Authors/Aristotle/metaphysics/l12/c3

Chapter 3

Greek	Latin	English
μετὰ ταῦτα ὅτι οὐ γίγνεται οὔτε ἡ ὕλη οὔτε τὸ εἶδος, λέγω δὲ τὰ ἔσχατα. πᾶν γὰρ μεταβάλλει τὶ καὶ ὑπό τινος καὶ εἴς τι: [1070α] [1] ὑφ᾽ οὗ μέν, τοῦ πρώτου κινοῦντος: ὃ δέ, ἡ ὕλη: εἰς ὃ δέ, τὸ εἶδος. εἰς ἄπειρον οὖν εἶσιν, εἰ μὴ μόνον ὁ χαλκὸς γίγνεται στρογγύλος ἀλλὰ καὶ τὸ στρογγύλον ἢ ὁ χαλκός: ἀνάγκη δὴ στῆναι.	Postea quia nec fit materia nec species, dico autem ↵ ultima. Omne namque transmutat aliquid et ab aliquo et in quid. A quo quidem, primo movente; cuius vero, materia; in quod vero, species. In infinitum ergo sunt, si non solum es fit rotundum sed et ipsum rotundum aut es; necesse est itaque stare.	Chapter 3. Note, next, that neither the matter nor the form comes to be-and I mean the last matter and form. For everything that changes is something and is changed by some[70a]thing and into something. That by which it is changed is the immediate mover; that which is changed, the matter; that into which it is changed, the form. The process, then, will go on to infinity, if not only the bronze comes to be round but also the round or the bronze comes to be; therefore there must be a stop.
μετὰ ταῦτα ὅτι ἑκάστη [5] ἐκ συνωνύμου γίγνεται οὐσία (τὰ γὰρ φύσει οὐσίαι καὶ τὰ ἄλλα). ἢ γὰρ τέχνῃ ἢ φύσει γίγνεται ἢ τύχῃ ἢ τῷ αὐτομάτῳ. ἡ μὲν οὖν τέχνη ἀρχὴ ἐν ἄλλῳ, ἡ δὲ φύσις ἀρχὴ ἐν αὐτῷ (ἄνθρωπος γὰρ ἄνθρωπον γεννᾷ), αἱ δὲ λοιπαὶ αἰτίαι στερήσεις τούτων.	ƿPostea quia queque ex univoco fit substantia; nam et quae ↵ sunt natura substantia et alia. Aut enim arte aut natura foint aut fortuna aut casu. Ars igitur principium est in alio, natura autem principium in ipso (homo namque hominem generat), relique vero cause horum privationes.	Note, next, that each substance comes into being out of something that shares its name. (Natural objects and other things both rank as substances.) For things come into being either by art or by nature or by luck or by spontaneity. Now art is a principle of movement in something other than the thing moved, nature is a principle in the thing itself (for man begets man), and the other causes are privations of these two.
οὐσίαι δὲ τρεῖς, ἡ μὲν ὕλη [10] τόδε τι οὖσα τῷ φαίνεσθαι (ὅσα γὰρ ἁφῇ καὶ μὴ συμφύσει, ὕλη καὶ ὑποκείμενον), ἡ δὲ φύσις τόδε τι καὶ ἕξις τις εἰς ἥν: ἔτι τρίτη ἡ ἐκ τούτων ἡ καθ᾽ ἕκαστα, οἷον Σωκράτης ἢ Καλλίας.	Substantiae autem tres sunt, materia quidem hoc aliquid sub↵stantia in apparere; nam quaecumque tactu et non connascentia, materia et subiectum. Natura vero hoc aliquid in quam et habitus quidam . Amplius tertia quae est ex hiis singularis, ut Socrates et Callias.	There are three kinds of substance-the matter, which is a this in appearance (for all things that are characterized by contact and not, by organic unity are matter and substratum, e.g. fire, flesh, head; for these are all matter, and the last matter is the matter of that which is in the full sense substance); the nature, which is a this or positive state towards which movement takes place; and again, thirdly, the particular substance which is composed of these two, e.g. Socrates or Callias.
ἐπὶ μὲν οὖν τινῶν τὸ τόδε τι οὐκ ἔστι παρὰ τὴν συνθετὴν οὐσίαν, οἷον οἰκίας τὸ εἶδος, εἰ [15] μὴ ἡ τέχνη (οὐδ᾽ ἔστι γένεσις καὶ φθορὰ τούτων, ἀλλ᾽ ἄλλον τρόπον εἰσὶ καὶ οὐκ εἰσὶν οἰκία τε ἡ ἄνευ ὕλης καὶ ὑγίεια καὶ πᾶν τὸ κατὰ τέχνην), ἀλλ᾽ εἴπερ, ἐπὶ τῶν φύσει: διὸ δὴ οὐ κακῶς Πλάτων ἔφη ὅτι εἴδη ἔστιν ὁπόσα φύσει, εἴπερ ἔστιν εἴδη ἄλλα τούτων <οἷον πῦρ σὰρξ κεφαλή: [20] ἅπαντα γὰρ ὕλη ἐστί, καὶ τῆς μάλιστ᾽ οὐσίας ἡ τελευταία>.	Igitur in quibusdam hoc non est praeter compositam substantiam, ut domus species, si non ↵ ars; nec est generatio et corruptio horum, sed alio modo sunt et non sunt domus quae sine materia et sanitas et omne quod secundum artem. Sed siquidem, in eis quae sunt natura. Quapropter non male Plato ait quia species sunt quaecumque natura, siquidem sunt species aliae horum, ut ignis, caro, caput; omnia ↵ enim materia sunt, et eius quae maxime substantiae ultima.	Now in some cases the this does not exist apart from the composite substance, e.g. the form of house does not so exist, unless the art of building exists apart (nor is there generation and destruction of these forms, but it is in another way that the house apart from its matter, and health, and all ideals of art, exist and do not exist); but if the this exists apart from the concrete thing, it is only in the case of natural objects. And so Plato was not far wrong when he said that there are as many Forms as there are kinds of natural object (if there are Forms distinct from the things of this earth).
τὰ μὲν οὖν κινοῦντα αἴτια ὡς προγεγενημένα ὄντα, τὰ δ᾽ ὡς ὁ λόγος ἅμα. ὅτε γὰρ ὑγιαίνει ὁ ἄνθρωπος, τότε καὶ ἡ ὑγίεια ἔστιν, καὶ τὸ σχῆμα τῆς χαλκῆς σφαίρας ἅμα καὶ ἡ χαλκῆ σφαῖρα (εἰ δὲ καὶ ὕστερόν τι ὑπομένει, σκεπτέον: [25] ἐπ᾽ ἐνίων γὰρ οὐδὲν κωλύει, οἷον εἰ ἡ ψυχὴ τοιοῦτον, μὴ πᾶσα ἀλλ᾽ ὁ νοῦς: πᾶσαν γὰρ ἀδύνατον ἴσως).	Moventes quidem igitur cause velut prius facte existentes, quae autem ut ratio simul. Quando enim sanatur homo, tunc et sanitas est, et figura eree spere simul et erea spera. Si autem et posterius aliquid manet, perscrutandum est. In quibusdam ↵ enim nihil prohibet, ut si anima tale, non omnis sed intellectus; omnem namque impossibile forsan.	The moving causes exist as things preceding the effects, but causes in the sense of definitions are simultaneous with their effects. For when a man is healthy, then health also exists; and the shape of a bronze sphere exists at the same time as the bronze sphere. (But we must examine whether any form also survives afterwards. For in some cases there is nothing to prevent this; e.g. the soul may be of this sort-not all soul but the reason; for presumably it is impossible that all soul should survive.)
φανερὸν δὴ ὅτι οὐδὲν δεῖ διά γε ταῦτ᾽ εἶναι τὰς ἰδέας: ἄνθρωπος γὰρ ἄνθρωπον γεννᾷ, ὁ καθ᾽ ἕκαστον τὸν τινά: ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν τεχνῶν: ἡ γὰρ ἰατρικὴ τέχνη ὁ λόγος τῆς ὑγιείας [30] ἐστίν.	ƿ Palam itaque quia non oportet propter haec esse ydeas; 90 homo enim hominem generat, qui singularis aliquem. Similiter ↵ autem et in artibus; medicinalis enim ars ratio sanitatis est.	Evidently then there is no necessity, on this ground at least, for the existence of the Ideas. For man is begotten by man, a given man by an individual father; and similarly in the arts; for the medical art is the formal cause of health. [70a 31]