Authors/Ockham/Summa Logicae/Book I/Chapter 73

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Latin English
[CAP. 73. DE SUPPOSITIONE CONFUSA TANTUM ET DE REGULIS EIUS] [Chapter 73. On 'merely confused' supposition and its rules]
Viso quae est suppositio determinata, videndum est de suppositione confusa tantum. Circa quam diversae regulae dantur. Una est quod quando terminus communis sequitur signum universale affirmativum mediate, tunc stat confuse tantum, hoc est semper in universali affirmativa praedicatum supponit confuse tantum, sicut in ista 'omnis homo est animal', 'omnis homo est albus', et sic de aliis. Sed quantumcumque signum universale ponatur a parte subiecti, si tamen propositio non sit universalis affirmativa, nec signum universale distribuit totum subiectum, praedicatum non supponit confuse tantum. Having looked at what determinate supposition is, we should look at supposition that is 'merely confused'.  Concerning this, various rules are given.  One is that when a common term mediately follows the affirmative universal sign, then it stands merely confusedly, i.e. in the universal affirmative the predicate supposits merely confusedly, for example in 'every man is an animal', 'every man is white', and so on.  But however much the universal sign is given on the side of the subject, nevertheless if the proposition is not universal affirmative, the universal sign neither distributes for its whole subject, and the predicate does not supposit merely confusedly.
Verbi gratia in ista 'videns omnem hominem est animal', li animal stat determinate, quia signum universale non distribuit totum subiectum, nec reddit istam propositionem universalem, ideo praedicatum non stat confuse tantum. Similiter est de ista 'creator omnium creabilium est ens', li ens stat determinate et non confuse tantum. For example, in 'someone seeing every man is an animal', the word 'animal' stands determinately, because the universal sign does not distribute the whole subject, nor does it make a universal proposition, therefore the predicate does not stand merely confusedly.  It is similar with 'a creator of all creatable things is a being', the word 'being' stands determinately and not merely confusedly.
Alia regula datur, quod quando aliquod signum universale vel includens aequivalenter signum universale praecedit terminum a parte eiusdem extremi, ita tamen quod non determinat totum praecedens copulam, facit illud quod sequitur a parte eiusdem extremi stare confuse tantum, illo modo loquendo quo pars extremi potest supponere et stare. Ita quod tunc sub illo non contingit descendere ad disiunctivam, sicut patet hic 'omni tempore aliquod creabile fuit'; similiter hic 'omni tempore post Adam aliquis homo fuit'. Hic li homo supponit confuse tantum, quia si supponeret determinate vel confuse et distributive, esset falsa, quia quaelibet singularis est falsa, patet inductive. Another rule is given that when some universal sign or one equivalently including the universal sign precedes a term on the side of the same extreme, but so that it does not determine the whole preceding copula, it makes what follows on the side of the same extreme stand merely confusedly, speaking in that manner where part of the extreme can supposit and stand (for something).  So that, then, under that term it is not possible to descend to a disjunction, as is clear in the case of 'in every time there was something creatable', similarly in 'in every time after Adam some man existed'.  Here, the word 'man' supposits merely confusedly, because if it were to supposit determinately, or confusedly and distributively, it would be false, because every singular is false. This is clear by example.
Similiter idem patet hic 'usque ad finem mundi aliquod animal erit' vel 'aliquis asinus erit'. Similiter idem posset dici hic 'usque ad finem mundi homo erit', et hic 'tota die fuit aliquis homo hic intus', posito quod diversi homines diversis horis fuerunt hic intus. Similiter in talibus 'semper fuit homo', 'semper erit homo', et sic de multis talibus. Utrum autem istud sit tenendum de virtute sermonis vel non, non multum curo; tamen secundum usum loquentium, propter quem multum valet talia scire, oportet sic dicere. Similarly, the same thing is clear in 'until the end of the world, some animal will exist' or 'some donkey will exist'.  Similarly, the same can be said in 'until the end of the world a man will exist', given that diverse men were in here in diverse times [horis].  Similarly, in such propositions as 'there was always a man', 'there will always be a man', and so for many such.  But whether that should be held literally speaking, or not, I do not mind much.  Yet, according to the use of speakers, because of which it is greatly valid to know such things, I have to speak as follows.
Dixi autem 'quando istud syncategorema non determinat totum extremum', quia si simpliciter determinaret totum extremum, hoc est totum quod ponitur ab una parte verbi, tunc non esset verum. Sicut patet in ista 'omnis asinus hominis currit', nam li omnis determinat hoc totum 'asinus hominis' et non distribuit tantum li asinus nec li hominis tantum. Similiter est hic 'cuiuslibet hominis asinus currit': distribuitur hoc totum 'hominis asinus'. Now I have said that "when that syncategoremic term does not determine the whole extreme", for if it were to determine the whole extreme absolutely, i.e. the whole expression which occurs on one side of the verb, then it would not be true.  For example, this is clear in 'every donkey of a man can run', for the word 'every' determines the whole expression 'donkey of a man', and does not distribute 'donkey' only, nor the word 'man' only.  It is similar in 'every man's donkey runs' - the whole expression 'man's donkey' is distributed.
Unde isti termini 'hominis asinus, asinus hominis' ita sunt distribuibiles unica distributione sicut isti termini 'homo albus', 'animal album', et sic de aliis. Ita non est in istis 'tota die fuit aliquis homo hic intus', 'omni tempore post Adam aliquis homo fuit', nam hoc totum 'tempore post Adam aliquis homo' non potest esse subiectum respectu cuiuslibet verbi, sicut hoc totum 'hominis asinus' et similiter hoc totum 'asinus hominis' potest esse subiectum respectu cuiuslibet verbi. Hence the terms 'man's donkey', 'donkey of a man' are thus distributable by a unique distribution, just as the terms 'white man', 'white animal', and so on.  It is not so in 'for the whole day some man was within', 'at every time after Adam some man existed', for the whole expression 'time after Adam some man' cannot be the subject in respect of some verb, just as the whole expression 'man's donkey' and similarly the whole expression 'donkey of a man' can be the subject in respect of some verb.
Sive autem hoc sit proprie dictum sive non, non curo. Hoc tamen sciendum est quod quando etiam a parte eiusdem extremi signum universale affirmativum praecedit mediate terminum communem, non contingit descendere ad contenta sub illo termino communi nec copulative nec disiunctive, non plus quam si ille terminus communis esset extremum propositionis et supponeret confuse tantum. But whether this is properly expressed or not, I do not mind.  But it should be known that when the universal affirmative sign mediately precedes a common term, it is not possible to descend to the objects contained under the common term either copulatively or disjunctively, any more than if that common term were the extreme of the proposition and were to supposit merely confusedly.
Et hoc est intelligendum quando terminus immediate sequens et mediate sequens non sunt eiusdem casus vel quando non se habent sicut adiectivum et substantivum, quia si sic se haberent, ad neutrius contenta omnia contingit descendere. Sicut quando sic dicitur 'omnis homo albus est albus' ad neutrius contenta omnia contingit descendere copulative. Secus est in primo casu, quia in illo casu contingit descendere ad omnia contenta termini immediate sequentis signum et non ad contenta alterius; neutrum tamen supponit proprie sed compositum ex illis duobus. Exemplum patet in ista 'cuiuslibet hominis asinus currit' et in ista 'omnem hominem videns est animal'. And this should be understood when the term immediately following, and mediately following, are not in the same case, or when they are not related as adjective and substantive, for if they were so related it would not be possible to descend to all the objects contained under either. For example, when we say 'every white man is white', it is not possible to descend to all the objects contained under either.  It is otherwise in the first case, for in that case it is possible to descend to all the objects contained under the term immediately following the sign, and not to those contained under the other, yet neither supposits properly but is a composite of the two.  The example is clear in 'every man's donkey runs', and in 'someone seeing every man is an animal'.
Tertia regula potest dari, quod semper subiectum exclusivae affirmativae supponit confuse tantum, sicut in ista 'tantum animal est homo', li animal supponit confuse tantum, sicut in universali affirmativa convertibili cum illa exclusiva, puta 'omnis homo est animal'.

A third rule can be given, that the subject of an exclusive affirmative always supposits merely confusedly, for example in 'only an animal is a man', the word 'animal' supposits merely confusedly, just as in a universal affirmative convertible with the excluse, e.g. 'every man is an animal'.

Notes