Authors/Thomas Aquinas/metaphysics/liber7/lect6

Lecture 6

Latin	English
lib. 7 l. 6 n. 1 Postquam philosophus ostendit quid est quod quid erat esse, et quorum est, et quod non est aliud ab eo cuius est, hic intendit ostendere, quod quidditates et formae existentes in istis sensibilibus non generantur ab aliquibus formis extra materiam existentibus, sed a formis quae sunt in materia. Et hic erit unus modorum, quo destruitur positio Platonis ponentis species separatas, quas ponebat esse necessarias ad hoc, quod per eas scientia de istis rebus sensibilibus haberetur, et ad hoc, quod earum participatione res sensibiles existerent, et ad hoc, quod essent principia generationis rerum sensibilium. Ostendit autem iam in praecedenti capitulo, quod species separatae non sunt necessariae ad scientiam rerum sensibilium, nec ad esse earum; cum ad hoc sufficiat quod quid est rei sensibilis in re sensibili existens, et idem ei. Unde restat ostendere, quod species separatae non sunt necessariae ad generationem sensibilium, quod ostendit in hoc capitulo. Dividitur ergo in partes duas. In prima praemittit quaedam, quae sunt necessaria ad propositum ostendendum. In secunda ostendit propositum, ibi, quoniam vero ab aliquo fit quod fit. Circa primum duo facit. Primo proponit quasdam divisiones circa rerum generationem. Secundo manifestat eas, ibi, et generationes autem naturales. Ponit autem duas divisiones: quarum prima accipitur penes ea quae generantur, et modum generationis. Secunda penes ea quae ad generationem requiruntur: et hanc ponit ibi, omnia vero quae fiunt. Dicit ergo primo, quod eorum quae fiunt, quaedam fiunt a natura, quaedam ab arte, et quaedam a casu sive automato, idest per se vano. Cuius divisionis ratio est, quia causa generationis, aut est causa per se, aut est causa per accidens. Si enim est causa per se: vel est principium motus in quo est, et sic est natura; vel est extra ipsum, et sic est ars. Natura enim est principium motus, in eo in quo est. Ars vero non est in artificiato quod fit per artem, sed in alio.	1381. Having shown what essence is and to what things it belongs, and that it does not differ from the thing to which it belongs, the Philosopher now aims to show that the essences and forms present in these sensible things are not generated by any forms existing apart from matter, but by forms present in matter. And this will be one of the ways in which the position of Plato is destroyed; for Plato claimed that there are separate Forms, and that these are necessary both in order that an understanding of sensible things may be had, and that sensible things may exist by participating in them, and and that these Forms may be responsible for the generation of sensible things. Now he has already shown, in the preceding chapter (593)C 1368), that separate Forms are not necessary either to account for our understanding of sensible things or their being, since these can be adequately explained on the grounds that the whatness of a sensible thing is both present in that thing and identical with it. Hence it remains to show that separate Forms are not required for the generation of sensible things; and he proves this in this chapter. This undertaking is accordingly divided into two parts. In the first (598:C 1381) he prefaces his discussion with certain points required for the proof of his thesis. In the second (611:C IV7), he proves his thesis (“Now since”). In regard to the first he does two things. First, he proposes certain divisions regarding the processes of generation which take place in the natural world. Second (600:C 1385), he explains these (“Now natural generations”). He gives two divisions. The first his to do with things that are generated and with their mode of generation; and the second (599:C 1383), with the conditions necessary for generation (“And everything”). He accordingly says, first (598), that of things which come to be, some come to be by nature, some by art, and some by chance, or “spontaneously,” i.e., by itself without purpose. The reason for this division is that the cause of generation is either a proper cause or an accidental one. For if it is a proper cause, it is either the principle of motion intrinsic to a thing, and then it is nature, or it is extrinsic to the thing, and then it is art; for nature is a principle of motion in that in which it exists, but art does not exist in the thing produced by art but in something else.
lib. 7 l. 6 n. 2 Si vero est causa per accidens, sic est casus et fortuna. Fortuna quidem in his quae aguntur ab intellectu. Casus autem etiam in aliis. Utrumque vero sub automato, idest sub per se vano comprehenditur, quia vanum est quod est ordinatum ad finem, et non attingit ad illum. Et tam casus quam fortuna invenitur in his quae fiunt propter aliquid, cum accidit aliquid praeter id quod intendebatur ab aliqua causa per se determinata. Unde et per se dicitur, inquantum causam determinatam habet; et vanum, inquantum praeter intentionem accidit.	1382. But if it is an accidental cause, then it is chance or fortune. It is fortune in reference to those things which act by mind, but chance occurs in other things also; and both of these come under “the spontaneous,” i.e., what is of itself without purpose; for that is without purpose which is directed to a goal and does not reach it. And both chance and fortune are found among those things which are done for the sake of some goal, when some effect results besides the one intended by some definite proper cause. Hence an effect is said to be proper inasmuch as it has a definite cause, and to be without purpose inasmuch as it occurs apart from the intention of the agent.
lib. 7 l. 6 n. 3 Deinde cum dicit omnia vero ponit secundam divisionem, quae sumitur penes ea, quae ad generationem requiruntur. Omnia enim quae fiunt, fiunt ab aliquo agente, et ex aliquo, sicut ex materia, et iterum fiunt aliquid quod est terminus generationis. Et, quia supra dixerat quod hoc aliquid proprie est in substantiis, ideo hic docet generalius esse sumendum, ut per aliquid intelligatur quodlibet praedicamentum, in quo potest esse generatio simpliciter vel secundum quid, per se vel per accidens. Hoc enim quod dixit aliquid, vel significat hoc, idest substantiam, aut quantum, aut quale, aut quando, vel aliquod aliud praedicamentum.	1383. And everything (599). Then he gives the second division, which involves the conditions of generation; for everything which comes to be is brought about by some agent, and is produced from something as its matter, and also becomes something, which is the terminus of generation. And since he had said above that this something belongs in the class of substances) he therefore now informs us that this must be understood in a more general way, inasmuch as by something is meant any category in which generation can occur, in an unqualified or qualified sense, essentially or accidentally. For the something of which he spoke is either “a this,” i.e., a substance, or a quantity or quality or time or some other category.
lib. 7 l. 6 n. 4 Et huius divisionis ratio est, quia in omni generatione fit aliquid actu, quod prius erat in potentia. Nihil autem potest dici de potentia in actum procedere, nisi per aliquod ens actu, quod est agens, a quo fit generatio; potentia vero pertinet ad materiam, ex qua aliquid generatur; actus vero ad id quod generatur.	1384. And the reason for this division is that in every generation something which was formerly potential becomes actual. Now a thing can be said to go from potency to actuality only by reason of some actual being, which is the agent by which the process of generation is brought about. Now potency pertains to. the matter from which something is generated: and actuality pertains to the thing generated.
lib. 7 l. 6 n. 5 Deinde cum dicit et generationes manifestat quod haec tria inveniantur in tribus modis generationis. Et circa hoc duo facit. Primo manifestat propositum. Secundo inducit conclusionem principaliter intentam, ibi, quare sicut dicitur. Circa primum tria facit. Primo ostendit hoc in generatione naturali. Secundo et in generatione quae fit secundum artem, ibi, generationes vero aliae. Tertio in generationibus quae fiunt a casu, ibi, si vero a casu. Circa primum quatuor facit. Primo manifestat quae generationes sint naturales; dicens, quod istae generationes sunt naturales, quarum principium est natura, non autem ars, aut aliquis intellectus, sicut cum generatur ignis, aut planta, aut animal ex virtute naturali rebus indita.	1385. Now natural generations (600). Then he explains that these three conditions required for generation are found in the three types mentioned; and in regard to this he does two things. First (600:C 1385), he explains his thesis. Second (609:C 1412), he introduces the conclusion which he chiefly intends to draw (“Hence, as is said”). In regard to the first he does three things. First, he makes this clear in the case of natural generations; and second (604:C 1394), in the case of generations resulting from art (“But the other”); and third (608:C 1410, in the case of those generations which come about by chance (“But if it comes ). In regard to the first he does four things. First (600), he indicates what generations are natural. He says that those generations are natural whose principle is nature and not art or any mind, for example, when fire or a plant or an animal is generated as a result of the natural power inherent in things.
lib. 7 l. 6 n. 6 Deinde cum dicit hoc autem exemplificat in generationibus naturalibus tria praemissa; dicens, quod in generatione naturali, hoc quidem est, ex quo fit quod generatur, quod dicitur materia. Hoc autem a quo generatur aliquid eorum quae sunt secundum naturam, quod dicitur agens. Hoc vero est aliquid, scilicet quod generatur, ut homo aut planta, aut aliquid talium, quae maxime dicimus esse substantias, idest substantias particulares compositas, de quibus magis est manifestum quod sint substantiae, ut supra habitum est. Materia autem et forma, quae est principium actionis in agente, non sunt substantiae, nisi inquantum sunt principia substantiae compositae.	1386. And that from which (601). Having posited these three conditions he now gives examples of natural generations. He says that in natural generation there is something from which any natural thing is generated, and this is called matter; and something by which it is generated, and this is called the agent; and there is this particular thing, namely, the thing generated, such as a man or a plant or something of this sort, which “we chiefly claim to be substances,” i.e., particular composite substances, which are more evidently substances, as was stated above. But matter and the form, which is the principle of action in the agent, are substances only insofar as they are principles of composite substances.
lib. 7 l. 6 n. 7 Inter autem haec tria, duo se habent ut generationis principia, scilicet materia et agens; tertium autem se habet ut generationis terminus, idest compositum quod generatur. Et quia natura est generationis principium, tam materia, quam forma, quae est principium generationis in agente, dicitur natura, ut patet secundo physicorum. Compositum autem generatum, dicitur esse a natura vel secundum naturam.	1387. Now of these three conditions, two have the nature of principles of generation, namely, matter and the agent, and the third has the nature of a terminus of generation, i.e., the composite which is generated. And since nature is a principle of generation, both the matter as well as the form, which is the principle of generation in the agent, are called nature, as is evident in Book II of the Physics. And the composite which is generated is said to be by nature or according to nature.
lib. 7 l. 6 n. 8 Deinde cum dicit omnia vero probat quod unum trium, scilicet principium ex quo, inveniatur in omni generatione; non solum in naturali, sed etiam in artificiali (de aliis enim duobus est manifestum): dicens, quod omnia quae fiunt vel secundum naturam vel secundum artem, habent materiam ex qua fiunt. Omne enim quod generatur vel per artem vel per naturam, est possibile esse et non esse. Cum enim generatio sit de non esse in esse mutatio, oportet id quod generatur quandoque quidem esse, quandoque non esse: quod non esset nisi esset possibile esse et non esse. Hoc autem quod est in unoquoque in potentia ad esse et non esse, est materia. Est enim in potentia ad formas per quas res habent esse, et ad privationes per quas habent non esse, ut ex supra habitis patet. Relinquitur ergo, quod in omni generatione oportet esse materiam.	1388. Now all things (602). Here he proves that one of these three conditions—the principle from which a thing comes to be—is found in every kind of generation, not only in natural generations but also in artificial ones (for the nature of the other two conditions is evident). He says that all the things which come to be by nature or by art have a matter from which they come to be; for everything that is generated by nature or by art is capable both of being and of not being. For since generation is a change from non-being to being, the thing generated must at one time be and at another not be, and this would be true only if it were possible for it both to be and not to be. Now the potential element which each thing has both for being and not being is matter; for it is in potentiality to the forms by which things have being, and to the privations by which they have non-being, as is clear from what was said above. Therefore it follows that there must be matter in every kind of generation.
lib. 7 l. 6 n. 9 Deinde cum dicit universaliter vero ostendit quomodo praedicta tria se habent ad naturam; dicens, quod universaliter quodlibet praedictorum trium quodammodo est natura. Nam principium ex quo est generatio naturalis, scilicet materia, dicitur natura. Et propter hoc generationes simplicium corporum dicuntur naturales, licet principium activum generationis eorum sit extrinsecum; quod videtur esse contra rationem naturae, quia natura est principium intrinsecum, in qua est naturalis aptitudo ad talem formam; et ab hoc principio tales generationes dicuntur naturales.	1389. And in general (603). Here he shows how the three conditions mentioned above are related to nature. He says that in general each of the three conditions mentioned above is in a sense nature. For the principle from which natural generation proceeds, namely, matter, is called nature; and for this reason the generations of simple bodies are said to be natural ones, even though the active principle of their generation is extrinsic to them. This seems to be contrary to the very notion of nature, because nature is an intrinsic principle having a natural aptitude for such a form; and processes of generation which proceed from this principle are said to be natural.
lib. 7 l. 6 n. 10 Et iterum illud secundum quod fit generatio, scilicet forma generati, dicitur esse natura, sicut planta, aut animal. Generatio enim naturalis est, quae est ad naturam, sicut dealbatio quae est ad albedinem.	1390. Again, the principle according to which generation comes about, namely, the form of the thing generated, is said to be its nature, as a plant or an animal; for a natural generation is one which is directed towards nature just as the act of whitening is one which is directed towards whiteness.
lib. 7 l. 6 n. 11 Et iterum principium, a quo fit generatio, sicut ab agente, est natura dicta secundum speciem, quae scilicet est eiusdem speciei cum natura generati, sed tamen est in alio secundum numerum. Homo enim generat hominem; nec tamen genitum et generans sunt idem numero, sed specie tantum.	1391. Again, the principle by which generation comes about, as by an agent, is the specific nature, which is specifically the same as the nature of the thing generated, although it exists in something else; for man begets man. However, the thing generated and the one generating it are not numerically the same but only specifically the same.
lib. 7 l. 6 n. 12 Et propter hoc dicitur in secundo physicorum quod forma et finis generationis incidunt in idem numero. Agens autem incidit cum eis in idem specie, sed non in idem numero. Materia vero neque in idem specie, neque in idem numero.	1392. And for this reason it is said in Book II of the Physics that the form and the goal of the process of generation coincide in one and the same individual. Now the agent coincides with these insofar as it is specifically the same but not insofar as it is numerically the same. But the matter is neither specifically the same nor numerically the same.
lib. 7 l. 6 n. 13 Alia litera habet quod principium a quo, est secundum speciem dicta natura, aut conformis, quia videlicet non semper generans et genitum sunt eiusdem speciei, sed semper habent aliquam conformitatem, sicut cum equus generat mulum. Et ultimo concludit, quod illa, quae generantur per naturam, sic generantur sicut expositum est.	1393. Another text states that the principle by which a thing comes to be is the so-called specific nature or one conforming to it; for the thing generated and the one generating it are not always specifically the same, although they do have some conformity, as when a horse begets a mule. Finally, he concludes that the things generated by nature are generated in the manner described.
lib. 7 l. 6 n. 14 Deinde cum dicit generationes vero determinat de his quae generantur per artem: et circa hoc duo facit. Primo distinguit generationem quae est secundum artem ab aliis generationibus, quae sunt secundum naturam. Secundo ostendit quomodo fiat generatio ab arte, ibi, ab arte vero fiunt. Dicit ergo primo, quod generationes, quae sunt aliae a naturalibus, dicuntur factiones. Quamvis enim nomine factionis, quae in Graeco dicitur praxis, possimus uti in rebus naturalibus, sicut cum dicimus quod calidum et ens actu, facit actu esse tale: magis tamen proprie utimur in his quae fiunt per intellectum, in quibus intellectus agentis habet dominium super illud quod facit, ut possit sic vel aliter facere: quod in rebus naturalibus non contingit; immo agunt ad aliquem effectum, determinato modo ab aliquo superiori praestito eis. Huiusmodi autem factiones vel fiunt ab arte, vel a potestate, vel a mente.	1394. But the other kinds (604). He now settles the issue about the things generated by art; and in regard to this he does two things. First (604), he distinguishes processes of generation arising from art from other processes of generation, namely, natural ones. Second (605:C 1404), he shows how generation comes about by art (“Now those things”). He accordingly says, first, that those processes of generation which differ from natural ones are called productions. For even though in the case of natural things we can use the word production, which is equivalent to praxis in Greek (as when we say that what is actually hot produces something which is actually hot), still we use the word properly in reference to those things which come about as a result of mind, in which the mind of the agent has dominion over the thing which he makes inasmuch as he can make it in this way or in that. But this does not occur in the case of natural things, for they rather act with a view to some effect in the definite manner provided for them by a superior agent. Moreover , productions of this kind are a result of art, of power, or of mind.
lib. 7 l. 6 n. 15 Potestas autem hic videtur pro violentia sumi. Quaedam enim in his, quae non natura fiunt, constituuntur ex sola virtute agentis, in quibus non multum requiritur ars aliqua, vel aliquis ordinatus processus intellectus; quod maxime contingit in corporibus trahendis, vel proiiciendis, aut expellendis.	1395. Now the tern, power used here seems to be taken in the sense of violence; for certain of those things which do not come about by nature are produced by virtue of the agent’s power alone, in which a minimum of art is required and a minimum of activity directed by mind. This occurs especially in pulling or throwing or casting out bodies.
lib. 7 l. 6 n. 16 Cum autem ordo intellectus ad effectum requiritur, quandoque quidem hoc contingit per artem, quandoque vero per solum intellectum, habitu artis nondum perfecto. Sicut enim aliquis argumentatur per artem, aliquis vero sine arte, ut idiotae; ita etiam aliquod opus artis aliquis per artem, aliquis sine arte facere potest in huiusmodi per artem factibilibus.	1396. Moreover, when the direction of mind is required, at one time this comes about by art, and at another by mind alone, as when one does not yet have an artistic habit perfectly. For just as one person may argue by art, and another without art, as an unlearned person, so too in reference to those things which are made by art one can produce an artistic work by art, and someone else without art.
lib. 7 l. 6 n. 17 Harum autem generationum quae fiunt vel arte vel potestate, vel mente, quaedam fiunt a casu et a fortuna: quando scilicet aliquod agens per intellectum intendit finem aliquem per suam actionem, et provenit aliquis finis praeter intentionem agentis. Sicut cum aliquis intendit se confricare, et ex hoc sequitur sanitas, ut postea dicetur.	1397. Furthermore, of those processes of generation which are a result either of art, of power, or of mind, some are a result of chance and fortune, for example, when an agent by use of intelligence aims at some goal to be attained by his own activity, and ‘a goal is reached which the agent did not intend. For example, someone intends to rub himself vigorously and health comes of it, as is said later (C 1403).
lib. 7 l. 6 n. 18 Et hoc similiter contingit in artificialibus, sicut in factis a natura. Virtus enim, quae est in spermate, ut infra dicetur, assimilatur arti. Sicut enim ars per determinata media pervenit ad formam quam intendit, ita et virtus formativa, quae est in spermate. Sicut autem contingit effectum qui fit per artem etiam praeter intentionem artis aut intellectus fieri, et tunc dicitur a casu accidere: ita etiam et in illis, scilicet in rebus naturalibus, eadem fiunt et ex spermate et sine spermate. Quae quidem cum fiunt ex spermate, fiunt a natura; cum autem sine spermate, fiunt a casu. Et de his perscrutandum est posterius in hoc eodem capitulo.	1398. And the same thing occurs in the case of things produced by art as in those produced by nature; for the power contained in the seed, as is said below (619)C 1451), is similar to art, because just as art through certain definite intermediates attains the form at which it aims, so also does the formative power in the seed. And just as an effect produced by art may also occur apart from the intention of art or of mind, and then it is said to happen by chance, so too in the case of these things, i.e., natural ones, some things are generated both from seed and without seed. And when they are generated from seed, they are generated by nature; but when they are generated without seed, they are generated by chance. These things must also be investigated in this same chapter.
lib. 7 l. 6 n. 19 Haec autem verba hic posita, duplicem habent dubitationem. Prima, quia cum cuiuslibet rei naturalis sit determinatus modus generationis, non videntur esse eadem quae generantur ex spermate, et per putrefactionem. Quod Averroes in octavo physicorum sentire videtur; dicens, quod non potest esse idem animal in specie quod generatur ex spermate, et quod generatur ex putrefactione. Avicenna autem e contrario sentit, quod omnia quae generantur ex semine, eadem specie possunt generari sine semine per putrefactionem, vel per aliquem modum commixtionis terrenae materiae.	1399. Now the words used here give rise to two problems. The first is that, since every natural thing has a definite mode of generation, those things which are generated from seed and those which are generated from decay do not seem to be the same. This is what Averroes seems to feel in his commentary on Book VIII of the Physics, for he says that an animal which is generated from seed and one which is generated from decay cannot be specifically the same. Avicenna, however, feels that all things which are generated from seed can be generated in the same species without seed from decay, or by some method of blending terrestrial matters.
lib. 7 l. 6 n. 20 Sententia Aristotelis videtur esse media inter has duas opiniones, quod scilicet aliqua possunt et sine semine generari, et ex semine; non tamen omnia, ut infra dicet. Sicut nec in artificialibus omnia possunt fieri per artem et sine arte; sed quaedam fiunt per artem tantum, ut domus. Animalia enim perfecta videntur non posse generari nisi ex semine; animalia vero imperfecta quae sunt vicina plantis, videntur posse generari et ex semine et sine semine. Sicut plantae producuntur aliquando sine semine per actionem solis in terra ad hoc bene disposita; et tamen plantae sic productae producunt semina, ex quibus plantae similes in specie generantur.	1400. Aristotle’s view seems to be a mean between these two opinions, namely, that some things can be generated both from seed and without seed, but not all things, as he says below (610)C 1454); just as in the case of things produced by art not all things can be produced by art and without art, but some are produced by art alone, as a house. For perfect animals seem to be capable of being generated from seed, whereas imperfect animals, which are akin to plants, seem to be capable of being generated both from seed and without seed. For instance, plants are sometimes produced without seed by the action of the sun on the earth when it is rightly disposed for this effect; yet plants generated in this way produce seed from which plants of a similar kind are generated.
lib. 7 l. 6 n. 21 Et hoc rationabiliter accidit. Quia quanto aliquid perfectius est, tanto plura ad eius completionem requiruntur. Et propter hoc ad plantas et ad animalia imperfecta, sufficit ad agendum sola virtus caelestis. In animalibus vero perfectis requiritur cum virtute caelesti etiam virtus seminis. Unde dicitur in secundo physicorum quod homo generat hominem et sol.	1401. And this is reasonable, because the more perfect a thing is the more numerous are the things required for its completeness. And, for this reason, in the generation of plants and imperfect animals it is sufficient that the power of the heavens alone should act. But in the case of perfect animals the power of the seed is also needed along with the power of the heavens. Hence it is said in Book II of the Physics that man and the sun beget man.
lib. 7 l. 6 n. 22 Secunda dubitatio est, quia videntur animalia generata sine semine ex putrefactione, non fieri a casu, sed ex determinato agente, scilicet ex virtute caelesti, quae in generatione eorum supplet vicem virtutis generativae, quae est in semine: et hoc etiam vult Commentator in nono huius.	1402. The second problem is that animals which are generated without seed from decay do not seem to be produced by chance but by some definite agent, namely, by the power of the heavens, which supplies in the generation of such animals the energy of the generative power found in the seed. The Commentator is also of this opinion in his commentary on Book IX of this work.
lib. 7 l. 6 n. 23 Sed sciendum est quod nihil prohibet aliquam generationem esse per se, cum refertur ad unam causam, quae tamen est per accidens et casualis, cum refertur in aliam causam. Sicut in ipso exemplo philosophi patet. Cum enim sanitas ex confricatione sequitur praeter intentionem confricantis, ipsa quidem sanatio, si referatur ad naturam, quae est corporis regitiva, non est per accidens, sed per se intenta. Si vero referatur ad intellectum confricantis, erit per accidens et casualis. Similiter etiam generatio animalis ex putrefactione generati, si referatur ad causas particulares, hic inferius agentes, invenitur esse per accidens et casualis. Non enim calor, qui causat putredinem, intendit naturali appetitu generationem huius vel illius animalis, quae ex putrefactione sequitur, sicut virtus, quae est ex semine, intendit productionem talis speciei. Sed si referatur ad virtutem caelestem, quae est universalis regitiva virtus generationum et corruptionum in istis inferioribus, non est per accidens, sed per se intenta; quia de eius intentione est ut educantur in actu omnes formae quae sunt in potentia materiae. Et sic recte assimilavit hic Aristoteles ea quae fiunt ab arte, his quae fiunt a natura.	1403. But it must be noted that nothing prevents a process of generation from being a proper process when referred to one cause, and yet be an accidental or chance affair when referred to another cause, as is evident in the Philosopher’s example. For when health results from a vigorous rubbing quite apart from the aim of the one doing the rubbing, the process of restoring health, if it is referred to nature, which governs the body, is not accidentally but properly aimed at. However, if it is referred to the aim of the one doing the rubbing, it will be accidental and a matter of chance. Similarly, if the process of generation of an animal generated from decay is referred to the particular causes acting here below, it will also be found to be accidental and a matter of chance; for heat, which causes decay, is not inclined by nature to have as its goal the generation of this or that particular animal which results from decay, as the power in the seed has as its goal the generation of something of a particular type. But if it is referred to the power of the heavens, which is the universal power regulating generation and corruption in these lower bodies, it is not accidental but is directly aimed at, because its goal is that all forms existing potentially in matter should be brought to actuality. Thus Aristotle has correctly compared here the things which come to be by art with those which come to be by nature.
lib. 7 l. 6 n. 24 Deinde cum dicit ab arte vero ostendit modum generationis, quae est ab arte; et praecipue quantum ad principium effectivum. De principio enim materiali iam supra dixerat cum locutus fuerat de generatione naturali. Circa hoc autem duo facit. Primo ostendit quid sit principium activum in generatione quae est per artem. Secundo ostendit quomodo ab hoc principio generatio procedat, ibi, fit itaque sanitas. Dicit ergo primo, quod illa fiunt ab arte, quorum species factiva est in anima. Per speciem autem exponit quod quid erat esse cuiuslibet rei factae per artem, ut quod quid erat esse domus, quando fit domus. Et hoc etiam nominat primam substantiam, idest primam formam. Et hoc ideo, quia a forma quae est in anima nostra, procedit forma quae est in materia in artificialibus; in naturalibus autem e contrario.	1404. Now those things (605). He now explains the way in which things are generated by art; and he does this chiefly with reference to the efficient principle, for the material principle has already been discussed where he spoke about natural generation. In regard to this he does two things. First, he shows what the active principle is in a process of generation resulting from art. Second (606:C 1406), he shows how the process of generation proceeds from this principle (“Health comes about”). He accordingly says, first (605), that those things which come to be by art are those of which the productive form exists in the mind. And by form he means the essence of anything made by art, for example, the essence of a house, when it is a house that is made. He also calls this the “first substance,” i.e., the first form; and he does this because the form present in the matter of things made by art proceeds from the form present in the mind. In the case of natural things, however, the opposite is true.
lib. 7 l. 6 n. 25 Haec autem forma quae est in anima, differt a forma, quae est in materia. Nam contrariorum formae in materia sunt diversae et contrariae, in anima autem est quodammodo una species contrariorum. Et hoc ideo, quia formae in materia sunt propter esse rerum formatarum: formae autem in anima sunt secundum modum cognoscibilem et intelligibilem. Esse autem unius contrarii tollitur per esse alterius; sed cognitio unius oppositi non tollitur per cognitionem alterius, sed magis iuvatur. Unde formae oppositorum in anima non sunt oppositae. Quinimmo substantia, idest quod quid erat esse privationis, est eadem cum substantia oppositi, sicut eadem est ratio in anima sanitatis et infirmitatis. Per absentiam enim sanitatis cognoscitur infirmitas. Sanitas autem, quae est in anima, est quaedam ratio, per quam cognoscitur sanitas et infirmitas; et consistit in scientia, idest in cognitione utriusque.	1405. Now the form present in the mind differs from the one present in matter; for in matter the forms of contraries are different and opposed, but in the mind contraries have in a sense the same form. And this is true because forms present in matter exist for the sake of the being of the things informed, but forms present in the mind exist according to the mode of what is knowable or intelligible. Now while the being of one contrary is destroyed by that of another, the knowledge of one contrary is not destroyed by that of another but is rather supported by it. Hence the forms of contraries in the mind are not opposed, but rather “the substance,” i.e., the whatness, “of a privation,” is the same as the substance of its contrary, as the concepts of health and of sickness in the mind are the same; for sickness is known by the absence of health. Further, the health which exists in the mind is the concept by which health and sickness are known; and it is found “in the scientific knowledge” of both, i.e., in knowing both.
lib. 7 l. 6 n. 26 Deinde cum dicit fit itaque ostendit quomodo ab hoc principio procedatur ad sanitatem. Et circa hoc duo facit. Primo ostendit quomodo sanitas quae est in anima, sit principium sanationis. Secundo quomodo diversimode accipitur principium in actione artis, ibi, generationum vero et motuum. Dicit ergo quod, cum sanitas quae est in anima, sit principium sanitatis quae fit per artem, ita fit sanitas in materia aliquo intelligente quod sanitas est hoc, scilicet vel regularitas vel adaequatio calidi, frigidi, humidi et sicci. Et ideo necesse est, si sanitas debet contingere, quod hoc existat, scilicet regularitas vel aequalitas humorum. Et si regularitas vel aequalitas debeat esse, oportet quod sit calor, per quem humores reducantur ad aequalitatem; et ita semper procedendo a posteriori ad prius, intelliget illud quod est factivum caloris, et quod est factivum illius, donec reducatur ad aliquod ultimum, quod ipse statim posset facere, sicut hoc quod est dare talem potionem; et demum motus incipiens ab illo quod statim potest facere, nominatur factio ordinata ad sanandum.	1406. Health comes about (606). He now shows how health is produced by this principle; and in regard to this he does two things. First, he shows how the health which exists in the mind is the principle (or starting point) for the restoring of health; and second (607:C 1408), how the term principle is taken in different ways in regard to the activity of art (“Now of generations”). He accordingly says (606) that, since the health present in the mind is the principle of the health produced by art, health is brought about in a subject as a result of someone thinking in this manner: since health is such and such, i.e., either regularity or the balance of heat, cold, moisture and dryness, if health is to exist, it is necessary that this exist, i.e., regular or the balance of humors; and if regularity or balance must exist, there must be heat, by which the humors are balanced; and thus by always going from what is subsequent to what is prior he thinks of the thing which is productive of heat, and then of the thing which is productive of this, until he reaches some final thing which he himself is immediately capable of doing, for example, the dispensing of some particular medicine; and finally the motion beginning from the thing which he can do immediately is said to be the activity directed to the production of health.
lib. 7 l. 6 n. 27 Patet ergo, quod sicut in naturalibus ex homine generatur homo, ita in artificialibus accidit quodammodo ex sanitate fieri sanitatem, et ex domo domum; scilicet ex ea quae est sine materia in anima existens, illa quae habet materiam. Ars enim medicinalis, quae est principium sanationis, nihil est aliud quam species sanitatis, quae est in anima; et ars aedificativa est species domus in anima. Et ista species sive substantia sine materia, est quam dixit supra quod quid erat esse rei artificiatae.	1407. Hence it is evident that, just as in the case of natural things man is generated from man, so too in the case of artificial things it turns out that health comes to be in a sense from health, and a house from a house; i.e., from what exists in the mind without matter there is produced something which has matter. For the medical art, which is the principle of health, is nothing else than the form of health existing in the mind; and this form or substance which exists without matter is the one which he speaks of above as the essence of the thing produced by art.
lib. 7 l. 6 n. 28 Deinde cum dicit generationum vero ostendit quomodo diversimode accipitur principium in actionibus artis; et dicit quod in generationibus et motibus artificialibus est aliqua actio quae vocatur intelligentia et aliqua quae vocatur factio. Ipsa enim excogitatio artificis vocatur intelligentia, quae incipit ab hoc principio, quae est species rei fiendae per artem. Et haec operatio protenditur, ut supra dictum est, usque ad illud quod est ultimum in intentione, et primum in opere. Et ideo illa actio quae incipit ab ultimo, ad quod intelligentia terminatur, vocatur factio, quae est motus iam in exteriorem materiam.	1408. Now of generations (607). He shows how the word principle is taken in different ways in regard to the activities of art. He says that in artificial generations and motions there is one activity which is called thinking and another which is called producing. For the artist’s planning, which begins from the principle which is the form of the thing to be made by his art, is itself called thinking; and this activity extends, as was said above, right down to what is last in the order of intention and first in the order of execution. Therefore the activity which begins from this last thing in which the activity of thinking terminates, is called producing, and this is then a motion affecting matter.
lib. 7 l. 6 n. 29 Et sicut diximus de actione artis respectu formae, quae est ultimus finis generationis artificialis, similiter est de omnibus aliis intermediis. Sicut ad hoc quod convalescat, oportet quod adaequentur humores. Hoc igitur ipsum quod est adaequari, est unum de intermediis, quod est propinquissimum sanitati. Et sicut medicus, ad hoc quod faceret sanitatem, incipiebat considerando quid est sanitas: ita, ad hoc quod faciat adaequationem, oportet quod sciat quid est adaequatio; videlicet quod adaequatio est hoc, scilicet debita proportio humorum in respectu ad naturam humanam. Hoc autem erit si corpus fuerit calefactum; quando scilicet quis infirmatur propter defectum caloris. Et iterum oportet quod sciat quod quid est hoc, scilicet calefieri: sicut si dicatur quod calefieri est immutari a medicina calida. Et hoc, scilicet dare medicinam calidam, existit statim in potestate medici, et est iam in ipso, idest in potestate eius, ut talem medicinam det.	1409. And what we have said about the activity of art in reference to the form, which is the ultimate goal of artificial generation, also applies in the case of all other intermediate things; for example in order that one may be healed the humors of the body must be balanced. Hence this process of balancing is one of the intermediate things which is nearest to health. And just as the physician when he aims to cause health must begin by considering what health is, so too when he intends to produce a balance he must know what a balance is, namely, that it is “some particular thing,” i.e., the proportion of humors appropriate to human nature. “And this will occur if the body is heated”—supposing that someone is sick because of a lack of heat. And again he must know what this is, i.e., what being heated is, as if one might say that being heated consists in being changed by a hot medicine. And “this, namely, the administering of a hot medicine, is immediately within the physician’s power; and “this is already present in the physician himself,” i.e., it is within his power to administer such a medicine.
lib. 7 l. 6 n. 30 Sic igitur patet, quod principium faciens sanitatem, unde incipit motus ad sanandum, est species, quae est in anima, vel ipsius sanitatis, vel aliorum intermediorum, per quae acquiritur sanitas. Et hoc dico, si sanatio fiat ab arte. Si autem fiat alio modo, non erit principium sanitatis species quae est in anima; hoc enim est proprium in operationibus artis.	1410. Hence it is evident that the principle causing health, from which the process of restoring health begins, is the form existing in the mind, either of health itself, or of other intermediate things by means of which health is produced. And I say that this is the case if the process of restoring health comes about by art. But if it comes about in some other way, the principle of health will not be a form existing in the mind; for this is proper to artificial operations.
lib. 7 l. 6 n. 31 Deinde cum dicit si vero manifestat quomodo fiunt generationes casuales: et dicit, quod quando sanatio fit a casu, tunc principium sanitatis fit ab hoc, quod est principium faciendi sanitatem apud eum qui facit sanitatem secundum artem. Sed hoc est intelligendum de principio factionis, quod est ultimum in intelligendo, et primum in exequendo. Sicut in medicando principium sanitatis aliquando forsan fit a calefactione. Et hinc etiam incipit sanatio, quando aliquis a casu sanatur, quia calorem aliquis excitat confricatione praeter intentionem confricantis. Calor itaque in corpore excitatus per fricationem vel medicationem, aut est pars sanitatis, quasi intrans substantiam sanitatis, sicut cum ipsa alteratio calefactionis ad sanitatem sufficit; aut sequitur ad calorem aliquid quod est pars sanitatis, sicut cum per calorem fit sanitas per hoc quod calor dissolvit aliquos humores compactos, quorum dissolutio est iam constituens sanitatem. Aut etiam hoc potest esse per plura media; sicut cum calor consumit humores superfluos impedientes aliquos meatus in corpore; quibus consumptis fit debitus motus spirituum ad aliquas determinatas partes corporis: et hoc ultimum est iam faciens sanitatem. Et quod est ita, scilicet quod est proximum sanitatis factivum est aliqua pars sanitatis, idest intrans in constitutionem sanitatis. Et similiter est in aliis artificialibus. Nam partes domus sunt lapides, quorum compositio iam est aliquid domus.	1411. But if it (608). He shows how chance generations take place. He says that, when the restoring of health comes about by chance, the principle of health is the same as the one from which health comes about for him who causes health by art. But this must be understood of the principle of production, which is last in the order of intention and first in the order of execution, just as in the process of restoring health the principle of health may at times begin with the patient’s being heated. And the process of restoring health also begins here when someone is healed by chance, because someone may produce heat by rubbing but not intend this as the goal of the rubbing. Thus the heat produced in the body by rubbing or by a medication either is a part of health, inasmuch as it is something entering into the substance of health, as when by itself the alteration of being heated is sufficient to promote health; or something which is a part of health may result from heat, as when health is produced as a result of the heat dissolving certain congested humors, the dissolution of which thereupon constitutes health. Or it can also be produced by several intermediates, as when heat consumes certain superfluous humors blocking some passage in the body, so that when these have been removed the proper movement of spirits to some parts of the body then begins; and this final step is the one then causing health. “And what is such,” namely, the proximate cause of health, “is a part of health,” i.e., something entering into the make-up of health. And it is the same with other things produced by art; for the parts of a house are the stones whose bonding in the course of construction goes to constitute a house.
lib. 7 l. 6 n. 32 Deinde cum dicit quare sicut concludit conclusionem principaliter intentam: et circa hoc duo facit. Primo includit conclusionem intentam. Secundo removet quamdam dubitationem, ibi, ex quo vero ut materia fit. Dicit ergo primo, quod ex quo omne quod generatur, generatur ex materia, et iterum generatur a suo simili, impossibile est aliquid esse factum, nisi aliquid praeexistat, sicut dicitur communiter. Communis enim philosophorum naturalium sententia erat, quod ex nihilo nihil fit. Palam est autem, quod id quod praeexistit, oportet quod sit pars rei generatae. Constat enim, quod materia quae praeexistit est pars generati. Quod ex hoc probari potest: quia materia est in generato, et ipsa fit generatum dum in actum educitur. Nec solum pars quae est materia praeexistit; sed, sicut ex dictis patet, etiam praeexistit pars quae est in ratione, scilicet forma. Haec enim duo, scilicet materia et forma, sunt partes generati.	1412. Hence, as is said (609). Then he draws the conclusion at which he chiefly aims; and in regard to this he does two things. First, he introduces this conclusion; and second (610:C 1414), he dispels a difficulty (“Now as for that”). He says, first (609), that, since everything which comes to be is generated from matter and is also generated by something like itself, it is impossible for anything to be generated unless something pre-exists, as is commonly said; for the common opinion of the philosophers of nature was that nothing comes to be from nothing. Further, it is evident that the thing which preexists must be part of the thing generated, and this can be shown from the fact that matter is present in the thing generated and becomes the thing generated when it is brought to actuality. And not only the. material part of a thing pre-exists, as is clear from the explanation given, but so also does the part which exists in the mind, namely, the form; for these two principles, matter and form, are parts of the thing generated.
lib. 7 l. 6 n. 33 Utroque enim modo possumus assignare quid sint circuli aerei vel circuli multi, secundum aliam literam, idest particulares et distincti; et dicentes materiam quae est aes, et dicentes speciem, idest formam, quae est talis figura. Et recte dicit multos circulos particulares. Nam circulus secundum speciem et formam est unus tantum. Multiplicatur autem et individuatur per materiam. Et haec, scilicet figura, est genus, in quod primo collocatur circulus aereus. Et ita patet ex dictis, quod circulus aereus in sua definitione habet materiam. Quod autem species geniti praeexistat, supra ostensum est in naturalibus et in artificialibus generationibus.	1413. For we can describe what brazen circles are in both ways, or, according to another text, what many circles are, i.e., particular and distinct circles, by stating the matter, which is bronze, and “by stating the specifying principle,” i.e., the form, which is such and such a figure. And he is right in saying many particular circles; for a circle is one thing specifically and formally, but it becomes many and is individuated by matter. And this, the figure, is the genus in which brazen circle is first placed. Hence it is evident, from what has been said, that brazen circle has matter in its definition. And the fact that the form of the thing generated pre-exists has been made clear above both in reference to natural generations and to artificial productions.
lib. 7 l. 6 n. 34 Deinde cum dicit ex quo vero removet quamdam dubitationem. Illud enim ex quo aliquid fit ut ex materia, quandoque praedicatur non in abstracto, sed denominative. Quaedam enim dicuntur non esse illud, idest materia, sed illiusmodi. Sicut statua non dicitur lapis, sed lapidea. Sed homo convalescens non dicitur illud ex quo, idest non recipit praedicationem eius ex quo fieri dicitur. Fit enim convalescens ex infirmo. Nec dicitur quod convalescens sit infirmus.	1414. Now as for that (610). Here he dispels. a certain difficulty; for that from which a thing comes to be as its matter is sometimes predicated of it not abstractly but denominatively; for some things are not said to be “that,” i.e., the matter, “but of that kind”; for instance, a statue is not said to be stone but of stone. And a man who is recovering his health “is not said to be that f rom which ' “ i.e., one does not predicate of him the thing from which, he is said to come to be; for a person who is recovering his health comes from a sick person. But we do not say that a person who is recovering his health is a sick one.
lib. 7 l. 6 n. 35 Huiusmodi autem causa est, quia dupliciter dicitur aliquid fieri ex aliquo: scilicet ex privatione, et ex subiecto quod dicitur materia: sicut dicitur quod homo fit sanus, et quod laborans fit sanus. Dicitur autem magis aliquid fieri ex privatione quam ex subiecto; sicut magis dicitur aliquis fieri sanus ex laborante, quam ex homine. Sed hoc fieri hoc, magis dicimus in subiecto quam in privatione. Magis enim dicimus proprie quod homo fit sanus, quam quod laborans. Et ideo ille qui est sanus, non dicitur laborans, sed magis dicitur homo; et e converso homo dicitur sanus. Sic ergo id quod fit, praedicatur de subiecto, non autem de privatione.	1415. Now the reason for this kind of difficulty is that one thing is said to come from something else in two ways, namely, from a privation and from a subject, which is matter, for example, when it is said that a man recovers his health, and that a sick person recovers his health. But a thing is said to come from a privation rather than from a subject; for example, a healthy person is said to come from a sick one rather than from a man. But when one thing becomes another we say this in reference to the subject rather than to the privation; for properly speaking we say that a man rather than a sick person becomes healthy. Therefore a healthy person is not said to be a sick one, but rather a man; and in the opposite way it is a man that is said to be healthy. Hence the thing that comes to be is predicated of the subject, not of the privation.
lib. 7 l. 6 n. 36 Sed in quibusdam privatio est non manifesta et innominata; sicut privatio cuiuscumque figurae in aere, non habet nomen, nec etiam privatio domus in lateribus et in lignis. Et ideo utimur materia, pro materia et privatione simul. Et propter hoc, sicut illic dicimus, quod sanus fit ex laborante, ita hic dicimus quod statua fit ex aere, et domus ex lapidibus et lignis. Et propter hoc etiam, sicut ibi id ex quo fit aliquid, sicut ex privatione, non praedicatur de subiecto, quia non dicimus quod sanus sit laborans, ita nec hic dicimus quod statua sit lignum; sed praedicatur abstractum in concreto, dicendo quod non est lignum, sed lignea, nec aes, sed aerea, nec lapis, sed lapidea. Et similiter domus non est lateres, sed lateritia. Quia si quis diligenter inspiciat, nec fit statua ex ligno, nec domus ex lateribus simpliciter loquendo, sed per aliquam permutationem. Fiunt enim ista ex istis sicut ex aliquo permutato, et non sicut ex permanente. Aes enim infiguratum non manet dum fit statua, nec lateres incompositi dum fit domus. Et propter hoc in praedictis ita dicitur, idest talis fit praedicatio.	1416. But in some cases the privation is not evident and is nameless; for example, the privation of any particular figure in bronze does not have a name, and neither does the privation of house in the stones and timbers. Therefore we use the term matter simultaneously to designate both the matter and the privation. Hence just as we say in the one case that a healthy person comes from a sick one, so too we say in the other case that a statue comes from bronze, and a house from stones and timbers. And for this reason, too, just as in the one case the thing that comes to be from something taken as a privation is not predicated of the subject, because we do not say that a healthy person is a sick one, neither do we say in the other case that a statue is wood; but the abstract term is predicated concretely by saying that it is not wood but wooden, not bronze but brazen, not stone but of stone. And similarly a house is not bricks but of bricks. For if someone were to examine the question carefully, he would not say in an unqualified sense either that the statue conics froin wood or the house from bricks, litit that it conics to be as a result of some change. For the former comes from the latter taken as something which is changed and not as something which remains, because bronze does not stay formless while it is being made into a statue, nor do bricks stay unbonded while a house is being built. And for this reason “we speak in this way,” i.e., Predication is made in this way, in the cases mentioned above.