Authors/Ockham/Summa Logicae/Book I/Chapter 57

Latin	English
[CAP. 57. DE PRAEDICAMENTO ACTIONIS]	[Chapter 57. On the category of action]
De sex praedicamentis Aristoteles se breviter expedit, de quibus tamen ad minorum[/itiniorum] utilitatem est latius disserendum. Unde quintum praedicamentum ponitur actio, quod tamen Philosophus, quando praedicamenta enumerat vel etiam tractat de illo praedicamento, non per nomen sed per hoc verbum 'facere' nominavit. Et consimiliter per verbum, non per nomen, Damascenus in Logica sua nominat hoc praedicamentum. Unde mihi videtur quod opinio Aristotelis [/is] erat quod praedicamentum illud non est nisi quaedam ordinatio verborum importantium quod aliquid facit vel agit aliquid, ita quod unum verbum de alio verbo, sumpto cum hoc pronomine 'qui', praedicatur, sic dicendo 'qui calefacit, agit vel facit'; 'qui movet facit vel [agit]”, et sic de consimilibus.	Aristotle deals with the [remaining] six categories briefly, but about these, for the utility of the minors [the Friars minor?], it should be more widely discussed. Hence the fifth category is given as action, although the Philosopher, when he lists the categories and also deals with that category, calls by the verb ‘doing’ [facit]. And Damascene names this category in similar fashion, using a verb, not a noun. Hence it seems to me that Aristotle’s opinion was that this category is merely a sort of ordering of verbs conveying that something causes or acts upon something, so that one verb is predicated of another verb, taken with the pronoun ‘which’, in saying “that which heats, acts or does”, “that which moves, does or acts” and so on.
Et isto modo potest salvari ibi esse genus generalissimum. Et si praecise essent in usu talia verba et participia eis correspondentia et nomina supponentia pro illis eisdem pro quibus supponunt verborum participia, de isto praedicamento, sicut de multis aliis, paucae forent difficultates. Tunc enim oporteret, si 'actio' esset nomen, quod supponeret pro eodem pro quo supponit 'agens', et esset planum quod actio esset res absoluta sicut agens, et quod sicut agens est substantia ita actio esset substantia.	And in this way the existence of a most general genus can be preserved. And there were precisely such verbs and participles in use, corresponding to them, and names suppositing for the same things for which the participles of verbs supposit, there would be few difficulties for this category, just as for many others. For then it would have to be the case, if ‘action’ were a name, that it would supposit for the same thing for which ‘agent’ supposits, and it would be plain that action was an absolute thing just as the agent is, and that just as the agent is a substance, so action is a substance.
Tamen illa substantia contingenter esset actio sicut contingenter est agens, et ita verbum esset in uno praedicamento et nomen in alio, sicut agens est in praedicamento relationis, secundum opinionem Aristotelis, sicut probatum est prius , quia 'agens' potest semper convenienter recipere obliquum adiunctum sibi, et tamen 'agere' non est in illo praedicamento. Et tunc praedicamentum non importaret aliquam rem quae non esset de praedicamento qualitatis vel substantiae, sed importaret tam rem de praedicamento substantiae quam rem de praedicamento qualitatis.	Yet that substance would contingently be an action just as it is contingently be an agent, and so the verb would be in one category and the noun in another, just as acting is in the category of relation, according to the opinion of Aristotle, as was proved before, because ‘acting’ can always appropriately receive a noun in the oblique case adjoined to it, and yet ‘acting’ is not in that category. And then ‘category’ would not convey some thing which was not in the category of quality or substance, but would convey something in the category of substance as well as something in the category of quality.
Unde sic dicendo 'ignis calefacit lignum', hoc verbum importat calorem, quamvis non nominaliter sed verbaliter; propter quod non oportet quod praedicetur de calore, sicut 'album' importat albedinem, non tamen praedicatur de albedine. Pro ista opinione, sive sit vera sive falsa, possunt adduci aliquae persuasiones. Quod enim quando sic dicitur 'ignis agit vel calefacit' non importetur aliqua res quae non sit substantia vel qualitas potest persuaderi. Primo, quia si aliqua alia res importetur, quaero: ubi est illa res ? Aut est per se subsistens aut est alteri inhaerens. Si sit per se subsistens, igitur est substantia, et tunc habetur intentum. Si sit alteri inhaerens, aut inhaeret igni calefacienti aut ligno calefacto. Si detur primum, igitur omne agens et omne movens vere reciperet novam rem in se quandocumque ageret vel moveret. Et ita corpus caeleste et intelligentia continue reciperent novas res in agendo.	Hence, in saying “fire heats wood”, the verb conveys heat, although not nominally but verbally. Because of this it does not have to be the case that it is predicated of heat, just as ‘white’ conveys whiteness, yet is not predicated of whiteness. For this opinion, whether it is true or false, we can cite several persuasive arguments. For it can be persuasively argued that when we say “fire acts or heats” there is not conveyed some thing which is not a substance or a quality. First, because if some other thing were conveyed, I ask: where is that thing? It is either subsisting per se, or inhering in another. If per se subsisting, it is therefore a substance, and I have what I wanted. If inhering in another, it either inheres in the fire that is heating or in the wood that is heated. If the former, then everything acting and everything moving truly receives something new in itself whenever it acted or moved. And so the heavenly body, and the intelligence, would continuously receive new things in acting.
Similiter, tunc Deus in agendo et producendo reciperet novam rem in se. Et si dicas quod non est simile de Deo et aliis creaturis, contra: si Deus nihil recipiendo vere et realiter agit, igitur simpliciter est ibi actio sine tali re alia, igitur frustra ponitur in alio agente, cum possit vere et realiter esse agens sine tali alia re.	Similarly, then God in acting and producing would receive a new thing in himself. And if you say that there is no similarity in the case of God and other creatures, against: if God truly and really acts without receiving anything, then there is in that even, without qualification, an action without another such thing, therefore in vain there is [such a thing] supposed in another agent, since there could truly and really be an agent without another such thing.
Si autem illa res recipiatur in calefacto, igitur non denominaret agens, nec illa re diceretur ignis agens. Similiter, tunc semper calefactum reciperet in se plures res, scilicet calorem et illam rem quae ponitur esse actio et aliam quae ponitur passio; quod videtur absurdum, quia ponitur pluralitas sine necessitate et sine ratione.	But if that thing is received in the thing that is heated, then it would not denominate the agent, nor by that thing would it be called the agent of fire.  Similarly, then the heated thing would always receive several things in itself, namely heat, and that thing which is supposed to be the action, and another which is supposed to be the affection.  Which seems absurd, for it supposes plurality without necessity and without reason.
Item, potest argui sic: illa res aut est causata aut non est causata. Si non est causata, igitur est Deus. Si est causata, quaero: a quo ? Nonnisi ab agente, igitur agens producit illam rem. Quo dato quaero de illa productione illius rei sicut prius. Et erit processus in infinitum, vel stabitur quod una res producitur sine productione alia. Et eadem ratione fuit standum in primo, quod calor producitur in ligno sine alia re nova in calefaciente.	Likewise, it can be argued as follows. That thing is either the cause, or the caused. If not the caused, then it is God. If the caused, I ask, by what? Only by an agent, therefore an agent produces that thing. Given this, I ask about that production of that thing just as before, and there will be an infinite regress, or it will come to a halt at one thing being produced without another production. And by the same reasoning it was upheld in the first place, that fire is produced in the wood without another new thing in the thing that heats.
Item, theologice potest argui sic: omnem rem quam producit Deus mediante causa secunda potest per se immediate producere; igitur illam rem quae ponitur esse actio quando ignis agit potest Deus producere immediate, sine hoc quod ignis agat. Quo facto quaero: aut ignis agit aut non. Si sic, igitur agit, et tamen solus Deus agit. Si non agit, contra: ibi est actio formaliter exsistens in igne, igitur ignis vere denominatur ab illa actione. Igitur vere agit; et ita agit et non agit, quod est impossibile. Propter istas rationes et alias multas posset aliquis tenere quod actio non est aliqua res distincta ab agente et passo et producto. Et haec opinio, sive sit vera sive falsa, est opinio Aristotelis, ut mihi videtur.	Likewise, it can be be argued theologically as follows. Every thing which God produces by an intermediary second cause, he can produce immediately. Therefore that thing which is supposed to be an ‘action’, when the fire acts, God can produce immediately, without the fire acting. Upon which I ask whether the fire acts or not. If so, then it acts, and yet God alone acts. If it does not act, against: in that case there is action formally existing in the fire, therefore the fire is truly denominated by that action. Therefore the fire acts, and so it acts and does not act, which is impossible. Because of these reasons and many others, someone could hold that action is not another thing distinct from an agent, or from the thing affected and produced. And this opinion, whether it be true or false, is the opinion of Aristotle, as it seems to me.
Et ideo ponit quod hoc nomen 'actio' supponit pro ipso agente, ut haec sit vera 'actio est agens' et consimiliter 'agere est agens'. Vel ponit quod talis propositio resolvenda est in aliam propositionem in qua ponitur verbum sine nomine tali, ut ista 'actio agentis est' aequivaleat isti 'agens agit', et ista 'calefactio est actio' aequivaleat isti 'quod calefacit, agit', et sic de consimilibus.	And therefore he supposes that the name ‘action’ supposits for that agent, so that ‘action is an agent’ is true, and similarly ‘acting is an agent’. Or he supposes that such a proposition is to be resolved into another proposition in which the verb occurs without such a name, so that “the action of an agent exists” is equivalent to “an agent acts”, and “heating is an action” is equivalent to “what heats, acts”, and so on.
Hoc ostenso sciendum est quod secundum opinionem Aristotelis 'agere' sicut et 'facere' multipliciter accipitur. Quandoque enim idem est quod aliquid producere vel causare vel destruere; quandoque idem est quod aliquid in aliquo facere vel destruere; quandoque accipitur communiter et large, secundum quod est commune ad praedicta duo et ad movere, et sic potest poni praedicamentum.	Having shown this, it should be known that according to the opinion of Aristotle that ‘act’, just like ‘do’ is understood in many ways. For sometimes it is the same for something to produce or cause or destroy. Sometimes it is the same thing for something to do or destroy in something. Sometimes it is understood generally and broadly, according as it is common to the previous two, and to ‘move’, and in this way it can be supposed to be a category.
Convenit autem isti praedicamento contrarietas, nam frigefacere et calefacere contraria sunt. Quae verba ideo dicuntur contraria quia important contrarias qualitates et non possunt eidem simul competere, saltem respectu eiusdem. Suscipit etiam hoc praedicamentum magis et minus, hoc est istis verbis convenienter adduntur ista adverbia 'magis' et 'minus', quamvis forte non omnibus. Unde convenienter dicitur 'hoc calefacit magis quam illud', et 'illud minus calefacit quam istud', et 'unus gaudet plus et alius minus'. Haec dicta sunt secundum opinionem quae mihi videtur consona doctrinae Aristotelis.	Now contraries belong to this category, for ‘to freeze’ and ‘to heat’ are contraries. These verbs are therefore called contraries because they convey contrary qualities and cannot belong at the same time to the same thing, at least in respect of the same thing. This category is also receptive or more and less, i.e. the adverbs ‘more’ and ‘less’ are appropriately added to those verbs, although perhaps not to all. Hence “this heats more than that” and “this heats less than that” are appropriate to say, and “one praises more and the other less”. These sayings are according to the opinion which seems to me to be consonant with the opinion of Aristotle.
Alii autem ponunt quod actio est quaedam res distincta ab agente, producto et passo et a ceteris rebus absolutis, et est quidam respectus qui ab aliquibus ponitur esse subiective in agente, ab aliquibus autem subiective in passo. Dicunt tamen quod aliquando actio est respectus realis agentis ad passum, aliquando autem est respectus rationis, sicut actio Dei non est nisi quidam respectus rationis. Et proprietates praedictas, scilicet habere contrarium et suscipere magis et minus dicunt tali respectui convenire.	But some suppose that action is a certain thing distinct from the agent, the thing produced and affected, and from the rest of the absolute things, and is a certain relative which is supposed by some to be subjectively in the agent, but by some to be subjectively in the thing affected. But they say that sometimes action is a real relative of the agent to the thing affected, but sometimes it is a relative of reason, for example the action of God is only a relative of reason. And the previous properties, namely holding a contrary and being receptive of more or less are said to belong to such a relative.