Authors/Thomas Aquinas/Summa Theologiae/Part IIa/Q18

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Q17 Q19



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Iª-IIae q. 18 a. 1 arg. 1 Ad primum sic proceditur. Videtur quod omnis actio hominis sit bona, et nulla sit mala. Dicit enim Dionysius, IV cap. de Div. Nom., quod malum non agit nisi virtute boni. Sed virtute boni non fit malum. Ergo nulla actio est mala. Objection 1. It would seem that every human action is good, and that none is evil. For Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv) that evil acts not, save in virtue of the good. But no evil is done in virtue of the good. Therefore no action is evil.
Iª-IIae q. 18 a. 1 arg. 2 Praeterea, nihil agit nisi secundum quod est actu. Non est autem aliquid malum secundum quod est actu, sed secundum quod potentia privatur actu, inquantum autem potentia perficitur per actum, est bonum, ut dicitur in IX Metaphys. Nihil ergo agit inquantum est malum, sed solum inquantum est bonum. Omnis ergo actio est bona, et nulla mala. Objection 2. Further, nothing acts except in so far as it is in act. Now a thing is evil, not according as it is in act, but according as its potentiality is void of act; whereas in so far as its potentiality is perfected by act, it is good, as stated in Metaph. ix, 9. Therefore nothing acts in so far as it is evil, but only according as it is good. Therefore every action is good, and none is evil.
Iª-IIae q. 18 a. 1 arg. 3 Praeterea, malum non potest esse causa nisi per accidens, ut patet per Dionysium, IV cap. de Div. Nom. Sed omnis actionis est aliquis per se effectus. Nulla ergo actio est mala, sed omnis actio est bona. Objection 3. Further, evil cannot be a cause, save accidentally, as Dionysius declares (Div. Nom. iv). But every action has some effect which is proper to it. Therefore no action is evil, but every action is good.
Iª-IIae q. 18 a. 1 s. c. Sed contra est quod dominus dicit, Ioan. III, omnis qui male agit, odit lucem. Est ergo aliqua actio hominis mala. On the contrary, Our Lord said (John 3:20): "Every one that doth evil, hateth the light." Therefore some actions of man are evil.
Iª-IIae q. 18 a. 1 co. Respondeo dicendum quod de bono et malo in actionibus oportet loqui sicut de bono et malo in rebus, eo quod unaquaeque res talem actionem producit, qualis est ipsa. In rebus autem unumquodque tantum habet de bono, quantum habet de esse, bonum enim et ens convertuntur, ut in primo dictum est. Solus autem Deus habet totam plenitudinem sui esse secundum aliquid unum et simplex, unaquaeque vero res alia habet plenitudinem essendi sibi convenientem secundum diversa. Unde in aliquibus contingit quod quantum ad aliquid habent esse, et tamen eis aliquid deficit ad plenitudinem essendi eis debitam. Sicut ad plenitudinem esse humani requiritur quod sit quoddam compositum ex anima et corpore, habens omnes potentias et instrumenta cognitionis et motus, unde si aliquid horum deficiat alicui homini deficit ei aliquid de plenitudine sui esse. Quantum igitur habet de esse, tantum habet de bonitate, inquantum vero aliquid ei deficit de plenitudine essendi, intantum deficit a bonitate, et dicitur malum, sicut homo caecus habet de bonitate quod vivit, et malum est ei quod caret visu. Si vero nihil haberet de entitate vel bonitate, neque malum neque bonum dici posset. Sed quia de ratione boni est ipsa plenitudo essendi, si quidem alicui aliquid defuerit de debita essendi plenitudine, non dicetur simpliciter bonum, sed secundum quid, inquantum est ens, poterit tamen dici simpliciter ens et secundum quid non ens, ut in primo dictum est. Sic igitur dicendum est quod omnis actio, inquantum habet aliquid de esse, intantum habet de bonitate, inquantum vero deficit ei aliquid de plenitudine essendi quae debetur actioni humanae, intantum deficit a bonitate, et sic dicitur mala, puta si deficiat ei vel determinata quantitas secundum rationem, vel debitus locus, vel aliquid huiusmodi. I answer that, We must speak of good and evil in actions as of good and evil in things: because such as everything is, such is the act that it produces. Now in things, each one has so much good as it has being: since good and being are convertible, as was stated in the I, 5, 1,3. But God alone has the whole plenitude of His Being in a certain unity: whereas every other thing has its proper fulness of being in a certain multiplicity. Wherefore it happens with some things, that they have being in some respect, and yet they are lacking in the fulness of being due to them. Thus the fulness of human being requires a compound of soul and body, having all the powers and instruments of knowledge and movement: wherefore if any man be lacking in any of these, he is lacking in something due to the fulness of his being. So that as much as he has of being, so much has he of goodness: while so far as he is lacking in goodness, and is said to be evil: thus a blind man is possessed of goodness inasmuch as he lives; and of evil, inasmuch as he lacks sight. That, however, which has nothing of being or goodness, could not be said to be either evil or good. But since this same fulness of being is of the very essence of good, if a thing be lacking in its due fulness of being, it is not said to be good simply, but in a certain respect, inasmuch as it is a being; although it can be called a being simply, and a non-being in a certain respect, as was stated in the I, 5, 1, ad 1. We must therefore say that every action has goodness, in so far as it has being; whereas it is lacking in goodness, in so far as it is lacking in something that is due to its fulness of being; and thus it is said to be evil: for instance if it lacks the quantity determined by reason, or its due place, or something of the kind.
Iª-IIae q. 18 a. 1 ad 1 Ad primum ergo dicendum quod malum agit in virtute boni deficientis. Si enim nihil esset ibi de bono, neque esset ens, neque agere posset. Si autem non esset deficiens, non esset malum. Unde et actio causata est quoddam bonum deficiens, quod secundum quid est bonum, simpliciter autem malum. Reply to Objection 1. Evil acts in virtue of deficient goodness. For it there were nothing of good there, there would be neither being nor possibility of action. On the other hand if good were not deficient, there would be no evil. Consequently the action done is a deficient good, which is good in a certain respect, but simply evil.
Iª-IIae q. 18 a. 1 ad 2 Ad secundum dicendum quod nihil prohibet aliquid esse secundum quid in actu, unde agere possit; et secundum aliud privari actu, unde causet deficientem actionem. Sicut homo caecus actu habet virtutem gressivam, per quam ambulare potest, sed inquantum caret visu, qui dirigit in ambulando, patitur defectum in ambulando, dum ambulat cespitando. Reply to Objection 2. Nothing hinders a thing from being in act in a certain respect, so that it can act; and in a certain respect deficient in act, so as to cause a deficient act. Thus a blind man has in act the power of walking, whereby he is able to walk; but inasmuch as he is deprived of sight he suffers a defect in walking by stumbling when he walks.
Iª-IIae q. 18 a. 1 ad 3 Ad tertium dicendum quod actio mala potest habere aliquem effectum per se, secundum id quod habet de bonitate et entitate. Sicut adulterium est causa generationis humanae, inquantum habet commixtionem maris et feminae, non autem inquantum caret ordine rationis. Reply to Objection 3. An evil action can have a proper effect, according to the goodness and being that it has. Thus adultery is the cause of human generation, inasmuch as it implies union of male and female, but not inasmuch as it lacks the order of reason.
Iª-IIae q. 18 a. 2 arg. 1 Ad secundum sic proceditur. Videtur quod actio non habeat bonitatem vel malitiam ex obiecto. Obiectum enim actionis est res. In rebus autem non est malum, sed in usu peccantium, ut Augustinus dicit in libro III de Doct. Christ. Ergo actio humana non habet bonitatem vel malitiam ex obiecto. Objection 1. It would seem that the good or evil of an action is not derived from its object. For the object of any action is a thing. But "evil is not in things, but in the sinner's use of them," as Augustine says (De Doctr. Christ. iii, 12). Therefore the good or evil of a human action is not derived from their object.
Iª-IIae q. 18 a. 2 arg. 2 Praeterea, obiectum comparatur ad actionem ut materia. Bonitas autem rei non est ex materia, sed magis ex forma, quae est actus. Ergo bonum et malum non est in actibus ex obiecto. Objection 2. Further, the object is compared to the action as its matter. But the goodness of a thing is not from its matter, but rather from the form, which is an act. Therefore good and evil in actions is not derived from their object.
Iª-IIae q. 18 a. 2 arg. 3 Praeterea, obiectum potentiae activae comparatur ad actionem sicut effectus ad causam. Sed bonitas causae non dependet ex effectu, sed magis e converso. Ergo actio humana non habet bonitatem vel malitiam ex obiecto. Objection 3. Further, the object of an active power is compared to the action as effect to cause. But the goodness of a cause does not depend on its effect; rather is it the reverse. Therefore good or evil in actions is not derived from their object.
Iª-IIae q. 18 a. 2 s. c. Sed contra est quod dicitur Osee IX, facti sunt abominabiles, sicut ea quae dilexerunt. Fit autem homo Deo abominabilis propter malitiam suae operationis. Ergo malitia operationis est secundum obiecta mala quae homo diligit. Et eadem ratio est de bonitate actionis. On the contrary, It is written (Hosea 9:10): "They became abominable as those things which they loved." Now man becomes abominable to God on account of the malice of his action. Therefore the malice of his action is according to the evil objects that man loves. And the same applies to the goodness of his action.
Iª-IIae q. 18 a. 2 co. Respondeo dicendum quod, sicut dictum est, bonum et malum actionis, sicut et ceterarum rerum, attenditur ex plenitudine essendi vel defectu ipsius. Primum autem quod ad plenitudinem essendi pertinere videtur, est id quod dat rei speciem. Sicut autem res naturalis habet speciem ex sua forma, ita actio habet speciem ex obiecto; sicut et motus ex termino. Et ideo sicut prima bonitas rei naturalis attenditur ex sua forma, quae dat speciem ei, ita et prima bonitas actus moralis attenditur ex obiecto convenienti; unde et a quibusdam vocatur bonum ex genere; puta, uti re sua. Et sicut in rebus naturalibus primum malum est, si res generata non consequitur formam specificam, puta si non generetur homo, sed aliquid loco hominis; ita primum malum in actionibus moralibus est quod est ex obiecto, sicut accipere aliena. Et dicitur malum ex genere, genere pro specie accepto, eo modo loquendi quo dicimus humanum genus totam humanam speciem. I answer that, as stated above (Article 1) the good or evil of an action, as of other things, depends on its fulness of being or its lack of that fulness. Now the first thing that belongs to the fulness of being seems to be that which gives a thing its species. And just as a natural thing has its species from its form, so an action has its species from its object, as movement from its term. And therefore just as the primary goodness of a natural thing is derived from its form, which gives it its species, so the primary goodness of a moral action is derived from its suitable object: hence some call such an action "good in its genus"; for instance, "to make use of what is one's own." And just as, in natural things, the primary evil is when a generated thing does not realize its specific form (for instance, if instead of a man, something else be generated); so the primary evil in moral actions is that which is from the object, for instance, "to take what belongs to another." And this action is said to be "evil in its genus," genus here standing for species, just as we apply the term "mankind" to the whole human species.
Iª-IIae q. 18 a. 2 ad 1 Ad primum ergo dicendum quod, licet res exteriores sint in seipsis bonae, tamen non semper habent debitam proportionem ad hanc vel illam actionem. Et ideo inquantum considerantur ut obiecta talium actionum, non habent rationem boni. Reply to Objection 1. Although external things are good in themselves, nevertheless they have not always a due proportion to this or that action. And so, inasmuch as they are considered as objects of such actions, they have not the quality of goodness.
Iª-IIae q. 18 a. 2 ad 2 Ad secundum dicendum quod obiectum non est materia ex qua, sed materia circa quam, et habet quodammodo rationem formae, inquantum dat speciem. Reply to Objection 2. The object is not the matter "of which" (a thing is made), but the matter "about which" (something is done); and stands in relation to the act as its form, as it were, through giving it its species.
Iª-IIae q. 18 a. 2 ad 3 Ad tertium dicendum quod non semper obiectum actionis humanae est obiectum activae potentiae. Nam appetitiva potentia est quodammodo passiva, inquantum movetur ab appetibili, et tamen est principium humanorum actuum. Neque etiam potentiarum activarum obiecta semper habent rationem effectus, sed quando iam sunt transmutata, sicut alimentum transmutatum est effectus nutritivae potentiae, sed alimentum nondum transmutatum comparatur ad potentiam nutritivam sicut materia circa quam operatur. Ex hoc autem quod obiectum est aliquo modo effectus potentiae activae, sequitur quod sit terminus actionis eius, et per consequens quod det ei formam et speciem, motus enim habet speciem a terminis. Et quamvis etiam bonitas actionis non causetur ex bonitate effectus, tamen ex hoc dicitur actio bona, quod bonum effectum inducere potest. Et ita ipsa proportio actionis ad effectum, est ratio bonitatis ipsius. Reply to Objection 3. The object of the human action is not always the object of an active power. For the appetitive power is, in a way, passive; in so far as it is moved by the appetible object; and yet it is a principle of human actions. Nor again have the objects of the active powers always the nature of an effect, but only when they are already transformed: thus food when transformed is the effect of the nutritive power; whereas food before being transformed stands in relation to the nutritive power as the matter about which it exercises its operation. Now since the object is in some way the effect of the active power, it follows that it is the term of its action, and consequently that it gives it its form and species, since movement derives its species from its term. Moreover, although the goodness of an action is not caused by the goodness of its effect, yet an action is said to be good from the fact that it can produce a good effect. Consequently the very proportion of an action to its effect is the measure of its goodness.
Iª-IIae q. 18 a. 3 arg. 1 Ad tertium sic proceditur. Videtur quod actio non sit bona vel mala ex circumstantia. Circumstantiae enim circumstant actum sicut extra ipsum existentes, ut dictum est. Sed bonum et malum sunt in ipsis rebus, ut dicitur in VI Metaphys. Ergo actio non habet bonitatem vel malitiam ex circumstantia. Objection 1. It would seem that an action is not good or evil from a circumstance. For circumstances stand around [circumstant] an action, as being outside it, as stated above (Question 7, Article 1). But "good and evil are in things themselves," as is stated in Metaph. vi, 4. Therefore an action does not derive goodness or malice from a circumstance.
Iª-IIae q. 18 a. 3 arg. 2 Praeterea, bonitas vel malitia actus maxime consideratur in doctrina morum. Sed circumstantiae, cum sint quaedam accidentia actuum, videntur esse praeter considerationem artis, quia nulla ars considerat id quod est per accidens, ut dicitur in VI Metaphys. Ergo bonitas vel malitia actionis non est ex circumstantia. Objection 2. Further, the goodness or malice of an action is considered principally in the doctrine of morals. But since circumstances are accidents of actions, it seems that they are outside the scope of art: because "no art takes notice of what is accidental" (Metaph. vi, 2). Therefore the goodness or malice of an action is not taken from a circumstance.
Iª-IIae q. 18 a. 3 arg. 3 Praeterea, id quod convenit alicui secundum suam substantiam, non attribuitur ei per aliquod accidens. Sed bonum et malum convenit actioni secundum suam substantiam, quia actio ex suo genere potest esse bona vel mala, ut dictum est. Ergo non convenit actioni ex circumstantia quod sit bona vel mala. Objection 3. Further, that which belongs to a thing, in respect of its substance, is not ascribed to it in respect of an accident. But good and evil belong to an action in respect of its substance; because an action can be good or evil in its genus as stated above (Article 2). Therefore an action is not good or bad from a circumstance.
Iª-IIae q. 18 a. 3 s. c. Sed contra est quod philosophus dicit, in libro Ethic., quod virtuosus operatur secundum quod oportet, et quando oportet, et secundum alias circumstantias. Ergo ex contrario vitiosus, secundum unumquodque vitium, operatur quando non oportet, ubi non oportet, et sic de aliis circumstantiis. Ergo actiones humanae secundum circumstantias sunt bonae vel malae. On the contrary, the Philosopher says (Ethic. ii, 3) that a virtuous man acts as he should, and when he should, and so on in respect of the other circumstances. Therefore, on the other hand, the vicious man, in the matter of each vice, acts when he should not, or where he should not, and so on with the other circumstances. Therefore human actions are good or evil according to circumstances.
Iª-IIae q. 18 a. 3 co. Respondeo dicendum quod in rebus naturalibus non invenitur tota plenitudo perfectionis quae debetur rei, ex forma substantiali, quae dat speciem; sed multum superadditur ex supervenientibus accidentibus, sicut in homine ex figura, ex colore, et huiusmodi; quorum si aliquod desit ad decentem habitudinem, consequitur malum. Ita etiam est in actione. Nam plenitudo bonitatis eius non tota consistit in sua specie, sed aliquid additur ex his quae adveniunt tanquam accidentia quaedam. Et huiusmodi sunt circumstantiae debitae. Unde si aliquid desit quod requiratur ad debitas circumstantias, erit actio mala. I answer that, In natural things, it is to be noted that the whole fulness of perfection due to a thing, is not from the mere substantial form, that gives it its species; since a thing derives much from supervening accidents, as man does from shape, color, and the like; and if any one of these accidents be out of due proportion, evil is the result. So it is with action. For the plenitude of its goodness does not consist wholly in its species, but also in certain additions which accrue to it by reason of certain accidents: and such are its due circumstances. Wherefore if something be wanting that is requisite as a due circumstance the action will be evil.
Iª-IIae q. 18 a. 3 ad 1 Ad primum ergo dicendum quod circumstantiae sunt extra actionem, inquantum non sunt de essentia actionis, sunt tamen in ipsa actione velut quaedam accidentia eius. Sicut et accidentia quae sunt in substantiis naturalibus, sunt extra essentias earum. Reply to Objection 1. Circumstances are outside an action, inasmuch as they are not part of its essence; but they are in an action as accidents thereof. Thus, too, accidents in natural substances are outside the essence.
Iª-IIae q. 18 a. 3 ad 2 Ad secundum dicendum quod non omnia accidentia per accidens se habent ad sua subiecta, sed quaedam sunt per se accidentia; quae in unaquaque arte considerantur. Et per hunc modum considerantur circumstantiae actuum in doctrina morali. Reply to Objection 2. Every accident is not accidentally in its subject; for some are proper accidents; and of these every art takes notice. And thus it is that the circumstances of actions are considered in the doctrine of morals.
Iª-IIae q. 18 a. 3 ad 3 Ad tertium dicendum quod, cum bonum convertatur cum ente, sicut ens dicitur secundum substantiam et secundum accidens, ita et bonum attribuitur alicui et secundum esse suum essentiale, et secundum esse accidentale, tam in rebus naturalibus, quam in actionibus moralibus. Reply to Objection 3. Since good and being are convertible; according as being is predicated of substance and of accident, so is good predicated of a thing both in respect of its essential being, and in respect of its accidental being; and this, both in natural things and in moral actions.
Iª-IIae q. 18 a. 4 arg. 1 Ad quartum sic proceditur. Videtur quod bonum et malum in actibus humanis non sint ex fine. Dicit enim Dionysius, IV cap. de Div. Nom., quod nihil respiciens ad malum operatur. Si igitur ex fine derivaretur operatio bona vel mala, nulla actio esset mala. Quod patet esse falsum. Objection 1. It would seem that the good and evil in human actions are not from the end. For Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv) that "nothing acts with a view to evil." If therefore an action were good or evil from its end, no action would be evil. Which is clearly false.
Iª-IIae q. 18 a. 4 arg. 2 Praeterea, bonitas actus est aliquid in ipso existens. Finis autem est causa extrinseca. Non ergo secundum finem dicitur actio bona vel mala. Objection 2. Further, the goodness of an action is something in the action. But the end is an extrinsic cause. Therefore an action is not said to be good or bad according to its end.
Iª-IIae q. 18 a. 4 arg. 3 Praeterea, contingit aliquam bonam operationem ad malum finem ordinari, sicut cum aliquis dat eleemosynam propter inanem gloriam, et e converso aliquam malam operationem ordinari ad bonum finem, sicut cum quis furatur ut det pauperi. Non ergo est ex fine actio bona vel mala. Objection 3. Further, a good action may happen to be ordained to an evil end, as when a man gives an alms from vainglory; and conversely, an evil action may happen to be ordained to a good end, as a theft committed in order to give something to the poor. Therefore an action is not good or evil from its end.
Iª-IIae q. 18 a. 4 s. c. Sed contra est quod Boetius dicit, in Topic., quod cuius finis bonus est, ipsum quoque bonum est, et cuius finis malus est, ipsum quoque malum est. On the contrary, Boethius says (De Differ. Topic. ii) that "if the end is good, the thing is good, and if the end be evil, the thing also is evil."
Iª-IIae q. 18 a. 4 co. Respondeo dicendum quod eadem est dispositio rerum in bonitate, et in esse. Sunt enim quaedam quorum esse ex alio non dependet, et in his sufficit considerare ipsum eorum esse absolute. Quaedam vero sunt quorum esse dependet ab alio, unde oportet quod consideretur per considerationem ad causam a qua dependet. Sicut autem esse rei dependet ab agente et forma, ita bonitas rei dependet a fine. Unde in personis divinis, quae non habent bonitatem dependentem ab alio, non consideratur aliqua ratio bonitatis ex fine. Actiones autem humanae, et alia quorum bonitas dependet ab alio, habent rationem bonitatis ex fine a quo dependent, praeter bonitatem absolutam quae in eis existit. Sic igitur in actione humana bonitas quadruplex considerari potest. Una quidem secundum genus, prout scilicet est actio, quia quantum habet de actione et entitate, tantum habet de bonitate, ut dictum est. Alia vero secundum speciem, quae accipitur secundum obiectum conveniens. Tertia secundum circumstantias, quasi secundum accidentia quaedam. Quarta autem secundum finem, quasi secundum habitudinem ad causam bonitatis. I answer that, The disposition of things as to goodness is the same as their disposition as to being. Now in some things the being does not depend on another, and in these it suffices to consider their being absolutely. But there are things the being of which depends on something else, and hence in their regard we must consider their being in its relation to the cause on which it depends. Now just as the being of a thing depends on the agent, and the form, so the goodness of a thing depends on its end. Hence in the Divine Persons, Whose goodness does not depend on another, the measure of goodness is not taken from the end. Whereas human actions, and other things, the goodness of which depends on something else, have a measure of goodness from the end on which they depend, besides that goodness which is in them absolutely. Accordingly a fourfold goodness may be considered in a human action. First, that which, as an action, it derives from its genus; because as much as it has of action and being so much has it of goodness, as stated above (Article 1). Secondly, it has goodness according to its species; which is derived from its suitable object. Thirdly, it has goodness from its circumstances, in respect, as it were, of its accidents. Fourthly, it has goodness from its end, to which it is compared as to the cause of its goodness.
Iª-IIae q. 18 a. 4 ad 1 Ad primum ergo dicendum quod bonum ad quod aliquis respiciens operatur, non semper est verum bonum; sed quandoque verum bonum, et quandoque apparens. Et secundum hoc, ex fine sequitur actio mala. Reply to Objection 1. The good in view of which one acts is not always a true good; but sometimes it is a true good, sometimes an apparent good. And in the latter event, an evil action results from the end in view.
Iª-IIae q. 18 a. 4 ad 2 Ad secundum dicendum quod, quamvis finis sit causa extrinseca, tamen debita proportio ad finem et relatio in ipsum, inhaeret actioni. Reply to Objection 2. Although the end is an extrinsic cause, nevertheless due proportion to the end, and relation to the end, are inherent to the action.
Iª-IIae q. 18 a. 4 ad 3 Ad tertium dicendum quod nihil prohibet actioni habenti unam praedictarum bonitatum, deesse aliam. Et secundum hoc, contingit actionem quae est bona secundum speciem suam vel secundum circumstantias, ordinari ad finem malum, et e converso. Non tamen est actio bona simpliciter, nisi omnes bonitates concurrant, quia quilibet singularis defectus causat malum, bonum autem causatur ex integra causa, ut Dionysius dicit, IV cap. de Div. Nom. Reply to Objection 3. Nothing hinders an action that is good in one of the way mentioned above, from lacking goodness in another way. And thus it may happen that an action which is good in its species or in its circumstances is ordained to an evil end, or vice versa. However, an action is not good simply, unless it is good in all those ways: since "evil results from any single defect, but good from the complete cause," as Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv).
Iª-IIae q. 18 a. 5 arg. 1 Ad quintum sic proceditur. Videtur quod actus morales non differant specie secundum bonum et malum. Bonum enim et malum in actibus invenitur conformiter rebus, ut dictum est. Sed in rebus bonum et malum non diversificant speciem, idem enim specie est homo bonus et malus. Ergo neque etiam bonum et malum in actibus diversificant speciem. Objection 1. It would seem that good and evil in moral actions do not make a difference of species. For the existence of good and evil in actions is in conformity with their existence in things, as stated above (Article 1). But good and evil do not make a specific difference in things; for a good man is specifically the same as a bad man. Therefore neither do they make a specific difference in actions.
Iª-IIae q. 18 a. 5 arg. 2 Praeterea, malum, cum sit privatio, est quoddam non ens. Sed non ens non potest esse differentia, secundum philosophum, in III Metaphys. Cum ergo differentia constituat speciem, videtur quod aliquis actus, ex hoc quod est malus, non constituatur in aliqua specie. Et ita bonum et malum non diversificant speciem humanorum actuum. Objection 2. Further, since evil is a privation, it is a non-being. But non-being cannot be a difference, according to the Philosopher (Metaph. iii, 3). Since therefore the difference constitutes the species, it seems that an action is not constituted in a species through being evil. Consequently good and evil do not diversify the species of human actions.
Iª-IIae q. 18 a. 5 arg. 3 Praeterea, diversorum actuum secundum speciem, diversi sunt effectus. Sed idem specie effectus potest consequi ex actu bono et malo, sicut homo generatur ex adulterio, et ex matrimoniali concubitu. Ergo actus bonus et malus non differunt specie. Objection 3. Further, acts that differ in species produce different effects. But the same specific effect results from a good and from an evil action: thus a man is born of adulterous or of lawful wedlock. Therefore good and evil actions do not differ in species.
Iª-IIae q. 18 a. 5 arg. 4 Praeterea, bonum et malum dicitur in actibus quandoque secundum circumstantiam, ut dictum est. Sed circumstantia, cum sit accidens, non dat speciem actui. Ergo actus humani non differunt specie propter bonitatem et malitiam. Objection 4. Further, actions are sometimes said to be good or bad from a circumstance, as stated above (Article 3). But since a circumstance is an accident, it does not give an action its species. Therefore human actions do not differ in species on account of their goodness or malice.
Iª-IIae q. 18 a. 5 s. c. Sed contra, secundum philosophum, in II Ethic., similes habitus similes actus reddunt. Sed habitus bonus et malus differunt specie, ut liberalitas et prodigalitas. Ergo et actus bonus et malus differunt specie. On the contrary, According to the Philosopher (Ethic ii. 1) "like habits produce like actions." But a good and a bad habit differ in species, as liberality and prodigality. Therefore also good and bad actions differ in species.
Iª-IIae q. 18 a. 5 co. Respondeo dicendum quod omnis actus speciem habet ex suo obiecto, sicut supra dictum est. Unde oportet quod aliqua differentia obiecti faciat diversitatem speciei in actibus. Est autem considerandum quod aliqua differentia obiecti facit differentiam speciei in actibus, secundum quod referuntur ad unum principium activum, quod non facit differentiam in actibus, secundum quod referuntur ad aliud principium activum. Quia nihil quod est per accidens, constituit speciem, sed solum quod est per se, potest autem aliqua differentia obiecti esse per se in comparatione ad unum activum principium, et per accidens in comparatione ad aliud; sicut cognoscere colorem et sonum, per se differunt per comparationem ad sensum, non autem per comparationem ad intellectum. In actibus autem humanis bonum et malum dicitur per comparationem ad rationem, quia, ut Dionysius dicit, IV cap. de Div. Nom., bonum hominis est secundum rationem esse, malum autem quod est praeter rationem. Unicuique enim rei est bonum quod convenit ei secundum suam formam; et malum quod est ei praeter ordinem suae formae. Patet ergo quod differentia boni et mali circa obiectum considerata, comparatur per se ad rationem, scilicet secundum quod obiectum est ei conveniens vel non conveniens. Dicuntur autem aliqui actus humani, vel morales, secundum quod sunt a ratione. Unde manifestum est quod bonum et malum diversificant speciem in actibus moralibus, differentiae enim per se diversificant speciem. I answer that, Every action derives its species from its object, as stated above (Article 2). Hence it follows that a difference of object causes a difference of species in actions. Now, it must be observed that a difference of objects causes a difference of species in actions, according as the latter are referred to one active principle, which does not cause a difference in actions, according as they are referred to another active principle. Because nothing accidental constitutes a species, but only that which is essential; and a difference of object may be essential in reference to one active principle, and accidental in reference to another. Thus to know color and to know sound, differ essentially in reference to sense, but not in reference to the intellect. Now in human actions, good and evil are predicated in reference to the reason; because as Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv), "the good of man is to be in accordance with reason," and evil is "to be against reason." For that is good for a thing which suits it in regard to its form; and evil, that which is against the order of its form. It is therefore evident that the difference of good and evil considered in reference to the object is an essential difference in relation to reason; that is to say, according as the object is suitable or unsuitable to reason. Now certain actions are called human or moral, inasmuch as they proceed from the reason. Consequently it is evident that good and evil diversify the species in human actions; since essential differences cause a difference of species.
Iª-IIae q. 18 a. 5 ad 1 Ad primum ergo dicendum quod etiam in rebus naturalibus bonum et malum, quod est secundum naturam et contra naturam, diversificant speciem naturae, corpus enim mortuum et corpus vivum non sunt eiusdem speciei. Et similiter bonum, inquantum est secundum rationem, et malum, inquantum est praeter rationem, diversificant speciem moris. Reply to Objection 1. Even in natural things, good and evil, inasmuch as something is according to nature, and something against nature, diversify the natural species; for a dead body and a living body are not of the same species. In like manner, good, inasmuch as it is in accord with reason, and evil, inasmuch as it is against reason, diversify the moral species.
Iª-IIae q. 18 a. 5 ad 2 Ad secundum dicendum quod malum importat privationem non absolutam, sed consequentem talem potentiam. Dicitur enim malus actus secundum suam speciem, non ex eo quod nullum habeat obiectum; sed quia habet obiectum non conveniens rationi, sicut tollere aliena. Unde inquantum obiectum est aliquid positive, potest constituere speciem mali actus. Reply to Objection 2. Evil implies privation, not absolute, but affecting some potentiality. For an action is said to be evil in its species, not because it has no object at all; but because it has an object in disaccord with reason, for instance, to appropriate another's property. Wherefore in so far as the object is something positive, it can constitute the species of an evil act.
Iª-IIae q. 18 a. 5 ad 3 Ad tertium dicendum quod actus coniugalis et adulterium, secundum quod comparantur ad rationem, differunt specie, et habent effectus specie differentes, quia unum eorum meretur laudem et praemium, aliud vituperium et poenam. Sed secundum quod comparantur ad potentiam generativam, non differunt specie. Et sic habent unum effectum secundum speciem. Reply to Objection 3. The conjugal act and adultery, as compared to reason, differ specifically and have effects specifically different; because the other deserves praise and reward, the other, blame and punishment. But as compared to the generative power, they do not differ in species; and thus they have one specific effect.
Iª-IIae q. 18 a. 5 ad 4 Ad quartum dicendum quod circumstantia quandoque sumitur ut differentia essentialis obiecti, secundum quod ad rationem comparatur, et tunc potest dare speciem actui morali. Et hoc oportet esse, quandocumque circumstantia transmutat actum de bonitate in malitiam, non enim circumstantia faceret actum malum, nisi per hoc quod rationi repugnat. Reply to Objection 4. A circumstance is sometimes taken as the essential difference of the object, as compared to reason; and then it can specify a moral act. And it must needs be so whenever a circumstance transforms an action from good to evil; for a circumstance would not make an action evil, except through being repugnant to reason.
Iª-IIae q. 18 a. 6 arg. 1 Ad sextum sic proceditur. Videtur quod bonum et malum quod est ex fine, non diversificent speciem in actibus. Actus enim habent speciem ex obiecto. Sed finis est praeter rationem obiecti. Ergo bonum et malum quod est ex fine, non diversificant speciem actus. Objection 1. It would seem that the good and evil which are from the end do not diversify the species of actions. For actions derive their species from the object. But the end is altogether apart from the object. Therefore the good and evil which are from the end do not diversify the species of an action.
Iª-IIae q. 18 a. 6 arg. 2 Praeterea, id quod est per accidens, non constituit speciem, ut dictum est. Sed accidit alicui actui quod ordinetur ad aliquem finem; sicut quod aliquis det eleemosynam propter inanem gloriam. Ergo secundum bonum et malum quod est ex fine, non diversificantur actus secundum speciem. Objection 2. Further, that which is accidental does not constitute the species, as stated above (Article 5). But it is accidental to an action to be ordained to some particular end; for instance, to give alms from vainglory. Therefore actions are not diversified as to species, according to the good and evil which are from the end.
Iª-IIae q. 18 a. 6 arg. 3 Praeterea, diversi actus secundum speciem, ad unum finem ordinari possunt, sicut ad finem inanis gloriae ordinari possunt actus diversarum virtutum, et diversorum vitiorum. Non ergo bonum et malum quod accipitur secundum finem, diversificat speciem actuum. Objection 3. Further, acts that differ in species, can be ordained to the same end: thus to the end of vainglory, actions of various virtues and vices can be ordained. Therefore the good and evil which are taken from the end, do not diversify the species of action.
Iª-IIae q. 18 a. 6 s. c. Sed contra est quod supra ostensum est, quod actus humani habent speciem a fine. Ergo bonum et malum quod accipitur secundum finem, diversificat speciem actuum. On the contrary, It has been shown above (Question 1, Article 3) that human actions derive their species from the end. Therefore good and evil in respect of the end diversify the species of actions.
Iª-IIae q. 18 a. 6 co. Respondeo dicendum quod aliqui actus dicuntur humani, inquantum sunt voluntarii, sicut supra dictum est. In actu autem voluntario invenitur duplex actus, scilicet actus interior voluntatis, et actus exterior, et uterque horum actuum habet suum obiectum. Finis autem proprie est obiectum interioris actus voluntarii, id autem circa quod est actio exterior, est obiectum eius. Sicut igitur actus exterior accipit speciem ab obiecto circa quod est; ita actus interior voluntatis accipit speciem a fine, sicut a proprio obiecto. Ita autem quod est ex parte voluntatis, se habet ut formale ad id quod est ex parte exterioris actus, quia voluntas utitur membris ad agendum, sicut instrumentis; neque actus exteriores habent rationem moralitatis, nisi inquantum sunt voluntarii. Et ideo actus humani species formaliter consideratur secundum finem, materialiter autem secundum obiectum exterioris actus. Unde philosophus dicit, in V Ethic., quod ille qui furatur ut committat adulterium, est, per se loquendo, magis adulter quam fur. I answer that, Certain actions are called human, inasmuch as they are voluntary, as stated above (Question 1, Article 1). Now, in a voluntary action, there is a twofold action, viz. the interior action of the will, and the external action: and each of these actions has its object. The end is properly the object of the interior act of the will: while the object of the external action, is that on which the action is brought to bear. Therefore just as the external action takes its species from the object on which it bears; so the interior act of the will takes its species from the end, as from its own proper object. Now that which is on the part of the will is formal in regard to that which is on the part of the external action: because the will uses the limbs to act as instruments; nor have external actions any measure of morality, save in so far as they are voluntary. Consequently the species of a human act is considered formally with regard to the end, but materially with regard to the object of the external action. Hence the Philosopher says (Ethic. v, 2) that "he who steals that he may commit adultery, is strictly speaking, more adulterer than thief."
Iª-IIae q. 18 a. 6 ad 1 Ad primum ergo dicendum quod etiam finis habet rationem obiecti, ut dictum est. Reply to Objection 1. The end also has the character of an object, as stated above.
Iª-IIae q. 18 a. 6 ad 2 Ad secundum dicendum quod ordinari ad talem finem, etsi accidat exteriori actui, non tamen accidit actui interiori voluntatis, qui comparatur ad exteriorem sicut formale ad materiale. Reply to Objection 2. Although it is accidental to the external action to be ordained to some particular end, it is not accidental to the interior act of the will, which act is compared to the external act, as form to matter.
Iª-IIae q. 18 a. 6 ad 3 Ad tertium dicendum quod quando multi actus specie differentes ordinantur ad unum finem, est quidem diversitas speciei ex parte exteriorum actuum; sed unitas speciei ex parte actus interioris. Reply to Objection 3. When many actions, differing in species, are ordained to the same end, there is indeed a diversity of species on the part of the external actions; but unity of species on the part of the internal action.
Iª-IIae q. 18 a. 7 arg. 1 Ad septimum sic proceditur. Videtur quod species bonitatis quae est ex fine, contineatur sub specie bonitatis quae est ex obiecto, sicut species sub genere, puta cum aliquis vult furari ut det eleemosynam. Actus enim habet speciem ex obiecto, ut dictum est. Sed impossibile est quod aliquid contineatur in aliqua alia specie, quae sub propria specie non continetur, quia idem non potest esse in diversis speciebus non subalternis. Ergo species quae est ex fine, continetur sub specie quae est ex obiecto. Objection 1. It would seem that the species of goodness derived from the end is contained under the species of goodness derived from the object, as a species is contained under its genus; for instance, when a man commits a theft in order to give alms. For an action takes its species from its object, as stated above (2,6). But it is impossible for a thing to be contained under another species, if this species be not contained under the proper species of that thing; because the same thing cannot be contained in different species that are not subordinate to one another. Therefore the species which is taken from the end, is contained under the species which is taken from the object.
Iª-IIae q. 18 a. 7 arg. 2 Praeterea, semper ultima differentia constituit speciem specialissimam. Sed differentia quae est ex fine, videtur esse posterior quam differentia quae est ex obiecto, quia finis habet rationem ultimi. Ergo species quae est ex fine, continetur sub specie quae est ex obiecto, sicut species specialissima. Objection 2. Further, the last difference always constitutes the most specific species. But the difference derived from the end seems to come after the difference derived from the object: because the end is something last. Therefore the species derived from the end, is contained under the species derived from the object, as its most specific species.
Iª-IIae q. 18 a. 7 arg. 3 Praeterea, quanto aliqua differentia est magis formalis, tanto magis est specialis, quia differentia comparatur ad genus ut forma ad materiam. Sed species quae est ex fine, est formalior ea quae est ex obiecto, ut dictum est. Ergo species quae est ex fine, continetur sub specie quae est ex obiecto, sicut species specialissima sub genere subalterno. Objection 3. Further, the more formal a difference is compared to genus, as form to matter. But the species derived from the end, is more formal than that which is derived from the object, as stated above (Article 6). Therefore the species derived from the end is contained under the species derived from the object, as the most specific species is contained under the subaltern genus.
Iª-IIae q. 18 a. 7 s. c. Sed contra, cuiuslibet generis sunt determinatae differentiae. Sed actus eiusdem speciei ex parte obiecti, potest ad infinitos fines ordinari, puta furtum ad infinita bona vel mala. Ergo species quae est ex fine, non continetur sub specie quae est ex obiecto, sicut sub genere. On the contrary, Each genus has its determinate differences. But an action of one same species on the part of its object, can be ordained to an infinite number of ends: for instance, theft can be ordained to an infinite number of good and bad ends. Therefore the species derived from the end is not contained under the species derived from the object, as under its genus.
Iª-IIae q. 18 a. 7 co. Respondeo dicendum quod obiectum exterioris actus dupliciter potest se habere ad finem voluntatis, uno modo, sicut per se ordinatum ad ipsum, sicut bene pugnare per se ordinatur ad victoriam; alio modo, per accidens, sicut accipere rem alienam per accidens ordinatur ad dandum eleemosynam. Oportet autem, ut philosophus dicit in VII Metaphys., quod differentiae dividentes aliquod genus, et constituentes speciem illius generis, per se dividant illud. Si autem per accidens, non recte procedit divisio, puta si quis dicat, animalium aliud rationale, aliud irrationale; et animalium irrationalium aliud alatum, aliud non alatum, alatum enim et non alatum non sunt per se determinativa eius quod est irrationale. Oportet autem sic dividere, animalium aliud habens pedes, aliud non habens pedes; et habentium pedes, aliud habet duos, aliud quatuor, aliud multos, haec enim per se determinant priorem differentiam. Sic igitur quando obiectum non est per se ordinatum ad finem, differentia specifica quae est ex obiecto, non est per se determinativa eius quae est ex fine, nec e converso. Unde una istarum specierum non est sub alia, sed tunc actus moralis est sub duabus speciebus quasi disparatis. Unde dicimus quod ille qui furatur ut moechetur, committit duas malitias in uno actu. Si vero obiectum per se ordinetur ad finem, una dictarum differentiarum est per se determinativa alterius. Unde una istarum specierum continebitur sub altera. Considerandum autem restat quae sub qua. Ad cuius evidentiam, primo considerandum est quod quanto aliqua differentia sumitur a forma magis particulari, tanto magis est specifica. Secundo, quod quanto agens est magis universale, tanto ex eo est forma magis universalis. Tertio, quod quanto aliquis finis est posterior, tanto respondet agenti universaliori, sicut victoria, quae est ultimus finis exercitus, est finis intentus a summo duce; ordinatio autem huius aciei vel illius, est finis intentus ab aliquo inferiorum ducum. Et ex istis sequitur quod differentia specifica quae est ex fine, est magis generalis; et differentia quae est ex obiecto per se ad talem finem ordinato, est specifica respectu eius. Voluntas enim, cuius proprium obiectum est finis, est universale motivum respectu omnium potentiarum animae, quarum propria obiecta sunt obiecta particularium actuum. I answer that, The object of the external act can stand in a twofold relation to the end of the will: first, as being of itself ordained thereto; thus to fight well is of itself ordained to victory; secondly, as being ordained thereto accidentally; thus to take what belongs to another is ordained accidentally to the giving of alms. Now the differences that divide a genus, and constitute the species of that genus, must, as the Philosopher says (Metaph. vii, 12), divide that genus essentially: and if they divide it accidentally, the division is incorrect: as, if one were to say: "Animals are divided into rational and irrational; and the irrational into animals with wings, and animals without wings"; for "winged" and "wingless" are not essential determinations of the irrational being. But the following division would be correct: "Some animals have feet, some have no feet: and of those that have feet, some have two feet, some four, some many": because the latter division is an essential determination of the former. Accordingly when the object is not of itself ordained to the end, the specific difference derived from the object is not an essential determination of the species derived from the end, nor is the reverse the case. Wherefore one of these species is not under the other; but then the moral action is contained under two species that are disparate, as it were. Consequently we say that he that commits theft for the sake of adultery, is guilty of a twofold malice in one action. On the other hand, if the object be of itself ordained to the end, one of these differences is an essential determination of the other. Wherefore one of these species will be contained under the other. It remains to be considered which of the two is contained under the other. In order to make this clear, we must first of all observe that the more particular the form is from which a difference is taken, the more specific is the difference. Secondly, that the more universal an agent is, the more universal a form does it cause. Thirdly, that the more remote an end is, the more universal the agent to which it corresponds; thus victory, which is the last end of the army, is the end intended by the commander in chief; while the right ordering of this or that regiment is the end intended by one of the lower officers. From all this it follows that the specific difference derived from the end, is more general; and that the difference derived from an object which of itself is ordained to that end, is a specific difference in relation to the former. For the will, the proper object of which is the end, is the universal mover in respect of all the powers of the soul, the proper objects of which are the objects of their particular acts.
Iª-IIae q. 18 a. 7 ad 1 Ad primum ergo dicendum quod secundum substantiam suam non potest aliquid esse in duabus speciebus, quarum una sub altera non ordinetur. Sed secundum ea quae rei adveniunt, potest aliquid sub diversis speciebus contineri. Sicut hoc pomum, secundum colorem, continetur sub hac specie, scilicet albi, et secundum odorem, sub specie bene redolentis. Et similiter actus qui secundum substantiam suam est in una specie naturae, secundum conditiones morales supervenientes, ad duas species referri potest, ut supra dictum est. Reply to Objection 1. One and the same thing, considered in its substance, cannot be in two species, one of which is not subordinate to the other. But in respect of those things which are superadded to the substance, one thing can be contained under different species. Thus one and the same fruit, as to its color, is contained under one species, i.e. a white thing: and, as to its perfume, under the species of sweet-smelling things. In like manner an action which, as to its substance, is in one natural species, considered in respect to the moral conditions that are added to it, can belong to two species, as stated above (1, 3, ad 3).
Iª-IIae q. 18 a. 7 ad 2 Ad secundum dicendum quod finis est postremum in executione; sed est primum in intentione rationis, secundum quam accipiuntur moralium actuum species. Reply to Objection 2. The end is last in execution; but first in the intention of the reason, in regard to which moral actions receive their species.
Iª-IIae q. 18 a. 7 ad 3 Ad tertium dicendum quod differentia comparatur ad genus ut forma ad materiam, inquantum facit esse genus in actu. Sed etiam genus consideratur ut formalius specie, secundum quod est absolutius, et minus contractum. Unde et partes definitionis reducuntur ad genus causae formalis, ut dicitur in libro Physic. Et secundum hoc, genus est causa formalis speciei, et tanto erit formalius, quanto communius. Reply to Objection 3. Difference is compared to genus as form to matter, inasmuch as it actualizes the genus. On the other hand, the genus is considered as more formal than the species, inasmuch as it is something more absolute and less contracted. Wherefore also the parts of a definition are reduced to the genus of formal cause, as is stated in Phys. ii, 3. And in this sense the genus is the formal cause of the species; and so much the more formal, as it is more universal.
Iª-IIae q. 18 a. 8 arg. 1 Ad octavum sic proceditur. Videtur quod non sit aliquis actus indifferens secundum suam speciem. Malum enim est privatio boni, secundum Augustinum. Sed privatio et habitus sunt opposita immediata, secundum philosophum. Ergo non est aliquis actus qui secundum speciem suam sit indifferens, quasi medium existens inter bonum et malum. Objection 1. It would seem that no action is indifferent in its species. For evil is the privation of good, according to Augustine (Enchiridion xi). But privation and habit are immediate contraries, according to the Philosopher (Categor. viii). Therefore there is not such thing as an action that is indifferent in its species, as though it were between good and evil.
Iª-IIae q. 18 a. 8 arg. 2 Praeterea, actus humani habent speciem a fine vel obiecto, ut dictum est. Sed omne obiectum, et omnis finis habet rationem boni vel mali. Ergo omnis actus humanus secundum suam speciem est bonus vel malus. Nullus ergo est indifferens secundum speciem. Objection 2. Further, human actions derive their species from their end or object, as stated above (06; 1, 3). But every end and every object is either good or bad. Therefore every human action is good or evil according to its species. None, therefore, is indifferent in its species.
Iª-IIae q. 18 a. 8 arg. 3 Praeterea, sicut dictum est, actus dicitur bonus, qui habet debitam perfectionem bonitatis; malus, cui aliquid de hoc deficit. Sed necesse est quod omnis actus vel habeat totam plenitudinem suae bonitatis, vel aliquid ei deficiat. Ergo necesse est quod omnis actus secundum speciem suam sit bonus vel malus, et nullus indifferens. Objection 3. Further, as stated above (Article 1), an action is said to be good, when it has its due complement of goodness; and evil, when it lacks that complement. But every action must needs either have the entire plenitude of its goodness, or lack it in some respect. Therefore every action must needs be either good or bad in its species, and none is indifferent.
Iª-IIae q. 18 a. 8 s. c. Sed contra est quod Augustinus dicit, in libro de Serm. Dom. in Mont., quod sunt quaedam facta media, quae possunt bono vel malo animo fieri, de quibus est temerarium iudicare. Sunt ergo aliqui actus secundum speciem suam indifferentes. On the contrary, Augustine says (De Serm. Dom. in Monte ii, 18) that "there are certain deeds of a middle kind, which can be done with a good or evil mind, of which it is rash to form a judgment." Therefore some actions are indifferent according to their species.
Iª-IIae q. 18 a. 8 co. Respondeo dicendum quod, sicut dictum est, actus omnis habet speciem ab obiecto; et actus humanus, qui dicitur moralis, habet speciem ab obiecto relato ad principium actuum humanorum, quod est ratio. Unde si obiectum actus includat aliquid quod conveniat ordini rationis, erit actus bonus secundum suam speciem, sicut dare eleemosynam indigenti. Si autem includat aliquid quod repugnet ordini rationis, erit malus actus secundum speciem, sicut furari, quod est tollere aliena. Contingit autem quod obiectum actus non includit aliquid pertinens ad ordinem rationis, sicut levare festucam de terra, ire ad campum, et huiusmodi, et tales actus secundum speciem suam sunt indifferentes. I answer that, As stated above (2,5), every action takes its species from its object; while human action, which is called moral, takes its species from the object, in relation to the principle of human actions, which is the reason. Wherefore if the object of an action includes something in accord with the order of reason, it will be a good action according to its species; for instance, to give alms to a person in want. On the other hand, if it includes something repugnant to the order of reason, it will be an evil act according to its species; for instance, to steal, which is to appropriate what belongs to another. But it may happen that the object of an action does not include something pertaining to the order of reason; for instance, to pick up a straw from the ground, to walk in the fields, and the like: and such actions are indifferent according to their species.
Iª-IIae q. 18 a. 8 ad 1 Ad primum ergo dicendum quod duplex est privatio. Quaedam quae consistit in privatum esse, et haec nihil relinquit, sed totum aufert; ut caecitas totaliter aufert visum, et tenebrae lucem, et mors vitam. Et inter hanc privationem et habitum oppositum, non potest esse aliquod medium circa proprium susceptibile. Est autem alia privatio quae consistit in privari, sicut aegritudo est privatio sanitatis, non quod tota sanitas sit sublata, sed quod est quasi quaedam via ad totalem ablationem sanitatis, quae fit per mortem. Et ideo talis privatio, cum aliquid relinquat, non semper est immediata cum opposito habitu. Et hoc modo malum est privatio boni, ut Simplicius dicit in commento super librum Praedic., quia non totum bonum aufert, sed aliquid relinquit. Unde potest esse aliquod medium inter bonum et malum. Reply to Objection 1. Privation is twofold. One is privation "as a result" [privatum esse], and this leaves nothing, but takes all away: thus blindness takes away sight altogether; darkness, light; and death, life. Between this privation and the contrary habit, there can be no medium in respect of the proper subject. The other is privation "in process" [privari]: thus sickness is privation of health; not that it takes health away altogether, but that it is a kind of road to the entire loss of health, occasioned by death. And since this sort of privation leaves something, it is not always the immediate contrary of the opposite habit. In this way evil is a privation of good, as Simplicius says in his commentary on the Categories: because it does not take away all good, but leaves some. Consequently there can be something between good and evil.
Iª-IIae q. 18 a. 8 ad 2 Ad secundum dicendum quod omne obiectum vel finis habet aliquam bonitatem vel malitiam, saltem naturalem, non tamen semper importat bonitatem vel malitiam moralem, quae consideratur per comparationem ad rationem, ut dictum est. Et de hac nunc agitur. Reply to Objection 2. Every object or end has some goodness or malice, at least natural to it: but this does not imply moral goodness or malice, which is considered in relation to the reason, as stated above. And it is of this that we are here treating.
Iª-IIae q. 18 a. 8 ad 3 Ad tertium dicendum quod non quidquid habet actus, pertinet ad speciem eius. Unde etsi in ratione suae speciei non contineatur quidquid pertinet ad plenitudinem bonitatis ipsius, non propter hoc est ex specie sua malus, nec etiam bonus, sicut homo secundum suam speciem neque virtuosus, neque vitiosus est. Reply to Objection 3. Not everything belonging to an action belongs also to its species. Wherefore although an action's specific nature may not contain all that belongs to the full complement of its goodness, it is not therefore an action specifically bad; nor is it specifically good. Thus a man in regard to his species is neither virtuous nor wicked.
Iª-IIae q. 18 a. 9 arg. 1 Ad nonum sic proceditur. Videtur quod aliquis actus secundum individuum sit indifferens. Nulla enim species est quae sub se non contineat vel continere possit aliquod individuum. Sed aliquis actus est indifferens secundum suam speciem, ut dictum est. Ergo aliquis actus individualis potest esse indifferens. Objection 1. It would seem that an individual action can be indifferent. For there is no species that does not, cannot, contain an individual. But an action can be indifferent in its species, as stated above (Article 8). Therefore an individual action can be indifferent.
Iª-IIae q. 18 a. 9 arg. 2 Praeterea, ex individualibus actibus causantur habitus conformes ipsis, ut dicitur in II Ethic. Sed aliquis habitus est indifferens. Dicit enim philosophus, in IV Ethic., de quibusdam, sicut de placidis et prodigis, quod non sunt mali, et tamen constat quod non sunt boni, cum recedant a virtute, et sic sunt indifferentes secundum habitum. Ergo aliqui actus individuales sunt indifferentes. Objection 2. Further, individual actions cause like habits, as stated in Ethic. ii, 1. But a habit can be indifferent: for the Philosopher says (Ethic. iv, 1) that those who are of an even temper and prodigal disposition are not evil; and yet it is evident that they are not good, since they depart from virtue; and thus they are indifferent in respect of a habit. Therefore some individual actions are indifferent.
Iª-IIae q. 18 a. 9 arg. 3 Praeterea, bonum morale pertinet ad virtutem, malum autem morale pertinet ad vitium. Sed contingit quandoque quod homo actum qui ex specie sua est indifferens, non ordinat ad aliquem finem vel vitii vel virtutis. Ergo contingit aliquem actum individualem esse indifferentem. Objection 3. Further, moral good belongs to virtue, while moral evil belongs to vice. But it happens sometimes that a man fails to ordain a specifically indifferent action to a vicious or virtuous end. Therefore an individual action may happen to be indifferent.
Iª-IIae q. 18 a. 9 s. c. Sed contra est quod Gregorius dicit in quadam homilia, otiosum verbum est quod utilitate rectitudinis, aut ratione iustae necessitatis aut piae utilitatis, caret. Sed verbum otiosum est malum, quia de eo reddent homines rationem in die iudicii, ut dicitur Matth. XII. Si autem non caret ratione iustae necessitatis aut piae utilitatis, est bonum. Ergo omne verbum aut est bonum aut malum. Pari ergo ratione, et quilibet alius actus vel est bonus vel malus. Nullus ergo individualis actus est indifferens. On the contrary, Gregory says in a homily (vi in Evang.): "An idle word is one that lacks either the usefulness of rectitude or the motive of just necessity or pious utility." But an idle word is an evil, because "men . . . shall render an account of it in the day of judgment" (Matthew 12:36): while if it does not lack the motive of just necessity or pious utility, it is good. Therefore every word is either good or bad. For the same reason every other action is either good or bad. Therefore no individual action is indifferent.
Iª-IIae q. 18 a. 9 co. Respondeo dicendum quod contingit quandoque aliquem actum esse indifferentem secundum speciem, qui tamen est bonus vel malus in individuo consideratus. Et hoc ideo, quia actus moralis, sicut dictum est, non solum habet bonitatem ex obiecto, a quo habet speciem; sed etiam ex circumstantiis, quae sunt quasi quaedam accidentia; sicut aliquid convenit individuo hominis secundum accidentia individualia, quod non convenit homini secundum rationem speciei. Et oportet quod quilibet individualis actus habeat aliquam circumstantiam per quam trahatur ad bonum vel malum, ad minus ex parte intentionis finis. Cum enim rationis sit ordinare, actus a ratione deliberativa procedens, si non sit ad debitum finem ordinatus, ex hoc ipso repugnat rationi, et habet rationem mali. Si vero ordinetur ad debitum finem, convenit cum ordine rationis, unde habet rationem boni. Necesse est autem quod vel ordinetur, vel non ordinetur ad debitum finem. Unde necesse est omnem actum hominis a deliberativa ratione procedentem, in individuo consideratum, bonum esse vel malum. Si autem non procedit a ratione deliberativa, sed ex quadam imaginatione, sicut cum aliquis fricat barbam, vel movet manum aut pedem; talis actus non est, proprie loquendo, moralis vel humanus; cum hoc habeat actus a ratione. Et sic erit indifferens, quasi extra genus moralium actuum existens. I answer that, It sometimes happens that an action is indifferent in its species, but considered in the individual it is good or evil. And the reason of this is because a moral action, as stated above (Article 3), derives its goodness not only from its object, whence it takes its species; but also from the circumstances, which are its accidents, as it were; just as something belongs to a man by reason of his individual accidents, which does not belong to him by reason of his species. And every individual action must needs have some circumstance that makes it good or bad, at least in respect of the intention of the end. For since it belongs to the reason to direct; if an action that proceeds from deliberate reason be not directed to the due end, it is, by that fact alone, repugnant to reason, and has the character of evil. But if it be directed to a due end, it is in accord with reason; wherefore it has the character of good. Now it must needs be either directed or not directed to a due end. Consequently every human action that proceeds from deliberate reason, if it be considered in the individual, must be good or bad. If, however, it does not proceed from deliberate reason, but from some act of the imagination, as when a man strokes his beard, or moves his hand or foot; such an action, properly speaking, is not moral or human; since this depends on the reason. Hence it will be indifferent, as standing apart from the genus of moral actions.
Iª-IIae q. 18 a. 9 ad 1 Ad primum ergo dicendum quod aliquem actum esse indifferentem secundum suam speciem, potest esse multipliciter. Uno modo, sic quod ex sua specie debeatur ei quod sit indifferens. Et sic procedit ratio. Sed tamen isto modo nullus actus ex sua specie est indifferens, non enim est aliquod obiectum humani actus, quod non possit ordinari vel ad bonum vel ad malum, per finem vel circumstantiam. Alio modo potest dici indifferens ex sua specie, quia non habet ex sua specie quod sit bonus vel malus. Unde per aliquid aliud potest fieri bonus vel malus. Sicut homo non habet ex sua specie quod sit albus vel niger, nec tamen habet ex sua specie quod non sit albus aut niger, potest enim albedo vel nigredo supervenire homini aliunde quam a principiis speciei. Reply to Objection 1. For an action to be indifferent in its species can be understood in several ways. First in such a way that its species demands that it remain indifferent; and the objection proceeds along this line. But no action can be specifically indifferent thus: since no object of human action is such that it cannot be directed to good or evil, either through its end or through a circumstance. Secondly, specific indifference of an action may be due to the fact that as far as its species is concerned, it is neither good nor bad. Wherefore it can be made good or bad by something else. Thus man, as far as his species is concerned, is neither white nor black; nor is it a condition of his species that he should not be black or white; but blackness or whiteness is superadded to man by other principles than those of his species.
Iª-IIae q. 18 a. 9 ad 2 Ad secundum dicendum quod philosophus dicit illum esse malum proprie, qui est aliis hominibus nocivus. Et secundum hoc, dicit prodigum non esse malum, quia nulli alteri nocet nisi sibi ipsi. Et similiter de omnibus aliis qui non sunt proximis nocivi. Nos autem hic dicimus malum communiter omne quod est rationi rectae repugnans. Et secundum hoc, omnis individualis actus est bonus vel malus, ut dictum est. Reply to Objection 2. The Philosopher states that a man is evil, properly speaking, if he be hurtful to others. And accordingly, because he hurts none save himself. And the same applies to all others who are not hurtful to other men. But we say here that evil, in general, is all that is repugnant to right reason. And in this sense every individual action is either good or bad, as stated above.
Iª-IIae q. 18 a. 9 ad 3 Ad tertium dicendum quod omnis finis a ratione deliberativa intentus, pertinet ad bonum alicuius virtutis, vel ad malum alicuius vitii. Nam hoc ipsum quod aliquis agit ordinate ad sustentationem vel quietem sui corporis, ad bonum virtutis ordinatur in eo qui corpus suum ordinat ad bonum virtutis. Et idem patet in aliis. Reply to Objection 3. Whenever an end is intended by deliberate reason, it belongs either to the good of some virtue, or to the evil of some vice. Thus, if a man's action is directed to the support or repose of his body, it is also directed to the good of virtue, provided he direct his body itself to the good of virtue. The same clearly applies to other actions.
Iª-IIae q. 18 a. 10 arg. 1 Ad decimum sic proceditur. Videtur quod circumstantia non possit constituere aliquam speciem boni vel mali actus. Species enim actus est ex obiecto. Sed circumstantiae differunt ab obiecto. Ergo circumstantiae non dant speciem actus. Objection 1. It would seem that a circumstance cannot place a moral action in the species of good or evil. For the species of an action is taken from its object. But circumstances differ from the object. Therefore circumstances do not give an action its species.
Iª-IIae q. 18 a. 10 arg. 2 Praeterea, circumstantiae comparantur ad actum moralem sicut accidentia eius, ut dictum est. Sed accidens non constituit speciem. Ergo circumstantia non constituit aliquam speciem boni vel mali. Objection 2. Further, circumstances are as accidents in relation to the moral action, as stated above (Question 7, Article 1). But an accident does not constitute the species. Therefore a circumstance does not constitute a species of good or evil.
Iª-IIae q. 18 a. 10 arg. 3 Praeterea, unius rei non sunt plures species. Unius autem actus sunt plures circumstantiae. Ergo circumstantia non constituit actum moralem in aliqua specie boni vel mali. Objection 3. Further, one thing is not in several species. But one action has several circumstances. Therefore a circumstance does not place a moral action in a species of good or evil.
Iª-IIae q. 18 a. 10 s. c. Sed contra, locus est circumstantia quaedam. Sed locus constituit actum moralem in quadam specie mali, furari enim aliquid de loco sacro est sacrilegium. Ergo circumstantia constituit actum moralem in aliqua specie boni vel mali. On the contrary, Place is a circumstance. But place makes a moral action to be in a certain species of evil; for theft of a thing from a holy place is a sacrilege. Therefore a circumstance makes a moral action to be specifically good or bad.
Iª-IIae q. 18 a. 10 co. Respondeo dicendum quod, sicut species rerum naturalium constituuntur ex naturalibus formis, ita species moralium actuum constituuntur ex formis prout sunt a ratione conceptae, sicut ex supradictis patet. Quia vero natura determinata est ad unum, nec potest esse processus naturae in infinitum, necesse est pervenire ad aliquam ultimam formam, ex qua sumatur differentia specifica, post quam alia differentia specifica esse non possit. Et inde est quod in rebus naturalibus, id quod est accidens alicui rei, non potest accipi ut differentia constituens speciem. Sed processus rationis non est determinatus ad aliquid unum, sed quolibet dato, potest ulterius procedere. Et ideo quod in uno actu accipitur ut circumstantia superaddita obiecto quod determinat speciem actus, potest iterum accipi a ratione ordinante ut principalis conditio obiecti determinantis speciem actus. Sicut tollere alienum habet speciem ex ratione alieni, ex hoc enim constituitur in specie furti, et si consideretur super hoc ratio loci vel temporis, se habebit in ratione circumstantiae. Sed quia ratio etiam de loco vel de tempore, et aliis huiusmodi, ordinare potest; contingit conditionem loci circa obiectum accipi ut contrariam ordini rationis; puta quod ratio ordinat non esse iniuriam faciendam loco sacro. Unde tollere aliquid alienum de loco sacro addit specialem repugnantiam ad ordinem rationis. Et ideo locus, qui prius considerabatur ut circumstantia, nunc consideratur ut principalis conditio obiecti rationi repugnans. Et per hunc modum, quandocumque aliqua circumstantia respicit specialem ordinem rationis vel pro vel contra, oportet quod circumstantia det speciem actui morali vel bono vel malo. I answer that, Just as the species of natural things are constituted by their natural forms, so the species of moral actions are constituted by forms as conceived by the reason, as is evident from what was said above (Article 5). But since nature is determinate to one thing, nor can a process of nature go on to infinity, there must needs be some ultimate form, giving a specific difference, after which no further specific difference is possible. Hence it is that in natural things, that which is accidental to a thing, cannot be taken as a difference constituting the species. But the process of reason is not fixed to one particular term, for at any point it can still proceed further. And consequently that which, in one action, is taken as a circumstance added to the object that specifies the action, can again be taken by the directing reason, as the principal condition of the object that determines the action's species. Thus to appropriate another's property is specified by reason of the property being "another's," and in this respect it is placed in the species of theft; and if we consider that action also in its bearing on place or time, then this will be an additional circumstance. But since the reason can direct as to place, time, and the like, it may happen that the condition as to place, in relation to the object, is considered as being in disaccord with reason: for instance, reason forbids damage to be done to a holy place. Consequently to steal from a holy place has an additional repugnance to the order of reason. And thus place, which was first of all considered as a circumstance, is considered here as the principal condition of the object, and as itself repugnant to reason. And in this way, whenever a circumstance has a special relation to reason, either for or against, it must needs specify the moral action whether good or bad.
Iª-IIae q. 18 a. 10 ad 1 Ad primum ergo dicendum quod circumstantia secundum quod dat speciem actui, consideratur ut quaedam conditio obiecti, sicut dictum est, et quasi quaedam specifica differentia eius. Reply to Objection 1. A circumstance, in so far as it specifies an action, is considered as a condition of the object, as stated above, and as being, as it were, a specific difference thereof.
Iª-IIae q. 18 a. 10 ad 2 Ad secundum dicendum quod circumstantia manens in ratione circumstantiae, cum habeat rationem accidentis, non dat speciem, sed inquantum mutatur in principalem conditionem obiecti, secundum hoc dat speciem. Reply to Objection 2. A circumstance, so long as it is but a circumstance, does not specify an action, since thus it is a mere accident: but when it becomes a principal condition of the object, then it does specify the action.
Iª-IIae q. 18 a. 10 ad 3 Ad tertium dicendum quod non omnis circumstantia constituit actum moralem in aliqua specie boni vel mali, cum non quaelibet circumstantia importet aliquam consonantiam vel dissonantiam ad rationem. Unde non oportet, licet sint multae circumstantiae unius actus, quod unus actus sit in pluribus speciebus. Licet etiam non sit inconveniens quod unus actus moralis sit in pluribus speciebus moris etiam disparatis, ut dictum est. Reply to Objection 3. It is not every circumstance that places the moral action in the species of good or evil; since not every circumstance implies accord or disaccord with reason. Consequently, although one action may have many circumstances, it does not follow that it is in many species. Nevertheless there is no reason why one action should not be in several, even disparate, moral species, as said above (07, ad 1; 1, 3, ad 3).
Iª-IIae q. 18 a. 11 arg. 1 Ad undecimum sic proceditur. Videtur quod omnis circumstantia pertinens ad bonitatem vel malitiam, det speciem actui. Bonum enim et malum sunt differentiae specificae moralium actuum. Quod ergo facit differentiam in bonitate vel malitia moralis actus, facit differre secundum differentiam specificam, quod est differre secundum speciem. Sed id quod addit in bonitate vel malitia actus, facit differre secundum bonitatem et malitiam. Ergo facit differre secundum speciem. Ergo omnis circumstantia addens in bonitate vel malitia actus, constituit speciem. Objection 1. It would seem that every circumstance relating to good or evil, specifies an action. For good and evil are specific differences of moral actions. Therefore that which causes a difference in the goodness or malice of a moral action, causes a specific difference, which is the same as to make it differ in species. Now that which makes an action better or worse, makes it differ in goodness and malice. Therefore it causes it to differ in species. Therefore every circumstance that makes an action better or worse, constitutes a species.
Iª-IIae q. 18 a. 11 arg. 2 Praeterea, aut circumstantia adveniens habet in se aliquam rationem bonitatis vel malitiae, aut non. Si non, non potest addere in bonitate vel malitia actus, quia quod non est bonum, non potest facere maius bonum; et quod non est malum, non potest facere maius malum. Si autem habet in se rationem bonitatis vel malitiae, ex hoc ipso habet quandam speciem boni vel mali. Ergo omnis circumstantia augens bonitatem vel malitiam, constituit novam speciem boni vel mali. Objection 2. Further, an additional circumstance either has in itself the character of goodness or malice, or it has not. If not, it cannot make the action better or worse; because what is not good, cannot make a greater good; and what is not evil, cannot make a greater evil. But if it has in itself the character of good or evil, for this very reason it has a certain species of good or evil. Therefore every circumstance that makes an action better or worse, constitutes a new species of good or evil.
Iª-IIae q. 18 a. 11 arg. 3 Praeterea, secundum Dionysium, IV cap. de Div. Nom., malum causatur ex singularibus defectibus. Quaelibet autem circumstantia aggravans malitiam, habet specialem defectum. Ergo quaelibet circumstantia addit novam speciem peccati. Et eadem ratione, quaelibet augens bonitatem, videtur addere novam speciem boni, sicut quaelibet unitas addita numero, facit novam speciem numeri; bonum enim consistit in numero, pondere et mensura. Objection 3. Further, according to Dionysius (Div. Nom. iv), "evil is caused by each single defect." Now every circumstance that increases malice, has a special defect. Therefore every such circumstance adds a new species of sin. And for the same reason, every circumstance that increases goodness, seems to add a new species of goodness: just as every unity added to a number makes a new species of number; since the good consists in "number, weight, and measure" (I, 5, 5).
Iª-IIae q. 18 a. 11 s. c. Sed contra, magis et minus non diversificant speciem. Sed magis et minus est circumstantia addens in bonitate vel malitia. Ergo non omnis circumstantia addens in bonitate vel malitia, constituit actum moralem in specie boni vel mali. On the contrary, More and less do not change a species. But more and less is a circumstance of additional goodness or malice. Therefore not every circumstance that makes a moral action better or worse, places it in a species of good or evil.
Iª-IIae q. 18 a. 11 co. Respondeo dicendum quod, sicut dictum est, circumstantia dat speciem boni vel mali actui morali, inquantum respicit specialem ordinem rationis. Contingit autem quandoque quod circumstantia non respicit ordinem rationis in bono vel malo, nisi praesupposita alia circumstantia, a qua actus moralis habet speciem boni vel mali. Sicut tollere aliquid in magna quantitate vel parva, non respicit ordinem rationis in bono vel malo, nisi praesupposita aliqua alia conditione, per quam actus habeat malitiam vel bonitatem, puta hoc quod est esse alienum, quod repugnat rationi. Unde tollere alienum in magna vel parva quantitate, non diversificat speciem peccati. Tamen potest aggravare vel diminuere peccatum. Et similiter est in aliis malis vel bonis. Unde non omnis circumstantia addens in bonitate vel malitia, variat speciem moralis actus. I answer that, As stated above (Article 10), a circumstance gives the species of good or evil to a moral action, in so far as it regards a special order of reason. Now it happens sometimes that a circumstance does not regard a special order of reason in respect of good or evil, except on the supposition of another previous circumstance, from which the moral action takes its species of good or evil. Thus to take something in a large or small quantity, does not regard the order of reason in respect of good or evil, except a certain other condition be presupposed, from which the action takes its malice or goodness; for instance, if what is taken belongs to another, which makes the action to be discordant with reason. Wherefore to take what belongs to another in a large or small quantity, does not change the species of the sin. Nevertheless it can aggravate or diminish the sin. The same applies to other evil or good actions. Consequently not every circumstance that makes a moral action better or worse, changes its species.
Iª-IIae q. 18 a. 11 ad 1 Ad primum ergo dicendum quod in his quae intenduntur et remittuntur, differentia intensionis et remissionis non diversificat speciem, sicut quod differt in albedine secundum magis et minus, non differt secundum speciem coloris. Et similiter quod facit diversitatem in bono vel malo secundum intensionem et remissionem, non facit differentiam moralis actus secundum speciem. Reply to Objection 1. In things which can be more or less intense, the difference of more or less does not change the species: thus by differing in whiteness through being more or less white a thing is not changed in regard to its species of color. In like manner that which makes an action to be more or less good or evil, does not make the action differ in species.
Iª-IIae q. 18 a. 11 ad 2 Ad secundum dicendum quod circumstantia aggravans peccatum, vel augens bonitatem actus, quandoque non habet bonitatem vel malitiam secundum se, sed per ordinem ad aliam conditionem actus, ut dictum est. Et ideo non dat novam speciem, sed auget bonitatem vel malitiam quae est ex alia conditione actus. Reply to Objection 2. A circumstance that aggravates a sin, or adds to the goodness of an action, sometimes has no goodness or malice in itself, but in regard to some other condition of the action, as stated above. Consequently it does not add a new species, but adds to the goodness or malice derived from this other condition of the action.
Iª-IIae q. 18 a. 11 ad 3 Ad tertium dicendum quod non quaelibet circumstantia inducit singularem defectum secundum seipsam, sed solum secundum ordinem ad aliquid aliud. Et similiter non semper addit novam perfectionem, nisi per comparationem ad aliquid aliud. Et pro tanto, licet augeat bonitatem vel malitiam, non semper variat speciem boni vel mali. Reply to Objection 3. A circumstance does not always involve a distinct defect of its own; sometimes it causes a defect in reference to something else. In like manner a circumstance does not always add further perfection, except in reference to something else. And, for as much as it does, although it may add to the goodness or malice, it does not always change the species of good or evil.

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