Authors/Thomas Aquinas/Summa Theologiae/Part I/Q53

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Q52 Q54



Latin English
Iª q. 53 pr. Consequenter considerandum est de motu locali Angelorum. Et circa hoc quaeruntur tria. Primo, utrum Angelus possit moveri localiter. Secundo, utrum moveatur de loco ad locum, pertranseundo medium. Tertio, utrum motus Angeli sit in tempore vel in instanti.
Iª q. 53 a. 1 arg. 1 Ad primum sic proceditur. Videtur quod Angelus non possit moveri localiter. Ut enim probat philosophus in VI Physic., nullum impartibile movetur, quia dum aliquid est in termino a quo, non movetur; nec etiam dum est in termino ad quem, sed tunc mutatum est, unde relinquitur quod omne quod movetur, dum movetur, partim est in termino a quo, et partim in termino ad quem. Sed Angelus est impartibilis. Ergo Angelus non potest moveri localiter. Objection 1. It seems that an angel cannot be moved locally. For, as the Philosopher proves (Phys. vi, text 32,86) "nothing which is devoid of parts is moved"; because, while it is in the term "wherefrom," it is not moved; nor while it is in the term "whereto," for it is then already moved; consequently it remains that everything which is moved, while it is being moved, is partly in the term "wherefrom" and partly in the term "whereto." But an angel is without parts. Therefore an angel cannot be moved locally.
Iª q. 53 a. 1 arg. 2 Praeterea, motus est actus imperfecti, ut dicitur in III Physic. Sed Angelus beatus non est imperfectus. Ergo Angelus beatus non movetur localiter. Objection 2. Further, movement is "the act of an imperfect being," as the Philosopher says (Phys. iii, text 14). But a beatified angel is not imperfect. Consequently a beatified angel is not moved locally.
Iª q. 53 a. 1 arg. 3 Praeterea, motus non est nisi propter indigentiam. Sed sanctorum Angelorum nulla est indigentia. Ergo sancti Angeli localiter non moventur. Objection 3. Further, movement is simply because of want. But the holy angels have no want. Therefore the holy angels are not moved locally.
Iª q. 53 a. 1 s. c. Sed contra, eiusdem rationis est Angelum beatum moveri, et animam beatam moveri. Sed necesse est dicere animam beatam localiter moveri, cum sit articulus fidei quod Christus secundum animam, descendit ad Inferos. Ergo Angelus beatus movetur localiter. On the contrary, It is the same thing for a beatified angel to be moved as for a beatified soul to be moved. But it must necessarily be said that a blessed soul is moved locally, because it is an article of faith that Christ's soul descended into Hell. Therefore a beatified angel is moved locally.
Iª q. 53 a. 1 co. Respondeo dicendum quod Angelus beatus potest moveri localiter. Sed sicut esse in loco aequivoce convenit corpori et Angelo, ita etiam et moveri secundum locum. Corpus enim est in loco, inquantum continetur sub loco, et commensuratur loco. Unde oportet quod etiam motus corporis secundum locum, commensuretur loco, et sit secundum exigentiam eius. Et inde est quod secundum continuitatem magnitudinis est continuitas motus; et secundum prius et posterius in magnitudine, est prius et posterius in motu locali corporis, ut dicitur in IV Physic. Sed Angelus non est in loco ut commensuratus et contentus, sed magis ut continens. Unde motus Angeli in loco, non oportet quod commensuretur loco, nec quod sit secundum exigentiam eius, ut habeat continuitatem ex loco; sed est motus non continuus. Quia enim Angelus non est in loco nisi secundum contactum virtutis, ut dictum est, necesse est quod motus Angeli in loco nihil aliud sit quam diversi contactus diversorum locorum successive et non simul, quia Angelus non potest simul esse in pluribus locis, ut supra dictum est. Huiusmodi autem contactus non est necessarium esse continuos. Potest tamen in huiusmodi contactibus continuitas quaedam inveniri. Quia, ut dictum est, nihil prohibet Angelo assignare locum divisibilem, per contactum suae virtutis; sicut corpori assignatur locus divisibilis, per contactum suae magnitudinis. Unde sicut corpus successive, et non simul, dimittit locum in quo prius erat, et ex hoc causatur continuitas in motu locali eius; ita etiam Angelus potest dimittere successive locum divisibilem in quo prius erat, et sic motus eius erit continuus. Et potest etiam totum locum simul dimittere, et toti alteri loco simul se applicare, et sic motus eius non erit continuus. I answer that, A beatified angel can be moved locally. As, however, to be in a place belongs equivocally to a body and to an angel, so likewise does local movement. For a body is in a place in so far as it is contained under the place, and is commensurate with the place. Hence it is necessary for local movement of a body to be commensurate with the place, and according to its exigency. Hence it is that the continuity of movement is according to the continuity of magnitude; and according to priority and posteriority of local movement, as the Philosopher says (Phys. iv, text 99). But an angel is not in a place as commensurate and contained, but rather as containing it. Hence it is not necessary for the local movement of an angel to be commensurate with the place, nor for it to be according to the exigency of the place, so as to have continuity therefrom; but it is a non-continuous movement. For since the angel is in a place only by virtual contact, as was said above (52, 1), it follows necessarily that the movement of an angel in a place is nothing else than the various contacts of various places successively, and not at once; because an angel cannot be in several places at one time, as was said above (52, 2). Nor is it necessary for these contacts to be continuous. Nevertheless a certain kind of continuity can be found in such contacts. Because, as was said above (52, 1), there is nothing to hinder us from assigning a divisible place to an angel according to virtual contact; just as a divisible place is assigned to a body by contact of magnitude. Hence as a body successively, and not all at once, quits the place in which it was before, and thence arises continuity in its local movement; so likewise an angel can successively quit the divisible place in which he was before, and so his movement will be continuous. And he can all at once quit the whole place, and in the same instant apply himself to the whole of another place, and thus his movement will not be continuous.
Iª q. 53 a. 1 ad 1 Ad primum ergo dicendum quod illa ratio dupliciter deficit in proposito. Primo quidem, quia demonstratio Aristotelis procedit de indivisibili secundum quantitatem, cui respondet locus de necessitate indivisibilis. Quod non potest dici de Angelo. Secundo, quia demonstratio Aristotelis procedit de motu continuo. Si enim motus non esset continuus, posset dici quod aliquid movetur dum est in termino a quo, et dum est in termino ad quem, quia ipsa successio diversorum ubi circa eandem rem, motus diceretur; unde in quolibet illorum ubi res esset, illa posset dici moveri. Sed continuitas motus hoc impedit, quia nullum continuum est in termino suo, ut patet, quia linea non est in puncto. Et ideo oportet quod illud quod movetur, non sit totaliter in altero terminorum, dum movetur; sed partim in uno, et partim in altero. Secundum ergo quod motus Angeli non est continuus, demonstratio Aristotelis non procedit in proposito. Sed secundum quod motus Angeli ponitur continuus, sic concedi potest quod Angelus, dum movetur, partim est in termino a quo, et partim in termino ad quem (ut tamen partialitas non referatur ad substantiam Angeli, sed ad locum), quia in principio sui motus continui, Angelus est in toto loco divisibili a quo incipit moveri; sed dum est in ipso moveri, est in parte primi loci quem deserit, et in parte secundi loci quem occupat. Et hoc quidem quod possit occupare partes duorum locorum, competit Angelo ex hoc quod potest occupare locum divisibilem per applicationem suae virtutis sicut corpus per applicationem magnitudinis. Unde sequitur de corpore mobili secundum locum, quod sit divisibile secundum magnitudinem de Angelo autem, quod virtus eius possit applicari alicui divisibili. Reply to Objection 1. This argument fails of its purpose for a twofold reason. First of all, because Aristotle's demonstration deals with what is indivisible according to quantity, to which responds a place necessarily indivisible. And this cannot be said of an angel. Secondly, because Aristotle's demonstration deals with movement which is continuous. For if the movement were not continuous, it might be said that a thing is moved where it is in the term "wherefrom," and while it is in the term "whereto": because the very succession of "wheres," regarding the same thing, would be called movement: hence, in whichever of those "wheres" the thing might be, it could be said to be moved. But the continuity of movement prevents this; because nothing which is continuous is in its term, as is clear, because the line is not in the point. Therefore it is necessary for the thing moved to be not totally in either of the terms while it is being moved; but partly in the one, and partly in the other. Therefore, according as the angel's movement is not continuous, Aristotle's demonstration does not hold good. But according as the angel's movement is held to be continuous, it can be so granted, that, while an angel is in movement, he is partly in the term "wherefrom," and partly in the term "whereto" (yet so that such partiality be not referred to the angel's substance, but to the place); because at the outset of his continuous movement the angel is in the whole divisible place from which he begins to be moved; but while he is actually in movement, he is in part of the first place which he quits, and in part of the second place which he occupies. This very fact that he can occupy the parts of two places appertains to the angel from this, that he can occupy a divisible place by applying his power; as a body does by application of magnitude. Hence it follows regarding a body which is movable according to place, that it is divisible according to magnitude; but regarding an angel, that his power can be applied to something which is divisible.
Iª q. 53 a. 1 ad 2 Ad secundum dicendum quod motus existentis in potentia, est actus imperfecti. Sed motus qui est secundum applicationem virtutis, est existentis in actu, quia virtus rei est secundum quod actu est. Reply to Objection 2. The movement of that which is in potentiality is the act of an imperfect agent. But the movement which is by application of energy is the act of one in act: because energy implies actuality.
Iª q. 53 a. 1 ad 3 Ad tertium dicendum quod motus existentis in potentia, est propter indigentiam suam, sed motus existentis in actu, non est propter indigentiam suam, sed propter indigentiam alterius. Et hoc modo Angelus, propter indigentiam nostram, localiter movetur, secundum illud Heb. I, omnes sunt administratorii spiritus, in ministerium missi propter eos qui haereditatem capiunt salutis. Reply to Objection 3. The movement of that which is in potentiality is the act of an imperfect but the movement of what is in act is not for any need of its own, but for another's need. In this way, because of our need, the angel is moved locally, according to Heb. 1:14: "They are all [Vulg.: 'Are they not all . . . ?'] ministering spirits, sent to minister for them who receive the inheritance of salvation."
Iª q. 53 a. 2 arg. 1 Ad secundum sic proceditur. Videtur quod Angelus non transeat per medium. Omne enim quod pertransit medium, prius pertransit locum sibi aequalem, quam maiorem. Locus autem aequalis Angeli, qui est indivisibilis, est locus punctalis. Si ergo Angelus in suo motu pertransit medium, oportet quod numeret puncta infinita suo motu, quod est impossibile. Objection 1. It would seem that an angel does not pass through intermediate space. For everything that passes through a middle space first travels along a place of its own dimensions, before passing through a greater. But the place responding to an angel, who is indivisible, is confined to a point. Therefore if the angel passes through middle space, he must reckon infinite points in his movement: which is not possible.
Iª q. 53 a. 2 arg. 2 Praeterea, Angelus est simplicioris substantiae quam anima nostra. Sed anima nostra sua cogitatione potest transire de uno extremo in aliud, non pertranseundo medium, possum enim cogitare Galliam et postea Syriam, nihil cogitando de Italia, quae est in medio. Ergo multo magis Angelus potest de uno extremo transire ad aliud, non per medium. Objection 2. Further, an angel is of simpler substance than the soul. But our soul by taking thought can pass from one extreme to another without going through the middle: for I can think of France and afterwards of Syria, without ever thinking of Italy, which stands between them. Therefore much more can an angel pass from one extreme to another without going through the middle.
Iª q. 53 a. 2 s. c. Sed contra, si Angelus movetur de uno loco ad alium, quando est in termino ad quem, non movetur, sed mutatus est. Sed ante omne mutatum esse praecedit mutari, ergo alicubi existens movebatur. Sed non movebatur dum erat in termino a quo. Movebatur ergo dum erat in medio. Et ita oportet quod pertranseat medium. On the contrary, If the angel be moved from one place to another, then, when he is in the term "whither," he is no longer in motion, but is changed. But a process of changing precedes every actual change: consequently he was being moved while existing in some place. But he was not moved so long as he was in the term "whence." Therefore, he was moved while he was in mid-space: and so it was necessary for him to pass through intervening space.
Iª q. 53 a. 2 co. Respondeo dicendum quod, sicut supra dictum est, motus localis Angeli potest esse continuus, et non continuus. Si ergo sit continuus, non potest Angelus moveri de uno extremo in alterum, quin transeat per medium, quia, ut dicitur in V Physic., medium est in quod prius venit quod continue mutatur, quam in quod mutatur ultimum; ordo enim prioris et posterioris in motu continuo, est secundum ordinem prioris et posterioris in magnitudine, ut dicitur in IV Physic. Si autem motus Angeli non sit continuus, possibile est quod pertranseat de aliquo extremo in aliud, non pertransito medio. Quod sic patet. Inter quaelibet enim duo extrema loca sunt infinita loca media; sive accipiantur loca divisibilia, sive indivisibilia. Et de indivisibilibus quidem manifestum est, quia inter quaelibet duo puncta sunt infinita puncta media, cum nulla duo puncta consequantur se invicem sine medio, ut in VI Physic. probatur. De locis autem divisibilibus necesse est etiam hoc dicere. Et hoc demonstratur ex motu continuo alicuius corporis. Corpus enim non movetur de loco ad locum nisi in tempore. In toto autem tempore mensurante motum corporis, non est accipere duo nunc, in quibus corpus quod movetur non sit in alio et alio loco, quia si in uno et eodem loco esset in duobus nunc, sequeretur quod ibi quiesceret; cum nihil aliud sit quiescere quam in loco eodem esse nunc et prius. Cum igitur inter primum nunc et ultimum temporis mensurantis motum, sint infinita nunc, oportet quod inter primum locum, a quo incipit moveri, et ultimum locum, ad quem terminatur motus, sint infinita loca. Et hoc sic etiam sensibiliter apparet. Sit enim unum corpus unius palmi, et sit via per quam transit, duorum palmorum, manifestum est quod locus primus, a quo incipit motus, est unius palmi; et locus, ad quem terminatur motus, est alterius palmi. Manifestum est autem quod, quando incipit moveri, paulatim deserit primum palmum, et subintrat secundum. Secundum ergo quod dividitur magnitudo palmi, secundum hoc multiplicantur loca media, quia quodlibet punctum signatum in magnitudine primi palmi, est principium unius loci; et punctum signatum in magnitudine alterius palmi, est terminus eiusdem. Unde cum magnitudo sit divisibilis in infinitum, et puncta sint etiam infinita in potentia in qualibet magnitudine; sequitur quod inter quaelibet duo loca sint infinita loca media. Mobile autem infinitatem mediorum locorum non consumit nisi per continuitatem motus, quia sicut loca media sunt infinita in potentia, ita et in motu continuo est accipere infinita quaedam in potentia. Si ergo motus non sit continuus, omnes partes motus erunt numeratae in actu. Si ergo mobile quodcumque moveatur motu non continuo, sequitur quod vel non transeat omnia media, vel quod actu numeret media infinita, quod est impossibile. Sic igitur secundum quod motus Angeli non est continuus, non pertransit omnia media. Hoc autem, scilicet moveri de extremo in extremum et non per medium, potest convenire Angelo sed non corpori. Quia corpus mensuratur et continetur sub loco, unde oportet quod sequatur leges loci in suo motu. Sed substantia Angeli non est subdita loco ut contenta, sed est superior eo ut continens, unde in potestate eius est applicare se loco prout vult, vel per medium vel sine medio. I answer that, As was observed above in the preceding article, the local motion of an angel can be continuous, and non-continuous. If it be continuous, the angel cannot pass from one extreme to another without passing through the mid-space; because, as is said by the Philosopher (Phys. v, text 22; vi, text 77), "The middle is that into which a thing which is continually moved comes, before arriving at the last into which it is moved"; because the order of first and last in continuous movement, is according to the order of the first and last in magnitude, as he says (Phys. iv, text 99). But if an angel's movement be not continuous, it is possible for him to pass from one extreme to another without going through the middle: which is evident thus. Between the two extreme limits there are infinite intermediate places; whether the places be taken as divisible or as indivisible. This is clearly evident with regard to places which are indivisible; because between every two points that are infinite intermediate points, since no two points follow one another without a middle, as is proved in Phys. vi, text. 1. And the same must of necessity be said of divisible places: and this is shown from the continuous movement of a body. For a body is not moved from place to place except in time. But in the whole time which measures the movement of a body, there are not two "nows" in which the body moved is not in one place and in another; for if it were in one and the same place in two "nows," it would follow that it would be at rest there; since to be at rest is nothing else than to be in the same place now and previously. Therefore since there are infinite "nows" between the first and the last "now" of the time which measures the movement, there must be infinite places between the first from which the movement begins, and the last where the movement ceases. This again is made evident from sensible experience. Let there be a body of a palm's length, and let there be a plane measuring two palms, along which it travels; it is evident that the first place from which the movement starts is that of the one palm; and the place wherein the movement ends is that of the other palm. Now it is clear that when it begins to move, it gradually quits the first palm and enters the second. According, then, as the magnitude of the palm is divided, even so are the intermediate places multiplied; because every distinct point in the magnitude of the first palm is the beginning of a place, and a distinct point in the magnitude of the other palm is the limit of the same. Accordingly, since magnitude is infinitely divisible and the points in every magnitude are likewise infinite in potentiality, it follows that between every two places there are infinite intermediate places. Now a movable body only exhausts the infinity of the intermediate places by the continuity of its movement; because, as the intermediate places are infinite in potentiality, so likewise must there be reckoned some infinitudes in movement which is continuous. Consequently, if the movement be not continuous, then all the parts of the movement will be actually numbered. If, therefore, any movable body be moved, but not by continuous movement, it follows, either that it does not pass through all the intermediate places, or else that it actually numbers infinite places: which is not possible. Accordingly, then, as the angel's movement is not continuous, he does not pass through all intermediate places. Now, the actual passing from one extreme to the other, without going through the mid-space, is quite in keeping with an angel's nature; but not with that of a body, because a body is measured by and contained under a place; hence it is bound to follow the laws of place in its movement. But an angel's substance is not subject to place as contained thereby, but is above it as containing it: hence it is under his control to apply himself to a place just as he wills, either through or without the intervening place.
Iª q. 53 a. 2 ad 1 Ad primum ergo dicendum quod locus Angeli non accipitur ei aequalis secundum magnitudinem, sed secundum contactum virtutis, et sic locus Angeli potest esse divisibilis, et non semper punctalis. Sed tamen loca media etiam divisibilia, sunt infinita, ut dictum est, sed consumuntur per continuitatem motus, ut patet ex praedictis. Reply to Objection 1. The place of an angel is not taken as equal to him according to magnitude, but according to contact of power: and so the angel's place can be divisible, and is not always a mere point. Yet even the intermediate divisible places are infinite, as was said above: but they are consumed by the continuity of the movement, as is evident from the foregoing.
Iª q. 53 a. 2 ad 2 Ad secundum dicendum quod Angelus dum movetur localiter, applicatur eius essentia diversis locis, animae autem essentia non applicatur rebus quas cogitat, sed potius res cogitatae sunt in ipsa. Et ideo non est simile. Reply to Objection 2. While an angel is moved locally, his essence is applied to various places: but the soul's essence is not applied to the things thought of, but rather the things thought of are in it. So there is no comparison.
Iª q. 53 a. 2 ad 3 Ad tertium dicendum quod in motu continuo mutatum esse non est pars moveri, sed terminus unde oportet quod moveri sit ante mutatum esse. Et ideo oportet quod talis motus sit per medium. Sed in motu non continuo mutatum esse est pars, sicut unitas est pars numeri, unde successio diversorum locorum, etiam sine medio, constituit talem motum. Reply to Objection 3. In continuous movement the actual change is not a part of the movement, but its conclusion; hence movement must precede change. Accordingly such movement is through the mid-space. But in movement which is not continuous, the change is a part, as a unit is a part of number: hence the succession of the various places, even without the mid-space, constitutes such movement.
Iª q. 53 a. 3 arg. 1 Ad tertium sic proceditur. Videtur quod motus Angeli sit in instanti. Quanto enim virtus motoris fuerit fortior, et mobile minus resistens motori, tanto motus est velocior. Sed virtus Angeli moventis seipsum, improportionabiliter excedit virtutem moventem aliquod corpus. Proportio autem velocitatum est secundum minorationem temporis. Omne autem tempus omni tempori proportionabile est. Si igitur aliquod corpus movetur in tempore, Angelus movetur in instanti. Objection 1. It would seem that an angel's movement is instantaneous. For the greater the power of the mover, and the less the moved resist the mover, the more rapid is the movement. But the power of an angel moving himself exceeds beyond all proportion the power which moves a body. Now the proportion of velocities is reckoned according to the lessening of the time. But between one length of time and any other length of time there is proportion. If therefore a body is moved in time, an angel is moved in an instant.
Iª q. 53 a. 3 arg. 2 Praeterea, motus Angeli simplicior est quam aliqua mutatio corporalis. Sed aliqua mutatio corporalis est in instanti, ut illuminatio, tum quia non illuminatur aliquid successive, sicut calefit successive; tum quia radius non prius pertingit ad propinquum quam ad remotum. Ergo multo magis motus Angeli est in instanti. Objection 2. Further, the angel's movement is simpler than any bodily change. But some bodily change is effected in an instant, such as illumination; both because the subject is not illuminated successively, as it gets hot successively; and because a ray does not reach sooner what is near than what is remote. Much more therefore is the angel's movement instantaneous.
Iª q. 53 a. 3 arg. 3 Praeterea, si Angelus movetur in tempore de loco ad locum, manifestum est quod in ultimo instanti illius temporis est in termino ad quem, in toto autem tempore praecedenti, aut est in loco immediate praecedenti, qui accipitur ut terminus a quo; aut partim in uno et partim in alio. Si autem partim in uno et partim in alio, sequitur quod sit partibilis, quod est impossibile. Ergo in toto tempore praecedenti est in termino a quo. Ergo quiescit ibi, cum quiescere sit in eodem esse nunc et prius, ut dictum est. Et sic sequitur quod non moveatur nisi in ultimo instanti temporis. Objection 3. Further, if an angel be moved from place to place in time, it is manifest that in the last instant of such time he is in the term "whereto": but in the whole of the preceding time, he is either in the place immediately preceding, which is taken as the term "wherefrom"; or else he is partly in the one, and partly in the other, it follows that he is divisible; which is impossible. Therefore during the whole of the preceding time he is in the term "wherefrom." Therefore he rests there: since to be at rest is to be in the same place now and previously, as was said (2). Therefore it follows that he is not moved except in the last instant of time.
Iª q. 53 a. 3 s. c. Sed contra, in omni mutatione est prius et posterius. Sed prius et posterius motus numeratur secundum tempus. Ergo omnis motus est in tempore, etiam motus Angeli; cum in eo sit prius et posterius. On the contrary, In every change there is a before and after. Now the before and after of movement is reckoned by time. Consequently every movement, even of an angel, is in time, since there is a before and after in it.
Iª q. 53 a. 3 co. Respondeo dicendum quod quidam dixerunt motum localem Angeli esse in instanti. Dicebant enim quod, cum Angelus movetur de uno loco ad alium, in toto tempore praecedenti Angelus est in termino a quo in ultimo autem instanti illius temporis est in termino ad quem. Nec oportet esse aliquod medium inter duos terminos; sicut non est aliquod medium inter tempus et terminum temporis. Inter duo autem nunc temporis, est tempus medium, unde dicunt quod non est dare ultimum nunc in quo fuit in termino a quo. Sicut in illuminatione, et in generatione substantiali ignis, non est dare ultimum instans in quo aer fuit tenebrosus, vel in quo materia fuit sub privatione formae ignis, sed est dare ultimum tempus, ita quod in ultimo illius temporis est vel lumen in aere, vel forma ignis in materia. Et sic illuminatio et generatio substantialis dicuntur motus instantanei. Sed hoc non habet locum in proposito. Quod sic ostenditur. De ratione enim quietis est quod quiescens non aliter se habeat nunc et prius, et ideo in quolibet nunc temporis mensurantis quietem, quiescens est in eodem et in primo, et in medio, et in ultimo. Sed de ratione motus est quod id quod movetur, aliter se habeat nunc et prius, et ideo in quolibet nunc temporis mensurantis motum, mobile se habet in alia et alia dispositione, unde oportet quod in ultimo nunc habeat formam quam prius non habebat. Et sic patet quod quiescere in toto tempore in aliquo, puta in albedine, est esse in illo in quolibet instanti illius temporis, unde non est possibile ut aliquid in toto tempore praecedenti quiescat in uno termino et postea in ultimo instanti illius temporis sit in alio termino. Sed hoc est possibile in motu, quia moveri in toto aliquo tempore, non est esse in eadem dispositione in quolibet instanti illius temporis. Igitur omnes huiusmodi mutationes instantaneae sunt termini motus continui, sicut generatio est terminus alterationis materiae, et illuminatio terminus motus localis corporis illuminantis. Motus autem localis Angeli non est terminus alicuius alterius motus continui, sed est per seipsum, a nullo alio motu dependens. Unde impossibile est dicere quod in toto tempore sit in aliquo loco, et in ultimo nunc sit in alio loco. Sed oportet assignare nunc in quo ultimo fuit in loco praecedenti. Ubi autem sunt multa nunc sibi succedentia, ibi de necessitate est tempus, cum tempus nihil aliud sit quam numeratio prioris et posterioris in motu. Unde relinquitur quod motus Angeli sit in tempore. In continuo quidem tempore, si sit motus eius continuus; in non continuo autem, si motus sit non continuus (utroque enim modo contingit esse motum Angeli, ut dictum est), continuitas enim temporis est ex continuitate motus, ut dicitur in IV Physic. Sed istud tempus, sive sit tempus continuum sive non, non est idem cum tempore quod mensurat motum caeli, et quo mensurantur omnia corporalia, quae habent mutabilitatem ex motu caeli. Motus enim Angeli non dependet ex motu caeli. I answer that, Some have maintained that the local movement of an angel is instantaneous. They said that when an angel is moved from place to place, during the whole of the preceding time he is in the term "wherefrom"; but in the last instant of such time he is in the term "whereto." Nor is there any need for a medium between the terms, just as there is no medium between time and the limit of time. But there is a mid-time between two "nows" of time: hence they say that a last "now" cannot be assigned in which it was in the term "wherefrom," just as in illumination, and in the substantial generation of fire, there is no last instant to be assigned in which the air was dark, or in which the matter was under the privation of the form of fire: but a last time can be assigned, so that in the last instant of such time there is light in the air, or the form of fire in the matter. And so illumination and substantial generation are called instantaneous movements. But this does not hold good in the present case; and it is shown thus. It is of the nature of rest that the subject in repose be not otherwise disposed now than it was before: and therefore in every "now" of time which measures rest, the subject reposing is in the same "where" in the first, in the middle, and in the last "now." On the other hand, it is of the very nature of movement for the subject moved to be otherwise now than it was before: and therefore in every "now" of time which measures movement, the movable subject is in various dispositions; hence in the last "now" it must have a different form from what it had before. So it is evident that to rest during the whole time in some (disposition), for instance, in whiteness, is to be in it in every instant of such time. Hence it is not possible for anything to rest in one term during the whole of the preceding time, and afterwards in the last instant of that time to be in the other term. But this is possible in movement: because to be moved in any whole time, is not to be in the same disposition in every instant of that time. Therefore all instantaneous changes of the kind are terms of a continuous movement: just as generation is the term of the alteration of matter, and illumination is the term of the local movement of the illuminating body. Now the local movement of an angel is not the term of any other continuous movement, but is of itself, depending upon no other movement. Consequently it is impossible to say that he is in any place during the whole time, and that in the last "now" he is in another place: but some "now" must be assigned in which he was last in the preceding place. But where there are many "nows" succeeding one another, there is necessarily time; since time is nothing else than the reckoning of before and after in movement. It remains, then, that the movement of an angel is in time. It is in continuous time if his movement be continuous, and in non-continuous time if his movement is non-continuous for, as was said (1), his movement can be of either kind, since the continuity of time comes of the continuity of movement, as the Philosopher says (Phys. iv, text 99). But that time, whether it be continuous or not, is not the same as the time which measures the movement of the heavens, and whereby all corporeal things are measured, which have their changeableness from the movement of the heavens; because the angel's movement does not depend upon the movement of the heavens.
Iª q. 53 a. 3 ad 1 Ad primum ergo dicendum quod, si tempus motus Angeli non sit continuum, sed successio quaedam ipsorum nunc, non habebit proportionem ad tempus quod mensurat motum corporalium, quod est continuum, cum non sit eiusdem rationis. Si vero sit continuum, est quidem proportionabile, non quidem propter proportionem moventis et mobilis sed propter proportionem magnitudinum in quibus est motus. Et praeterea, velocitas motus Angeli non est secundum quantitatem suae virtutis; sed secundum determinationem suae voluntatis. Reply to Objection 1. If the time of the angel's movement be not continuous, but a kind of succession of 'nows,' it will have no proportion to the time which measures the movement of corporeal things, which is continuous; since it is not of the same nature. If, however, it be continuous, it is indeed proportionable, not, indeed, because of the proportion of the mover and the movable, but on account of the proportion of the magnitudes in which the movement exists. Besides, the swiftness of the angel's movement is not measured by the quantity of his power, but according to the determination of his will.
Iª q. 53 a. 3 ad 2 Ad secundum dicendum quod illuminatio est terminus motus; et est alteratio, non motus localis ut intelligatur lumen moveri prius ad propinquum, quam ad remotum. Motus autem Angeli est localis, et non est terminus motus. Unde non est simile. Reply to Objection 2. Illumination is the term of a movement; and is an alteration, not a local movement, as though the light were understood to be moved to what is near, before being moved to what is remote. But the angel's movement is local, and, besides, it is not the term of movement; hence there is no comparison.
Iª q. 53 a. 3 ad 3 Ad tertium dicendum quod obiectio illa procedit de tempore continuo. Tempus autem motus Angeli potest esse non continuum. Et sic Angelus in uno instanti potest esse in uno loco, et in alio instanti in alio loco, nullo tempore intermedio existente. Si autem tempus motus Angeli sit continuum, Angelus in toto tempore praecedenti ultimum nunc, variatur per infinita loca, ut prius expositum est. Est tamen partim in uno locorum continuorum et partim in alio, non quod substantia illius sit partibilis; sed quia virtus sua applicatur ad partem primi loci et ad partem secundi, ut etiam supra dictum est. Reply to Objection 3. This objection is based on continuous time. But the same time of an angel's movement can be non-continuous. So an angel can be in one place in one instant, and in another place in the next instant, without any time intervening. If the time of the angel's movement be continuous, he is changed through infinite places throughout the whole time which precedes the last 'now'; as was already shown (2). Nevertheless he is partly in one of the continuous places, and partly in another, not because his substance is susceptible of parts, but because his power is applied to a part of the first place and to a part of the second, as was said above (2).

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