Authors/Duns Scotus/Ordinatio/Ordinatio I/D32/Q2

Translated by Peter Simpson

Latin	English
Quaestio 2	Question Two Whether the Father is Wise by Generated Wisdom
6 Secundo quaero utrum Pater sit sapiens sapientia genita. Quod sic: 'Pater dicit Verbo', secundum Augustinum VII Trinitatis cap. 2; sed secundum Anselmum Monologion cap. 64, ((nihil aliud est summo spiritui dicere quam quasi cogitando intueri)); igitur Pater intuetur Verbo, et ita sapit Verbo.	6. Second I ask whether the Father is wise by generated wisdom. That he is: ‘The Father speaks by the Word’, according to Augustine On the Trinity VII ch.1 n.1; but according to Anselm Monologion ch.63, “to speak by supreme spirit is nothing else than to intuit as it were by thinking;” therefore the Father intuits by the Word, and so he is wise by the Word.
7 Contra: Augustinus VII De Trinitate cap. 4: 'Eo est quo sapit, quia idem est ei sapere et esse'; ergo si saperet Verbo, esset Verbo.	7. On the contrary: Augustine On the Trinity VII ch.1 n.1: “He exists by that by which he is wise, because for him to be wise and to be are the same;” therefore if he were wise by the Word he would exist by the Word.
8 Primam quaestionem Magister reputat difficilem et dimittit eam insolutam. ƿ	8. The first question is held to be difficult by the Master [I d.32 ch.1 n.283] and he dismisses it unsolved.
9 Aliqui negaverunt illam propositionem 'Pater et Filius diligunt se Spiritu Sancto', et dixerunt eam ab Augustino retractatam in simili I Retractationum 25, ubi retractat istam 'Pater est sapiens sapientia genita', cui illa videtur assimilari, - et ideo istam retractatam dicunt in illa.	9. Some have denied the proposition ‘the Father and the Son love themselves by the Holy Spirit’, and have said it was retracted by Augustine in a similar case, Retractions I ch.26, where he retracts this proposition ‘the Father is wise by generated wisdom’, to which the former seems to be similar, – and therefore they say the former is retracted in the latter.
10 Contra: Non solum diversas materias retractandas Augustinus seorsum retractat, sed etiam eandem materiam - quae in diversis libris dicitur (quae tamen est retractanda) - Augustinus pluries retractat, quando scilicet facit mentionem de illis libris diversis; ergo multo magis istam retractaret seorsum, si esset retractanda.	10. On the contrary: Not only does Augustine separately retract matters that need to be retracted, but he even retracts the same matter – which is spoken off in diverse books (though it needs to be retracted) – several times, namely when he makes mention of those diverse books; therefore much more would he separately retract this one, if it was to be retracted.
11 Augustinus etiam non retractat dicta aliorum sanctorum, qui videntur istam concedere, - ut Hieronymi Super psalmos. ƿ	11. Also Augustine does not retract the sayings of other saints who seem to concede this proposition, – as Jerome On the Psalms [Ps.-Jerome, 17.1]
12 Alii dixerunt quod propositio est exponenda, ita quod ly 'Spiritu Sancto' accipiatur in ratione signi,- ita quod Pater et Filius diligant se Spiritu Sancto ut signo dilectionis communis.	12. Others have said that the proposition needs to be interpreted, so that the ‘by the Holy Spirit’ is to be taken in the idea of sign, – so that the Father and the Son love themselves by the Holy Spirit as by a sign of common love.
13 Contra: Ita posset dici quod diligunt se creatura, quia creatura est signum dilectionis eorum.	13. On the contrary: In this way it could be said that they love themselves by a creature, because a creature is a sign of their love.
14 Alii dicunt quod diligunt se amore appropriato Spiritui Sancto, et ita dicuntur diligere se Spiritu Sancto per appropriationem, non per proprietatem.	14. Others say that they love themselves with a love appropriated to the Holy Spirit, and so they are said to love themselves by the Holy Spirit through appropriation, not properly.
15 Contra: Ita essent boni Spiritu Sancto, quia bonitas appropriatur Spiritui Sancto.	15. On the contrary: In this way they would be good by the Holy Spirit, because goodness is appropriated to the Holy Spirit.
16 Aliter dicitur quod ((ablativus iste construitur in ratione effectus formalis)). ƿ	16. In another way it is said that “the ablative [sc. ‘by’] is to be construed by way of formal effect.”
17 Quod declaratur primo, quia licet non omnis res sit forma, tamen ((omne illud a quo aliquid denominatur - quantum ad hoc habet habitudinem formae: ut si dicam 'iste est indutus indumento', iste ablativus 'indumento' construitur in habitudine causae formalis, licet non sit forma hominis.	17. This is made clear first by the fact that, although not every thing is a form, yet “all that by which something is denominated – as far as this goes – has the disposition of a form; so that, if I should say ‘he is clothed in clothing’, the ablative ‘in clothing’ is construed by way of disposition of a form, although it is not the form of man.”
18 Contingit autem aliquid denominari per illud quod ab ipso procedit, non solum sicut agens ab actione, sed etiam sicut a termino actionis qui est effectus, quando ipse effectus in intellectu actionis includitur: dicimus enim quod 'ignis est calefaciens calefactione', quamvis calefactio non sit calor (qui est forma ignis), sed actio quae ab igne procedit; et dicimus etiam quod 'arbor est florens floribus', quamvis flores non sint forma arboris, sed quidam effectus ab ipsa procedentes. ƿ	18. “But it happens that something is denominated by that which proceeds from it, as an agent is not only by the action but also as by the term of the action, which is the effect, when the effect is included in the understanding of the action; for we say that ‘fire is a heater by heating’, although heating is not heat (which is the form of fire) but an action that proceeds from fire; and we also say that ‘the tree is flowering with flowers’, although the flowers are not the form of the tree but certain effects proceeding from it.”
19 Secundum hoc ergo dicendum quod cum diligere in divinis dupliciter sumatur, scilicet essentialiter et notionaliter, - secundum quod essentialiter sumitur, sic Pater et Filius non diligunt se Spiritu Sancto, sed essentia sua; unde Augustinus dicit XI De Trinitate: "Quis audet dicere Patrem nec se nec Filium nec Spiritum Sanctum diligere nisi per Spiritum Sanctum?")).	19. “According to this, then, one must say that since we may take ‘to love’ in two ways in divine reality, namely essentially and notionally – as to the way it is taken essentially, the Father and the Son do not love themselves in this way by the Holy Spirit but by their essence; hence Augustine says On the Trinity XI ch.7 n.12: ‘Who dares say that neither Father nor Son nor Holy Spirit love save through the Holy Spirit?’”
20 Contra: 'Aedificare' distincte importat istum terminum qui est 'aedificium', tamen non conceditur quod 'aedificator aedificat aedificio'; et in proposito etiam, 'spirare' distinctius importat Spiritum Sanctum quam 'diligere', et tamen non conceditur quod 'Pater et Filius spirent Spiritu Sancto'.	20. On the contrary [n.18]: ‘To build’ distinctly includes the term which is ‘a building’, yet it is not conceded that ‘a builder builds by a building’; and in the issue at hand too, ‘to inspirit’ more distinctly includes the Holy Spirit than it includes ‘to love’, and yet it is not conceded that ‘the Father and the Son inspirit by the Holy Spirit’.
21 Item, etsi talis praedicatio concederetur, non tamen ut conversiva super agens, - quia non concederetur de igne dici aliquid quod terminaretur ad ipsum ignem aliquo producto a se.	21. Again, even if such predication were conceded, yet it is not referable back to the agent – because something that would be a term for the fire by something it produces is not conceded to be said of fire.
22 Praeterea, in constructione transitiva numquam effectus 'ut effectus' construitur in ablativo; diligere autem est verbum transitivum. Unde exemplum - cui innituntur - non est ad propositum; ƿ'florere' enim est verbum neutrum, et non significat formaliter productionem alicuius. Omne quippe verbum neutrum idem significat cum nomine adiectivo (si nomen impositum esset), nisi quod nomen illud significat per modum habitus et quietis, verbum autem quasi significat in fieri, - sicut idem significat 'calidum esse' quasi in quiete et 'calere' quasi in fieri. Et sicut tale nomen denominativum posset dici de aliquo cum ablativo, notante illud a quo subiectum denominatur tali denominativo, ita verbum neutrum posset construi cum ablativo in eadem habitudine formae denominantis: ita enim ignis 'calet calore', sicut est 'calidus calore', et utrumque est in ratione formae, a qua est ista denominatio per modum quietis in uno et per modum fieri in altero. Illa autem forma aliquando est inhaerens, ut qualitas, - aliquando se habet per modum formae ab extra denominantis, sicut de genere habitus vel per modum illius (utroque modo potest fieri denominatio); et sicut aliquid denominatur non tantum a forma sed ab aliquo extrinseco, quandoque, ita denominativum posset dici de eo, cum illo extrinseco ablative sumpto, et hoc sive illud denominativum significetur nominaliter sive verbaliter: sicut enim posset dici 'iste est ornatus vestimento' (prout 'ornatus' significat aliquid de genere habitus), ita posset dici 'iste nitet vestimento' (vel aliquo alio verbo neutro, quod significaret idem cum isto denominativo 'esse ornatum'), - et ita est in proposito, quia 'arborem florere' non significat formaliter arborem producere florem. Si enim ponatur verbum activum, quod sic signiƿlicet, puta 'florificare' (si esset in usu), haec esset falsa 'arbor florificat floribus'; haec autem vera est 'arbor floret floribus', quia per verbum istud neutrum significatur quod denominat subiectum quasi per modum habitus, quia licet non sit proprie habitus in inanimatis, possunt tamen denominari ab aliquo adiacente, quod - in quantum est aliquo modo ornamentum vel tegumentum eorum potest reduci ad genus habitus: et tunc, sicut diceretur 'arbor esse florida floribus' et ablativus construeretur in ratione illius a quo subiectum denominatur secundum talem denominationem, ita etiam construitur ly 'floribus' cum hoc verbo 'florere'. Est ergo exemplum ad oppositum, loquendo de verbo activo, et nihil ad propositum - ut verum est - loquendo de verbo neutro.	22. Further, in a transitive construction never is the effect ‘as effect’ construed in the ablative; but to love is a transitive verb. Hence the example – on which they rely [who adopt this opinion] – is not to the purpose; for ‘to flower’ is a neutral verb and does not formally state the production of anything. Every neutral verb indeed signifies the same as an adjectival name (if a name were imposed), save that this name signifies by way of having and rest, but the verb signifies it in becoming, – as ‘to be hot’ signifies the same thing in rest as ‘to heat’ signifies it as it were in becoming. And just as such a denominative name could be said of something with the ablative, indicating that by which the subject is denominated with such denominative, so a neutral verb could be construed with the ablative in the same disposition of denominating form; for as fire ‘heats by heat’ so it is ‘hot by heat’, and both are in the idea of the form from which the denomination comes, by way of rest in the one case and by way of becoming in the other. But the form is sometimes inherent, as a quality, – and sometimes it is disposed by way of a form from without of the denominating thing, as in the case of the category of having [sc. being clad] or by way of it (in both ways the denomination can be made); and just as something is denominated not only by the form but by something extrinsic, sometimes, so what denominates can be said of it with the extrinsic thing taken in the ablative, and this whether what denominates signifies nominally or verbally; for just as one can say ‘he is adorned with a garment’ (insofar as ‘adorned’ signifies something in the category of having), so one can say ‘he is glowing with a garment’ (or by some other neutral verb that would signify the same as the denominative ‘is adorned’), – and so it is in the issue at hand, because ‘the tree is flowering’ does not formally signify that the tree is producing a flower. For if an active verb is posited, which would signify in this way, namely ‘to florificate’ (if it were in use), this proposition would be false ‘the tree is florificating with flowers’; but this proposition is true ‘the tree is flowering with flowers’, because by this neutral verb is signified that it denominates the subject as it were by way of having, because although having [sc. being clad] does not properly exist in inanimate things, yet they can be denominated by something next to them, which – insofar as it is in some way an ornament or covering for them – can be reduced to the category of having; and then, just as one would say ‘the tree is flowery with flowers’ and the ablative would be construed in idea of that by which the subject is denominated according to such a denomination, in this way too is the ‘with flowers’ construed with this verb ‘to flower’. The example, then, is to the opposite, when we are speaking of an active verb, and is nothing to the purpose – the way it is true – when we are speaking of a neutral verb.
23 Ad istam quaestionem solvendam (quia illa quae sunt in intellectu, sunt manifestiora), primo respondendum est ad secundam quaestionem. Et primo videamus de intellectu nostro: Ibi enim memoria gignit notitiam actualem, quae ad memoriam habet duplicem relationem: videlicet 'geniti ad gignens', et haec est de secundo modo relativorum et mutua, - et aliam 'declarantis ad declaratum', et haec est tertii modi relativorum et non mutua. Sicƿut autem notitia genita declarat formaliter obiectum latens in memoria, ita illud quod producit notitiam actualem et dat illi istam vim declarandi potest dici 'declarare ista notitia' quasi effective: si enim aliquis producat speculum et in eo imagines relucentes, licet speculum formaliter declaret illa relucentia, tamen illud 'producens speculum' effective declarat. Et istud magis apparet, si actus animae, qui non sunt verae factiones, significarentur per verba neutra, non activa (nunc autem significantur per verba activa, propter illam habitudinem quam habent ad obiectum in quod transeunt quasi in terminum, licet nihil causent in illo obiecto): tunc enim, si essent neutra, significarent formaliter illam realitatem inesse subiecto a qua imponuntur, et tunc possent talia verba activa imponi ab eisdem formis, quae significarent productionem talium; et tunc 'notitia genita' formaliter esset declarativa obiecti, sed 'producens' diceretur effective causare formam (sicut alias dictum est quod similitudo potest esse in quo fundatur relatio activi et passivi, ita quod 'assimilans' est dans similitudineml), et tunc 'declarans' - active sumptum - esset efficiens ipsam declarationem formalem in ipso actu animae sive in subiecto illius actus.	23. To solve this question [n.1] (because things in the intellect are more manifest [sc. than those in the will]), one must first reply to the second question [n.6]. And first let us look at our own intellect: For there memory generates actual knowledge, which has a double relation to memory; namely ‘of generated to generating’ and this relation belongs to the second mode of relatives and is mutual – and the other ‘of declaring to declared’, and this belongs to the third mode of relatives and is not mutual [d.30 n.31]. But just as generated knowledge declares formally the object that lies in the memory, so that which produces actual knowledge and gives it this power of declaring can be said ‘to declare by this knowledge’ as if by way of efficient cause; for if someone produces a mirror and images appearing in it, although the mirror formally declares those appearing images, yet the ‘one producing the mirror’ declares them by efficient causality. And this is more evident if acts of the soul, which are not truly makings, were signified by neutral, non active verbs (but now they are signified by active verbs, because of the disposition they have to the object into which they pass as into their term, although they cause nothing in the object); for then, if they were neutral verbs, they would signify formally that the reality is in the subject from which they are imposed, and then active verbs of this sort could be imposed by the same forms, which would signify the production of them; and then ‘generated knowledge’ would be formally declarative of the object, but ‘the one producing’ would be said to be efficient cause of the form (just as was said elsewhere that likeness can be in that on which the relation of active and passive is founded, so that ‘making like’ is a giving of likeness [I d.19 n.28]), and then ‘declaring’ – taken actively – would be efficient cause of the formal declaration in the act of the soul or in the subject of that act.
24 Ad propositum: Verbum divinum a Patre exprimitur, et haec expressio est relatio originis; huic autem expresso communicatur ex vi productionis suae notitia infinita, quae - ex hoc - est declarativa omnis declarabilis. Habet igitur relationem realem ad exprimentem, a quo giƿgnitur, sed aliam - scilicet declarantis - habet non tantum ad ipsum, sed, quia est infinitum, habet hunc respectum 'declarativi' ad se et ad ipsum et ad omnia alia: et ista est tantum rationis, quia non tantum est ad creaturam, sed ad se ipsum; et si nulla relatio realis est ad creaturam (ex distinctione 30), multo magis ergo nec eiusdem ad se est relatio realis. Sed istud 'declarare' competit formaliter Verbo, producenti autem competit principiative (sicut in nobis competebat memoriae effective), - et tunc Verbum formaliter declarat omne declarabile; Pater autem Verbo declarat non formaliter sed principiative, in quantum sibi communicat notitiam actualem infinitam, qua Verbum actualiter declarat.	24. To the issue at hand: The divine Word is expressed by the Father, and this expression is a relation of origin; but to this expressed word is communicated by force of its production infinite knowledge, which – from this fact – is declarative of everything declarable. It has therefore a real relation to what expresses it, from which it is born, but the other relation – namely of the declarer – it has not only to itself but, because it is infinite, it has this respect of ‘declarative’ to itself and to it and to everything else; and this is only a relation of reason, because it is not only to creatures but also to itself; and if there is no real relation to creatures (from distinction 30 nn.49-51]), much more then is there not a real relation of the same thing to itself. But this ‘to declare’ belongs formally to the Word, but it belongs by way of principal to the producer (just as in us it belonged to the memory as efficient cause), – and then the Word formally declares everything declarable; but the Father declares by the Word not formally but by way of principal, insofar as he communicates to him infinite actual knowledge, by which the Word actually declares.
25 Applicando ergo istam realitatem ad istud vocabulum quod est 'dicere', dico quod 'dicere' potest significare illam relationem originis quae est 'generantis ad genitum', et hoc modo solus Pater dicit, - non quidem Verbo, sed Verbum; et hoc modo loquitur Richardus VI De Trinitate cap. 12, quod ((solus Pater dicit)), et Augustinus dixit 'Verbum, quo omnia disposuit'. Alio modo ƿpotest significare istam habitudinem rationis quae est 'declarare', et hoc prout 'declarare' competit alicui formaliter, - et sic Verbum dicit omnia declarabilia et se ipso formaliter; et de hoc loquitur Augustinus VII De Trinitate cap. 5: ((si enim hoc verbum nostrum temporale )) etc. Tertio modo significare potest istam eandem habitudinem declarantis, prout competit alicui non formaliter sed principiative, et hoc modo dicitur de Patre quod 'dicit Verbo', et isto tertio modo loquitur Augustinus VII De Trinitate cap. 2, quod 'Pater dicit Verbo'; hoc etiam modo loquitur XV De Trinitate cap. 14, quod ((Pater se ipsum dicens genuit Filium sibi aequalem)), ubi accipit 'dicere' pro 'principiative declarare', licet non addat ibi illud principium quo Pater dicit. ƿ	25. Applying this reality then to this verb which is ‘to say’, I say that ‘to say’ can signify the relation of origin which is ‘of generating to generated’ and in this way only the Father says, – not indeed by the Word but he says the Word; and in this way Richard [of St. Victor] says On the Trinity VI ch.12 that “only the Father says,” and as Augustine said “the Word, by which he has disposed all things.” In another way, ‘to say’ can signify the disposition of reason which is ‘to declare’, and this insofar as ‘to declare’ belongs to something formally, – and in this way the Word says all declarable things and by himself formally; and about this Augustine speaks ibid., VII ch.3 n.4: “For if this word is our temporal word etc.” In the third way it can signify the same disposition of the declarer, insofar is it belongs to it not formally but by way of principal, and in this way it is said of the Father that ‘he says by the Word’, – and in this third way Augustine says ibid. that ‘the Father says by the Word’; in this way too he says ibid. XV ch.14 n.23 that “the Father saying himself generated the Son equal to himself,” where the takes ‘to say’ for ‘to declare by way of principal’, although he does not add there the principle by which the Father says.
26 Sed tunc est unum dubium, utrum declarare formaliter omne declarabile, sit proprium Verbi.	26. But then there is a doubt, whether to declare formally everything declarable is proper to the Word.
27 Dicunt aliqui quod sic, quia ex vi productionis suae hoc sibi competit.	27. Some say that it is, because this belongs to him by force of his production.
28 Sed de hoc supra dictum est, distinctione 27 quaestione 3; et generaliter, cum istud verbum 'declarare' dicat relationem rationis, et nulla talis est propria alicui personae nec includitur in proprio alicuius personae, non erit 'declarare' proprium Verbo, sed tantum est ei appropriatum, pro eo quod Verbum ex vi productionis suae habet notitiam actualem sibi communicatam: Pater autem licet habeat eandem, tamen ex vi ea qua producit, est memoria, et non producit in quantum actualis notitia; notitiae autem actuali - unde actualis - competit declarare, et ideo 'declarare' magis convenit cum proprio Filii quam cum proprio aliarum personarum, et ita sibi magis appropriatur. Vere tamen est in omni alia persona, quia quaelibet habet actualem declarationem in quantum est actualis noƿtitia, et aeque declarativam realiter sicut est illa notitia actualis quae est 'verbum'. Declarat ergo formaliter Pater omnia se ipso, sicut Filius formaliter omnia se ipso et Spiritus Sanctus omnia se ipso declarant. Declarant ergo Pater et Filius Spiritu Sancto principiative, licet isti modi accipiendi 'declarare' - formaliter et principiative non sint ita usitati sicut illi quibus Verbum dicitur declarare formaliter et Pater principiative Verbo; et ratio maioris usitationis istorum verborum est propriatio notitiae actualis ad Verbum.	28. But this was discussed above, in distinction 27 question 1 nn.100-101; and generally, since this verb ‘to declare’ states a relation of reason, and no such relation is proper to any person nor is included in what is proper to any person, it will not be the ‘to declare’ that is proper to the Word, but it is only appropriated to him by the fact that the Word, by force of his production, has actual knowledge communicated to him; but the Father, although he has it, yet, by the force by which he produces, he is memory, and he does not produce insofar as he is actual knowledge; but to actual knowledge – whereby it is actual – it belongs to declare, and therefore ‘to declare’ more belongs with a property of the Son than with a property of the other persons, and so it is more appropriated to him. But it truly is in every other person, because any person has actual declaration insofar as it is actual knowledge, and has it as equally declarative really as the actual knowledge is which is ‘word’. Therefore the Father formally declares everything by himself, just as the Son and the Holy Spirit formally declare everything each by himself. Therefore the Father and Son declare by the Holy Spirit by way of principle, although these ways of taking ‘to declare’ – formally and by way of principle – are not as much in use as those by which the Word is said to declare formally and the Father to do so by the Son by way of principle; and the reason for the greater use of these words is the appropriation of actual knowledge to the Word.
29 Ad quaestionem tunc secundam concedo partem quaestionis negativam, propter rationem Augustini VII De Trinitate cap. 4. ƿ	29. To the second question, then, I concede the negative part of the question, because of the reason of Augustine ibid. [n.2].
30 Ad argumentum in oppositum dico quod Anselmus accipit ibi 'dicere' mere essentialiter, pro 'actualiter intelligere', sicut expresse vult cap. illo, ubi dicit quod sunt 'unus dicens sicut unus intelligens, et licet quilibet dicat et quemlibet, tamen sunt unus in ratione dicentis et dicti sicut sunt unus intelligens et unum intellectum'. Iste modus est valde extensivus huius quod est 'dicere', quia nec significat illam relationem originis, nec connotat eam, sicut nec intelligere vel sapere; et hoc modo non dicit Augustinus quod Pater dicit Verbo.	30. To the argument for the opposite [n.6] I say that Anselm takes ‘to say’ there purely essentially for ‘actually to understand’, as he expressly intends in that chapter, where he says that they are ‘one sayer as they are one understander, and although each says and says each, yet they are one in idea of saying and of said just as they one understanding and one intellect’. This way extends considerably what it is ‘to say’, because it neither signifies the relation of origin nor connotes it, just as neither do ‘to understand’ and ‘to be wise’; and Augustine does not in this way say that the Father says by the Word [nn.6, 25].
31 Sed quomodo conceditur quod Spiritus Sanctus dicit Verbum? - Respondeo: sicut intelligit Verbum. Sed non pro exprimere; nec pro declarare, nisi accipiatur formaliter, quia Spiritus Sanctus declarat formaliter omne declarabile; non autem pro declarare principiative, nisi forte respectu creaturae, quia loquendo de manifestatione creaturae, illam efficit tota Trinitas. Et quia absolute super manifestationem formalem Verbi - non comparando ad creaturam - Spiritus Sanctus non habet aliquam rationem principii (quia non dat Verbo illud quo formaliter est manifestativum), ideo non videtur aliquo modo concedendum. Nec Anselmus diƿcit quod 'Spiritus Sanctus dicit Verbo', licet videat omnia in Verbo: ita etiam beatus quilibet videt omnia in Verbo, et quaelibet persona videt in qualibet (secundum Augustinum XV De Trinitate cap. 14), sed 'dicere Verbo' videtur importare aliquam auctoritatem 'dicentis Verbo' respectu Verbi in quantum est declarativum formaliter.	31. But how is it conceded that the Holy Spirit says the Word? – I reply: in the same way as he understands the Word [sc. purely essentially]. But it is not conceded for ‘to express’; nor for ‘to declare’, unless it is taken formally, because the Holy Spirit declares formally everything declarable; but not for ‘to declare by way of principle’, save perhaps in respect of creatures, because when we speak of the manifestation of creatures, the whole Trinity effects that. And because the Holy Spirit does not have any idea of principle absolutely over the formal manifestation of the Word – not when comparing it to creatures – (because he does not give to the Word that by which he is formally manifestive), therefore this seems in no way to be conceded. Nor does Anselm say that ‘the Holy Spirit says by the Word’, although he sees everything in the Word; so too any of the blessed sees everything in the Word, and any person sees in any person (according to Augustine ibid. XV ch.14 n.23), but ‘to say by the Word’ seems to involve some authority of ‘saying by the Word’ with respect to the Word insofar as the Word is declarative formally.
32 Ad primam quaestionem, de Spiritu Sancto, procedendum est eodem modo ut in praecedente quaestione processum est. Et primo de voluntate nostra: Ubi dico quod amor in nobis, ut productus est, habet ad voluntatem, ut producentem, relationem secundi modi, et illa forte est mutua. Habet etiam aliam relationem, ad obiectum, pertinentem ad tertium modum relativorum, - et illa non est mutua, quia sicut scientia refertur ad scibile et non e converso, ita amor ad amabile et non e converso; et sicut amor habet formaliter habitudinem aliquam ad obiectum, ita illud quod producit amorem posset denominari ab illa habitudine, si esset verbum impositum hoc significans active.	32. As to the first question, about the Holy Spirit [n.1], one must proceed in the same way as was done in the preceding question [nn.23-25]. And first about our will: Here I say that will in us, as it is produced, has a relation of the second mode to the will as producer, and the relation is perhaps mutual. It also has another relation, to the object, pertaining to the third mode of relatives, – and it is not mutual, because just as science is referred to the knowable and conversely [d.30 n.38], so love is referred to the lovable and not conversely; and just as love has formally some disposition to the object, so that which produces love can be denominated from that disposition, if a word were imposed signifying it actively.
33 Ita dico in divinis, quod Spiritus Sanctus ex vi productionis suae - non quidem proprie sed appropriate - est amor omnis necessario amati, et ideo habet aliquam relationem rationis formaliter ad sic amatum; producens autem ipsum potest denominari ab ƿeadem habitudine quasi principiative, et illa habitudo ut principiative denominans, importatur per hoc verbum 'diligere', quando dicuntur Pater et Filius 'diligere se Spiritu Sancto': hoc quippe est 'Patrem et Filium producere Amorem' qui est Patris et Filii, sicut 'Patrem dicere se Verbo' est producere Verbum, quod est declarans ipsum Patrem.	33. So I say in divine reality that the Holy Spirit, by the force of his production – not indeed properly but by appropriation – is love of everything necessarily loved, and therefore he has some relation of reason formally to what is thus loved; but the producer of him can be denominated from the same disposition, as if by way of principle, and this disposition, as denominating by way of principle, is introduced by this word ‘to love’, when the Father and the Son are said ‘to love themselves by the Holy Spirit’; this indeed is for ‘the Father and the Son to produce the Love’ which is of the Father and the Son, just as for ‘the Father to say himself by the Word’ is to produce the Word, which is what declares the Father himself.
34 Ad primum argumentum dico quod nec mere essentialiter nec mere notionaliter tenetur, sed connotat notionem (scilicet productionem Spiritus Sancti), et significat illam habitudinem consequentem Spiritum Sanctum ad illud amatum (non quidem formaliter, sed principiative); et ratione illius habitudinis consequentis, 'essentiale' est quantum ad terminum illius habitudinis, quia terminus ille non tantum est Spiritus Sanctus, sed omne necessario amabile, - et quoad illud fit conversio, non autem quantum ad notionale connotatum (per hoc patet ad secundum2). Et istud potest manifestari in exemplo de 'dicere', quod eo modo quo conceditur Patrem dicere Verbo, non est 'dicere' neque mere essentiale neque mere notionale, sed connotat notionale (scilicet gignitionem), et importat habitudinem declarativi quae est ad omne declarabile; simile huius (licet non ita perfecte) potest haberi in hoc quod est 'mitti', quod connotat in divinis processionem, licet significet principaliter effectum temporalem: et quantum ad illud ƿquod significat, tota Trinitas operatur effectum illum, - sed quantum ad notionem illam, non respicit totam Trinitatem in ratione principii (Filius enim potest mitti, licet non sit a Spiritu Sancto).	34. To the first argument [n.1] I say that it is held neither purely essentially nor purely notionally, but it connotes the notion (namely the production of the Holy Spirit), and it signifies the disposition that follows the Holy Spirit to that loved thing (not indeed formally but by way of being principle); and by reason of this following disposition it is an ‘essential’ as to the term of the disposition, because the term is not only the Holy Spirit but everything necessarily lovable, – and to this extent there is conversion, but not as to the connoted notional feature (the answer to the second argument [n.2] is plain from this). And this can be made clear in the example of ‘to say’, that, in the way in which it is conceded that the Father says by the Word, ‘to say’ is neither merely essential nor merely notional, but connotes the notional (namely generation), and it introduces the disposition of what is declarative, which disposition is to everything declarable; something similar to this (although not so perfectly) can be found in what it is ‘to be sent’, which connotes process in divine reality, although it signifies principally a temporal effect; and as to what it signifies, the whole Trinity works the effect, – as to the notion, it does not respect the whole Trinity in the idea of principle (for the Son can be sent, though he is not from the Holy Spirit).
35 Ad tertium. Licet posset fieri vis in ista propositione, quod ly 'se' potest construi retransitive vel reciproce (de qua duplici constructione habetur ab illo Petro Eliae Super Priscianum 'Constructionis', - et patet in illo sophismate 'isti pugnant ut vincant se'), et videretur secundum aliquos magis concedenda propositio prout ly 'se' construitur retransitive quam reciproce, pro eo quod Spiritus Sanctus secundum eos spiratur a Patre et Filio voluntate concordi (in quantum scilicet Pater impendit amorem Filio et Filius rependit, secundum Richardum De Trinitate), tamen dicendo consequenter his quae dicta sunt distinctione 12 de ista materia, quod Pater et Filius spirant formaliter voluntate in quantum una est (non autem ipsa relatio concordiae Patris ad Filium, et e converso, est formalis ratio spirandi, quia non videtur quod ƿPater et Filius in quantum habent respectum originis ad Spiritum Sanctum habeant mutuam relationem ad invicem: tunc enim non haberent tantum mutuam relationem originis paternitatis et filiationis; et hoc, inquam, dicendo quod licet habendo unam voluntatem concordent in ea formaliter, tamen concordia non est per se ratio sed voluntas una, - et quod fecunditas plena sit in una sicut in duabus; ideo tamen duo spirant, quia praeintelligitur illa fecunditas una esse in duobus antequam habeant terminum), potest concedi quod eadem est veritas accipiendo ly 'se' sic vel sic; et tunc concedo consequens, quod 'Pater diliget se Spiritu Sancto'. Et cum dicis 'diligit se in primo signo originis', verum est, - sed tunc diligit se voluntate ut in ipso est formaliter; spirando autem Spiritum Sanctum, qui necessario est amor eius, diligit se Spiritu Sancto quasi principiative, - quo modo etiam diligit Filius se Spiritu Sancto.	35. To the third [n.5]. Although some force can be give to this proposition [sc. the Father and Son love themselves by the Holy Spirit], because the ‘themselves’ can be understood reflexively or reciprocally (discussion of this double construal is found in Peter Elias On Priscian on Construal – and it is plain in the sophism ‘they are fighting so that they may themselves conquer’ [sc. either: conquer over themselves, or: be themselves conquerors]), and according to some the proposition would seem more needing to be conceded to the extent the ‘themselves’ is construed reflexively than reciprocally, because the Holy Spirit according to them is inspirited by the Father and the Son by concordant will (insofar namely as the Father bestows love on the Son and the Son bestows it back, according to Richard On the Trinity [I d.12 n.10]), yet when speaking in accordance with what was said in distinction 12 n.36 on this matter, that the Father and Son inspirit formally by will insofar as it is one (but the relation of concord of Father with Son and conversely is not the formal reason for inspiriting, because it does not seem that the Father and Son, insofar as they have a respect of origin to the Holy Spirit, have a mutual relation to each other; for then they would not have only a mutual relation of origin of paternity and filiation; and this, I repeat, when saying that although by having one will they agree in it formally yet the concord is not per se the reason but the one will is – and that the fecundity is complete in one just as it is in two; therefore, however, two inspirit, because the fecundity is pre-understood to be one in the two before they have the term), it can be conceded that the truth is the same when taking the ‘themselves’ in this way or in that way; and then I concede the consequent [n.3], that ‘the Father loves himself by the Holy Spirit’. And when you say ‘he loves himself in the first moment of origin’ [n.3], it is true, – but then he loves himself by the will as it is in him formally; but by inspiriting the Holy Spirit, who is necessarily love of him, he loves himself by the Holy Spirit as it were by way of being principle – in which way too the Son loves himself by the Holy Spirit.
36 Ad ultimum dico quod non oportet concedere Patrem et Filium diligere creaturam Spiritu Sancto sicut diligunt se Spiritu Sancto, quia iste modus diligendi - ut sumitur principiative - videtur esse primo illius termini dilectionis cuius ipsa dilectio est formaliter, ex hoc quod est principiata: sic enim diligere obiectum, est principiare amorem, qui - ut principiatus - est formaliter illius obiecti; Spiritus autem Sanctus ex vi principiationis suae neque primo ƿneque concomitanter est amor creaturae, quia creatura tantum contingenter amatur a Deo. Licet autem ex vi productionis suae primo sit amor essentiae, tamen concomitanter potest dici amor Filii, quia illae personae sunt 'in natura primo amata' ex necessitate illius naturae; et ideo posset concedi quod Pater non diligit creaturam Spiritu Sancto eo modo quo Filium, quia non producit amorem qui ex vi productionis sit amor creaturae, immo completa productione necessaria illius amoris, adhuc est contingentia illius amoris ut sit creaturae, - et hoc est in potestate non tantum producentis hunc amorem, sed illius amoris producti, quia ita contingenter amat Spiritus Sanctus creaturam sicut Pater et Filius.	36. To the final argument [n.4] I say that one should not concede that the Father and Son love the creature by the Holy Spirit in the way they love themselves by the Holy Spirit, because this way of loving – as taken by way of being principle – seems to belong first to that term of love to which love itself belongs formally, from the fact that it is from a principle; for thus to love the object is to be principle of love, which – as from a principle – is formally of that object; but the Holy Spirit, by the force of his being from a principle, is neither first nor concomitantly love of the creature, because the creature is only contingently loved by God. But although from the force of his production he is first love of essence, yet concomitantly he can be called love of the Son, because those persons are ‘in nature first loved’ from necessity of the nature; and therefore it can be conceded that the Father does not love the creature by the Holy Spirit in the way that he loves the Son by the Holy Spirit, because he does not produce a love which by the force of its production is love of the creature, nay with a complete necessary production of the love there is still contingency in the love as it is of the creature – and this is in the power not only of producing this love but of the love produced, because the Holy Spirit as contingently loves the creature as the Father and Son do.