Authors/Ockham/Summa Logicae/Book I/Chapter 67

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Latin English
[CAP. 67. DE SUPPOSITIONE MATERIALI IN SPECIALI] [Chapter 67. About material supposition specifically]
Praemissa divisione suppositionis dicendum est de membris in speciali, et primo de suppositione materiali. Circa quod sciendum quod suppositio materialis cuilibet quod quocumque modo potest esse pars propositionis competere potest. Omne enim tale potest esse extremum propositionis et pro voce vel scripto supponere. Et de nominibus quidem est manifestum, sicut patet in istis 'homo: est nomen', 'homo: est numeri singularis'. About the previous division of supposition, we must specifically discuss the members, and first of material supposition. About which, you should know that material supposition can belong to anything that can in any way be part of the proposition. For anything of this kind can be an extreme of a proposition, and can supposit for an utterance or written speech. And this is manifestly true of names, as is clear in the expressions ‘man is a name’, ‘man is of the singular number’.
Hoc etiam idem patet de adverbiis, verbis, pronominibus, coniunctionibus, praepositionibus, interiectionibus, sicut patet in istis 'bene: est adverbium', 'legit: est indicativi modi', 'legens: est participium', 'iste: est pronomen', 'si: est coniunctio', 'ex: est praepositio', 'heu: est interiectio'. Similiter etiam propositiones et oratioties talem suppositionem habere possunt, sicut patet in istis 'homo est animal: est propositio vera', 'hominem currere: est oratio', et sic de consimilibus. The same is clearly true of adverbs, verbs, pronouns, conjunctions, prepositions, interjections, as is clear in the case of ‘well is an adverb’, ‘reads is in the indicative mood’, ‘reading is a participle’, ‘that is a pronoun’, ‘if is a conjunction’, ‘out of is a preposition’, ‘ouch is an interjection’. Similarly also propositions and expressions can have such supposition, as is clear in ‘a man is an animal is a true proposition’, ‘that a man runs is an expression’, and so on. 
Et potest ista suppositio non tantum competere voci sed etiam scripto et parti propositionis mentalis, sive sit propositio sive pars propositionis et non propositio. Unde breviter, omni complexo Ct incomplexo competere potest. Potest autem dividi suppositio materialis, quia quaedam est quando vox vel scriptum supponit pro se, sicut in istis 'homo: est nomen', 'hominis: est genitivi casus', 'homo est animal: est propositio vera', 'bene: est adverbium', 'legit: est verbum' et huiusmodi. And this kind of supposition can belong not only to utterance but also to writing and to a part of a mental proposition, whether it is a proposition, or part of a proposition and not a proposition. Hence, in short, it can belong to any complex or non-complex expression. Material supposition can also be divided, for one sort is when utterance or writing supposits for itself, for example in ‘man is a name', ‘man's is the genitive case’, ‘man is an animal is a true proposition’, ‘well is an adverb’, ‘reads is a verb’ and so on.
Quandoque autem vox vel scriptum vel conceptus mentis non supponit pro se sed pro voce vel scripto, quod tamen scriptum vel quam vocem non significat. Sicut in ista propositione vocali 'animal: praedicatur de homine', haec vox 'homine' non supponit pro hac voce 'homine', quia 'animal' non praedicatur de hac voce 'homine'; sed ibi illud incomplexum 'homine' supponit pro hac voce 'homo', quia de hac voce 'homo' praedicatur 'animal', sic dicendo 'homo est animal'. Similiter in ista 'hominem currere est verum', illud subiectum 'hominem currere' non supponit pro se, sed supponit pro ista propositione 'homo currit', quam tamen non significat. But sometimes an utterance or writing or a concept of the mind does not supposit for itself, but for an utterance or writing which it nonetheless does not signify. For example, in the vocal proposition ‘animal is predicated of man [homine]’, the utterance 'man' [homine] does not supposit for the utterance homine, because 'animal' is not predicated of the utterance homine but here the non-complex 'man' [homine] supposits for the utterance homo, because 'animal' is predicated of the utterance homo, when we say 'a man is an animal'[1]. Similarly in 'that a man runs is true', the subject 'that a man runs' does not supposit for itself, but rather supposits for the proposition 'a man runs', even though it does not signify it.
Similiter in talibus 'homo: praedicatur de asino in obliquo', li homo supponit pro obliquo tali 'hominis' vel 'hominem' vel huiusmodi, quia in ista propositione 'asinus est hominis' non praedicatur haec vox 'homo' sed haec vox 'hominis'. Similiter hic 'qualitas praedicatur de subiecto in concreto', li qualitas supponit pro concretis praedicabilibus de subiecto. Similarly, in such propositions as ‘man is predicated of a donkey in an oblique case’, the word 'man' supposits for the oblique 'of a man' or 'to a man', for in the proposition "a donkey is a man's"[2], the utterance 'man' is not predicated but the utterance "man's". Similarly, in 'quality is predicated of a subject in the concrete mode', the word 'quality' supposits for concrete predicables of the subject.

Notes

  1. This makes much more sense in the inflected Latin. The Latin for 'of a man' is de homine, where 'homine' is the Latin ablative case. In material supposition, the word stands for itself, i.e. it signifies the word 'homine', in the ablative case. But sentence 'a man is an animal' in Latin is 'homo est animal', where 'homo' is in the nominative case. It is this which 'animal' is predicated of. Thus 'homine' supposits for the word 'homo', but signifies the word 'homine'.
  2. i.e. a donkey belongs to some man
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