Authors/Aristotle/metaphysics/l5/c12

Chapter 12 Potency

Greek	Latin	English
δύναμις λέγεται ἡ μὲν ἀρχὴ κινήσεως ἢ μεταβολῆς ἡ ἐν ἑτέρῳ ἢ ᾗ ἕτερον, οἷον ἡ οἰκοδομικὴ δύναμίς ἐστιν ἣ οὐχ ὑπάρχει ἐν τῷ οἰκοδομουμένῳ, ἀλλ᾽ ἡ ἰατρικὴ δύναμις οὖσα ὑπάρχοι ἂν ἐν τῷ ἰατρευομένῳ, ἀλλ᾽ οὐχ ᾗ ἰατρευόμενος.	ƿ ↵ Potestas dicitur haec quidem principium motus aut mutationis aut in altero aut in quantum alterum; ut edificativa potestas est quae non existit in edificato, sed ars medicinalis potestas ens * existet utique in sanato, sed non in quantum sanatum est.	Chapter 12. Potency means (1) a source of movement or change, which is in another thing than the thing moved or in the same thing qua other; e.g. the art of building is a potency which is not in the thing built, while the art of healing, which is a potency, may be in the man healed, but not in him qua healed.
ἡ μὲν οὖν ὅλως ἀρχὴ μεταβολῆς ἢ κινήσεως λέγεται δύναμις [20] ἐν ἑτέρῳ ἢ ᾗ ἕτερον, ἡ δ᾽ ὑφ᾽ ἑτέρου ἢ ᾗ ἕτερον (καθ᾽ ἣν γὰρ τὸ πάσχον πάσχει τι, ὁτὲ μὲν ἐὰν ὁτιοῦν, δυνατὸν αὐτό φαμεν εἶναι παθεῖν, ὁτὲ δ᾽ οὐ κατὰ πᾶν πάθος ἀλλ᾽ ἂν ἐπὶ τὸ βέλτιον):	Ergo totaliter principium mutationis aut motus ↵ dicitur potestas in altero aut in quantum * alterum. Haec autem ab altero aut in quantum alterum; secundum quam enim patiens patitur aliquid, quandoque quidem si quodcumque pati sit possibile dicimus esse autopathein, quandoque autem non secundum omnem passionem sed si ad melius.	Potency then means the source, in general, of change or movement in another thing or in the same thing qua other, and also (2) the source of a thing's being moved by another thing or by itself qua other. For in virtue of that principle, in virtue of which a patient suffers anything, we call it capable of suffering; and this we do sometimes if it suffers anything at all, sometimes not in respect of everything it suffers, but only if it suffers a change for the better.
ἔτι ἡ τοῦ καλῶς τοῦτ᾽ ἐπιτελεῖν ἢ κατὰ προαίρεσιν: ἐνίοτε γὰρ τοὺς μόνον ἂν πορευθέντας ἢ εἰπόντας, μὴ [25] καλῶς δὲ ἢ μὴ ὡς προείλοντο, οὔ φαμεν δύνασθαι λέγειν ἢ βαδίζειν: ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ ἐπὶ τοῦ πάσχειν.	Adhuc aut ut bene hoc efficiatur aut secundum voluntatem; quandoque enim solum utique ambulantes aut loquen↵tes, non bene autem aut non ut vellent, non dicimus posse loqui aut ambulare. Similiter autem et in pati.	(3) The capacity of performing this well or according to intention; for sometimes we say of those who merely can walk or speak but not well or not as they intend, that they cannot speak or walk. So too (4) in the case of passivity.
ἔτι ὅσαι ἕξεις καθ᾽ ἃς ἀπαθῆ ὅλως ἢ ἀμετάβλητα ἢ μὴ ῥᾳδίως ἐπὶ τὸ χεῖρον εὐμετακίνητα, δυνάμεις λέγονται: κλᾶται μὲν γὰρ καὶ συντρίβεται καὶ κάμπτεται καὶ ὅλως φθείρεται οὐ τῷ [30] δύνασθαι ἀλλὰ τῷ μὴ δύνασθαι καὶ ἐλλείπειν τινός: ἀπαθῆ δὲ τῶν τοιούτων ἃ μόλις καὶ ἠρέμα πάσχει διὰ δύναμιν καὶ τῷ δύνασθαι καὶ τῷ ἔχειν πώς.	Amplius quicumque habitus secundum quos impassibilia omnino aut immutabilia aut non facile in peius mobilia, potestates dicuntur; franguntur enim et conteruntur, curuantur et omnino corrum↵puntur non per posse sed per non posse et * deficere in aliquo, impassibilia vero talium aut vix et modicum patiuntur propter potentiam et posse et aliqualiter habere.	(5) The states in virtue of which things are absolutely impassive or unchangeable, or not easily changed for the worse, are called potencies; for things are broken and crushed and bent and in general destroyed not by having a potency but by not having one and by lacking something, and things are impassive with respect to such processes if they are scarcely and slightly affected by them, because of a potency and because they can do something and are in some positive state.
λεγομένης δὲ τῆς δυνάμεως τοσαυταχῶς, καὶ τὸ δυνατὸν ἕνα μὲν τρόπον λεχθήσεται τὸ ἔχον κινήσεως ἀρχὴν ἢ μεταβολῆς (καὶ γὰρ [35] τὸ στατικὸν δυνατόν τι) ἐν ἑτέρῳ ἢ ᾗ ἕτερον, ἕνα δ᾽ ἐὰν ἔχῃ τι αὐτοῦ ἄλλο δύναμιν τοιαύτην,	Dicta vero potestate totiens, et potens uno quidem modo dicetur quod habet motus principium aut mutationis (et enim ↵ sistitivum potens aliquid in altero aut in quantum * alte↵rum); uno vero si quid ab ipso aliud potestatem habet talem.	Potency having this variety of meanings, so too the potent or capable in one sense will mean that which can begin a movement (or a change in general, for even that which can bring things to rest is a potent thing) in another thing or in itself qua other; and in one sense [19b] that over which something else has such a potency;
[1019β] [1] ἕνα δ᾽ ἐὰν ἔχῃ μεταβάλλειν ἐφ᾽ ὁτιοῦν δύναμιν, εἴτ᾽ ἐπὶ τὸ χεῖρον εἴτ᾽ ἐπὶ τὸ βέλτιον (καὶ γὰρ τὸ φθειρόμενον δοκεῖ δυνατὸν εἶναι φθείρεσθαι, ἢ οὐκ ἂν φθαρῆναι εἰ ἦν ἀδύνατον: νῦν δὲ ἔχει τινὰ [5] διάθεσιν καὶ αἰτίαν καὶ ἀρχὴν τοῦ τοιούτου πάθους: ὁτὲ μὲν δὴ τῷ ἔχειν τι δοκεῖ, ὁτὲ δὲ τῷ ἐστερῆσθαι τοιοῦτον εἶναι:	Uno autem si habet permutari in quodlibet * potestatem, sive ƿ in peius sive in melius. Et enim corruptibile videtur esse possibile corrumpi, aut non utique corrumpi si erat impossibile; nunc autem dispositionem quandam habet et causam et princi↵pium talis passionis. Aliquando quidem itaque per habere aliquid videtur, aliquando per privari tale esse;	and in one sense that which has a potency of changing into something, whether for the worse or for the better (for even that which perishes is thought to be capable of perishing, for it would not have perished if it had not been capable of it; but, as a matter of fact, it has a certain disposition and cause and principle which fits it to suffer this; sometimes it is thought to be of this sort because it has something, sometimes because it is deprived of something;
εἰ δ᾽ ἡ στέρησίς ἐστιν ἕξις πως, πάντα τῷ ἔχειν ἂν εἴη τι, [εἰ δὲ μὴ] ὥστε τῷ τε ἔχειν ἕξιν τινὰ καὶ ἀρχήν ἐστι δυνατὸν [ὁμωνύμως] καὶ τῷ ἔχειν τὴν τούτου στέρησιν, εἰ ἐνδέχεται [10] ἔχειν στέρησιν: <εἰ δὲ μή, ὁμωνύμως>):	si autem privatio est habitus aliquo modo, omnia in habendo utique erunt aliquid. Equivoce vero dicimus ens, quare in habendo habitum quendam et principium est possibile et habendo huius privationem, si contingit habere privationem.	but if privation is in a sense having or habit , everything will be capable by having something, so that things are capable both by having a positive habit and principle, and by having the privation of this, if it is possible to have a privation;
ἕνα δὲ τῷ μὴ ἔχειν αὐτοῦ δύναμιν ἢ ἀρχὴν ἄλλο ἢ ᾗ ἄλλο φθαρτικήν. ἕνα δὲ τῷ μὴ ἔχειν αὐτοῦ δύναμιν ἢ ἀρχὴν ἄλλο ἢ ᾗ ἄλλο φθαρτικήν. ἕνα δὲ τῷ μὴ ἔχειν αὐτοῦ δύναμιν ἢ ἀρχὴν ἄλλο ἢ ᾗ ἄλλο φθαρτικήν.	Uno in non ↵ habendo ipsius potestatem aut principium in alio in quantum est aliud corruptivum.	and if privation is not in a sense habit , capable is used in two distinct senses); and a thing is capable in another sense because neither any other thing, nor itself qua other, has a potency or principle which can destroy it.
ἔτι δὲ ταῦτα πάντα ἢ τῷ μόνον ἂν συμβῆναι γενέσθαι ἢ μὴ γενέσθαι, ἢ τῷ καλῶς. καὶ γὰρ ἐν τοῖς ἀψύχοις ἔνεστιν ἡ τοιαύτη δύναμις, οἷον ἐν τοῖς ὀργάνοις: τὴν μὲν γὰρ δύνασθαί φασι [15] φθέγγεσθαι λύραν, τὴν δ᾽ οὐδέν, ἂν ᾖ μὴ εὔφωνος.	Amplius autem haec omnia aut in solum accidere fieri aut non fieri, aut in bene. Nam in inanimatis inest talis potestas, ut in organis; aliam enim dicunt posse sonare liram, aliam non, si est non bene sonans.	Again, all of these are capable either merely because the thing might chance to happen or not to happen, or because it might do so well. This sort of potency is found even in lifeless things, e.g. in instruments; for we say one lyre can speak, and another cannot speak at all, if it has not a good tone.
ἀδυναμία δὲ ἐστὶ στέρησις δυνάμεως καὶ τῆς τοιαύτης ἀρχῆς οἵα εἴρηται, ἢ ὅλως ἢ τῷ πεφυκότι ἔχειν, ἢ καὶ ὅτε πέφυκεν ἤδη ἔχειν: οὐ γὰρ ὁμοίως ἂν φαῖεν ἀδύνατον εἶναι γεννᾶν παῖδα καὶ ἄνδρα καὶ εὐνοῦχον.	↵ Impotentia autem est privatio potentiae et talis principii sublatio quaedam qualis dicta est, aut omnino aut apto nato habere aut quando aptum natum est iam habere; non enim similiter dicunt impossibile generare puerum et virum * eunuchum.	Incapacity is privation of capacity – i.e. of such a principle as has been described either in general or in the case of something that would naturally have the capacity, or even at the time when it would naturally already have it; for the senses in which we should call a boy and a man and a eunuch incapable of begetting are distinct.
ἔτι δὲ καθ᾽ ἑκατέραν [20] δύναμιν ἔστιν ἀδυναμία ἀντικειμένη, τῇ τε μόνον κινητικῇ καὶ τῇ καλῶς κινητικῇ.	Amplius autem secundum alteram potentiam est impo↵tentia opposita, ei quae solum * motive et ei quae bene motive.	Again, to either kind of capacity there is an opposite incapacity – both to that which only can produce movement and to that which can produce it well.
καὶ ἀδύνατα δὴ τὰ μὲν κατὰ τὴν ἀδυναμίαν ταύτην λέγεται, τὰ δὲ ἄλλον τρόπον, οἷον δυνατόν τε καὶ ἀδύνατον, ἀδύνατον μὲν οὗ τὸ ἐναντίον ἐξ ἀνάγκης ἀληθές (οἷον τὸ τὴν διάμετρον σύμμετρον εἶναι [25] ἀδύνατον ὅτι ψεῦδος τὸ τοιοῦτον οὗ τὸ ἐναντίον οὐ μόνον ἀληθὲς ἀλλὰ καὶ ἀνάγκη [ἀσύμμετρον εἶναι]: τὸ ἄρα σύμμετρον οὐ μόνον ψεῦδος ἀλλὰ καὶ ἐξ ἀνάγκης ψεῦδος):	Et impossibilia vero haec quidem secundum impotentiam hanc dicuntur, alia alio modo, puta possibile et impossibile. Impossibile quidem cuius contrarium ex necessitate verum, ut dyametrum commensurabilem esse est impossibile, quia falsum ↵ quod tale cuius contrarium non solum verum sed et necesse non commensurabile esse; ergo commensurabile non solum falsum sed ex necessitate falsum.	Some things, then, are called adunata in virtue of this kind of incapacity, while others are so in another sense; i.e. both dunaton and adunaton are used as follows. The impossible is that of which the contrary is of necessity true, e.g. that the diagonal of a square is commensurate with the side is impossible, because such a statement is a falsity of which the contrary is not only true but also necessary; that it is commensurate, then, is not only false but also of necessity false.
τὸ δ᾽ ἐναντίον τούτῳ, τὸ δυνατόν, ὅταν μὴ ἀναγκαῖον ᾖ τὸ ἐναντίον ψεῦδος εἶναι, οἷον τὸ καθῆσθαι ἄνθρωπον δυνατόν: οὐ [30] γὰρ ἐξ ἀνάγκης τὸ μὴ καθῆσθαι ψεῦδος. τὸ μὲν οὖν δυνατὸν ἕνα μὲν τρόπον, ὥσπερ εἴρηται, τὸ μὴ ἐξ ἀνάγκης ψεῦδος σημαίνει, ἕνα δὲ τὸ ἀληθές [εἶναι], ἕνα δὲ τὸ ἐνδεχόμενον ἀληθὲς εἶναι.	Contrarium vero huic, possibile, quando non necesse fuerit contrarium falsum esse, ut sedere hominem possibile; non enim ex necessitate non sedere falsum. ↵ ƿ ergo possibile quidem uno modo, sicut dictum est, quod non ex necessitate falsum significat, alio vero verum esse, alio contingens verum iam.	The contrary of this, the possible, is found when it is not necessary that the contrary is false, e.g. that a man should be seated is possible; for that he is not seated is not of necessity false. The possible, then, in one sense, as has been said, means that which is not of necessity false; in one, that which is true; in one, that which may be true.
κατὰ μεταφορὰν δὲ ἡ ἐν γεωμετρίᾳ λέγεται δύναμις. ταῦτα μὲν οὖν τὰ δυνατὰ οὐ κατὰ δύναμιν:	Secundum methaphoram autem quae * in geometria dicitur potentia. Haec quidem igitur possibilia non ↵ secundum potentiam.	A potency or power in geometry is so called by a change of meaning. – These senses of capable or possible involve no reference to potency.
[35] τὰ δὲ λεγόμενα κατὰ δύναμιν πάντα λέγεται πρὸς τὴν πρώτην [μίαν]: [1020α] [1] αὕτη δ᾽ ἐστὶν ἀρχὴ μεταβολῆς ἐν ἄλλῳ ἢ ᾗ ἄλλο. τὰ γὰρ ἄλλα λέγεται δυνατὰ τῷ τὰ μὲν ἔχειν αὐτῶν ἄλλο τι τοιαύτην δύναμιν τὰ δὲ μὴ ἔχειν τὰ δὲ ὡδὶ ἔχειν. ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ τὰ ἀδύνατα. ὥστε ὁ κύριος ὅρος [5] τῆς πρώτης δυνάμεως ἂν εἴη ἀρχὴ μεταβλητικὴ ἐν ἄλλῳ ἢ ᾗ ἄλλο.	Quae vero secundum potentiam omnia ↵ dicuntur ad primam unam; haec autem est principium mutationis in alio * in quantum aliud. Alia namque dicuntur possibilia, haec quidem eorum in habendo aliud aliquid talem potentiam, illa vero in non habendo, alia in sic habendo. Similiter autem ↵ et impossibilia. Quare propria diffinitio prime potentie utique erit: principium permutativum in alio in quantum aliud.	But the senses which involve a reference to potency all refer to the primary [20a] kind of potency; and this is a source of change in another thing or in the same thing qua other. For other things are called capable , some because something else has such a potency over them, some because it has not, some because it has it in a particular way. The same is true of the things that are incapable. Therefore the proper definition of the primary kind of potency will be a source of change in another thing or in the same thing qua other .