Authors/Thomas Aquinas/Summa Theologiae/Part IIa/Q17

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Q16 Q18



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Iª-IIae q. 17 pr. Deinde considerandum est de actibus imperatis a voluntate. Et circa hoc quaeruntur novem. Primo, utrum imperare sit actus voluntatis, vel rationis. Secundo, utrum imperare pertineat ad bruta animalia. Tertio, de ordine imperii ad usum. Quarto, utrum imperium et actus imperatus sint unus actus, vel diversi. Quinto, utrum actus voluntatis imperetur. Sexto, utrum actus rationis. Septimo, utrum actus appetitus sensitivi. Octavo, utrum actus animae vegetabilis. Nono, utrum actus exteriorum membrorum. Question 17. The acts commanded by the will Is command an act of the will or of the reason? Does command belong to irrational animals? The order between command and use Are command and the commanded act one act or distinct? Is the act of the will commanded? Is the act of the reason commanded? Is the act of the sensitive appetite commanded? Is the act of the vegetal soul commanded? Are the acts of the external members commanded?
Iª-IIae q. 17 a. 1 arg. 1 Ad primum sic proceditur. Videtur quod imperare non sit actus rationis, sed voluntatis. Imperare enim est movere quoddam, dicit enim Avicenna quod quadruplex est movens, scilicet perficiens, disponens, imperans et consilians. Sed ad voluntatem pertinet movere omnes alias vires animae, ut dictum est supra. Ergo imperare est actus voluntatis. Objection 1. It would seem that command is not an act of the reason but of the will. For command is a kind of motion; because Avicenna says that there are four ways of moving, "by perfecting, by disposing, by commanding, and by counselling." But it belongs to the will to move all the other powers of the soul, as stated above (Question 9, Article 1). Therefore command is an act of the will.
Iª-IIae q. 17 a. 1 arg. 2 Praeterea, sicut imperari pertinet ad id quod est subiectum, ita imperare pertinere videtur ad id quod est maxime liberum. Sed radix libertatis est maxime in voluntate. Ergo voluntatis est imperare. Objection 2. Further, just as to be commanded belongs to that which is subject, so, seemingly, to command belongs to that which is most free. But the root of liberty is especially in the will. Therefore to command belongs to the will.
Iª-IIae q. 17 a. 1 arg. 3 Praeterea, ad imperium statim sequitur actus. Sed ad actum rationis non statim sequitur actus, non enim qui iudicat aliquid esse faciendum, statim illud operatur. Ergo imperare non est actus rationis, sed voluntatis. Objection 3. Further, command is followed at once by act. But the act of the reason is not followed at once by act: for he who judges that a thing should be done, does not do it at once. Therefore command is not an act of the reason, but of the will.
Iª-IIae q. 17 a. 1 s. c. Sed contra est quod Gregorius Nyssenus dicit, et etiam philosophus quod appetitivum obedit rationi. Ergo rationis est imperare. On the contrary, Gregory of Nyssa [Nemesius, De Nat. Hom. xvi.] and the Philosopher (Ethic. i, 13) say that "the appetite obeys reason." Therefore command is an act of the reason.
Iª-IIae q. 17 a. 1 co. Respondeo dicendum quod imperare est actus rationis, praesupposito tamen actu voluntatis. Ad cuius evidentiam, considerandum est quod, quia actus voluntatis et rationis supra se invicem possunt ferri, prout scilicet ratio ratiocinatur de volendo, et voluntas vult ratiocinari; contingit actum voluntatis praeveniri ab actu rationis, et e converso. Et quia virtus prioris actus remanet in actu sequenti, contingit quandoque quod est aliquis actus voluntatis, secundum quod manet virtute in ipso aliquid de actu rationis, ut dictum est de usu et de electione; et e converso aliquis est actus rationis, secundum quod virtute manet in ipso aliquid de actu voluntatis. Imperare autem est quidem essentialiter actus rationis, imperans enim ordinat eum cui imperat, ad aliquid agendum, intimando vel denuntiando; sic autem ordinare per modum cuiusdam intimationis, est rationis. Sed ratio potest aliquid intimare vel denuntiare dupliciter. Uno modo, absolute, quae quidem intimatio exprimitur per verbum indicativi modi; sicut si aliquis alicui dicat, hoc est tibi faciendum. Aliquando autem ratio intimat aliquid alicui, movendo ipsum ad hoc, et talis intimatio exprimitur per verbum imperativi modi; puta cum alicui dicitur, fac hoc. Primum autem movens in viribus animae ad exercitium actus, est voluntas, ut supra dictum est. Cum ergo secundum movens non moveat nisi in virtute primi moventis, sequitur quod hoc ipsum quod ratio movet imperando, sit ei ex virtute voluntatis. Unde relinquitur quod imperare sit actus rationis, praesupposito actu voluntatis, in cuius virtute ratio movet per imperium ad exercitium actus. I answer that, Command is an act of the reason presupposing, however, an act of the will. In proof of this, we must take note that, since the acts of the reason and of the will can be brought to bear on one another, in so far as the reason reasons about willing, and the will wills to reason, the result is that the act of the reason precedes the act of the will, and conversely. And since the power of the preceding act continues in the act that follows, it happens sometimes that there is an act of the will in so far as it retains in itself something of an act of the reason, as we have stated in reference to use and choice; and conversely, that there is an act of the reason in so far as it retains in itself something of an act of the will. Now, command is essentially indeed an act of the reason: for the commander orders the one commanded to do something, by way of intimation or declaration; and to order thus by intimating or declaring is an act of the reason. Now the reason can intimate or declare something in two ways. First, absolutely: and this intimation is expressed by a verb in the indicative mood, as when one person says to another: "This is what you should do." Sometimes, however, the reason intimates something to a man by moving him thereto; and this intimation is expressed by a verb in the imperative mood; as when it is said to someone: "Do this." Now the first mover, among the powers of the soul, to the doing of an act is the will, as stated above (Question 9, Article 1). Since therefore the second mover does not move, save in virtue of the first mover, it follows that the very fact that the reason moves by commanding, is due to the power of the will. Consequently it follows that command is an act of the reason, presupposing an act of the will, in virtue of which the reason, by its command, moves (the power) to the execution of the act.
Iª-IIae q. 17 a. 1 ad 1 Ad primum ergo dicendum quod imperare non est movere quocumque modo, sed cum quadam intimatione denuntiativa ad alterum. Quod est rationis. Reply to Objection 1. To command is to move, not anyhow, but by intimating and declaring to another; and this is an act of the reason.
Iª-IIae q. 17 a. 1 ad 2 Ad secundum dicendum quod radix libertatis est voluntas sicut subiectum, sed sicut causa, est ratio. Ex hoc enim voluntas libere potest ad diversa ferri, quia ratio potest habere diversas conceptiones boni. Et ideo philosophi definiunt liberum arbitrium quod est liberum de ratione iudicium, quasi ratio sit causa libertatis. Reply to Objection 2. The root of liberty is the will as the subject thereof; but it is the reason as its cause. For the will can tend freely towards various objects, precisely because the reason can have various perceptions of good. Hence philosophers define the free-will as being "a free judgment arising from reason," implying that reason is the root of liberty.
Iª-IIae q. 17 a. 1 ad 3 Ad tertium dicendum quod ratio illa concludit quod imperium non sit actus rationis absolute, sed cum quadam motione, ut dictum est. Reply to Objection 3. This argument proves that command is an act of reason not absolutely, but with a kind of motion as stated above.
Iª-IIae q. 17 a. 2 arg. 1 Ad secundum sic proceditur. Videtur quod imperare conveniat brutis animalibus. Quia secundum Avicennam, virtus imperans motum est appetitiva, et virtus exequens motum est in musculis et in nervis. Sed utraque virtus est in brutis animalibus. Ergo imperium invenitur in brutis animalibus. Objection 1. It would seem that command belongs to irrational animals. Because, according to Avicenna, "the power that commands movement is the appetite; and the power that executes movement is in the muscles and nerves." But both powers are in irrational animals. Therefore command is to be found in irrational animals.
Iª-IIae q. 17 a. 2 arg. 2 Praeterea, de ratione servi est quod ei imperetur. Sed corpus comparatur ad animam sicut servus ad dominum, sicut dicit philosophus in I Polit. Ergo corpori imperatur ab anima, etiam in brutis, quae sunt composita ex anima et corpore. Objection 2. Further, the condition of a slave is that of one who receives commands. But the body is compared to the soul as a slave to his master, as the Philosopher says (Polit. i, 2). Therefore the body is commanded by the soul, even in irrational animals, since they are composed of soul and body.
Iª-IIae q. 17 a. 2 arg. 3 Praeterea, per imperium homo facit impetum ad opus. Sed impetus in opus invenitur in brutis animalibus, ut Damascenus dicit. Ergo in brutis animalibus invenitur imperium. Objection 3. Further, by commanding, man has an impulse towards an action. But impulse to action is to be found in irrational animals, as Damascene says (De Fide Orth. ii, 22). Therefore command is to be found in irrational animals.
Iª-IIae q. 17 a. 2 s. c. Sed contra, imperium est actus rationis, ut dictum est. Sed in brutis non est ratio. Ergo neque imperium. On the contrary, Command is an act of reason, as stated above (Article 1). But in irrational animals there is no reason. Neither, therefore, is there command.
Iª-IIae q. 17 a. 2 co. Respondeo dicendum quod imperare nihil aliud est quam ordinare aliquem ad aliquid agendum, cum quadam intimativa motione. Ordinare autem est proprius actus rationis. Unde impossibile est quod in brutis animalibus, in quibus non est ratio, sit aliquo modo imperium. I answer that, To command is nothing else than to direct someone to do something, by a certain motion of intimation. Now to direct is the proper act of reason. Wherefore it is impossible that irrational animals should command in any way, since they are devoid of reason.
Iª-IIae q. 17 a. 2 ad 1 Ad primum ergo dicendum quod vis appetitiva dicitur imperare motum, inquantum movet rationem imperantem. Sed hoc est solum in hominibus. In brutis autem animalibus virtus appetitiva non est proprie imperativa, nisi imperativum sumatur large pro motivo. Reply to Objection 1. The appetitive power is said to command movement, in so far as it moves the commanding reason. But this is only in man. In irrational animals the appetitive power is not, properly speaking, a commanding faculty, unless command be taken loosely for motion.
Iª-IIae q. 17 a. 2 ad 2 Ad secundum dicendum quod in brutis animalibus corpus quidem habet unde obediat, sed anima non habet unde imperet, quia non habet unde ordinet. Et ideo non est ibi ratio imperantis et imperati; sed solum moventis et moti. Reply to Objection 2. The body of the irrational animal is competent to obey; but its soul is not competent to command, because it is not competent to direct. Consequently there is no ratio there of commander and commanded; but only of mover and moved.
Iª-IIae q. 17 a. 2 ad 3 Ad tertium dicendum quod aliter invenitur impetus ad opus in brutis animalibus, et aliter in hominibus. Homines enim faciunt impetum ad opus per ordinationem rationis, unde habet in eis impetus rationem imperii. In brutis autem fit impetus ad opus per instinctum naturae, quia scilicet appetitus eorum statim apprehenso convenienti vel inconvenienti, naturaliter movetur ad prosecutionem vel fugam. Unde ordinantur ab alio ad agendum, non autem ipsa seipsa ordinant ad actionem. Et ideo in eis est impetus, sed non imperium. Reply to Objection 3. Impulse to action is in irrational animals otherwise than in man. For the impulse of man to action arises from the directing reason; wherefore his impulse is one of command. On the other hand, the impulse of the irrational animal arises from natural instinct; because as soon as they apprehend the fitting or the unfitting, their appetite is moved naturally to pursue or to avoid. Wherefore they are directed by another to act; and they themselves do not direct themselves to act. Consequently in them is impulse but not command.
Iª-IIae q. 17 a. 3 arg. 1 Ad tertium sic proceditur. Videtur quod usus praecedat imperium. Imperium enim est actus rationis praesupponens actum voluntatis, ut supra dictum est. Sed usus est actus voluntatis, ut supra dictum est. Ergo usus praecedit imperium. Objection 1. It would seem that use precedes command. For command is an act of the reason presupposing an act of the will, as stated above (Article 1). But, as we have already shown (16, 1), use is an act of the will. Therefore use precedes command.
Iª-IIae q. 17 a. 3 arg. 2 Praeterea, imperium est aliquid eorum quae ad finem ordinantur. Eorum autem quae sunt ad finem, est usus. Ergo videtur quod usus sit prius quam imperium. Objection 2. Further, command is one of those things that are ordained to the end. But use is of those things that are ordained to the end. Therefore it seems that use precedes command.
Iª-IIae q. 17 a. 3 arg. 3 Praeterea, omnis actus potentiae motae a voluntate, usus dicitur, quia voluntas utitur aliis potentiis, ut supra dictum est. Sed imperium est actus rationis prout mota est a voluntate, sicut dictum est. Ergo imperium est quidam usus. Commune autem est prius proprio. Ergo usus est prius quam imperium. Objection 3. Further, every act of a power moved by the will is called use; because the will uses the other powers, as stated above (Question 16, Article 1). But command is an act of the reason as moved by the will, as stated above (Article 1). Therefore command is a kind of use. Now the common precedes the proper. Therefore use precedes command.
Iª-IIae q. 17 a. 3 s. c. Sed contra est quod Damascenus dicit, quod impetus ad operationem praecedit usum. Sed impetus ad operationem fit per imperium. Ergo imperium praecedit usum. On the contrary, Damascene says (De Fide Orth. ii, 22) that impulse to action precedes use. But impulse to operation is given by command. Therefore command precedes use.
Iª-IIae q. 17 a. 3 co. Respondeo dicendum quod usus eius quod est ad finem, secundum quod est in ratione referente ipsum in finem, praecedit electionem, ut supra dictum est. Unde multo magis praecedit imperium. Sed usus eius quod est ad finem, secundum quod subditur potentiae executivae, sequitur imperium, eo quod usus utentis coniunctus est cum actu eius quo quis utitur; non enim utitur aliquis baculo, antequam aliquo modo per baculum operetur. Imperium autem non est simul cum actu eius cui imperatur, sed naturaliter prius est imperium quam imperio obediatur, et aliquando etiam est prius tempore. Unde manifestum est quod imperium est prius quam usus. I answer that, use of that which is directed to the end, in so far as it is in the reason referring this to the end, precedes choice, as stated above (Question 16, Article 4). Wherefore still more does it precede command. On the other hand, use of that which is directed to the end, in so far as it is subject to the executive power, follows command; because use in the user is united to the act of the thing used; for one does not use a stick before doing something with the stick. But command is not simultaneous with the act of the thing to which the command is given: for it naturally precedes its fulfilment, sometimes, indeed, by priority of time. Consequently it is evident that command precedes use.
Iª-IIae q. 17 a. 3 ad 1 Ad primum ergo dicendum quod non omnis actus voluntatis praecedit hunc actum rationis qui est imperium, sed aliquis praecedit, scilicet electio; et aliquis sequitur, scilicet usus. Quia post determinationem consilii, quae est iudicium rationis, voluntas eligit; et post electionem, ratio imperat ei per quod agendum est quod eligitur; et tunc demum voluntas alicuius incipit uti, exequendo imperium rationis; quandoque quidem voluntas alterius, cum aliquis imperat alteri; quandoque autem voluntas ipsius imperantis, cum aliquis imperat sibi ipsi. Reply to Objection 1. Not every act of the will precedes this act of the reason which is command; but an act of the will precedes, viz. choice; and an act of the will follows, viz. use. Because after counsel's decision, which is reason's judgment, the will chooses; and after choice, the reason commands that power which has to do what was chosen; and then, last of all, someone's will begins to use, by executing the command of reason; sometimes it is another's will, when one commands another; sometimes the will of the one that commands, when he commands himself to do something.
Iª-IIae q. 17 a. 3 ad 2 Ad secundum dicendum quod, sicut actus sunt praevii potentiis, ita obiecta actibus. Obiectum autem usus est id quod est ad finem. Ex hoc ergo quod ipsum imperium est ad finem, magis potest concludi quod imperium sit prius usu, quam quod sit posterius. Reply to Objection 2. Just as act ranks before power, so does the object rank before the act. Now the object of use is that which is directed to the end. Consequently, from the fact that command precedes, rather than that it follows use.
Iª-IIae q. 17 a. 3 ad 3 Ad tertium dicendum quod, sicut actus voluntatis utentis ratione ad imperandum, praecedit ipsum imperium; ita etiam potest dici quod et istum usum voluntatis praecedit aliquod imperium rationis, eo quod actus harum potentiarum supra seipsos invicem reflectuntur. Reply to Objection 3. Just as the act of the will in using the reason for the purpose of command, precedes the command; so also we may say that this act whereby the will uses the reason, is preceded by a command of reason; since the acts of these powers react on one another.
Iª-IIae q. 17 a. 4 arg. 1 Ad quartum sic proceditur. Videtur quod actus imperatus non sit unus actus cum ipso imperio. Diversarum enim potentiarum diversi sunt actus. Sed alterius potentiae est actus imperatus, et alterius ipsum imperium, quia alia est potentia quae imperat, et alia cui imperatur. Ergo non est idem actus imperatus cum imperio. Objection 1. It would seem that the commanded act is not one with the command itself. For the acts of different powers are themselves distinct. But the commanded act belongs to one power, and the command to another; since one is the power that commands, and the other is the power that receives the command. Therefore the commanded act is not one with the command.
Iª-IIae q. 17 a. 4 arg. 2 Praeterea, quaecumque possunt ab invicem separari, sunt diversa, nihil enim separatur a seipso. Sed aliquando actus imperatus separatur ab imperio, praecedit enim quandoque imperium, et non sequitur actus imperatus. Ergo alius actus est imperium ab actu imperato. Objection 2. Further, whatever things can be separate from one another, are distinct: for nothing is severed from itself. But sometimes the commanded act is separate from the command: for sometimes the command is given, and the commanded act follows not. Therefore command is a distinct act from the act commanded.
Iª-IIae q. 17 a. 4 arg. 3 Praeterea, quaecumque se habent secundum prius et posterius, sunt diversa. Sed imperium naturaliter praecedit actum imperatum. Ergo sunt diversa. Objection 3. Further, whatever things are related to one another as precedent and consequent, are distinct. But command naturally precedes the commanded act. Therefore they are distinct.
Iª-IIae q. 17 a. 4 s. c. Sed contra est quod philosophus dicit, quod ubi est unum propter alterum, ibi est unum tantum. Sed actus imperatus non est nisi propter imperium. Ergo sunt unum. On the contrary, The Philosopher says (Topic. iii, 2) that "where one thing is by reason of another, there is but one." But there is no commanded act unless by reason of the command. Therefore they are one.
Iª-IIae q. 17 a. 4 co. Respondeo dicendum quod nihil prohibet aliqua esse secundum quid multa, et secundum quid unum. Quinimmo omnia multa sunt secundum aliquid unum, ut Dionysius dicit, ult. cap. de Div. Nom. Est tamen differentia attendenda in hoc, quod quaedam sunt simpliciter multa, et secundum quid unum, quaedam vero e converso. Unum autem hoc modo dicitur sicut et ens. Ens autem simpliciter est substantia, sed ens secundum quid est accidens, vel etiam ens rationis. Et ideo quaecumque sunt unum secundum substantiam, sunt unum simpliciter, et multa secundum quid. Sicut totum in genere substantiae, compositum ex suis partibus vel integralibus vel essentialibus, est unum simpliciter, nam totum est ens et substantia simpliciter, partes vero sunt entia et substantiae in toto. Quae vero sunt diversa secundum substantiam, et unum secundum accidens, sunt diversa simpliciter, et unum secundum quid, sicut multi homines sunt unus populus, et multi lapides sunt unus acervus; quae est unitas compositionis, aut ordinis. Similiter etiam multa individua, quae sunt unum genere vel specie, sunt simpliciter multa, et secundum quid unum, nam esse unum genere vel specie, est esse unum secundum rationem. Sicut autem in genere rerum naturalium, aliquod totum componitur ex materia et forma, ut homo ex anima et corpore, qui est unum ens naturale, licet habeat multitudinem partium; ita etiam in actibus humanis, actus inferioris potentiae materialiter se habet ad actum superioris, inquantum inferior potentia agit in virtute superioris moventis ipsam, sic enim et actus moventis primi formaliter se habet ad actum instrumenti. Unde patet quod imperium et actus imperatus sunt unus actus humanus, sicut quoddam totum est unum, sed est secundum partes multa. I answer that, Nothing prevents certain things being distinct in one respect, and one in another respect. Indeed, every multitude is one in some respect, as Dionysius says (Div. Nom. xiii). But a difference is to be observed in this, that some are simply many, and one in a particular aspect: while with others it is the reverse. Now "one" is predicated in the same way as "being." And substance is being simply, whereas accident or being "of reason" is a being only in a certain respect. Wherefore those things that are one in substance are one simply, though many in a certain respect. Thus, in the genus substance, the whole composed of its integral or essential parts, is one simply: because the whole is being and substance simply, and the parts are being and substances in the whole. But those things which are distinct in substance, and one according to an accident, are distinct simply, and one in a certain respect: thus many men are one people, and many stones are one heap; which is unity of composition or order. In like manner also many individuals that are one in genus or species are many simply, and one in a certain respect: since to be one in genus or species is to be one according to the consideration of the reason. Now just as in the genus of natural things, a whole is composed of matter and form (e.g. man, who is one natural being, though he has many parts, is composed of soul and body); so, in human acts, the act of a lower power is in the position of matter in regard to the act of a higher power, in so far as the lower power acts in virtue of the higher power moving it: for thus also the act of the first mover is as the form in regard to the act of its instrument. Hence it is evident that command and the commanded act are one human act, just as a whole is one, yet in its parts, many.
Iª-IIae q. 17 a. 4 ad 1 Ad primum ergo dicendum quod, si essent potentiae diversae ad invicem non ordinatae, actus earum essent simpliciter diversi. Sed quando una potentia est movens alteram, tunc actus earum sunt quodammodo unus, nam idem est actus moventis et moti, ut dicitur in III Physic. Reply to Objection 1. If the distinct powers are not ordained to one another, their acts are diverse simply. But when one power is the mover of the other, then their acts are, in a way, one: since "the act of the mover and the act of the thing moved are one act" (Phys. iii, 3).
Iª-IIae q. 17 a. 4 ad 2 Ad secundum dicendum quod ex hoc quod imperium et actus imperatus possunt ab invicem separari, habetur quod sunt multa partibus. Nam partes hominis possunt ab invicem separari, quae tamen sunt unum toto. Reply to Objection 2. The fact that command and the commanded act can be separated from one another shows that they are different parts. Because the parts of a man can be separated from one another, and yet they form one whole.
Iª-IIae q. 17 a. 4 ad 3 Ad tertium dicendum quod nihil prohibet in his quae sunt multa partibus et unum toto, unum esse prius alio. Sicut anima quodammodo est prius corpore, et cor est prius aliis membris. Reply to Objection 3. In those things that are many in parts, but one as a whole, nothing hinders one part from preceding another. Thus the soul, in a way, precedes the body; and the heart, the other members.
Iª-IIae q. 17 a. 5 arg. 1 Ad quintum sic proceditur. Videtur quod actus voluntatis non sit imperatus. Dicit enim Augustinus, in VIII Confess., imperat animus ut velit animus, nec tamen facit. Velle autem est actus voluntatis. Ergo actus voluntatis non imperatur. Objection 1. It would seem that the act of the will is not commanded. For Augustine says (Confess. viii, 9): "The mind commands the mind to will, and yet it does not." But to will is the act of the will. Therefore the act of the will is not commanded.
Iª-IIae q. 17 a. 5 arg. 2 Praeterea, ei convenit imperari, cui convenit imperium intelligere. Sed voluntatis non est intelligere imperium, differt enim voluntas ab intellectu, cuius est intelligere. Ergo actus voluntatis non imperatur. Objection 2. Further, to receive a command belongs to one who can understand the command. But the will cannot understand the command; for the will differs from the intellect, to which it belongs to understand. Therefore the act of the will is not commanded.
Iª-IIae q. 17 a. 5 arg. 3 Praeterea, si aliquis actus voluntatis imperatur, pari ratione omnes imperantur. Sed si omnes actus voluntatis imperantur, necesse est in infinitum procedere, quia actus voluntatis praecedit actum imperantis rationis, ut dictum est; qui voluntatis actus si iterum imperatur, illud iterum imperium praecedet alius rationis actus, et sic in infinitum. Hoc autem est inconveniens, quod procedatur in infinitum. Non ergo actus voluntatis imperatur. Objection 3. Further, if one act of the will is commanded, for the same reason all are commanded. But if all the acts of the will are commanded, we must needs proceed to infinity; because the act of the will precedes the act of reason commanding, as stated above (Article 1); for if that act of the will be also commanded, this command will be precedes by another act of the reason, and so on to infinity. But to proceed to infinity is not possible. Therefore the act of the will is not commanded.
Iª-IIae q. 17 a. 5 s. c. Sed contra, omne quod est in potestate nostra, subiacet imperio nostro. Sed actus voluntatis sunt maxime in potestate nostra, nam omnes actus nostri intantum dicuntur in potestate nostra esse, inquantum voluntarii sunt. Ergo actus voluntatis imperantur a nobis. On the contrary, Whatever is in our power, is subject to our command. But the acts of the will, most of all, are in our power; since all our acts are said to be in our power, in so far as they are voluntary. Therefore the acts of the will are commanded by us.
Iª-IIae q. 17 a. 5 co. Respondeo dicendum quod, sicut dictum est, imperium nihil aliud est quam actus rationis ordinantis, cum quadam motione, aliquid ad agendum. Manifestum est autem quod ratio potest ordinare de actu voluntatis, sicut enim potest iudicare quod bonum sit aliquid velle, ita potest ordinare imperando quod homo velit. Ex quo patet quod actus voluntatis potest esse imperatus. I answer that, As stated above (Article 1), command is nothing else than the act of the reason directing, with a certain motion, something to act. Now it is evident that the reason can direct the act of the will: for just as it can judge it to be good to will something, so it can direct by commanding man to will. From this it is evident that an act of the will can be commanded.
Iª-IIae q. 17 a. 5 ad 1 Ad primum ergo dicendum quod, sicut Augustinus ibidem dicit, animus, quando perfecte imperat sibi ut velit, tunc iam vult, sed quod aliquando imperet et non velit, hoc contingit ex hoc quod non perfecte imperat. Imperfectum autem imperium contingit ex hoc, quod ratio ex diversis partibus movetur ad imperandum vel non imperandum, unde fluctuat inter duo, et non perfecte imperat. Reply to Objection 1. As Augustine says (Confess. viii, 9) when the mind commands itself perfectly to will, then already it wills: but that sometimes it commands and wills not, is due to the fact that it commands imperfectly. Now imperfect command arises from the fact that the reason is moved by opposite motives to command or not to command: wherefore it fluctuates between the two, and fails to command perfectly.
Iª-IIae q. 17 a. 5 ad 2 Ad secundum dicendum quod, sicut in membris corporalibus quodlibet membrum operatur non sibi soli, sed toti corpori, ut oculus videt toti corpori; ita etiam est in potentiis animae. Nam intellectus intelligit non solum sibi, sed omnibus potentiis; et voluntas vult non solum sibi, sed omnibus potentiis. Et ideo homo imperat sibi ipsi actum voluntatis, inquantum est intelligens et volens. Reply to Objection 2. Just as each of the members of the body works not for itself alone but for the whole body; thus it is for the whole body that the eye sees; so is it with the powers of the soul. For the intellect understands, not for itself alone, but for all the powers; and the will wills not only for itself, but for all the powers too. Wherefore man, in so far as he is endowed with intellect and will, commands the act of the will for himself.
Iª-IIae q. 17 a. 5 ad 3 Ad tertium dicendum quod, cum imperium sit actus rationis, ille actus imperatur, qui rationi subditur. Primus autem voluntatis actus non est ex rationis ordinatione, sed ex instinctu naturae, aut superioris causae, ut supra dictum est. Et ideo non oportet quod in infinitum procedatur. Reply to Objection 3. Since command is an act of reason, that act is commanded which is subject to reason. Now the first act of the will is not due to the direction of the reason but to the instigation of nature, or of a higher cause, as stated above (Question 9, Article 4). Therefore there is no need to proceed to infinity.
Iª-IIae q. 17 a. 6 arg. 1 Ad sextum sic proceditur. Videtur quod actus rationis non possit esse imperatus. Inconveniens enim videtur quod aliquid imperet sibi ipsi. Sed ratio est quae imperat, ut supra dictum est. Ergo rationis actus non imperatur. Objection 1. It would seem that the act of the reason cannot be commanded. For it seems impossible for a thing to command itself. But it is the reason that commands, as stated above (Article 1). Therefore the act of the reason is not commanded.
Iª-IIae q. 17 a. 6 arg. 2 Praeterea, id quod est per essentiam, diversum est ab eo quod est per participationem. Sed potentia cuius actus imperatur a ratione, est ratio per participationem, ut dicitur in I Ethic. Ergo illius potentiae actus non imperatur, quae est ratio per essentiam. Objection 2. Further, that which is essential is different from that which is by participation. But the power whose act is commanded by reason, is rational by participation, as stated in Ethic. i, 13. Therefore the act of that power, which is essentially rational, is not commanded.
Iª-IIae q. 17 a. 6 arg. 3 Praeterea, ille actus imperatur, qui est in potestate nostra. Sed cognoscere et iudicare verum, quod est actus rationis, non est semper in potestate nostra. Non ergo actus rationis potest esse imperatus. Objection 3. Further, that act is commanded, which is in our power. But to know and judge the truth, which is the act of reason, is not always in our power. Therefore the act of the reason cannot be commanded.
Iª-IIae q. 17 a. 6 s. c. Sed contra, id quod libero arbitrio agimus, nostro imperio agi potest. Sed actus rationis exercentur per liberum arbitrium, dicit enim Damascenus quod libero arbitrio homo exquirit, et scrutatur, et iudicat, et disponit. Ergo actus rationis possunt esse imperati. On the contrary, That which we do of our free-will, can be done by our command. But the acts of the reason are accomplished through the free-will: for Damascene says (De Fide Orth. ii, 22) that "by his free-will man inquires, considers, judges, approves." Therefore the acts of the reason can be commanded.
Iª-IIae q. 17 a. 6 co. Respondeo dicendum quod, quia ratio supra seipsam reflectitur, sicut ordinat de actibus aliarum potentiarum, ita etiam potest ordinare de actu suo. Unde etiam actus suus potest esse imperatus. Sed attendendum est quod actus rationis potest considerari dupliciter. Uno modo, quantum ad exercitium actus. Et sic actus rationis semper imperari potest, sicut cum indicitur alicui quod attendat, et ratione utatur. Alio modo, quantum ad obiectum, respectu cuius, duo actus rationis attenduntur. Primo quidem, ut veritatem circa aliquid apprehendat. Et hoc non est in potestate nostra, hoc enim contingit per virtutem alicuius luminis, vel naturalis vel supernaturalis. Et ideo quantum ad hoc, actus rationis non est in potestate nostra, nec imperari potest. Alius autem actus rationis est, dum his quae apprehendit assentit. Si igitur fuerint talia apprehensa, quibus naturaliter intellectus assentiat, sicut prima principia, assensus talium vel dissensus non est in potestate nostra, sed in ordine naturae, et ideo, proprie loquendo, nec imperio subiacet. Sunt autem quaedam apprehensa, quae non adeo convincunt intellectum, quin possit assentire vel dissentire, vel saltem assensum vel dissensum suspendere, propter aliquam causam, et in talibus assensus ipse vel dissensus in potestate nostra est, et sub imperio cadit. I answer that, Since the reason reacts on itself, just as it directs the acts of other powers, so can it direct its own act. Consequently its act can be commanded. But we must take note that the act of the reason may be considered in two ways. First, as to the exercise of the act. And considered thus, the act of the reason can always be commanded: as when one is told to be attentive, and to use one's reason. Secondly, as to the object; in respect of which two acts of the reason have to be noticed. One is the act whereby it apprehends the truth about something. This act is not in our power: because it happens in virtue of a natural or supernatural light. Consequently in this respect, the act of the reason is not in our power, and cannot be commanded. The other act of the reason is that whereby it assents to what it apprehends. If, therefore, that which the reason apprehends is such that it naturally assents thereto, e.g. the first principles, it is not in our power to assent or dissent to the like: assent follows naturally, and consequently, properly speaking, is not subject to our command. But some things which are apprehended do not convince the intellect to such an extent as not to leave it free to assent or dissent, or at least suspend its assent or dissent, on account of some cause or other; and in such things assent or dissent is in our power, and is subject to our command.
Iª-IIae q. 17 a. 6 ad 1 Ad primum ergo dicendum quod ratio hoc modo imperat sibi ipsi, sicut et voluntas movet seipsam, ut supra dictum est, inquantum scilicet utraque potentia reflectitur supra suum actum, et ex uno in aliud tendit. Reply to Objection 1. Reason commands itself, just as the will moves itself, as stated above (Question 9, Article 3), that is to say, in so far as each power reacts on its own acts, and from one thing tends to another.
Iª-IIae q. 17 a. 6 ad 2 Ad secundum dicendum quod, propter diversitatem obiectorum quae actui rationis subduntur, nihil prohibet rationem seipsam participare, sicut in cognitione conclusionum participatur cognitio principiorum. Reply to Objection 2. On account of the diversity of objects subject to the act of the reason, nothing prevents the reason from participating in itself: thus the knowledge of principles is participated in the knowledge of the conclusions.
Iª-IIae q. 17 a. 6 ad 3 Ad tertium patet responsio ex dictis. The reply to the third object is evident from what has been said.
Iª-IIae q. 17 a. 7 arg. 1 Ad septimum sic proceditur. Videtur quod actus sensitivi appetitus non sit imperatus. Dicit enim apostolus, Rom. VII, non enim quod volo bonum, hoc ago, et Glossa exponit quod homo vult non concupiscere, et tamen concupiscit. Sed concupiscere est actus appetitus sensitivi. Ergo actus appetitus sensitivi non subditur imperio nostro. Objection 1. It would seem that the act of the sensitive appetite is not commanded. For the Apostle says (Romans 7:15): "For I do not that good which I will": and a gloss explains this by saying that man lusts, although he wills not to lust. But to lust is an act of the sensitive appetite. Therefore the act of the sensitive appetite is not subject to our command.
Iª-IIae q. 17 a. 7 arg. 2 Praeterea, materia corporalis soli Deo obedit, quantum ad transmutationem formalem, ut in primo habitum est. Sed actus appetitus sensitivi habet quandam formalem transmutationem corporis, scilicet calorem vel frigus. Ergo actus appetitus sensitivi non subditur imperio humano. Objection 2. Further, corporeal matter obeys God alone, to the effect of formal transmutation, as was shown in the I, 65, 4; I, 91, 02; I, 110, 2. But the act of the sensitive appetite is accompanied by a formal transmutation of the body, consisting in heat or cold. Therefore the act of the sensitive appetite is not subject to man's command.
Iª-IIae q. 17 a. 7 arg. 3 Praeterea, proprium motivum appetitus sensitivi est apprehensum secundum sensum vel imaginationem. Sed non est in potestate nostra semper quod aliquid apprehendamus sensu vel imaginatione. Ergo actus appetitus sensitivi non subiacet imperio nostro. Objection 3. Further, the proper motive principle of the sensitive appetite is something apprehended by sense or imagination. But it is not always in our power to apprehend something by sense or imagination. Therefore the act of the sensitive appetite is not subject to our command.
Iª-IIae q. 17 a. 7 s. c. Sed contra est quod Gregorius Nyssenus dicit, quod obediens rationi dividitur in duo, in desiderativum et irascitivum, quae pertinent ad appetitum sensitivum. Ergo actus appetitus sensitivi subiacet imperio rationis. On the contrary, Gregory of Nyssa [Nemesius, De Nat. Hom. xvi.] says: "That which obeys reason is twofold, the concupiscible and the irascible," which belong to the sensitive appetite. Therefore the act of the sensitive appetite is subject to the command of reason.
Iª-IIae q. 17 a. 7 co. Respondeo dicendum quod secundum hoc aliquis actus imperio nostro subiacet, prout est in potestate nostra, ut supra dictum est. Et ideo ad intelligendum qualiter actus appetitus sensitivi subdatur imperio rationis, oportet considerare qualiter sit in potestate nostra. Est autem sciendum quod appetitus sensitivus in hoc differt ab appetitu intellectivo, qui dicitur voluntas, quod appetitus sensitivus est virtus organi corporalis, non autem voluntas. Omnis autem actus virtutis utentis organo corporali, dependet non solum ex potentia animae, sed etiam ex corporalis organi dispositione, sicut visio ex potentia visiva, et qualitate oculi, per quam iuvatur vel impeditur. Unde et actus appetitus sensitivi non solum dependet ex vi appetitiva, sed etiam ex dispositione corporis. Illud autem quod est ex parte potentiae animae, sequitur apprehensionem. Apprehensio autem imaginationis, cum sit particularis, regulatur ab apprehensione rationis, quae est universalis, sicut virtus activa particularis a virtute activa universali. Et ideo ex ista parte, actus appetitus sensitivi subiacet imperio rationis. Qualitas autem et dispositio corporis non subiacet imperio rationis. Et ideo ex hac parte, impeditur quin motus sensitivi appetitus totaliter subdatur imperio rationis. Contingit etiam quandoque quod motus appetitus sensitivi subito concitatur ad apprehensionem imaginationis vel sensus. Et tunc ille motus est praeter imperium rationis, quamvis potuisset impediri a ratione, si praevidisset. Unde philosophus dicit, in I Polit., quod ratio praeest irascibili et concupiscibili non principatu despotico, qui est domini ad servum; sed principatu politico aut regali, qui est ad liberos, qui non totaliter subduntur imperio. I answer that, An act is subject to our command, in so far as it is in our power, as stated above (Article 5). Consequently in order to understand in what manner the act of the sensitive appetite is subject to the command of reason, we must consider in what manner it is in our power. Now it must be observed that the sensitive appetite differs from the intellective appetite, which is called the will, in the fact that the sensitive appetite is a power of a corporeal organ, whereas the will is not. Again, every act of a power that uses a corporeal organ, depends not only on a power of the soul, but also on the disposition of that corporeal organ: thus the act of vision depends on the power of sight, and on the condition of the eye, which condition is a help or a hindrance to that act. Consequently the act of the sensitive appetite depends not only on the appetitive power, but also on the disposition of the body. Now whatever part the power of the soul takes in the act, follows apprehension. And the apprehension of the imagination, being a particular apprehension, is regulated by the apprehension of reason, which is universal; just as a particular active power is regulated by a universal active power. Consequently in this respect the act of the sensitive appetite is subject to the command of reason. On the other hand, condition or disposition of the body is not subject to the command of reason: and consequently in this respect, the movement of the sensitive appetite is hindered from being wholly subject to the command of reason. Moreover it happens sometimes that the movement of the sensitive appetite is aroused suddenly in consequence of an apprehension of the imagination of sense. And then such movement occurs without the command of reason: although reason could have prevented it, had it foreseen. Hence the Philosopher says (Polit. i, 2) that the reason governs the irascible and concupiscible not by a "despotic supremacy," which is that of a master over his slave; but by a "politic and royal supremacy," whereby the free are governed, who are not wholly subject to command.
Iª-IIae q. 17 a. 7 ad 1 Ad primum ergo dicendum quod hoc quod homo vult non concupiscere, et tamen concupiscit, contingit ex dispositione corporis, per quam impeditur appetitus sensitivus ne totaliter sequatur imperium rationis. Unde et apostolus ibidem subdit, video aliam legem in membris meis, repugnantem legi mentis meae. Hoc etiam contingit propter subitum motum concupiscentiae, ut dictum est. Reply to Objection 1. That man lusts, although he wills not to lust, is due to a disposition of the body, whereby the sensitive appetite is hindered from perfect compliance with the command of reason. Hence the Apostle adds (Romans 7:15): "I see another law in my members, fighting against the law of my mind." This may also happen through a sudden movement of concupiscence, as stated above.
Iª-IIae q. 17 a. 7 ad 2 Ad secundum dicendum quod qualitas corporalis dupliciter se habet ad actum appetitus sensitivi. Uno modo, ut praecedens, prout aliquis est aliqualiter dispositus secundum corpus, ad hanc vel illam passionem. Alio modo, ut consequens, sicut cum ex ira aliquis incalescit. Qualitas igitur praecedens non subiacet imperio rationis, quia vel est ex natura, vel ex aliqua praecedenti motione, quae non statim quiescere potest. Sed qualitas consequens sequitur imperium rationis, quia sequitur motum localem cordis, quod diversimode movetur secundum diversos actus sensitivi appetitus. Reply to Objection 2. The condition of the body stands in a twofold relation to the act of the sensitive appetite. First, as preceding it: thus a man may be disposed in one way or another, in respect of his body, to this or that passion. Secondly, as consequent to it: thus a man becomes heated through anger. Now the condition that precedes, is not subject to the command of reason: since it is due either to nature, or to some previous movement, which cannot cease at once. But the condition that is consequent, follows the command of reason: since it results from the local movement of the heart, which has various movements according to the various acts of the sensitive appetite.
Iª-IIae q. 17 a. 7 ad 3 Ad tertium dicendum quod, quia ad apprehensionem sensus requiritur sensibile exterius, non est in potestate nostra apprehendere aliquid sensu, nisi sensibili praesente; cuius praesentia non semper est in potestate nostra. Tunc enim homo potest uti sensu cum voluerit, nisi sit impedimentum ex parte organi. Apprehensio autem imaginationis subiacet ordinationi rationis, secundum modum virtutis vel debilitatis imaginativae potentiae. Quod enim homo non possit imaginari quae ratio considerat, contingit vel ex hoc quod non sunt imaginabilia, sicut incorporalia; vel propter debilitatem virtutis imaginativae, quae est ex aliqua indispositione organi. Reply to Objection 3. Since the external sensible is necessary for the apprehension of the senses, it is not in our power to apprehend anything by the senses, unless the sensible be present; which presence of the sensible is not always in our power. For it is then that man can use his senses if he will so to do; unless there be some obstacle on the part of the organ. On the other hand, the apprehension of the imagination is subject to the ordering of reason, in proportion to the strength or weakness of the imaginative power. For that man is unable to imagine the things that reason considers, is either because they cannot be imagined, such as incorporeal things; or because of the weakness of the imaginative power, due to some organic indisposition.
Iª-IIae q. 17 a. 8 arg. 1 Ad octavum sic proceditur. Videtur quod actus vegetabilis animae imperio rationis subdantur. Vires enim sensitivae nobiliores sunt viribus animae vegetabilis. Sed vires animae sensitivae subduntur imperio rationis. Ergo multo magis vires animae vegetabilis. Objection 1. It would seem that the acts of the vegetal soul are subject to the command of reason. For the sensitive powers are of higher rank than the vegetal powers. But the powers of the sensitive soul are subject to the command of reason. Much more, therefore, are the powers of the vegetal soul.
Iª-IIae q. 17 a. 8 arg. 2 Praeterea, homo dicitur minor mundus, quia sic est anima in corpore, sicut Deus in mundo. Sed Deus sic est in mundo, quod omnia quae sunt in mundo, obediunt eius imperio. Ergo et omnia quae sunt in homine, obediunt imperio rationis, etiam vires vegetabilis animae. Objection 2. Further, man is called a "little world" [Aristotle, Phys. viii. 2, because the soul is in the body, as God is in the world. But God is in the world in such a way, that everything in the world obeys His command. Therefore all that is in man, even the powers of the vegetal soul, obey the command of reason.
Iª-IIae q. 17 a. 8 arg. 3 Praeterea, laus et vituperium non contingit nisi in actibus qui subduntur imperio rationis. Sed in actibus nutritivae et generativae potentiae, contingit esse laudem et vituperium, et virtutem et vitium, sicut patet in gula et luxuria, et virtutibus oppositis. Ergo actus harum potentiarum subduntur imperio rationis. Objection 3. Further, praise and blame are awarded only to such acts as are subject to the command of reason. But in the acts of the nutritive and generative power, there is room for praise and blame, virtue and vice: as in the case of gluttony and lust, and their contrary virtues. Therefore the acts of these powers are subject to the command of reason.
Iª-IIae q. 17 a. 8 s. c. Sed contra est quod Gregorius Nyssenus dicit, quod id quod non persuadetur a ratione, est nutritivum et generativum. On the contrary, Gregory of Nyssa [Nemesius, De Nat. Hom. xxii.] sats that "the nutritive and generative power is one over which the reason has no control."
Iª-IIae q. 17 a. 8 co. Respondeo dicendum quod actuum quidam procedunt ex appetitu naturali, quidam autem ex appetitu animali vel intellectuali, omne enim agens aliquo modo appetit finem. Appetitus autem naturalis non consequitur aliquam apprehensionem, sicut sequitur appetitus animalis et intellectualis. Ratio autem imperat per modum apprehensivae virtutis. Et ideo actus illi qui procedunt ab appetitu intellectivo vel animali, possunt a ratione imperari, non autem actus illi qui procedunt ex appetitu naturali. Huiusmodi autem sunt actus vegetabilis animae, unde Gregorius Nyssenus dicit quod vocatur naturale quod generativum et nutritivum. Et propter hoc, actus vegetabilis animae non subduntur imperio rationis. I answer that, Some acts proceed from the natural appetite, others from the animal, or from the intellectual appetite: for every agent desires an end in some way. Now the natural appetite does not follow from some apprehension, as to the animal and the intellectual appetite. But the reason commands by way of apprehensive power. Wherefore those acts that proceed from the intellective or the animal appetite, can be commanded by reason: but not those acts that proceed from the natural appetite. And such are the acts of the vegetal soul; wherefore Gregory of Nyssa (Nemesius, De Nat. Hom. xxii) says "that generation and nutrition belong to what are called natural powers." Consequently the acts of the vegetal soul are not subject to the command of reason.
Iª-IIae q. 17 a. 8 ad 1 Ad primum ergo dicendum quod, quanto aliquis actus est immaterialior, tanto est nobilior, et magis subditus imperio rationis. Unde ex hoc ipso quod vires animae vegetabilis non obediunt rationi, apparet has vires infimas esse. Reply to Objection 1. The more immaterial an act is, the more noble it is, and the more is it subject to the command of reason. Hence the very fact that the acts of the vegetal soul do not obey reason, shows that they rank lowest.
Iª-IIae q. 17 a. 8 ad 2 Ad secundum dicendum quod similitudo attenditur quantum ad aliquid, quia scilicet, sicut Deus movet mundum, ita anima movet corpus. Non autem quantum ad omnia, non enim anima creavit corpus ex nihilo, sicut Deus mundum; propter quod totaliter subditur eius imperio. Reply to Objection 2. The comparison holds in a certain respect: because, to wit, as God moves the world, so the soul moves the body. But it does not hold in every respect: for the soul did not create the body out of nothing, as God created the world; for which reason the world is wholly subject to His command.
Iª-IIae q. 17 a. 8 ad 3 Ad tertium dicendum quod virtus et vitium, laus et vituperium, non debentur ipsis actibus nutritivae vel generativae potentiae, qui sunt digestio et formatio corporis humani; sed actibus sensitivae partis ordinatis ad actus generativae vel nutritivae; puta in concupiscendo delectationem cibi et venereorum, et utendo, secundum quod oportet, vel non secundum quod oportet. Reply to Objection 3. Virtue and vice, praise and blame do not affect the acts themselves of the nutritive and generative power, i.e. digestion, and formation of the human body; but they affect the acts of the sensitive part, that are ordained to the acts of generation and nutrition; for example the desire for pleasure in the act of taking food or in the act of generation, and the right or wrong use thereof.
Iª-IIae q. 17 a. 9 arg. 1 Ad nonum sic proceditur. Videtur quod membra corporis non obediant rationi quantum ad actus suos. Constat enim quod membra corporis magis distant a ratione quam vires animae vegetabilis. Sed vires animae vegetabilis non obediunt rationi, ut dictum est. Ergo multo minus membra corporis. Objection 1. It would seem that the members of the body do not obey reason as to their acts. For it is evident that the members of the body are more distant from the reason, than the powers of the vegetal soul. But the powers of the vegetal soul do not obey reason, as stated above (Article 8). Therefore much less do the members of the body obey.
Iª-IIae q. 17 a. 9 arg. 2 Praeterea, cor est principium motus animalis. Sed motus cordis non subditur imperio rationis, dicit enim Gregorius Nyssenus quod pulsativum non est persuasibile ratione. Ergo motus membrorum corporalium non subiacet imperio rationis. Objection 2. Further, the heart is the principle of animal movement. But the movement of the heart is not subject to the command of reason: for Gregory of Nyssa [Nemesius, De Nat. Hom. xxii.] says that "the pulse is not controlled by reason." Therefore the movement of the bodily members is not subject to the command of reason.
Iª-IIae q. 17 a. 9 arg. 3 Praeterea, Augustinus dicit, XIV de Civ. Dei, quod motus membrorum genitalium aliquando importunus est, nullo poscente, aliquando autem destituit inhiantem, et cum in animo concupiscentia ferveat, friget in corpore. Ergo motus membrorum non obediunt rationi. Objection 3. Further, Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xiv, 16) that "the movement of the genital members is sometimes inopportune and not desired; sometimes when sought it fails, and whereas the heart is warm with desire, the body remains cold." Therefore the movements of the members are not obedient to reason.
Iª-IIae q. 17 a. 9 s. c. Sed contra est quod Augustinus dicit, VIII Confess., imperat animus ut moveatur manus, et tanta est facilitas, ut vix a servitio discernatur imperium. On the contrary, Augustine says (Confess. viii, 9): "The mind commands a movement of the hand, and so ready is the hand to obey, that scarcely can one discern obedience from command."
Iª-IIae q. 17 a. 9 co. Respondeo dicendum quod membra corporis sunt organa quaedam potentiarum animae. Unde eo modo quo potentiae animae se habent ad hoc quod obediant rationi, hoc modo se habent etiam corporis membra. Quia igitur vires sensitivae subduntur imperio rationis, non autem vires naturales; ideo omnes motus membrorum quae moventur a potentiis sensitivis, subduntur imperio rationis; motus autem membrorum qui consequuntur vires naturales, non subduntur imperio rationis. I answer that, The members of the body are organs of the soul's powers. Consequently according as the powers of the soul stand in respect of obedience to reason, so do the members of the body stand in respect thereof. Since then the sensitive powers are subject to the command of reason, whereas the natural powers are not; therefore all movements of members, that are moved by the sensitive powers, are subject to the command of reason; whereas those movements of members, that arise from the natural powers, are not subject to the command of reason.
Iª-IIae q. 17 a. 9 ad 1 Ad primum ergo dicendum quod membra non movent seipsa, sed moventur per potentias animae; quarum quaedam sunt rationi viciniores quam vires animae vegetabilis. Reply to Objection 1. The members do not move themselves, but are moved through the powers of the soul; of which powers, some are in closer contact with the reason than are the powers of the vegetal soul.
Iª-IIae q. 17 a. 9 ad 2 Ad secundum dicendum quod in his quae ad intellectum et voluntatem pertinent, primum invenitur id quod est secundum naturam, ex quo alia derivantur, ut a cognitione principiorum naturaliter notorum, cognitio conclusionum; et a voluntate finis naturaliter desiderati, derivatur electio eorum quae sunt ad finem. Ita etiam in corporalibus motibus principium est secundum naturam. Principium autem corporalis motus est a motu cordis. Unde motus cordis est secundum naturam, et non secundum voluntatem, consequitur enim sicut per se accidens vitam, quae est ex unione animae et corporis. Sicut motus gravium et levium consequitur formam substantialem ipsorum, unde et a generante moveri dicuntur, secundum philosophum in VIII Physic. Et propter hoc motus iste vitalis dicitur. Unde Gregorius Nyssenus dicit quod sicut generativum et nutritivum non obedit rationi, ita nec pulsativum, quod est vitale. Pulsativum autem appellat motum cordis, qui manifestatur per venas pulsatiles. Reply to Objection 2. In things pertaining to intellect and will, that which is according to nature stands first, whence all other things are derived: thus from the knowledge of principles that are naturally known, is derived knowledge of the conclusions; and from volition of the end naturally desired, is derived the choice of the means. So also in bodily movements the principle is according to nature. Now the principle of bodily movements begins with the movement of the heart. Consequently the movement of the heart is according to nature, and not according to the will: for like a proper accident, it results from life, which follows from the union of soul and body. Thus the movement of heavy and light things results from their substantial form: for which reason they are said to be moved by their generator, as the Philosopher states (Phys. viii, 4). Wherefore this movement is called "vital." For which reason Gregory of Nyssa (Nemesius, De Nat. Hom. xxii) says that, just as the movement of generation and nutrition does not obey reason, so neither does the pulse which is a vital movement. By the pulse he means the movement of the heart which is indicated by the pulse veins.
Iª-IIae q. 17 a. 9 ad 3 Ad tertium dicendum quod, sicut Augustinus dicit in XIV de Civ. Dei, hoc quod motus genitalium membrorum rationi non obedit, est ex poena peccati, ut scilicet anima suae inobedientiae ad Deum in illo praecipue membro poenam inobedientiae patiatur, per quod peccatum originale ad posteros traducitur. Sed quia per peccatum primi parentis, ut infra dicetur, natura est sibi relicta, subtracto supernaturali dono quod homini divinitus erat collatum; ideo consideranda est ratio naturalis quare motus huiusmodi membrorum specialiter rationi non obedit. Cuius causam assignat Aristoteles in libro de causis motus animalium, dicens involuntarios esse motus cordis et membri pudendi, quia scilicet ex aliqua apprehensione huiusmodi membra commoventur, inquantum scilicet intellectus et phantasia repraesentant aliqua ex quibus consequuntur passiones animae, ad quas consequitur motus horum membrorum. Non tamen moventur secundum iussum rationis aut intellectus, quia scilicet ad motum horum membrorum requiritur aliqua alteratio naturalis, scilicet caliditatis et frigiditatis, quae quidem alteratio non subiacet imperio rationis. Specialiter autem hoc accidit in his duobus membris, quia utrumque istorum membrorum est quasi quoddam animal separatum, inquantum est principium vitae, principium autem est virtute totum. Cor enim principium est sensuum, et ex membro genitali virtus exit seminalis, quae est virtute totum animal. Et ideo habent proprios motus naturaliter, quia principia oportet esse naturalia, ut dictum est. Reply to Objection 3. As Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xiv, 17,20) it is in punishment of sin that the movement of these members does not obey reason: in this sense, that the soul is punished for its rebellion against God, by the insubmission of that member whereby original sin is transmitted to posterity. But because, as we shall state later on, the effect of the sin of our first parent was that his nature was left to itself, through the withdrawal of the supernatural gift which God had bestowed on man, we must consider the natural cause of this particular member's insubmission to reason. This is stated by Aristotle (De Causis Mot. Animal.) who says that "the movements of the heart and of the organs of generation are involuntary," and that the reason of this is as follows. These members are stirred at the occasion of some apprehension; in so far as the intellect and imagination represent such things as arouse the passions of the soul, of which passions these movements are a consequence. But they are not moved at the command of the reason or intellect, because these movements are conditioned by a certain natural change of heat and cold, which change is not subject to the command of reason. This is the case with these two organs in particular, because each is as it were a separate animal being, in so far as it is a principle of life; and the principle is virtually the whole. For the heart is the principle of the senses; and from the organ of generation proceeds the seminal virtue, which is virtually the entire animal. Consequently they have their proper movements naturally: because principles must needs be natural, as stated above (Reply to Objection 2).

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