Authors/Aristotle/metaphysics/l5/c8

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Chapter 8 Substance

Latin English
ƿ ↵ Substantia dicitur et simplicia corpora, ut terra et ignis et aqua et quaecumque talia, et universaliter corpora et ex hiis consistentia, animalia et demonia et partes horum; haec autem omnia dicuntur substantia, quia non de subiecto dicun↵tur sed de hiis alia. Chapter 8. We call substance (1) the simple bodies, i.e. earth and fire and water and everything of the sort, and in general bodies and the things composed of them, both animals and divine beings, and the parts of these. All these are called substance because they are not predicated of a subject but everything else is predicated of them.
Alio vero modo quodcumque fuerit causa essendi, inexistens in talibus quaecumque non dicuntur de subiecto, ut anima * animali. (2) That which, being present in such things as are not predicated of a subject, is the cause of their being, as the soul is of the being of an animal.
Amplius quaecumque particule existentes sunt in talibus et terminantes et hoc aliquid significantes, quibus destructis destruitur totum, ut superficie corpus, ↵ ut dicunt quidam, et superficies linea; et totaliter numerus videtur esse quibusdam talis; nam destructo nihil esse, et terminare omnia. (3) The parts which are present in such things, limiting them and marking them as individuals, and by whose destruction the whole is destroyed, as the body is by the destruction of the plane, as some say, and the plane by the destruction of the line; and in general number is thought by some to be of this nature; for if it is destroyed, they say, nothing exists, and it limits all things.
Amplius quod quid erat esse, cuius ratio est diffinitio, et hoc substantia dicitur uniuscuiusque. (4) The essence, the formula of which is a definition, is also called the substance of each thing.
Accidit itaque secundum duos modos substantiam dici: subiectum ulti↵mum quod non adhuc de alio dicitur, et quodcumque hoc aliquid ens et separabile fuerit; tale vero uniuscuiusque forma et species. It follows, then, that substance has two senses, (A) ultimate substratum, which is no longer predicated of anything else, and (B) that which, being a this , is also separable and of this nature is the shape or form of each thing.

Notes