Authors/Duns Scotus/Ordinatio/Ordinatio I/D1/Q3
From The Logic Museum
Translated by Peter Simpson.
|62 Consequenter quaero de frui in se, et primo - supposito quod sit aliquid voluntatis praecise - quaero, an sit aliquis actus elicitus a voluntate, vel passio recepta in voluntate, puta aliqua delectatio. Quod sit delectatio, probo: Quia fructus est ultimum quod exspectatur de arbore, et frui dicitur a fructu; sed ultimum fructus non est ipsa comestio, sed delectatio, propter quam comeditur et quaeritur fructus. Ergo similiter est in spiritualibus, quod scilicet fructus est ultimum quod exspectatur de obiecto; sed tale est delectatio; quia delectatio etiam sequitur actum, X Ethicorum, ergo est ultimum; ergo etc. >||62. Next in order I ask about enjoying in itself, and first – on the supposition that it is something precisely of the will – I ask whether it is an act elicited by the will or a passion received in the will, to wit delight. That it is delight my proof is: Because the fruit is the final thing expected from a tree, and enjoying is said of fruit; but the ultimate fruit is not the eating itself but the delight is, because of which fruit is eaten and for which fruit is sought. Things are similar, then, in spiritual matters, namely that fruit is the final thing expected from the object; but delight is of this sort; because delight also follows the act, Ethics 10.4.1174b31-33, therefore it is the final thing; therefore etc.|
|63 Item, ad Galatas 5: Fructus Spiritus sunt pax, gaudium, etc. Omnia ista sunt passiones - et praecipue gaudium, quod est delectatio aut saltem non sunt actus, sed consequentes actum; fructu autem per se fruimur; ergo frui est aliquid per se consequens actum, ut videtur.||63. Again, Galatians 5.22: “The fruits of the Spirit are peace, joy, etc.” All these things are passions – and especially joy, which is delight – or they are at least not acts but things consequent to act; but fruit is what we per se enjoy; therefore enjoying is something per se consequent to act, as it seems.|
|64 Contra: Voluntas actu elicito amat Deum; aut ergo propter aliud, et tunc utitur, et ita est perversa, aut propter se, et tunc fruitur (ex definitione 'frui'), et ita frui est actus. >||64. On the contrary: The will loves God by an elicited act; either then it loves God for the sake of something else, and then it is using him and so is perverse, or it loves him for himself, and then it is enjoying him (from the definition of ‘enjoying’ [n.62]), and so enjoying is an act.|
|65 In ista quaestione primo videndum est de ipsis conceptibus et secundo de significato nominis.||65. In this question one must look first into the concepts themselves and second into the thing signified by the name.|
|66 Quantum ad primum dico quod sicut in intellectu sunt duo actus assentiendi alicui complexo - unus quo assentitur alicui vero propter se, sicut principio, alius quo assentitur alicui vero complexo non propter se sed propter aliud verum, sicut conclusioni ita in voluntate sunt duo actus assentiendi bono, unus quo assentitur alicui bono propter se, alius quo assentitur alicui bono propter aliud, ad quod illud bonum refertur, sicut conclusioni assentitur propter principium, quia conclusio veritatem suam habet a principio. Ista similitudo accipi potest a Philosopho VI Ethicorum, ubi dicitur quod ((in mente est affirmatio et negatio, sed hoc in appetitu est prosecutio et fuga)); et ita, ultra, sicut in mente >est duplex affirmatio, propter se et propter aliud, ita in appetitu est duplex prosecutio vel adhaesio, et propter se et propter aliud.||66. As to the first I say that just as there are in the intellect two acts of assenting to some proposition – one by which it assents to something true on its own account, as to a principle, another by which it assents to some true proposition, not on its own account, but on account of something else true, as it assents to a conclusion – so there are in the will two acts of assenting to the good, one by which it assents to some good on its own account, another by which it assents to some good on account of something else to which it refers that good, just as the conclusion is assented to because of the principle, since the conclusion has its truth from the principle. This likeness can be got from the Philosopher in Ethics 6.2.1139a21-22, where it is said that “in the mind there is affirmation and negation, but this in the appetite is pursuit and flight;” and so, further, just as in the mind there is a double affirmation, on its own account and on account of another, so there is in the appetite a double prosecution or adhering, on its own account and on account of another.|
|67 Est tamen inter haec duplex differentia. Prima, quia illi duo assensus intellectus distinguuntur ex natura obiectorum; sunt enim alteri propter alteram evidentiam huius et illius veri, et ideo habent distincta obiecta sibi correspondentia et ipsos causantia. Hic autem isti assensus non sunt ex distinctione obiectorum, sed ex distincto actu potentiae liberae, sic vel sic acceptantis eius obiectum, quia, sicut prius dictum est, in potestate eius est sic vel sic agere, referendo vel non referendo; et ideo non correspondent istis actibus propria obiecta distincta, sed quodcumque bonum volibile potest voluntas habere obiectum secundum hunc actum vel secundum illum. Secunda differentia est quod illi duo assensus intellectus sufficienter dividunt assensum intellectus in communi, nec inter ipsos est aliquid medium, quia nulla est evidentia media ex parte obiecti a qua possit accipi alia veritas quam veritas principii vel conclusionis. Praeter autem istos duos assensus voluntatis est aliquis assensus medius, quia voluntati potest ostendi aliquod >bonum absolute apprehensum, non sub ratione alicuius propter se boni nec propter aliud boni. Voluntas autem circa tale sic ostensum potest habere aliquem actum, et non necessario inordinatum; ergo potest habere aliquem actum volendi illud absolute, absque relatione ad aliud, aut absque fruitione propter se; et ulterius, potest imperare intellectui ut inquirat quale bonum illud sit et qualiter volendum, et tunc potest illi sic assentire,- et tota ratio differentiae hinc et inde est libertas voluntatis et necessitas naturalis ex parte intellectus.||67. There is between these, however, a double difference. First, because the two assents of the intellect are distinguished by the nature of their objects; for they are different according to the different evidence of this and of that, and therefore they have distinct objects corresponding to them and causing them. But in the case of the will the assents are not from distinction of objects but from a distinct act of a free faculty accepting its object in this way or in that, because, as was said above [n.16], it is in its power to act in this way or in that, referring or not referring it [sc. to another]; and so there are no distinct proper objects corresponding to those acts, but any ‘will’-able good at all is had by the will for object according to this act or according to that. The second difference is that the two assents of the intellect constitute a sufficient division of assent in general, nor is there any middle in between, because there is on the part of the object no evidence in between from which some other truth might be received than the truth of a principle or of a conclusion. But there is in addition to the two assents of the will some assent in between, because there can be shown to the will some good that is apprehended absolutely, not under the idea of something good for its own sake or good for the sake of something else. Now the will can have an act in respect of such a good thus shown, and not necessarily a disordered act; therefore it can have an act of willing that good absolutely, without any relation to anything else, or without any enjoyment of it for its own sake; and further, the will can command the intellect to inquire into what sort the good is and how it should be willed, and then it can in this way assent to it, – and the whole nature of the difference on this side and on that is freedom of the will and natural necessity on the part of the intellect.|
|68 Ex his ultra: actus assensus bono propter se est actus perfectus; actum autem perfectum consequitur delectatio, ex X Ethicorum; ergo actum volendi bonum propter se consequitur aliqua delectatio. Habemus igitur quantum ad propositum quattuor distincta: actum imperfectum volendi bonum propter aliud, qui vocatur usus, et actum perfectum volendi bonum propter se, qui vocatur fruitio, et actum neutrum, et delectationem consequentem actum.||68. From this one may say further: an act of an assent to a good for its own sake is a perfect act; but on a perfect act delight follows, from Ethics 10.4.1174b14-23; therefore on an act of willing a good for its own sake some delight follows. We have then in respect of the proposed intention four distinct things: an imperfect act of willing a good for the sake of something else, which is called use, and a perfect act of willing the good for its own sake, which is called enjoyment, and a neutral act, and a delight consequent to the act.|
|69 De secundo principali, cui scilicet istorum convenit hoc nomen 'frui', potest colligi ex auctoritatibus loquentibus de hoc vocabulo 'frui'; planum est quod non est actus neuter, nec actus usus >est actus fruitionis, sed tantum est altercatio de actu perfecto et delectatione consequente. Respondeo: aliquae auctoritates videntur dicere quod frui est iste actus perfectus tantum, aliquae quod est delectatio tantum; aliquae quod includit utrumque, et tunc non significat aliquod ens per se unum, sed unum aggregatione ex duobus entibus vel ens per accidens: nec est hoc inconveniens quod unum nomen significet multa, quia Ilias secundum Philosophum VII Metaphysicae potest significare totum bellum troianum.||69. On the second principal point [n.65], namely to which of them the name ‘enjoying’ belongs, the answer can be collected from the authorities that speak about the word ‘enjoying’ [from Augustine nn.70-72]; it is plain that it is not the neutral act, nor is the act of use the act of enjoying, but the dispute concerns only the perfect act and the delight that follows it. I reply: some authorities seem to say that enjoying is the perfect act alone, some that it is the delight alone; some that it includes both, and then it does not signify any being that is per se one, but one by aggregation from two beings, or a being per accidens: nor is it discordant that one name should signify many things, because the Iliad, according to the Philosopher at Metaphysics 7.4.1030a6-10, is able to signify the whole Trojan War.|
|70 Quod tantum sit actus videtur illa auctoritate Augustini 83 Quaestionum quaestione 30: ((Omnis perversitas, quae vitium nominatur, est uti fruendis et frui utendis)). Perversitas formaliter est in actu voluntatis elicito, non in delectatione, quia delectatio non est prava nisi quia actus est pravus, nec delectatio est in potestate delectantis nisi quia actus est in potestate eius; peccatum >autem in quantum peccatum formaliter est in potestate peccantis. Hoc etiam videtur manifeste dicere Augustinus I De doctrina christiana cap. l: ((Frui est amore inhaerere alicui rei propter se)). Ista inhaesio videtur esse per potentiam motivam inhaerentis, sicut in corporibus (a quibus transumptum est hoc nomen 'inhaerere' ibi) inhaesio est virtute inhaerentis.||70. That it is the act alone is seen from the authority of Augustine On 83 Diverse Questions q.30: “All perversity, which is named vice, is to use things which are to be enjoyed and to enjoy things which are to be used.” Perversity exists formally in an elicited act of the will, not in delight, since delight is only depraved because the act is depraved, and delight is only in the power of the one delighted because the act is in his power; but sin insofar as it is sin is formally in the power of the sinner. This too Augustine seems manifestly to say On Christian Doctrine I ch.4 n.4: “To enjoy is to inhere by love to some thing for its own sake.” This inhering seems to be through the moving power of the inherer, just as in the case of bodies (from which the name ‘inhere’ is there metaphorically taken) inhesion is by virtue of the inherer.|
|71 Quod autem frui sit tantum delectatio videtur dicere illa auctoritas Augustini I De Trinitate cap. l0 g: ((Plenum gaudium est >frui Trinitate)); quod si non distorqueatur auctoritas ad causalitatem vel ad alium intellectum, quem non sonant verba, gaudium est formaliter delectatio. Similiter et in illa quaestione praeallegata Augustini: ((Fruimur illa re de qua capimus voluptatem)); si sit locutio per identitatem vel quasi definitio, tunc 'capere voluptatem' est frui essentialiter.||71. But that enjoying is delight alone seems to be said by the authority of Augustine On the Trinity I ch.8 n.18: “Full joy is to enjoy the Trinity;” but if the authority is not twisted toward causality or to some other understanding, which the words do not signify, joy is delight formally. Likewise too in the question alleged already from Augustine: “We enjoy the thing from which we receive pleasure;” if the phrase is meant as identity or as it were a definition, then ‘to receive pleasure’ is to enjoy essentially.|
|72 Quod autem frui accipiatur pro utroque, actu scilicet et delectatione simul, probatur ex definitione illa 'frui' X De Trinitate cap. 9: ((Fruimur cognitis, in quibus voluntas propter se delectata conquiescit)). Ad actum enim pertinet quod dicitur 'fruimur cognitis', quia actui voluntatis praesupponitur obiectum cognitum; sed post subditur 'in quibus voluntas delectata conquiescit' etc., quod, si delectatio accideret fruitioni, non debet poni in eius definitione. Similiter, si ponatur ad beatitudinem essentialiter pertinere et actus et delectatio sequens, tunc omnes auctoritates quae dicunt >frui esse summum praemium vel beatitudinem nostram dicunt eam includere utrumque, et actum et delectationem. Istam minorem dicit illa auctoritas I De doctrina christiana cap. 6: ((Summa merces est ut ipso perfruamur)).||72. But that enjoying may be taken for both things, namely for the act and the delight together, is proved from the definition of ‘to enjoy’ in On the Trinity X ch.10 n.13: “We enjoy the things we know, wherein the will delighted for its own sake rests.” For to the act pertains what is said, that ‘we enjoy the things we know’, because to the act of will the object known is presupposed; but afterwards there is added ‘wherein the will delighted for its own sake rests’ etc., which, if delight were an accident of enjoyment, should not be placed in the definition of it. Likewise, if it be posited that both the act and the ensuing delight essentially pertain to beatitude [cf. n.70 footnote], then all the authorities that say to enjoy is the highest reward or is our beatitude say that it includes each of them, both the act and the delight. The minor is said by the authority of Augustine in On Christian Doctrine I ch.22 n.35: “Supreme wages are to enjoy him himself.”|
|73 Sed de significato vocabuli non est contendendum, quia secundum Augustinum I Retractationum cap. 9 ((cum res constat, non est vis facienda in nominibus)). Res constat quod voluntas ha>bet triplicem actum, et quartum, puta passionem consequentem: et duobus actibus nullo modo convenit hoc nomen; pro alterutro aliorum duorum et pro ambobus simul videntur aliqui uti vocabulo, et tunc erit aequivocum, - vel si est univocum, oportet quasdam auctoritates exponere quod loquuntur causaliter vel concomitanter.||73. But one should not contend about the signification of the word, because according to Augustine Retractions I ch.15 n.4: “when the thing is clear, one should not force the words.” The thing is clear, because the will has a triple act, and a fourth, to wit the ensuing passion [n.68]; and to two of the acts this name in no way belongs [n.69]; some people seem to use the word for either of the other two and for both together, and then it will be equivocal, – or if it is univocal some of the authorities [nn.70-72] must be expounded as speaking loosely or concomitantly.|
|74 Ad primum argumentum dico quod fructus est ultimum quod exspectatur ab arbore, non ut possidendum corporaliter, sed ut habendum per actum potentiae attingentis illud ut obiectum; pomum enim non est fructus in quantum exspectatur ut possidendum sed in quantum exspectatur ut gustandum et actu gustus attingendum, quam gustationem sequitur delectatio- si ergo fructus dicatur quo fruendum est, delectatio non est fructus, sed illud ultimum exspectandum; sed nec delectatio erit frui si primum quo attingo exspectatum ut exspectatum est frui, - quod videtur pro>babile, cum fructus sit quid exspectatum sub prima ratione, sub qua exspectatur ut a potentia attingendum.||74. To the first argument [n.62] I say that fruit is the final thing that is expected from a tree, not as something to be bodily possessed, but as something to be had by the act of the power that attains it as its object; for an apple is not the fruit insofar as it is expected as to be possessed but insofar as it is expected as to be tasted and to be attained by the act of tasting, which tasting is followed by delight; if therefore the fruit is said to be that which is to be enjoyed, delight is not the fruit, but that is which is to be expected last; but delight will not be the enjoying either if the first thing by which I attain the expected thing as expected is to enjoy it, – which seems probable, since fruit is what is expected under the first idea under which, as to be attained by the power, it is expected.|
|75 Ad secundum dico quod auctoritas est in oppositum. Cum enim dicat auctoritas 'non actus esse fructus sed passiones', sequitur quod frui non est delectari, quia fructus est obiectum fruitionis; passio autem non potest esse ita primo obiectum sui, sicut potest esse obiectum actus; ideo frui si est passionis ut obiecti, ut sonat auctoritas, non erit passio, sed actus aliquis, potens illas passiones habere pro obiectis quasi proximis suo primo obiecto. Et cum dicitur quod 'per se fructu fruimur', non est hoc intelligendum in ratione formali principali, sicut 'calore calet', sed in ratione obiecti, sicut si diceretur quod 'amabili amamus'; in ratione autem causae formalis fruitione fruimur. Auctoritas autem non dicit aliquid consequens actum esse fruitionem, sed fructum, id est fruitionis obiectum.||75. To the second [n.63] I say that the authority is to the opposite. For since the authority says that ‘acts are not fruits but passions are’, it follows that to enjoy is not to be delighted, because fruit is the object of enjoyment; but a passion cannot be the object first of itself as it can be the object of an act; therefore to enjoy, if it is of a passion as of its object, as the authority indicates, will not be a passion but an act, able to have for object those passions which are as it were proximate to its first object. – And when it is said that ‘we take joy in fruit per se’, this is not to be understood in the sense of formal principal, in the way ‘it is hot by heat’ is to be understood, but in the sense of object, as if one were to say that ‘we take love in the lovable’; now enjoyment is what, in the sense of formal cause, we enjoy by. But the authority does not say that enjoyment is something consequent to act but that fruit is, that is, the object of enjoyment.|
|76 $a Opinio quod dilectio et delectatio sunt idem, quattuor ra>tionibus: prima, eiusdem potentiae circa idem obiectum est unicus actus; secunda, eandem cognitionem non sequitur immediate nisi idem; tertia, quorum opposita sunt eadem, et ipsa sunt eadem; quarta, habentia eosdem effectus et eadem consequentia sunt eadem. - Differunt ratione sicut ab hoc in illud et e converso; etiam sicut unio et quietatio, privatio divisionis et privatio motus. Contra: definitio dilectionis II Rhetoricae et definitio delectationis I Rhetoricae differunt. Responsio: Contra de tristitia quadrupliciter: nolle est in Deo et in beatis; nolle non requirit apprehensionem exsistentiae rei, vel est circa illud quod nec exsistit in re nec apprehenditur exsistere; nolle intensissimum ante fieri rei; voluntarie nolo. Contra de dilectione: delectatio est per se obiectum dilectionis, sicut et desiderii praecedentis, IX Trinitatis ultimo: ((Desiderium inhiantis)) etc. Item, Lucifer potest se summe diligere, XIV Civitatis ultimo et Anselmus De casu diaboli 3. Item, intensior dilectio minor delectatio. >Contra distinctionem primam rationis, aliud agens; contra secundum, unio est relatio. - Solutio X Ethicorum. a$||76. The opinion that love and delight are the same is shown by four reasons: first, there is a single act of the same power about the same object; second, the same knowledge is followed immediately only by the same thing; third, things whose opposites are the same are themselves the same as well; fourth, things that have the same effects and the same consequences are the same. – Love and delight differ in idea just as from this to that and the reverse differ; also just as union and rest differ, or the privation of division and the privation of motion. On the contrary: the definition of love in Rhetoric 2.4.1380b35-81a2 and the definition of delight in Rhetoric 1.11.1369b33-35 are different. Response: To the opposite about sadness, in four ways: not to want exists both in God and in the blessed; not to want does not require apprehension of the existence of a thing, or it is about that which neither exists in reality nor is apprehended as existing; not to want is most intense before the coming to be of the thing; I voluntarily do not want. To the opposite about love: delight is the per se object of love, just as it is of the preceding desire, Augustine On the Trinity IX ch.12 n.18: “The desire of him who yearns, etc.” Again, Lucifer is able to love himself supremely, Augustine On the City of God XIV ch. 28 and Anselm On the Fall of the Devil ch.4. Again, the more intense the love the less the delight [cf. Ethics 3.12.1117b10-11, about the happier and more virtuous man being sadder at death]. Against the first distinction in idea, the agent is different [n.76, end of first paragraph]; against the second, union is a relation. The solution is in Ethics 10.2.1174a4-8.|
- ↑ 17 Interpolation: “Thirdly, Augustine On the Trinity X ch.10 n.13: ‘We enjoy things known, in which the very will in itself rests delighted’. So delight either is the same as enjoyment, and the proposition is gained, or it is something consequent and posterior (as a certain property), and thus the definition given of enjoying [n.62] is not appropriate, because the posterior is not put in the definition of the prior nor a property in the definition of the subject” [n.72].
- ↑ 18 Text cancelled by Scotus: “Likewise ‘inhesion in something for its own sake’ does not seem to be through delight, because the efficient cause of delight seems to be the delightful object and not the end, and thus the one who delights does not seem to tend to the object for its own sake. But this reason does not entail the conclusion – for it proceeds as if the object could not be the efficient and final cause of delight – and it must be solved by holding that delight is of the essence of beatitude, see 4 Suppl. d.49 p.1 q.7 nn.2-7.”
- ↑ 19 Text cancelled by Scotus: “But that it be the more proper signification of the word is difficult to prove, yet it can in some way be conjectured from the use of the word: for the word ‘to enjoy’ is construed with the ablative case to signify the object in transitive sense, such as is the construal appropriate to verbs signifying activity, but it is not construed with the object in the ablative case in causal sense, as is the construal due to passions signified by verbs that are primarily passive; for one does not say ‘I am joyed by God’ as one says ‘I am delighted by God’ or ‘God delights me’, but I am said ‘to enjoy God’ transitively in the way I am said ‘to love God’, and that seems to be the more proper signification of the word.” Scotus is here commenting on a peculiarity of Latin grammar, that the phrase ‘I enjoy God’ has a verb in passive form and an object in indirect or causal form (‘fruor Deo’), but in meaning it is active and the object is direct, as in ‘I love God’ (‘amo Deum’).
- ↑ 20 Interpolation (from Appendix A): “Now some say that love and delight are the same really but differ in reason. The first point is proved in four ways. Firstly, because in the case of one power about one object there is one act. The proof is that the distinction of an act is only from the power or the object. – Secondly thus: on something the same there follows immediately only something the same; but, once the object possessed, love and delight immediately follow. – Again: things whose opposites are the same are themselves the same; but hatred and sadness are the same. The fact is plain because each introduces a certain inquietude. – Fourth thus: for they have the same effects and the same consequences. The fact is plain because each has to perfect an operation of the intellect. The second is shown thus, that love is asserted on the basis of what comes from the power to the object, but delight on the basis of the reverse. Also, delight implies rest, which is the privation of motion; but love states union, which is the privation of division. Now these two privations differ only in reason. But to the contrary. Firstly, that the opposites of them are not the same. The proof is that hatred is a certain refusal to will, but refusal to will does not require an existing object, while sadness does. – Secondly, that a very intense refusal to will precedes the event of a thing, but from the event such sadness arises. – Thirdly, because delight is per se the object of enjoyment, but love is not. – Fourthly, because a bad angel can love himself supremely. The thing is plain from Augustine On the City of God XIV ch.28: “Two loves” etc. – Fifthly, because in Ethics 10 [no such reference is found, though there is something close in Eudemian Ethics 7.2.1237b35ff.] it is said that one loves old friends more, but finds more delight in new ones. – Again, the definition of love and that of delight differ. The thing is plain from Rhetoric 2.4.1380b35-81a2. – Again, where sometimes the love is more intense, there the delight is less. The thing is plain in the devoted. To the first of these: the major is false. – To the second: the minor is false. – To the third: it has been shown that the minor is false. – To the fourth I say that they do not perfect in the same way, but delight is as it were an accidental perfection of it, as beauty in youth, from Ethics 10.4.1174b31- 33, but love is as it were a commanded act or an act joining the parent with the offspring.” Interpolation: “Note the reasons that the same John [Duns Scotus], in d.1 q.3 in the Parisian Lectura [Rep. IA d.1 p.2 q.2], gives against this conclusion, that enjoyment and love and delight are the same really. The first reason is founded on this that hatred and sadness, which are the opposites of love and delight, are really distinct. His proof for this is that to hate something is not to want it; now not to want and to be sad are not the same thing, because the act of not wanting does not require an object apprehended under the idea of existing, which is what makes one sad, according to Augustine On the City of God XIV ch.6. He also proves the same because it happens that the will changes from not being sad to being said when there is a not wanting equally in place, because a thing intensely not wanted can precede the happening of that not wanted thing itself. Therefore, when the not wanted thing is posited as existing, the not wanting will not be more intense and it is then necessarily sad but before not. Third, because the will freely elicits the act of not wanting as of wanting, but it is not voluntarily saddened; therefore not wanting is not being saddened. A confirmation is that when the will turns itself back on an act voluntarily elicited it has pleasure in itself, and so a will willing itself freely not to want has pleasure in itself; but a will that turns itself back on being sad does not have pleasure in itself but is displeased; therefore etc The second reason: in God there is properly found the act of not wanting, but not the act of being sad. The assumption is plain, because just as God is by his willing the cause of things that come to be, so by his not willing he is a cause preventative of bad things. The third reason: delight can be the per se object of some love of which love cannot be the per se object. The proof of this is that the will can choose to be delighted in the delightful thing itself when that delightful thing is absent, and of that choice delight is the per se object, but choice or love is not, because then the will would be turning itself back on its own act; but it is not necessary that the will turn itself back on its own act when it desires to be conjoined to its delightful object, or when it desires to be delighted in the delightful object when it will have become present; therefore when by an act of love it chooses the delightful thing or chooses to be delighted, it is not necessary that it be turned back, therefore delight can be the object of a love of which it is not the love. Again, a bad angel can love itself supremely, and yet does not have delight. The thing is plain in Augustine On the City of God ibid. ch.28. Again, a more intense love is compatible with a less intense delight, as in the case of the devoted/infatuated.