Authors/Duns Scotus/Ordinatio/Ordinatio I/D1/Q2

From The Logic Museum

Jump to: navigation, search

Translated by Peter Simpson.

Latin English
Questio 2
23 Secundo quaero utrum ultimus finis habeat tantum unam rationem fruibilis, an in ipso aliqua sit distinctio secundum quam posset voluntas frui eo secundum unam rationem et non secundum aliam. Et quod sit in eo talis distinctio, probatio: Quia I Ethicorum cap. 7, in illo paragrapho Amplius autem quia bonum ultimum, dicit Philosophus et Commentator quod >sicut ens et unum sunt in omni genere, ita bonum, et specialiter loquitur ibi de relatione; igitur sicut habet propriam bonitatem, sic et propriam fruibilitatem, et per consequens cum ipsa sit in Deo alia et alia, ibi erit alia et alia ratio fruibilis. 23. Second I inquire whether the ultimate end has only one idea of enjoyability, or whether there is in it some distinction according to which the will could enjoy it in respect of one idea and not in respect of another. And that there is in it such a distinction the proof is: Because in Ethics 1.4.1096a23-27, in the paragraph, “But further, because the good…” the Philosopher says, and the Commentator [Eustratius Explanations of Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics 1 ch.6 (17E)], that, just as being and one are in all the categories, so also is good, and he speaks there specifically of the category of relation; therefore just as relation has its own goodness, so also does it have its own enjoyability, and consequently, since there are different relations in God, there will be in him different ideas of being enjoyable.
24 Item, sicut unum convertitur cum ente, ita et bonum; ergo quando transferuntur ad divina, aequaliter transferuntur. Ergo sicut unum est ibi essentiale et personale, ita bonum et bonitas; ergo sicut in divinis sunt tres unitates, sic tres bonitates, et per consequens habetur propositum. 24. Again, just as one is convertible with being, so also is good; therefore, when these are transferred to God, they are transferred equally. Therefore just as one is an essential and a personal feature in God, so also is good and goodness; therefore just as there are three unities in divine reality, so are there three goodnesses, and the intended proposition is as a result obtained.
25 Praeterea, actus non terminatur ad obiectum in quantum numeratur nisi obiectum ut est formale ohiectum numeretur; sed actus fruendi terminatur ad tres personas in quantum tres; ergo obiectum fruitionis in quantum formale obiectum numeratur. 25. Further, an act does not terminate in an object insofar as the object is numbered unless the object is numbered as it is the formal object; but the act of enjoying terminates in the three persons insofar as they are three; therefore the object of enjoyment is numbered insofar as it is the formal object.
26 Probatio minoris: credimus Deum in quantum trinus; ergo videbimus Deum in quantum trinus, quia visio succedit fidei secundum totam perfectionem eius; ergo fruemur Deo in quantum trinus. >Ad oppositum: 26. Proof of the minor: we believe in God insofar as he is Triune; therefore we will see God insofar as he is Triune, because vision succeeds to faith according to the complete perfection of faith [Prologue n.217]; therefore we will enjoy God insofar as he is Triune.
27 In omni ordine essentiali est tantum unum primum, ergo in ordine finium est tantum unus finis, fruitio autem est respectu finis; igitur etc. 27. To the opposite: In every essential order there is only one first, therefore in the order of ends there is only one end; but enjoyment is in respect of the end; therefore etc.
28 Item, primo efficienti correspondet ultimus finis; sed tantum est unum efficiens primum, et sub unica ratione; ergo tantum unus finis. - Et confirmatur ratio, quia tanta est unitas efficientis quod non potest una persona efficere non efficiente alia; igitur similiter tanta est unitas finis quod non poterit una persona finire non finiente alia, et sequitur propositum. - Ista secunda ratio confirmatur per Augustinum V De Trinitate cap. 7 vel 17: ((Pater)), inquit, ((et Filius sunt unum principium Spiritus Sancti sicut unus creator respectu creaturae)). 28. Again, to the first efficient cause the ultimate end corresponds; but there is only one first efficient cause, and one under a single idea; therefore there is only one end. – The reasons is confirmed too, because the unity of the efficient cause is so great that one person cannot so cause without the other person so causing; therefore likewise the unity of the end is so great that one person cannot be end without the other person being end, and the intended proposition follows. – This second reason is confirmed by Augustine On the Trinity V ch.14 n.15: “The Father,” he says, “and the Son are one principle of the Holy Spirit as they are one Creator with respect to the creature.”
29 Item, sicut in Deo est una maiestas, ita et una bonitas; sed propter eius maiestatem debetur ei tantum una adoratio, secundum Damascenum 54, ita quod non contingit adorare unam personam non adorando aliam; ergo nec contingit frui una persona non fruendo alia. > 29. Again, just as there is in God one majesty, so also there is one goodness; but there is owed to him because of his majesty only one adoration, according to Damascene On the Orthodox Faith 1 ch.8, such that it is not possible to adore one person without adoring the other;[1] therefore it is not possible to enjoy one person without adoring the other.
30 Ista quaestio posset habere quadruplicem difficultatem secundum quadruplicem distinctionem in divinis, quarum prima est distinctio essentiae a persona, secunda distinctio personae a persona, tertia essentiae ab attributis et quarta essentiae ab ideis. De tertia et quarta modo non dicam, quia non est ostensum qualis est illa distinctio nec utrum illa distincta pertineant ad fruitionem. Tantum ergo de duabus primis distinctionibus nunc videndum est. Et quantum ad illas duas distinctiones primo videndum est de fruitione viatoris quantum ad possibilitatem eius, secundo videndum est de fruitione comprehensoris et hoc loquendo de potentia absoluta divina, tertio de fruitione comprehensoris loquendo de potentia creaturae, quarto loquendo de fruitione viatoris et comprehensoris de facto. 30. This question could have a fourfold difficulty according to the fourfold distinction in divine things, the first of which is the distinction of essence from person, the second the distinction of person from person, the third the distinction of essence from attributes, and the fourth the distinction of essence from ideas. About the third and fourth distinctions I will not now speak, because it has not been shown of what sort that distinction is nor whether the things distinguished pertain to enjoyment [cf. 1 d.8 p.1 q.4 nn.1-26; d.35 q.un nn.12-16]. Therefore we must only look now into the first two distinctions. And as concerns those two distinctions one must first see about the enjoyment of the wayfarer as to its possibility, second one must see about the enjoyment of the comprehender and that when speaking of absolute divine power, third about the enjoyment of the comprehender speaking about the power of the creature, fourth when speaking of the enjoyment in fact of the wayfarer and of the comprehender.
31 De primo dico quod possibile est viatorem frui essentia divina non fruendo persona, et hoc etiam potest fruitione ordinata. Quod probo, quia secundum Augustinum VII Trinitatis cap. 2 ((si es>sentia relative dicitur, non est essentia, quia omnis essentia quae relative dicitur est aliquid excepto relativo)); ex quo concludit 3 cap. a: ((quapropter si Pater non est aliquid ad se, non est aliquid quod ad alterum dicatur)). Est ergo essentia divina aliquod obiectum conceptibile in cuius conceptu non includitur relatio, ergo sic potest concipi a viatore; sed essentia sic concepta habet rationem summi boni, ergo et perfectam rationem fruibilitatis; ergo contingit ea frui etiam ordinate. 31. About the first I say that it is possible for the wayfarer to enjoy the divine essence without enjoying the person, and this is even possible in the case of ordered enjoyment. My proof for this is that according to Augustine On the Trinity VII ch.1 n.2: “if essence is said relatively it is not essence, because every essence which is said relatively is something after the relative has been removed;” from which he concludes: “wherefore, if the Father is not something for himself, he is not something which can be said relative to another.” The divine essence, then, is some conceivable object in whose concept relation is not included, therefore it can be thus conceived by the wayfarer; but essence thus conceived has the idea of the supreme good, therefore it also has the perfect idea of enjoyability; therefore one can also enjoy it in an ordered way.
32 Ista ratio confirmatur, quia possibile est concludi ex naturalibus puris esse unum summum bonum et tamen ex illis naturalibus non concipimus Deum ut trinus est; ergo circa summum bonum sic cognitum potest habere aliquem actum voluntatis, et non necessario non ordinatum; ergo habebit actum fruitionis ordinatum circa essentiam et non circa personam ut nos concipimus personam. E converso autem non est possibile, scilicet quod ordinate fruatur persona non fruendo essentia, quia persona includit in ratione sui essentiam. > 32. A confirmation of this reason is that one can deduce from purely natural facts that the supreme good is one, and yet from those natural facts we do not conceive God as he is Triune; therefore about the supreme good thus conceived one can have some act of 18 the will, and not necessarily a disordered act; therefore one will have an ordered act of enjoyment about the essence and not about the person as we now conceive the person. The converse, however, is not possible, namely that one might enjoy in an ordered way the person without enjoying the essence, because the person includes the essence in the idea of itself.
33 Secundo dico etiam quod viator potest frui ordinate una persona non fruendo alia. Quod probo, quia respectu trium personarum tres sunt distincti articuli fidei; ergo potest concipi una persona cui correspondet unus articulus alia persona non concepta cui correspondet alius articulus, et tunc in illa persona concipitur ratio summi boni; possibile est igitur frui illa persona sic concepta non fruendo alia. Si dicas quod persona est relativa, igitur non potest concipi nisi suum correlativum concipiatur, respondeo: etsi cognitio relativi requirat cognitionem sui correlativi, non tamen oportet cognoscentem et fruentem uno relativo cognoscere et frui alio relativo, quia possibile est frui Deo in quantum creator, non fruendo creatura, quae tamen terminat illam relationem. - Similiter, licet Pater dicatur correlative ad Filium et ideo non possit intelligi in quantum Pater non intellecto Filio, non tamen dicitur relative ad Spiritum Sanctum in quantum Pater; ergo erit possibile concipere Patrem ut Patrem et frui eo, non concipiendo vel fruendo Spiritu Sancto. > 33. Second I say also that the wayfarer can enjoy in an ordered way one person without enjoying another. My proof is that with respect to the three persons there are three distinct articles of faith; therefore one person can be conceived to whom one article corresponds, and then in that person the idea of the supreme good is conceived; one can therefore enjoy the person thus conceived without enjoying another. If you say the person is a relative notion, therefore it cannot be conceived unless its correlative is conceived, I reply: although the knowledge of a relative requires knowledge of its correlative, it is nevertheless not necessary that the knower and enjoyer of one relative know and enjoy the other relative, because it is possible to enjoy God insofar as he is Creator without enjoying the creature that is nevertheless the term of that relation. – Likewise, although the Father is said correlatively to the Son and therefore cannot be understood insofar as he is Father without the Son being understood, yet he is not said relatively to the Holy Spirit insofar as he is Father; therefore it will be possible to conceive the Father as Father and to enjoy him without conceiving and enjoying the Holy Spirit.
34 De secundo articulo dicicitur quod non est possibile loquendo de potentia absoluta Dei quod aliquis comprehensor fruatur essentia divina non fruendo persona. Quod probatur primo de visione, videlicet quod non sit possibile absolute aliquem intellectum videre essentiam divinam nisi videndo personam: Primo sic, quia cognitio confusa est cognitio imperfecta; visio illius essentiae non potest esse imperfecta; ergo cognitio visiva eius non potest esse confusa. Sed si esset tantum cognitio vel visio - de essentia et non de persona vel essentiae et non personae, esset visio confusa, quia esset alicuius communis ad personas et non illarum personarum, quod videtur inconveniens. 34. About the second article [n.30] it is asserted that it is not possible, when speaking of the absolute power of God, that anyone who comprehends should enjoy the divine essence without enjoying the person. The proof of this is first about vision [about enjoyment see nn. 40-41], namely that it is not possible absolutely for any intellect to see the divine essence without seeing the person: The first proof is thus, that confused knowledge is imperfect knowledge; the vision of that essence cannot be imperfect; therefore the visual knowledge of it cannot be confused. But if it were knowledge alone or vision alone – about the essence and not about the person or of the essence and not of the person – it would be confused vision, because it would be of something common to the persons and would not be of the persons, which seems discordant.
35 Secundo sic: visio est exsistentis ut exsistens est et ut praesens est videnti secundum suam exsistentiam; et secundum hoc distinguitur visio ab intellectione abstractiva, quae potest esse non exsistentis, vel exsistentis non in quantum in se praesens est; et est in intellectu ista distinctio inter intellectionem intuitivam et abstracti>vam sicut in parte sensitiva est distinctio inter actum visus et actum phantasiae. Est ergo alia cognitio essentiae divinae intuitiva ab illa quae est cognitio abstractiva, quae visio est exsistentiae eius ut exsistens est et secundum exsistentiam eius praesens virtuti cognoscenti; sed essentia divina non exsistit nisi in persona; ergo non potest esse visio eius nisi in persona. 35. The second is as follows: vision is of what is existent as it existent and as it is present to the seer according to its existence; and in this respect vision is distinguished from abstractive understanding, because the latter can be of what is not existent or of what is existent insofar as it is not present in itself; and this distinction in the intellect between intuitive and abstractive understanding is like the distinction in the sensitive part between act of vision and act of imagination. Intuitive knowledge of the divine essence, then, is other than knowledge which is abstractive, because the former is vision of his existence as it is existent and as it is, according to its existence, present to the knowing power; but the divine essence only exists in the person; therefore there can only be vision of it in the person.
36 Item, non potest aliquid cognosci cognitione intuitiva in quo sunt aliqua plura distincta ex natura rei nisi etiam omnia illa distincte videantur et perfecte. Exemplum: albedo non videtur distincte nisi videantur omnes partes quae sunt in basi pyramidis, quae partes distinguuntur ex natura rei. Sed personae sunt in essentia et distinguuntur ex natura rei; ergo non distincte videtur essentia nisi videantur personae. 36. Again, something in which there are many things distinct on the part of the nature of the thing cannot be known by intuitive knowledge unless all those things are also distinctly and perfectly seen. An example: whiteness is not seen distinctly unless all the parts at the base of a pyramid are seen, which parts are distinct on the part of the nature of the thing. But the persons are in their essence also distinct on the part of the nature of the thing; therefore the essence is not distinctly seen unless the persons are seen.
37 Ex his arguitur ad propositum quantum ad secundam distinctionem, scilicet personarum inter se, quia si non potest videri essentia nisi in persona - et non magis videtur in una persona quam in alia, quia aeque immediate videtur se habere ad quamlibet perso>nam - ergo non potest videri nisi videatur in qualibet persona, et ita non videtur in una persona nisi videatur in alia. 37. From this there is an argument to the intended proposition [n.34] as concerns the second distinction, namely the distinction of the persons among themselves [n.30], because if the essence cannot be seen save in the person – and it is not seen more in one person than in another, because it is seen with equal immediacy to be related to any person whatever – therefore it cannot be seen unless it is seen in any person whatever, and so it is not seen in one person without being seen in another.
38 Arguitur etiam ultra quantum ad frui propositum, quia voluntas non potest magis abstrahere obiectum suum quam intellectus ostendere; igitur si intellectus non potest distincte ostendere essentiam sine persona vel personam sine persona, igitur nec voluntas poterit distincte frui. 38. There is also an argument that goes further to the enjoying proposed [n.34], because the will cannot abstract its object beyond what the intellect can display of it; therefore if the intellect cannot distinctly display the essence without the person or the person without the person, then neither can the will distinctly enjoy them.
39 Et hoc etiam confirmatur sic, quia voluntas non potest habere actum distinctum ex parte obiecti nisi ponatur distinctio ex parte obiecti vel realis vel secundum rationem; sed si intellectus apprehendat indistincte essentiam et personam, non erit distinctio ex parte obiecti nec rei nec rationis; ergo voluntas non potest habere actum distinctum ex parte distinctionis in obiecto primo. Quod non sit distinctio realis ex parte obiecti, patet; quod non sit rationis, probatur, quia intellectus non distinctive comprehendit vel non distincte apprehendit hoc et illud; ergo non distinguit hoc et illud. 39. And there is a confirmation for this too, that the will cannot have a distinct act on the part of the object unless a distinction either real or in idea is posited on the part of the object; but if the intellect apprehends the essence and person indistinctly, there will not be on the part of the object a distinction either real or in idea; therefore the will cannot have a distinct act on the part of a distinction in the first object. That there is not a real distinction on the part of the object is plain; the proof that there is not a distinction in idea is that the intellect does not distinctively comprehend, or does not distinctly apprehend, this and that; therefore it does not distinguish this and that.
40 Ex parte fruitionis arguitur sic: fruitio quietat fruentem; una >persona non perfecte quietat fruitionem fruentis sine alia nec essentia sine persona, quia tunc potentia quietata in illa non posset ulterius quietari; nec in aliquo alio quietari potest, quia ultimate quietatum non est ulterius quietabile, et per consequens illa potentia non posset quietari in alia persona nec frui ea, quod est falsum. 40. On the part of enjoyment the argument is as follows: enjoyment gives rest to the enjoyer; one person does not without another give rest perfectly to the enjoyment of the enjoyer, nor does the essence without the person, because then the power that is at rest therein could not be made to be at further rest; nor can it be made to be at rest in anything else, because what is at ultimate rest is not able to be made to be at further rest, and consequently that power could not be made to be at rest in another person or to enjoy it, which is false.
41 Item, si quietatur in ista persona sola, et patet quod potest frui alia, ergo vel fruitio alterius personae potest esse cum fruitione istius personae, vel erunt incompossibilia, ita quod una non erit cum alia; si primo modo, ergo duo actus eiusdem speciei erunt simul in eadem potentia quorum uterque aequatur capacitati illius potentiae, quod est impossibile; si secundo modo, ergo neuter actus erit fruitio, quia neuter actus poterit esse perpetuus. 41. Again, if it were at rest in this person alone, and it is plain that it can enjoy another person, then either the enjoyment of the other person can exist with the enjoyment of this person, or these enjoyments will not be compossible, so that one of them will not exist with the other; if in the first way then two acts of the same species will exist at the same time in the same power, each of which acts is equal to the capacity of the power, which is impossible; if in the second way then neither act will be enjoyment, because neither act will be able to be perpetual.[2]
42 Quantum ad istum articulum dico quod de potentia Dei absoluta loquendo non videtur contradictio quin possibile sit ex parte intellectus et ex parte voluntatis quod utrius>que actum terminet essentia et non persona vel una persona et non alia, puta quod intellectus videat essentiam et non personam vel unam personam et non aliam, et quod voluntas fruatur essentia et non persona vel una persona et non alia. 42. [Scotus’ own opinion] – As to this article [n.34] I say that, speaking about the absolute power of God, there seems to be no contradiction in its being possible on the part of the intellect and on the part of the will that the act of each should be terminated in the essence and not in the person, or terminated in one person and not in another, to wit that the intellect should see the essence and not the person, or see one person and not the other, and that the will should enjoy the essence and not the person or enjoy one person and not the other.
43 Hoc persuadetur sic: $a aliquis actus habet primum obiectum >a quo essentialiter dependet, et habet obiectum secundum a quo essentialiter non dependet sed tendit in illud virtute primi obiecti; licet igitur non possit manere ibidem actus idem nisi habeat habi>tudinem ad primum obiectum, potest tamen manere idem sine habitudine ad obiectum secundum, quia ab eo non dependet. Exemplum: idem est actus visionis essentiae divinae et aliarum re>rum in essentia divina, sed essentia est primum obiectum, res visae sunt secundarium obiectum; non posset autem manere eadem visio nisi esset eiusdem essentiae, posset tamen manere absque hoc quod esset rerum visarum in ea. Sicut ergo Deus sine contradictione potest cooperari ad actum illum in quantum tendit in primum obiectum et non in quantum tendit in secundum, et tamen erit idem actus, ita sine contradictione potest cooperari ad visionem essentiae, quia essentia habet rationem primi obiecti, non cooperando eidem actui visionis vel fruitionis in quantum tendit in personam, et pari ratione in quantum tendit in unam personam et non in aliam. a$ 43. Proof for this is as follows:[3] some act has a first object on which it essentially depends, and it has a second object on which it does not essentially depend but does tend toward it in virtue of the first object; although, therefore, the act could not stay the same in the same way unless it had a relation to the first object, yet it could stay the same without a relation to the second object, because it does not depend on the second object. An example: the act of seeing the divine essence is the same act as that of seeing other things in the divine essence, but the essence is the first object and the seen things are the secondary object; now the seeing could not stay the same unless it was of the same essence, but it could stay the same without being of the things seen in the essence. Just as God, then, could without contradiction cooperate with that act insofar as it tends to the first object and not insofar as it tends to the second object, and yet it will be the same act, so he can without contradiction cooperate with the seeing of the essence, because the essence has the idea of the first object, but not cooperate with the same act of seeing or of enjoying insofar as it tends to the person, and, by parity of reasoning, insofar as it tends to one person and not to another.
44 Per hoc ad argumenta contra istam viam. Cum primo dicitur de visione confusa, dico quod universale in creaturis dividitur in suis singularibus; hoc autem quod est 'dividi', est imperfectionis, et ita non competit ei quod est commune in Deo, immo essentia >divina, quae communis est tribus personis, est de se haec. Ideo igitur est cognitio alicuius universalis abstracti a singularibus confusa et imperfecta, quia obiectum est confusum, divisum in illis quae in ipso confuse concipiuntur. Haec autem cognitio divinae essentiae est distincta, quia eius obiecti est quod est de se hoc, et tamen non oportet in illo distincte concepto personam distincte concipi vel cognosci, quia ipsa non est primus terminus fruitionis vel visionis, ut dictum est. 44. From this comes response to the arguments against this way [n.34]. As to what is said first about confused vision [n.34], I say that the universal in creatures is divided among its singular instances; but this ‘to be divided’ is a mark of imperfection and so it does not belong to what is common in God, nay the divine essence, which is common to the three persons, is of itself a ‘this’. So that is why knowledge of some universal abstracted from singulars is confused and imperfect, because the object is confused, being divided among the things which are confusedly conceived in it. But the knowledge of the divine essence is distinct, because it is of an object that is of itself a ‘this’, and yet there is no need that in this distinctly conceived object the person be distinctly conceived or known, because the person is not the first term of enjoyment or of vision, as has been said [n.32].
45 Ad secundum, cum arguitur de essentia exsistente etc., dico quod necessarium est terminum visionis esse exsistens in quantum exsistens, non tamen oportet quod subsistentia, id est incommunicabilis exsistentia, sit de ratione termini visionis. Essentia autem divina est de se haec et actu exsistens licet non includat de sua ratione incommunicabilem subsistentiam, et ideo ipsa ut haec potest terminare visionem absque hoc quod videantur personae. Exemplum: album videtur intuitive in quantum exsistens et praesens visioni secundum exsistentiam suam; non oportet tamen album videri tamquam subsistens vel in quantum habet rationem suppo>siti, quia non habet rationem suppositi nec suppositum in quo est vel videtur. Ad formam igitur argumenti patet, quia licet non sit visio nisi exsistentis in quantum exsistens est, et non est exsistens nisi in persona, non tamen sequitur 'ergo est exsistentis in quantum est in persona', sed tantum debet inferri quod est subsistentis vel exsistentis in subsistente. 45. To the second, when the argument is made about existent essence etc. [n.35], I say that it is necessary that the term of vision be existent as far as it is existent, but it is not necessary that subsistence, i.e. incommunicable essence, belong to the idea of the terminus of vision. But the divine essence is of itself a ‘this’ and actually existent, although it does not of its idea include incommunicable subsistence, and therefore it can as a ‘this’ be the terminus of vision without the persons being seen. An example: a white thing is seen intuitively insofar as it is existent and is present to vision according to its existence; but it is not necessary that the white thing be seen as subsistent or insofar as it has the idea of a supposit, because it does not have the idea of a supposit, nor does it have the supposit in which it exists or is seen. As to the form of the argument, then, it is plain that although vision is of the existent insofar as it is existent, and although it is existent only in a person, yet the inference does not follow ‘therefore it is of the existent insofar as it exists in a person’, but what should be inferred is only that it is of what subsists or exists in the subsistent.
46 Ad tertium dico quod prima propositio est falsa, nisi quando in illis distinctis ex natura rei ipsum primum visum distinguitur, sicut apparet in exemplo tuo de basi pyramidis, nam albedo et album visum distinguuntur in partes in quibus videntur, et ideo non distincte videtur album nisi istae partes in quibus distinguitur album visum distincte videantur. In proposito autem etsi personae divinae ex natura rei distinguantur, tamen essentia visa non distinguitur in eis, quia est de se haec; ideo potest distincte videri sine illis visis quae subsistunt in ea. 46. To the third [n.36] I say that the first proposition is false except when the first thing seen in those things that are distinct on the part of the nature of the thing is itself distinct, as is clear in your example about the base of the pyramid, for whiteness and a seen white thing are distinguished into the parts in which they are seen, and therefore the white thing is not distinctly seen unless the parts in which the seen white thing is distinguished are distinctly seen. But in the intended proposition, although the divine persons are distinguished on the part of the thing, yet the seen essence is not distinguished in them, because it is of itself a ‘this’; therefore the essence can be distinctly seen without the persons that subsist in it being seen.
47 Ad illam deductionem ulteriorem de voluntate etsi non oporteat respondere, quia antecedens est negandum, tamen quia consequentia non videtur necessaria, potest responderi. Cum dicitur quod 'voluntas non plus abstrahit quam intellectus ostendit', >dico quod intellectus potest ostendere aliquod obiectum primum voluntati et in isto obiecto primo aliquod per se obiectum et non primum (et vocatur hic 'obiectum primum' totum illud ad quod terminatur actus potentiae et 'obiectum per se' quod includitur per se in obiecto terminante primo). Utraque autem ratio ostensa ibi sufficit ad hoc quod voluntas habeat actum suum circa illud; non enim oportet quod voluntas velit totum primum obiectum ostensum, sed potest velle primum ostensum et potest nolle illud quod ostenditur in illo primo ostenso. Exemplum ponatur tale: in episcopatu ostenditur sacerdotium; talis ostensio sufficit ad hoc quod voluntas habeat velle vel nolle circa sacerdotium, ita quod ex tali ostensione possit habere velle circa episcopatum et non circa sacerdotium; et tamen non est nisi una ostensio, et unius obiecti primi, in quo tamen includitur aliquid ut per se obiectum. Dico quod voluntas non abstrahit universale a singulari, sed voluntati ostenduntur plura volita per intellectum qui est aliquorum plurium inclusorum in primo obiecto, quorum utrumque ut sic ostensum potest voluntas velle. > 47. As to the further deduction about the will [n.38], although there is no need to reply to it, because the antecedent must be denied, yet one can reply that the consequence does not seem to be necessary. When it is said that ‘the will does not abstract more than the intellect displays’, I say that the intellect can show some first object to the will and in that first object something that is a per se object and not first (and here the whole of that in which the act of the power terminates is called ‘first object’, and what is included per se in the object that first terminates is called ‘per se object’). Now each idea there shown [the idea of first object and of per se object] suffices for the will to have its own act with respect to it; for there is no need that the will wills the whole of the first object shown, but it can will the first object shown and not will what is shown in that first object shown. Take the following sort of example: in bishop-hood is shown priesthood; such showing suffices for the will to have an act of willing or of not willing with respect to priesthood, so that it could from this showing have an act of willing with respect to bishop-hood and not with respect to priesthood; and yet there is only one showing, and a showing of one first object, in which first object however is included something as per se object. I say that the will does not abstract the universal from the singular, but there are many willed things shown by the understanding to the will, and this understanding is of several different things included in the first object, each of which, as thus shown, can be willed by the will.
48 Ad confirmationem, cum dicitur 'obiectum aut differt re aut ratione', dico quod differt ratione. Et cum improbatur quod non, 'quia intellectus non distincte concipit hoc ab illo', dico quod non oportet ad distinctionem rationis quod intellectus habeat illa sicut obiecta distincta, sed sufficit quod in primo obiecto concipiat illa. 48. To the confirmation, when it is said that ‘the object differs either in reality or in idea’ [n.39], I say that it differs in idea. And when the proof is given that it does not, ‘because the intellect does not conceive this distinctly from that’ [n.39], I say that a distinction of reason does not require that the intellect possess them as distinct objects, but it is enough that it conceive them in the first object.
49 Ad aliud de quietatione dico quod Pater quietatur in essentia sua ut est in se; nec sequitur 'ergo non potest quietari in ea ut in Filio vel in Spiritu Sancto', immo quietatur in essentia ut communicata est eis, et hoc eadem quietatione qua quietatur in essentia ut in se. Quod enim quietatur primo in aliquo obiecto, quietatur in illo in quocumque est secundum illum modum; ita hic, si beatus prius fruatur essentia quam persona, non quietatur ulteriori quietatione quam prius quietabatur sed eadem quietatione, in quantum obiectum quietans terminat ut in aliquo et prius non terminavit ut in illo. 49. To the point about rest [n.40] I say that the Father rests in his essence as it is in himself; nor does it follow that ‘therefore he cannot rest in it as it is in the Son or the Holy Spirit’, for rather he rests in the essence as communicated to them and does so with the same rest with which he rests in the essence as it is in himself. For that which rests first in some object rests in it as to whatever it is according to that mode of it; so here, if the blessed were to enjoy the essence first and then the person, they would not rest with a further rest beyond what they were resting with before but with the same rest, because the object is complete in giving rest as it exists in any one of them and was not first complete as it existed in that one.
50 Per hoc ad quintum argumentum dico quod non erunt ibi duo actus, quia quicumque actus est ibi fruitionis vel visionis, est obiecti primi sub una formali ratione; sed ille unus actus potest >esse omnium vel obiecti per se virtute primi obiecti, vel potest esse tantum ipsius obiecti primi: nec igitur erunt duo actus eiusdem speciei simul, nec successive. 50. Using this in answer to the fifth argument [n.41] I say that there will not be two acts there, because whatever act there is of enjoyment or of vision there is of the first object under one formal idea; but that one act can be of everything or of the object per se by virtue of the first object, or it can be only of the first object itself; there will not then be two acts, at the same time or in succession, of the same species.[4]
51 Quantum ad tertium articulum de potentia creaturae dico quod intellectus non potest per potentiam suam naturalem videre essentiam non videndo personam, quia cum intellectus de se sit potentia naturalis et non libera, agente obiecto intellectus agit quantum potest; ergo si obiectum ex parte sui agit manifestando tres personas intellectui, non est in potestate intellectus ut videat aliquid ostensum et aliquid non videat. > 51. As to the third article about the power of the creature [n.30] I say that the intellect cannot by its own natural power see the essence without seeing the person, because, since the intellect is of itself a natural and not a free power, when the object acts the intellect acts as much as it can; therefore if the object on its own part acts by manifesting the three persons to the intellect, it is not in the power of the intellect to see part of what is shown and not to see some other part of what is shown.
52 Similiter nec est in potestate voluntatis ordinate frui sic non fruendo sic, quia sicut non est in potestate voluntatis ut ordinate non fruatur (si enim non frueretur, non impedita in hoc, peccaret et mereretur non frui), ita non est in potestate voluntatis ut ordinate fruatur aliquo et non fruatur quocumque potest frui; et ideo non est in potestate eius ordinate manentis sub aliqua ratione non frui sub qua potest frui. > 52. Likewise neither is it in the power of the will to have ordered enjoyment thus by not enjoying thus, because just as it is not in the power of the will not to enjoy in an ordered way (for if it was not enjoying, though unimpeded in this respect, it would be sinning and deserving not to enjoy), so it is not in the power of the will to enjoy something in an ordered way and not to enjoy whatever it can enjoy; and therefore it is not in its power, while remaining in an ordered state, not to have enjoyment under any idea under which it can have enjoyment.[5]
53 $a Contra: quidquid non necessario concomitatur actum, est in potestate voluntatis elicientis illum; vel sic: quaecumque non necessario simul respiciuntur ab actu voluntatis, nec etiam ab ipsa voluntate ut elicit actum; vel sic: quaecumque separari possunt ut terminant actum voluntatis, possunt etiam separari respectu potentiae ut elicientis actum. a$ > 53. On the contrary: whatever is not necessarily concomitant to an act is within the power of the will that elicits the act; or in this way: whatever the act of will does not necessarily regard, the will itself, which elicits the act, also does not necessarily regard; or in this way: whatever can be separated as it is the terminus of the act of will can also be separated in respect of the power as eliciting the act.
54 Quantum ad quartum articulum de facto dico quod de facto erit una visio et una fruitio essentiae in tribus personis. Et hoc dicit Augustinus I De Trinitate cap. 10, in fine: ((Neuter sine altero ostendi potest)), et loquitur de Patre et Filio; quod intelligendum est de potentia ordinata, de qua locutus est Philippus, volens Patrem sibi ostendi, quasi potuisset de facto videre Filium sine Patre . Et tractat ibi Augustinus de verbis Philippi et respon>sione Christi. Hoc etiam vult Augustinus XV De Trinitate cap. 16: ((Forte omnem scientiam nostram uno simul conspectu videbimus)). Et quod dicit 'forte', non refertur ad obiectum beatificum, sed ad alia videnda in eo. 54. As to the article about the fact [n.30] I say that in fact there will be one vision and one enjoyment of the essence in three persons. And this is what Augustine says On the Trinity I ch.8 n.17: “Neither can be shown without the other,” and he is speaking of the Father and the Son; but the remark is to be understood of ordained power, of which Philip spoke when wanting the Father to be shown to him [John 14.8], as if he could in fact have seen the Son without the Father. And Augustine treats there of the words of Philip and Christ’s response. Augustine also means this in On the Trinity XV ch.16 n.26: “Perhaps we will see the whole of our knowledge in one view all at once.” And the fact that he says ‘perhaps’ does not refer to the beatific object but to the other things to be seen in it.
55 Similiter de viatore dico quod de facto necessario fruitio habitualis ordinata simul est trium personarum licet non actualis; nullus enim viator nec comprehensor ordinate potest frui una persona non fruendo alia (hoc est nisi habitualiter fruatur alia, hoc est quod sit in proxima dispositione ad fruendum alia) si distincte haec concipiatur ab illa; et ideo non stat fruitio unius personae cum odio alterius personae, quia, sicut dicit Salvator in Ioanne, qui me odit, et Patrem meum odit. 55. Likewise about the wayfarer I say that in fact necessarily the habitual, though not the actual, ordered enjoyment is of the three persons together; for no wayfarer or comprehender can have ordered enjoyment of one person without enjoying the other (that is, unless he habitually enjoys the other, namely that he is in proximate disposition to enjoying that other), if this person is conceived distinctly from that; and therefore enjoyment of one persons does not stand with hatred of a second person, because, as the Savior said, John 15.23: “he who hates me hates my Father also.”
56 Ad argumenta principalia. Ad primum de I Ethicorum dico quod bonum uno modo convertitur cum ente, et isto modo potest poni in quolibet genere; sed bonum ut sic non habet rationem obiecti >fruibilis, et ideo non oportet quod in quocumque sit bonum hoc modo sumptum quod ibi sit proprie ratio obiecti fruibilis. Ratio enim boni fruibilis non est ratio boni in communi sed boni perfecti, quod est bonum non habens defectum, vel saltem secundum apparentiam est tale vel secundum praefixionem voluntatis, qualis non est relatio. 56. To the principal arguments. To the first from the Ethics [n.23] I say that good is in one way convertible with being, and that in that way it can be placed in any category; but good in this sense does not have the idea of enjoyable object, and therefore it is not necessary that the idea of enjoyable object should exist wherever good taken in this way is found. For the idea of enjoyable object is not the idea of good in general but of perfect good, which is good without any defect, or is so at least in appearance or according to what has been prefixed by the will [n.16]; and the category of relation is not of this sort.
57 Ad secundum dicitur quod illa quae uniformiter respiciunt essentiam et personam, tantum sunt essentialia, si tantum conveniunt personae sunt praecise personalia; quae autem sub alia ratione respiciunt personam et sub alia essentiam sunt essentialia et personalia. Primo modo se habet bonum, secundo modo unum, scilicet indivisio, quae sub una propria ratione pertinet ad essentiam et sub alia ratione propria pertinet ad personas. Sed contra: istius causam quaerit argumentum; arguit enim: cum haec duo aeque videantur convertibilia cum ente et ad di>vina transferri, ergo aequaliter utrumque erit essentiale tantum vel utrumque personale et essentiale. > 57. To the second [n.24] the reply is that the things that regard in a uniform way the essence and the person are only the essential features, if the ones that belong only to the person are precisely the personal features; but things that under one idea regard the person and under another idea the essence are essential and personal features. ‘Good’ is related in the first way while ‘one’ is related in the second, namely ‘indivision’, which under one proper idea pertains to the essence and under another proper idea pertains to the person. But on the contrary: the cause of this fact is what the argument [n.24] is looking for; for it runs: since these two things seem to be equally convertible with being and equally transferred to divine reality, therefore each of them will be equally essential features only, or each of them will be essential and personal features.[6]
58 Ad tertium dico quod ly 'in quantum' potest solummodo denotare illud quod sequitur accipi secundum suam rationem formalem, vel, alio modo, ultra hoc potest denotare illud esse rationem formalem inhaerentiae praedicati ad subiectum. Secundo modo accipitur reduplicatio propriissime, quia reduplicatum sive sumatur pro toto se ipso primo sive pro aliquo quod includitur in intellectu eius, accipiendo reduplicationem formaliter semper illud pro quo accipitur, notatur esse formalis ratio inhaerentiae praedicati ad subiectum. Ad propositum ergo dico quod si reduplicatio ista quantum ad utraque ista accipiatur in maiori, ipsa est vera et minor est falsa, si vero pro primo tantum et non pro secundo, minor est vera et maior est falsa. Et cum probatur minor secundum primum modum accipiendi ipsam dico quod videbimus tres in quantum tres, hoc est formalis ratio Trinitatis videbitur, sed ipsa Trinitas non est formalis ratio videndi vel causa formalis inhaerentiae praedicati, scilicet fruitionis vel visionis, sed unitas essentiae. Et cum probatur ulterius per credere quod est trium in quantum tres sunt, vel trinum in >quantum trinus, dico quod non est simile, quia essentia divina non causat in nobis immediate actum credendi sicut causabit in nobis immediate actum videndi, et hoc est propter imperfectionem intellectionis nostrae pro statu isto, quia intelligimus personas distinctas ex creaturis et distinctis actibus. Et ideo quantum ad cognitionem nostram modo potest Trinitas esse ratio formalis cognoscendi, tunc autem erit praecise cognita sicut est, et non erit ratio formalis cognoscendi, quia tunc videbitur per rationem essentiae in se praecise ut per rationem primi obiecti. 58. To the third [n.25] I say that the ‘insofar as’ can denote only the fact that what follows is taken according to its formal idea or, in another, it can denote in addition that what follows is the formal idea of the inherence of the predicate in the subject. In the second way reduplication is taken most properly, because the reduplicated thing, whether it is taken for the whole of what it itself first is or for anything that is included in the understanding of it, taking reduplication formally to be always that for which it is taken, is marked out as being the formal idea of the inherence of the predicate in the subject. To the proposed case, then, I say that if reduplication is taken in both ways in the major, the major is true and the minor is false; but if it is taken in the first way and not in the second, the minor is true and the major is false. And when the proof of the minor is given [n.26], I say that in the first way of taking it [sc. ‘insofar as’] we will see the three insofar as they are three, that is, the formal idea of the Trinity will be seen, but the Trinity itself is not the formal idea of seeing or the formal cause of the inherence of the predicate, namely the predicate ‘enjoyment’ or ‘vision’, but the unity of the essence is. And when proof is given further through the act of faith [n.26], which is of the three insofar as they are three, or triune insofar as triune, I say that the case is not similar, because the divine essence does not cause in us immediately the act of belief as it will cause in us immediately the act of seeing, and that because of the imperfection of our understanding for the present state, because we understand the distinct persons from creatures and distinct acts. And therefore, as far as concerns our knowledge now, the Trinity can be the formal idea of knowing; but then the Trinity will be precisely known as it is and will not be the formal idea of knowing, because then it will be seen through the idea of the essence in itself precisely as through the idea of the first object.
59 Ad rationes in oppositum. Ad primam dico quod est tantum unus ultimus finis in se, tamen ille habet distinctas rationes aliquas quae non sunt formaliter rationes ultimi finis, et ita possibile est frui eo sub ratione ultimi finis non fruendo eo sub illis rationibus. > 59. To the reasons for the opposite. To the first [n.27] I say that there is only one ultimate end in itself, although it has several distinct ideas which are not formally ideas of the ultimate end, and so one can enjoy it under the idea of the ultimate end without enjoying it under those ideas.
60 Ad secundam dico quod sicut dictum est in praecedenti quaestione quod per accidens est quod in eodem concurrant ratio efficientis et ratio finis, tamen de facto una est ratio formalis ipsius finis sicut est una ratio formalis ipsius efficientis, sed in illa una ratione potest potentia quietari licet non quietetur in rationibus personalibus quae sunt in illo fine. Ad confirmationem cum dicitur 'non potest una persona causare nisi alia causet, ergo una non potest finire actum fruitionis nisi alia finiat', dico quod non sequitur; bene enim sequitur quod una persona ex natura rei non est finis nisi alia persona sit finis, sed non sequitur de fine actus ut est elicitus a potentia, quia finis actus ut eliciti est ad quem potentia ut eliciens ordinat actum et propter quem elicit ipsum. Sed finis ex natura rei est bonum, ad quod actus ex natura sui natus est ordinari, non quidem in ratione obiecti quod attingatur per actum sed sicut omnes naturae creatae in suo gradu ad finem ultimum ordinantur. Ad auctoritatem Augustini V De Trinitate, patet quod loquitur ibi de facto et de formali ratione eius. 60. To the second [n.28] I say that, as was said in the preceding question [n.14], it is per accidens that the idea of efficient cause and the idea of end come together in the same thing, yet in fact there is one formal idea of the end itself just as there is one formal idea of the efficient cause itself, but in that one idea the power can be at rest although it is not at rest in the personal ideas that are in that end. As to the confirmation when it is said that ‘one person cannot cause unless the other causes, therefore one person cannot terminate the act of enjoyment unless the other terminates it’ [n.28], I say that the conclusion does not follow; for while it does very well follow that one person from the nature of the thing is not the end unless the other person is the end, this conclusion does not follow about the end of the act as the act is elicited from the power, because the end of the act as elicited is that to which the power as eliciting orders the act and for the sake of which it elicits the act. But the end from the nature of the thing is the good, to which the act of its own nature is naturally ordered, not indeed by reason of the object which is attained by the act, but in the way that all created natures are in their degree ordered to the ultimate end. To the authority from Augustine On the Trinity [n.28], what is said there about the fact and the formal reason for the fact is plain.
61 Ad ultimum de adoratione dico quod una est adoratio ha>bitualis trium personarum, quia quicumque adorat unam habitualiter, subicit se toti Trinitati; sed non oportet quod actualiter: non enim oportet quod actualiter cogitet de alia persona quando adorat unam, sicut patet de orante unam personam oratione quae non dirigitur actualiter alteri personae, sicut patet de illo hymno Veni, creator Spiritus, et de multis orationibus in Ecclesia constitutis. Unde orationes Ecclesiae frequenter diriguntur Patri, et in fine inducitur Filius, tamquam mediator; ergo dum aliquis refert actualiter intentionem suam ad adorandum Patrem, non oportet quod actualiter tunc cogitet de Filio vel de Spiritu Sancto, quousque post inducat Filium in adoratione vel cogitatione sua, tamquam scilicet mediatorem. Et sicut est eadem adoratio habitualis, non tamen actualis, ita est eadem fruitio habitualis, licet non necessario eadem actualis. > 61. To the final point about adoration [n.29] I say that there is one habitual adoration of the three persons, because whoever adores one of them habitually is subjecting himself to the whole Trinity; but this need not be the case actually; for he need not think actually of another person when he adores one of them, as is plain about someone praying to one of the persons by a prayer that is not directed actually to another person, as is clear in the case of the hymn ‘Come, Creator Spirit’, and in the case of many prayers established in the Church. Hence it is that the prayers of the Church are frequently directed to the Father and at the end the Son is brought in as mediator; therefore when someone actually directs his intention to adoring the Father, he need not then actually think of the Son or of the Holy Spirit, until after he introduces the Son in his adoration and thought, namely as mediator. And just as there is the same adoration in habit but not the same in act, so there is the same enjoyment in habit although not necessarily the same in act.

Notes

  1. 11 Interpolation: “as it seems.”
  2. 12 Text cancelled by Scotus: “Again, in our soul there is by nature the image of the Trinity; therefore the soul cannot be made to rest except in the Trinity; therefore it cannot enjoy anything in an ordered way except the Triune God.”
  3. 13 Text cancelled by Scotus: “The Father is in origin perfectly blessed before he generates the Son, because he gets from the person produced no perfection intrinsic to himself. Blessedness is a perfection intrinsic to the blessed person. But if in the prior stage the Father is perfectly blessed, then in the prior stage he has the object as making perfectly blessed; but he does not seem in that prior stage to have an essence communicated as object to the three persons, but an essence absolutely, or an essence as it is in one person only; per se then it is not of the idea of the essence as it is the beatific object that it beatify insofar as it is communicated to the three persons, and so there seems to be no contradiction, either as to enjoyment or as to vision. Response: the Father has the essence for object as it is in the three persons, and yet he has it first according to origin, because he has it of himself as an object for himself, and this is to be first in origin; but there is no other priority there according to which his essence, as it exists in one person and not as it exists in another, is an object for himself, just as neither in any prior stage of nature is it an object for one person and not for another, but it is an object only for one person from himself and an object for another person not from himself. On the contrary: any of the persons whatever understands formally with the intellect as it exists in that person, not as it exists in another person, nor as it exists in all three, from Augustine On the Trinity XV ch.7 n.12; therefore in this way it seems that each person understands by perfectly understanding the essence as it exists formally in that person; therefore perfect understanding, which is beatific understanding, does not necessarily of itself require that the essence is understood as it exists in the three persons. Proof of the consequence: the intelligible thing is required for understanding no less than the intellect; therefore in one who understands perfectly of himself there is required no less that he have in himself the object as it is formally intelligible than that he have in himself the intellect whereby he understands. The reason is confirmed because if the Father were by the beatific vision to understand the essence as it is in the Son, therefore he would as it were receive something from the Son, or from something as it exists in the Son. The consequence is proved by the argument of the Philosopher in Metaphysics 12.9.1074b28‐35, where he proves that God does not understand something other than himself, because then his understanding would be cheapened since it would receive perfection from the intelligible thing; therefore it is so here, nay rather, what is more discordant, the Father would as it were receive perfection simply, which is the beatific vision, from the three persons as from three objects, or from something as it exists in the three. And then two absurdities seem to follow: first that the Father does not have all perfection from himself, because of the fact that the whole and essential perfection simply is not in any person prior to the properties, but some part of it is as it were posterior to the persons themselves, namely the part that is from the object as it exists in the three. Again, if the intellect as it exists in something produced were the principle of the Father’s beatitude, the Father would not be blessed of himself, Augustine On the Trinity XV ch.7 n.12; therefore if the essence as it exists in the thing produced were the per se object of beatitude, the Father will not be blessed of himself. The proof of the consequence is that the object as object is no less required for beatitude than is the intellect. Response: it is required as present but not as existent within; the intellect is required as existent within, because by it one formally understands; not so by the object. An example: [the Archangel] Michael is not blessed except by his intellect existing within him; but he is blessed by an object that does not exist within him, and he would be naturally blessed if he naturally had the object present to him although not existent in him; not so with the intellect. On the contrary: of whatever sort something is of itself, it would be of that sort even if, per impossibile, any other thing whatever did not exist. Again, the Father would receive something from the Son, or from something as it exists in the Son, as from the object of his beatitude; that which exists of itself does not necessarily require for its being anything which is not of itself, and this with a necessity as great as the necessity with which a dependent thing requires what it depends on. This reason very well concludes that the Father has of himself, not only on the part of the intellect but also on the part of the object, the source whereby he is blessed, and consequently that he has of himself the essence as the essence is what makes him blessed; not, however, as it exists in the three, because in this way an object present of itself is required just as an intellect of itself is required, so that he might be blessed of himself. Here is a brief enthymeme: he is blessed of himself; therefore he has of himself the object as it is the beatific object; but he does not of himself have that object as beatific object as it exists in the three, because then as it exists in the Son it would per se as it were act on the beatitude of the Father. Response: in comparison with the Father, the essence as essence is the first beatifying object, although it at the same time necessarily beatifies in the three; thus too does it necessarily understand creatures, although it does not expect understanding from them but from the essence which it has of itself; thus the first object can, in comparison with the created intellect, be posited without the second object. The manner of positing it is as follows: etc. [as in the body of the text].
  4. 14 Text cancelled by Scotus: “To the other point about the image [in footnote 7 above] the response is clear from what has just been said.”
  5. 15 Text cancelled by Scotus: “But about the absolute power of the will there is more doubt. However it can be said there that it is not in the power of the will to enjoy in this way and not to enjoy in this way, because although it is in the power of the will that some act be brought to be or not be brought to be, yet it is not in its power that the act once brought to be should or should not have the condition that naturally belongs to the act from the nature of its object. An example: although it is in the power of the will to elicit or not to elicit a sinful act, yet if the act, once brought to be, is disordered, it is not in the power of the will that the act so brought to be should or should not be disordered; now the act of enjoyment, as far as the nature of its first object is concerned, is naturally of the three persons in the essence, because on the part of the object – barring some miracle – it will of itself be of the three persons; therefore it does not seem to be in the power of the will that an act brought to be should or should not be of the essence as it exists in the three persons. If you say that this reason concludes that it is not in the power of God that an act be of the essence and not of the three persons, I say that the conclusion does not follow, for the elicited act is in the power of God as to any condition that might naturally from the object be within his competence, and yet the act as to that condition is not within created power. An example: it is in the power of God that an act elicited by a sinful will be referred back to God because God refers it back to himself, but it is not in the power of the will, once the act has been brought to be, that the will use that act for God because the creature is enjoying the act; but it cannot at the same time enjoy a thing other than God and use that same thing for God. – The example does not, however, seem to be a good one, because that act of the sinner is referred back by one power and not by another. Let the example be dismissed then, and let the reason be held onto, because an accident necessarily consequent to an act once it has been brought to be cannot not be in the act as long as the act persists, and this accident is something subject to the divine will, though not to the created will which elicits it; so let it be said of a condition which, in respect of a secondary object, the act is of a nature necessarily, as far as depends on itself, to have, though not essentially to have; therefore that the condition not be present in the act is something subject to the divine will.”
  6. 16 No reply by Scotus to this argument is given in the Ordinatio. Replies are, however, given in the following interpolations: “Therefore there is another response, that it is necessary for the object of enjoyment to be some quidditative good and not some perfection of a supposit, because the perfection of a supposit, as it is distinguished from quidditative perfection, is not the formal idea of acting, nor is it the formal idea of the term of any action; but quidditative perfection is only a perfection abstracted from a supposit, which of itself indifferently states or regards any supposit. And therefore it is necessary that goodness, as it terminates the act of enjoying, be only a quidditative perfection; but unity can be both the quidditative idea and the idea of the supposit, because it does not of itself state the idea of the principle of an act nor the formal idea of the term of any act. The good, then, is not the term of enjoyment when taken in any way at all but when taken quidditatively, because it is a quidditative perfection, which is an essential feature and not the idea of the supposit. But unity is in one way the essential idea and is in another way the idea of the supposit; in the second way it is not the formal idea nor the formal term of the act of enjoyment.” An interpolation in place of this interpolation (from Appendix A): “But relation is not another thing or another goodness than the essence, therefore [the argument] is not valid. Therefore it can in another way be said that in the consequent of the first consequence only one sense can, by the force of the words, be held to, namely that this predicate, which is the being another thing than the essence, is present in the property; and thus the sense is false, because in this way a false thing, that which is inferred in the second consequence, well follows. And therefore I likewise deny the first consequence, since the two propositions in the antecedent are false and the consequent is false. To the proof of the consequence I say that ‘the same’ and ‘other’ are not immediate in any predicate as said per se of a subject, nay not even contradictories are as it were immediates; for man is not per se white nor per se not-white. Yet between contradictories said absolutely of anything there is no middle; thus if a property is a thing, it is ‘the same’ or ‘other’, it is true that it is the same, but with ‘per se’ it is not valid that it is ‘per se the same’ or ‘per se other’.” Two further interpolations follow on these interpolations (from Appendix A). The first interpolation: “Therefore I say that being in its first division is divided into quidditative being and into being have quiddity, which is subsistent being. But now whatever is a formal perfection is quidditative being and quidditative entity; for formal perfection is what in any being is better existing than not existing. But nothing is such unless it is a quidditative entity insofar as it abstracts from subsistence. But subsistent being that possesses quiddity is what contracts that perfection, and it is not formally that quidditative perfection. But now it is such that one, which converts with being, is both quidditative being and subsistent being; and so it is both essential and notional. But good – as we are here speaking of it – in the way it states the formal idea of terminating an act of will, is quidditative essence; and therefore it is only essential. Etc.” The second interpolation: “To the third it can be said that, although necessarily an act of will follows an act of intellect, yet the mode of the will does not necessarily follow the mode of the intellect, because the intellect can make many formations about things that are not in the things, because it can divide what is united and unite what is divided, and thus it can form diverse ideas. But the will is borne toward the thing not according to the mode the thing has in the intellect but according to the mode of the thing. However, after a preceding showing by the intellect, only enjoyment states an act will that is terminated in some object, beyond which act it is not appropriate to proceed. But in the terminating of something there are two things to consider, that which terminates and the idea of terminating, – just as light does not terminate but is the reason for terminating, while color terminates. In the same way the reason for terminating in respect of the act of enjoyment is the divine essence as it is a certain absolute form, on which the ideas of true and good follow, because on the idea by which it terminates the intellect the idea of truth follows, and on the idea by which it terminates the will the idea of good follows; but that which terminates is the essence existing in the three persons. Then to the remark ‘we enjoy God under one idea’ [nn.34, 30]: that idea is the divine essence, what terminates is the essence existing in the three persons; one person cannot terminate without another – and he is speaking about ordered enjoyment. Responses to the arguments are plain from what has been said. The concept of essence is other than the concept of relation. The mode of the will does not follow the mode of the intellect, as has been said. Hence the intellect can form many ideas, and the will does not have to follow them. Hence the respect of an idea is a respect of reason, but it is not the object of enjoyment. That ‘God can make a creature see the essence and not the person’ [nn.51, 30], the proof is that the vision of the essence and of the person, and of the attributes and of the creatures or the ideas, in the essence, whether they are two acts or one, come freely from God, and both, each, namely per se, are the same. Because, once the first has been produced, the other is producible freely and not by any necessity, therefore one is producible without the other. The consequence is plain. The proof of the antecedent is that it is not repugnant by way of contradiction for the vision of the essence to be created and no vision with respect to the persons or with respect to the creatures in the essence to be created; the proof is that since the essence is an absolute and first and distinct object, different from creature or relation or person (On the Trinity VII ch.1 n.2: ‘everything that is said relatively is something’, etc.), it can, as taken precisely and distinct from all the aforesaid objects, none of which it includes quidditatively as an essential or integral part, be the total object of an act of a created and limited intellect, whether intuitively or abstractly, although not of a created and unlimited intellect (but that is because of the infinity of the intellection, not because of the distinction of the object from other things). Thus it is plain that the intellect can distinguish this object from all others, and can therefore have an act only about it. Again, the intellect can abstractively understand it taken precisely, and therefore it can likewise do so intuitively. Again if, once the essence is seen, it cannot not see the attributes, then it cannot not see the infinite perfections glittering within it and so comprehend them, which is false. Through this is made plain the solution to the argument ‘he who sees something white sees all the parts of it’ [n.36], because those parts are something in that white object, because they are integral parts, – just as, when seeing a man, perhaps animal that is included in him is seen, but not risibility. On the contrary: the essence as distinct from the will presents itself to the blessed intellect, therefore it does so naturally; therefore as to the persons and the glittering creatables. Again, to the same: the same principle has one mode of acting. But the divine essence presents itself naturally to the divine intellect, therefore to whomever it presents itself it presents itself naturally, and presents all the things that are in God.”
  • [[]]
Personal tools