Authors/Thomas Aquinas/Summa Theologiae/Part I/Q54

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Q53 Q55



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Iª q. 54 pr. Consideratis his quae ad substantiam Angeli pertinent, procedendum est ad cognitionem ipsius. Haec autem consideratio erit quadripartita, nam primo considerandum est de his quae pertinent ad virtutem cognoscitivam Angeli; secundo, de his quae pertinent ad medium cognoscendi ipsius; tertio, de his quae ab eo cognoscuntur; quarto, de modo cognitionis ipsorum. Circa primum quaeruntur quinque. Primo, utrum intelligere Angeli sit sua substantia. Secundo, utrum eius esse sit suum intelligere. Tertio, utrum eius substantia sit sua virtus intellectiva. Quarto, utrum in Angelis sit intellectus agens et possibilis. Quinto, utrum in eis sit aliqua alia potentia cognoscitiva quam intellectus.
Iª q. 54 a. 1 arg. 1 Ad primum sic proceditur. Videtur quod intelligere Angeli sit eius substantia. Angelus enim est sublimior et simplicior quam intellectus agens animae. Sed substantia intellectus agentis est sua actio; ut patet in III de anima per Aristotelem, et eius Commentatorem. Ergo, multo fortius, substantia Angeli est sua actio, quae est intelligere. Objection 1. It would seem that the angel's act of understanding is his substance. For the angel is both higher and simpler than the active intellect of a soul. But the substance of the active intellect is its own action; as is evident from Aristotle (De Anima iii) and from his Commentator [Averroes, A.D. 1126-1198]. Therefore much more is the angel's substance his action--that is, his act of understanding.
Iª q. 54 a. 1 arg. 2 Praeterea, philosophus dicit, in XII Metaphys., quod actio intellectus est vita. Sed cum vivere sit esse viventibus, ut dicitur in II de anima, videtur quod vita sit essentia. Ergo actio intellectus est essentia intelligentis Angeli. Objection 2. Further, the Philosopher says (Metaph. xii, text 39) that "the action of the intellect is life." But "since in living things to live is to be," as he says (De Anima ii, text 37), it seems that life is essence. Therefore the action of the intellect is the essence of an angel who understands.
Iª q. 54 a. 1 arg. 3 Praeterea, si extrema sunt unum, medium non differt ab eis, quia extremum magis distat ab extremo, quam medium. Sed in Angelo idem est intellectus et intellectum, ad minus inquantum intelligit essentiam suam. Ergo intelligere, quod cadit medium inter intellectum et rem intellectam, est idem cum substantia Angeli intelligentis. Objection 3. Further, if the extremes be one, then the middle does not differ from them; because extreme is farther from extreme than the middle is. But in an angel the intellect and the object understood are the same, at least in so far as he understands his own essence. Therefore the act of understanding, which is between the intellect and the thing understood, is one with the substance of the angel who understands.
Iª q. 54 a. 1 s. c. Sed contra, plus differt actio rei a substantia eius, quam ipsum esse eius. Sed nullius creati suum esse est sua substantia, hoc enim solius Dei proprium est, ut ex superioribus patet. Ergo neque Angeli, neque alterius creaturae, sua actio est eius substantia. On the contrary, The action of anything differs more from its substance than does its existence. But no creature's existence is its substance, for this belongs to God only, as is evident from what was said above (3, 4). Therefore neither the action of an angel, nor of any other creature, is its substance.
Iª q. 54 a. 1 co. Respondeo dicendum quod impossibile est quod actio Angeli, vel cuiuscumque alterius creaturae, sit eius substantia. Actio enim est proprie actualitas virtutis; sicut esse est actualitas substantiae vel essentiae. Impossibile est autem quod aliquid quod non est purus actus, sed aliquid habet de potentia admixtum, sit sua actualitas, quia actualitas potentialitati repugnat. Solus autem Deus est actus purus. Unde in solo Deo sua substantia est suum esse et suum agere. Praeterea, si intelligere Angeli esset sua substantia, oporteret quod intelligere Angeli esset subsistens. Intelligere autem subsistens non potest esse nisi unum; sicut nec aliquod abstractum subsistens. Unde unius Angeli substantia non distingueretur neque a substantia Dei, quae est ipsum intelligere subsistens; neque a substantia alterius Angeli. Si etiam Angelus ipse esset suum intelligere, non possent esse gradus in intelligendo perfectius et minus perfecte, cum hoc contingat propter diversam participationem ipsius intelligere. I answer that, It is impossible for the action of an angel, or of any creature, to be its own substance. For an action is properly the actuality of a power; just as existence is the actuality of a substance or of an essence. Now it is impossible for anything which is not a pure act, but which has some admixture of potentiality, to be its own actuality: because actuality is opposed to potentiality. But God alone is pure act. Hence only in God is His substance the same as His existence and His action. Besides, if an angel's act of understanding were his substance, it would be necessary for it to be subsisting. Now a subsisting act of intelligence can be but one; just as an abstract thing that subsists. Consequently an angel's substance would neither be distinguished from God's substance, which is His very act of understanding subsisting in itself, nor from the substance of another angel. Also, if the angel were his own act of understanding, there could then be no degrees of understanding more or less perfectly; for this comes about through the diverse participation of the act of understanding.
Iª q. 54 a. 1 ad 1 Ad primum ergo dicendum quod, cum dicitur quod intellectus agens est sua actio, est praedicatio non per essentiam, sed per concomitantiam, quia cum sit in actu eius substantia, statim quantum est in se, concomitatur ipsam actio. Quod non est de intellectu possibili, qui non habet actiones nisi postquam fuerit factus in actu. Reply to Objection 1. When the active intellect is said to be its own action, such predication is not essential, but concomitant, because, since its very nature consists in act, instantly, so far as lies in itself, action accompanies it: which cannot be said of the passive intellect, for this has no actions until after it has been reduced to act.
Iª q. 54 a. 1 ad 2 Ad secundum dicendum quod vita non hoc modo se habet ad vivere, sicut essentia ad esse; sed sicut cursus ad currere, quorum unum significat actum in abstracto, aliud in concreto. Unde non sequitur si vivere sit esse, quod vita sit essentia. Quamvis etiam quandoque vita pro essentia ponatur; secundum quod Augustinus dicit, in libro de Trin., quod memoria et intelligentia et voluntas sunt una essentia, una vita. Sed sic non accipitur a philosopho cum dicit quod actio intellectus est vita. Reply to Objection 2. The relation between "life" and "to live" is not the same as that between "essence" and "to be"; but rather as that between "a race" and "to run," one of which signifies the act in the abstract, and the other in the concrete. Hence it does not follow, if "to live" is "to be," that "life" is "essence." Although life is sometimes put for the essence, as Augustine says (De Trin. x), "Memory and understanding and will are one essence, one life": yet it is not taken in this sense by the Philosopher, when he says that "the act of the intellect is life."
Iª q. 54 a. 1 ad 3 Ad tertium dicendum quod actio quae transit in aliquid extrinsecum, est realiter media inter agens et subiectum recipiens actionem. Sed actio quae manet in agente, non est realiter medium inter agens et obiectum, sed secundum modum significandi tantum, realiter vero consequitur unionem obiecti cum agente. Ex hoc enim quod intellectum fit unum cum intelligente, consequitur intelligere, quasi quidam effectus differens ab utroque. Reply to Objection 3. The action which is transient, passing to some extrinsic object, is really a medium between the agent and the subject receiving the action. The action which remains within the agent, is not really a medium between the agent and the object, but only according to the manner of expression; for it really follows the union of the object with the agent. For the act of understanding is brought about by the union of the object understood with the one who understands it, as an effect which differs from both.
Iª q. 54 a. 2 arg. 1 Ad secundum sic proceditur. Videtur quod intelligere Angeli sit eius esse. Vivere enim viventibus est esse, ut dicitur in II de anima. Sed intelligere est quoddam vivere, ut in eodem dicitur. Ergo intelligere Angeli est eius esse. Objection 1. It would seem that in the angel to understand is to exist. For in living things to live is to be, as the Philosopher says (De Anima ii, text. 37). But to "understand is in a sense to live" (De Anima ii, text. 37). Therefore in the angel to understand is to exist.
Iª q. 54 a. 2 arg. 2 Praeterea, sicut se habet causa ad causam, ita effectus ad effectum. Sed forma per quam Angelus est, est eadem cum forma per quam intelligit ad minus seipsum. Ergo eius intelligere est idem cum suo esse. Objection 2. Further, cause bears the same relation to cause, as effect to effect. But the form whereby the angel exists is the same as the form by which he understands at least himself. Therefore in the angel to understand is to exist.
Iª q. 54 a. 2 s. c. Sed contra, intelligere Angeli est motus eius; ut patet per Dionysium, IV cap. de Div. Nom. Sed esse non est motus. Ergo esse Angeli non est intelligere eius. On the contrary, The angel's act of understanding is his movement, as is clear from Dionysius (Div. Nom. iv). But to exist is not movement. Therefore in the angel to be is not to understand.
Iª q. 54 a. 2 co. Respondeo dicendum quod actio Angeli non est eius esse, neque actio alicuius creaturae. Duplex enim est actionis genus, ut dicitur IX Metaphys. Una scilicet actio est quae transit in aliquid exterius, inferens ei passionem, sicut urere et secare. Alia vero actio est quae non transit in rem exteriorem, sed manet in ipso agente, sicut sentire, intelligere et velle, per huiusmodi enim actionem non immutatur aliquid extrinsecum, sed totum in ipso agente agitur. De prima ergo actione manifestum est quod non potest esse ipsum esse agentis, nam esse agentis significatur intra ipsum, actio autem talis est effluxus in actum ab agente. Secunda autem actio de sui ratione habet infinitatem, vel simpliciter, vel secundum quid. Simpliciter quidem, sicut intelligere, cuius obiectum est verum, et velle, cuius obiectum est bonum, quorum utrumque convertitur cum ente; et ita intelligere et velle, quantum est de se, habent se ad omnia; et utrumque recipit speciem ab obiecto. Secundum quid autem infinitum est sentire, quod se habet ad omnia sensibilia, sicut visus ad omnia visibilia. Esse autem cuiuslibet creaturae est determinatum ad unum secundum genus et speciem, esse autem solius Dei est simpliciter infinitum, in se omnia comprehendens, ut dicit Dionysius, V cap. de Div. Nom. Unde solum esse divinum est suum intelligere et suum velle. I answer that, The action of the angel, as also the action of any creature, is not his existence. For as it is said (Metaph. ix, text. 16), there is a twofold class of action; one which passes out to something beyond, and causes passion in it, as burning and cutting; and another which does not pass outwards, but which remains within the agent, as to feel, to understand, to will; by such actions nothing outside is changed, but the whole action takes place within the agent. It is quite clear regarding the first kind of action that it cannot be the agent's very existence: because the agent's existence is signified as within him, while such an action denotes something as issuing from the agent into the thing done. But the second action of its own nature has infinity, either simple or relative. As an example of simple infinity, we have the act "to understand," of which the object is "the true"; and the act "to will," of which the object is "the good"; each of which is convertible with being; and so, to understand and to will, of themselves, bear relation to all things, and each receives its species from its object. But the act of sensation is relatively infinite, for it bears relation to all sensible things; as sight does to all things visible. Now the being of every creature is restricted to one in genus and species; God's being alone is simply infinite, comprehending all things in itself, as Dionysius says (Div. Nom. v). Hence the Divine nature alone is its own act of understanding and its own act of will.
Iª q. 54 a. 2 ad 1 Ad primum ergo dicendum quod vivere quandoque sumitur pro ipso esse viventis, quandoque vero pro operatione vitae, idest per quam demonstratur aliquid esse vivens. Et hoc modo philosophus dicit quod intelligere est vivere quoddam, ibi enim distinguit diversos gradus viventium secundum diversa opera vitae. Reply to Objection 1. Life is sometimes taken for the existence of the living subject: sometimes also for a vital operation, that is, for one whereby something is shown to be living. In this way the Philosopher says that to understand is, in a sense, to live: for there he distinguishes the various grades of living things according to the various functions of life.
Iª q. 54 a. 2 ad 2 Ad secundum dicendum quod ipsa essentia Angeli est ratio totius sui esse, non autem est ratio totius sui intelligere, quia non omnia intelligere potest per suam essentiam. Et ideo secundum propriam rationem, inquantum est talis essentia, comparatur ad ipsum esse Angeli. Sed ad eius intelligere comparatur secundum rationem universalioris obiecti, scilicet veri vel entis. Et sic patet quod, licet sit eadem forma, non tamen secundum eandem rationem est principium essendi et intelligendi. Et propter hoc non sequitur quod in Angelo sit idem esse et intelligere. Reply to Objection 2. The essence of an angel is the reason of his entire existence, but not the reason of his whole act of understanding, since he cannot understand everything by his essence. Consequently in its own specific nature as such an essence, it is compared to the existence of the angel, whereas to his act of understanding it is compared as included in the idea of a more universal object, namely, truth and being. Thus it is evident, that, although the form is the same, yet it is not the principle of existence and of understanding according to the same formality. On this account it does not follow that in the angel "to be" is the same as 'to understand.'
Iª q. 54 a. 3 arg. 1 Ad tertium sic proceditur. Videtur quod virtus vel potentia intellectiva in Angelo non sit aliud quam sua essentia. Mens enim et intellectus nominant potentiam intellectivam. Sed Dionysius in pluribus locis suorum librorum, nominat ipsos Angelos intellectus et mentes. Ergo Angelus est sua potentia intellectiva. Objection 1. It would seem that in an angel the power or faculty of understanding is not different from his essence. For, "mind" and "intellect" express the power of understanding. But in many passages of his writings, Dionysius styles angels "intellects" and "minds." Therefore the angel is his own power of intelligence.
Iª q. 54 a. 3 arg. 2 Praeterea, si potentia intellectiva in Angelo est aliquid praeter eius essentiam, oportet quod sit accidens, hoc enim dicimus esse accidens alicuius, quod est praeter eius essentiam. Sed forma simplex subiectum esse non potest, ut Boetius dicit, in libro de Trin. Ergo Angelus non esset forma simplex, quod est contra praemissa. Objection 2. Further, if the angel's power of intelligence be anything besides his essence, then it must needs be an accident; for that which is besides the essence of anything, we call it accident. But "a simple form cannot be a subject," as Boethius states (De Trin. 1). Thus an angel would not be a simple form, which is contrary to what has been previously said (50, 2).
Iª q. 54 a. 3 arg. 3 Praeterea, Augustinus dicit, XII Confess., quod Deus fecit angelicam naturam prope se, materiam autem primam prope nihil, ex quo videtur quod Angelus sit simplicior quam materia prima, utpote Deo propinquior. Sed materia prima est sua potentia. Ergo multo magis Angelus est sua potentia intellectiva. Objection 3. Further, Augustine (Confess. xii) says, that God made the angelic nature "nigh unto Himself," while He made primary matter "nigh unto nothing"; from this it would seem that the angel is of a simpler nature than primary matter, as being closer to God. But primary matter is its own power. Therefore much more is an angel his own power of intelligence.
Iª q. 54 a. 3 s. c. Sed contra est quod Dionysius dicit, XI cap. Angel. Hier., quod Angeli dividuntur in substantiam, virtutem et operationem. Ergo aliud est in eis substantia, et aliud virtus, et aliud operatio. On the contrary, Dionysius says (Coel. Hier. xi) that "the angels are divided into substance, power, and operation." Therefore substance, power, and operation, are all distinct in them.
Iª q. 54 a. 3 co. Respondeo dicendum quod nec in Angelo nec in aliqua creatura, virtus vel potentia operativa est idem quod sua essentia. Quod sic patet. Cum enim potentia dicatur ad actum, oportet quod secundum diversitatem actuum sit diversitas potentiarum, propter quod dicitur quod proprius actus respondet propriae potentiae. In omni autem creato essentia differt a suo esse, et comparatur ad ipsum sicut potentia ad actum, ut ex supra dictis patet. Actus autem ad quem comparatur potentia operativa, est operatio. In Angelo autem non est idem intelligere et esse, nec aliqua alia operatio aut in ipso aut in quocumque alio creato, est idem quod eius esse. Unde essentia Angeli non est eius potentia intellectiva, nec alicuius creati essentia est eius operativa potentia. I answer that, Neither in an angel nor in any creature, is the power or operative faculty the same as its essence: which is made evident thus. Since every power is ordained to an act, then according to the diversity of acts must be the diversity of powers; and on this account it is said that each proper act responds to its proper power. But in every creature the essence differs from the existence, and is compared to it as potentiality is to act, as is evident from what has been already said (44, 1). Now the act to which the operative power is compared is operation. But in the angel to understand is not the same as to exist, nor is any operation in him, nor in any other created thing, the same as his existence. Hence the angel's essence is not his power of intelligence: nor is the essence of any creature its power of operation.
Iª q. 54 a. 3 ad 1 Ad primum ergo dicendum quod Angelus dicitur intellectus et mens, quia tota eius cognitio est intellectualis. Cognitio autem animae partim est intellectualis, et partim sensitiva. Reply to Objection 1. An angel is called "intellect" and "mind," because all his knowledge is intellectual: whereas the knowledge of a soul is partly intellectual and partly sensitive.
Iª q. 54 a. 3 ad 2 Ad secundum dicendum quod forma simplex quae est actus purus, nullius accidentis potest esse subiectum, quia subiectum comparatur ad accidens ut potentia ad actum. Et huiusmodi est solus Deus. Et de tali forma loquitur ibi Boetius. Forma autem simplex quae non est suum esse, sed comparatur ad ipsum ut potentia ad actum, potest esse subiectum accidentis, et praecipue eius quod consequitur speciem, huiusmodi enim accidens pertinet ad formam (accidens vero quod est individui, non consequens totam speciem, consequitur materiam, quae est individuationis principium). Et talis forma simplex est Angelus. Reply to Objection 2. A simple form which is pure act cannot be the subject of accident, because subject is compared to accident as potentiality is to act. God alone is such a form: and of such is Boethius speaking there. But a simple form which is not its own existence, but is compared to it as potentiality is to act, can be the subject of accident; and especially of such accident as follows the species: for such accident belongs to the form--whereas an accident which belongs to the individual, and which does not belong to the whole species, results from the matter, which is the principle of individuation. And such a simple form is an angel.
Iª q. 54 a. 3 ad 3 Ad tertium dicendum quod potentia materiae est ad ipsum esse substantiale, et non potentia operativa, sed ad esse accidentale. Unde non est simile. Reply to Objection 3. The power of matter is a potentiality in regard to substantial being itself, whereas the power of operation regards accidental being. Hence there is no comparison.
Iª q. 54 a. 4 arg. 1 Ad quartum sic proceditur. Videtur quod in Angelo sit intellectus agens et possibilis. Dicit enim philosophus, in III de anima, quod sicut in omni natura est aliquid quo est omnia fieri, et aliquid quo est omnia facere, ita etiam in anima. Sed Angelus est natura quaedam. Ergo in eo est intellectus agens et possibilis. Objection 1. It would seem that there is both an active and a passive intellect in an angel. The Philosopher says (De Anima iii, text. 17) that, "in the soul, just as in every nature, there is something whereby it can become all things, and there is something whereby it can make all things." But an angel is a kind of nature. Therefore there is an active and a passive intellect in an angel.
Iª q. 54 a. 4 arg. 2 Praeterea, recipere est proprium intellectus possibilis, illuminare autem est proprium intellectus agentis, ut patet in III de anima. Sed Angelus recipit illuminationem a superiori, et illuminat inferiorem. Ergo in eo est intellectus agens et possibilis. Objection 2. Further, the proper function of the passive intellect is to receive; whereas to enlighten is the proper function of the active intellect, as is made clear in De Anima iii, text. 2,3,18. But an angel receives enlightenment from a higher angel, and enlightens a lower one. Therefore there is in him an active and a passive intellect.
Iª q. 54 a. 4 s. c. Sed contra est quod in nobis intellectus agens et possibilis est per comparationem ad phantasmata; quae quidem comparantur ad intellectum possibilem ut colores ad visum, ad intellectum autem agentem ut colores ad lumen, ut patet ex III de anima. Sed hoc non est in Angelo. Ergo in Angelo non est intellectus agens et possibilis. On the contrary, The distinction of active and passive intellect in us is in relation to the phantasms, which are compared to the passive intellect as colors to the sight; but to the active intellect as colors to the light, as is clear from De Anima iii, text. 18. But this is not so in the angel. Therefore there is no active and passive intellect in the angel.
Iª q. 54 a. 4 co. Respondeo dicendum quod necessitas ponendi intellectum possibilem in nobis, fuit propter hoc, quod nos invenimur quandoque intelligentes in potentia et non in actu, unde oportet esse quandam virtutem, quae sit in potentia ad intelligibilia ante ipsum intelligere, sed reducitur in actum eorum cum fit sciens, et ulterius cum fit considerans. Et haec virtus vocatur intellectus possibilis. Necessitas autem ponendi intellectum agentem fuit, quia naturae rerum materialium, quas nos intelligimus, non subsistunt extra animam immateriales et intelligibiles in actu, sed sunt solum intelligibiles in potentia, extra animam existentes, et ideo oportuit esse aliquam virtutem, quae faceret illas naturas intelligibiles actu. Et haec virtus dicitur intellectus agens in nobis. Utraque autem necessitas deest in Angelis. Quia neque sunt quandoque intelligentes in potentia tantum, respectu eorum quae naturaliter intelligunt, neque intelligibilia eorum sunt intelligibilia in potentia, sed in actu; intelligunt enim primo et principaliter res immateriales, ut infra patebit. Et ideo non potest in eis esse intellectus agens et possibilis, nisi aequivoce. I answer that, The necessity for admitting a passive intellect in us is derived from the fact that we understand sometimes only in potentiality, and not actually. Hence there must exist some power, which, previous to the act of understanding, is in potentiality to intelligible things, but which becomes actuated in their regard when it apprehends them, and still more when it reflects upon them. This is the power which is denominated the passive intellect. The necessity for admitting an active intellect is due to this--that the natures of the material things which we understand do not exist outside the soul, as immaterial and actually intelligible, but are only intelligible in potentiality so long as they are outside the soul. Consequently it is necessary that there should be some power capable of rendering such natures actually intelligible: and this power in us is called the active intellect. But each of these necessities is absent from the angels. They are neither sometimes understanding only in potentiality, with regard to such things as they naturally apprehend; nor, again, are their intelligible in potentiality, but they are actually such; for they first and principally understand immaterial things, as will appear later (84, 7; 85, 1). Therefore there cannot be an active and a passive intellect in them, except equivocally.
Iª q. 54 a. 4 ad 1 Ad primum ergo dicendum quod philosophus intelligit ista duo esse in omni natura in qua contingit esse generari vel fieri, ut ipsa verba demonstrant. In Angelo autem non generatur scientia, sed naturaliter adest. Unde non oportet ponere in eis agens et possibile. Reply to Objection 1. As the words themselves show, the Philosopher understands those two things to be in every nature in which there chances to be generation or making. Knowledge, however, is not generated in the angels, but is present naturally. Hence there is not need for admitting an active and a passive intellect in them.
Iª q. 54 a. 4 ad 2 Ad secundum dicendum quod intellectus agentis est illuminare non quidem alium intelligentem, sed intelligibilia in potentia, inquantum per abstractionem facit ea intelligibilia actu. Ad intellectum autem possibilem pertinet esse in potentia respectu naturalium cognoscibilium, et quandoque fieri actu. Unde quod Angelus illuminat Angelum, non pertinet ad rationem intellectus agentis. Neque ad rationem intellectus possibilis pertinet, quod illuminatur de supernaturalibus mysteriis, ad quae cognoscenda quandoque est in potentia. Si quis autem velit haec vocare intellectum agentem et possibilem, aequivoce dicet, nec de nominibus est curandum. Reply to Objection 2. It is the function of the active intellect to enlighten, not another intellect, but things which are intelligible in potentiality, in so far as by abstraction it makes them to be actually intelligible. It belongs to the passive intellect to be in potentiality with regard to things which are naturally capable of being known, and sometimes to apprehend them actually. Hence for one angel to enlighten another does not belong to the notion of an active intellect: neither does it belong to the passive intellect for the angel to be enlightened with regard to supernatural mysteries, to the knowledge of which he is sometimes in potentiality. But if anyone wishes to call these by the names of active and passive intellect, he will then be speaking equivocally; and it is not about names that we need trouble.
Iª q. 54 a. 5 arg. 1 Ad quintum sic proceditur. Videtur quod in Angelis non sit sola intellectiva cognitio. Dicit enim Augustinus, VIII de Civ. Dei, quod in Angelis est vita quae intelligit et sentit. Ergo in eis est potentia sensitiva. Objection 1. It would seem that the knowledge of the angels is not exclusively intellectual. For Augustine says (De Civ. Dei viii) that in the angels there is "life which understands and feels." Therefore there is a sensitive faculty in them as well.
Iª q. 54 a. 5 arg. 2 Praeterea, Isidorus dicit quod Angeli multa noverunt per experientiam. Experientia autem fit ex multis memoriis, ut dicitur in I Metaphys. Ergo in eis est etiam memorativa potentia. Objection 2. Further, Isidore says (De Summo Bono) that the angels have learnt many things by experience. But experience comes of many remembrances, as stated in Metaph. i, 1. Consequently they have likewise a power of memory.
Iª q. 54 a. 5 arg. 3 Praeterea, Dionysius dicit, IV cap. de Div. Nom., quod in Daemonibus est phantasia proterva. Phantasia autem ad vim imaginativam pertinet. Ergo in Daemonibus est vis imaginativa. Et eadem ratione in Angelis, quia sunt eiusdem naturae. Objection 3. Further, Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv) that there is a sort of "perverted phantasy" in the demons. But phantasy belongs to the imaginative faculty. Therefore the power of the imagination is in the demons; and for the same reason it is in the angels, since they are of the same nature.
Iª q. 54 a. 5 s. c. Sed contra est quod Gregorius dicit, in homilia de ascensione, quod homo sentit cum pecoribus, et intelligit cum Angelis. On the contrary, Gregory says (Hom. 29 in Ev.), that "man senses in common with the brutes, and understands with the angels."
Iª q. 54 a. 5 co. Respondeo dicendum quod in anima nostra sunt quaedam vires, quarum operationes per organa corporea exercentur, et huiusmodi vires sunt actus quarundam partium corporis, sicut est visus in oculo, et auditus in aure. Quaedam vero vires animae nostrae sunt, quarum operationes per organa corporea non exercentur, ut intellectus et voluntas, et huiusmodi non sunt actus aliquarum partium corporis. Angeli autem non habent corpora sibi naturaliter unita, ut ex supra dictis patet. Unde de viribus animae non possunt eis competere nisi intellectus et voluntas. Et hoc etiam Commentator dicit, XII Metaphys., quod substantiae separatae dividuntur in intellectum et voluntatem. Et hoc convenit ordini universi, ut suprema creatura intellectualis sit totaliter intellectiva; et non secundum partem, ut anima nostra. Et propter hoc etiam Angeli vocantur intellectus et mentes, ut supra dictum est. I answer that, In our soul there are certain powers whose operations are exercised by corporeal organs; such powers are acts of sundry parts of the body, as sight of the eye, and hearing of the ear. There are some other powers of the soul whose operations are not performed through bodily organs, as intellect and will: these are not acts of any parts of the body. Now the angels have no bodies naturally joined to them, as is manifest from what has been said already (51, 1). Hence of the soul's powers only intellect and will can belong to them. The Commentator (Metaph. xii) says the same thing, namely, that the separated substances are divided into intellect and will. And it is in keeping with the order of the universe for the highest intellectual creature to be entirely intelligent; and not in part, as is our soul. For this reason the angels are called "intellects" and "minds," as was said above (3, ad 1).
Iª q. 54 a. 5 ad 1 Ad ea vero quae in contrarium obiiciuntur, potest dupliciter responderi. Uno modo, quod auctoritates illae loquuntur secundum opinionem illorum qui posuerunt Angelos et Daemones habere corpora naturaliter sibi unita. Qua opinione frequenter Augustinus in libris suis utitur, licet eam asserere non intendat, unde dicit, XXI de Civ. Dei, quod super hac inquisitione non est multum laborandum. Alio modo potest dici, quod auctoritates illae, et consimiles, sunt intelligendae per quandam similitudinem. Quia cum sensus certam apprehensionem habeat de proprio sensibili, est in usu loquentium ut etiam secundum certam apprehensionem intellectus aliquid sentire dicamur. Unde etiam sententia nominatur. Experientia vero Angelis attribui potest per similitudinem cognitorum, etsi non per similitudinem virtutis cognoscitivae. Est enim in nobis experientia, dum singularia per sensum cognoscimus, Angeli autem singularia cognoscunt, ut infra patebit, sed non per sensum. Sed tamen memoria in Angelis potest poni, secundum quod ab Augustino ponitur in mente; licet non possit eis competere secundum quod ponitur pars animae sensitivae. Similiter dicendum quod phantasia proterva attribuitur Daemonibus, ex eo quod habent falsam practicam existimationem de vero bono, deceptio autem in nobis proprie fit secundum phantasiam, per quam interdum similitudinibus rerum inhaeremus sicut rebus ipsis, ut patet in dormientibus et amentibus. A twofold answer can be returned to the contrary objections. First, it may be replied that those authorities are speaking according to the opinion of such men as contended that angels and demons have bodies naturally united to them. Augustine often makes use of this opinion in his books, although he does not mean to assert it; hence he says (De Civ. Dei xxi) that "such an inquiry does not call for much labor." Secondly, it may be said that such authorities and the like are to be understood by way of similitude. Because, since sense has a sure apprehension of its proper sensible object, it is a common usage of speech, when he understands something for certain, to say that we "sense it." And hence it is that we use the word "sentence." Experience can be attributed to the angels according to the likeness of the things known, although not by likeness of the faculty knowing them. We have experience when we know single objects through the senses: the angels likewise know single objects, as we shall show (57, 2), yet not through the senses. But memory can be allowed in the angels, according as Augustine (De Trin. x) puts it in the mind; although it cannot belong to them in so far as it is a part of the sensitive soul. In like fashion 'a perverted phantasy' is attributed to demons, since they have a false practical estimate of what is the true good; while deception in us comes properly from the phantasy, whereby we sometimes hold fast to images of things as to the things themselves, as is manifest in sleepers and lunatics.

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