause of the appetitive movement, on the part of the end, is the object of that movement. And thus, it has been said above (Article 1) that the cause of pain or sorrow is a present evil. On the other hand, the cause, by way or principle, of that movement, is the inward inclination of the appetite; which inclination regards, first of all, the good, and in consequence, the rejection of a contrary evil. Hence the first principle of this appetitive movement is love, which is the first inclination of the appetite towards the possession of good: while the second principle is hatred, which is the first inclination of the appetite towards the avoidance of evil. But since concupiscence or desire is the first effect of love, which gives rise to the greatest pleasure, as stated above (Question 32, Article 6); hence it is that Augustine often speaks of desire or concupiscence in the sense of love, as was also stated (30, 2, ad 2): and in this sense he says that desire is the universal cause of sorrow. Sometimes, however, desire taken in its proper sense, is the cause of sorrow. Because whatever hinders a movement from reaching its end is contrary to that movement. Now that which is contrary to the movement of the appetite, is a cause of sorrow. Consequently, desire becomes a cause of sorrow, in so far as we sorrow for the delay of a desired good, or for its entire removal. But it cannot be a universal cause of sorrow: since we sorrow more for the loss of present good, in which we have already taken pleasure, than for the withdrawal of future good which we desire to have.
Iª-IIae q. 36 a. 2 ad 1 Ad primum ergo dicendum quod inclinatio appetitus ad bonum consequendum, est causa inclinationis appetitus ad malum fugiendum, sicut dictum est. Et ex hoc contingit quod motus appetitivi qui respiciunt bonum, ponuntur causa motuum appetitus qui respiciunt malum.	Reply to Objection 1. The inclination of the appetite to the possession of good causes the inclination of the appetite to fly from evil, as stated above. And hence it is that the appetitive movements that regard good, are reckoned as causing the appetitive movements that regard evil.
Iª-IIae q. 36 a. 2 ad 2 Ad secundum dicendum quod illud quod concupiscitur, etsi realiter sit futurum, est tamen quodammodo praesens, inquantum speratur. Vel potest dici quod, licet ipsum bonum concupitum sit futurum, tamen impedimentum praesentialiter apponitur, quod dolorem causat.	Reply to Objection 2. That which is desired, though really future, is, nevertheless, in a way, present, inasmuch as it is hoped for. Or we may say that although the desired good itself is future, yet the hindrance is reckoned as present, and so gives rise to sorrow.
Iª-IIae q. 36 a. 2 ad 3 Ad tertium dicendum quod concupiscentia est delectabilis, quandiu manet spes adipiscendi quod concupiscitur. Sed, subtracta spe per impedimentum appositum, concupiscentia dolorem causat.	Reply to Objection 3. Desire gives pleasure, so long as there is hope of obtaining that which is desired. But, when hope is removed through the presence of an obstacle, desire causes sorrow.
Iª-IIae q. 36 a. 3 arg. 1 Ad tertium sic proceditur. Videtur quod appetitus unitatis non sit causa doloris. Dicit enim philosophus, in X Ethic., quod haec opinio, quae posuit repletionem esse causam delectationis, et incisionem causam tristitiae, videtur esse facta ex delectationibus et tristitiis quae sunt circa cibum. Sed non omnis delectatio vel tristitia est huiusmodi. Ergo appetitus unitatis non est causa universalis doloris, cum repletio ad unitatem pertineat, incisio vero multitudinem inducat.	Objection 1. It would seem that the craving for unity is not a cause of sorrow. For the Philosopher says (Ethic. x, 3) that "this opinion," which held repletion to be the cause of pleasure, and division [Aristotle wrote endeian, 'want'; St. Thomas, in the Latin version, read 'incisionem'; should he have read 'indigentiam'?], the cause of sorrow, "seems to have originated in pains and pleasures connected with food." But not every pleasure or sorrow is of this kind. Therefore the craving for unity is not the universal cause of sorrow; since repletion pertains to unity, and division is the cause of multitude.
Iª-IIae q. 36 a. 3 arg. 2 Praeterea, quaelibet separatio unitati opponitur. Si ergo dolor causaretur ex appetitu unitatis, nulla separatio esset delectabilis. Quod patet esse falsum in separatione omnium superfluorum.	Objection 2. Further, every separation is opposed to unity. If therefore sorrow were caused by a craving for unity, no separation would be pleasant: and this is clearly untrue as regards the separation of whatever is superfluous.
Iª-IIae q. 36 a. 3 arg. 3 Praeterea, eadem ratione appetimus coniunctionem boni, et remotionem mali. Sed sicut coniunctio pertinet ad unitatem, cum sit unio quaedam; ita separatio est contrarium unitati. Ergo appetitus unitatis non magis debet poni causa doloris quam appetitus separationis.	Objection 3. Further, for the same reason we desire the conjunction of good and the removal of evil. But as conjunction regards unity, since it is a kind of union; so separation is contrary to unity. Therefore the craving for unity should not be reckoned, rather than the craving for separation, as causing sorrow.
Iª-IIae q. 36 a. 3 s. c. Sed contra est quod Augustinus dicit, in III de libero arbitrio, quod ex dolore quem bestiae sentiunt, satis apparet in regendis animandisque suis corporibus, quam sint animae appetentes unitatis. Quid enim est aliud dolor, nisi quidam sensus divisionis vel corruptionis impatiens?	On the contrary, Augustine says (De Lib. Arb. iii, 23), that "from the pain that dumb animals feel, it is quite evident how their souls desire unity, in ruling and quickening their bodies. For what else is pain but a feeling of impatience of division or corruption?"
Iª-IIae q. 36 a. 3 co. Respondeo dicendum quod eo modo quo concupiscentia vel cupiditas boni est causa doloris, etiam appetitus unitatis, vel amor, causa doloris ponendus est. Bonum enim uniuscuiusque rei in quadam unitate consistit, prout scilicet unaquaeque res habet in se unita illa ex quibus consistit eius perfectio, unde et Platonici posuerunt unum esse principium, sicut et bonum. Unde naturaliter unumquodque appetit unitatem, sicut et bonitatem. Et propter hoc, sicut amor vel appetitus boni est causa doloris, ita etiam amor vel appetitus unitatis.	I answer that, Forasmuch as the desire or craving for good is reckoned as a cause of sorrow, so must a craving for unity, and love, be accounted as causing sorrow. Because the good of each thing consists in a certain unity, inasmuch as each thing has, united in itself, the elements of which its perfection consists: wherefore the Platonists held that "one" is a principle, just as "good" is. Hence everything naturally desires unity, just as it desires goodness: and therefore, just as love or desire for good is a cause of sorrow, so also is the love or craving for unity.
Iª-IIae q. 36 a. 3 ad 1 Ad primum ergo dicendum quod non omnis unio perficit rationem boni, sed solum illa a qua dependet esse perfectum rei. Et propter hoc etiam, non cuiuslibet appetitus unitatis est causa doloris vel tristitiae, ut quidam opinabantur. Quorum opinionem ibi philosophus excludit per hoc, quod quaedam repletiones non sunt delectabiles, sicut repleti cibis non delectantur in ciborum sumptione. Talis enim repletio, sive unio, magis repugnaret ad perfectum esse, quam ipsum constitueret. Unde dolor non causatur ex appetitu cuiuslibet unitatis, sed eius in qua consistit perfectio naturae.	Reply to Objection 1. Not every kind of union causes perfect goodness, but only that on which the perfect being of a thing depends. Hence neither does the desire of any kind of unity cause pain or sorrow, as some have maintained: whose opinion is refuted by the Philosopher from the fact that repletion is not always pleasant; for instance, when a man has eaten to repletion, he takes no further pleasure in eating; because repletion or union of this kind, is repugnant rather than conducive to perfect being. Consequently sorrow is caused by the craving, not for any kind of unity, but for that unity in which the perfection of nature consists.
Iª-IIae q. 36 a. 3 ad 2 Ad secundum dicendum quod separatio potest esse delectabilis, vel inquantum removetur illud quod est contrarium perfectioni rei, vel inquantum separatio habet aliquam unionem adiunctam, puta sensibilis ad sensum.	Reply to Objection 2. Separation can be pleasant, either because it removes something contrary to a thing's perfection, or because it has some union connected with it, such as union of the sense to its object.
Iª-IIae q. 36 a. 3 ad 3 Ad tertium dicendum quod separatio nocivorum et corrumpentium appetitur, inquantum tollunt debitam unitatem. Unde appetitus huiusmodi separationis non est prima causa doloris, sed magis appetitus unitatis.	Reply to Objection 3. Separation from things hurtful and corruptive is desired, in so far as they destroy the unity which is due. Wherefore the desire for such like separation is not the first cause of sorrow, whereas the craving for unity is.
Iª-IIae q. 36 a. 4 arg. 1 Ad quartum sic proceditur. Videtur quod potestas maior non debeat poni causa doloris. Quod enim est in potestate agentis, nondum est praesens, sed futurum. Dolor autem est de malo praesenti. Ergo potestas maior non est causa doloris.	Objection 1. It would seem that a greater power should not be reckoned a cause of sorrow. For that which is in the power of the agent is not present but future. But sorrow is for present evil. Therefore a greater power is not a cause of sorrow.
Iª-IIae q. 36 a. 4 arg. 2 Praeterea, nocumentum illatum est causa doloris. Sed nocumentum potest inferri etiam a potestate minore. Ergo potestas maior non debet poni causa doloris.	Objection 2. Further, hurt inflicted is the cause of sorrow. But hurt can be inflicted even by a lesser power. Therefore a greater power should not be reckoned as a cause of sorrow.
Iª-IIae q. 36 a. 4 arg. 3 Praeterea, causae appetitivorum motuum sunt interiores inclinationes animae. Potestas autem maior est aliquid exterius. Ergo non debet poni causa doloris.	Objection 3. Further, the interior inclinations of the soul are the causes of the movements of appetite. But a greater power is something external. Therefore it should not be reckoned as a cause of sorrow.
Iª-IIae q. 36 a. 4 s. c. Sed contra est quod Augustinus dicit, in libro de natura boni, in animo dolorem facit voluntas resistens potestati maiori; in corpore dolorem facit sensus resistens corpori potentiori.	On the contrary, Augustine says (De Nat. Boni xx): "Sorrow in the soul is caused by the will resisting a stronger power: while pain in the body is caused by sense resisting a stronger body."
Iª-IIae q. 36 a. 4 co. Respondeo dicendum quod, sicut supra dictum est, malum coniunctum est causa doloris vel tristitiae per modum obiecti. Id ergo quod est causa coniunctionis mali, debet poni causa doloris vel tristitiae. Manifestum est autem hoc esse contra inclinationem appetitus, ut malo praesentialiter inhaereat. Quod autem est contra inclinationem alicuius, nunquam advenit ei nisi per actionem alicuius fortioris. Et ideo potestas maior ponitur esse causa doloris ab Augustino. Sed sciendum est quod, si potestas fortior intantum invalescat quod mutet contrariam inclinationem in inclinationem propriam, iam non erit aliqua repugnantia vel violentia, sicut quando agens fortius, corrumpendo corpus grave, aufert ei inclinationem qua tendit deorsum; et tunc ferri sursum non est ei violentum, sed naturale. Sic igitur si aliqua potestas maior intantum invalescat quod auferat inclinationem voluntatis vel appetitus sensitivi, ex ea non sequitur dolor vel tristitia, sed tunc solum sequitur, quando remanet inclinatio appetitus in contrarium. Et inde est quod Augustinus dicit quod voluntas resistens potestati fortiori, causat dolorem, si enim non resisteret, sed cederet consentiendo, non sequeretur dolor, sed delectatio.	I answer that, As stated above (Article 1), a present evil, is cause of sorrow or pain, by way of object. Therefore that which is the cause of the evil being present, should be reckoned as causing pain or sorrow. Now it is evident that it is contrary to the inclination of the appetite to be united with a present evil: and whatever is contrary to a thing's inclination does not happen to it save by the action of something stronger. Wherefore Augustine reckons a greater power as being the cause of sorrow. But it must be noted that if the stronger power goes so far as to transform the contrary inclination into its own inclination there will be no longer repugnance or violence: thus if a stronger agent, by its action on a heavy body, deprives it of its downward tendency, its consequent upward tendency is not violent but natural to it. Accordingly if some greater power prevail so far as to take away from the will or the sensitive appetite, their respective inclinations, pain or sorrow will not result therefrom; such is the result only when the contrary inclination of the appetite remains. And hence Augustine says (De Nat. Boni xx) that sorrow is caused by the will "resisting a stronger power": for were it not to resist, but to yield by consenting, the result would be not sorrow but pleasure.
Iª-IIae q. 36 a. 4 ad 1 Ad primum ergo dicendum quod maior potestas dolorem causat, non secundum quod est agens in potentia, sed secundum quod est agens actu, dum scilicet facit coniunctionem mali corruptivi.	Reply to Objection 1. A greater power causes sorrow, as acting not potentially but actually, i.e. by causing the actual presence of the corruptive evil.
Iª-IIae q. 36 a. 4 ad 2 Ad secundum dicendum quod nihil prohibet aliquam potestatem quae non est maior simpliciter, esse maiorem quantum ad aliquid. Et secundum hoc, aliquod nocumentum inferre potest. Si autem nullo modo maior esset, nullo modo posset nocere. Unde non posset causam doloris inferre.	Reply to Objection 2. Nothing hinders a power which is not simply greater, from being greater in some respect: and accordingly it is able to inflict some harm. But if it be nowise stronger, it can do no harm at all: wherefore it cannot bring about that which causes sorrow.
Iª-IIae q. 36 a. 4 ad 3 Ad tertium dicendum quod exteriora agentia possunt esse causa motuum appetitivorum, inquantum causant praesentiam obiecti. Et hoc modo potestas maior ponitur causa doloris.	Reply to Objection 3. External agents can be the causes of appetitive movements, in so far as they cause the presence of the object: and it is thus that a greater power is reckoned to be the cause of sorrow.