Authors/Thomas Aquinas/metaphysics/liber5

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Aquinas: Commentary on the Metaphysics Book 5. With English translation by John P. Rowan, Chicago, 1961.

Lecture 1

Latin English
lib. 5 l. 1 n. 1 In praecedenti libro determinavit philosophus quid pertineat ad considerationem huius scientiae; hic incipit determinare de rebus, quas scientia ista considerat. Et quia ea quae in hac scientia considerantur, sunt omnibus communia, nec dicuntur univoce, sed secundum prius et posterius de diversis, ut in quarto libro est habitum; ideo prius distinguit intentiones nominum, quae in huius scientiae consideratione cadunt. Secundo incipit determinare de rebus, quae sub consideratione huius scientiae cadunt, in sexto libro, qui incipit, ibi, principia et causae. Cuiuslibet autem scientiae est considerare subiectum, et passiones, et causas; et ideo hic quintus liber dividitur in tres partes. Primo determinat distinctiones nominum quae significant causas, secundo, illorum nominum quae significant subiectum huius scientiae vel partes eius, ibi, unum dicitur aliud secundum accidens. Tertio nominum quae significant passiones entis inquantum est ens, ibi, perfectum vero dicitur et cetera. Prima in duas. Primo distinguit nomina significantia causas. Secundo quoddam nomen significans quoddam quod consequitur ad causam, scilicet necessarium. Nam causa est ad quam de necessitate sequitur aliud, ibi, necessarium dicitur sine quo non contingit. Prima dividitur in duas. Primo distinguit nomina significantia causas generaliter. Secundo distinguit quoddam nomen, quod significat quamdam causam in speciali, scilicet hoc nomen natura, ibi, natura vero dicitur et cetera.
lib. 5 l. 1 n. 2 Prima dividitur in tres. Primo distinguit hoc nomen, principium. Secundo hoc nomen, causa, ibi, causa vero dicitur. Tertio hoc nomen, elementum, ibi, elementum vero dicitur. Procedit autem hoc ordine, quia hoc nomen principium communius est quam causa: aliquid enim est principium, quod non est causa; sicut principium motus dicitur terminus a quo. Et iterum causa est in plus quam elementum. Sola enim causa intrinseca potest dici elementum. Circa primum duo facit. Primo ponit significationes huius nominis principium. Secundo reducit omnes ad unum commune, ibi, omnium igitur principiorum.
lib. 5 l. 1 n. 3 Sciendum est autem, quod principium et causa licet sint idem subiecto, differunt tamen ratione. Nam hoc nomen principium ordinem quemdam importat; hoc vero nomen causa, importat influxum quemdam ad esse causati. Ordo autem prioris et posterioris invenitur in diversis; sed secundum id, quod primo est nobis notum, est ordo inventus in motu locali, eo quod ille motus est sensui manifestior. Sunt autem trium rerum ordines sese consequentes; scilicet magnitudinis, motus, et temporis. Nam secundum prius et posterius in magnitudine est prius et posterius in motu; et secundum prius et posterius in motu est prius et posterius in tempore, ut habetur quarto physicorum. Quia igitur principium dicitur quod in aliquo ordine, et ordo qui attenditur secundum prius et posterius in magnitudine, est prius nobis notus, secundum autem quod res sunt nobis notae secundum hoc a nobis nominantur, ideo hoc nomen principium secundum propriam sui inquisitionem significat id quod est primum in magnitudine, super quam transit motus. Et ideo dicit, quod principium dicitur illud unde aliquis rem primo moveat, idest aliqua pars magnitudinis, a qua incipit motus localis. Vel secundum aliam literam, unde aliquid rei primo movebitur, idest ex qua parte rei aliquid incipit primo moveri. Sicut in longitudine et in via quacumque, ex illa parte est principium, unde incipit motus. Ex parte vero opposita sive contraria, est diversum vel alterum, idest finis vel terminus. Sciendum est, quod ad hunc modum pertinet principium motus et principium temporis ratione iam dicta. 751. Now it should be noted that, although a principle and a cause are the same in subject, they nevertheless differ in meaning; for the term principle implies an order or sequence, whereas the term cause implies some influence on the being of the thing caused. Now an order of priority and posteriority is found in different things; but according to what is first known by us order is found in local motion, because that kind of motion is more evident to the senses. Further, order is found in three classes of things, one of which is naturally associated with the other, i.e., continuous quantity, motion and time. For insofar as there is priority and posteriority in continuous quantity, there is priority and posteriority in motion; and insofar as there is priority and posteriority in motion, there is priority and posteriority in time, as is stated in Book IV of the Physics. Therefore, because a principle is said to be what is first in any order, and the order which is considered according to priority and posteriority in continuous quantity is first known by us (and things are named by us insofar as they are known to us), for this reason the term principle, properly considered, designates what is first in a continuous quantity over which motion passes. Hence he says that a principle is said to be “that from which someone first moves something,” i.e., any part of a continuous quantity from which local motion begins. Or, according to another reading, “Some part of a thing from which motion will first begin”; i.e., some part of a thing from which it first begins to be moved; for example in the case of a line and in that of any kind of journey the principle is the point from which motion begins. But the opposite or contrary point is “something different or other,” i.e., the end or terminus. It should also be noted that a principle of motion and a principle of time belong to this class for the reason just given.
lib. 5 l. 1 n. 4 Quia vero motus non semper incipit a principio magnitudinis, sed ab ea parte unde est unicuique in promptu magis ut moveatur, ideo ponit secundum modum, dicens, quod alio modo dicitur principium motus unde unumquodque fiet maxime optime, idest unusquisque incipit optime moveri. Et hoc manifestat per simile, in disciplinis scilicet in quibus non semper incipit aliquis addiscere ab eo quod est principium simpliciter et secundum naturam, sed ab eo unde aliquid facilius sive opportunius valet addiscere, idest ab illis, quae sunt magis nota quo ad nos, quae quandoque posteriora sunt secundum naturam. 752. But because motion does not always begin from the starting point of a continuous quantity but from that part from which the motion of each thing begins most readily, he therefore gives a second meaning of principle, saying that we speak of a principle of motion in another way “as that from which a thing best comes into being,” i.e., the point from which each thing begins to be moved most easily. He makes this clear by an example; for in the disciplines one does not always begin to learn from something that is a beginning in an absolute sense and by nature, but from that from which one “is able to learn” most readily, i.e., from those things which are better known to us, even though they are sometimes more remote by their nature.
lib. 5 l. 1 n. 5 Differt autem hic modus a primo. Nam in primo modo ex principio magnitudinis designatur principium motus. Hic autem ex principio motus designatur principium in magnitudine. Et ideo etiam in illis motibus, qui sunt super magnitudines circulares non habentes principium, accipitur aliquod principium a quo optime vel opportune movetur mobile secundum suam naturam. Sicut in motu primi mobilis principium est ab oriente. In motibus etiam nostris non semper incipit homo moveri a principio viae, sed quandoque a medio, vel a quocumque termino, unde est ei opportunum primo moveri. 753. Now this sense of principle differs from the first. For in the first sense a principle of motion gets its name from the starting point of a continuous quantity, whereas here the principle of continuous quantity gets its name from the starting point of motion. Hence in the case of those motions which are over circular continuous quantities and have no starting point, the principle is also considered to be the point from which the movable body is best or most fittingly moved according to its nature. For example, in the case of the first thing moved [the first sphere] the starting point is in the east. The same thing is true in the case of our own movements; for a man does not always start to move from the beginning of a road but sometimes from the middle or from any terminus at all from which it is convenient for him to start moving.
lib. 5 l. 1 n. 6 Ex ordine autem, qui consideratur in motu locali, fit nobis etiam notus ordo in aliis motibus; et ideo sequuntur significationes principii, quae sumuntur secundum principium in generatione vel fieri rerum. Quod quidem principium dupliciter se habet. Aut enim est inexistens, idest intrinsecum; vel non est inexistens, idest extrinsecum. 754. Now from the order considered in local motion we come to know the order in other motions. And for this reason we have the senses of principle based upon the principle of generation or coming to be of things. But this is taken in two ways; for it is either “inherent,” i.e., intrinsic, or “non-inherent,” i.e., extrinsic.
lib. 5 l. 1 n. 7 Dicitur ergo primo modo principium illa pars rei, quae primo generatur, et ex qua generatio rei incipit; sicut in navi fit primo sedile vel carina, quae est quasi navis fundamentum, super quod omnia ligna navis compaginantur. Similiter quod primo in domo fit, est fundamentum. In animali vero primo fit cor secundum quosdam, et secundum alios cerebrum, aut aliud tale membrum. Animal enim distinguitur a non animali, sensu et motu. Principium autem motus apparet esse in corde. Operationes autem sensus maxime manifestantur in cerebro. Et ideo qui consideraverunt animal ex parte motus, posuerunt cor principium esse in generatione animalis. Qui autem consideraverunt animal solum ex parte sensus, posuerunt cerebrum esse principium; quamvis etiam ipsius sensus primum principium sit in corde, etsi operationes sensus perficiantur in cerebro. Qui autem consideraverunt animal inquantum agit vel secundum aliquas eius operationes, posuerunt membrum adaptatum illi operationi, ut hepar vel aliud huiusmodi, esse primam partem generatam in animali. Secundum autem philosophi sententiam, prima pars est cor, quia a corde omnes virtutes animae per corpus diffunduntur. 755. In the first way, then, a principle means that part of a thing which is first generated and from which the generation of the thing begins; for example, in the case of a ship the first thing to come into being is the base or keel, which is in a certain sense the foundation on which the whole superstructure of the ship is raised. And, similarly, in the case of a house the first thing that comes into being is the foundation. And in the case of an animal the first thing that comes into being, according to some, is the heart, and according to others, the brain or some such member of the body. For an animal is distinguished from a non-animal by reason of sensation and motion. Now the principle of motion appears to be in the heart, and sensory operations are most evident in the brain. Hence those who considered an animal from the viewpoint of motion held that the heart is the principle in the generation of an animal. But those who considered an animal only from the viewpoint of the senses held that the brain is this principle; yet the first principle of sensation is also in the heart even though the operations of the senses are completed in the brain. And those who considered an animal from the viewpoint of operation, or according to some of its activities, held that the organ which is naturally disposed for that operation, as the liver or some other such part is the first part which is generated in an animal. But according to the view of the Philosopher the first part is the heart because all of the soul’s powers are diffused throughout the body by means of the heart.
lib. 5 l. 1 n. 8 Alio autem modo dicitur principium, unde incipit rei generatio, quod tamen est extra rem; et hoc quidem manifestatur in tribus. Primo quidem in rebus naturalibus, in quibus principium generationis dicitur, unde primum natus est motus incipere in his quae fiunt per motum, sicut in his quae acquiruntur per alterationem, vel per aliquem alium motum huiusmodi. Sicut dicitur homo fieri magnus vel albus. Vel unde incipit permutatio, sicut in his quae non per motum, sed per solam fiunt mutationem; ut patet in factione substantiarum, sicut puer est ex patre et matre qui sunt eius principium, et bellum ex convitio, quod concitat animos hominum ad bellum. 756. In the second way, a principle means that from which a thing’s process of generation begins but which is outside the thing. This is made clear in the case of three classes of things. The first is that of natural beings, in which the principle of generation is said to be the first thing from which motion naturally begins in those things which come about through motion (as those which come about through alteration or through some similar kind of motion; for example, a man is said to become large or white); or that from which a complete change begins (as in the case of those things which are not a result of motion but come into being through mutation alone). This is evident in the case of substantial generation; for example, a child comes from its father and mother, who are its principles, and a fight from abusive language, which stirs the souls of men to quarrel.
lib. 5 l. 1 n. 9 Secundo etiam manifestat in rebus agibilibus sive moralibus aut politicis, in quibus dicitur principium id, ex cuius voluntate vel proposito moventur et mutantur alia; et sic dicuntur principatus in civitatibus illi qui obtinent potestates et imperia, vel etiam tyrannides in ipsis. Nam ex eorum voluntate fiunt et moventur omnia in civitatibus. Dicuntur autem potestates habere homines, qui in particularibus officiis in civitatibus praeponuntur, sicut iudices et huiusmodi. Imperia autem illi, qui universaliter quibuscumque imperant, ut reges. Tyrannides autem obtinent, qui per violentiam et praeter iuris ordinem ad suam utilitatem civitates et regnum detinent. 757. The second class in which this is made clear is that of human acts, whether ethical or political, in which that by whose will or intention others are moved or changed is called a principle. Thus those who hold civil, imperial, or even tyrannical power in states are said to have the principal places; for it is by their will that all things come to pass or are put into motion in states. Those men are said to have civil power who are put in command of particular offices in states, as judges and persons of this kind. Those are said to have imperial power who govern everyone without exception, as kings. And those hold tyrannical power who through violence and disregard for law keep royal power within their grip for their own benefit.
lib. 5 l. 1 n. 10 Tertium exemplum ponit in artificialibus, quia artes etiam simili modo principia esse dicuntur artificiatorum, quia ab arte incipit motus ad artificii constructionem. Et inter has maxime dicuntur principia architectonicae, quae a principio nomen habent, idest principales artes dictae. Dicuntur enim artes architectonicae quae aliis artibus subservientibus imperant, sicut gubernator navis imperat navifactivae, et militaris equestri. 758. He gives as the third class things made by art; for the arts too in a similar way are called principles of artificial things, because the motion necessary for producing an artifact begins from an art. And of these arts the architectonic, which “derive their name” from the word principle, i.e., those called principal arts, are said to be principles in the highest degree. For by architectonic arts we mean those which govern subordinate arts, as the art of the navigator governs the art of ship-building, and the military art governs the art of horsemanship.
lib. 5 l. 1 n. 11 Ad similitudinem autem ordinis, qui in motibus exterioribus consideratur, attenditur etiam quidam ordo in rerum cognitione; et praecipue secundum quod intellectus noster quamdam similitudinem motus habet, discurrens de principiis in conclusiones. Et ideo alio modo dicitur principium, unde res primo innotescit; sicut dicimus principia demonstrationum esse suppositiones, idest dignitates et petitiones. 759. Again, in likeness to the order considered in external motions a certain order may also be observed in our apprehensions of things, and especially insofar as our act of understanding, by proceeding from principles to conclusions, bears a certain resemblance to motion. Therefore in another way that is said to be a principle from which a thing first becomes known; for example, we say that “postulates,” i.e., axioms and assumptions, are principles of demonstrations.
lib. 5 l. 1 n. 12 His etiam modis et causae dicuntur quaedam principia. Nam omnes causae sunt quaedam principia. Ex causa enim incipit motus ad esse rei, licet non eadem ratione causa dicatur et principium, ut dictum est. 760. Causes are also said to be principles in these ways, “for all causes are principles.” For the motion that terminates in a thing’s being begins from some cause, although it is not designated a cause and a principle from the same point of view, as was pointed out above (750).
lib. 5 l. 1 n. 13 Deinde cum dicit omnium igitur reducit omnes praedictos modos ad aliquid commune; et dicit quod commune in omnibus dictis modis est, ut dicatur principium illud, quod est primum, aut in esse rei, sicut prima pars rei dicitur principium, aut in fieri rei, sicut primum movens dicitur principium, aut in rei cognitione. 761. Therefore, it is (404). Then he reduces all of the abovementioned senses of principle to one that is common. He says that all of the foregoing senses have something in common inasmuch as that is said to be a principle which comes first (1) either with reference to a thing’s being (as the first part of a thing is said to be a principle) or (2) with reference to its coming to be (as the first mover is said to be a principle) or with reference to the knowing of it.
lib. 5 l. 1 n. 14 Sed quamvis omnia principia in hoc, ut dictum est, conveniant, differunt tamen, quia quaedam sunt intrinseca, quaedam extrinseca, ut ex praedictis patet. Et ideo natura potest esse principium et elementum, quae sunt intrinseca. Natura quidem, sicut illud a quo incipit motus: elementum autem sicut pars prima in generatione rei. Et mens, idest intellectus, et praevoluntas, idest propositum, dicuntur principia quasi extrinseca. Et iterum quasi intrinsecum dicitur principium substantia rei, idest forma quae est principium in essendo, cum secundum eam res sit in esse. Et secundum etiam praedicta, finis cuius causa fit aliquid, dicitur etiam esse principium. Bonum enim, quod habet rationem finis in prosequendo, et malum in vitando, in multis sunt principia cognitionis et motus, sicut in omnibus quae aguntur propter finem. In naturalibus enim, et moralibus et artificialibus, praecipue demonstrationes ex fine sumuntur. 762. But while all principles agree in the respect just mentioned, they nevertheless differ, because some are intrinsic and others extrinsic, as is clear from the above. Hence nature and element, which are intrinsic, can be principles-nature as that from which motion begins, and element as the first part in a thing's generation. "And mind," i.e., intellect, and "purpose," i.e., a man's intention, are said to be principles as extrinsic ones. Again, "a thing's substance," i.e., its form, which is its principle of being, is called an intrinsic principle, since a thing has being by its form. Again, according to what has been said, that for the sake of which something comes to be is said to be one of its principles. For the good, which has the character of an end in the case of pursuing, and evil in that of shunning, are principles of the knowledge and motion of many things; that is, all those which are done for the sake of some end. For in the realm of nature, in that of moral acts, and in that of artifacts, demonstrations make special use of the final cause.

Lecture 2

Latin English
lib. 5 l. 2 n. 1 Hic philosophus distinguit quot modis dicitur causa. Et circa hoc duo facit. Primo assignat species causarum. Secundo modos causarum, ibi, modi vero causarum. Circa primum duo facit. Primo enumerat diversas species causarum. Secundo reducit eas ad quatuor, ibi, omnes vero causae dictae. Circa primum duo facit. Primo enumerat diversas species causarum. Secundo manifestat quaedam circa species praedictas, ibi, accidit autem multoties et cetera. Dicit ergo primo, quod uno modo dicitur causa id ex quo fit aliquid, et est ei inexistens, idest intus existens. Quod quidem dicitur ad differentiam privationis, et etiam contrarii. Nam ex contrario vel privatione dicitur aliquid fieri sicut ex non inexistente, ut album ex nigro vel album ex non albo. Statua autem fit ex aere, et phiala ex argento, sicut ex inexistente. Nam cum statua fit, non tollitur ratio aeris, nec si fit phiala, tollitur ratio argenti. Et ideo aes statuae, et argentum phialae sunt causa per modum materiae. Et horum genera, quia cuiuscumque materia est species aliqua, materia est eius genus, sicut si materia statuae est aes, eius materia erit metallum, et mixtum, et corpus, et sic de aliis. 763. Here the Philosopher distinguishes the various senses in which the term cause is used; and in regard to this he does two things. First, he enumerates the classes of causes. Second (783), he gives the modes of causes (“Now the modes”). In regard to the first part he does two things. First, he enumerates the various classes of causes. Second (777), he reduces them to four (“All the causes”). In regard to the first part he does two things. First, he enumerates the different classes of causes. Second (773), he clarifies certain things about the classes of causes (“And since”). He accordingly says, first, that in one sense the term cause means that from which a thing comes to be and is “something intrinsic,” i.e., something which exists within the thing. This is said to distinguish it from a privation and also from a contrary; for a thing is said to come from a privation or from a contrary as from something which is not intrinsic; for example, white is said to come from black or from not-white. But a statue comes from bronze and a goblet from silver as from something which is intrinsic; for the nature bronze is not destroyed when a statue comes into being, nor is the nature silver destroyed when a goblet comes into being. Therefore the bronze of a statue and the silver of a goblet are causes in the sense of matter. He adds “and the genera of these,” because if matter is the species of anything it is also its genus. For example, if the matter of a statue is bronze, its matter will also be metal, compound and body. The same holds true of other things.
lib. 5 l. 2 n. 2 Alio autem modo dicitur causa, species et exemplum, id est exemplar; et haec est causa formalis, quae comparatur dupliciter ad rem. Uno modo sicut forma intrinseca rei; et haec dicitur species. Alio modo sicut extrinseca a re, ad cuius tamen similitudinem res fieri dicitur; et secundum hoc, exemplar rei dicitur forma. Per quem modum ponebat Plato ideas esse formas. Et, quia unumquodque consequitur naturam vel generis vel speciei per formam suam, natura autem generis vel speciei est id quod significat definitio, dicens quid est res, ideo forma est ratio ipsius quod quid erat esse, idest definitio per quam scitur quid est res. Quamvis enim in definitione ponantur aliquae partes materiales, tamen id quod est principale in definitione, oportet quod sit ex parte formae. Et ideo haec est ratio quare forma est causa, quia perficit rationem quidditatis rei. Et sicut id quod est genus materiae, est etiam materia, ita etiam genera formarum sunt formae rerum; sicut forma consonantiae diapason, est proportio duorum ad unum. Quando enim duo soni se habent adinvicem in dupla proportione, tunc est inter eos consonantia diapason, unde dualitas est forma eius. Nam proportio dupla ex dualitate rationem habet. Et, quia numerus est genus dualitatis, ideo ut universaliter loquamur, etiam numerus est forma diapason, ut scilicet dicamus quod diapason est secundum proportionem numeri ad numerum. Et non solum tota definitio comparatur ad definitum ut forma, sed etiam partes definitionis, quae scilicet ponuntur in definitione in recto. Sicut enim animal gressibile bipes est forma hominis, ita animal, et gressibile, et bipes. Ponitur autem interdum materia in definitione, sed in obliquo; ut cum dicitur, quod anima est actus corporis organici physici potentia vitam habentis. 764. In another sense cause means the form and pattern of a thing, i.e., its exemplar. This is the formal cause, which is related to a thing in two ways. (1) In one way it stands as the intrinsic form of a thing, and in this respect it is called the formal principle of a thing. (2) In another way it stands as something which is extrinsic to a thing but is that in likeness to which it is made, and in this respect an exemplar is also called a thing’s form. It is in this sense that Plato held the Ideas to be forms. Moreover, because it is from its form that each thing derives its nature, whether of its genus or of its species, and the nature of its genus or of its species is what is signified by the definition, which expresses its quiddity, the form of a thing is therefore the intelligible expression of its quiddity, i.e., the formula by which its quiddity is known. For even though certain material parts are given in the definition, still it is from a thing’s form that the principal part of the definition comes. The reason why the form is a cause, then, is that it completes the intelligible expression of a thing’s quiddity. And just as the genus of a particular matter is also matter, in a similar way the genera of forms are the forms of things; for example, the form of the octave chord is the ratio of 2:1. For when two notes stand to each other in the ratio of 2:1, the interval between them is one octave. Hence twoness is its form; for the ratio of 2:1 derives its meaning from twoness. And because number is the genus of twoness, we may therefore say in a general way that number is also the form of the octave, inasmuch as we may say that the octave chord involves the ratio of one number to another. And not only is the whole definition related to the thing defined as its form, but so also are the parts of the definition, i.e., those which are given directly in the definition. For just as two-footed animal capable of walking is the form of man, so also are animal, capable of walking and two-footed. But sometimes matter is given indirectly in the definition, as when the soul is said to be the actuality of a physical organic body having life potentially.
lib. 5 l. 2 n. 3 Tertio modo dicitur causa unde primum est principium permutationis et quietis; et haec est causa movens, vel efficiens. Dicit autem, motus, aut etiam quietis, quia motus naturalis et quies naturalis in eamdem causam reducuntur, et similiter quies violenta et motus violentus. Ex eadem enim causa ex qua movetur aliquid ad locum, quiescit in loco. Sicut consiliator est causa. Nam ex consiliatore incipit motus in eo, qui secundum consilium agit ad rei conservationem. Et similiter pater est causa filii. In quibus duobus exemplis duo principia motus tetigit ex quibus omnia fiunt, scilicet propositum in consiliatore, et naturam in patre. Et universaliter omne faciens est causa facti per hunc modum, et permutans permutati. 765. In a third sense cause means that from which the first beginning of change or of rest comes, i.e., a moving or efficient cause. He says “of change or of rest,” because motion and rest which are natural are traced back to the same cause, and the same is true of motion and of rest which are a result of force. For that cause by which something is moved to a place is the same as that by which it is made to rest there. “An adviser” is an example of this kind of cause, for it is as a result of an adviser that motion begins in the one who acts upon his advice for the sake of safeguarding something. And in a similar way “a father is the cause of a child.” In these two examples Aristotle touches upon the, two principles of motion from which all things come to be, namely, purpose in the case of an adviser, and nature in the case of a father. And in general every maker is a cause of the thing made and every changer a cause of the thing changed.
lib. 5 l. 2 n. 4 Sciendum est autem quod secundum Avicennam quatuor sunt modi causae efficientis; scilicet perficiens, disponens, adiuvans, et consilians. Perficiens autem dicitur causa efficiens, quae ultimam rei perfectionem causat, sicut quod inducit formam substantialem in rebus naturalibus, vel artificialem in artificialibus, ut aedificator domus. 766. Moreover, it should be noted that according to Avicenna, there are four modes of efficient cause, namely, perfective, dispositive, auxiliary and advisory. An efficient cause is said to be perfective inasmuch as it causes the final perfection of a thing, as the one who induces a substantial form in natural things or artificial forms in things made by art, as a builder induces the form of a house.
lib. 5 l. 2 n. 5 Disponens autem quod non inducit ultimam formam perfectivam, sed tantummodo praeparat materiam ad formam; sicut ille, qui dolat ligna et lapides, dicitur domum facere. Et haec non proprie dicitur efficiens domus; quia id, quod ipse facit, non est domus nisi in potentiam. Magis tamen proprie erit efficiens, si inducat ultimam dispositionem ad quam sequitur de necessitate forma; sicut homo generat hominem non causans intellectum, qui est ab extrinseco. 767. An efficient cause is said to be dispositive if it does not induce the final form that perfects a thing but only prepares the matter for that form, as one who hews timbers and stones is said to build a house. This cause is not properly said to be the efficient cause of a house, because what he produces is only potentially a house. But he will be more properly an efficient cause if he induces the ultimate disposition on which the form necessarily follows; for example, man generates man without causing his intellect, which comes from an extrinsic cause.
lib. 5 l. 2 n. 6 Adiuvans autem dicitur causa secundum quod operatur ad principalem effectum. In hoc tamen differt ab agente principali, quia principale agens agit ad finem proprium, adiuvans autem ad finem alienum; sicut qui adiuvat regem in bello, operatur ad finem regis. Et haec est dispositio causae secundariae ad primam; nam causa secunda operatur propter finem primae causae in omnibus agentibus per se ordinatis, sicut militaris propter finem civilis. 768. And an efficient cause is said to be auxiliary insofar as it contributes to the principal effect. Yet it differs from the principal efficient cause in that the principal efficient cause acts for its own end, whereas an auxiliary cause acts for an end which is not its own. For example, one who assists a king in war acts for the king’s end. And this is the way in which a secondary cause is disposed for a primary cause. For in the case of all efficient causes which are directly subordinated to each other, a secondary cause acts because of the end of a primary cause; for example, the military art acts because of the end of the political art.
lib. 5 l. 2 n. 7 Consilians autem differt ab efficiente principali, inquantum dat finem et formam agendi. Et haec est habitudo primi agentis per intellectum ad omne agens secundum, sive sit naturale, sive intellectuale. Nam primum agens intellectuale in omnibus dat finem et formam agendi secundo agenti, sicut architector navis navim operanti, et primus intellectus toti naturae. 769. And an advisory cause differs from a principal efficient cause inasmuch as it specifies the end and form of the activity. This is the way in which the first agent acting by intellect is related to every secondary agent, whether it be natural or intellectual. For in every case a first intellectual agent gives to a secondary agent its end and its form of activity; for example, the naval architect gives these to the shipwright, and the first intelligence does the same thing for everything in the natural world.
lib. 5 l. 2 n. 8 Ad hoc autem genus causae reducitur quicquid facit aliquid quocumque modo esse, non solum secundum esse substantiale, sed secundum accidentale; quod contingit in omni motu. Et ideo non solum dicit quod faciens sit causa facti, sed etiam mutans mutati. 770. Further, to this genus of cause is reduced everything that makes anything to be in any manner whatsoever, not only as regards substantial being, but also as regards accidental being, which occurs in every kind of motion. Hence he says not only that the maker is the cause of the thing made, but also that the changer is the cause of the thing changed.
lib. 5 l. 2 n. 9 Quarto modo dicitur causa finis; hoc autem est cuius causa aliquid fit, sicut sanitas est causa ambulandi. Et quia de fine videbatur minus quod esset causa, propter hoc quod est ultimum in esse, unde etiam ab aliis prioribus philosophis haec causa est praetermissa, ut in primo libro praehabitum est, ideo specialiter probat de fine quod sit causa. Nam haec quaestio quare, vel propter quid, quaerit de causa: cum enim quaeritur quare, vel propter quid quis ambulat, convenienter respondentes dicimus, ut sanetur. Et sic respondentes opinamur reddere causam. Unde patet quod finis est causa. Non solum autem ultimum, propter quod efficiens operatur, dicitur finis respectu praecedentium; sed etiam omnia intermedia quae sunt inter primum agens et ultimum finem, dicuntur finis respectu praecedentium; et eodem modo dicuntur causa unde principium motus respectu sequentium: sicut inter medicinam, quae est primum agens in hoc ordine, et sanitatem quae est ultimus finis, sunt ista media: scilicet attenuatio, quae est propinquissima sanitati in his, qui superabundant in humoribus, et purgatio, per quam acquiritur attenuatio, et pharmacia, idest medicina laxativa, et ex qua purgatio causatur, et organa idest instrumenta quibus medicina vel pharmacia praeparatur et ministratur. Huiusmodi etiam omnia sunt propter finem; et tamen unum eorum est finis alterius. Nam attenuatio est finis purgationis, et purgatio pharmaciae. Haec autem intermedia posita differunt adinvicem in hoc, quaedam eorum sunt organa, sicut instrumenta quibus medicina praeparatur et ministratur, et ipsa medicina ministrata qua natura utitur ut instrumento; quaedam vero sunt opera, idest operationes, sive actiones, ut purgatio et attenuatio. 771. In a fourth sense cause means a thing’s end, i.e., that for the sake of which something is done, as health is the cause of walking. And since it is less evident that the end is a cause in view of the fact that it comes into being last of all (which is also the reason why this cause was overlooked by the earlier philosophers, as was pointed out in Book I (1771), he therefore gives a special proof that an end is a cause. For to ask why or for what reason is to ask about a cause, because when we are asked why or for what reason someone walks, we reply properly by answering that he does so in order to be healthy. And when we answer in this way we think that we are stating the cause. Hence it is evident that the end is a cause. Moreover, not only the ultimate reason for which an agent acts is said to be an end with respect to those things which precede it, but everything that is intermediate between the first agent and the ultimate end is also said to be an end with respect to the preceding agents. And similarly those things are said to be causes from which motion arises in subsequent things. For example, between the art of medicine, which is the first efficient cause in this order, and health, which is the ultimate end, there are these intermediates: reducing, which is the most proximate cause of health in those who have a superfluity of humors; purging, by means of which reducing is brought about; “drugs,” i.e., laxative medicine, by means of which purging is accomplished; and “instruments,” i.e., the instruments by which medicine or drugs are prepared and administered. And all such things exist for the sake of the end, although one of them is the end of another. For reducing is the end of purging, and purging is the end of purgatives. However, these intermediates differ from each other in that (1) some are instruments, i.e., the instruments by means of which medicine is prepared and administered (and the administered medicine itself is something which nature employs as an instrument); and (2) some—purging and reducing—are processes, i.e., operations or activities.
lib. 5 l. 2 n. 10 Concludit ergo quod causae toties dicuntur, idest quatuor modis. Et addit fere propter modos causarum quos infra ponet. Vel etiam ideo, quia illae eaedem species non eadem ratione in omnibus inveniuntur. 772. He concludes, then, that “these are the ways in which causes are spoken of (405),” i.e., the four ways; and he adds “nearly all” because of the modes of causes which he gives below. Or he also adds this because the same classes of causes are not found for the same reason in all things.
lib. 5 l. 2 n. 11 Deinde cum dicit accidit autem ponit quaedam, quae consequuntur circa causas ex praedictis; et sunt tria: quorum primum est, quod quia causa multis modis dicitur, contingit multas causas esse unius rei non secundum accidens, sed secundum se. Quod enim secundum accidens multae sint causae unius rei, hoc difficile non videbatur; quia rei, quae est causa per se alicuius effectus, multa possunt accidere, qua omnia illius effectus possunt etiam causa per accidens dici: sed, quod causae per se sint multae unius, hoc fit manifestum ex hoc, quod causae multipliciter dicuntur. Statuae enim causa per se et non per accidens est factor statuae, et aes; sed non eodem modo. Hoc enim est impossibile quod eiusdem secundum idem genus, sint multae causae per se eodem ordine; licet possint esse plures causae hoc modo, quod una sit proxima, alia remota: vel ita, quod neutrum sit causa sufficiens, sed utrumque coniunctim; sicut patet in multis, qui trahunt navem. Sed in proposito diversis modis ista duo sunt causa statuae: aes quidem ut materia, artifex vero ut efficiens. 773. And since (406). Then he indicates certain points which follow from the things said above about the causes, and there are four of these. The first is that, since the term cause is used in many senses, there may be several causes of one thing not accidentally but properly. For the fact that there are many causes of one thing accidentally presents no difficulty, because many things may be accidents of something that is the proper cause of some effect, and all of these can be said to be accidental causes of that effect. But that there are several proper causes of one thing becomes evident from the fact that causes are spoken of in various ways. For the maker of a statue is a proper cause and not an accidental cause of a statue, and so also is the bronze, but not in the same way. For it is impossible that there should be many proper causes of the same thing within the same genus and in the same order, although there can be many causes providing that (1) one is proximate and another remote; or (2) that neither of them is of itself a sufficient cause, but both together. An example would be many men rowing a boat. Now in the case in point these two things are causes of a statue in different ways: the bronze as matter, and the artist as efficient cause.
lib. 5 l. 2 n. 12 Secundum ponit ibi, et adinvicem dicit, quod etiam contingit, quod aliqua duo adinvicem sibi sunt causae: quod impossibile est in eodem genere causae. Manifestum vero fit multipliciter dictis causis. Sicut dolor ex incisione vulneris est causa sanitatis, ut efficiens sive principium motus: sanitas autem est causa illius doloris, ut finis. Secundum enim idem genus causae aliquid esse causam et causatum est impossibile. Alia litera habet melius laborare causa est euexiae, idest bonae dispositionis, quae causatur ex labore moderato, qui ad digestionem confert et superfluos humores consumit. 774. And there are (407). Then he sets down the second fact that may be drawn from the foregoing discussion. He says that it may also happen that any two things may be the cause of each other, although this is impossible in the same class of cause. But it is evident that this may happen when causes are spoken of in different senses. For example, the pain resulting from a wound is a cause of health as an efficient cause or source of motion, whereas health is the cause of pain as an end. For it is impossible, that a thing should be both a cause and something caused. Another text states this better, saying that “exercise is the cause of physical fitness,” i.e., of the good disposition caused by moderate exercise, which promotes digestion and uses up superfluous humors.
lib. 5 l. 2 n. 13 Sciendum est autem, quod cum sint quatuor causae superius positae, earum duae sibiinvicem correspondent, et aliae duae similiter. Nam efficiens et finis sibi correspondent invicem, quia efficiens est principium motus, finis autem terminus. Et similiter materia et forma: nam forma dat esse, materia autem recipit. Est igitur efficiens causa finis, finis autem causa efficientis. Efficiens est causa finis quantum ad esse quidem, quia movendo perducit efficiens ad hoc, quod sit finis. Finis autem est causa efficientis non quantum ad esse, sed quantum ad rationem causalitatis. Nam efficiens est causa inquantum agit: non autem agit nisi causa finis. Unde ex fine habet suam causalitatem efficiens. Forma autem et materia sibiinvicem sunt causa quantum ad esse. Forma quidem materiae inquantum dat ei esse actu; materia vero formae inquantum sustentat ipsam. Dico autem utrumque horum sibi invicem esse causam essendi vel simpliciter vel secundum quid. Nam forma substantialis dat esse materiae simpliciter. Forma autem accidentalis secundum quid, prout etiam forma est. Materia etiam quandoque non sustentat formam secundum esse simpliciter, sed secundum quod est forma huius, habens esse in hoc, sicut se habet corpus humanum ad animam rationalem. 775. Now it must be borne in mind that, although four causes are given above, two of these are related to one another, and so also are the other two. (1) The efficient cause is related to the final cause, and (2) the material cause is related to the formal cause. The efficient cause is related to the final cause because the efficient cause is the starting point of motion and the final cause is its terminus. There is a similar relationship between matter and form. For form gives being, and matter receives it. Hence the efficient cause is the cause of the final cause, and the final cause is the cause of the efficient cause. The efficient cause is the cause of the final cause inasmuch as it makes the final cause be, because by causing motion the efficient cause brings about the final cause. But the final cause is the cause of the efficient cause, not in the sense that it makes it be, but inasmuch as it is the reason for the causality of the efficient cause. For an efficient cause is a cause inasmuch as it acts, and it acts only because of the final cause. Hence the efficient cause derives its causality from the final cause. And form and matter are mutual causes of being: form is a cause of matter inasmuch as it gives actual being to matter, and matter is a cause of form inasmuch as it supports form in being. And I say that both of these together are causes of being either in an unqualified sense or with some qualification. For substantial form gives being absolutely to matter, whereas accidental form, inasmuch as it is a form, gives being in a qualified sense. And matter sometimes does not support a form in being in an unqualified sense but according as it is the form of this particular thing and has being in this particular thing. This is what happens in the case of the human body in relation to the rational soul.
lib. 5 l. 2 n. 14 Tertium ponit ibi, amplius autem dicit, quod idem contrariorum contingit esse causam. Quod etiam difficile videbatur vel impossibile, si similiter ad utrumque referatur; sed dissimiliter est causa utriusque. Illud enim, quod per sui praesentiam est causa huius, quando est absens causamur idest accusamus ipsum de contrario, idest dicimus ipsum esse causam contrarii. Sicut patet, quod gubernator per sui praesentiam est causa salutis navis, dicimus eius absentiam esse causam perditionis. Ne autem putetur quod hoc sit referendum ad diversa genera causarum sicut et priora duo, ideo subiungit quod utrumque istorum reducitur ad idem genus causae, scilicet ad causam moventem. Eodem enim modo oppositum est causa oppositi, quo haec est causa huius. 776. Further, the same thing (408). Then he gives the third conclusion that may be drawn from the foregoing discussion. He says that the same thing can be the cause of contraries. This would also seem to be difficult or impossible if it were related to both in the same way. But it is the cause of each in a different way. For that which when present is the cause of some particular thing, this when absent “we blame,” i.e., we hold it responsible, “for the contrary.” For example, it is evident that by his presence the pilot is the cause of a ship’s safety, and we say that his absence is the cause of the ship’s loss. And lest someone might think that this is to be attributed to different classes of causes, just as the preceding two were, he therefore adds that both of these may be reduced to the same class of cause—the moving cause. For the opposite of a cause is the cause of an opposite effect in the same line of causality as that in which the original cause was the cause of its effect.

Lecture 3

Latin English
lib. 5 l. 3 n. 1 Hic philosophus reducit omnes causas in quatuor modos causarum praedictos; dicens, quod omnia quae dicuntur causae, incidunt in praedictos quatuor modos. Dicuntur enim elementa, idest literae, causae syllabarum, et materia artificialium dicitur esse causa factorum per artem, et ignis et terra et huiusmodi omnia simplicia corpora, dicuntur esse causae corporum mixtorum. Et partes dicuntur esse causa totius. Et suppositiones, idest propositiones praemissae, ex quibus propositis syllogizatur, dicuntur esse causa conclusionis. Et in omnibus istis est una ratio causae, secundum quod dicitur causa illud ex quo fit aliquid, quod est ratio causae materialis. 777. Here the philosopher reduces all causes to the classes of causes mentioned above (409), saying that all those things which are called causes fall into one of the four classes mentioned above. For “elements,” i.e., letters, are said to be the causes of syllables; and the matter of artificial things is said to be their cause; and fire and earth and all simple bodies of this kind are said to be the causes of compounds. And parts are said to be the causes of a whole, and “premises,” i.e., propositions previously set down from which conclusions are drawn, are said to be the causes of the conclusion. And in all of these cases cause has a single formal aspect according as cause means that from which a thing is produced, and this is the formal aspect of material cause.
lib. 5 l. 3 n. 2 Sciendum est autem, quod propositiones dicuntur esse materia conclusionis, non quidem secundum quod sub tali forma existunt, vel secundum virtutem earum; (sic enim magis se habent in ratione causae efficientis); sed quantum ad terminos, ex quibus componuntur. Nam ex terminis praemissarum componitur conclusio, scilicet ex maiori et ex minori extremitate. 778. Now it must be noted that propositions are said to constitute the matter of a conclusion, not inasmuch as they exist under such a form, or according to their force (for in this way they would rather have the formal aspect of an efficient cause), but with reference to the terms of which they are composed. For a conclusion is constituted of the terms contained in the premises, i.e., of the major and minor terms.
lib. 5 l. 3 n. 3 Inter ea autem ex quibus res integratur, aliquid se habet per modum subiecti, sicut partes et alia quae praedicta sunt; alia vero se habent ut quod quid erat esse, scilicet totum, et compositio, et species, quae pertinent ad rationem formae, secundum quam quidditas rei completur. Sciendum est enim, quod quandoque una res simpliciter est alicuius materia, sicut argentum phialae; et tunc forma correspondens tali materiae potest dici species. Quandoque autem plures adinvicem adunatae sunt materia alicuius rei. Quod quidem contingit tripliciter. Quandoque enim adunantur secundum ordinem tantum, sicut homines in exercitu, vel domus in civitate; et sic pro forma respondet totum, quod designatur nomine exercitus vel civitatis. Quandoque autem non solum adunantur ordine, sed contactu et colligatione, sicut apparet in partibus domus; et tunc respondet pro forma compositio. Quandoque autem super hoc additur alteratio componentium, quod contingit in mixtione; et tunc forma est ipsa mixtio, quae tamen est quaedam compositionis species. Ex quolibet autem trium horum sumitur quod quid est rei, scilicet ex compositione et specie et toto: sicut patet si definiretur exercitus, domus et phiala. Sic ergo habemus duos modos causae. 779. And of those things of which something is composed, some are like a subject, for example, parts and the other things mentioned above, whereas some are like the essence, for example, the whole, the composition and the species, which have the character of a form whereby a thing’s essence is made complete. For it must be borne in mind that (1) sometimes one thing is the matter of something else in an unqualified sense (for example, silver of a goblet), and then the form corresponding to such a matter can be called the species. (2) But sometimes many things taken together constitute the matter of a thing; and this may occur in three ways. (a) For sometimes things are united merely by their arrangement, as the men in an army or the houses in a city; and then the whole has the role of a form which is designated by the term army or city. (b) And sometimes things are united not just by arrangement alone but by contact and a bond, as is evident in the parts of a house; and then their composition has the role of a form. (c) And sometimes the alteration of the component parts is added to the above, as occurs in the case of a compound; and then the compound state itself is the form, and this is still a kind of composition. And a thing’s essence is derived from any one of these three—the composition’ species, or whole—as becomes clear when an army, a house, or a goblet is defined. Thus we have two classes of cause.
lib. 5 l. 3 n. 4 Secundum autem aliam rationem dicitur causa sperma et medicus et consiliator, et universaliter omne faciens, ex eo scilicet quod sunt principia motus et quietis. Unde iam hoc est aliud genus causae, propter aliam rationem causandi. Ponit autem sperma in hoc genere causae, quia secundum eius sententiam sperma vim habet activam, menstruum autem mulieris cedit in materiam concepti. 780. But the seed, the physician and the adviser, and in general every agent, are called causes for a different reason, namely, because they are the sources of motion and rest. Hence this is now a different class of cause because of a different formal aspect of causality. He puts seed in this class of cause because he is of the opinion that the seed has active power, whereas a woman’s menstrual fluid has the role of the matter of the offspring.
lib. 5 l. 3 n. 5 Quarta vero ratio causandi est secundum quod aliqua dicuntur causae per modum finis et boni respectu aliorum. Illud enim cuius causa fit aliquid, est optimum inter alia et vult esse idest habet aptitudinem ut sit aliorum finis. Quia vero posset aliquis obiicere quod non semper bonum est finis, cum quandoque aliqui inordinate agentes malum finem sibi constituant, ideo respondet, quod nihil ad propositum differt dicere quod simpliciter sit bonum vel apparens bonum. Qui enim agit, agit per se loquendo propter bonum; hoc enim intendit; per accidens autem propter malum, inquantum accidit ei quod existimat bonum esse. Nullus enim agit propter aliquid intendens malum. 781. There is a fourth formal aspect of causality inasmuch as some things are said to be causes in the sense of the end and good of other things. For that for the sake of which something else comes to be is the greatest good “and the end” of other things, i.e., it is naturally disposed to be their end. But because someone could raise the objection that an end is not always a good since certain agents sometimes inordinately set up an evil as their end, he therefore replies that it makes no difference to his thesis whether we speak of what is good without qualification or of an apparent good. For one who acts does so, properly speaking, because of a good, for this is what he has in mind. And one acts for the sake of an evil accidentally inasmuch as he happens to think that it is good. For no one acts for the sake of something with evil in view.
lib. 5 l. 3 n. 6 Sciendum autem est, quod licet finis sit ultimus in esse in quibusdam, in causalitate tamen est prior semper. Unde dicitur causa causarum, quia est causa causalitatis in omnibus causis. Est enim causa causalitatis efficientis, ut iam dictum est. Efficiens autem est causa causalitatis et materiae et formae. Nam facit per suum motum materiam esse susceptivam formae, et formam inesse materiae. Et per consequens etiam finis est causa causalitatis et materiae et formae; et ideo potissimae demonstrationes sumuntur a fine, in illis in quibus agitur aliquid propter finem, sicut in naturalibus, in moralibus et artificialibus. Concludit igitur, quod praedicta sunt causae, et quod causae secundum tot species distinguuntur. 782. Moreover, it must be noted that, even though the end is the last thing to come into being in some cases, it is always prior in causality. Hence it is called the “cause of causes”, because it is the cause of the causality of all causes. For it is the cause of efficient causality, as has already been pointed out (775); and the efficient cause is the cause of the causality of both the matter and the form, because by its motion it causes matter to be receptive of form and makes form exist in matter. Therefore the final cause is also the cause of the causality of both the matter and the form. Hence in those cases in which something is done for an end (as occurs in the realm of natural things, in that of moral matters, and in that of art), the most forceful demonstrations are derived from the final cause. Therefore he concludes that the foregoing are causes, and that causes are distinguished into this number of classes.
lib. 5 l. 3 n. 7 Deinde cum dicit modi vero distinguit modos causarum. Est autem distinctio causae per species et per modos. Nam distinctio per species est penes diversas rationes causandi; et ideo est quasi divisio per differentias essentiales species constituentes. Divisio autem per modos est penes diversas habitudines causae ad causatum. Et ideo est in his quae habent eamdem rationem causandi, sicut per se et per accidens, remotum et propinquum. Unde est quasi per differentias accidentales non diversificantes speciem. 783. Now the modes (410). Then he distinguishes between the modes of causes. And causes are distinguished into classes and into modes. For the division of causes into classes is based on different formal aspects of causality, and is therefore equivalently a division based on essential differences, which constitute species. But the division of causes into modes is based on the different relationships between causes and things caused, and therefore pertains to those causes which have the same formal aspect of causality. An example of this is the division of causes into proper and accidental causes, and into remote and proximate causes. Therefore this division is equivalently a division based on accidental differences, which do not constitute different species.
lib. 5 l. 3 n. 8 Dicit ergo, quod multi sunt modi causarum, sed pauciores inveniuntur quando capitulatim, idest quodam compendio comprehenduntur. Per se enim et per accidens sunt duo modi; tamen reducuntur ad unum capitulum, secundum quod est eadem consideratio de utroque. Et similiter est de aliis modis oppositis. Causae enim multis modis dicuntur, non solum quantum ad diversas species causae, sed etiam quantum ad causas conspeciales, quae scilicet reducuntur ad unam speciem causae. 784. He accordingly says that there are many modes of causes, but that these are found to be fewer in number when “summarized,” i.e., when brought together under one head. For even though proper causes and accidental causes are two modes, they are still reduced to one head insofar as both may be considered from the same point of view. The same thing is true of the other different modes. For many different modes of causes are spoken of, not only with reference to the different species of causes, but also with reference to causes of the same species, namely, those which are reduced to one class of cause.
lib. 5 l. 3 n. 9 Dicitur enim una prior, et altera posterior. Prius autem et posterius in causis invenitur dupliciter. Uno modo in causis diversis numero adinvicem ordinatis, quarum una est prima et remota, et alia secunda et propinqua; sicut in causis efficientibus homo generat hominem ut causa propinqua et posterior, sol autem ut causa prior et remota: et similiter potest considerari in aliis speciebus causarum. Alio modo in una et eadem causa numero secundum ordinem rationis qui est inter universale et particulare. Nam universale naturaliter est prius, particulare posterius. 785. (1) For one cause is said to be prior and another subsequent; and causes are prior or subsequent in two ways: (1) In one way, when there are many distinct causes which are related to each other, one of which is primary and remote, and another secondary and proximate (as in the case of efficient causes man generates man as a proximate and subsequent cause, but the sun as a prior and remote cause); and the same thing can be considered in the case of the other classes of causes. (2) In another way, when the cause is numerically one and the same, but is considered according to the sequence which reason sets up between the universal and the particular; for the universal is naturally prior and the particular subsequent.
lib. 5 l. 3 n. 10 Praetermittit autem primum modum, et accipit secundum. In secundo enim modo immediate effectus ab utraque causa existit, scilicet priori et posteriori, quod in primo non convenit. Unde dicit, quod sanitatis causa est medicus et artifex in genere causae efficientis. Artifex quidem ut universale, et prius; medicus vero ut particulare, sive speciale, et posterius. Similiter etiam in causis formalibus dupliciter est causa formalis: ut diapason duplum, vel proportio dupla, vel dualitas est causa formalis, ut speciale et posterius; numerum autem, vel proportio numeri ad numerum vel ad unum, ut universale et prius. Et ita semper ea quae continent singularia, scilicet universalia, dicuntur causae priores. 786. But he omits the first way and considers the second. For in the second way the effect is the immediate result of both causes, i.e., of both the prior and subsequent cause; but this cannot happen in the first way. Hence he says that the cause of health is both the physician and one possessing an art, who belong to the class of efficient cause: one possessing an art as a universal and prior cause, and the physician as a particular, or special, and subsequent cause. The same thing is true of the formal cause, since this cause may also be considered in two ways; for example, for an octave chord “double,” or the ratio of 2:1, or the number two, is a formal cause as one that is special and subsequent, whereas number, or the ratio of one number to another or to the unit, is like a universal and prior cause. And in this way too “always those classes which contain singulars,” i.e., universals, are said to be prior causes.
lib. 5 l. 3 n. 11 Alia divisio est causarum, secundum quod aliquid dicitur esse causa per se et per accidens. Sicut enim causa per se dividitur in universale et particulare, sive in prius et posterius, ita etiam causa per accidens. Unde non solum ipsae causae accidentales dicuntur causae per accidens, sed etiam ipsarum genera. Ut statuae factor, statuae causa est per se; Polycletus autem per accidens est causa, inquantum accidit ei factorem statuae esse. Et sicut Polycletus est causa statuae per accidens, ita omnia universalia continentia accidens, idest causam per accidens, dicuntur per accidens causae; sicut homo et animal, quae sub se continent Polycletum, qui est homo et animal. 787. (2) Causes are distinguished in another way inasmuch as one thing is said to be a proper cause and another an accidental cause. For just as proper causes are divided into universal and particular, or into prior and subsequent, so also are accidental causes. Therefore, not only accidental causes themselves are called such, but so also are the classes which contain these. For example, a sculptor is the proper cause of a statue, and Polyclitus is an accidental cause inasmuch as he happens to be a sculptor. And just as Polyclitus is an accidental cause of a statue, in a similar way all universals “which contain accidents,” i.e., accidental causes, are said to be accidental causes, for example, man and animal, which contain under themselves Polyclitus, who is a man and an animal.
lib. 5 l. 3 n. 12 Et sicut causarum per se quaedam sunt propinquae, quaedam remotae, ut dictum est, ita et inter causas per accidens. Nam Polycletus est causa statuae magis propinqua quam album et musicum. Magis enim remotus modus praedicationis per accidens est, cum accidens praedicatur de accidente, quam cum accidens praedicatur de subiecto. Accidens enim non praedicatur de accidente, nisi quia ambo praedicantur de subiecto. Unde magis remotum est ut attribuatur uni accidenti quod est alterius, sicut musico quod est aedificatoris, quam quod attribuatur subiecto quod est accidentis, sicut Polycleto quod est aedificatoris. 788. And just as some proper causes are proximate and some remote, as was pointed out above, so also is this the case with accidental causes. For Polyclitus is a more proximate cause of a statue than what is white or what is musical. For an accidental mode of predication is more remote when an accident is predicated of an accident than when an accident is predicated of a subject. For one accident is predicated of another only because both are predicated of a subject. Hence when something pertaining to one accident is predicated of another, as when something pertaining to a builder is predicated of a musician, this mode of predication is more remote than one in which something is predicated of the subject of an accident, as when something pertaining to a builder is predicated of Polyclitus.
lib. 5 l. 3 n. 13 Sciendum autem est, quod aliquid potest dici causa per accidens alterius dupliciter. Uno modo ex parte causae; quia scilicet illud quod accidit causae, dicitur causa per accidens, sicut si album dicatur causa domus. Alio modo ex parte effectus; ut scilicet aliquid dicatur causa per accidens alicuius, quod accidit ei quod est effectus per se. Quod quidem potest esse tripliciter. Uno modo, quia habet ordinem necessarium ad effectum, sicut remotio impedimenti habet ordinem necessarium ad effectum. Unde removens prohibens dicitur movens per accidens; sive illud accidens sit contrarium, sicut cholera prohibet frigiditatem, unde scamonaea dicitur infrigidare per accidens, non quia causet frigiditatem sed quia tollit impedimentum frigiditatis, quod est ei contrarium, scilicet choleram: sive etiam si non sit contrarium, sicut columna impedit motum lapidis, unde removens columnam dicitur per accidens movere lapidem superpositum alio modo, quando accidens habet ordinem ad effectum, non tamen necessarium, nec ut in pluribus, sed ut in paucioribus, sicut inventio thesauri ad fossionem in terra. Et hoc modo fortuna et casus dicuntur causae per accidens. Tertio, quando nullum ordinem habent, nisi forte secundum existimationem; sicut si aliquis dicat se esse causam terraemotus, quia eo intrante domum accidit terraemotus. 789. Now it must be borne in mind that one thing can be said to be the accidental cause of something else in two ways: (1) in one way, from the viewpoint of the cause; because whatever is accidental to a cause is itself called an accidental cause, for example, when we say that something white is the cause of a house. (2) In another way, from the viewpoint of the effect, i.e., inasmuch as one thing is said to be an accidental cause of something else because it is accidental to the proper effect. This can happen in three ways: The first is that the thing has a necessary connection with the effect. Thus that which removes an obstacle is said to be a mover accidentally. This is the case whether that accident is a contrary, as when bile prevents coolness (and thus scammony is said to produce coolness accidentally, not because it causes coolness, but because it removes the obstacle preventing coolness, i.e., bile, which is its contrary); or even if it is not a contrary, as when a pillar hinders the movement of a stone which rests upon it, so that one who removes the pillar is said to move the stone accidentally. In a second way, something is accidental to the proper effect when the accident is connected with the effect neither necessarily nor in the majority of cases but seldom, as the discovery of a treasure is connected with digging in the soil. It is in this way that fortune and chance are said to be accidental causes. In a third way things are accidental to the effect when they have no connection except perhaps in the mind, as when someone says that he is the cause of an earthquake because an earthquake took place when he entered the house.
lib. 5 l. 3 n. 14 Tertia distinctio est, secundum quod prae omnibus his vel praeter omnia haec, quae dicuntur esse secundum se sive per se, et secundum accidens, quaedam sunt causae in potentia, quaedam ut agentia, idest in actu. Sicut aedificationis causa est aedificator in potentia. Hoc enim sonat habitum vel officium. Vel aedificans actu. 790. [Cross-division of all] And besides the distinction of all things into causes in themselves or proper causes and accidental causes, there is a third division of causes inasmuch as some things are causes potentially and some actually, i.e., actively. For example, the cause of building is a builder in a state of potency (for this designates his habit or office), or one who is actually building.
lib. 5 l. 3 n. 15 Et eisdem modis, quibus dividuntur causae, possunt dividi causata in quibus vel quorum causae sunt causae. Potest enim dividi causatum per prius et posterius sive particulare et universale; sicut si dicamus, quod statuae factor est causa huius statuae, quod est posterius, aut statuae, quod est universalius et prius, aut imaginis, quod est adhuc universalius. Et similiter aliquid est causa formalis huius aeris, aut aeris, quod est universalius, aut materiae, quod est adhuc universalius. Et similiter potest dici in accidentalibus, scilicet in effectibus per accidens. Nam statuae factor qui est causa statuae, est etiam causa gravis vel albi vel rubei quae accidunt ex parte materiae, et non sunt ab hoc agente causata. 791. And the same distinctions which apply to causes can apply to the effects of which these causes are the causes. For effects, whether particular or universal, can be divided into prior and subsequent, as a sculptor may be called the cause of this statue, which is subsequent; or of a statue, which is more universal and prior; or of an image, which is still more universal. And similarly something is the formal cause of this particular bronze; or of bronze, which is more universal; or of matter, which is still more universal. The same things can be said of accidental effects, i.e., of things produced by accident. For a sculptor who is the cause of a statue is also the cause of the heaviness, whiteness or redness which are in it as accidents from the matter and are not caused by this agent.
lib. 5 l. 3 n. 16 Ulterius ponit quartam distinctionem causae, quae est in simplex et in compositum; ut simplex causa dicatur secundum quod accipitur causa statuae per se totum ut statuae factor, sive per accidens tantum, scilicet Polycletus. Composita autem secundum quod utrumque simul accipitur, ut dicatur causa statuae Polycletus statuae factor. 792. (3) Again, he gives a fourth division of causes, namely, the division into simple causes and composite causes. A cause is said to be simple (a) when, for example, in the case of a statue, the proper cause alone is considered, as a sculptor, or when an accidental cause alone is considered, as Polyclitus. But a cause is said to be composite when both are taken together, for example, when we say that the cause of a statue is the sculptor Polyclitus.
lib. 5 l. 3 n. 17 Est autem alius modus quo causae possunt dici compositae, secundum quod plures causae concurrunt ad unius rei constitutionem; sicut plures homines ad trahendum navem, vel plures lapides, ut sint materia domus. Sed hoc praetermisit, quia nullum illorum est causa, sed pars causae. 793. (b) There is moreover another way in which causes are said to be composite, i.e., when several causes act together to produce one effect, for example, when many men act together in order to row a boat, or when many stones combine in order to constitute the matter of a house. But he omits the latter way because no one of these things taken in itself is the cause, but a part of the cause.
lib. 5 l. 3 n. 18 His autem modis positis, colligit istorum modorum numerum, dicens, quod isti modi causarum sunt sex et variantur dupliciter, et ita efficiuntur duodecim. Hi enim modi sex sunt aut singulare, aut genus, quod superius dixit prius et posterius. Et secundum se et per accidens, ad quod etiam reducitur genus accidentis, nam genus accidentis est causa per accidens. Et iterum per complexum et simplex. Hi autem sex modi ulterius dividuntur per potentiam et per actum, et sunt duodecim. Ideo autem oportet omnes istos modos per potentiam et actum dividi, quia potentia et actus diversificant habitudinem causae ad effectum. Nam causae in actu particulares sunt simul et tolluntur cum suis effectibus, sicut hic medicans cum hoc convalescente, et hic aedificans cum hoc aedificato: non enim potest aliquid actu aedificari, nisi sit actu aedificans. Sed causae secundum potentiam non semper removentur cum effectibus; sicut domus et aedificator non simul corrumpuntur. In quibusdam tamen contingit, quod remota actione efficientis tollitur substantia effectus, sicut in his quorum esse est in fieri, vel quorum causa non solum est effectui causa fiendi sed essendi. Unde remota illuminatione solis ab aere, tollitur lumen. Dicit autem causas singulares, quia actus singularium sunt, ut in primo huius habitum est. 794. And having given these different modes of causes, he brings out their number, saying that these modes of causes are six in number, and that each of these have two alternatives so that twelve result. For these six modes are (1-2) either singular or generic (or, as he called them above, prior and subsequent); (3-4) either proper or accidental (to which the genus of the accident is also reduced, for the genus to which an accident belongs is an accidental cause); and again, (5-6) either composite or simple. Now these six modes are further divided by potency and actuality and thus are twelve in number. Now the reason why all these modes must be divided by potency and actuality is that potency and actuality distinguish the connection between cause and effect. For active causes are at one and the same time particulars and cease to exist along with their effects; for example, this act of healing ceases with this act of recovering health, and this act of building with this thing being built; for a thing cannot be actually being built unless something is actually building. But potential causes do not always cease to exist when their effects cease; for example, a house and a builder do not cease to exist at one and the same time. In some cases, however, it does happen that when the activity of the efficient cause ceases the substance of the effect ceases. This occurs in the case of those things whose being consists in coming to be, or whose cause is not only the cause of their coming to be but also of their being. For example, when the sun’s illumination is removed from the atmosphere, light ceases to be. He says “singular causes” because acts belong to singular things, as was stated in Book I of this work (21).

Lecture 4

Latin English
lib. 5 l. 4 n. 1 Hic distinguit hoc nomen elementum. Circa quod duo facit. Primo assignat diversos modos elementi. Secundo ostendit quid in omnibus sit commune, ibi, omnium autem commune. Circa primum duo facit. Primo ostendit quomodo elementum proprie dicatur. Secundo quomodo dicatur transumptive, ibi, et transferentes elementum et cetera. Ponit ergo primo, quamdam elementi descriptionem; ex qua colligi potest, quod quatuor sunt de ratione elementi. Quorum primum est, ut sit causa sicut ex quo: per quod patet, quod elementum ponitur in genere causae materialis. 795. Here he distinguishes the different senses of the term element, and in regard to this lie does two things. First, he gives the different senses in which the term element is used. Second (807), he indicates what all of them have in common (“And in all these”). In regard to the first he does two things. First, he explains how the term element is used in its proper sense; and second (802), how it is used in transferred senses (“People also use”). First, he gives a sort of description of an element, and from this one can gather the four notes contained in its definition. The first is that an element is a cause in the sense of that from which a thing comes to be; and from this it is clear that an element is placed in the class of material cause.
lib. 5 l. 4 n. 2 Secundum est, quod sit principium ex quo aliquid fiat primo. Cuprum enim est ex quo fit statua; non tamen est elementum, quia habet aliquam aliam materiam ex qua fit. 796. The second is that an element is the principle from which something first comes to be. For copper is that from which a statue comes to be, but it is still not an element because it has some matter from which it comes to be.
lib. 5 l. 4 n. 3 Tertium est, quod sit inexistens sive intrinsecum: per quod differt elementum ab omni eo ex quo fit aliquid sicut ex transeunte, sive sit privatio, aut contrarium, sive materia contrarietati et privationi subiecta, quae est materia transiens. Ut cum dicimus, quod homo musicus fit ex homine non musico, vel musicum ex non musico. Elementa enim oportet manere in his quorum sunt elementa. 797. The third is that an element is inherent or intrinsic; and for this reason. it differs from everything of a transitory nature from which a thing comes to be, whether it be a privation or a contrary or the matter subject to contrariety and privation, which is transitory; for example, when we say that a musical man comes from a nonmusical man, or that the musical comes from the non-musical. For elements must remain in the things of which they are the elements.
lib. 5 l. 4 n. 4 Quartum est, quod habeat aliquam speciem, quae non dividatur in diversas species: per quod differt elementum a materia prima, qua nullam speciem habet, et etiam ab omnibus materiis, quae in diversas species resolvi possunt, sicut sanguis et huiusmodi. Propter hoc dicit, quod elementum est ex quo aliquid componitur, quantum ad primum. Primo, quantum ad secundum. Inexistente, quantum ad tertium. Indivisibili specie in aliam speciem, quantum ad quartum. 798. The fourth is that an element has a species which is not divisible into different species; and thus an element differs from first matter, which has no species, and also from every sort of matter which is capable of being divided into different species, as blood and things of this kind. Hence he says, as the first note, that an element is that of which a thing is composed; as the second, that it is that of which a thing is “first” composed; as the third, that it is “an inherent principle”; and as the fourth, that it is “not divisible into another species.”
lib. 5 l. 4 n. 5 Hanc autem definitionem manifestat in quatuor, in quibus utimur nomine elementi. Dicimus enim ipsas literas esse elementa vocis, quia ex eis omnis vox componitur, et primo. Quod ex hoc patet, quia omnes voces in literas resolvuntur, sicut in ultima. Quod est enim ultimum in resolutione, oportet esse primum in compositione. Literae autem non resolvuntur ulterius in alias voces specie diversas. Sed, si aliquo modo dividantur, particulae in quas fit divisio, erunt conformes, idest unius speciei, sicut omnes particulae aquae sunt aqua. Dividitur autem litera secundum tempora prolationis, prout litera longa dicitur habere duo tempora, brevis vero unum. Nec tamen partes, in quas sic dividuntur literae, sunt diversae secundum speciem vocis. Non est autem ita de syllaba: nam eius partes sunt diversae secundum speciem: alius enim sonus est secundum speciem, quem facit vocalis et consonans, ex quibus syllaba componitur. 799. He illustrates this definition of element in four cases in which we use the term element. For we say that letters are the elements of a word because every word is composed of them, and of them primarily. This is evident from the fact that all words are divided into letters as ultimate things; for what is last in the process of dissolution must be first in the process of composition. But letters are not further divided into other words which are specifically different. Yet if they should be divided in any way, the parts in which the division results would be “alike,” i.e., specifically the same, just as all parts of water are water. Now letters are divided according to the amount of time required to pronounce them, inasmuch as a long letter is said to require two periods of time, and a short letter one. But while the parts into which letters are so divided do not differ as the species of words do, this is not the case with a syllable; for its parts are specifically different, since the sounds which a vowel and a consonant make, of which a syllable is composed, are specifically different.
lib. 5 l. 4 n. 6 Secundum exemplum ponit in corporibus naturalibus, in quibus etiam quaedam dicimus elementa quorumdam. Illa enim dicuntur corporum esse elementa, in quae ultimo resolvuntur omnia corpora mixta: et per consequens ea sunt, ex quibus primo componuntur huiusmodi corpora. Ipsa autem corpora, quae elementa dicuntur, non dividuntur in alia corpora specie differentia, sed in partes consimiles, sicut quaelibet pars aquae est aqua. Et quicumque posuerunt tale corpus esse unum, scilicet in quod omnia resolvuntur, et ipsum non resolvitur in alia, dixerunt unum esse elementum. Quidam vero aquam, quidam autem aerem, quidam autem ignem. Qui vero posuerunt plura talia corpora, dixerunt etiam esse elementa plura. Sciendum est, quod cum in definitione elementi ponatur, quod non dividitur in diversa secundum speciem, non est intelligendum de partibus in quas aliquid dividitur divisione quantitatis: sic enim lignum esset elementum, quia quaelibet pars ligni est lignum: sed de divisione, quae fit secundum alterationem, sicut corpora mixta resolvuntur in simplicia. 800. He gives as a second example natural bodies, certain of which we also call the elements of certain others. For those things into which all compounds are ultimately dissolved are called their elements; and therefore they are the things of which bodies of this kind are composed. But those bodies which are called elements are not divisible into other bodies which are specifically different, but into like parts, as any part of water is water. And all those who held for one such body into which every body is dissolved and which is itself incapable of being further divided , said that there is one element. Some said that it is water, some air, and some fire. But those who posited many such bodies also said there are many elements. Now it should be borne in mind that when it is set down in the definition of an element that an element is not divisible into different species, this should not be understood of the parts into which a thing is divided in a quantitative division (for wood would then be an element, since any part of wood is wood), but in a division made by alteration, as compounds are dissolved into simple bodies.
lib. 5 l. 4 n. 7 Tertium exemplum ponit in demonstrationibus; in quibus etiam utimur nomine elementi, sicut dicitur liber elementorum Euclidis. Et dicit, quod modo simili et propinquo dictis dicuntur elementa, quae sunt diagrammatum, idest descriptionum geometralium elementa. Et non solum hoc potest dici in geometria, sed universaliter in omnibus demonstrationibus. Illae enim demonstrationes, quae existunt in tribus terminis tantum, dicuntur esse aliorum elementa. Nam ex his componuntur aliae demonstrationes, et in ea resolvuntur. Quod sic patet. Secunda enim demonstratio accipit pro principio conclusionem primae demonstrationis, inter cuius terminos intelligitur medium, quod fuit primae demonstrationis principium. Et sic secunda demonstratio erit ex quatuor terminis; prima ex tribus tantum, tertia vero ex quinque, quarta ex sex, et sic quaelibet demonstratio unum terminum addit. In quo manifestum est demonstrationes primas in postremis includi: ut si sit haec demonstratio prima: omne b est a: omne c est b: ergo omne c est a: hoc includetur in hac, omne c est a: omne d est c: ergo omne d est a. Et ulterius ista in alia, quae concludit, omne e est a: ut quasi videatur esse ad hanc ultimam conclusionem unus syllogismus ex pluribus syllogismis compositus plura media habens, ut dicatur sic, omne b est a: et omne c est b: et omne d est c: et omne e est d: ergo omne e est a. Prima igitur demonstratio, quae habebat unum medium et solum tres terminos, est simplex et non resolvitur in aliam demonstrationem, sed omnes aliae resolvuntur in ipsam. Et ideo syllogismi primi, qui fiunt ex terminis tribus per unum medium, elementa dicuntur. 801. As a third example he gives the order of demonstrations, in which we also employ the word element; for example, we speak of Euclid’s Book of Elements. And he says that, in a way similar and close to those mentioned, those things which “are parts of diagrams,” i.e., the constituents of geometrical figures, are called elements. This can be said not only of the demonstrations in geometry but universally of all demonstrations. For those demonstrations which have only three terms are called the elements of other demonstrations, because the others are composed of them and resolved into them. This is shown as follows: a second demonstration takes as its starting point the conclusion of a first demonstration, whose terms are understood to contain the middle term which was the starting point of the first demonstration. Thus the second demonstration will proceed from four terms the first from three only, the third from five, and the fourth from six; so that each demonstration adds one term. Thus it is clear that first demonstrations are included in subsequent ones, as when this first demonstration—every B is A, every C is B, therefore every C is A—is included in this demonstration—every C is A, every D is C, therefore every D is A; and this again is included in the demonstration whose conclusion is that every E is A, so that for this final conclusion there seems to be one syllogism composed of several syllogisms having several middle terms. This may be expressed thus: every B is A, every C is B, every D is C, every E is D, therefore every E is A. Hence a first demonstration, which has one middle term and only three terms, is simple and not reducible to another demonstration, whereas all other demonstrations are reducible to it. Hence first syllogisms, which come from three terms by way of one middle term, are called elements.
lib. 5 l. 4 n. 8 Deinde cum dicit et transferentes ostendit quomodo elementum dicatur transumptive; dicens, quod ex hac praemissa ratione et significatione elementi transtulerunt quidam hoc nomen elementum ad significandum aliquid, quod est unum, et parvum, et ad multa utile. Ex hoc enim quod elementum est indivisibile in diversas species, acceperunt quod sit unum. Ex eo vero quod est primum, quod sit simplex. Ex eo vero, quod ex elementis alia componuntur, acceperunt quod sit utile ad multa. Unde hanc rationem elementi constituerunt, ut elementum dicerent omne illud, quod est parvum in quantitate, et simplex, quasi ex aliis non compositum, et indivisibile in diversa. 802. People also use (412). Here he shows how the term element is used in a transferred sense. He says that some men, on the basis of the foregoing notion or meaning of element, have used the term in a transferred sense to signify anything that is one and small and useful for many purposes. For from the fact that an element is indivisible they understood that it is one; and from the fact that it is first they understood that it is simple; and from the fact that other things are composed of elements they understood that an element is useful for many purposes. Hence they set up this definition of an element in order that they might say that everything which is smallest in quantity and simple (inasmuch as it is not composed of other things) and incapable of division into different species, is an element.
lib. 5 l. 4 n. 9 Hac autem ratione elementi constituta, per transumptionem contingebat eis ut duos modos elementorum adinvenirent; quorum primus est, ut ea quae sunt maxime universalia, dicerent elementa. Universale enim est unum secundum rationem, et est simplex, quia eius definitio non componitur ex diversis, et est in multis, et sic est ad multa utile, sive sit in omnibus, sicut unum et ens; sive in pluribus, sicut alia genera. Per eamdem vero rationem contingebat eis secundo, quod punctum et unitatem dicerent esse principia vel elementa, quia utrumque eorum est unum simplex et ad multa utile. 803. But when they had set up this definition of element, it turned out that by using it in a transferred sense they had invented two senses of element. First, they called the most universal things elements; for a universal is one in definition and is simple (because its definition is not composed of different parts) and is found in many things, and thus is useful for many purposes, whether it be found in all things, as unity and being are, or in most things, as the other genera. And by the same reasoning it came about, second, that they called points and units principles or elements because each of them is one simple thing and useful for many purposes.
lib. 5 l. 4 n. 10 Sed in hoc a vera ratione elementi defecerunt, quia universalia non sunt materia, ex quibus componuntur particularia, sed praedicant eorum substantiam. Similiter et punctus non est materia linearum; non enim linea ex punctis componitur. 804. But in this respect they fell short of the true notion of a principle, because universals are not the matter of which particular things are composed but predicate their very substance. And similarly points are not the matter of a line, for a line is not composed of points.
lib. 5 l. 4 n. 11 Hac autem transumptiva elementi ratione constituta, patet solutio cuiusdam quaestionis in tertio libro disputatae; scilicet quid sit magis elementum, utrum genus vel species, et utrum genus magis quam differentia. Patet enim consequi quod genera magis sunt elementa, quia genera magis sunt universalia et indivisibilia. Non enim est ratio eorum et definitio, quam oporteat componi ex genere et differentia; sed definitiones proprie dantur de speciebus. Et si aliquod genus definitur, non definitur inquantum est genus, sed inquantum est species; et ideo species dividitur in diversa, et propter hoc non habent rationem elementi. Genus autem non dividitur in diversa: et ideo dixerunt genera esse elementa magis quam species. Alia translatio habet una enim est eorum ratio idest indivisibilis, quia genera, etsi non habeant definitionem, tamen id quod significatur per nomen generis, est quaedam conceptio intellectus simplex, quae ratio dici potest. 805. Now with this transferred notion of element established, the solution to a question disputed in Book III (431-36) becomes clear, i.e., whether a genus or a species is more an element, and whether a genus or a difference is more an element; for it clearly follows that genera are elements to a greater degree because genera are more universal and indivisible. For there is no concept or definition of them which must be composed of genera and differences, but it is species which are properly defined. And if a genus is defined, it is not defined insofar as it is a genus but insofar as it is a species. Hence a species is divided into different parts and thus does not have the character of an element. But a genus is not divisible into different parts, and therefore they said that genera are elements more than species. Another translation reads, “For their formal character is one,” that is, indivisible, because even though genera do not have a definition, still what is signified by the term genus is a simple conception of the intellect which can be called a definition.
lib. 5 l. 4 n. 12 Et sicut genus est magis elementum quam species, quia est simplicius; ita etiam magis quam differentia, licet ipsa simplex sit, quia genus est universalius. Quod ex hoc patet: quia cuicumque inest differentia, inest genus, cum per se differentiae non transcendant genus: non tamen oportet quod ad omne id sequatur differentia cui convenit genus. 806. And just as a genus is more an element than a species is because it is simpler, in a similar way it is more an element than a difference is, even though a difference is simple, because a genus is more universal. This is clear from the fact that anything which has a difference has a genus, since essential differences do not transcend a genus; but not everything which has a genus necessarily has a difference.
lib. 5 l. 4 n. 13 Ultimo autem dicit, quod omnibus praedictis modis elementi hoc est commune, esse primum in unoquoque, sicut dictum est. 807. Last of all he says that all of the foregoing senses of element have this note in common, that an element is the primary component of each being, as has been stated.

Lecture 5

Latin English
lib. 5 l. 5 n. 1 Hic distinguit hoc nomen natura: cuius quidem consideratio, licet non videatur ad primum philosophum, sed magis ad naturalem pertinere, ideo tamen hic hoc nomen natura distinguitur, quia natura secundum sui quamdam acceptionem de omni substantia dicitur, ut patebit. Et per consequens cadit in consideratione philosophi primi, sicut et substantia universalis. Circa hoc autem duo facit. Primo distinguit diversos modos, quibus natura dicitur. Secundo reducit omnes ad unum primum, ibi, ex dictis igitur. Circa primum duo facit. Primo ponit quinque modos principales. Secundo ponit duos alios adiunctos duobus ultimis, ibi, natura autem prima materia. Dicit ergo primo, quod natura dicitur uno modo generatio generatorum, vel ut alia litera habet melius, nascentium. Non enim omnia generata nascentia dici possunt; sed solum in viventibus, sicut in plantis, sive in animalibus, et in partibus eorum. Non autem generatio rerum non viventium potest dici natura proprie loquendo secundum communem usum vocabuli, sed solum generatio viventium; ut dicatur natura ipsa nativitas vel ipsa nascentia, quod ipsum nomen sonare videtur. Ut si quis porrigens dicat naturam. Litera ista corrupta est. Quod ex alia translatione patet, quae sic habet ut si quis producens dicat ypsilon. Physis enim, quod apud Graecos naturam significat, si pro generatione viventium accipiatur, habet primum ypsilon productum; si vero pro principio, sicut communiter utitur, habet primum ypsilon breve. Posset tamen per hanc literam intelligi quod hoc nomen natura de generatione viventium dicatur secundum quamdam porrectionem idest extensionem. 808. Here he gives the different meanings of the term nature. And even though an investigation of the term nature appears not to belong to first philosophy but rather to the philosophy of nature, he nevertheless gives the different meanings of this term here, because according to one of its common meanings nature is predicated of every substance, as he will make clear. Hence it falls under the consideration of first philosophy just as universal substance does. In regard to the first he does two things. First (808), he distinguishes the different senses in which the term nature is used. Second (824), he reduces all of these to one primary notion (“Hence, from what”). In regard to the first he does two things. First, he gives five principal senses in which the term, nature is used. Second (821), he gives two additional senses connected with the last two of these (“Again, nature”). (1) He accordingly says, first, that in one sense nature means the process of generation of things that are generated, or, according to another text which states this in a better way, “of things that are born.” For not everything that is generated can be said to be born but only living things, for example, plants and animals and their parts. The generation of non-living things cannot be called nature, properly speaking, according to the common use of the term, but only the generation of living things inasmuch as nature may mean the nativity or birth of a thing... Yet even from this text it can be understood that the term nature means the generation of living things by a certain lengthening or extension of usage.
lib. 5 l. 5 n. 2 Ex hoc autem quod ipsa nativitas primo natura dicta est, secutus est modus secundus, ut scilicet generationis principium, ex quo aliquid generatur, sive ex quo illud, quod nascitur generatur primo, sicut ex intrinseco principio, dicatur natura. 809. Again, from the fact that nature was first used to designate the birth of a thing there followed a second use of the term, so that nature came to mean the principle of generation from which a thing comes to be, or that from which as from an intrinsic principle something born is first generated.
lib. 5 l. 5 n. 3 Et per similitudinem nativitatis ad alios motus, ulterius processit huius nominis significatio, ut natura tertio modo dicatur id, unde est principium motus in quolibet entium secundum naturam, dummodo sit in eo inquantum huiusmodi, et non per accidens. Sicut in medico, qui infirmatur, inest principium sanationis, scilicet ars medicinae, non tamen inquantum est infirmus, sed inquantum medicus. Sanatur autem non inquantum est medicus, sed inquantum infirmus: et sic principium motus non est in eo inquantum movetur. Et haec est definitio naturae posita in secundo physicorum. 810. And as a result of the likeness between birth and other kinds of motion the meaning of the term nature has been extended farther, so that in a third sense it means the source from which motion begins in any being according to its nature, provided that it is present in it insofar as it is such a being and not accidentally. For example, the principle of health, which is the medical art, is not present in a physician who is ill insofar as he is ill but insofar as he is a physician. And he is not healed insofar as he is a physician but insofar as he is ill; and thus the source of motion is not in him insofar as he is moved. This is the definition of nature given in Book II of the Physics.
lib. 5 l. 5 n. 4 Et, quia de nascentibus mentionem fecit, ostendit quid sit proprie nasci, ut habet alia litera, loco cuius haec litera improprie habet generari. Differt enim generatio in viventibus a generatione inanimatorum, quia inanimatum generatur, non ut coniunctum sive unitum generanti, ut ignis ab igne, et aqua ab aqua. In viventibus autem fit generatio per quamdam unionem ad generationis principium. Et, quia additio quanti ad quantum facit augmentum, ideo in generatione viventium videtur esse quoddam augmentum, sicut est cum ex arbore nascitur fructus, aut folium. Et ideo dicit, quod nasci dicuntur quaecumque augmentum habent, idest quoddam augmentum cum generationis principio. 811. And because he mentioned things that are born, he also shows what it means in the proper sense “to be born,” as another text says, and in place of which this text incorrectly says “to be generated.” For the generation of living things differs from that of non-living things, because a non-living thing is not generated by being joined or united to its generator, as fire is generated by fire and water by water. But the generation of a living thing comes about through some kind of union with the principle of generation. And because the addition of quantity to quantity causes increase, therefore in the generation of living things there seems to be a certain increase, as when a tree puts forth foliage and fruit. Hence he says that those things are said to be born which “increase,” i.e., have some increase together with the principle of generation [i.e. multiply].
lib. 5 l. 5 n. 5 Differt autem hoc augmentum a specie motus quae augmentum dicitur, qua moventur iam nata. Nam in augmento aliquid augetur in seipso per hoc, quod id quod additur transit in substantiam eius cui additur, sicut nutrimentum in substantiam nutriti: id autem, quod nascitur apponitur ei ex quo nascitur, tamquam alterum et diversum, non sicut in eius substantiam transiens. Et ideo dicit, quod habet augmentum per diversum sive per alterum: quasi dicat, quod hoc augmentum fit per appositionem alicuius alterius, vel diversi. 812. But this kind of increase differs from that class of motion which is called increase [or augmentation], by which things that are already born are moved or changed. For a thing that increases within itself does so because the part added passes over into the substance of that thing, as food passes over into the substance of the one nourished. But anything that is born is added to the thing from which it is born as something other and different, and not as something that passes over into its substance. Hence he says that it increases “through something distinct” or something else, as if to say that this increase comes about through the addition of something that is other or different.
lib. 5 l. 5 n. 6 Sed appositio augmentum faciens potest intelligi dupliciter. Uno modo tangendo, idest per solum contactum. Alio modo per hoc quod est simul idest aliqua duo simul producuntur adinvicem coaptata, sicut brachium et nervus et aliquid esse apte, idest quod aliquid adaptetur ad alterum iam praeexistens, sicut capilli capiti, et dentes gingivis. Loco autem huius alia litera habet melius connasci et adnasci. In hac autem generatione viventium non solum fit appositio per tactum, sed etiam per quamdam coaptationem sive connascentiam; ut patet in embryonibus, qui non solum tanguntur in matrice, sed etiam alligantur in principio suae generationis. 813. But addition that brings about increase can be understood to take place in two ways: in one way, “by touching,” i.e., by contact alone; in another way, “by existing together,” i.e., by the fact that two things are produced together and naturally connected with each other, as the arms and sinews; “and by being joined,” i.e., by the fact that something is naturally adapted to something else already existing, as hair to the head and teeth to the gums. In place of this another text reads, more appropriately, “by being born together with,” and “by being connected with at birth.” Now in the generation of living things addition comes about not only by contact but also by a kind of joining together or natural connection, as is evident in the case of embryos, which are not only in contact in the womb, but are also bound to it at the beginning of their generation.
lib. 5 l. 5 n. 7 Ostendit autem quid inter duo praedicta differat; dicens, quod conflatio, idest colligatio sive connascentia, ut alia litera habet, differt a tactu, quia in tactu non est necessarium aliquid esse praeter tangentia, quod ea faciat unum. In colligatis autem sive coaptatis sive connatis vel adnatis oportet esse quid unum in ambobus quod pro tactu, idest loco tactus faciat ea simul apta esse idest coaptata vel ligata sive simul nasci. Intelligendum est autem quod id, quod facit ea unum, facit esse unum secundum quantitatem et continuitatem, et non secundum qualitatem; quia ligamentum non alterat ligata a suis dispositionibus. 814. Further, he indicates the difference between these two, saying that “being fused,” i.e., being bound together, or “being connected at birth,” as another text says, differs from contact, because in the case of contact there need be nothing besides the things in contact which makes them one. But in the case of things which are bound together, whether naturally connected or born together and joined at birth, there must be some one thing “instead of contact,” i.e., in the place of contact, which causes them “to be naturally joined,” i.e., joined or bound together or born together. Moreover, it must be understood that the thing which causes them to be one makes them one in quantity and continuity but not in quality; because a bond does not alter the things bound from their own dispositions.
lib. 5 l. 5 n. 8 Ex hoc autem apparet, quia quod nascitur semper est coniunctum ei ex quo nascitur. Ideo natura numquam dicit principium extrinsecum, sed secundum omnes suas acceptiones dicit principium intrinsecum. 815. And from this it is evident that anything that is born is always connected with the thing from which it is born. Hence nature never means an extrinsic principle, but in every sense in which it is used it is taken to mean an intrinsic principle.
lib. 5 l. 5 n. 9 Ex hac autem tertia ratione naturae sequitur quarta. Si enim principium motus rerum naturalium natura dicitur, principium autem motus rerum naturalium quibusdam videbatur esse materia, consequens fuit ut materia natura diceretur, quae quidem est principium rei, et quantum ad esse et quantum ad fieri. Ipsa etiam absque omni forma consideratur, nec a seipsa movetur, sed ab alio. Et ideo dicit quod natura dicitur ex quo aliquod entium primo est aut fit. 816. (4) And from this third meaning of nature there follows a fourth. For if the source of motion in natural bodies is called their nature, and it seemed to some that the principle of motion in natural bodies is matter, it was for this reason that matter came to be called nature, which is taken as a principle of a thing both as to its being and as to its becoming. And it is also considered to be without any form, and is not moved by itself but by something else. He accordingly says that nature is spoken of as that primary thing of which any being is composed or from which it comes to be.
lib. 5 l. 5 n. 10 Quod ideo dicit, quia materia essendi et fiendi est principium. Ex quo, dico, existente inordinato idest absque forma. Unde alia litera habet cum informe sit. In quibusdam enim ipse ordo habetur pro forma, sicut in exercitu et civitate. Ex quo, dico, immutabili ex sua potestate, idest, quod moveri non potest per suam potestatem, sed secundum potestatem sui superioris agentis. Nam materia non movet seipsam ad formam, sed movetur a superiori exteriori agente. Sicut si diceremus aes materiam statuae et vasorum aereorum, et ligna ligneorum, si huiusmodi vasa, naturalia corpora essent. Similiter est in omnibus aliis quae ex materia sunt vel fiunt. Unumquodque enim eorum fit ex sua materia, ea salvata. Dispositiones autem formae non salvantur in generatione; una enim forma introducitur altera abiecta. Et propter hoc formae videbantur esse quibusdam accidentia, et sola materia substantia et natura, ut dicitur secundo physicorum. 817. He says this because matter is a principle both of being and of becoming. Hence he says that “it is without order,” i.e., form; and for this reason another text says “when it is unformed”; for in the case of some things their order (or arrangement) is regarded as their form, as in the case of an army or of a city. And for this reason he says that it is “immutable by its own power,” i.e., it cannot be moved by its own power but by that of a higher agent. For matter does not move itself to acquire a form but is moved by a higher and extrinsic agent. For instance, we might say that “bronze is the nature of a statue or of bronze vessels” or “wood of wooden,” as if such vessels were natural bodies. The same is true of everything else that is composed of or comes to be from matter; for each comes to be from its matter though this is preserved. But in the process of generation the dispositions of a form are not preserved; for when one form is introduced another is cast out. And for this reason it seemed to some thinkers that forms are accidents and that matter alone is substance and nature, as he points out in the Physics, Book II
lib. 5 l. 5 n. 11 Et hoc ideo, quia similiter existimabant formam et materiam in rebus naturalibus, sicut in rebus artificialibus, in quibus formae sunt accidentia, et sola materia substantia. Unde isto modo naturales dixerunt elementa esse materiam existentium secundum naturam, vel aquam, vel aerem, vel ignem aut terram, quam nullus elementum naturalium posuit solam, sed aliqui non naturales, ut in primo libro est habitum. Quidam autem posuerunt aliqua eorum esse elementa et naturam rerum, sicut Parmenides. Quidam vero omnia quatuor, sicut Empedocles. Quidam vero aliquid aliud, sicut Heraclitus vaporem. 818. They held this view because they considered the matter and form of natural bodies in the same way as they did the matter and form of things made by art, in which forms are merely accidents and matter alone is substance. It was in this sense that the philosophers of nature said that the elements are the matter of things which come to be by nature, i.e., water, air, or fire, or earth, which no philosopher has held to be the element of natural beings all by itself, although some of those who were not philosophers of nature did hold this, as was stated in Book I (134). And some philosophers, such as Parmenides, held that some of these are the elements and natures of things; others, such as Empedocles, held that all four are the elements of things; and still others, such as Heraclitus, held that something different is the element of things, for he claimed that vapor plays this role.
lib. 5 l. 5 n. 12 Quia vero motus rerum naturalium magis causatur ex forma quam ex materia, ideo supervenit quintus modus quo ipsa forma dicitur natura. Et sic alio modo natura dicitur ipsa substantia, idest forma rerum existentium secundum naturam, sicut naturam rerum dixerunt esse ipsam compositionem mixtorum; sicut Empedocles dixit, quod non est aliquid entium absolutum, sed solummodo commutatio seu relaxatio vel commixtio permixtorum, secundum aliam translationem, natura apud homines dicitur. Dicuntur enim quae sunt permixtionis diversae, naturam diversam habere. 819. (5) Now because motion is caused in natural bodies by the form rather than by the matter, he therefore adds a fifth sense in which the term nature is used: that in which nature means the form of a thing. Hence in another sense nature means “the substance of things,” i.e., the form of things, which are by nature. It was in this sense that some said that the nature of things is the composition of mixed bodies, as Empedocles said that there is nothing absolute in the world, but that only the alteration or loosening (or mixing, according to another text) of what has been mixed is called nature by men. For they said that things composed of different mixtures have different natures.
lib. 5 l. 5 n. 13 Ad ponendum autem formam esse naturam, hac ratione inducebantur, quia quaecumque sunt et fiunt naturaliter non dicuntur habere naturam, existente materia ex qua nata sunt fieri vel esse, nisi habeant speciem propriam et formam, per quam speciem consequantur. Videtur autem nomen speciei poni pro forma substantiali, et forma pro figura quae consequitur speciem, et est signum speciei. Si igitur forma est natura, nec aliquid potest dici habere naturam nisi quando habet formam, illud ergo quod compositum est ex materia et forma dicitur esse natura, idest secundum naturam, ut animalia et partes eorum, sicut caro et os et huiusmodi. 820. Now they were led to hold that form is nature by this process of reasoning: whatever things exist or come to be by nature are not said to have a nature, even though the matter from which they are naturally disposed to be or to come to be is already present, unless they have a proper species and a form through which they acquire their species. Now the term species seems to be given in place of substantial form and the term form in place of figure, which is a natural result of the species and a sign of it. Hence, if form is nature, a thing cannot be said to have a nature unless it has a form. Therefore, that which is composed of matter and form “is said to be by nature,” i.e., according to nature, as animals and the parts of animals, such as flesh and bones and the like.
lib. 5 l. 5 n. 14 Deinde cum dicit natura autem ponit duos modos adiunctos duobus ultimis praecedentibus, quorum primus additur quarto modo quo materia dicebatur natura. Et dicit, quod materia dicitur natura non quaecumque, sed prima. Quod potest intelligi dupliciter aut quantum ad id quod est genus; aut ex toto vel simpliciter prima. Sicut operum artificialium quae fiunt ex aere, prima materia secundum genus illud est aes. Prima vero simpliciter est aqua. Nam omnia quae liquescunt calido et indurantur frigido sunt aquea magis, ut dicitur quarto Meteororum. 821. Again, nature (414). Then he gives two meanings of nature which are connected with the last two preceding ones, and the first of these is added to the fourth sense of nature, in which it means the matter of a thing. And he says that not every kind of matter is said to be the nature of a thing but only first matter. This can be understood in two senses: either with reference to something generic, or with reference to something that is first absolutely or without qualification. For example, the first matter generically of artificial things produced from bronze is bronze; but their first matter without qualification is water; for all things which are liquefied by heat and solidified by cold have the character of water, as he says in Book IV of the Meteors.
lib. 5 l. 5 n. 15 Secundus modus adiacet quinto modo praedicto quo forma dicebatur natura. Et secundum hunc modum non solum forma partis dicitur natura, sed species ipsa est forma totius. Ut si dicamus quod hominis natura non solum est anima, sed humanitas et substantia quam significat definitio. Secundum hoc enim Boetius dicit, quod natura est unumquodque informans specifica differentia. Nam specifica differentia est, quae complet substantiam rei et dat ei speciem. Sicut autem forma vel materia dicebatur natura, quia est principium generationis, quae secundum primam nominis impositionem natura dicitur; ita species et substantia dicitur natura, quia est finis generationis. Nam generatio terminatur ad speciem generati, quae resultat ex unione formae et materiae. 822. He links up the second of these additional meanings with the fifth sense of nature mentioned above, according to which nature means form. And in this sense not only the form of a part (forma partis) is called nature but the species is the form of the whole (forma totius). For example, we might say that the nature of man is not only a soul but humanity and the substance signified by the definition. For it is from this point of view that Boethius says that the nature of a thing is the specific difference which informs each thing, because the specific difference is the principle that completes a thing’s substance and gives it its species. And just as form or matter is called nature because it is a principle of generation, which is the meaning of nature according to the original use of the term, in a similar way the species or substance of a thing is called its nature because it is the end of the process of generation. For the process of generation terminates in the species of the thing generated, which is a result of the union of matter and form.
lib. 5 l. 5 n. 16 Et ex hoc secundum quamdam metaphoram et nominis extensionem omnis substantia dicitur natura; quia natura quam diximus quae est generationis terminus, substantia quaedam est. Et ita cum eo quod natura dicitur, omnis substantia similitudinem habet. Et hunc modum etiam ponit Boetius. Ratione autem istius modi distinguitur hoc nomen natura inter nomina communia. Sic enim commune est sicut et substantia. 823. And because of this every substance is called nature according to a kind of metaphorical and extended use of the term; for the nature which we spoke of as the terminus of generation is a substance. Thus every substance is similar to what we call nature. Boethius also gives this meaning of the term. Moreover, it is because of this meaning that the term nature is distinguished from other common terms. For it is common in this way just as substance also is.
lib. 5 l. 5 n. 17 Deinde dum dicit ex dictis reducit omnes modos praedictos ad unum. Sciendum est autem, quod reductio aliorum modorum ad unum primum, fieri potest dupliciter. Uno modo secundum ordinem rerum. Alio modo secundum ordinem, qui attenditur quantum ad nominis impositionem. Nomina enim imponuntur a nobis secundum quod nos intelligimus, quia nomina sunt intellectuum signa. Intelligimus autem quandoque priora ex posterioribus. Unde aliquid per prius apud nos sortitur nomen, cui res nominis per posterius convenit: et sic est in proposito. Quia enim formae et virtutes rerum ex actibus cognoscuntur, per prius ipsa generatio vel nativitas, naturae nomen accepit, et ultimo forma. 824. Hence, from what (415). Then he reduces all of the foregoing senses of the term nature to one common notion. But it must be noted that the reduction of the other senses to one primary sense can happen in two ways: in one way, with reference to the order which things have; and in another way, with reference to the order which is observed in giving names to things. For names are given to things according as we understand them, because names are signs of what we understand; and sometimes we understand prior things from subsequent ones. Hence something that is prior for us receives a name which subsequently fits the object of that name. And this is what happens in the present case; for since the forms and powers of things are known from their activities, the process of generation or birth of a thing is the first to receive the name of nature and the last is the form.
lib. 5 l. 5 n. 18 Sed secundum rerum ordinem, formae prius competit ratio naturae, quia, ut dictum est, nihil dicitur habere naturam, nisi secundum quod habet formam. 825. But with reference to the order which things have in reality the concept of nature primarily fits the form, because, as has been said (808), nothing is said to have a nature unless it has a form.
lib. 5 l. 5 n. 19 Unde patet ex dictis, quod primo et proprie natura dicitur substantia, idest forma rerum habentium in se principium motus inquantum huiusmodi. Materia enim dicitur esse natura, quia est formae susceptibilis. Et generationes habent nomen naturae, quia sunt motus procedentes a forma, et iterum ad formas. Et idipsum, scilicet forma est principium motus rerum existentium secundum naturam, aut in actu, aut in potentia. Forma enim non semper facit motum in actu, sed quandoque in potentia tantum: sicut quando impeditur motus naturalis ab aliquo exteriori prohibente, vel etiam quando impeditur actio naturalis ex materiae defectu. 826. Hence from what has been said it is evident that “in its primary and proper sense nature is the substance,” i.e., the form, of those things which have within themselves as such the source of their motion. For matter is called nature because it is receptive of form; and processes of generation get the name of nature because they are motions proceeding from a form and terminating in further forms. And this, namely, the form, is the principle of motion in those things which are by nature, either potentially or actually. For a form is not always the cause of actual motion but sometimes only of potential motion, as when a natural motion is prevented by an external obstacle, or even when a natural action is prevented by a defect in the matter.

Lecture 6

Latin English
lib. 5 l. 6 n. 1 Postquam philosophus distinxit nomina, quae significant causas, hic distinguit nomen quod significat aliquid pertinens ad orationem causae; scilicet necessarium. Causa enim est ad quam de necessitate sequitur aliud. Et circa hoc duo facit. Primo distinguit modos necessarii. Secundo reducit omnes ad unum primum, ibi, et secundum hoc necessarium. Ponit autem in prima parte quatuor modos necessarii. Primus est, secundum quod dicitur aliquid necessarium, sine quo non potest aliquid vivere aut esse; quod licet non sit principalis causa rei, est tamen quaedam concausa. Sicut respirare est necessarium animali respiranti, quia sine respiratione vivere non potest. Ipsa enim respiratio, etsi non sit causa vitae, est tamen concausa, inquantum cooperatur ad contemperamentum caloris, sine quo non est vita. Et similiter est de cibo, sine quo animal vivere non potest, inquantum cooperatur ad restaurationem deperditi, et impedit totalem consumptionem humidi radicalis, quod est causa vitae. Igitur huiusmodi dicuntur necessaria, quia sine eis impossibile est esse. 827. Having distinguished the different senses of the terms which signify causes, the Philosopher now gives the different senses of a term which designates something pertaining to the notion of cause, i.e., the term necessary; for a cause is that from which something else follows of necessity. In regard to this he does two things. First, he distinguishes the different senses of the term necessary. Second (836), he reduces all of these to one primary sense (“And from this sense”). In the first part he gives four senses in which the term necessary is used: First, it means that without which a thing cannot be or live; and even when this is not the principal cause of a thing, it is still a contributing cause. Breathing, for example, is necessary to an animal which breathes, because it cannot live without this. And while breathing is not the [principal] cause of life, nonetheless it is still a contributing cause inasmuch as it helps to restore what is lost and prevents the total consumption of moisture, which is a cause of life. Hence things of this kind are said to be necessary because it is impossible for things to exist without them.
lib. 5 l. 6 n. 2 Secundum modum ponit ibi, et sine dicit, quod secundo modo dicuntur necessaria, sine quibus non potest esse vel fieri bonum aliquod, vel vitari aliquod malum, vel expelli; sicut bibere pharmacum, idest medicinam laxativam, dicimus esse necessarium, non quia sine hoc vivere animal non possit; sed ad expellendum, scilicet hoc malum quod est infirmitas, vel etiam vitandum. Est enim hoc necessarium ut non laboret, idest ut non infirmetur aliquis. Similiter navigare ad Aeginam, scilicet ad illum locum, est necessarium, non quia sine hoc non possit homo esse; sed quia sine hoc non potest acquirere aliquod bonum, idest pecuniam. Unde dicitur, quod necessaria est talis navigatio, ut aliquis pecuniam recipiat. 828. And it also means (417). Then he gives a second sense in which things are said to be necessary. He says that in a second way those things are said to be necessary without which some good cannot be or come about, or some evil be avoided or expelled. For example, we say that “the drinking of some drug,” i.e., a laxative medicine, is necessary, not because an animal cannot live without it, but because it is required to expel something, namely, an evil, illness, or even to avoid it. For this is necessary “in order that one may not be in distress,” i.e., to avoid being ill. And similarly “sailing to Aegina,” i.e., to a definite place, is necessary, not because a man cannot exist without this, but because he cannot acquire some good, i.e., money, without doing this. Hence, such a voyage is said to be necessary in order to collect a sum of money.
lib. 5 l. 6 n. 3 Tertium modum ponit ibi, amplius enim dicit quod id quod infert violentiam, et etiam ipsa violentia necessarii nomen accepit; nam violentia necessaria dicitur, et qui vim patitur dicitur de necessitate id facere ad quod cogitur. Quid autem sit faciens vim, manifestat in naturalibus, et in voluntariis. In naturalibus quidem est impetus, sive inclinatio ad aliquem finem, cui respondet voluntas in natura rationali; unde et ipsa naturalis inclinatio appetitus dicitur. Utrumque autem, scilicet et impetum naturalis inclinationis, et propositum voluntatis, contingit impediri et prohiberi. Impediri quidem, in prosecutione motus iam incepti. Prohiberi autem, ne etiam motus incipiat. Illud ergo dicitur esse violentum, quod est praeter impetum, idest praeter inclinationem rei naturalis, et est impediens praevoluntatem, idest propositum in prosecutione motus voluntarii iam incepti, et prohibens etiam ne incipiat. Alia litera habet et hoc est secundum ormin, idest secundum impetum. Violentia enim est cum aliquid agit secundum impetum exterioris agentis, contra voluntatem vim passi. Violentum autem est secundum impetum vim faciens. 829. Again, it means (418). Here he gives a third sense in which things are said to be necessary. He says that anything which exerts force, and even force itself, is termed necessary. For force is said to be necessary, and one who is forced is said to do of necessity whatever he is compelled to do. He shows what is meant by something that exerts force both in the case of natural beings and in that of beings endowed with will. In natural beings there is a desire for or an inclination toward some end or goal, to which the will of a rational nature corresponds; and for this reason a natural inclination is itself called an appetite. For both of these, i.e., both the desire of a natural inclination and the intention of the will, can be hindered and prevented—hindered in carrying out a motion already begun, and prevented from initiating motion. Therefore, that is said to be forced “which is done in opposition to desire,” ‘ i.e., against the inclination of a natural being; and it is “something that hinders choice,” i.e., the end intended in executing a voluntary motion already begun, and also something that prevents it from beginning. Another text says, “and this is according to impetuousness,” i.e., according to impulse. For force is found when something is done through the impulse of an external agent and is opposed to the will and power of the subject. And that is forced which is done as a result of an impulse applying force.
lib. 5 l. 6 n. 4 Ex hac autem violenti definitione duas conclusiones inducit. Quarum prima est, quod omne violentum est triste sive flebile. Quod probat per cuiusdam poetae sive doctoris dictum; dicens, quod omnis res necessaria sive violenta est tristis sive lamentabilis: necessitas enim est quaedam violentia; sicut Sophocles poeta dicit: violentia me facere coegit ea, idest necessitas. Dictum est enim, quod violentia est impediens voluntatem. Ea autem, qua voluntati sunt contraria, contristant. Tristitia enim est de his quae nobis nolentibus accidunt. 830. Now from this definition of the forced he draws two conclusions. The first is that everything forced is sad or mournful. He proves this by using the statement of a certain poet or teacher, saying that everything which is necessary or forced is sad or lamentable; for force is a kind of necessity, as the poet Sophodes says: “Force,” i.e., necessity, “compelled me to do this.” For it has been said that force is something which hinders the will; and things which are opposed to the will cause sorrow, because sorrow has to do with things which happen to us against our will.
lib. 5 l. 6 n. 5 Secunda conclusio est, quod necessitas recte dicitur, quod est inculpabilis et irreprehensibilis. Dicitur enim quod necessitas magis meretur veniam quam increpationem. Et hoc ideo, quia non inculpamur nisi de his quae voluntarie facimus, de quibus etiam rationabiliter increpamur. Necessitas autem violentiae est contraria voluntati et excogitationi, ut dictum est; et ideo rationabilius dicitur, quod violenta non sunt culpabilia. 831. The second conclusion is that anything which is necessary is rightly said to be without blame or reproach. For it is said that necessity deserves forgiveness rather than blame; and this is true because we deserve to be blamed only for the things which we do voluntarily and for which we may also be reasonably rebuked. But the kind of necessity which pertains to force is opposed to the will and to reason, as has been stated (829); and thus it is more reasonable to say that things done by force are not subject to blame.
lib. 5 l. 6 n. 6 Quartum modum ponit ibi, amplius quod dicit, quod necessarium etiam dicimus sic se habere, quod non contingit aliter se habere: et hoc est necessarium absolute. Prima autem necessaria sunt secundum quid. 832. Again, we say (419). He gives a fourth sense in which things are said to be necessary. He says that being in such a state that it cannot be otherwise we also call necessary, and this is what is necessary in an absolute sense. Things necessary in the first senses, however, are necessary in a relative sense.
lib. 5 l. 6 n. 7 Differt autem necessarium absolute ab aliis necessariis: quia necessitas absoluta competit rei secundum id quod est intimum et proximum ei; sive sit forma, sive materia, sive ipsa rei essentia; sicut dicimus animal necesse esse corruptibile, quia hoc consequitur eius materiam inquantum ex contrariis componitur. Dicimus etiam animal necessario esse sensibile, quia consequitur eius formam: et animal necessario esse substantiam animatam sensibilem, quia est eius essentia. 833. Now whatever is absolutely necessary differs from the other types of necessity, because absolute necessity belongs to a thing by reason of something that is intimately and closely connected with it, whether it be the form or the matter or the very essence of a thing. For example, we say that an animal is necessarily corruptible because this is a natural result of its matter inasmuch as it is composed of contraries; and we say that an animal is necessarily capable of sensing because this is a result of its form; and we also say that an animal is necessarily a living sensible substance because this is its essence.
lib. 5 l. 6 n. 8 Necessarium autem secundum quid et non absolute est, cuius necessitas dependet ex causa extrinseca. Causa autem extrinseca est duplex; scilicet finis et efficiens. Finis autem est, vel ipsum esse absolutum, et ab hoc fine necessitas sumpta pertinet ad primum modum; vel bene esse, sive aliquod bonum habere, et ab hoc fine sumitur necessitas secundi modi. 834. However, the necessity of something which is necessary in a relative sense and not absolutely depends on an extrinsic cause. And there are two kinds of extrinsic causes—the end and the agent. The end is either existence taken absolutely, and the necessity taken from this end pertains to the first kind; or it is well disposed existence or the possession of some good, and necessity of the second kind is taken from this end.
lib. 5 l. 6 n. 9 Necessitas autem quae est a movente exteriori, pertinet ad tertium modum. Nam violentia est quando aliquid movetur ab exteriori agente ad aliud ad quod ex propria natura aptitudinem non habet. Si enim secundum suam naturam ordinetur ad hoc quod recipiat motum ab exteriori agente, tunc motus non erit violentus, sed naturalis. Sicut patet de motu caelestium orbium a substantiis separatis, et de motu inferiorum corporum a superioribus. 835. Again, the necessity which comes from an external agent pertains to the third kind of necessity. For force exists when a thing is moved by an external agent to something which it has no aptitude for by its own nature. For if something is disposed by its own nature to receive motion from an external agent, such motion will not be forced but natural. This is evident in the motion of the celestial bodies by separate substances, and in that of lower bodies by higher ones.
lib. 5 l. 6 n. 10 Deinde cum dicit et secundum reducit omnes modos ad unum: et circa hoc tria facit. Primo ostendit quod omnes modi necessitatis, qui in rebus inveniuntur ad hunc ultimum modum pertinent. Secundo ostendit, quod secundum ultimum modum accipitur necessarium in demonstrativis, ibi, amplius demonstratio. Tertio infert quoddam corollarium ex praemissis, ibi, horum quidem itaque. Dicit ergo primo, quod secundum istum ultimum modum necessarii, omnes alii modi aliqualiter dicuntur. Quod primo ostendit in tertio modo. Illud enim quod vim patitur, de necessitate dicitur aliquid facere vel pati, propter hoc quod non contingit secundum proprium impetum aliquid agere propter violentiam agentis, quae est quaedam necessitas propter quam non contingit aliter se habere. 836. And from this (420). Here he reduces all of the senses in which things are necessary to one; and in regard to this he does three things. First (836), he shows that all the types of necessity found in reality pertain to this last type. Second (838), he shows that necessity in matters of demonstration is taken in this last sense (“Further, demonstration”). Third (839), he draws a corollary from what has been set down above (“Now of necessary things”). He accordingly says, first, that all the other senses of the term necessary are somehow referred to this last sense. He makes this clear, first, with reference to the third way in which things are said to be necessary. For whatever is forced is said to do or to undergo something of necessity on the grounds that it cannot act through its own power because of the force exerted on it by an agent; and this is a kind of necessity by which it cannot be otherwise than it is.
lib. 5 l. 6 n. 11 Et similiter ostendit hoc in primo et secundo modo, in quibus necessitas sumitur ex causis vivendi vel essendi simpliciter, quantum ad primum modum: vel ex causis boni, quantum ad secundum modum. Sic enim in aliis modis necessarium dicebatur, sine quo non poterat esse ex una parte bonum, et ex alia parte vivere et esse. Et sic illa causa, sine qua non contingit vivere vel esse, vel bonum habere, vel malo carere, necessitas dicitur; quasi ex hoc sit prima ratio necessarii, quia impossibile est aliter se habere. 837. Then he shows that the same thing is true of the first and second ways in which things are said to be necessary: in the first way with reference to the causes of living and being absolutely, and in the second with reference to the causes of good. For the term necessary was so used in these other ways: in one way to designate that without which a thing cannot be well off, and in the other to designate that without which a thing cannot live or exist. Hence that cause without which a thing cannot live or exist or possess a good or avoid an evil is said to be necessary; the supposition being that the primary notion of the necessary derives from the fact that something cannot be otherwise.
lib. 5 l. 6 n. 12 Deinde cum dicit amplius demonstratio ostendit quod secundum ultimum modum accipitur necessarium in demonstrativis, et quantum ad conclusiones, et quantum ad principia. Demonstratio enim dicitur esse necessariorum, et dicitur esse ex necessariis. Necessariorum quidem esse dicitur, quia illud, quod simpliciter demonstratur, non contingit aliter se habere. Dicitur autem simpliciter demonstratum ad eius differentiam quod demonstratur in demonstratione quae est ad aliquem, et non simpliciter; quod in quarto libro dixit demonstrare ad hominem arguentem. In talibus enim demonstrationibus, quae sunt ad aliquem, contingit etiam impossibile concludi ex aliquibus impossibilibus positis. Sed, quia causae conclusionis in demonstrationibus sunt praemissae, cum demonstratio simpliciter scire faciat, quod non est nisi per causam, oportet etiam principia, ex quibus est syllogismus, esse necessaria quae impossibile sint aliter se habere. Nam ex causa non necessaria non potest sequi effectus necessarius. 838. Further, demonstration (421). Then he shows that the necessary in matters of demonstration is taken from this last sense, and this applied both to principles and to conclusions. For demonstration is said to be about necessary things, and to proceed from necessary things. At is said to be about necessary things because what is demonstrated in the strict sense cannot be otherwise. He says “demonstrated in the strict sense” in order to distinguish this from what is demonstrated by the kind of demonstration which refutes an opponent, and does not strictly demonstrate. In the fourth book (609) he called this an ad hominem argument. In demonstrations of this kind which refute an opponent we conclude to the impossible from certain impossible premises. But since in demonstrations the premises are the causes of the conclusion, for demonstrations in the strict sense are productive of science and this is had only by way of a cause, the principles from which a syllogism proceeds must also be necessary and thus cannot be otherwise than they are. For a necessary effect cannot come from a non-necessary cause.
lib. 5 l. 6 n. 13 Deinde cum dicit horum quidem concludit ex praemissis tres conclusiones se invicem sequentes: quarum prima est, quod ex quo in demonstrationibus praemissae sunt causae conclusionis, et utraque sunt necessaria, sequitur quod aliqua sunt necessaria dupliciter. Quaedam quidem quorum altera sit causa necessitatis; quaedam vero quorum nulla sit causa necessitatis; et talia sunt necessaria propter seipsa. Et hoc est contra Democritum, qui dicebat quod necessariorum non sunt quaerendae causae, ut habetur in octavo physicorum. 839. Now of necessary things (422). Here he draws three conclusions from the points set down above, one of which follows from the other. The first is that, since in demonstrations the premises are the causes of the conclusion and both of these are necessary, it follows that some things are necessary in one of two ways. For there are (1) some things whose necessity is caused by something else, and there are (2) others whose necessity has no cause; and such things are necessary of themselves. This is said against Democritus, who claimed that we must not look for the causes of necessary things, as is stated in Book VIII of the Physics.
lib. 5 l. 6 n. 14 Secunda conclusio, quia, cum oporteat esse unum primum necessarium, a quo alia necessitatem habent, quia in causis non est procedere in infinitum, ut in secundo ostensum est, oportet hoc primum necessarium, quod etiam maxime proprie est necessarium, quia est omnibus modis necessarium, quod ipsum sit simplex. Ea enim, quae sunt composita, sunt mutabilia, et ita pluribus modis se possunt habere: quae autem pluribus modis habere se possunt, possunt se habere aliter et aliter; quod est contra rationem necessarii. Nam necessarium est, quod est impossibile aliter se habere. Unde oportet, quod primum necessarium non aliter et aliter se habeat, et per consequens nec pluribus modis. Et ita oportet ipsum esse simplex. 840. The second conclusion is that, since there must be one first necessary being from which other beings derive their necessity (for there cannot be an infinite regress in causes, as was shown in the second book (301), this first necessary being, which is also necessary in the most proper sense because it is necessary in all ways, must be simple. For composite things are changeable and thus can be in more ways than one. But things which can be in more ways than one can be now in one way and now in another, and this is opposed to the notion of necessity; for that is necessary which cannot be otherwise. Hence the first necessary being must not be now in one way and now in another, and consequently cannot be in more ways than one. Thus he must be simple.
lib. 5 l. 6 n. 15 Tertia conclusio est, quod, cum violentum sit quod movetur ab aliquo exteriori agente praeter naturam propriam, principia autem necessaria sunt simplicia et immobilia, ut ostensum est, necessarium est ut si sunt aliqua sempiterna et immobilia sicut sunt substantiae separatae, quod in illis non sit aliquid violentum nec praeter naturam. Et hoc dicit, ne deceptio accidat in nomine necessitatis, cum dicitur de substantiis immaterialibus, nec per hoc intelligitur aliqua violentia in eis esse. 841. The third conclusion is that, since the forced is something which is moved by an external agent in opposition to its own nature, and necessary principles are simple and unchangeable, as has been shown (422)C 840), therefore if there are certain eternal and unchangeable beings, as the separate substances are, in them there must be nothing forced or contrary to their nature. He says this lest a mistake should be made in the case of the term necessity, since it is predicated of immaterial substances without implying on this account that anything forced is found in them.

Lecture 7

Latin English
lib. 5 l. 7 n. 1 Postquam philosophus distinxit nomina quae significant causas, hic distinguit nomina quae significant id quod est subiectum aliquo modo in ista scientia. Et dividitur in duas partes. Primo ponit sive distinguit nomina, quae significant subiectum huius scientiae. Secundo ea, quae significant partes subiecti, ibi, eadem dicuntur. Subiectum autem huius scientiae potest accipi, vel sicut communiter in tota scientia considerandum, cuiusmodi est ens et unum: vel sicut id de quo est principalis intentio, ut substantia. Et ideo primo distinguit hoc nomen unum. Secundo hoc nomen ens, ibi, ens dicitur et cetera. Tertio hoc nomen substantia, ibi, substantia dicitur et cetera. Circa primum duo facit. Primo distinguit unum in per se et per accidens; et ostendit quot modis dicitur unum per accidens. Secundo quot modis dicitur unum per se, ibi secundum se vero unum et cetera. 842. Having given the various senses of the terms which signify causes, the Philosopher now proceeds to do the same thing with those terms which signify in some way the subject of this science. This is divided into two parts. In the first (423)C 843) he gives or distinguishes the different senses of the terms which signify the subject of this science; and in the second (445:C 908) he distinguishes the different senses of the terms which signify the parts of this subject ("Things are said to be the same"). Now the subject of this science can be taken either as that which has to be considered generally in the whole science, and as such it is unity and being, or as that with which this science is chiefly concerned, and this is substance. Therefore, first (423), he gives the different senses of the term one; second (435:C 885) of the term being ("The term being"); and third (440:C 898), of the term substance ("The term substance"). In regard to the first part of this division he does two things. First, he makes a distinction between what is essentially one and what is accidentally one, and he also indicates the various senses in which things are said to be accidentally one. Second (42VC 848), he notes the various senses in which things are said to be essentially one ("But in the case").
lib. 5 l. 7 n. 2 Dicit ergo, quod unum dicitur et per se et per accidens. Per accidens autem unum docet considerare primo in terminis singularibus; et hoc dupliciter. Uno modo secundum quod accidens comparatur ad subiectum. Alio modo secundum quod unum accidens comparatur ad aliud. In utroque autem istorum tria est accipere; scilicet unum compositum et duo simplicia. Si enim unum per accidens accipiatur secundum comparationem accidentis ad subiectum, sic sunt ista tria: primum est Coriscus, secundum est musicus, tertium Coriscus musicus. Et haec tria sunt unum per accidens. Nam idem subiecto est Coriscus et musicus. Et similiter, quando comparatur accidens ad accidens, tria est accipere; quorum primum est musicum, secundum est iustum, tertium est musicus iustus Coriscus. Et omnia praedicta dicuntur esse unum secundum accidens; tamen alia et alia ratione. 843. He says (423), then, that the term one signifies both what is essentially one and what is accidentally one. And he tells us that what is accidentally one we should consider first in the case of singular terms. Now singular terms can be accidentally one in two ways: in one way according as an accident is related to a subject; and in another way according as one accident is related to another. And in both cases three things have to be considered—one composite thing and two simple ones. For if what is accidentally one is considered to be such according as an accident is related to a subject, then there are, for example, these three things: first, Coriscus; second, musical; and third, musical Coriscus. And these three are accidentally one; for Coriscus and what is musical are the same in subject. Similarly when an accident is related to an accident, three terms must be considered: first, musical; second, just; and third, just musical Coriscus. And all these atle said to be accidentally one, but for different reasons.
lib. 5 l. 7 n. 3 Iustum enim et musicum, quae sunt duo simplicia in secunda acceptione, dicuntur unum per accidens, quia accidunt uni subiecto. Musicus vero et Coriscus, quae sunt duo simplicia in prima acceptione, dicuntur unum per accidens, quia alterum eorum, scilicet musicum accidit alteri, scilicet Corisco. Et similiter quantum ad aliquid musicus Coriscus cum Corisco, quod est compositum cum uno simplicium, in prima acceptione dicuntur unum per accidens, quia inter partes istas quae sunt in hac oratione, idest in hoc termino complexo, scilicet, Coriscus musicus, altera pars termini complexi, scilicet musicus, accidit alteri parti per se signatae, scilicet Corisco. Et eadem ratione potest dici, quod musicus Coriscus est unum cum iusto Corisco, quae sunt duo composita in secunda acceptione, quia ambae partes utriusque compositi accidunt uni, scilicet Corisco. Si enim idem est musicus et musicus Coriscus, et iustus et iustus Coriscus, cuicumque accidit musicum accidit musicus Coriscus; et quicquid accidit Corisco accidit Corisco iusto. Unde, si musicum accidit Corisco, sequitur, quod musicus Coriscus accidit iusto Corisco. Et sic nihil differt dicere musicum Coriscum accidere iusto Corisco, quam musicum accidere Corisco. 844. For just and musical, which are two simple terms in the second way, are said to be accidentally one because both are accidents of one and the same subject. But musical and Coriscus, which are two simple terms in the first way, are said to be accidentally one because "the one," namely, musical, "is an accident of the other," namely, of Coriscus. And similarly in regard to the relationship of musical Coriscus to Coriscus (which is the relationship of a composite term to one of two simple terms), these are said to be accidentally one in the first way, because in this expression, i.e., in the complex term, musical Coriscus, one of the parts, namely, musical, is an accident of the other, which is designated as a substance, namely, Coriscus. And for the same reason it can be said that musical Coriscus is one with just Coriscus, which are two composites in the second way, because two of the parts of each composite are accidents of one subject, Coriscus. For if musical and musical Coriscus, and just and just Coriscus, are the same, then whatever is an accident of musical is also an accident of musical Coriscus; and whatever is an accident of Coriscus is also an accident of just Coriscus. Hence, if musical is an accident of Coriscus, it follows that musical Coriscus is an accident of just Coriscus. Therefore it makes no difference whether we say that musical Coriscus is an accident of just Coriscus, or that musical is an accident of Coriscus.
lib. 5 l. 7 n. 4 Quia vero huiusmodi praedicata per accidens per prius praedicantur de singularibus, et per posterius de universalibus, cum tamen e converso sit de praedicatis per se, manifestat consequenter in terminis universalibus quod in singularibus ostenderat; dicens, quod similiter accipitur unum per accidens, si aliquod accidens dicatur cum aliquo nomine alicuius generis, vel cuiuscumque universalis, sicut accipitur unum per accidens in praedictis, quando accidens adiungitur nomini singulari; sicut cum dicitur, quod homo et musicus homo sunt unum per accidens, licet quantum ad aliquid differant. 845. But because accidental predicates of this kind are first applied to singular things and then to universals (although the reverse is true of essential predicates), he therefore makes clear that what he showed in the case of singular terms also applies in that of universal terms. He says that, if an accident is used along with the name of a genus or of any universal term, accidental unity is taken in the same way as it is in the above cases when an accident is joined to a singular term; for example, when it is said that man and musical man are accidentally one, although they differ in some respect.
lib. 5 l. 7 n. 5 Singulares enim substantiae nec sunt in subiecto, nec de subiecto praedicantur. Unde tantum substant et nihil eis substat. Substantiae quidem universales dicuntur de subiecto, sed non sunt in subiecto. Unde non substant accidentibus, et eis aliquid substat. Cum ergo accidens adiungitur particulari substantiae, non potest esse alia ratio dicti, nisi quia accidens inest substantiae particulari, ut quia musicum inest Corisco cum dicitur Coriscus musicus. 846. For singular substances are neither present in a subject nor predicated of a subject, so that while they are the subject of other things, they themselves do not have a subject. Now universal substances are predicated of a subject but are not present in a subject, so that while they are not the subjects of accidents, they have something as their subject. Hence, when an accident is joined to a singular substance, the expression stating this can only mean that an accident belongs to a singular substance, as musical belongs to Coriscus when Coriscus is said to be musical.
lib. 5 l. 7 n. 6 Sed, cum dicitur homo musicus, potest esse duplex ratio dicti. Aut enim hoc dicitur, quia musicum accidit homini, per quod significatur substantia, et ex hoc competit sibi quod possit substare accidenti. Aut hoc ideo dicit, quia ambo, scilicet homo et musicus, insunt alicui singulari, sicut Corisco: sicut musicum dicebatur iustum, quia eidem singulari insunt, et eodem modo, scilicet per accidens. Sed forsan hoc non eodem modo; sed universalis substantia inest singulari ut genus, sicut hoc nomen animal; aut si non sit genus, saltem est in substantia subiecti, idest ut substantiale praedicatum, sicut hoc nomen homo. Sed aliud, scilicet musicum, non est ut genus vel essentiale praedicatum, sed ut habitus vel passio subiecti, vel qualecumque accidens. Ponit autem haec duo, habitum et passionem, quia quaedam accidentia sunt manentia in subiecto, sicut habitus, qui sunt difficile mobiles; quaedam autem sunt accidentia pertranseuntia et non manentia, sicut passiones. Patet igitur quod isti sunt modi, quibus aliqua dicuntur unum per accidens. 847. But when we say musical man, the expression can mean one of two things: either that musical is an accident of man, by which substance is designated, and from this it derives its ability to be the subject of an accident; or it means that both of these, man and musical, belong to some singular thing, for example, Coriscus, in the way that musical was predicated of just, because these two belong to the same singular thing and in the same way, i.e., accidentally. But perhaps the one term does not belong to the other in the same way, but in the way that universal substance belongs to the singular as a genus, as the term animal, or if it is not a genus, it at least belongs to the substance of the subject, i.e., as an essential predicate, as the term man. But the other term, namely, musical, does not have the character of a genus or essential predicate, but that of a habit or modification of the subject, or whatever sort of accident it may be. He gives these two, habit and modification, because there are some accidents which remain in their subject, such as habits, which are moved with difficulty, and others which are not permanent but transient, such as modifications. It is clear, then, that these are the ways in which things are said to be accidentally one. Kinds of unity
lib. 5 l. 7 n. 7 Deinde cum dicit secundum se ponit modos unius per se; et circa hoc duo facit. Primo ostendit quot modis dicitur unum. Secundo quot modis dicuntur multa, ibi, palam autem, et quia multa. Circa primum duo facit. Primo distinguit modos unius naturaliter, idest secundum conditiones in rebus inventas. Secundo vero logice, idest secundum intentiones logicales, ibi, amplius autem alia et cetera. Circa primum duo facit. Primo distinguit modos unius. Secundo vero ponit quamdam proprietatem consequentem ad unum, ibi, uni vero esse, est principium. Circa primum duo facit. Primo ponit modos unius. Secundo reducit eos omnes ad unum, ibi, universaliter enim quaecumque. Ponit autem in prima parte quinque modos unius. 848. But in the case (424). Then he gives the ways in which things are essentially one, and in regard to this he does two things. First, he indicates the different senses in which the term one is used; and second (880), the different senses in which the term many is used (“Moreover, it is evident”). In regard to the first he does two things. First, he gives the different senses in which things arc one from the viewpoint of nature, i.e., according to the conditions found in reality; and second (876), from the viewpoint of logic, i.e., according to the considerations of logic (“Further, some things”). In regard to the first he does two things. First, he distinguishes the different senses in which things are said to be one. Second (872), he indicates a property which accompanies unity (“But the essence of oneness”). In regard to the first he does two things. First, he sets down the different senses in which things are said to be one. Second (866), he reduces all of them to a single sense (“For in general”). In the first part he gives five senses in which the term one is used.
lib. 5 l. 7 n. 8 Quorum primus est, quod eorum quae secundum se dicuntur unum, quaedam dicuntur unum esse natura continuitatis, idest essendo continua: vel eo quod sunt continua, sicut dicit alia translatio. Sed continua dicuntur aliqua dupliciter. Quaedam enim sunt continua, sicut dicit alia litera, per aliud, quaedam secundum se. 849. (1) The first is this: some of the things which are said to be essentially one are such “by nature of their continuity,” i.e., by being continuous, or “because they are continuous,” as another translation says. But things are said to be continuous in two ways; for, as another text says, some things are continuous by reason of something other than themselves, and some in themselves.
lib. 5 l. 7 n. 9 Prosequitur ergo primo continua secundum aliud, dicens, quod continua per aliud sunt, sicut onus lignorum continuum est ratione ligaminis vel vinculi: et hoc modo ligna adinvicem conviscata dicuntur unum per viscum. Quod etiam contingit dupliciter: quia quandoque continuatio alligatorum fit secundum lineam rectam, quandoque autem secundum lineam indirectam, sicut est linea reflexa angulum continens, quae fit ex contactu duarum in una superficie, quarum applicatio non est directa. Per hunc enim modum partes animalis dicuntur unum et continuum. Sicut tibia, quae habet reflexionem, et angulum continet ad genu, dicitur una et continua, et similiter brachium. 850. First, he proceeds to deal with those things which are continuous (a) by reason of something other than themselves. He says that there are things which are continuous as a result of something else; for example, a bundle of sticks is continuous by means of a cord or binding; and in this way too pieces of wood which have been glued together are said to be one by means of the glue. Now there are also two ways in which this occurs, because the continuity of things which are fastened together (i) sometimes takes the form of a straight line, and (ii) sometimes that of a line which is not straight. This is the case, for example, with a bent line having an angle, which results from the contact of two lines in one surface in such a way that they are not joined in a straight line. And it is in this way that the parts of an animal are said to be one and continuous; for example, the leg, which is bent, and contains an angle at the knee, is said to be one and continuous; and it is the same with the arm.
lib. 5 l. 7 n. 10 Sed, cum talis continuatio, quae est per aliud, possit esse vel fieri naturaliter et arte, magis unum sunt quae sunt continua per naturam, quam quae sunt continua per artem: quia in his quae sunt continua per naturam, illud unum, per quod fit continuatio, non est extraneum a natura rei quae per ipsum continuatur, sicut accidit in his quae sunt unum per artificium, in quibus vinculum, vel viscus, vel aliquid tale est omnino extraneum a natura colligatorum. Et ita ea quae sunt naturaliter colligata, prius accedunt ad ea quae sunt secundum se continua, quae sunt maxime unum. 851. But since this kind of continuity which comes about by reason of something else can exist or come to be both by nature and by art, (b) those things which are continuous by nature are one to a greater degree than those which are continuous by art; for the unity that accounts for the continuity of things which are continuous by nature is not extrinsic to the nature of the thing which is made continuous by it, as happens in the case of things which are one by art, in which the binding or glue or something of the sort is entirely extrinsic to the nature of, the things which are joined together. Hence those things which are joined by nature hold the first place among those which are essentially continuous, which are one in the highest degree.
lib. 5 l. 7 n. 11 Et ad evidentiam huius, definit continuum, dicens, quod continuum dicitur id cuius est secundum se unus motus tantum, et non est possibile aliter. Non enim possibile est in continuo, ut diversae partes diversis motibus moveantur, sed totum continuum movetur uno motu. Dicit autem secundum se, quia possibile est ut continuum moveatur uno modo per se, et uno alio vel pluribus per accidens; sicut si homo movetur in navi per se contra motum navis, movetur nihilominus motu navis per accidens. 852. In order to make this clear he defines the continuous. He says that that is said to be continuous which has only one motion essentially and cannot be otherwise. For the different parts of any continuous thing cannot be moved by different motions, but the whole continuous thing is moved by one motion. He says “essentially” because a continuous thing can be moved in one way essentially and in another or others accidentally. For example, if a man in a ship moves against the motion of the ship essentially, he is still moved accidentally by the motion of the ship.
lib. 5 l. 7 n. 12 Ad hoc autem quod sit unus motus, oportet quod sit indivisibilis: et hoc dico secundum tempus, ut videlicet simul dum movetur una pars continui, moveatur et alia. Non enim contingit in continuo quod una pars moveatur et alia quiescat, vel quod una quiescat et alia moveatur, ut sic motus diversarum partium continui sint in diversis partibus temporis. 853. Now in order for motion to be one it must be indivisible; and by this I mean from the viewpoint of time, in the sense that at the same time that one part of a continuous thing is moved another is also moved. For it is impossible that one part of a continuous thing should be in motion and another at rest, or that one part should be at rest and another in motion, so that the motion of the different parts should take place in different parts of time.
lib. 5 l. 7 n. 13 Ideo autem hic definit philosophus continuum per motum et non per unitatem termini, ad quem partes continui coniunguntur, sicut in praedicamentis et in libro physicorum habetur, quia ex ista definitione potest sumi diversus gradus unitatis in diversis continuis, sicut postea patebit, non autem ex definitione ibi data. 854. Therefore the Philosopher defines the continuous here by means of motion, and not by means of the oneness of the boundary at which the parts of the continuous things are joined, as is stated in the Categories, and in the Physics; because from this definition he can consider different grades of unity in different continuous things (as will be made clear later on [856]), but he cannot do this from the definition given there.
lib. 5 l. 7 n. 14 Sciendum est autem, quod hoc quod hic dicitur, quod motus continui indivisibilis est secundum tempus, non est contrarium ei quod probatur in sexto physicorum, scilicet, quod tempus motus dividitur secundum partes mobilis. Hic enim loquitur philosophus quantum ad motum absolute, quia scilicet non ante incipit moveri una pars continui quam alia: ibi autem loquitur referendo ad aliquod signum, quod signatur in magnitudine, per quam fit motus. Illud enim signum, quod est prior pars magnitudinis, in priori tempore transitur, licet etiam in illa priori parte temporis aliae partes mobilis continui moveantur. 855. Moreover, it should be noted that what is said here about the motion of a continuous thing being indivisible from the viewpoint of time is not opposed to the point proved in Book VI of the Physics, that the time of a motion is divided according to the parts of the thing moved. For here the Philosopher is speaking of motion in an unqualified sense, because one part of a continuous thing does not begin to be moved before another part does; but there he is speaking of some designation which is made in the continuous quantity over which motion passes. For that designation, which is the first part of a continuous quantity, is traversed in a prior time, although in that prior time other parts of the continuous thing that is in motion are also moved.
lib. 5 l. 7 n. 15 Deinde cum dicit secundum se prosequitur de illis quae sunt secundum se continua, dicens, quod illa sunt secundum se continua quae non dicuntur unum per contactum. Quod sic probat. Illa enim, quae se tangunt, ut duo ligna, non dicuntur unum lignum, nec unum corpus, nec unum aliquid aliud quod pertineat ad genus continui. Et sic patet quod alia est unitas continuorum, et alia tangentium. Quae enim sunt se tangentia non habent unitatem continuitatis per seipsa, sed per aliquod vinculum quod ea coniungit. Sed illa quae sunt continua, dicuntur unum secundum se, quamvis habeant reflexionem. Duae enim lineae reflexae continuantur ad unum communem terminum, qui est punctus in loco ubi constituitur angulus. 856. Again, all those (425). Then he proceeds to deal with things which are essentially continuous. He says that those things are essentially continuous which are said to be one not by contact. He proves this as follows: things which touch each other, as two pieces of wood, are not said to be one piece of wood or one body or any other kind of one which belongs to the class of the continuous. Hence it is evident that the oneness of things which are continuous differs from that of things which touch each other. For those things which touch each other do not have any unity of continuity of themselves but by reason of some bond which unites them; but those things which are continuous are said to be essentially one even though they are bent. For two bent lines are continuous in relation to one common boundary, which is the point at which the angle is formed.
lib. 5 l. 7 n. 16 Sed tamen magis sunt unum quae per se sunt continua sine reflexione. Cuius ratio est, quia linea recta non potest habere nisi unum motum in omnibus partibus suis. Linea vero reflexa potest habere unum motum, et duos motus. Potest enim intelligi linea reflexa tota moveri in unam partem: et iterum potest intelligi quod una parte quiescente, alia pars, quae cum parte quiescente continet angulum, appropinquet per suum motum ad partem quiescentem, sicut quando tibia vel crus applicatur ad coxam, quae hic dicitur femur. Unde utrumque eorum, scilicet tibia vel coxa, sunt magis unum quam scelos, ut habetur in Graeco, idest quam id quod est compositum ex tibia et coxa. 857. Yet those things are one to a greater degree which are essentially continuous and without a bend. The reason is that a straight line can have only one motion in all of its parts, whereas a bent line can have one or two motions. For the whole of a bent line can be understood to be moved in one part; and it can also be understood that when one part is at rest, the other part, which makes an angle with the part at rest, can come closer by its motion to the unmoved part; for example, when the lower leg or shin is bent in the direction of the upper leg, which here is called the thigh. Hence each of these—the shin and thigh—is one to a greater degree “than the scelos,” as the Greek text says, i.e. the whole composed of the shin and thigh.
lib. 5 l. 7 n. 17 Sciendum autem, quod litera quae habet curvitatem loco reflexionis, falsa est. Constat enim quod partes lineae curvae angulum non continentes, oportet quod simul moveantur et simul quiescant, sicut partes lineae rectae; quod non accidit in reflexa, ut dictum est. 858. Further, it must be noted that the text which reads “curved” instead of “bent” is false. For, since the parts of a curved line do not contain an angle, it is evident that they must be in motion together or at rest together, just as the parts of a straight line are; but this does not happen in the case of a bent line, as has been stated (857).
lib. 5 l. 7 n. 18 Secundum modum ponit ibi, amplius alio dicit, quod secundo modo dicitur unum, non tantum ratione continuae quantitatis, sed ex eo quod subiectum totum est indifferens forma secundum speciem. Quaedam enim esse possunt continua quae tamen in subiecto sunt diversa secundum speciem; sicut si continuetur aurum argento, vel aliqua huiusmodi. Et tunc talia duo erunt unum si attendatur sola quantitas, non autem si attendatur natura subiecti. Si vero totum subiectum continuum sit unius formae secundum speciem, erit unum et secundum rationem quantitatis et secundum rationem naturae. 859. Again, a thing (426). (2) Here he gives the second way in which things are one. He says that a thing is said to be one in a second way not merely by reason of continuous quantity but because of the fact that the whole subject is uniform in species. For some things can be continuous even though they differ in species; for example, when gold is continuous with silver or something of this kind. And then two such things will be one if quantity alone is considered but not if the nature of the subject is considered. But if the whole continuous subject is uniform in species, it will be one both from the viewpoint of quantity and from that of nature.
lib. 5 l. 7 n. 19 Subiectum autem dicitur esse indifferens secundum speciem, quando eadem species sensibilis non dividitur, ita quod sint diversae formae sensibiles in diversis partibus subiecti, sicut quandoque contingit quod unius corporis sensibilis una pars est alba, et alia nigra. Hoc autem subiectum indifferens potest accipi dupliciter. Uno modo subiectum primum. Alio modo subiectum finale sive ultimum, ad quod pervenitur in fine divisionis. Sicut patet quod totum vinum dicitur unum esse, quia partes eius communicant in uno primo subiecto quod est indifferens secundum speciem. Et similiter est de aqua. Omnes enim liquores sive humores dicuntur unum in uno ultimo. Nam oleum et vinum et omnia huiusmodi resolvuntur ultimo in aquam vel aerem, qui in omnibus est radix humiditatis. 860. Now a subject is said to be uniform in species when the same sensible form is not divided in such a way that there are different sensible forms in different parts of the subject, as it sometimes happens, for example, that one part of a sensible body is white and another black. And this subject, which does not differ in species, can be taken in two ways: in one way as the first subject, and in another as the last or ultimate subject which is reached at the end of a division. It is evident, for example, that a whole amount of wine is said to be one because its parts are parts of one common subject which is undifferentiated specifically. The same is true of water. For all liquids or moist things are said to be one insofar as they have a single ultimate subject. For oil and wine and the like are ultimately dissolved into water or air, which is the root of moistness in all things.
lib. 5 l. 7 n. 20 Tertium modum ponit ibi, dicuntur autem dicit, quod aliqua dicuntur unum, quorum genus est unum, oppositis differentiis divisum. Et ille modus habet aliquam similitudinem cum praecedenti. Ibi enim aliqua dicebantur esse unum, quia genus subiectum est unum: hic etiam aliqua dicuntur esse unum, quia eorum genus, quod est subiectum differentiis, est unum; sicut homo et equus et canis dicuntur unum, quia communicant in animali, quasi in uno genere, subiecto differentiis. Differt tamen hic modus a praedicto, quia in illo modo subiectum erat unum non distinctum per formas; hic autem genus subiectum est unum distinctum per diversas differentias quasi per diversas formas. 861. And those things (427). (3) Then he indicates the third way in which things are said to be one. He says that those things are said to be one whose genus is one, even though it is divided by opposite differences. And this way resembles the preceding one; for some things were said to be one in the preceding way because their subject-genus is one, and now some things are said to be one because their genus, which is the subject of differences, is one; for example, a man and a horse and a dog are said to be one because they have animality in common as one genus, which is the subject of differences. Yet this way differs from the preceding, because in the preceding way the subject was one thing which was not differentiated by forms; but here the subject-genus is one thing which is differentiated by various differences, as though by various forms.
lib. 5 l. 7 n. 21 Et sic patet quod propinquissimo modo dicuntur aliqua esse unum genere, et similiter sicut aliqua dicuntur esse unum materia. Nam illa etiam quae dicuntur esse unum materia, distinguuntur per formas. Genus enim, licet non sit materia, quia non praedicaretur de specie, cum materia sit pars, tamen ratio generis sumitur ab eo quod est materiale in re; sicut ratio differentiae ab eo quod est formale. Non enim anima rationalis est differentia hominis, cum de homine non praedicetur; sed habens animam rationalem, quod significat hoc nomen rationale. Et similiter natura sensitiva non est genus hominis, sed pars. Habens etiam naturam sensitivam, quod nomine animalis significatur, est hominis genus. Similiter ergo et propinquus modus est quo aliqua sunt unum materia et unum genere. 862. Thus it is evident that some things are said to be one in genus in a most proximate sense, and in a way similar to that in which some things are said to be one in matter. For those things which are said to be one in matter are also differentiated by forms. For even though a genus is not matter, because it would then not be predicated of a species since matter is part of a thing, still the notion of a genus is taken from what is material in a thing, just as the notion of a difference is taken from what is formal. For the rational soul is not the difference of man (since it is not predicated of man), but something having a rational soul (for this is what the term rational signifies). Similarly, sensory nature is not the genus of man but a part. But something having a sensory nature, which the term animal Signifies, is the genus of man. In a similar fashion, then, the way in which things are one in matter is closely related to that in which they are one in genus.
lib. 5 l. 7 n. 22 Sed sciendum est, quod unum ratione generis dicitur dupliciter. Quandoque enim aliqua dicuntur ita unum in genere sicut dictum est, quia scilicet eorum unum est genus qualitercumque. Quandoque vero non dicuntur aliqua esse unum in genere, nisi in genere superiori, quod cum adiunctione unitatis vel identitatis praedicatur de ultimis speciebus generis inferioris, quando sunt aliquae aliae superiores species supremi generis, in quarum una infinitae species conveniunt. Sicut figura est unum genus supremum continens sub se multas species, scilicet circulum, triangulum, quadratum, et huiusmodi. Et triangulus etiam continet diversas species, scilicet aequilaterum, qui dicitur isopleurus, et triangulum duorum aequalium laterum, qui dicitur aequitibiarum vel isosceles. Isti igitur duo trianguli dicuntur una figura, quod est genus remotum, sed non unus triangulus, quod est genus proximum. Cuius ratio est, quia hi duo trianguli non differunt per differentias quibus dividitur figura. Differunt autem per differentias quibus dividitur triangulus. Idem autem dicitur a quo aliquid non differt differentia. 863. But it must be borne in mind that to he one in generic character has two meanings. For sometimes some things are said to be one in genus, as has been stated, because they belong to one genus, whatever it may be. But sometimes some things are said to be one in genus only in reference to a higher genus, which, along with the designation “one” or “the same,” is predicated of the last species of a lower genus when there are other higher species in one of which the lower species agree. For example, figure is one supreme genus which has many species under it, namely, circle, triangle, square, and the like. And triangle also has different species, namely, the equilateral, which is called iso-pleural and the triangle with two equal sides, which is called equi-legged or isosceles. Hence these two triangles are said to be one figure, which is their remote genus, but not one triangle, which is their proximate genus. The reason for this is that these two triangles do not differ by any differences which divide figure, but by differences which divide triangle. And the term same means that from which something does not differ by a difference.
lib. 5 l. 7 n. 23 Quartum modum ponit ibi, amplius autem dicit quod unum etiam dicuntur, quaecumque ita se habent quod definitio unius, quae est ratio significans quid est esse, non dividitur a definitione alterius, quae significat etiam quid est esse eius. Ipsa enim definitio, scilicet secundum se, oportet quod sit divisibilis, cum constet ex genere et differentia. Sed potest esse quod definitio unius sit indivisibilis a definitione alterius, quando duo habent unam definitionem; sive illae definitiones significent totum hoc quod est in definito, sicut tunica et indumentum: et tunc sunt simpliciter unum, quorum definitio est una: sive illa communis definitio non totaliter comprehendat rationem duorum, quae in ea conveniunt, sicut bos et equus conveniunt in una definitione animalis. Unde numquam sunt unum simpliciter, sed secundum quid, in quantum scilicet utrumque eorum est animal. Et similiter augmentum et diminutio conveniunt in una definitione generis, quia utraque est motus secundum quantitatem. Similiter in omnibus superficiebus est una definitio huius speciei quae est superficies. 864. (4) He now describes the fourth way in which things are said to be one. He says that things such that the definition of one (which is the concept signifying its quiddity) is not distinguished from the definition of the other (which also signifies its quiddity) are also said to be one. For while every definition must be divisible or distinguishable in itself, or essentially, since it is composed of genus and difference, it is possible for the definition of one thing to be indistinguishable from that of another when the two have one definition. And this applies (a) whether those definitions signify the total [intelligible structure] of the thing defined, as tunic and clothing (and then things whose definition is one are one in an absolute sense), or (b) whether that common definition does not totally comprehend the intelligible structure of the two things which have it in common, as an ox and a horse have in common the one definition of animal. Hence they are never one in an absolute sense, but only in a relative sense inasmuch as each is an animal. The same applies in the case of increase and decrease; for there is one common definition of the genus, because each is a motion relating to quantity. And the same thing is true of plane figures, for there is one definition of the species, plane figure.
lib. 5 l. 7 n. 24 Quintum modum ponit ibi, omnino vero dicit, quod omnino idest perfecte et maxime sunt unum, quorum intellectus intelligens quidditatem eorum est omnino indivisibilis, sicut simplicia, quae non componuntur ex principiis materialibus et formalibus. Unde intellectus accipiens quidditatem eorum, non comprehendit ea, quasi componens definitionem eorum ex diversis principiis; sed magis per modum negationis, sicut punctus est, cuius pars non est: vel etiam per modum habitudinis ad composita, sicut si dicatur quod unitas est principium numeri. Et, quia talia habent intellectum indivisibilem in seipsis, ea autem quae sunt quocumque modo divisa, possunt intelligi separatim, ideo sequitur quod huiusmodi sunt inseparabilia, et secundum tempus, et secundum locum, et secundum rationem. Et propter hoc sunt maxime unum; praecipue illud quod est indivisibile in genere substantiae. Nam quod est indivisibile in genere accidentis, etsi ipsum in se non sit compositum, est tamen alteri compositum, idest subiecto in quo est. Indivisibilis autem substantia, neque secundum se composita est, nec alteri componitur. Vel ly substantia, potest esse ablativi casus. Et tunc est sensus, quod licet aliqua dicantur unum quia sunt indivisibilia secundum locum vel tempus vel rationem, tamen inter ea illa maxime dicuntur unum, quae non dividuntur secundum substantiam. Et redit in eumdem sensum cum priore. 865. And those things (429). (5) He gives the fifth way in which things are one. He says that those things are “altogether” one, i.e., perfectly, and in the highest degree, whose concept, which grasps their quiddity, is altogether indivisible, like simple things, which are not composed of material and formal principles. Hence the concept which embraces their quiddity does not comprehend them in such a way as to form a definition of them from different principles, but (a) rather grasps them negatively, as happens in the case of a point, which has no parts; or (b) it even comprehends them by relating them to composite things, as happens, for example, when someone defines the unit as the principle of number. And because such things have in themselves an indivisible concept, and things which are divided in any way at all can be understood separately, it therefore follows that such things are indivisible both in time and in place and in their intelligible structure. Hence these things are one in the highest degree, and especially those which are indivisible in the genus of substance. For even though what is indivisible in the genus of accident is not composite in itself, nonetheless it does form a composite with something else, namely, the subject in which it inheres. But an indivisible substance is neither composite in itself nor does it form a composite with something else. Or the term substance can be taken in the ablative case, and then the sense is that, even though some things are said to be one because they are indivisible in time and in place and in definition, still those things in this class which are indivisible in substance are said to be one in the highest degree. This sense is reduced to the preceding one.

Lecture 8

Latin English
lib. 5 l. 8 n. 1 Hic philosophus reducit omnes modos ad unum primum; et circa hoc duo facit. Primo ponit reductionem praedictam. Secundo super modos positos ponit alium modum unitatis, ibi, amplius autem et cetera. Dicit ergo primo, quod ex hoc patet, quod illa quae sunt penitus indivisibilia, maxime dicuntur unum: quia ad hunc modum omnes alii modi reducuntur, quia universaliter hoc est verum, quod quaecumque non habent divisionem, secundum hoc dicuntur unum, inquantum divisionem non habent. Sicut quae non dividuntur in eo quod est homo, dicuntur unum in homine, sicut Socrates et Plato. Et quae non dividuntur in ratione animalis, dicuntur unum in animali. Et quae non dividuntur in magnitudine vel mensura, dicuntur unum secundum magnitudinem, sicut continua. 866. Here the Philosopher reduces all senses in which things are said to be one to one primary sense, and in regard to this he does two things. First, he makes this reduction; and second (870), to those senses in which things are said to be one, which have already been given, he adds another (“Again, in one sense”). He accordingly says, first, that it is evident from what precedes that things which are indivisible in every way are said to be one in the highest degree. For all the other senses in which things are said to be one are reducible to this sense, because it is universally true that those things which do not admit of division are said to be one insofar as they do not admit of division. For example, those things which are undivided insofar as they are man are said to be one in humanity, as Socrates and Plato; those which are undivided in the notion of animality are said to be one in animality; and those which are undivided from the viewpoint of extension or measure are said to be one in quantity, as continuous things.
lib. 5 l. 8 n. 2 Et ex hoc potest accipi etiam numerus et diversitas modorum unius suprapositorum; quia unum aut est indivisibile simpliciter, aut indivisibile secundum quid. Siquidem simpliciter, sic est ultimus modus, qui est principalis. Si autem est indivisibile secundum quid, aut secundum quantitatem tantum, aut secundum naturam. Si secundum quantitatem, sic est primus modus. Si secundum naturam, aut quantum ad subiectum, aut quantum ad divisionem quae se tenet ex parte formae. Si quantum ad subiectum, vel quantum ad subiectum reale, et sic est secundus modus. Vel quantum ad subiectum rationis, et sic est tertius modus. Indivisibilitas autem formae, quae est indivisibilitas rationis, idest definitionis, facit quartum modum. 867. And from this we can also derive number and the types of unity given above, because what is one is indivisible either in an absolute sense or in a qualified one. (5) If it is indivisible in an absolute sense, it is the last type of unity, which is a principle; but if it is indivisible in a qualified sense, it is so either in quantity alone or in nature. (1) If it is indivisible in quantity, then it is the first type. If it is indivisible in nature, it is so either in reference to its subject or to the division which depends upon the form. If it is divisible in reference to its subject, (2) it is so either in reference to a real subject, and then it is the second type, or (3) to a logical subject, and then it is the third type. (4) And indivisibility of form, which is indivisibility of intelligible structure, or definition, constitutes the fourth type.
lib. 5 l. 8 n. 3 Ex his autem modis ulterius aliqui alii modi derivantur. Plurima autem sunt, quae dicuntur unum, ex eo quod faciunt unum; sicut plures homines dicuntur unum, ex hoc quod trahunt navem. Et etiam dicuntur aliqua unum, ex eo quod unum patiuntur; sicut multi homines sunt unus populus, ex eo quod ab uno rege reguntur. Quaedam vero dicuntur unum ex eo quod habent aliquid unum, sicut multi possessores unius agri sunt unum in dominio eius. Quaedam etiam dicuntur unum ex hoc quod sunt aliquid unum; sicut multi homines albi dicuntur unum, quia quilibet eorum albus est. 868. Now from these senses of the term one certain others are again derived. Thus there are many things which are said to be one because they are doing one thing. For example, many men are said to be one insofar as they are rowing a boat. And some things are said to be one because they are subject to one thing; for example, many men constitute one people because they are ruled by one king. And some are said to be one because they possess one thing; for example, many owners of a field are said to be one in their ownership of it. And some things are also said to be one because they are something which is one; for example, many men are said to be one because each of them is white.
lib. 5 l. 8 n. 4 Sed respectu omnium istorum modorum secundariorum, primo dicuntur unum illa quae sunt unum secundum suam substantiam, de quibus supra dictum est in quinque modis suprapositis. Una namque substantia est, aut ratione continuitatis, sicut in primo modo: aut propter speciem subiecti, sicut in secundo modo, et etiam in tertio, prout unitas generis aliquid habet simile cum unitate speciei: aut etiam propter rationem, sicut in quarto et in quinto modo. Et quod adhuc ex his modis aliqua dicantur unum, patet per oppositum. Aliqua enim sunt numero plura, vel numerantur ut plura, quia non sunt continua, vel quia non habent speciem unam, vel quia non conveniunt in una ratione. 869. But considering all of these secondary senses in which things are said to be one, which have already been stated in the five ways given above, we can say that those things are one in the primary sense which are one in their substance.(1) For a thing is one in substance either by reason of its continuity, as in the first way; or (2) because of the species of the subject, as in the second way; (3) and again in the third way because the unity of the genus is somewhat similar to the unity of the species; or also (4 & 5) because of the intelligible structure, as in the fourth and fifth ways. That some things are said to be one in these ways is clear from the opposite of one. For things are many in number, i.e., they are counted as many, either because they are continuous, or because they do not have one species, or because they do not have one common intelligible structure.
lib. 5 l. 8 n. 5 Deinde cum dicit amplius autem addit alium modum a supradictis, qui non sumitur ex ratione indivisionis sicut praedicti, sed magis ex ratione divisionis; et dicit, quod quandoque aliqua dicuntur unum propter solam continuitatem, quandoque vero non, nisi sit aliquod totum et perfectum; quod quidem contingit quando habet aliquam unam speciem, non quidem sicut subiectum homogeneum dicitur unum specie quod pertinet ad secundum modum positum prius, sed secundum quod species in quadam totalitate consistit requirens determinatum ordinem partium; sicut patet quod non dicimus unum aliquid, ut artificiatum, quando videmus partes calceamenti qualitercumque compositas, nisi forte secundum quod accipitur unum pro continuo; sed tunc dicimus esse unum omnes partes calceamenti, quando sic sunt compositae, quod sit calceamentum et habeat aliquam unam speciem, scilicet calceamenti. 870. Again, in one sense (430)Then he gives an additional sense in which the term one is used, which differs from the preceding ones. This sense is not derived from thr- notion of indivision, as the foregoing are, but rather from the notion of division. He says that sometimes some things are said to be one because of continuity alone, and sometimes they are said to be one only if they constitute a whole and something complete. Now this happens when the thing has one form, not in the sense that a homogeneous subject is said to have one form, which pertains to the second type given above, but in the sense that the form consists in a kind of totality requiring a definite order of parts. Thus it is clear that we do not say that a thing is one, for example, some artifact such as a shoe, when we see the parts put together in any way at all (unless perhaps it is taken to be one insofar as it is continuous); but we say that all parts of a shoe are one when they are united in such a way that the thing is a shoe and has one form-that of a shoe.
lib. 5 l. 8 n. 6 Et ex hoc patet, quod linea circularis est maxime una; quia non solum habet continuitatem, sicut linea recta; sed etiam habet totalitatem et perfectionem, quod non habet linea recta. Perfectum est enim et totum, cui nihil deest: quod quidem contingit lineae circulari. Non enim potest sibi fieri additio, sicut fit lineae rectae. 871. And from this it is clear that a circular line is one in the highest degree. For a circular line is not only continuous like a straight line, but also has a totality and completeness which a straight line does not have; for that is complete and whole which lacks nothing. Now this characteristic belongs to a circular line; for nothing can be added to a circular line, but something can be added to a straight one.
lib. 5 l. 8 n. 7 Deinde cum dicit uni vero ponit quamdam proprietatem consequentem unum; et dicit, quod ratio unius est in hoc, quod sit principium alicuius numeri. Quod ex hoc patet, quia unum est prima mensura numeri, quo omnis numerus mensuratur: mensura autem habet rationem principii, quia per mensuram res mensuratae cognoscuntur, res autem cognoscuntur per sua propria principia. Et ex hoc patet, quod unum est principium noti vel cognoscibilis circa quodlibet, et est in omnibus principium cognoscendi. 872. But the essence (432). Then he indicates a property which flows from oneness or unity. He says that the essence of one consists in being the principle of some number. This is clear from the fact that the unit is the primary numerical measure by which every number is measured. Now a measure has the character of a principle, because measured things are known by their measure, and things are known by their proper principles. And it is clear from this that unity is the first principle of what is known or knowable about each thing, and that it is the principle of knowing in all classes.
lib. 5 l. 8 n. 8 Hoc autem unum, quod est principium cognoscendi, non est idem in omnibus generibus. In genere enim consonantiarum est unum, quod est diesis, quod est minimum in consonantiis. Diesis enim est semitonium minus. Dividitur enim tonus in duo semitonia inaequalia, quorum unus dicitur diesis. In vocibus autem unum primum et minimum est litera vocalis, aut consonans; et magis vocalis quam consonans, ut in decimo dicetur. Et in gravitatibus sive ponderibus est aliquid minimum, quod est mensura, scilicet uncia, vel aliquid aliud huiusmodi. Et in motibus est una prima mensura, quae mensurat alios motus, scilicet motus simplicissimus et velocissimus, sicut est motus diurnus. 873. But this unity which is the principle of knowing is not the same in all classes of things. For in the class of musical sounds it is the lesser half tone, which is the smallest thing in this class; for a lesser half tone is less than a half tone since a tone is divided into two unequal half tones one of which is called a lesser half tone. And in the class of words the first and smallest unity is the vowel or consonant; and the vowel to a greater degree than the consonant, as will be stated in Book X (831:C 1971). And in the class of heavy things or weights there is some smallest thing which is their measure, i.e., the ounce or something of this kind. And in the class of motions there is one first measure which measures the other motions, namely, the simplest and swiftest motion, which is the diurnal motion.
lib. 5 l. 8 n. 9 In omnibus tamen istis hoc est commune, quod illud, quod est prima mensura, est indivisibile secundum quantitatem, vel secundum speciem. Quod igitur est in genere quantitatis unum et primum, oportet quod sit indivisibile et secundum quantitatem. Si autem sit omnino indivisibile et secundum quantitatem et non habeat positionem, dicitur unitas. Punctus vero est id, quod est omnino indivisibile secundum quantitatem et tamen habet positionem. Linea vero est quod est divisibile secundum unam dimensionem tantum: superficies vero secundum duas. Corpus autem est omnibus modis divisibile secundum quantitatem, scilicet secundum tres dimensiones. Et hae descriptiones convertuntur. Nam omne quod duabus dimensionibus dividitur, est superficies, et sic de aliis. 874. Yet all of these have this feature in common that the first measure is indivisible in quantity or in species. Hence, in order that something be one and first in the genus of quantity it must be indivisible, and indivisible in quantity. It is called a unit if it is indivisible in every way and has no position, and a point if it is altogether indivisible in quantity but has position. A line is something divisible in one dimension only; a surface, in two; and a body, in all, i.e., in three dimensions. And these descriptions are reversible; for everything that is divisible in two dimensions is a surface, and so on with the others.
lib. 5 l. 8 n. 10 Sciendum est autem quod esse mensuram est propria ratio unius secundum quod est principium numeri. Hoc autem non est idem cum uno quod convertitur cum ente, ut in quarto dictum est. Ratio enim illius unius in sola indivisione consistit: huiusmodi autem unius in mensuratione. Sed tamen haec ratio mensurae, licet primo conveniat uni quod est principium numeri, tamen per quamdam similitudinem derivatur ad unum in aliis generibus, ut in decimo huius philosophus ostendet. Et secundum hoc ratio mensurae invenitur in quolibet genere. Haec autem ratio mensurae consequitur rationem indivisionis, sicut habitum est. Et ideo unum non omnino aequivoce dicitur de eo quod convertitur cum ente, et de eo quod est principium numeri; sed secundum prius et posterius. 875. Again, it must be noted that being a measure is the distinctive characteristic of unity insofar as it is the principle of number. But this unity or one is not the same as that which is interchangeable with being, as has been stated in Book IV (303:C 557). For the concept of the latter kind of unity involves only being undivided, but that of the former kind involves being a measure. But even though this character of a measure belongs to the unity which is the principle of number, still by a kind of likeness it is transferred to the unity found in other classes of things, as the Philosopher will show in Book X of this work (814:C 1921). And according to this the character of a measure is found in any class of things. But this character of a measure is a natural consequence of the note of undividedness, as has been explained (432:C 872). Hence the term one is not predicated in a totally equivocal sense of the unity which is interchangeable with being and of that which is the principle of number, but it is predicated of one primarily and of the other secondarily.
lib. 5 l. 8 n. 11 Deinde cum dicit amplius autem ponit aliam divisionem unius, quae est magis logica; dicens, quod quaedam sunt unum numero, quaedam specie, quaedam genere, quaedam analogia. Numero quidem sunt unum, quorum materia est una. Materia enim, secundum quod stat sub dimensionibus signatis, est principium individuationis formae. Et propter hoc ex materia habet singulare quod sit unum numero ab aliis divisum. 876. Further, some things (433). Then he gives another way of dividing unity, and this division is rather from the viewpoint of logic. He says that some things are one in number, some in species, some in genus, and some analogically. Those things are one in number whose matter is one; for insofar as matter has certain designated dimensions it is the principle by which a form is individuated. And for this reason a singular thing is numerically one and divided from other things as a result of matter.
lib. 5 l. 8 n. 12 Specie autem dicuntur unum, quorum una est ratio, idest definitio. Nam nihil proprie definitur nisi species, cum omnis definitio ex genere et differentia constet. Et si aliquod genus definitur, hoc est inquantum est species. 877. Those things are said to be one in species which have one “intelligible structure,” or definition; for the only thing that is defined in a proper sense is the species, since every definition is composed of a genus and a difference. And if any genus is defined, this happens in so far as it is a species.
lib. 5 l. 8 n. 13 Unum vero genere sunt, quae conveniunt in figura praedicationis, idest quae habent unum modum praedicandi. Alius enim est modus quo praedicatur substantia, et quo praedicatur qualitas vel actio; sed omnes substantiae habent unum modum praedicandi, inquantum praedicantur non ut in subiecto existentes. 878. Those things are one in genus which have in common one of the “figures of predication,” i.e., which have one way of being predicated. For the way in which substance is predicated and that in which quality or action is predicated are different; but all substances have one way of being predicated inasmuch as they are not predicated as something which is present in a subject.
lib. 5 l. 8 n. 14 Proportione vero vel analogia sunt unum quaecumque in hoc conveniunt, quod hoc se habet ad illud sicut aliud ad aliud. Et hoc quidem potest accipi duobus modis, vel in eo quod aliqua duo habent diversas habitudines ad unum; sicut sanativum de urina dictum habitudinem significat signi sanitatis; de medicina vero, quia significat habitudinem causae respectu eiusdem. Vel in eo quod est eadem proportio duorum ad diversa, sicut tranquillitatis ad mare et serenitatis ad aerem. Tranquillitas enim est quies maris et serenitas aeris. 879. And those things are proportionally or analogically one which agree in this respect that one is related to another as some third thing is to a fourth. Now this can be taken in two ways: (1) either in the sense that any two things are related in different ways to one third thing (for example, the term healthy is predicated of urine because it signifies the relationship of a sign of health [to health itself]; and of medicine because it signifies the relationship of a cause to the same health); (2) or it may be taken in the sense that the proportion of two things to two other things is the same (for example, tranquillity to the sea and serenity to the air; for tranquillity is a state of rest in the sea, and serenity is a state of rest in the air).
lib. 5 l. 8 n. 15 In istis autem modis unius, semper posterius sequitur ad praecedens et non convertitur. Quaecumque enim sunt unum numero, sunt specie unum et non convertitur. Et idem patet in aliis. 880. Now with regard to the ways in which things are one, the latter types of unity always follow the former, and not the reverse; for those things which are one in number are one in species, but not the other way about. The same thing is clear in the other cases.
lib. 5 l. 8 n. 16 Deinde cum dicit palam autem ex modis unius accipit modos multorum; et dicit, quod multa dicuntur per oppositum ad unum. Et ideo quot modis dicitur unum, tot modis dicuntur multa; quia quoties dicitur unum oppositorum, toties dicitur et reliquum. Unde aliqua dicuntur multa propter hoc, quod non sunt continua. Quod est per oppositum ad primum modum unius. 881. Moreover, itis evident (434). From the ways in which things are said to be one he now derives the ways in which things are said to be many. He says that things are said to be many in just as many ways as they are said to be one, because in the case of opposite terms one is used in as many ways as the other. (1) Hence some things are said to be many because they are not continuous, which is the opposite of the first way in which things are one.
lib. 5 l. 8 n. 17 Alia dicuntur multa propter hoc quod materiam habent divisam secundum speciem, sive intelligamus de materia prima, idest proxima, aut de finali sive ultima, in quam ultimo fit resolutio. Per divisionem quippe proximae materiae dicuntur multa vinum et oleum: per divisionem vero materiae remotae, vinum et lapis. Et si materia accipiatur tam pro materia naturae quam pro materia rationis, scilicet pro genere quod habet similitudinem materiae, hic modus multitudinis sumitur per oppositum ad secundum et tertium modum unius. 882. (2 & 3) Other things are said to be many because their matter is divisible in species, whether we understand by matter “the first,” i.e., their proximate matter, or the final or ultimate matter into which they are ultimately dissolved. Indeed, it is by the division of their proximate matter that wine and oil are said to be many, and by the division of their remote matter that wine and a stone are said to be many. And if matter be taken both for real matter and for conceptual matter, i.e., for a genus, which resembles matter, many in this sense is taken as the opposite of the second and third ways in which things are said to be one.
lib. 5 l. 8 n. 18 Alia vero dicuntur multa quae habent rationes, quod quid est esse dicentes, plures. Et hoc sumitur per oppositum ad quartum modum. 883. (4) And still other things are said to be many when the conceptions which express their essence are many. And many in this sense is taken as the opposite of the fourth way in which things are said to be one.
lib. 5 l. 8 n. 19 Quod autem opponitur quinto modo, nondum habet rationem pluralitatis nisi secundum quid et in potentia. Non enim ex hoc quod aliquid est divisibile propter hoc est multa nisi in potentia. 884. (5) But the opposite of the fifth way in which things are one does not have the notion of many except in a qualified sense and potentially; for the fact that a thing is divisible does not make it many except potentially.

Lecture 9

Latin English
lib. 5 l. 9 n. 1 Hic philosophus distinguit quot modis dicitur ens. Et circa hoc tria facit. Primo distinguit ens in ens per se et per accidens. Secundo distinguit modos entis per accidens, ibi, secundum accidens quidem et cetera. Tertio modos entis per se, ibi, secundum se vero. Dicit ergo, quod ens dicitur quoddam secundum se, et quoddam secundum accidens. Sciendum tamen est quod illa divisio entis non est eadem cum illa divisione qua dividitur ens in substantiam et accidens. Quod ex hoc patet, quia ipse postmodum, ens secundum se dividit in decem praedicamenta, quorum novem sunt de genere accidentis. Ens igitur dividitur in substantiam et accidens, secundum absolutam entis considerationem, sicut ipsa albedo in se considerata dicitur accidens, et homo substantia. Sed ens secundum accidens prout hic sumitur, oportet accipi per comparationem accidentis ad substantiam. Quae quidem comparatio significatur hoc verbo, est, cum dicitur, homo est albus. Unde hoc totum, homo est albus, est ens per accidens. Unde patet quod divisio entis secundum se et secundum accidens, attenditur secundum quod aliquid praedicatur de aliquo per se vel per accidens. Divisio vero entis in substantiam et accidens attenditur secundum hoc quod aliquid in natura sua est vel substantia vel accidens. 885. Here the Philosopher gives the various senses in which the term being is used, and in regard to this he does three things. First, he divides being into essential being and accidental being. Second (886), he distinguishes between the types of accidental being (“Accidental being”). Third (889), he distinguishes between the types of essential being (“On the other hand”). He says, then, that while things are said to be both essentially and accidentally, it should be noted that this division of being is not the same as that whereby being is divided into substance and accident. This is clear from the fact that he later divides essential being into the ten predicaments, nine of which belong to the class of accident (889). Hence being is divided into substance and accident insofar as it is considered in an absolute sense; for example, whiteness considered in itself is called an accident, and man a substance. But accidental being, in the sense in which it is taken here must be understood by comparing an accident with a substance; and this comparison is signified by the term is when, for example, it is said that the man is white. Hence this whole “the man is white” is an accidental being. It is clear, then, that the division of being into essential being and accidental being is based on the fact that one thing is predicated of another either essentially or accidentally. But the division of being into substance and accident is based on the fact that a thing is in its own nature either a substance or an accident.
lib. 5 l. 9 n. 2 Deinde cum dicit secundum accidens ostendit quot modis dicitur ens per accidens; et dicit, quod tribus: quorum unus est, quando accidens praedicatur de accidente, ut cum dicitur, iustus est musicus. Secundus, cum accidens praedicatur de subiecto, ut cum dicitur, homo est musicus. Tertius, cum subiectum praedicatur de accidente, ut cum dicitur musicus est homo. Et, quia superius iam manifestavit quomodo causa per accidens differt a causa per se, ideo nunc consequenter per causam per accidens manifestat ens per accidens. 886. Then he indicates the various senses in which a thing is said to be accidentally. He says that this occurs in three ways: (1) first, when an accident is predicated of an accident, as when it is said that someone just is musical: (2) second, when an accident is predicated of a subject, as when it is said that the man is musical; and (3) third, when a subject is predicated of an accident, as when it is said that the musician is a man. And since he has shown above (787) how an accidental cause differs from an essential cause, he therefore now shows that an accidental being is a result of an accidental cause.
lib. 5 l. 9 n. 3 Et dicit, quod sicut assignantes causam per accidens dicimus quod musicus aedificat, eo quod musicum accidit aedificatori, vel e contra, constat enim quod hoc esse hoc, idest musicum aedificare, nihil aliud significat quam hoc accidere huic, ita est etiam in praedictis modis entis per accidens, quando dicimus hominem esse musicum, accidens praedicando de subiecto: vel musicum esse hominem, praedicando subiectum de accidente: vel album esse musicum, vel e converso, scilicet musicum esse album, praedicando accidens de accidente. In omnibus enim his, esse, nihil aliud significat quam accidere. Hoc quidem, scilicet quando accidens de accidente praedicatur, significat quod ambo accidentia accidunt eidem subiecto: illud vero, scilicet cum accidens praedicatur de subiecto, dicitur esse, quia enti idest subiecto accidit accidens. Sed musicum esse hominem dicimus, quia huic, scilicet praedicato, accidit musicum, quod ponitur in subiecto. Et est quasi similis ratio praedicandi, cum subiectum praedicatur de accidente, et accidens de accidente. Sicut enim subiectum praedicatur de accidente ea ratione, quia praedicatur subiectum de eo, cui accidit accidens in subiecto positum; ita accidens praedicatur de accidente, quia praedicatur de subiecto accidentis. Et propter hoc, sicut dicitur musicum est homo, similiter dicitur musicum esse album, quia scilicet illud cui accidit esse musicum, scilicet subiectum, est album. 887. He says that in giving an accidental cause we say that the musician builds, because it is accidental to a builder to be a musician, or vice versa; for it is evident that the statement “this is that,” i.e., the musician is a builder, simply means that “this is an accident of that.” The same is true of the foregoing senses of accidental being when we say that the man is musical by predicating an accident of a subject, or when we say that what is white is musical, or conversely that what is musical is white by predicating an accident of an accident. For in all of these cases is signifies merely accidental being: “in the latter case,” i.e., when an accident is predicated of an accident, is signifies that both accidents are accidental to the same subject; “and in the former,” i.e., when an accident is predicated of a subject, is signifies “that the attribute is accidental to the being,” i.e., to the subject. But when we say that what is musical is a man, we mean “that musical is an accident of this person,” i.e., that musical, which holds the position of a subject, is an accident of the predicate. And the reason for making the predication is similar in a sense when a subject is predicated of an accident and when an accident is predicated of an accident. For a subject is predicated of an accident by reason of the fact that the subject is predicated of that to which the accident, which is expressed in the subject, is accidental; and in a similar fashion an accident is predicated of an accident because it is predicated of the subject of an accident. And for this reason the attribute musical is predicated not only of man but also of white, because that of which the attribute musical is an accident, i.e., the subject, is white.
lib. 5 l. 9 n. 4 Patet igitur, quod ea, quae dicuntur esse secundum accidens, dicuntur triplici ratione: aut eo quod ambo, scilicet subiectum et praedicatum, insunt eidem, sicut cum accidens praedicatur de accidente, aut quia illud, scilicet praedicatum, ut musicum, inest enti, idest subiecto, quod dicitur esse musicum; et hoc est cum accidens praedicatur de subiecto; aut quia illud, scilicet subiectum in praedicato positum, est illud cui inest accidens, de quo accidente illud, scilicet subiectum, praedicatur. Et hoc est scilicet cum subiectum praedicatur de accidente, ut cum dicimus, musicum est homo. 888. It, is evident, then, that those things which are said to be in an accidental sense are said to be such for three reasons: (1) either “because both,” namely, the subject and predicate, belong to the same thing (as when an accident is predicated of an accident); or (2) “because the attribute,” namely, the predicate, such as musical, “belongs to the being,” i.e., to the subject which is said to be musical (and this occurs when an accident is predicated of a subject); or (3) “because the thing,” i.e., the subject which is expressed in the predicate, to which belongs the accident of which it (the subject) is itself predicated, itself is (and this occurs when a subject is predicated of an accident, as when we say that what is musical is a man).
lib. 5 l. 9 n. 5 Deinde cum dicit secundum se distinguit modum entis per se: et circa hoc tria facit. Primo distinguit ens, quod est extra animam, per decem praedicamenta, quod est ens perfectum. Secundo ponit alium modum entis, secundum quod est tantum in mente, ibi, amplius autem et esse significat. Tertio dividit ens per potentiam et actum: et ens sic divisum est communius quam ens perfectum. Nam ens in potentia, est ens secundum quid tantum et imperfectum, ibi, amplius esse significat et ens. Dicit ergo primo, quod illa dicuntur esse secundum se, quaecumque significant figuras praedicationis. Sciendum est enim quod ens non potest hoc modo contrahi ad aliquid determinatum, sicut genus contrahitur ad species per differentias. Nam differentia, cum non participet genus, est extra essentiam generis. Nihil autem posset esse extra essentiam entis, quod per additionem ad ens aliquam speciem entis constituat: nam quod est extra ens, nihil est, et differentia esse non potest. Unde in tertio huius probavit philosophus, quod ens, genus esse non potest. 889. On the other hand (437). Here he distinguishes between the types of essential being; and in regard to this he does three things. First, he divides the kind of being which lies outside the mind, which is complete being, by the ten predicaments. Second (895), he gives another type of being, inasmuch as being exists only in the mind (“Again, being, signifies”). Third (897), he divides being by potentiality and actuality— and being divided in this way is more common than complete being, for potential being is being only imperfectly and in a qualified sense (“Again, to be”). He says, first (437), that all those things which signify the figures of predication are said to be essentially. For it must be noted that being cannot be narrowed down to some definite thing in the way in which a genus is narrowed down to a species by means of (-) differences. For since a difference does not participate in a genus, it lies outside the essence of a genus. But there could be nothing outside the essence of being which could constitute a particular species of being by adding to being; for what is outside of being is nothing, and this cannot be a difference. Hence in Book III of this work (433) the Philosopher proved that being cannot be a genus.
lib. 5 l. 9 n. 6 Unde oportet, quod ens contrahatur ad diversa genera secundum diversum modum praedicandi, qui consequitur diversum modum essendi; quia quoties ens dicitur, idest quot modis aliquid praedicatur, toties esse significatur, idest tot modis significatur aliquid esse. Et propter hoc ea in quae dividitur ens primo, dicuntur esse praedicamenta, quia distinguuntur secundum diversum modum praedicandi. Quia igitur eorum quae praedicantur, quaedam significant quid, idest substantiam, quaedam quale, quaedam quantum, et sic de aliis; oportet quod unicuique modo praedicandi, esse significet idem; ut cum dicitur homo est animal, esse significat substantiam. Cum autem dicitur, homo est albus, significat qualitatem, et sic de aliis. 890. Being must then be narrowed down to diverse genera on the basis of a (+) different mode of predication, which flows from a different mode of being; for “being is signified,” i.e., something is signified to be, “in just as many ways” (or in as many senses) as we can make predications. And for this reason the classes into which being is first divided are called predicaments, because they are distinguished on the basis of different ways of predicating. Therefore, since some predicates signify what (i.e., substance); some, of what kind; some, how much; and so on; there must be a mode of being corresponding to each type of predication. For example, when it is said that a man is an animal, is signifies substance; and when it is said that a man is white, is signifies quality; and so on.
lib. 5 l. 9 n. 7 Sciendum enim est quod praedicatum ad subiectum tripliciter se potest habere. Uno modo cum est id quod est subiectum, ut cum dico, Socrates est animal. Nam Socrates est id quod est animal. Et hoc praedicatum dicitur significare substantiam primam, quae est substantia particularis, de qua omnia praedicantur. 891. For it should be noted that a predicate can be referred to a subject in three ways. (1) This occurs in one way when the predicate states what the subject is, as when I say that Socrates is an animal; for Socrates is the thing which is an animal. And this predicate is said to signify first substance, i.e., a particular substance, of which all attributes are predicated.
lib. 5 l. 9 n. 8 Secundo modo ut praedicatum sumatur secundum quod inest subiecto: quod quidem praedicatum, vel inest ei per se et absolute, ut consequens materiam, et sic est quantitas: vel ut consequens formam, et sic est qualitas: vel inest ei non absolute, sed in respectu ad aliud, et sic est ad aliquid. Tertio modo ut praedicatum sumatur ab eo quod est extra subiectum: et hoc dupliciter. Uno modo ut sit omnino extra subiectum: quod quidem si non sit mensura subiecti, praedicatur per modum habitus, ut cum dicitur, Socrates est calceatus vel vestitus. Si autem sit mensura eius, cum mensura extrinseca sit vel tempus vel locus, sumitur praedicamentum vel ex parte temporis, et sic erit quando: vel ex loco, et sic erit ubi, non considerato ordine partium in loco, quo considerato erit situs. Alio modo ut id a quo sumitur praedicamentum, secundum aliquid sit in subiecto, de quo praedicatur. Et si quidem secundum principium, sic praedicatur ut agere. Nam actionis principium in subiecto est. Si vero secundum terminum, sic praedicabitur ut in pati. Nam passio in subiectum patiens terminatur. 892. (2) A predicate is referred to a subject in a second way when the predicate is taken as being in the subject, and this predicate is in the subject either (a) essentially and absolutely and (i) as something flowing from its matter, and then it is quantity; or (ii) as something flowing from its form, and then it is quality; or (b) it is not present in the subject absolutely but with reference to something else, and then it is relation. (3) A predicate is referred to a subject in a third, way when the predicate is taken from something extrinsic to the subject, and this occurs in two ways. (a) In one way, that from which the predicate is taken is totally extrinsic to the subject; and (i) if this is not a measure of the subject, it is predicated after the manner of attire, as when it is said that Socrates is shod or clothed. (ii) But if it is a measure of the subject, then, since an extrinsic measure is either time or place, (aa) the predicament is taken either in reference to time, and so it will be when; or (bb) if it is taken in reference to place and the order of parts in place is not considered, it will be where; but if this order is considered, it will be position. (b) In another way, that from which the predicate is taken, though outside the subject, is nevertheless from a certain point of view in the subject of which it is predicated. (i) And if it is from the viewpoint of the principle, then it is predicated as an action; for the principle of action is in the subject. (ii) But if it is from the viewpoint of its terminus, then it will be predicated as a passion; for a passion is terminated in the subject which is being acted upon.
lib. 5 l. 9 n. 9 Quia vero quaedam praedicantur, in quibus manifeste non apponitur hoc verbum est, ne credatur quod illae praedicationes non pertineant ad praedicationem entis, ut cum dicitur, homo ambulat, ideo consequenter hoc removet, dicens quod in omnibus huiusmodi praedicationibus significatur aliquid esse. Verbum enim quodlibet resolvitur in hoc verbum est, et participium. Nihil enim differt dicere, homo convalescens est, et homo convalescit, et sic de aliis. Unde patet quod quot modis praedicatio fit, tot modis ens dicitur. 893. But since there are some predications in which the verb is is clearly not used (for example, when it is said that a man walks), lest someone think that these predications do not involve the predication of being, for this reason Aristotle subsequently rejects this, saying that in all predications of this kind something is signified to be. For every verb is reduced to the verb is plus a participle. For there is no difference between the statements “the man is recovering” and “the man recovers”; and it is the same in other cases. It is clear, then, that “being” is used in as many ways as we make predications.
lib. 5 l. 9 n. 10 Nec est verum quod Avicenna dicit, quod praedicata, quae sunt in generibus accidentis, principaliter significant substantiam, et per posterius accidens, sicut hoc quod dico album et musicum. Nam album ut in praedicamentis dicitur, solam qualitatem significat. Hoc autem nomen album significat subiectum ex consequenti, inquantum significat albedinem per modum accidentis. Unde oportet, quod ex consequenti includat in sui ratione subiectum. Nam accidentis esse est inesse. Albedo enim etsi significet accidens, non tamen per modum accidentis, sed per modum substantiae. Unde nullo modo consignificat subiectum. Si enim principaliter significaret subiectum, tunc praedicata accidentalia non ponerentur a philosopho sub ente secundum se, sed sub ente secundum accidens. Nam hoc totum, quod est homo albus, est ens secundum accidens, ut dictum est. 894. And there is no truth in Avicenna’s statement that predicates which belong to the class of accidents primarily signify substance and secondarily accidents, as the terms white and musical. For the term white, as it is used in the categories, signifies quality alone. Now the term white implies a subject inasmuch as it signifies whiteness after the manner of an accident, so that it must by implication include the subject in its notion, because the being of an accident consists in being in something. For even though whiteness signifies an accident, it still does not signify this after the manner of an accident but after that of a substance. Hence it implies a subject in no way. For if it were to signify a subject primarily, then the Philosopher would not put accidental predicates under essential being but under accidental being. For the whole statement “the man is white” is a being in an accidental sense, as has been stated (886).
lib. 5 l. 9 n. 11 Deinde cum dicit amplius autem ponit alium modum entis, secundum quod esse et est, significant compositionem propositionis, quam facit intellectus componens et dividens. Unde dicit, quod esse significat veritatem rei. Vel sicut alia translatio melius habet quod esse significat quia aliquod dictum est verum. Unde veritas propositionis potest dici veritas rei per causam. Nam ex eo quod res est vel non est, oratio vera vel falsa est. Cum enim dicimus aliquid esse, significamus propositionem esse veram. Et cum dicimus non esse, significamus non esse veram; et hoc sive in affirmando, sive in negando. In affirmando quidem, sicut dicimus quod Socrates est albus, quia hoc verum est. In negando vero, ut Socrates non est albus, quia hoc est verum, scilicet ipsum esse non album. Et similiter dicimus, quod non est diameter incommensurabilis lateri quadrati, quia hoc est falsum, scilicet non esse ipsum non commensurabilem. 895. Again, being signifies (438). Then he gives another sense in which the term being is used, inasmuch as the terms being and is signify the composition of a proposition, which the intellect makes when it combines and separates. He says that being signifies the truth of a thing, or as another translation better expresses it, being signifies that some statement is true. Thus the truth of a thing can be said to determine the truth of a proposition after the manner of a cause; for by reason of the fact that a thing is or is not, a discourse is true or false. For when we say that something is, we signify that a proposition is true; and when we say that something is not, we signify that it is not true. And this applies both to affirmation and to negation. It applies to affirmation, as when we say that Socrates is white because this is true; and to negation, as when we say that Socrates is not white, because this is true, namely, that he is not white. And in a similar way we say that the diagonal of a square is not incommensurable with a side, because this is false, i.e., its not being incommensurable.
lib. 5 l. 9 n. 12 Sciendum est autem quod iste secundus modus comparatur ad primum, sicut effectus ad causam. Ex hoc enim quod aliquid in rerum natura est, sequitur veritas et falsitas in propositione, quam intellectus significat per hoc verbum est prout est verbalis copula. Sed, quia aliquid, quod est in se non ens, intellectus considerat ut quoddam ens, sicut negationem et huiusmodi, ideo quandoque dicitur esse de aliquo hoc secundo modo, et non primo. Dicitur enim, quod caecitas est secundo modo, ex eo quod vera est propositio, qua dicitur aliquid esse caecum; non tamen dicitur quod sit primo modo vera. Nam caecitas non habet aliquod esse in rebus, sed magis est privatio alicuius esse. Accidit autem unicuique rei quod aliquid de ipsa vere affirmetur intellectu vel voce. Nam res non refertur ad scientiam, sed e converso. Esse vero quod in sui natura unaquaeque res habet, est substantiale. Et ideo, cum dicitur, Socrates est, si ille est primo modo accipiatur, est de praedicato substantiali. Nam ens est superius ad unumquodque entium, sicut animal ad hominem. Si autem accipiatur secundo modo, est de praedicato accidentali. 896. Now it must be noted that this second way in which being is used is related to the first as an effect is to a cause. For from the fact that something is in reality it follows that there is truth and falsity in a proposition, and the intellect signifies this by the term is taken as a verb copula. But since the intellect considers as a kind of being something which is in itself a non-being, such as a negation and the like, therefore sometimes being is predicated of something in this second way and not in the first. For blindness is said to be in the second way on the grounds that the proposition in which something is said to be blind is true. However, it is not said to be true in the first way; for blindness does not have any being in reality but is rather a privation of some being. Now it is accidental to a thing that an attribute should be affirmed of it truly in thought or in word, for reality is not referred to knowledge but the reverse. But the act of being which each thing has in its own nature is substantial; and therefore when it is said that Socrates is, if the is is taken in the first way, it belongs to the class of substantial predicates; for being is a higher predicate with reference to any particular being, as animal with reference to man. But if it is taken in the second way, it belongs to the class of accidental predicates.


lib. 5 l. 9 n. 13 Deinde cum dicit amplius esse ponit distinctionem entis per actum et potentiam; dicens, quod ens et esse significant aliquid dicibile vel effabile in potentia, vel dicibile in actu. In omnibus enim praedictis terminis, quae significant decem praedicamenta, aliquid dicitur in actu, et aliquid in potentia. Et ex hoc accidit, quod unumquodque praedicamentum per actum et potentiam dividitur. Et sicut in rebus, quae extra animam sunt, dicitur aliquid in actu et aliquid in potentia, ita in actibus animae et privationibus, quae sunt res rationis tantum. Dicitur enim aliquis scire, quia potest uti scientia, et quia utitur: similiter quiescens, quia iam inest ei quiescere, et quia potest quiescere. Et non solum hoc est in accidentibus, sed etiam in substantiis. Etenim Mercurium, idest imaginem Mercurii dicimus esse in lapide in potentia, et medium lineae dicitur esse in linea in potentia. Quaelibet enim pars continui est potentialiter in toto. Linea vero inter substantias ponitur secundum opinionem ponentium mathematica esse substantias, quam nondum reprobaverat. Frumentum etiam quando nondum est perfectum, sicut quando est in herba, dicitur esse in potentia. Quando vero aliquid sit in potentia, et quando nondum est in potentia, determinandum est in aliis, scilicet in nono huius. 897. Again, to be, or being (439). Here he gives the division of being into the actual and the potential. He says that to be and being signify something which is expressible or utterable potentially or actually. For in the case of all of the foregoing terms which signify the ten predicaments, something is said to be so actually and something else potentially; and from this it follows that each predicament is divided by actuality and potentiality. And just as in the case of things which are outside the mind some are said to be actually and some potentially, so also is this true in the case of the mind’s activities, and in that of privations, which are only conceptual beings. For one is said to know both because he is capable of using scientific knowledge and because he is using it; and similarly a thing is said to be at rest both because rest belongs to it already and because it is capable of being at rest. And this is true not only of accidents but also of substances. For “Mercury,” we say, i.e., the image of Mercury, is present potentially in the stone; and half of a line is present potentially in a line, for every part of a continuum is potentially in the whole. And the line is included in the class of substances according to the opinion of those who hold that the objects of mathematics are substances—an opinion which he has not yet disproved. And when grain is not yet ripe, for example, when it is still in blade, it is said to be potentially. Just when, however, something is potential and when it is no longer such must be established elsewhere, namely, in Book IX of this work (1832).

Lecture 10

Latin English
lib. 5 l. 10 n. 1 Hic ostendit quot modis dicitur substantia: et circa hoc duo facit. Primo ponit diversos modos substantiae. Secundo reducit omnes ad duos, ibi, accidit itaque. Circa primum ponit quatuor modos; quorum primus est secundum quod substantiae particulares dicuntur substantiae, sicut simplicia corpora, ut terra et ignis et aqua et huiusmodi. Et universaliter omnia corpora, etiam si non sint simplicia, sicut mixta similium partium, ut lapis, sanguis, caro, et huiusmodi. Et iterum animalia quae constant et huiusmodi corporibus sensibilibus, et partes eorum, ut manus et pedes et huiusmodi, et Daemonia, idest idola, quae in templis posita colebantur pro diis. Vel Daemonia dicit quaedam animalia rationabilia secundum Platonicos, quae Apuleius sic definit: Daemones sunt animalia corpore aerea, mente rationalia, animo passiva, tempore aeterna. Haec enim omnia praedicta dicuntur substantia, quia non dicuntur de alio subiecto, sed alia dicuntur de his. Et haec est descriptio primae substantiae in praedicamentis. 898. Aristotle now explains the various senses in which the term substance is used; and in regard to this he does two things. First, he gives the various senses in which the term substance is used. Second (903), he reduces all of these to two (“It follows”). In treating the first part he gives four senses of the term substance. (1) First, it means particular substances, such as the simple bodies: earth, fire, water and the like. And in general it means all bodies, even though they are not simple, i.e., compound bodies of like parts, such as stones, blood, flesh and the like. Again, it means animals, which are composed of such sensible bodies, and also their parts, such as hands and feet and so on; “and demons,” i.e., the idols set up in temples and worshipped as gods. Or by demons he means certain animals which the Platonists claimed are capable of reasoning, and which Apuleius defines thus: demons are animals composed of an ethereal body, rational in mind, passive in soul, and eternal in time. Now all of the foregoing things are called substances because they are not predicated of another subject but other things are predicated of them. This is the description of first substance given in the Categories.
lib. 5 l. 10 n. 2 Secundum modum ponit ibi alio vero dicit quod alio modo dicitur substantia quae est causa essendi praedictis substantiis quae non dicuntur de subiecto; non quidem extrinseca sicut efficiens, sed intrinseca eis, ut forma. Sicut dicitur anima substantia animalis. 899. In another sense (441). (2) He says that in another sense substance means the cause of the being of the foregoing substances which are not predicated of a subject; and it is not extrinsic to them like an efficient cause but is intrinsic like a form. It is in this sense that the soul is called the substance of an animal.
lib. 5 l. 10 n. 3 Deinde cum dicit amplius quaecumque ponit tertium modum, secundum opinionem Platonicorum et Pythagoricorum, dicens, quod quaecumque particulae sunt in praedictis substantiis, quae sunt termini earum, et significant hoc aliquid secundum opinionem eorum, in quibus destructis destruitur totum, dicuntur etiam substantiae. Sicut superficie destructa destruitur corpus, ut quidam dicunt, et destructa linea destruitur superficies. Patet etiam, quod superficies est terminus corporis, et linea terminus superficiei. Et secundum dictorum positionem, linea est pars superficiei, et superficies pars corporis. Ponebant enim corpora componi ex superficiebus et superficies ex lineis, et lineas ex punctis. Unde sequebatur, quod punctum sit substantia lineae, et linea superficiei, et sic de aliis. Numerus autem secundum hanc positionem videtur esse substantia totaliter omnium rerum, quia remoto numero nihil remanet in rebus: quod enim non est unum, nihil est. Et similiter quae non sunt plura, non sunt. Numerus etiam invenitur terminare omnia, eo quod omnia mensurantur per numerum. 900. Again, substance (442). (3) He gives a third meaning of substance, which is the one used by the Platonists and Pythagoreans. He says that all those parts of the foregoing substances which constitute their limits and designate them as individuals, according to the opinion of these thinkers, and by whose destruction the whole is destroyed, are also termed substances. For example, body is destroyed when surface is, as some say, and surface when line is. It is also clear that surface is the limit of body and line the limit of surface. And according to the opinion of the philosophers just mentioned the line is a part of surface and surface a part of body. For they held that bodies are composed of surfaces, surfaces of lines, and lines of points; and thus it would follow that the point is the substance of the line, the line the substance of surface, and so on for the rest. And according to this position number seems to constitute the entire substance of all things, because when number is destroyed nothing remains in the world; for what is not one is nothing. And similarly things which are not many are non-existent. And number is also found to limit all things, because all things are measured by number.
lib. 5 l. 10 n. 4 Iste autem modus non est verus. Nam hoc quod communiter invenitur in omnibus, et sine quo res esse non potest, non oportet quod sit substantia rei, sed potest esse aliqua proprietas consequens rei substantiam vel principium substantiae. Provenit etiam eis error specialiter quantum ad unum et numerum, eo quod non distinguebant inter unum quod convertitur cum ente, et unum quod est principium numeri. 901. But this sense of substance is not a true one. For that which is found to be common to all things and is something without which they cannot exist does not necessarily constitute their substance, but it can be some property flowing from the substance or from a principle of the substance. These philosophers also fell into error especially regarding unity and number because they failed to distinguish between the unity which is interchangeable with being and that which is the principle of number.
lib. 5 l. 10 n. 5 Quartum modum ponit ibi amplius quod dicit quod etiam quidditas rei, quam significat definitio, dicitur substantia uniuscuiusque. Haec autem quidditas sive rei essentia, cuius definitio est ratio, differt a forma quam dixit esse substantiam in secundo modo, sicut differt humanitas ab anima. Nam forma est pars essentiae vel quidditatis rei. Ipsa autem quidditas vel essentia rei includit omnia essentialia principia. Et ideo genus et species dicuntur esse substantia eorum, de quibus praedicantur, hoc ultimo modo. Nam genus et species non significant tantum formam, sed totam rei essentiam. 902. Again, the quiddity (443). (4) He says that the quiddity of each thing, which the definition signifies, is also called its substance. Now the quiddity or essence of a thing, whose intelligible expression is the definition, differs from a form, which he identified with the second meaning of substance, just as humanity differs from a soul, for a form is part of a thing’s essence or quiddity, but the essence or quiddity itself of a thing includes all its essential principles. It is in this last sense, then, that genus and species are said to be the substance of the things of which they are predicated; for genus and species do not signify the form alone but the whole essence of a thing.
lib. 5 l. 10 n. 6 Deinde cum dicit accidit itaque reducit dictos modos substantiae ad duos; dicens, quod ex praedictis modis considerari potest, quod substantia duobus modis dicitur: quorum unus est secundum quod substantia dicitur id quod ultimo subiicitur in propositionibus, ita quod de alio non praedicetur, sicut substantia prima. Et hoc est, quod est hoc aliquid, quasi per se subsistens, et quod est separabile, quia est ab omnibus distinctum et non communicabile multis. Et quantum ad haec tria differt substantia particularis ab universali. Primo quidem, quia substantia particularis non praedicatur de aliquo inferiori, sicut universalis. Secundo, quia substantia universalis non subsistit nisi ratione singularis quae per se subsistit. Tertio, quia substantia universalis est in multis, non autem singularis, sed est ab omnibus separabilis et distincta. 903. It follows (444). Then he reduces the foregoing senses of substance to two. He says that from the above-mentioned ways in which the term substance is used we can understand that it has two meanings. (1) It means the ultimate subject in propositions, and thus is not predicated of something else. This is first substance, which means a particular thing which exists of itself and is capable of existing apart because it is distinct from everything else and cannot be common to many. (2) And a particular substance differs from universal substance in these three respects: first, a particular substance is not predicated of inferiors, whereas a universal substance is; second, universal substance subsists only by reason of a particular substance, which subsists of itself; and third, universal substance is present in many things, whereas a particular substance is not but is distinct from everything else and capable of existing apart.
lib. 5 l. 10 n. 7 Sed etiam forma et species uniuscuiusque rei, dicitur tale, idest substantia. In quo includit et secundum et quartum modum. Essentia enim et forma in hoc conveniunt quod secundum utrumque dicitur esse illud quo aliquid est. Sed forma refertur ad materiam, quam facit esse in actu; quidditas autem refertur ad suppositum, quod significatur ut habens talem essentiam. Unde sub uno comprehenduntur forma et species, idest sub essentia rei. 904. And the form and species of a thing also “is said to be of this nature,” i.e., substance. In this he includes the second and fourth senses of substance; for essence and form have this note in common that both are said to be that by which something is. However, form, which causes a thing to be actual, is related to matter, whereas quiddity or essence is related to the supposit, which is signified as having such and such an essence. Hence “the form and species” are comprehended under one thing—a being’s essence.
lib. 5 l. 10 n. 8 Tertium autem modum praetermittit, quia falsus est, vel quia reducibilis est ad formam, quae habet rationem termini. Materiam vero, quae substantia dicitur, praetermittit, quia non est substantia in actu. Includitur tamen in primo modo, quia substantia particularis non habet quod sit substantia et quod sit individua in rebus materialibus, nisi ex materia. 905. He omits the third sense of substance because it is a false one, or because it is reducible to form, which has the character of a limit. And he omits matter, which is called substance, because it is not substance actually. However, it is included in the first sense of substance, because a particular substance is a substance and is individuated in the world of material things only by means of matter.

Lecture 11

Latin English
lib. 5 l. 11 n. 1 Postquam philosophus distinxit nomina, quae significant subiectum huius scientiae, hic distinguit nomina, quae significant partes eorum, quae sunt subiecta huius scientiae: et dividitur in partes duas. In prima distinguit nomina, quae significant partes unius. In secunda, nomina, quae significant partes entis; hoc ibi, potestas dicitur. Substantia enim quae etiam posita est subiectum huius scientiae, est unum solum praedicamentum non divisum in multa praedicamenta. Prima dividitur in duas. In prima distinguit nomina, quae significant partes unius. In secunda, nomina, quae significant, aliquod consequens ad rationem unius, scilicet prius et posterius. Nam unum esse, est principium esse, ut supra dictum est. Et hoc ibi, priora et posteriora dicuntur. 906. Having given the various senses of the terms which signify the subject of this science, here the Philosopher gives those which signify the parts of such things as constitute the subject of this science. This is divided into two parts. In the first (445)C 906) he gives the various senses of the terms which signify the parts of unity; and in the second (467:C 954), those which signify the parts of being ("In one sense"). For substance, which is also posited as the subject of this science, is a single category which is not divided into many categories. The first part is divided into two sections. In the first he gives the various senses of the terms which signify the parts of unity; and in the second (457:C 936), those which signify something that flows from the notion of unity, namely, prior and subsequent ("Things are said to be"). For to be one is to be a principle or starting point, as has been explained above (432:C 872).
lib. 5 l. 11 n. 2 Prima dividitur in duas. In prima distinguit nomina, quae significant primas partes unius et eius oppositi, scilicet multitudinis. In secunda distinguit nomina, quae significant quasdam secundarias partes, ibi, opposita dicuntur. Partes autem unius sunt idem, quod est unum in substantia: et simile, quod est unum in qualitate: et aequale, quod est unum in quantitate. Et e contrario partes multitudinis sunt diversum, dissimile et inaequale. Circa primum duo facit. Primo distinguit hoc nomen idem, et ea quae ei opponuntur. Secundo distinguit hoc nomen simile et dissimile oppositum eius, ibi, similia dicuntur. De aequali autem, et eius opposito, mentionem hic non facit, quia in eis multiplicitas non est ita manifesta. Circa primum tria facit. Primo distinguit hoc nomen idem. Secundo hoc nomen diversum, ibi, diversa vero dicuntur. Tertio hoc nomen differens, ibi, differentia vero. Circa primum duo facit. Primo ponit modos eiusdem per accidens. Secundo eiusdem per se, ibi, alia vero secundum se. 907. The first part is divided into two sections. In the first he gives the various senses of the terms which signify the primary parts of unity and of its opposite, plurality; and in the second (451)C 922), he gives those which signify certain secondary parts of unity ("By opposites"). Now the parts of unity are sameness, which is oneness in substance; likeness, which is oneness in quality; and equality, which is oneness in quantity. And, opposed to these, the parts of plurality are otherness, unlikeness and inequality. In regard to the first he does two things. First, he gives the various senses in which the term same is used, and the senses of its opposite. Second (449:C q18), he gives the various senses of the term like, and of its opposite, unlike ("Things are said to be like"). He makes no mention here, however, of the term equal and its opposite, because in the case of these terms plurality is not so evident. In regard to the first part he does three things. First, he gives the various senses of the term same; second (447:C 91D, of the term other, or diverse ("Those things are said to be other"); and third (448:C 916), of the term different ("Things are said to be different"). In regard to the first he does two things. First, he gives the ways in which things are said to be accidentally the same; and second (446:C 911), he gives those in which things are said to be essentially the same ("And others"). The “same”, “per accidens” & “per se”
lib. 5 l. 11 n. 3 Dicit ergo quod aliqua dicuntur eadem per accidens tribus modis. Uno modo sicut duo accidentia; ut album et musicum dicuntur idem, quia accidunt eidem subiecto. Secundo modo, quando praedicatum dicitur idem subiecto in quantum de eo praedicatur; ut cum dicitur, homo est musicus, quae dicuntur idem, quia accidit musicum homini, idest praedicatum subiecto. Tertio modo dicuntur idem per accidens, quando subiectum dicitur esse idem accidenti quasi de eo praedicatum: ut cum dicitur, musicus est homo, significatur quod homo sit idem musico. Quod enim praedicatur de aliquo, significatur idem esse illi. Et haec ratio identitatis est, quia subiectum accidit praedicato. 908. He says that things are said to be accidentally the same (idem per accidens) in three ways. (1) In one way they are the same in the sense that two accidents are; thus “white” and “musical” are said to be the same because they are accidents of the same subject. (2) Things are accidentally the same in a second way when a predicate is said to be the same as a subject inasmuch as it is predicated of it; thus when it is said that the man is musical, these (man and musical) are said to be the same because musical is an accident of a man, i.e., the predicate is an accident of the subject. (3) And things are accidentally the same in a third way when the subject is said to be the same as an accident inasmuch as it is predicated of it. For example, when it is said that the musical thing is a man, it is understood that the man is the same as the musical thing; for what is predicated of some subject is identified with that subject. And sameness in this sense means that the subject is an accident of the predicate.
lib. 5 l. 11 n. 4 Praeter hos autem modos eiusdem per accidens, in quibus sumitur accidens per se et subiectum per se, sunt alii modi in quibus accipitur accidens cum subiecto compositum. Et in hoc variantur duo modi: quorum unus significatur, quando accidens simpliciter praedicatur de composito ex accidente et subiecto. Et tunc significatur hoc, scilicet accidens esse idem utrique simul accepto; sicut musico homini, musicum. Alius modus significatur quando compositum praedicatur de subiecto simplici, ut cum dicitur, homo est homo musicus. Tunc enim illi, idest subiecto simplici, significatur esse idem horum utrumque simul acceptum, scilicet hoc quod dicitur homo musicus. Et similis ratio est, si accidens accipitur ut simplex, et subiectum cum compositione; ut si dicamus, musicus est homo musicus, aut e converso, quia et homini musico, quod est compositum, dicuntur idem per accidens et homo et musicum, quando haec duo de illo uno praedicantur, et e converso. 909. Now besides these ways in which things are accidentally the same, in which an accident and a subject are taken in themselves, there are also others, i.e., those in which an accident is taken in conjunction with a subject. And when this occurs two senses of the term same have to be distinguished. (1) One of these is signified when an accident taken singly is predicated of the composite of subject and accident; and then the meaning is that the accident is the same as both of the simple terms taken together; for example, “musical” is the same as “musical man.” (2) The other is signified when the composite of accident and subject is predicated of the subject taken singly, as when we say that the man is a musical man; and then both of these (the composite “musical man”) are signified as being the same as this, i.e., as the subject taken singly. The same notion applies if an accident is taken singly and a subject is taken in combination with the accident. This would be the case, for example, if we were to say that what is musical is a musical man, or the reverse, for both “man” and “musical” are said to be accidentally the same as “musical man,” which is the composite, when these two are predicated of that one thing, and vice versa.
lib. 5 l. 11 n. 5 Ex hoc autem concludit ulterius conclusionem, quod in omnibus praedictis modis praedicandi, in quibus idem per accidens praedicatur, non praedicatur aliquod nomen universaliter. Non enim est verum dicere, quod omnis homo sit idem musico. Quod sic patet. Ea enim sola de universalibus praedicantur universaliter, quae secundum se insunt eidem. Propter hoc enim modus praedicandi, qui est universaliter praedicari, convenit cum conditione subiecti, quod est universale, quia praedicatum per se de subiecto praedicatur. Sed accidentia non praedicantur secundum se de universalibus, sed ratione singularium. Et ideo de universalibus non praedicantur universaliter. Sed de singularibus praedicantur simpliciter, quia idem videtur esse subiecto Socrates et Socrates musicus; non tamen praedicantur de singulari universaliter, quia de nullo potest praedicari aliquid universaliter quod non est universale. Socrates autem non est universale: nam non est in multis. Et ideo non praedicatur universaliter aliquid de Socrate, ut dicatur, omnis Socrates sicut omnis homo. Igitur quae diximus sic dicuntur eadem, scilicet per accidens, ut dictum est. 910. From this he draws the further conclusion that, in all of the foregoing modes of predication in which things are said to be accidentally the same, no term is predicated universally. For it is not true to say that every man is the same as what is musical. This becomes clear as follows: Only those attributes which belong essentially to the same subject are predicated universally of universals; for a predicate is predicated essentially of a subject because the mode of predication, which is a universal one, agrees with the condition of the subject, which is universal. However, accidents are not predicated essentially of universals, but only by reason of singular things; and thus they are not predicated universally of universals. But while accidents are predicated in an unqualified sense of singular things (for Socrates and musical Socrates seem to be the same in subject), they are not predicated universally of singular things; for nothing can be predicated universally of something that is not universal. But Socrates is not universal, because he is not present in many. Hence nothing can be predicated of Socrates so that we should say “every Socrates” as we say “every man.” The things of which we have spoken, then, are said to be one in this way, i.e., accidentally, as has been stated.
lib. 5 l. 11 n. 6 Deinde cum dicit alia vero ponit modos eiusdem per se; et dicit, quod aliqua dicuntur eadem secundum se eisdem modis, quibus dicitur unum per se. Omnes enim modi, quibus aliqua unum per se dicuntur, reducuntur ad duos: quorum unus est secundum quod dicuntur unum illa, quorum materia est una; sive accipiamus materiam eamdem secundum speciem, sive secundum numerum; ad quod pertinet secundus et tertius modus unius. Alio modo dicuntur unum, quorum substantia est una: vel ratione continuitatis, quod pertinet ad primum modum: vel propter unitatem et indivisibilitatem rationis, quod pertinet ad quartum et quintum. Unde et his modis dicuntur aliqua esse idem. 911. And others (446). Then he gives the ways in which things are said to be essentially the same (idem per se). He says that things are said to be essentially the same in the same number of ways in which they are said to be essentially one. Now all of the ways in which things are said to be essentially one are reduced to two. (1) Thus, in one sense, things are said to be essentially one because their matter is one, whether we take the matter to be the same in species or in number. The second and third ways in which things are one are reduced to this. (2) And, in another sense, things are said to be one because their substance is one, whether by reason of continuity, which pertains to the first way in which things are one, or by reason of the unity and indivisibility of their intelligible structure, which pertains to the fourth and fifth ways. Therefore some things are said to be the same in these ways too.
lib. 5 l. 11 n. 7 Ex hoc autem ulterius concludit, quod identitas est unitas vel unio; aut ex eo quod illa quae dicuntur idem, sunt plura secundum esse, et tamen dicuntur idem in quantum in aliquo uno conveniunt. Aut quia sunt unum secundum esse, sed intellectus utitur eo ut pluribus ad hoc quod relationem intelligat. Nam non potest intelligi relatio nisi inter duo extrema. Sicut cum dicitur aliquid esse idem sibiipsi. Tunc enim intellectus utitur eo quod est unum secundum rem, ut duobus. Alias eiusdem ad seipsum relationem designare non posset. Unde patet, quod si relatio semper requirit duo extrema, et in huiusmodi relationibus non sunt duo extrema secundum rem sed secundum intellectum solum, relatio identitatis non erit relatio realis, sed rationis tantum, secundum quod aliquid dicitur idem simpliciter. Secus autem est, quando aliqua duo dicuntur esse idem vel genere vel specie. Si enim identitatis relatio esset res aliqua praeter illud quod dicitur idem, res etiam, quae relatio est, cum sit idem sibi, pari ratione haberet aliam relationem, quae sibi esset idem, et sic in infinitum. Non est autem possibile in rebus in infinitum procedere. Sed in his quae sunt secundum intellectum nihil prohibet. Nam cum intellectus reflectatur super suum actum, intelligit se intelligere. Et hoc ipsum potest etiam intelligere, et sic in infinitum. 912. From this he further concludes that sameness (identitas) is a unity or union. For things which are said to be the same are either many in being, but are said to be the same inasmuch as they agree in some respect, or they are one in being, but the intellect uses this as many in order to understand a relationship; for a relationship can be understood only between two extremes. This is what happens, for example, when we say that something is the same as itself; for the intellect then uses something which is one in reality as though it were two, otherwise it could not designate the relationship of a thing to itself. Hence it is clear that, if a relationship always requires two extremes, and in relations of this kind there are not two extremes in reality but only in the mind, then the relationship of sameness according to which something is said to be absolutely the same, will not be a real relation but only a conceptual relation. This is not the case, however, when any two things are said to be the same either in genus or in species. For if the relationship of sameness were something in addition to what we designate by the term same, then since this reality, which is a relation, is the same as itself, it would have to have for a like reason something that is also the same as itself; and so on to infinity. Now while it is impossible to proceed to infinity in the case of real beings, nothing prevents this from taking place in the case of things which have being in the mind. For since the mind may reflect on its own act it can understand that it understands; and it can also understand this act in turn, and so on to infinity.

Lecture 12

Latin English
lib. 5 l. 12 n. 1 Hic ostendit quot modis dicitur diversum; et dicit, quod diversa dicuntur aliqua tripliciter. Dicuntur enim aliqua diversa specie, quorum species sunt plures, sicut asinus et bos. Quaedam vero dicuntur diversa numero, quia differunt secundum materiam, sicut duo individua unius speciei. Quaedam vero dicuntur diversa secundum rationem substantiae, idest definitionem declarantem substantiam rei. Contingit enim quaedam esse idem numero, scilicet subiecti, sed diversa ratione, sicut Socrates et hoc album. 913. Here he explains the various ways in which the term diverse (or other) is used, and he gives three senses. (1) Thus some things are said to be diverse in species because their species are many, as an ass and an ox; (2) others are said to be diverse in number because their matters differ, as two individuals of one species; (3) and others are said to be diverse because “the intelligible structure of the essence,” i.e., the definition designating their substance, is different. For some things may be the same in number, i.e., from the viewpoint of matter, but diverse in their intelligible structure, as Socrates and this white man.
lib. 5 l. 12 n. 2 Et quia plures modi diversitatis accipi possunt, sicut quod dicatur diversum genere et diversum propter continui divisionem, ideo subiungit, quod diversum dicitur oppositum totaliter ad idem. Cuilibet enim modo eius, quod est idem, opponitur aliquis modus eius quod est diversum. Et propter hoc, quot modis dicitur idem, tot modis diversum. 914. And since many modes of diversity can be considered (for example, diversity in genus, and the diversity resulting from the division of the continuous), he therefore adds that the term diverse means the very opposite of the same; for to every way in which things are the same there corresponds an opposite way in which they are diverse. Hence things are said to be diverse in the same number of senses in which they are said to be the same.
lib. 5 l. 12 n. 3 Et tamen alii modi unius, vel eius quod est idem, possunt reduci ad istos hic tactos. Diversitas enim generis includitur in diversitate speciei. Diversitas vero continuitatis in diversitate materiae, eo quod partes quantitatis se habent per modum materiae ad totum. 915. Yet the other ways in which things are said to be one, i.e., the same, can be reduced to those stated here. For diversity of genus is included in diversity of species, and diversity of quantity is included in diversity of matter, because the parts of a quantity have the character of matter in relation to the whole.
lib. 5 l. 12 n. 4 Deinde cum dicit differentia vero hic distinguit quot modis dicitur hoc nomen differens. Assignat autem duos modos: quorum primus est, quod aliquid proprie dicitur differens secundum quod aliqua duo quae sunt aliquid idem entia, idest in aliquo uno convenientia, sunt diversa: sive conveniant in aliquo uno secundum numerum, sicut Socrates sedens a Socrate non sedente: sive conveniant in aliquo uno specie, sicut Socrates et Plato in homine: sive in aliquo uno genere, sicut homo et asinus in animali: sive in aliquo uno secundum proportionem, sicut quantitas et qualitas in ente. Ex quo patet, quod differens omne est diversum, sed non convertitur. Nam illa diversa, quae in nullo conveniunt, non possunt proprie dici differentia, quia non differunt aliquo alio, sed seipsis. Differens autem dicitur, quod aliquo alio differt. Secundus modus est prout differens communiter sumitur pro diverso; et sic differentia dicuntur etiam illa, quae habent diversum genus, et in nullo communicant. 916. Things are said to be “different” (448). Then he gives the various senses in which the term different is used, and there are two of them. First, any two things are said properly to be different which, while being diverse, are “the same in some respect,” i.e., they have some one thing in common. And this is so (1) whether they have some one thing in common numerically, as Socrates sitting and Socrates not sitting; or (2) whether they have some one thing in common specifically, as Socrates and Plato have man in common; or (3) whether they have a common genus, as man and ass share in the genus animal; or (4) whether they share in some one thing proportionally, as quantity and quality both share in being. And from this it is evident that everything different is diverse, but not the reverse. For diverse things which agree in no respect cannot properly be called different, because they do not differ in some other respect but only in themselves; but that is said to be different which differs in some particular respect. The term different is used in a second way when it is taken commonly in place of the term diverse; and then those things are also said to be different which belong to diverse genera and have nothing in common.
lib. 5 l. 12 n. 5 Deinde docet quibus conveniat esse differens secundum primum modum qui est proprius. Cum enim oporteat ea, quae proprie dicuntur differentia, in uno aliquo convenire; ea vero, quae conveniunt in specie, non distinguuntur nisi per accidentales differentias, ut Socrates albus vel iustus, Plato niger vel musicus; quae vero conveniunt in genere et sunt diversa secundum speciem, differunt differentiis substantialibus: illa propriissime dicuntur differentia, quae sunt eadem genere et diversa secundum speciem. Omne autem genus dividitur in contrarias differentias; non autem omne genus dividitur in contrarias species. Coloris enim species sunt contrariae, scilicet album, nigrum: et differentiae etiam, scilicet congregativum et disgregativum. Animalis autem differentiae quidem sunt contrariae, scilicet rationale et irrationale sed species animalis, ut homo et equus etc. non sunt contrariae. Illa igitur, quae propriissime dicuntur differentia, sunt quae vel sunt species contrariae, sicut album et nigrum: vel sunt species unius generis non contrariae, sed habentia contrarietatem in substantia ratione contrarii differentiarum quae sunt de substantia specierum. 917. Next he indicates the kind of things which admit of difference in the first way, which is the proper one. Now those things which are said properly to differ must agree in some respect. Those which agree in species differ only by accidental differences; for example, Socrates insofar as he is white or just differs from Plato insofar as he is black or musical. And those things which agree in genus and are diverse in species differ by substantial differences. And since this is so, then those things are said to differ most properly which are the same in genus and diverse in species. For (+) every genus is divided into contrary differences, but (-) not every genus is divided into contrary species. Thus the species of color, white and black, are contraries, and so are their differences, expanding and contracting. And the differences of animal, rational and irrational, are contraries; but the species of animal, such as man, horse, and the like, are not. Therefore things which are said to differ most properly are either those which are contrary species, as white and black, or those species of one genus which are not contrary but have contrariety in their essence because of the contrariety of differences which belong to the essence of the species.
lib. 5 l. 12 n. 6 Deinde cum dicit similia dicuntur ostendit quot modis dicitur simile. Circa hoc autem duo facit. Nam primo assignat quot modis dicitur simile. Secundo quot modis dicitur dissimile, ibi, opposita vero. Circa primum duo facit. Primo ostendit quot modis dicitur simile. Secundo quomodo dicatur aliquid maxime simile, ibi, et secundum quae alterari. Ponit autem tres modos similitudinis. Constat enim quod unum in qualitate facit simile. Passio autem est affinis qualitati, eo quod praecipue passio in mutatione qualitatis, quae est alteratio, attenditur. Unde et quaedam species qualitatis est passio et passibilis qualitas. Et propter hoc similitudo non solum attenditur secundum convenientiam in qualitate, sed secundum convenientiam in passione. Quod quidem potest esse dupliciter. Aut ex parte passionis, aut ex parte eius ad quod passio terminatur. 918. Things are said to be “like” (449). Here he points out the various ways in which the term like is used, and in regard to this he does two things. First, he indicates the various ways in which this term is used; and second (922), he gives those senses in which the term unlike is used (“By opposites”). In regard to the first he does two things. First, he gives the ways in which the term like is used; and second (920), he explains how one thing is said to be most like another (“And whatever”). He gives three ways in which things are like. Now it is evident that oneness in quality causes likeness. Further, undergoing or affection (passio) is associated with quality, because undergoing is most noticeable in the case of qualitative change or alteration; and thus one species of quality is called affection or possible quality. Hence things are observed to be like not only insofar as they have a common quality but also insofar as they undergo or suffer something in common. And this can be taken from two points of view: either from that of the affection or undergoing, or from that of the subject in which the affection is terminated.
lib. 5 l. 12 n. 7 Sic igitur tripliciter aliqua sunt similia. Uno modo, quia patiuntur idem, sicut duo ligna, quae comburuntur, possunt dici similia. Alio modo ex hoc solo, quod patiuntur aliqua plura, similia dicuntur, sive patiuntur idem, sive diversa: sicut duo homines, quorum unus fustigatur, et alter incarceratur, dicuntur similes in patiendo. Tertio modo dicuntur similia quorum una est qualitas; sicut duo albi, et duo sidera in caelo habentia similem splendorem aut virtutem. 919. Some things are like, then, for three reasons. (1) First, they undergo or suffer the same thing; for example, two pieces of wood which are consumed by fire can be said to be like. (2) Second, several things are like merely because they are affected or undergo something, whether this be the same or different; for example, two men, one of whom is beaten and the other imprisoned, are said to be like in that they both undergo something or suffer. (3) Third, those things are said to be like which have one quality; for example, two white things are alike in whiteness, and two stars in the heaven are alike in brightness or in power.
lib. 5 l. 12 n. 8 Deinde cum dicit et secundum ostendit unde aliquid maxime dicatur simile. Quando enim sunt plures contrarietates, secundum quas attenditur alteratio, illud, quod secundum plures illarum contrarietatum est alicui simile, dicitur magis proprie simile. Sicut allium, quod est calidum et siccum, dicitur magis proprie simile igni, quam saccharum, quod est calidum et humidum. Et idem est inter duo quorum utrumque est simile alicui tertio secundum unam qualitatem tantum: illud quod est simile secundum qualitatem magis sibi propriam, magis proprie dicitur simile ei: sicut aer magis proprie similis est igni, quam terra. Aer enim assimilatur igni in calore, quae est qualitas sibi propria, magis quam siccitas in qua assimilatur sibi terra. 920. And whatever (450). [more or less] Then he shows how one thing is said to be most like some other thing. For when there are several contraries of the sort which are observed to be alterable, whatever resembles some other thing in having the more important of these contraries is said to be more properly like that thing. For example, garlic, which is hot and dry, is said to be more properly like fire than sugar, which is hot and moist. The same holds true of any two things which are like some third thing in terms of only one quality; for whatever resembles some other thing in terms of some quality which is more proper to itself, is said to be more properly like that thing. For example, air is more properly like fire than earth; for air is like fire in reference to warmth, which is a quality proper to fire itself to a greater degree than dryness, in reference to which earth is like air.
lib. 5 l. 12 n. 9 Consequenter dicit, quod dissimilia dicuntur per oppositum ad similia.
lib. 5 l. 12 n. 10 Deinde cum dicit opposita dicuntur hic distinguit secundarias partes pluralitatis, quae scilicet continentur sub differenti et diverso, quae sunt partes primae: et circa hoc tria facit. Primo ostendit quot modis dicuntur opposita. Secundo quot modis dicuntur contraria, ibi, contraria dicuntur. Tertio quot modis dicuntur diversa specie, ibi, diversa vero specie. Circa primum duo facit. Primo enim dicit quot modis dicuntur opposita; quia quatuor modis; scilicet contradictoria, contraria, privatio et habitus, et ad aliquid. Aliquid enim contraponitur alteri vel opponitur aut ratione dependentiae, qua dependet ab ipso, et sic sunt opposita relative. Aut ratione remotionis, quia scilicet unum removet alterum. Quod quidem contingit tripliciter. Aut enim totaliter removet nihil relinquens, et sic est negatio. Aut relinquit subiectum solum, et sic est privatio. Aut relinquit subiectum et genus, et sic est contrarium. Nam contraria non sunt solum in eodem subiecto, sed etiam in eodem genere. 922. By “opposites” (451). Here he distinguishes between the secondary parts of plurality, i.e., those contained under difference and diversity, which are its primary parts; and in regard to this he does three things. First, he gives the various ways in which the term opposite is used; second (925), those in which the term contrary is used (“By contraries”); and third (931), those in which things are said to be diverse or other in species (“Those things are said to be”). In regard to the first he does two things. First (451), he gives the various ways in which we speak of opposites; and there are four of these: contradictories, contraries, privation and possession, and relatives. (1) For one thing is contraposed or opposed to another either by reason of dependence, i.e., insofar as one depends on another, and then they are opposed as relatives, or (2) by reason of removal, i.e., because one removes another. This occurs in three ways: (a) either one thing removes another entirely and leaves nothing, and then there is negation; or (b) the subject alone remains, and then there is privation; or the subject and genus remain, and then there is contrariety. For there are contraries not only in the same subject but also in the same genus.
lib. 5 l. 12 n. 11 Secundo ibi et ex quibus ponit duos modos, secundum quos potest cognosci, quod aliqua sunt opposita: quorum primus est per comparationem ad motum. Nam in quolibet motu vel mutatione, terminus a quo, opponitur termino ad quem. Et ideo ex quibus est motus, et in quae est motus, sunt opposita, ut patet in generationibus. Nam generatio albi est ex non albo, et ignis ex non igne. 923. And opposites (452). Second, he gives two ways in which things can be recognized as opposites, (1) The first of these pertains to motion, for in any motion or change the terminus from which is the opposite of the terminus to which. Hence those things from which motion begins and those in which it ends are opposites. This is evident in processes of generation; for the white is generated from the not-white, and fire is generated from what is not-fire.
lib. 5 l. 12 n. 12 Secundo modo per comparationem ad subiectum. Nam illa, quae non possunt inesse simul eidem susceptibili, oportet quod adinvicem opponantur, vel ipsa, vel ea in quibus sunt. Non enim potest idem corpus simul esse album et nigrum, quae sunt contraria. Homo vero et asinus non possunt de eodem dici, quia habent in suis rationibus differentias oppositas, scilicet rationale et irrationale. Et similiter pallidum et album; quia pallidum componitur ex nigro, quod est oppositum albo. Et notandum, quod signanter dicit, eidem susceptibili: quia quaedam non possunt alicui eidem subiecto simul inesse, non propter oppositionem quam habeant adinvicem, sed quia subiectum non est susceptibile utriusque; sicut albedo et musica non possunt simul inesse asino, possunt autem simul inesse homini. 924. (2) The second pertains to the subject. For those attributes which cannot belong at the same time to the same subject must be the opposite of each other, either they themselves or the things in which they are present. For the same body cannot be at the same time both white and black, which are contraries; nor can the terms man and ass be predicated of the same thing, because their intelligible structures contain opposite differences, i.e., rational and irrational. The same holds true of gray and white, because gray is composed of black, which is the opposite of white. And we should note that he expressly says, “in the same subject”; for certain things cannot exist at the the same time in the same subject, not because they are opposed to each other, but because the subject is not receptive of the one or the other; for example, whiteness and music cannot exist at the same time in an ass, but they can exist at the same time in a man.
lib. 5 l. 12 n. 13 Deinde cum dicit contraria dicuntur hic ostendit quot modis contraria dicuntur: et circa hoc tria facit. Quorum primum est, quod assignat modos, quibus aliqua principaliter dicuntur contraria: inter quos ponit unum primum improprium: scilicet quod aliqua dicuntur contraria, quae non possunt simul adesse eidem, licet differant secundum genus: proprie enim contraria sunt quae sunt unius generis: sicut si diceretur, quod gravitas et motus circularis non sunt in eodem subiecto. 925. By “contraries” (453). Then he states the various ways in which the term contrary is used, and in regard to this he does three things. First, he gives the principal ways in which things are said to be contrary. Among these he includes, first, one improper usage of the term, i.e., that whereby some attributes are called contraries which, while differing in genus, cannot belong at the same time to the same subject; for properly speaking contraries are attributes which belong to one genus. An example of this would be found if we were to say that heaviness and circular motion cannot belong to the same subject.
lib. 5 l. 12 n. 14 Alium modum ponit proprium secundum quod contraria dicuntur in aliquo convenientia. Conveniunt enim contraria in tribus: scilicet in eodem genere, et in eodem subiecto, et in eadem potestate. Et ideo notificat secundum ista tria, illa quae sunt vere contraria; dicens, quod illa, quae plurimum differunt eorum quae sunt in eodem genere, dicuntur contraria, sicut album et nigrum in genere coloris. Et iterum illa, quae plurimum differunt in eodem susceptibili existentia, sicut sanum et aegrum in animali. Et iterum, quae plurimum differunt in eadem potestate contenta, sicut congruum et incongruum in grammatica. Potestates enim rationabiles ad opposita sunt. Dicit autem plurimum ad differentiam mediorum inter contraria, quae etiam conveniunt in eodem genere, subiecto et potestate, non tamen sunt plurimum differentia. 926. Then he gives a second usage of the term, which is a proper one, according to which contraries are said to be things that agree in some respect; for contraries agree in three respects, namely, in reference to the same genus, or to the same subject, or to the same power. Then he uses these three to expose the things which are real contraries. He says (1) that those attributes which differ most in the same genus are called contraries, as white and black in the genus of color; (2) and those which differ most in the same subject, as health and disease in an animal; (3) and those which differ most in reference to the same power, as what is correct and what is incorrect in reference to grammar; for rational powers extend to opposites. He says “most” in order to differentiate contraries from the intermediate attributes which lie between them, which also agree in the same genus, subject and power, yet do not differ to the greatest degree.
lib. 5 l. 12 n. 15 Unde subiungit universalem rationem, secundum quam aliqua dicuntur contraria; quia scilicet eorum differentia est maxima, vel simpliciter, vel in eodem genere, vel in eadem specie. Simpliciter quidem, sicut in motu locali extrema sunt maxime distantia, sicut punctus orientis et occidentis, quae sunt extrema diametri totius orbis. In eodem genere, sicut specificae differentiae, quae dividunt genus. In eadem specie, sicut accidentales differentiae contrariae per quae differunt individua eiusdem speciei. 927. [e.g.] Hence he adds the universal notion involved in things which are designated as contraries, namely, that contraries are things which differ most either absolutely or in the same genus or in the same species. They differ “absolutely,” for example, in the case of local motion, where the extremes are separated most widely, as the most easterly and westerly points of the whole universe, which are the limits of its diameter. And they differ “in the same genus,” as the specific differences which divide a genus; and “in the same species,” as contrary differences of an accidental kind by which individuals of the same species differ from each other.
lib. 5 l. 12 n. 16 Secundum ponit ibi, alia vero et ostendit qualiter aliqua secundario modo dicuntur contraria, propter hoc quod habent habitudinem ad ea quae principaliter sunt contraria; scilicet quia vel habent contraria in actu, sicut ignis et aqua dicuntur contraria, quia alterum est calidum et alterum frigidum; vel quia sunt susceptibilia contrariorum in potentia, sicut sanativum et aegrotativum. Vel quia sunt activa vel passiva contrariorum in potentia, ut calefactivum et infrigidativum, calefactibile et infrigidabile. Vel quia sunt contrariorum agentia et patientia in actu, sicut calefaciens et infrigidans, calefactum et infrigidatum. Vel quia sunt expulsiones, sive abiectiones, sive acceptiones contrariorum, vel etiam habitus aut privationes eorum. Nam privatio albi opposita est privationi nigri, sicut habitus habitui. 928. [e.g.] Here he shows in what respect some things are said to be contraries in a secondary way because they are related to those things which are contraries in the primary way. For some things are contraries either because they actually possess contraries, as fire and water are called contraries because one is hot and the other cold; or because they are the potential recipients of contraries, as what is receptive of health and of disease; or because they are potentially causing contraries or undergoing them, as what is capable of heating and of cooling, and what is able to be heated and to be cooled; or because they are actually causing contraries or undergoing them, as what is heating and cooling or being heated and being cooled; or because they are expulsions or rejections or acquisitions of contraries, or even possessions or privations of them. For the privation of white is the opposite of the privation of black, just as the possession of the former is the opposite of that of the latter.
lib. 5 l. 12 n. 17 Patet ergo quod tangit triplicem habitudinem circa contraria. Una quae est subiecti in actu, vel in potentia. Alia quae est activi et passivi in actu et potentia. Tertia quae est generationis et corruptionis, vel secundum se, vel quantum ad eorum terminos, qui sunt habitus et privatio. 929. It is evident, then, that he touches on a threefold relationship of contraries to things: (1) one is to a subject which is either in act or in potency; (2) another is to something that is active or passive in act or in potency; and (3) a third is to processes of generation and corruption, either to the processes themselves or to their termini, which are possession and privation.
lib. 5 l. 12 n. 18 Tertium ponit ibi sed quoniam et ostendit qua de causa praedicta dicuntur multipliciter. Quia enim unum et ens dicuntur multipliciter, oportet quod ea quae dicuntur secundum ea, multipliciter dicantur; sicut idem et diversum, quae consequuntur unum et multa, et contrarium, quod sub diverso continetur. Et ita oportet, quod diversum dividatur secundum decem praedicamenta, sicut ens et unum. 930. But since the term (455). He gives a third way in which the term contrary is used, and he also shows why the foregoing terms are used in many ways. For since the terms one and being have several meanings, the terms which are based upon them must also have several meanings; for example, same and diverse, which flow from one and many; and contrary, which is contained under diverse. Hence diverse must be divided according to the ten categories just as being and one are.
lib. 5 l. 12 n. 19 Diversa vero hic ostendit quot modis dicantur aliqua diversa specie: et ponit quinque modos: quorum primus est, quando aliqua sunt in eodem genere, et non sunt subalterna, sicut scientia et albedo sub qualitate, licet non contra se dividantur oppositis differentiis. 931. Those things (456). He now explains the various ways in which things are said to be diverse (or other) in species, and he gives five of these. First, they belong to the same genus and are not subalternate; for example, science and whiteness both come under quality, yet they are not distinguished from each other by opposite differences.
lib. 5 l. 12 n. 20 Secundus est, quando sunt ea in eodem genere, et dividuntur contra invicem per aliquam differentiam; sive differentiae sint contrariae, sive non, ut bipes et quadrupes. 932. Second, they belong to the same genus and are distinguished from each other by some difference, whether such differences are contrary or not, as two-footed and four-footed.
lib. 5 l. 12 n. 21 Tertius modus est, quando sua subiecta habent contrarietatem, utpote quae dividuntur per differentias contrarias; sive ipsa sint contraria, ut album et nigrum, quae dividuntur per congregativum et disgregativum; sive non, ut homo et asinus, quae dividuntur per rationale et irrationale. Contraria enim oportet esse diversa specie, vel omnia, vel illa quae principaliter dicuntur esse contraria. 933. Third, their subjects contain contrariety; i.e., those things which are distinguished by contrary differences, whether the subjects are contrary themselves (as white and black, which are distinguished by the differences “expanding” and “contracting”) or not (as man and ass, which are distinguished by the differences “rational” and “irrational”). For contraries must differ in species, either all of them, or those which are called contraries in the primary sense.
lib. 5 l. 12 n. 22 Quartus modus est, quando sunt diversae species ultimae, eaedemque specialissimae in aliquo genere, ut homo et equus. Magis enim proprie dicuntur specie differre, quae solum specie differunt, quam quae specie et genere. 934. Fourth, the lowest species are diverse and are the last in some genus, as man and horse. For those things which differ only in species are said more properly to differ in species than those which differ both in species and in genus.
lib. 5 l. 12 n. 23 Quintus modus est, quando aliqua accidentia sunt in eodem subiecto, et tamen differunt adinvicem, eo quod impossibile est plura accidentia unius speciei in eodem subiecto esse. Eadem vero specie dicuntur per oppositum ad praedicta. 935. Fifth, they are accidents in the same subject, yet differ from each other; for many accidents of one and the same kind cannot exist in the same subject. And things are said to be the same in species in ways opposite to those given above.

Lecture 13

Latin English
lib. 5 l. 13 n. 1 Postquam distinxit nomina, quae significant partes unius, hic distinguit nomina significantia ordinem, scilicet prius et posterius. Unum enim quemdam ordinem importat, eo quod uni esse est principium esse, ut supra dictum est. Et circa hoc duo facit. Primo assignat rationem communem prioris et posterioris. Secundo distinguit diversos modos prioris et posterioris secundum communem rationem, ibi, ut hoc quidem secundum locum. Dicit ergo primo, quod significatio prioris dependet a significatione principii. Nam principium in unoquoque genere est id, quod est primum in genere. Prius autem dicitur, quod est propinquius alicui determinato principio. Huiusmodi autem ordo principii, et eius, quod est principio propinquum, potest attendi multipliciter. Aut enim aliquid est principium et primum simpliciter et secundum naturam, sicut pater est principium filii. Aut est principium ad aliquid, idest per ordinem ad aliquid extrinsecum; sicut dicitur id, quod est secundum se posterius, esse prius quantum ad aliquid; vel quantum ad cognitionem, vel perfectionem, vel dignitatem, vel aliquo tali modo. Vel etiam dicitur aliquid esse principium et prius quantum ad ubi. Aut etiam aliquibus aliis modis. 936. Having given the various senses of the terms which signify the parts of unity, here Aristotle gives those which signify order, namely, prior and subsequent. For unity implies a certain order, because the essence of unity consists in being a principle, as was stated above (872). In regard to the first he does two things. First, he indicates the common meaning of the terms prior and subsequent; and second (936), he gives the various senses in which these terms are commonly taken (“For example, a thing”). He accordingly says, first, that the meaning of the term prior depends on that of the term principle (or starting point); for the principle in each class of things is what is first in that class, and the term prior means what is nearest to some determinate principle. Now the relationship between a principle of this kind and something which is near it can be considered from several points of view. For something is a principle or primary thing either in an absolute sense and by nature (as a father is a principle of a child), or “relatively,” i.e., in relation to some extrinsic thing (for example, something that is subsequent by nature is said to be prior in relation to something else). Things which are prior in this last sense are such either in reference to knowledge or to perfection or to dignity, or in some such way. Or a thing is also said to be a principle and to be prior in reference to place; or even in certain other ways.
lib. 5 l. 13 n. 2 Deinde cum dicit ut hoc distinguit modos diversos, quibus dicitur aliquid prius et posterius. Et quia prius et posterius dicuntur in ordinem ad principium aliquod, principium autem est, ut supra dictum est, quod est primum in esse, aut in fieri, aut in cognitione: ideo pars ista dividitur in partes tres. In prima dicit quomodo dicitur aliquid esse prius secundum motum et quantitatem; nam ordo in motu, sequitur ordinem in quantitate. Per prius enim et posterius in magnitudine, est prius et posterius in motu, ut dicitur in quarto physicorum. Secundo ostendit, quomodo aliquid dicitur prius altero in cognitione, ibi, alio vero modo. Tertio, quomodo dicitur aliquid altero prius in essendo, idest secundum naturam, ibi, alia vero secundum naturam. Circa primum duo facit. Primo ostendit quomodo aliquid sit prius et posterius secundum quantitatem in rebus continuis. Secundo, quomodo in rebus discretis, ibi, alia secundum ordinem. 937. Then he gives the various ways in which things are said to be prior and subsequent. And since the terms prior and subsequent are used in reference to some principle, and a principle is what is first either in being or in becoming or in knowledge (as has been stated above (404:C 761), this part is therefore divided into three sections. In the first he explains how a thing is said to be prior in motion and in quantity, because the order found in motion flows from that found in quantity. For the prior and subsequent in motion depends on the prior and subsequent in continuous quantity, as is stated in Book IV of the Physics. Second (946), he shows how one thing is said to be prior to another in knowledge (“In another way”). Third (950), he explains how one thing is said to be prior to another in being, i.e., in nature (“But others”). In regard to the first he does two things. First, he shows how one thing is said to be prior and another subsequent in quantity in the case of continuous things; and second (944), how one thing is prior and another subsequent in the case of discrete things (“Other things are prior in arrangement”).
lib. 5 l. 13 n. 3 Et circa primum ponit tres modos. Primus modus attenditur secundum ordinem in loco: sicut aliquid dicitur esse prius secundum locum in hoc, quod est propinquius alicui loco determinato; sive ille locus determinatus accipiatur ut medium in aliqua magnitudine, sive ut extremum. Potest enim in ordine locali accipi ut principium, centrum mundi, ad quod feruntur gravia: ut sic ordinemus elementa, dicentes terram esse primum, aquam secundum et cetera. Et potest etiam accipi ut principium etiam ipsum caelum, ut si dicamus ignem esse primum, aerem secundum, et sic deinceps. 938. In treating the first member of this division he gives three ways in which things are prior. (1) The first has to do with place; for example, a thing is said to be prior in place inasmuch as it is nearer to some determinate place, whether that place be the middle point in some continuous quantity or an extreme. For the center of the world, to which heavy bodies gravitate, can be taken as the principle (or starting point) of the order involving place, and then we put the elements in the following. order, saying that earth is first, water second, and so on. Or the outermost sphere can be taken as the principle, and then we say that fire is first, air second, and so on.
lib. 5 l. 13 n. 4 Propinquitas autem ad principium in loco, quidquid sit illud, potest esse dupliciter. Uno modo secundum ordinem naturalem: sicut aqua propinquior est medio naturaliter quam aer, aer vero propinquior extremo, scilicet caelo. Alio modo sicut evenit, idest secundum quod ordinantur aliqua in loco a casu, vel a quacumque causa praeter naturam; sicut in lapidibus superpositis invicem in acervo, supremus est prior uno ordine, et alio est prior infimus. Et sicut id quod est propinquius principio, est prius, ita quod remotius a principio, est posterius. 939. Now nearness to a principle of place, whatever it may be, can be taken in two ways: (a) in one way with reference to an order naturally determined, as water is naturally nearer to the middle of the universe than air, and air nearer to the extreme, i.e., the outermost sphere; (b) and in another way with reference to an order that depends “on chance,” i.e., insofar as some things have a certain order purely as a result of chance, or on some other cause than nature. For example, in the case of stones which lie on top of one another in a heap, the highest is prior according to one order, and the lowest according to another. And just as what is nearest to a principle is prior, in a similar way what is farther away from a principle is subsequent.
lib. 5 l. 13 n. 5 Alia secundum tempus secundus modus attenditur secundum ordinem temporis; quem ponit, dicens, quod alia dicuntur priora secundum tempus, et diversimode. Quaedam namque dicuntur priora, eo quod sunt remotiora a praesenti nunc, ut accidit in factis, idest in praeteritis. Bella enim Troiana dicuntur priora bellis Medis et Persicis, quibus Xerses rex Persarum et Medorum Graeciam expugnavit, quia remotiora sunt a praesenti nunc. Quaedam vero dicuntur priora, quia sunt affiniora vel propinquiora ipsi nunc; sicut dicitur quod prius est Menelaus Pyrrho, quia propinquius alicui nunc praesenti, respectu cuius utrumque erat futurum. Videtur autem haec litera falsa esse, quia utrumque erat praeteritum tempore Aristotelis quando haec sunt scripta. In Graeco autem habetur, quod prius est Nemea Pythion, quae quidem erant duae nundinae vel duo festa, quorum unum erat propinquius illi nunc quo haec scripta sunt, cum tamen utrumque esset futurum. 940. Other things are prior in time (459). (2) Things are understood to be prior and subsequent in a second way with reference to the order in time. And he now describes this order, saying that other things are said to be prior in time, and this in various ways. For some things are prior because they are farther away from the present, as occurs “in the case of things which have taken place,” i.e., past events. For the Trojan wars are said to be prior to those of the Medes and the Persians (in which Xerxes, the king of the Persians and Medes, fought against the Greeks), because they are farther away from the present. And some things are said to be prior because they are closer or nearer to the present; for example, Meneleus is said to be prior to Pyrrho because he is nearer to some present moment in reference to which each was future. But this text seems to be false, because both of them lived before the time of Aristotle, when these words were written. And it is said in the Greek that the Nemean are prior to the Pythian, these being two holidays or feasts one of which was nearer to the moment at which these words were written although both were future.
lib. 5 l. 13 n. 6 Patet autem quod in hoc utimur ipso nunc, ut principio et primo in tempore; quia per propinquitatem vel remotionem respectu eius, dicimus aliquid esse prius vel posterius. Et hoc necessarium est dicere secundum ponentes aeternitatem temporis. Non enim potest accipi hac positione facta, aliquod principium in tempore, nisi ab aliquo nunc, quod est medium praeteriti et futuri, ut ex utraque parte tempus in infinitum procedat. 941. Now it is clear that in this case we are using the present as a principle or starting point in time, because we say that something is prior or subsequent on the grounds that it is nearer to or farther away from the present. And those who hold that time is eternal must say this; for, when this is supposed, the only principle or starting point of time which can be taken is one that relates to some present moment, which is the middle point between the past and the future, inasmuch as time might proceed to infinity in both directions.
lib. 5 l. 13 n. 7 Alia secundum motum tertius modus est secundum ordinem in motu: et hoc primo ponit quantum ad naturalia; dicens, quod aliqua dicuntur esse priora secundum ordinem in motu. Illud enim, quod est propinquius primo moventi, est prius; sicut puer est prius viro, quia est propinquior primo, scilicet generanti. Et hoc etiam prius dicitur per propinquitatem ad aliquod principium. Id enim, scilicet movens et generans, est principium quodammodo, non qualitercumque, sicut in loco accidebat, sed simpliciter et secundum naturam. Secundo ponit hunc ordinem motus etiam in rebus voluntariis; dicens, quod quaedam priora dicuntur secundum potestatem, sicuti homines, qui sunt in potestatibus constituti. Ille enim, qui excedit potestate, et qui est potentior, dicitur esse prior. Et hic est ordo dignitatis. 942. Other thins are prior in motion (460). (3) The term prior is used in a third way with reference to the order in motion; and (a) he first shows how this applies to natural things. He says that some things are said to be prior in the order found in motion; for what is nearer to a first cause of motion is prior. A boy, for example, is prior to a man because he is nearer to his primary mover, i.e., the one begetting him. And the latter is also said to be prior because of his nearness to some principle. For that—the one moving and begetting—is in a sense a principle, though not in just any way at all (as happened in the case of place), but in an absolute sense and by nature. (b) Second, he also mentions this order of motion in the realm of the voluntary, saying that some things are said to be prior in power, as men who are placed in positions of authority. For one who surpasses another in power, or is more powerful, is said to be prior. This is the order of dignity.
lib. 5 l. 13 n. 8 Patet autem, quod hic ordo etiam est secundum motum, quia potentius et potestate excedens est secundum cuius praevoluntatem, idest propositum, necesse est sequi aliquid, quod est eo posterius in movendo; ita scilicet quod non movente illo potentiori vel priori, non moveatur posterius, et movente moveatur. Sicut se habet princeps in civitate. Nam ex eius imperio moventur alii ad exequendum imperata; eo vero non imperante, non moventur. Et patet, quod hoc etiam prius dicitur propter propinquitatem ad aliquod principium. Nam praevoluntas, idest propositum imperantis, hic accipitur ut principium, cui propinquiores sunt, et per consequens priores per quos propositum et imperium principis ad subditos defertur. 943. Now it is evident that this order also involves motion; for one who is more powerful, or surpasses another in power, is one “according to whose will,” i.e., intention, something necessarily follows, because it is through him that some subsequent thing is put in motion. Hence, when the more powerful or prior does not move, no subsequent thing moves; but when the former moves, the latter is also moved. This is the position of a prince in a state; for it is by his authority that others are moved to carry out the things which he commands, and if he does not command them they do not move. And it is clear that the term prior is used here too because of the nearness of a thing to some principle. For “the will,” i.e., the intention, of the ruler is taken here as a principle, and those who are nearer to the ruler, and therefore prior, are the ones through whom his commands are made known to his subjects.
lib. 5 l. 13 n. 9 Deinde cum dicit alia secundum ordinem ponit modum secundum ordinem in rebus discretis; dicens, quod alia dicuntur priora secundum ordinem, qui invenitur in aliquibus rebus tantummodo quodam ordine associatis sibi, non per continuitatem, ut in praecedentibus accidebat. Huiusmodi autem sunt, quae distant ab aliquo uno determinato secundum aliquam rationem determinatam, ut parastata, tritostata. Parastata est prius tritostata. Parastata dicitur ille, qui stat iuxta aliquem, puta regem. Tritostata autem ille, qui stat tertius ab eo. Unde alia litera habet, praestans, tertio stante prius est. Patet autem, quod alia ratio distantiae est distare ut secundum, vel tertium. Et similiter paranitae sunt priores nitis. In chordis enim hypatae dicuntur quae sunt graves, nitae vero acutae dicuntur, mediocres autem vocantur mesae. Paranitae autem dicuntur quae sunt iuxta nitas mesis propinquiores. 944. Other things are prior in arrangement (461). He now explains how a thing is prior in the order found among discrete things. He says that some things are said to be prior in order only because they (the associated things) have some kind of arrangement, and not because of continuity, as happened in the previous cases. And things of this kind have a different place in relation to some one determinate thing from a given point of view, as one who stands second and one who stands third —the one who stands second being prior to the one who stands third. By one who stands second is meant one who stands next to someone, such as a king; and by one who stands third is meant one who stands third from the king. Hence another text reads, “The leader is prior to the one who stands third.” It is evident, then, that things are understood to have different places inasmuch as one is second and another third. And in a similar way the paranete is prior to the nete; for among the strings of the lyre the low-pitched string is called the hypate; the high-pitched, the nete; and the middle, the mese. And the paranete refers to that which is next to the nete and nearer to the mese.
lib. 5 l. 13 n. 10 Patet etiam, quod hic dicitur etiam esse aliquid prius per propinquitatem ad aliquod principium. Sed differenter in utroque praedictorum exemplorum: quia in illis, scilicet parastata et tritostata, accipitur principium id quod est verum initium et extremum, scilicet ille, qui est summus inter alios vel vertex aliorum, ut rex vel aliquis alius talis. Sed in chordis accipitur ut principium, medium, et media chorda quae dicitur mesa, cui propinquiores dicuntur paranitae, et per hoc priores dicuntur nitis. Ista ergo dicuntur priora per hunc modum, scilicet per ordinem quantitatis vel continuae vel discretae. 945. It is also evident that something is said to be prior here because of its nearness to some principle, although this happens differently in both of the examples given above. For in the former case—that of one who stands second and one who stands third—the thing which is taken as a principle is a real starting point and extreme, namely, the one who is highest among them, or the chief of the others, as a king or some other person of this kind. But in the case of the strings of the lyre it is the middle one, i.e., the middle string, termed the mese, that is taken as the principle; and since those which are nearer to this are called the paranete, the paranete are therefore said to be prior to the nete. These things are said to be prior in this way, then, i.e., by the order in quantity, whether continuous or discrete.
lib. 5 l. 13 n. 11 Secundo ibi alio vero ostendit quomodo aliquid dicitur prius altero in cognitione. Illud autem prius est cognitione, quod etiam prius est simpliciter, non secundum quid, sicut erat in loco: nam res per sua principia cognoscitur. Sed, cum cognitio sit duplex, scilicet intellectus vel rationis, et sensus, aliter dicimus aliqua priora secundum rationem, et aliter secundum sensum. 946. In another way (462). Here he shows how one thing is said to be prior to another in knowledge. Now what is prior in knowledge is also prior in an absolute sense and not in a qualified one, as was the case with place; for a thing is known through its principles. But since knowledge is twofold: intellectual or rational, and sensory, we say that things are prior in one way in reference to reason, and in another in reference to the senses.
lib. 5 l. 13 n. 12 Ponit autem tres modos, secundum quos aliquid est prius ratione sive cognitione intellectiva; quorum primus est secundum quod universalia sunt priora singularibus, licet in cognitione sensitiva accidat e converso. Ibi enim singularia sunt priora. Ratio enim est universalium, sensus autem singularium. Unde sensus non cognoscit universalia nisi per accidens, inquantum cognoscit singularia, de quibus universalia praedicantur. Cognoscit enim hominem inquantum cognoscit Socratem, qui est homo. E contrario autem intellectus cognoscit Socratem inquantum cognoscit hominem. Semper autem quod est per se est prius eo quod est per accidens. 947. He gives three ways in which something is prior in reference to reason or intellectual knowledge: (1) First, there is the way in which universals are prior to singulars, although the opposite occurs in the case of sensory knowledge because there singulars are prior. For reason has to do with universals and the senses with singulars; and thus the senses know universals only accidentally inasmuch as they know the singular of which the universals are predicated. For a sense knows man inasmuch as it knows Socrates, who is a man; and in the opposite way the intellect knows Socrates inasmuch as it knows man. But what is essential is always prior to what is accidental.
lib. 5 l. 13 n. 13 Secundum modum ponit et secundum dicit, quod secundum rationem prius est accidens quam totum, idest quam compositum ex subiecto et accidente; et musicus homo cognosci non potest sine ratione huius partis, quod est musicum. Eodem modo quaecumque alia simplicia sunt priora secundum rationem compositis, cum in sensu sit e converso. Nam sensui primo composita offeruntur. 948. And in the intelligible structure (463). (2) Here he gives the second way in which a thing is prior in reference to reason. He says that in the intelligible structure “the attribute is prior to the whole,” i.e., to the composite of subject and attribute; thus “musical man” cannot be known without grasping the meaning of the part “musical.” And in the same way all other simple things are prior in intelligibility to the composite, although the opposite is true from the viewpoint of the senses; for it is composite things which are first offered to the senses.
lib. 5 l. 13 n. 14 Tertium modum ponit ibi amplius priora dicit, quod priora dicuntur etiam secundum rationem, passiones, sicut rectitudo habetur prior levitate. Rectitudo enim est per se passio lineae, levitas autem superficiei, linea vero naturaliter est prior superficie. Secundum autem sensum prior est superficies linea, et passiones compositorum passionibus simplicium. Haec igitur dicuntur priora per hunc modum, scilicet per ordinem cognoscendi. 949. Again, the attributes (464). (3) Then he gives the third way. He says that the attributes of prior things are also said to be prior from the viewpoint of reason, as straightness is said to be prior to smoothness. For straightness is an essential property of a line, and smoothness a property of surface, and a line is naturally prior to surface. But from the viewpoint of the senses surface is prior to a line, and the attributes of composite things are prior to those of simple ones. These things, then, are said to be prior in this way, namely, according to the order in knowing.
lib. 5 l. 13 n. 15 Deinde cum dicit alia vero ponit modos, quibus dicitur aliquid prius secundum ordinem in essendo: et circa hoc duo facit. Primo ponit tres modos, quibus dicitur aliquid esse prius in essendo. Secundo reducit eos ad unum, ibi, modo itaque quodam. Dicit ergo primo, quod quaedam dicuntur esse priora, secundum naturam et substantiam, idest secundum naturalem ordinem in essendo. Et hoc tripliciter. Primo ratione communitatis aut dependentiae: secundum quod priora dicuntur, quae possunt esse sine aliis et illa non possunt esse sine eis. Et hoc est prius a quo non convertitur essendi consequentia, ut dicitur in praedicamentis. Et hac divisione, idest isto modo prioris et posterioris contra alios diviso usus est Plato. Voluit enim quod propter hoc universalia essent priora in essendo quam singularia, et superficies quam corpora, et lineae quam superficies, et numerus quam omnia alia. 950. But others (465). He then gives the ways in which a thing is said to be prior according to the order in being, and in regard to this he does two things. First, he gives three ways in which a thing is said to be prior in being; and second (953), he reduces them to one (“In a sense, then”). He says, first, that some things are said to be prior in being, i.e., “in nature and substance,” or according to the natural order in being. And this is so for three reasons: (1) First, priority is attributed because of community or dependence; and according to this those things are said to be prior which can exist without others, although others cannot exist without them. And one thing is prior to another when the sequence of their being cannot be reversed, as is stated in the Categories. “This is the division,” i.e., the mode of division of prior and subsequent, which Plato used against others; for it was because of community or dependence that he wanted universals to be prior in being to singular things, surfaces prior to bodies, lines to surfaces, and numbers to all other things.
lib. 5 l. 13 n. 16 Secundus modus attenditur secundum ordinem substantiae ad accidens. Quia enim ens multipliciter dicitur, et non univoce, oportet, quod omnes significationes entis reducantur ad unam primam, secundum quam dicitur ens, quod est subiectum aliorum entium per se existens. Et propter hoc primum subiectum dicitur esse prius: unde substantia prius est accidente. 951. (2) Second, things are said to be prior in being because of the relationship of substance to accident. For since the term being is used in many senses and not univocally, all senses of being must be reduced to one primary sense, according to which being is said to be the subject of other things and to subsist of itself. Hence the first subject is said to be prior; and thus substance is prior to accident.
lib. 5 l. 13 n. 17 Tertius modus attenditur secundum divisionem entis in actum et potentiam. Nam uno modo dicitur aliquid esse prius secundum potentiam et alio modo secundum actum: secundum potentiam quidem dimidium rei est prius re ipsa, et quaelibet pars toto, et materia quam substantia, idest quam forma. Haec enim omnia sic comparantur ad ea, respectu quorum sic dicuntur priora, ut potentia ad actum: secundum actum vero dicuntur praedicta esse posteriora. Nam praedicta non efficiuntur in actu nisi per dissolutionem. Resoluto enim toto in partes, incipiunt partes esse in actu. 952. Third, things are said to be prior in being inasmuch as being is divided into the actual and the potential. For a thing is said to be prior in one way potentially and in another actually. A thing is said to be prior potentially in the sense that half a line is prior to an entire line, and any part to its whole, and matter “to substance,” i.e., to form. For all of the first things mentioned in these instances are related to the others, to which they are said to be prior, as something potential to something actual. However, from the viewpoint of actuality the first things mentioned are said to be subsequent, since they become actual only by the dissolution of some whole. For when a whole is dissolved into its parts, the parts then begin to exist actually.
lib. 5 l. 13 n. 18 Deinde cum dicit modo itaque concludit, quod omnes modi prioris et posterioris possunt reduci ad hos ultimos modos, et praecipue ad primum, prout prius dicitur quod potest esse sine aliis, et non e converso. Quaedam enim possunt esse sine aliis secundum generationem, per quem modum totum est prius partibus: quia, quando iam totum generatum est, partes non sunt in actu, sed in potentia. Quaedam vero contingit esse sine aliis secundum corruptionem, sicut pars sine toto, quando est iam totum corruptum et dissolutum in partes. Et similiter etiam alii modi prioris et posterioris ad hunc modum reduci possunt. Constat enim, quod priora non dependent a posterioribus, sicut e converso. Unde omnia priora aliquo modo possunt esse sine posterioribus, et non e converso. 953. In a sense, then (466). Here he concludes that all of the ways in which the terms prior and subsequent are used can be reduced to the last one given; and especially to the first of these inasmuch as the term prior means something which can exist without other things, but not the reverse. For from the viewpoint of generation some things can exist without others, and it is in this way that a whole is prior to its parts; for when a whole has been generated its parts do not exist actually but only potentially. And from the viewpoint of corruption some things can exist without others; for example, the parts can exist without the whole after the whole has been corrupted and dissolved into its parts. And in the same way too the other senses of prior and subsequent can be reduced to this sense. For it is certain that prior things do not depend upon subsequent ones, but the reverse. Hence all prior things can exist without subsequent ones, but not the reverse.

Lecture 14

Latin English
lib. 5 l. 14 n. 1 Postquam distinxit nomina significantia partes unius, hic incipit distinguere nomina significantia partes entis. Et primo secundum quod ens dividitur per actum et potentiam. Secundo, prout dividitur ens in decem praedicamenta, ibi, quantum vero dicitur quod est divisibile. Circa primum distinguit hoc nomen potentia vel potestas. Nomen autem actus praetermittit, quia eius significationem sufficienter explicare non poterat, nisi prius natura formarum esset manifesta, quod faciet in octavo et nono. Unde statim in nono simul determinat de potentia et actu. Dividitur ergo pars ista in partes duas: in prima ostendit quot modis dicitur potentia. In secunda reducit omnes ad unum primum, ibi, quae vero secundum potentiam. Circa primum duo facit. Primo distinguit hoc nomen, potentia. Secundo hoc nomen, impotentia, ibi, impotentia autem. Circa primum duo facit. Primo ponit modos potentiae. Secundo modos possibilis, ibi, dicta vero potestate. 954. Having treated the various senses of the terms which signify the parts of unity, here Aristotle begins to treat those which signify the parts of being. He does this, first, according as being is divided by act and potency; and second (977), according as it is divided by the ten categories “Quantity means”). In regard to the first, he gives the various senses in which the term potency or power (potestas) is used. But he omits the term act, because he could explain its meaning adequately only if the nature of forms had been made clear first, and he will do this in Books VIII (1703) and IX (1823). Hence in Book IX he immediately settles the question about potency and act together. This part, then, is divided into two members. In the first he explains the various senses in which the term potency is used; and in the second (975), he reduces all of them to one primary sense (“But those senses”). In regard to the first he does two things. First, he gives the various senses in which the term potency is used; and second (967), the various senses in which the term incapacity is used (“Incapacity”). In treating the first he does two things. First, he gives the senses in which the term potency is used; and second (961), those in which the term capable or potent is used (“And since the term”).
lib. 5 l. 14 n. 2 Ponit ergo in prima parte quatuor modos potentiae vel potestatis. Quorum primus est, quod potentia dicitur principium motus et mutationis in alio inquantum est aliud. Est enim quoddam principium motus vel mutationis in eo quod mutatur, ipsa scilicet materia: vel aliquod principium formale, ad quod consequitur motus, sicut ad formam gravis vel levis sequitur motus sursum aut deorsum. Sed huiusmodi principium non potest dici de potentia activa, ad quam pertinet motus ille. Omne enim quod movetur ab alio movetur. Neque aliquid movet seipsum nisi per partes, inquantum una pars eius movet aliam, ut probatur in octavo physicorum. Potentia igitur, secundum quod est principium motus in eo in quo est, non comprehenditur sub potentia activa, sed magis sub passiva. Gravitas enim in terra non est principium ut moveat, sed magis ut moveatur. Potentia igitur activa motus oportet quod sit in alio ab eo quod movetur, sicut aedificativa potestas non est in aedificato, sed magis in aedificante. Ars autem medicinalis, quamvis sit potentia activa, quia per eam medicus curat, contingit tamen quod sit in aliquo sanato, non inquantum est sanatum, sed per accidens, inquantum accidit eidem esse medicum et sanatum. Sic igitur universaliter loquendo, potestas dicitur uno modo principium mutationis aut motus in alio, inquantum est aliud. 955. In dealing with the first part, then, he gives four senses in which the term potency or power is used: First, potency means an [active] principle of motion or change in some other thing as other. For there is some principle of motion or change in the thing changed, namely, the matter, or some formal principle on which the motion depends, as upward or downward motion is a result of the forms of lightness or heaviness. But a principle of this kind cannot be designated as the active power on which this motion depends. For everything which is moved is moved by another; and a thing moves itself only by means of its parts inasmuch as one part moves another, as is proved in Book VIII of the Physics. Hence insofar as a potency is a principle of motion in that in which motion is found, it is not included under active power but under passive potency. For heaviness in earth is not a principle causing motion but rather one which causes it to be moved. Hence active power must be present some other thing than the one moved, for example, the power of building is not in the thing being built but rather in the builder. And while the art of medicine is an active power, because the physician heals by means of it, it may also be found in the one who is healed, not inasmuch as he is healed, but accidentally, i.e., inasmuch as the physician and the one who is healed happen to be the same. So therefore generally speaking potency or power means in one sense a principle of motion or change in some other thing as other.
lib. 5 l. 14 n. 3 Secundum modum ponit ibi, alia diverso dicit, quod quodam alio modo dicitur potestas principium motus vel mutationis ab altero inquantum est aliud. Et haec est potentia passiva, secundum quam patiens aliquid patitur. Sicut enim omne agens et movens, aliud a se movet, et in aliud a se agit; ita omne patiens, ab alio patitur: et omne motum, ab alio movetur. Illud enim principium, per quod alicui competit ut moveatur vel patiatur ab alio, dicitur potentia passiva. 956. (2)Here he gives a second sense in which the term potency is used. He says that in another sense the term potency means the principle whereby something is moved or changed by another thing as other. Now this is passive potency, and it is by reason of it that a patient undergoes some change. For just as every agent or mover moves something other than itself and acts in something other than itself, so too every patient is acted upon by something other than itself, i.e., everything moved is moved by another. For that principle whereby one thing is properly moved or acted upon by another is called passive potency.
lib. 5 l. 14 n. 4 Posse autem pati ab alio dicitur dupliciter. Aliquando quidem, quicquid sit illud, quod aliquid potest pati, dicimus ipsum esse possibile ad illud patiendum, sive sit bonum, sive malum. Aliquando vero non dicitur aliquid potens ex eo quod potest pati aliquod malum, sed ex hoc quod potest pati aliquod excellentius. Sicut, si aliquis potest vinci, non dicimus potentem; sed si aliquis potest doceri vel adiuvari, dicimus eum potentem. Et hoc ideo, quia posse pati aliquem defectum quandoque attribuitur impotentiae; et posse non pati idem, attribuitur potentiae, ut infra dicetur. 957. Now there are two ways in which we can say that a thing has the potency to be acted upon by another. Sometimes we attribute such a potency to something, whatever it may be, because it is able to undergo some change, whether it be good or bad. And sometimes we say that a thing has such a potency, not because it can undergo something evil, but because it can be changed for the better. For example, we do not say that one who can be overpowered has a potency [in this last sense], but we do attribute such a potency to one who can be taught or helped. And we speak thus because sometimes an ability to be changed for the worse is attributed to incapacity, and the ability not to be changed in the same way is attributed to potency, as will be said below (965).
lib. 5 l. 14 n. 5 Alia tamen litera habet, aliquando autem non secundum omnem passionem, sed utique in contrarium. Quod quidem sic debet intelligi. Improprie enim dicitur pati, quicquid recipit aliquam perfectionem ab aliquo, sicut intelligere dicitur quoddam pati. Proprie autem pati dicitur quod recipit aliquid cum sui transmutatione ab eo quod est ei naturale. Unde et talis passio dicitur esse abiiciens a substantia. Hoc autem non potest fieri nisi per aliquod contrarium. Unde, quando aliquid patitur, secundum quod est contrarium suae naturae vel conditioni, proprie pati dicitur. Secundum quod etiam aegritudines passiones dicuntur. Quando vero aliquis recipit id quod est ei conveniens secundum suam naturam, magis dicitur perfici quam pati. 958. Another text reads, “And sometimes this is not said of every change which a thing undergoes but of change to a contrary”; and this should be understood thus: whatever receives a perfection from something else is said in an improper sense to undergo a change; and it is in this sense that to understand is said to be a kind of undergoing. But that which receives along with a change in itself something other than what is natural to it is said in a proper sense to undergo a change. Hence such undergoing is also said to be a removing of something from a substance. But this can come about only by way of some contrary. Therefore, when a thing is acted upon in a way contrary to its own nature or condition, it is said in a proper sense to undergo a change or to be passive. And in this sense even illnesses are called undergoings. But when a thing receives something which is fitting to it by reason of its nature, it is said to be perfected rather than passive.
lib. 5 l. 14 n. 6 Tertium modum ponit ibi amplius alia dicit, quod alia potestas dicitur, quae est principium faciendi aliquid non quocumque modo, sed bene, aut secundum praevoluntatem, idest secundum quod homo disponit. Quando enim aliqui progrediuntur vel loquuntur, sed non bene, aut non secundum quod volunt, dicuntur non posse loqui aut progredi. Et similiter est in pati. Dicitur enim aliquid posse pati illud quod bene potest pati. Sicut dicuntur aliqua ligna combustibilia, quia de facili comburuntur, et incombustibilia, quae non possunt de facili comburi. 959. And in another sense (469). (3) He now gives a third sense in which the term potency is used. He says that in another sense potency means the principle of performing some act, not in any way at all, but well or according to “intention,” i.e., according to what a man plans. For when men walk or talk but not well or as they planned to do, we say that they do not have the ability to walk or to talk. And “the same thing applies when things are being acted upon,” for a thing is said to be able to undergo something if it can undergo it well; for example, some pieces of wood are said to be combustible because they can be burned easily, and others are said to be incombustible because they cannot be burned easily.
lib. 5 l. 14 n. 7 Quartum modum ponit ibi amplius quicumque dicit, quod etiam potestates dicuntur omnes habitus sive formae vel dispositiones, quibus aliqua dicuntur vel redduntur omnino impassibilia, vel immobilia, aut non de facili mobilia in peius. Quod enim in peius mutentur, sicut quod frangantur, vel curventur, vel conterantur, vel qualitercumque corrumpantur, non inest corporibus per aliquam potentiam, sed magis per impotentiam et defectum alicuius principii, quod corrumpenti resistere non potest. Nunquam enim corrumpitur aliquid nisi propter victoriam corrumpentis supra ipsum. Quod quidem contingit ex debilitate propriae virtutis. Illis vero, quae non possunt tales defectus pati, aut vix aut paulatim, idest tarde vel modicum patiuntur, accidit eis propter potentiam, et in eo quod habent aliquo modo posse, idest cum quadam perfectione, ut non superentur a contrariis. Et per hunc modum dicitur in praedicamentis, quod durum vel sanativum significat potentiam naturalem non patiendi a corrumpentibus. Molle autem et aegrotativum impotentiam. 960. Further, all states (470). (4) He gives a fourth sense in which the term potency is used. He says that we designate as potencies all habits or forms or dispositions by which some things are said or made to be altogether incapable of being acted upon or changed, or to be not easily changed for the worse. For when bodies are changed for the worse, as those which are broken or bent or crushed or destroyed in any way at all, this does not happen to them because of some ability or potency but rather because of some inability and the weakness of some principle which does not have the power of resisting the thing which destroys them. For a thing is destroyed only because of the victory which the destroyer wins over it, and this is a result of the weakness of its proper active power. For those things which cannot be affected by defects of this kind, or can “hardly or only gradually” be affected by them (i.e., they are affected slowly or to a small degree) are such “because they have the potency and the ability to be in some definite state”; i.e., they have a certain perfection which prevents them from being overcome by contraries. And, as is said in the Categories, it is in this way that hard or healthy signifies a natural power which a thing has of resisting change by destructive agents. But soft and sickly signify incapacity or lack of power.
lib. 5 l. 14 n. 8 Deinde cum dicit dicta vero ponit modos possibilis correspondentes praedictis modis potestatis. Primo autem modo potestatis respondent duo modi possibilis. Secundum potestatem enim activam aliquid dicitur potens agere dupliciter. Uno modo, quia ipse per seipsum agit immediate. Alio modo, quia agit mediante altero, cui potentiam suam communicat, sicut rex agit per ballivum. Dicit ergo, quod, cum potentia tot modis dicatur, possibile etiam et potens pluribus modis dicetur. Uno quidem modo, quod habet principium activum mutationis in seipso sicut stativum vel sistitivum, idest id quod facit aliud stare, dicitur esse potens ad sistendum aliquid aliud diversum ab eo. Alio vero modo, quando ipse non immediate operatur, sed aliud habet ab eo talem potestatem, ut possit immediate agere. 961. And since the term (471). Here he gives the senses of the term capable or potent, which correspond to the above senses of potency. And there are two senses of capable which correspond to the first sense of potency. (1) For according to its active power a thing is said to be capable of acting in two ways: in one way, because it acts immediately of itself; and in another way, because it acts through something else to which it communicates its power, as a king acts through a bailiff. Hence he says that, since the term potency is used in this number of senses, the term capable or potent must also be used in the same number of senses. Thus in one sense it means something which has an active principle of change in itself, as what brings another to rest or to a stop”; i.e., what causes some other thing to stand still is said to be capable of bringing something different from itself to a state of rest. And it is used in another sense when a thing does not act directly but another thing receives such power from it that it can act directly.
lib. 5 l. 14 n. 9 Deinde cum dicit alio si secundo ponit secundum modum respondentem secundo modo potentiae, idest potentiae passivae; dicens, quod alio modo a praedicto dicitur possibile sive potens, quod potest mutari in aliquid, quicquid sit illud; scilicet sive possit mutari in peius, sive in melius. Et secundum hoc, aliquid dicitur corruptibile, quia potest corrumpi, quod est in peius mutari: vel non corruptibile, quia potest non corrumpi, si sit impossibile illud ipsum corrumpi. 962. And in still another (472). (2) Next, he gives a second sense in which the term capable is used, and this corresponds to the second sense of the term potency, i.e., passive potency. He says that, in a different way from the foregoing, a thing said to be capable or potent when it can be changed in some respect, whatever it may be, i.e., whether it can be changed for the better or for the worse. And in this sense a thing is said to be corruptible because “it is capable of being corrupted,” which is to undergo change for the worse, or it is not corruptible because it is capable of not being corrupted, assuming that it is impossible for it to be corrupted.
lib. 5 l. 14 n. 10 Oportet autem illud, quod est possibile ad aliquid patiendum, habere in se quamdam dispositionem, quae sit causa et principium talis passionis; et illud principium vocatur potentia passiva. Principium autem passionis potest inesse alicui passibili dupliciter. Uno modo per hoc, quod habet aliquid; sicut homo est possibilis pati infirmitatem propter abundantiam alicuius inordinati humoris in ipso. Alio vero modo est aliquid potens pati per hoc, quod privatur aliquo, quod posset repugnare passioni; sicut si homo dicatur potens infirmari propter subtractionem fortitudinis et virtutis naturalis. Et haec duo oportet esse in quolibet potente pati. Nunquam enim aliquid pateretur, nisi esset in eo subiectum, quod esset receptivum dispositionis, vel formae, quae per passionem inducitur; et nisi esset debilitas virtutis in patiente ad resistendum actioni agentis. 963. And what is capable of being acted upon in some way must have within itself a certain disposition which is the cause and principle of its passivity, and this principle is called passive potency. But such a principle can be present in the thing acted upon for two reasons. First, this is because it possesses something; for example, a man is capable of suffering from some disease because he has an excessive amount of some inordinate humor. Second, a thing is capable of being acted upon because it lacks something which could resist the change. This is the case, for example, when a man is said to be capable of suffering from some disease because his strength and natural power have been weakened. Now both of these must be present in anything which is capable of being acted upon; for a thing would never be acted upon unless it both contained a subject which could receive the disposition or form induced in it as a result of the change and also lacked the power of resisting the action of an agent.
lib. 5 l. 14 n. 11 Hi enim duo modi principii patiendi possunt reduci in unum, quia potest privatio significari ut habitus. Et sic sequetur, quod privari sit habere privationem. Et ita uterque modus erit in aliquid habendo. Quod autem privatio possit significari ut habitus, et ut aliquid habitum, ex hoc contingit, quod ens aequivoce dicitur. Et secundum unum modum et privatio et negatio dicitur ens, ut habitum est in principio quarti. Et sic sequitur quod etiam negatio et privatio possunt significari ut habitus. Et ideo possumus universaliter dicere, quod aliquid possibile sit pati propter hoc quod habet in se quemdam habitum et quoddam principium passionis; cum etiam privari sit habere aliquid, si contingat privationem habere. 964. Now these two ways in which the principle of passivity is spoken of can be reduced to one, because privation can be designated as “a having.” Thus it follows that to lack something is to have a privation, and so each way will involve the having of something. Now the designation of privation as a having and as something had follows from the fact that being is used in two different ways; and both privation and negation are called being in one of these ways, as has been pointed out at the beginning of Book IV (564). Hence it follows that negation and privation can also be designated as “havings.” We can say, then, that in general something is capable of undergoing because it contains a kind of “having” and a certain principle that enables it to be acted upon; for even to lack something is to have something, if a thing can have a privation.
lib. 5 l. 14 n. 12 Deinde cum dicit alio in tertium modum ponit hic; et respondet quarto modo potentiae, secundum quod potentia dicebatur inesse alicui, quod non potest corrumpi, vel in peius mutari. Dicit ergo, quod alio modo dicitur possibile vel potens, inquantum non habet potestatem vel principium aliquod ad hoc quod corrumpatur. Et hoc dico ab alio inquantum est aliud; quia secundum hoc aliquid dicitur potens et vigorosum, quod ab exteriori vinci non potest, ut corrumpatur. 965. An in another sense (474). (3) Here he gives a third sense in which the term capable is used; and this sense corresponds to the fourth sense of potency inasmuch as a potency was said to be present in something which cannot be corrupted or changed for the worse. Thus he says that in another sense a thing is said to be capable because it does not have some potency or principle which enables it to be corrupted. And I mean by some other thing as other. For a thing is said to be potent or powerful in the sense that it cannot be overcome by something external so as to be corrupted.
lib. 5 l. 14 n. 13 Deinde cum dicit amplius autem quartum modum ponit, qui respondet tertio modo potentiae, secundum quem dicebatur potentia ad bene agendum vel patiendum. Dicit ergo, quod secundum praedictos modos, qui pertinent ad agendum vel patiendum, potest dici aliquid potens vel ex eo solum, quod aliquid accidit fieri vel non fieri, vel ex eo quod accidit etiam bene fieri. Sicut etiam dicitur potens agere, quia potest bene et faciliter agere, vel quia potest agere simpliciter. Et similiter potens pati et corrumpi, quia de facili hoc pati potest. Et iste modus potestatis etiam invenitur in rebus inanimatis ut in organis, idest in lyra et musicis instrumentis. Dicitur enim quod aliqua lyra potest sonare, quia bene sonat; alia non potest sonare, quia non bene sonat. 966. Again, all these (475). (4) He gives a fourth sense in which the term capable is used, and this corresponds to the third sense of potency inasmuch as potency designated the ability to act or be acted upon well. He says that according to the foregoing senses of potency which pertain both to acting and to being acted upon, a thing can be said to be capable either because it merely happens to come into being or not or because it happens to come into being well. For a thing is said to be capable of acting either because it can simply act or because it can act well and easily. And in a similar way a thing is said to be capable of being acted upon and corrupted because it can be acted upon easily. And this sense of potency is also found in inanimate things “such as instruments,” i.e., in the case of the lyre and other musical instruments. For one lyre is said to be able to produce a tone because it has a good tone, and another is said not to because its tone is not good. Incapacity
lib. 5 l. 14 n. 14 Deinde cum dicit impotentia autem ostendit quot modis dicitur impotentia; et circa hoc duo facit. Primo distinguit hoc nomen impotentia. Secundo hoc nomen impossibile, ibi, impossibilia vero. Circa primum duo facit. Primo enim ostendit communem rationem huius nominis impotentia. Secundo ostendit quot modis dicatur, ibi, amplius autem. Dicit ergo primo, quod impotentia est privatio potentiae. Ad rationem autem privationis duo requiruntur; quorum primum est remotio habitus oppositi. Id autem, quod opponitur impotentiae, est potentia. Unde, cum potentia sit quoddam principium, impotentia erit sublatio quaedam talis principii, qualis dicta est esse potentia. Secundum quod requiritur, est quod privatio proprie dicta sit circa determinatum subiectum et determinatum tempus. Improprie autem sumitur absque determinatione subiecti et temporis. Non enim caecum proprie dicitur nisi quod est aptum natum habere visum, et quando est natum habere visum. 967. Incapacity (476). Then he gives the different senses of the term incapacity, and in regard to this he does two things. First, he gives the various senses in which we speak of incapacity; and second (970), he treats the different senses in which the term impossible is used (“And some things”). In treating the first part he does two things. First, he gives the common meaning of the term incapacity. Second (969), he notes the various ways in which it is used (“Again, there is”). He accordingly says, first, that incapacity is the privation of potency. Now two things are required in the notion of privation, (1) and the first of these is the removal of an opposite state. But the opposite of incapacity is potency. Therefore, since potency is a kind of principle, incapacity will be the removal of that kind of principle which potency has been described to be. (2) The second thing required is that privation properly speaking must belong to a definite subject and at a definite time; and it is taken in an improper sense when taken without a definite subject and without a definite time. For properly speaking only that is said to be blind which is naturally fitted to have sight and at the time when it is naturally fitted to have it.
lib. 5 l. 14 n. 15 Impotentia autem sic dicta dicit remotionem potentiae, aut omnino, idest universaliter, ut scilicet omnis remotio potentiae impotentia dicatur, sive sit aptum natum habere, sive non: aut dicitur remotio in eo quod est aptum natum habere quandocumque, aut solum tunc quando aptum natum est habere. Non enim similiter accipitur impotentia, cum dicimus puerum non posse generare, et cum virum et eunuchum simul. Puer enim dicitur impotens generare, quia subiectum est aptum ad generandum, non tamen pro illo tempore. Vir autem eunuchus dicitur impotens ad generandum, quia pro illo tempore esset quidem aptus, non tamen potest, quia caret principiis activis generationis. Unde hic magis salvatur ratio privationis. Mulus autem vel lapis dicitur impotens ad generandum, quia non potest nec etiam habet aptitudinem in subiecto existentem. 968. And he says that incapacity, such as it has been described, is the removal of a potency, (1) “either altogether,” i.e., universally, in the sense that every removal of a potency is called incapacity, whether the thing is naturally disposed to have the potency or not; or (2) it is the removal of a potency from something which is naturally fitted to have it at some time or other or only at the time when it is naturally fitted to have it. For incapacity is not taken in the same way when we say that a boy is incapable of begetting, and when we say this of a man and of an eunuch. For to say that a boy is incapable of begetting means that, while the subject is naturally fitted to beget, it cannot beget before the proper time. But to say that an eunuch is incapable of begetting means that, while he was naturally fitted to beget at the proper time, he cannot beget now; for he lacks the active principles of begetting. Hence incapacity here retains rather the notion of privation. But a mule or a stone is said to be incapable of begetting because neither can do so, and also because neither has any real aptitude for doing so.
lib. 5 l. 14 n. 16 Deinde cum dicit amplius autem dat intelligere impotentiae modos per oppositum ad modos potentiae. Sicut enim potentia est duplex, scilicet activa et passiva: et iterum utraque aut ad agendum et patiendum simpliciter, aut ad bene agendum et patiendum; ita secundum utramque potentiam est impotentia opposita. Et solum mobili et bene mobili idest potentiae activae, quae est ad movendum simpliciter, vel bene movendum: et potentiae passivae, quae est ad moveri simpliciter, vel bene moveri. 969. Again, there is (477). Then he explains the various senses of incapacity by contrasting them with the senses of potency. For just as potency is twofold, namely, active and passive, and both refer either to acting and being acted upon simply, or to acting and being acted upon well, in a similar fashion there is an opposite sense of incapacity corresponding to each type of potency. That is to say, there is a sense of incapacity corresponding “both to that which can merely produce motion and to that which can produce it well,” namely, to active potency, which is the potency to simply move a thing of to move it well, and to passive potency, which is the potency to simply be moved or to be moved well.
lib. 5 l. 14 n. 17 Deinde cum dicit impossibilia vero ostendit quot modis dicitur impossibile: et circa hoc duo facit. Primo distinguit modos impossibilis. Secundo reducit illos modos ad unum, ibi, quae vero secundum. Circa primum tria facit. Primo dicit, quod uno modo dicuntur aliqua impossibilia secundum quod habent impotentiam praedictam, quae opponitur potentiae. Et huiusmodi modus in quatuor dividitur, sicut et impotentia. 970. And some things (478). Then he explains the various senses in which the term impossible is used; and in regard to this he does two things. First, he gives the various senses in which the term impossible is used; and then (975) he reduces them to one (“But those senses”). In regard to the first he does three things: (1) First, he says that in one sense some things are said to be impossible because they have the foregoing incapacity which is opposed to potency. And impossible in this sense is used in four ways corresponding to those of incapacity.
lib. 5 l. 14 n. 18 Ideo cum dicit alio modo, ponit alium modum, quo dicuntur aliqua impossibilia, non propter privationem alicuius potentiae, sed propter repugnantiam terminorum in propositionibus. Cum enim posse dicatur in ordine ad esse, sicut ens dicitur non solum quod est in rerum natura, sed secundum compositionem propositionis, prout est in ea verum vel falsum; ita possibile et impossibile dicitur non solum propter potentiam vel impotentiam rei: sed propter veritatem et falsitatem compositionis vel divisionis in propositionibus. Unde impossibile dicitur, cuius contrarium est verum de necessitate, ut diametrum quadrati esse commensurabilem eius lateri, est impossibile, quia hoc tale est falsum, cuius contrarium non solum est verum, sed etiam necessarium, quod quidem est non commensurabilem esse. Et propter hoc esse commensurabilem est falsum de necessitate, et hoc est impossibile. 971. (2) Accordingly, when he says “in a different sense, he gives another way in which some things are said to be impossible. And they are said to be such not because of the privation of some potency but because of the opposition existing between the terms in propositions. For since potency is referred to being, then just as being is predicated not only of things that exist in reality but also of the composition of a proposition inasmuch as it contains truth and falsity, in a similar fashion the terms possible and impossible are predicated not only of real potency and incapacity but also of the truth an falsity found in the combining or eparating of terms in propositions. ence the term impossible means that of which the contrary is necessarily true. For example, it is impossible that the diagonal of a square should be commensurable with a side, because such a statement is false whose contrary is not only true but necessarily so, namely, that it is not commensurable. Hence the statement that it is commensurable is necessarily false, and this is impossible.
lib. 5 l. 14 n. 19 Tertio ibi, contrarium vero manifestat quid sit possibile oppositum impossibili secundo modo dicto. Impossibile enim opponitur possibili secundo modo dicto, sicut dictum est. Dicit ergo, quod possibile contrarium huic secundo impossibili est, cuius contrarium non est de necessitate falsum: sicut sedere hominem est possibile, quia non sedere, quod est eius oppositum, non est de necessitate falsum. 972. And the contrary (479). Here he shows that the possible is the opposite of the impossible in the second way mentioned; for the impossible is opposed to the possible in the second way mentioned. He says, then, that the possible, as the contrary of this second sense of the impossible, means that whose contrary is not necessarily false; for example, it is possible that a man should be seated, because the opposite of this—that he should not be seated—is not necessarily false.
lib. 5 l. 14 n. 20 Ex quo patet, quod ille modus possibilis in tres modos dividitur. Dicitur enim uno modo possibile quod falsum est, sed non ex necessitate: sicut hominem sedere dum non sedet, quia eius oppositum non est verum ex necessitate. Alio modo dicitur possibile quod est verum, sed non de necessitate, quia eius oppositum non est falsum de necessitate, sicut Socratem sedere dum sedet. Tertio modo dicitur possibile, quia licet non sit verum, tamen contingit in proximo verum esse. 973. From this it is clear that this sense of possible has three usages. (1) For in one way it designates what is false but is not necessarily so; for example, it is possible that a man should be seated while he is not seated, because the opposite of this is not necessarily true. (2) In another way possible designates what is true but is not necessarily so because its opposite is not necessarily false, for example, that Socrates should be seated while he is seated. (3) And in a third way it means that, although a thing is not true now, it may be true later on.
lib. 5 l. 14 n. 21 Deinde cum dicit secundum metaphoram ostendit quomodo potentia sumatur metaphorice; et dicit, in geometria dicitur potentia secundum metaphoram. Potentia enim lineae in geometria dicitur quadratum lineae per hanc similitudinem: quia sicut ex eo quod est in potentia fit illud quod est in actu, ita ex ductu alicuius lineae in seipsam, resultat quadratum ipsius. Sicut si diceremus, quod ternarius potest in novenarium, quia novenarius consurgit ex ductu ternarii in seipsum. Nam ter tria sunt novem. Sicut autem impossibile secundo modo acceptum non dicitur secundum aliquam impotentiam, ita et modi possibilis ultimo positi, non dicuntur secundum aliquam potentiam, sed secundum similitudinem, vel secundum modum veri et falsi. 974. And what is called a “power” (480). He shows how the term power is used metaphorically. He says that in geometry the term power is used metaphorically. For in geometry the square of a line is called its power by reason of the following likeness, namely, that just as from something in potency something actual comes to be, in a similar way from multiplying a line by itself its square results. It would be the same if we were to say that the number three is capable of becoming the number nine, because from multiplying the number three by itself the number nine results; for three times three makes nine. And just as the term impossible taken in the second sense does not correspond to any incapacity, in a similar way the senses of the term possible which were given last do not correspond to any potency, but they are used figuratively or in the sense of the true and the false.
lib. 5 l. 14 n. 22 Deinde cum dicit quae vero reducit omnes modos possibilis et impossibilis ad unum primum: et dicit, quod possibilia, quae dicuntur secundum potentiam, omnia dicuntur per respectum ad unam primam potentiam, quae est prima potentia activa, de qua supra dictum est, quod est principium mutationis in alio inquantum est aliud. Nam omnia alia possibilia dicuntur per respectum ad istam potentiam. Aliquid enim dicitur possibile per hoc, quod aliquid aliud habet potentiam activam in ipsum, secundum quod dicitur possibile secundum potentiam passivam. Quaedam vero dicuntur possibilia in non habendo aliquid aliud talem potentiam in ipsa: sicut quae dicuntur potentia, quia non possunt corrumpi ab exterioribus agentibus. Quaedam vero potentia in sic habendo, idest in hoc quod habent potentiam, ut bene aut faciliter agant vel patiantur. 975. But those senses (481). He now reduces all senses of capable and incapable to one primary sense. He says that those senses of the term capable or potent which correspond to potency all refer to one primary kind of potency—the first active potency which was described above (955) as the principle of change in some other thing as other; because all the other senses of capable or potent are referred to this kind of potency. For a thing is said to be capable by reason of the fact that some other thing has active power over it, and in this sense it is said to be capable according to passive potency. And some things are said to be capable because some other thing does not have power over them as those which said to be capable because they cannot be corrupted by external agents. And others are said to be capable because they have it “in some special way,” i.e., because they have the power or potency to act or be acted upon well or easily.
lib. 5 l. 14 n. 23 Et sicut omnia possibilia, quae dicuntur secundum aliquam potentiam, reducuntur ad unam primam potentiam; ita omnia impossibilia, quae dicuntur secundum aliquam impotentiam, reducuntur ad unam primam impotentiam, quae est opposita primae potentiae. Patet igitur, quod propria definitio potentiae primo modo dictae est principium permutationis in alio inquantum est aliud, quod est ratio potentiae activae. 976. And just as all things which are said to be capable because of some potency are reduced to one primary potency, in a similar way all things which are said to be incapable because of some impotency are reduced to one primary incapacity, which is the opposite of the primary potency. It is clear, then, that the proper notion of potency in the primary sense is this: a principle of change in some other thing as other; and this is the notion of active potency or power.

Lecture 15

Latin English
lib. 5 l. 15 n. 1 Quoniam ens non solum dividitur in potentiam et actum, sed etiam in decem praedicamenta, postquam philosophus distinxit hoc nomen potentia, hic incipit distinguere nomina, quae significant praedicamenta. Et primo nomen quantitatis. Secundo nomen qualitatis, ibi, quale autem. Tertio distinguit modos ad aliquid, ibi, ad aliquid dicuntur. Alia vero praedicamenta praetermittit, quia sunt determinata ad aliquod genus rerum naturalium; ut patet praecipue de agere et pati, et de ubi et quando. Circa primum tria facit. Primo ponit rationem quantitatis; dicens, quod quantum dicitur quod est divisibile in ea quae insunt. Quod quidem dicitur ad differentiam divisionis mixtorum. Nam corpus mixtum resolvitur in elementa, quae non sunt actu in mixto, sed virtute tantum. Unde non est ibi tantum divisio quantitatis; sed oportet quod adsit aliqua alteratio, per quam mixtum resolvitur in elementa. Et iterum addit, quod utrumque aut singulum, est natum esse unum aliquid, hoc est aliquid demonstratum. Et hoc dicit ad removendum divisionem in partes essentiales, quae sunt materia et forma. Nam neutrum eorum aptum natum est esse unum aliquid per se. 977. Since being is divided not only into potency and actuality but also into the ten categories, having given the different senses of the term potency (954-60), the Philosopher begins here to give the different senses of the terms which designate the categories. First, he considers the term quantity; and second (987), the term quality (“Quality means”). Third (1001), he gives the different meanings of the term relative (“Some things”). He omits the other categories because they are limited to one class of natural beings, as is especially evident of action and passion, and of place and time. In regard to the first he does three things. First, he gives the meaning of quantity. He says that quantity means what is divisible into constituent parts. Now this is said to distinguish this kind of division from that of compounds. For a compound is dissolved into the elements, and these are not present in it actually but only virtually. Hence, in the latter case there is not just division of quantity, but there must also be some alteration by means of which a compound is dissolved into its elements. He adds that both or one of these constituents is by nature “a one,” that is, something which is pointed out. He says this in order to exclude the division of a thing into its essential parts, which are matter and form; for neither one of these is fitted by nature to be a particular thing of itself.
lib. 5 l. 15 n. 2 Secundo ibi, multitudo ergo ponit species quantitatis; inter quas primae sunt duae; scilicet multitudo sive pluralitas, et magnitudo sive mensura. Utrumque autem eorum habet rationem quanti, inquantum multitudo numerabilis est et magnitudo est mensurabilis. Mensuratio enim propria pertinet ad quantitatem. Definitur autem multitudo sic. Multitudo est, quod est divisibile secundum potentiam in partes non continuas. Magnitudo autem quod est divisibile in partes continuas. Quod quidem contingit tripliciter: et secundum hoc sunt tres species magnitudinis. Nam, si sit divisibile secundum unam tantum dimensionem in partes continuas, erit longitudo. Si autem in duas, latitudo. Si autem in tres, profunditas. Ulterius autem, quando pluralitas vel multitudo est finita, dicitur numerus. Longitudo autem finita, dicitur linea. Latitudo finita, corpus. Si enim esset multitudo infinita, non esset numerus; quia quod infinitum est, numerari non potest. Similiter, si esset longitudo infinita, non esset linea. Linea enim est longitudo mensurabilis. Et propter hoc in ratione lineae ponitur, quod eius extremitates sunt duo puncta. Simile est de superficie et corpore. 978. Therefore plurality (483). Second, he gives the kinds of quantity; and of these there are two primary kinds: plurality or multitude, and magnitude or measure. And each of these has the character of something quantitative inasmuch as plurality is numerable and magnitude is measurable. For mensuration pertains properly to quantity. However, plurality is defined as what is divisible potentially into parts which are not continuous; and magnitude as what is divisible into parts which are continuous. Now this occurs in three ways, and therefore there are three kinds of magnitude. For if inagnitude is divisible into continuous parts in one dimension only, it will be length; if into two, width; and if into three, depth. Again, when plurality or multitude is limited, it is called number. And a limited length is called a line; a limited width, surface; and a limited depth, body. For if multitude were unlimited, number would not exist, because what is unlimited cannot be numbered. Similarly, if length were unlimited, a line would not exist, because a line is a measurable length (and this is why it is stated in the definition of a line that its extremities are two points). The same things holds true of surface and of body.
lib. 5 l. 15 n. 3 Tertio ibi, amplius autem distinguit modos quantitatis; et circa hoc tria facit. Primo distinguit quantum in id quod est quantum per se, sicut linea, et in id quod est quantum per accidens, sicut musicum. 979. Again, some things (484). Third, he gives the different ways in which things are quantitative; and in regard to this he does three things. First, he draws a distinction between what is essentially quantitative, as a line, and what is accidentally quantitative, as the musical.
lib. 5 l. 15 n. 4 Secundo ibi, eorum vero distinguit quantum per se; quod quidem duplex est. Quaedam enim significantur per modum substantiae et subiecti, sicut linea, vel superficies, vel numerus. Quodlibet enim istorum substantialiter est quantum, quia in definitione cuiuslibet ponitur quantitas. Nam linea est quantitas continua secundum longitudinem divisibilis, finita: et similiter est de aliis. 980. And of those (485). Second, he gives the different senses in which things are essentially quantitative, and there are two of these. For some things are said to be such after the manner of a substance or subject, as line, surface or number; for each of these is essentially quantitative because quantity is given in the definition of each. For a line is a limited quantity divisible in length. The same is true of the other dimensions.
lib. 5 l. 15 n. 5 Quaedam vero per se pertinent ad genus quantitatis, et significantur per modum habitus vel passionis talis substantiae, scilicet lineae, quae est substantialiter quantitas, vel aliarum similium quantitatum: sicut multum et paucum significantur ut passiones numeri: et productum et breve, ut passiones lineae: et latum et strictum, ut passiones superficiei: et profundum et humile sive altum, ut passiones corporis: et similiter grave et leve, secundum opinionem illorum, qui dicebant multitudinem superficierum vel atomorum esse causam gravitatis in corporibus, paucitatem vero eorumdem, causam levitatis. Sed secundum veritatem grave et leve non pertinent ad quantitatem, sed ad qualitatem, ut infra ponet. Et similiter est de aliis talibus. 981. And other things belong essentially to the genus of quantity and are signified after the manner of a state or property of such substance, i.e., of a line, which is essentially quantitative, or of other similar kinds of quantity. For example, much and little are signified as properties of number; long and short, as properties of a line; broad and narrow, as properties of surface; and high and low or deep, as properties of body. And the same is true of heavy and light according to the opinion of those who said that having many surfaces, or atoms, causes bodies to be heavy, and having few causes them to be light. But the truth of the matter is that heavy and light do not pertain to quantity but to quality, as he states below (993). The same thing is true of other such attributes as these.
lib. 5 l. 15 n. 6 Quaedam etiam sunt, quae communiter cuiuslibet quantitatis continuae passiones sunt, sicut magnum et parvum, maius et minus; sive haec dicantur secundum se, idest absolute, sive dicantur ad invicem, sicut aliquid dicitur magnum et parvum respective, sicut in praedicamentis habetur. Ista autem nomina, quae significant passiones quantitatis per se, transferuntur etiam ad alia quam ad quantitates. Dicitur enim albedo magna et parva, et alia huiusmodi. 982. There are also certain attributes which are common properties of any continuous quantity, as large and small, and larger and smaller, whether these are taken “essentially,” i.e., absolutely, or “in relation to each other,” its something is said to be large and small relatively, as is stated in the Categories. But these terms which signify the properties of quantity pure and simple are also transferred to other things besides quantities. For whiteness is said to be large and small, and so also are other accidents of this kind.
lib. 5 l. 15 n. 7 Sciendum autem est, quod quantitas inter alia accidentia propinquior est substantiae. Unde quidam quantitates esse substantias putant, scilicet lineam et numerum et superficiem et corpus. Nam sola quantitas habet divisionem in partes proprias post substantiam. Albedo enim non potest dividi, et per consequens nec intelligitur individuare nisi per subiectum. Et inde est, quod in solo quantitatis genere aliqua significantur ut subiecta, alia ut passiones. 983. But it must be borne in mind that of all the accidents quantity is closest to substance. Hence some men think that quantities, such as line, number, surface and body are substances. For next to substance only quantity can be divided into distinctive parts. For whiteness cannot be divided, and therefore it cannot be understood to be individuated except by its subject. And it is for this reason that only in the genus of quantity are some things designated as subjects and others as properties.
lib. 5 l. 15 n. 8 Tertio ibi, secundum accidens distinguit modos quantitatis per accidens: et ponit duos modos quantitatis per accidens: quorum unus est secundum quod aliqua dicuntur quanta per accidens ex hoc solo, quod sunt accidentia alicuius quanti, sicut album et musicum per hoc quod sunt accidentia alicuius subiecti, quod est quantum. 984. But of things (486). Then he gives the different senses in which things are said to be accidentally quantitative. These senses are two. (1) In one sense, things are said to be accidentally quantitative only because they are accidents of some quantity; for example, white and musical are said to be quantitative because they are accidents of a subject which is quantitative.
lib. 5 l. 15 n. 9 Alio modo dicuntur aliqua quanta per accidens non ratione subiecti, in quo sunt, sed eo quod dividuntur secundum quantitatem ad divisionem alicuius quantitatis; sicut motus et tempus, quae dicuntur quaedam quanta et continua, propterea quod ea, quorum sunt, sunt divisibilia, et ipsa dividuntur ad divisionem eorum. Tempus enim est divisibile et continuum propter motum; motus autem propter magnitudinem; non quidem propter magnitudinem eius quod movetur, sed propter magnitudinem eius in quo aliquid movetur. Ex eo enim quod illa magnitudo est quanta, et motus est quantus. Et propter hoc quod motus est quantus, sequitur tempus esse quantum. Unde haec non solum per accidens quantitates dici possunt, sed magis per posterius, inquantum quantitatis divisionem ab aliquo priori sortiuntur. 985. (2) In another sense, some things are said to be accidentally quantitative, not because of the subject in which they exist, but because they are divided quantitatively as a result of the division of some quantity; for example, motion and time (which are said to be quantitative and continuous because of the subjects to which they belong) are divisible and are themselves divided as a result of the division of the subjects to which they belong. For time is divisible and continuous because of motion, and motion is divisible because of magnitude—not because of the magnitude of the thing which is moved, but because of the magnitude of the space through which it is moved. For since that magnitude is quantitative, motion is also quantitative; and since motion is quantitative, it follows that time is quantitative. Hence these can be said to be quantitative not merely accidentally but rather subsequently, inasmuch as they receive quantitative division from something prior.
lib. 5 l. 15 n. 10 Sciendum est autem, quod philosophus in praedicamentis posuit tempus quantitatem per se, cum hic ponat ipsum quantitatem per accidens; quia ibi distinxit species quantitatis secundum diversas rationes mensurae. Aliam enim rationem mensurae habet tempus, quod est mensura extrinseca, et magnitudo, quae est mensura intrinseca. Et ideo ponitur ibi ut alia species quantitatis. Hic autem considerat species quantitatis quantum ad ipsum esse quantitatis. Et ideo illa, quae non habent esse quantitatis nisi ex alio, non ponit hic species quantitatis, sed quantitates per accidens, ut motum et tempus. Motus autem non habet aliam rationem mensurae quam tempus et magnitudo. Et ideo nec hic nec ibi ponitur quantitatis species. Locus autem ponitur ibi species quantitatis, non hic, quia habet aliam rationem mensurae, sed non aliud esse quantitatis. 986. However, it must be noted that in the Categories the Philosopher held that time is essentially quantitative, while here he holds that it is accidentally quantitative. There he distinguished between the species of quantity from the viewpoint of the different kinds of measure. For time, which is an external measure, has the character of one kind of measure, and continuous quantity, which is an internal measure, has a different one. Hence in the Categories time is given as another species of quantity, whereas here he considers the species of quantity from the viewpoint of the being of quantity. Therefore those things which only receive their quantitative being from something else he does not give here as species of quantity, but as things which are accidentally quantitative, as motion and time. But motion has no other manner of measure than time and magnitude. Hence neither in this work nor in the Categories does he give it as a species of quantity. Place, however, is given there as a species of quantity. But it is not given as such here because it has a different manner of measure, although not a different quantitative being. LESSON 16 The Senses of Quality ARISTOTLE'S TEXT Chapter 14: 1020a 33-1020b 25

Lecture 16

Latin English
lib. 5 l. 16 n. 1 Hic distinguit modos qualitatis: et circa hoc duo facit. Primo ponit quatuor modos qualitatis. Secundo reducit eos ad duos, ibi, fere vero secundum duos modos. Dicit ergo primo, quod unus modus qualitatis est secundum quod qualitas dicitur differentia substantiae, idest differentia, per quam aliquid ab altero substantialiter differt, quae intrat in definitionem substantiae. Et propter hoc dicitur, quod differentia praedicatur in quale quid. Ut si quaeratur, quale animal est homo? Respondemus quod bipes: et quale animal equus? Respondemus quod quadrupes: et qualis figura est circulus? Respondemus quod agonion, id est sine angulo; ac si ipsa differentia substantiae qualitas sit. Uno igitur modo ipsa differentia substantiae qualitas dicitur. 987. Here he gives the various senses in which the term quality is used, and in regard to this he does two things. First, he gives four senses of the term quality; and second (966), he reduces them to two (“The senses of quality”). (1) He accordingly says, first, that the term quality is used in one sense as “substantial difference,” i.e., the difference by which one thing is distinguished substantially from another and which is included in the definition of the substance. And for this reason it is said that a difference is predicated as a substantial qualification. For example, if one were to ask what sort of (quale) animal man is, we would answer that he is two-footed; and if one were to ask what sort of animal a horse is, we would answer that it is four-footed; and if one were to ask what sort of figure a circle is, we would answer that it is “non-angular,” i.e., without angles; as if a substantial difference were quality. In one sense, then, quality means substantial difference. ,
lib. 5 l. 16 n. 2 Hunc autem modum qualitatis Aristoteles in praedicamentis praetermisit, quia non continetur sub praedicamento qualitatis, de quo ibi agebat. Hic autem agit de significationibus huius nominis, qualitas. 988. Now Aristotle omits this sense of quality in the Categories because it is not contained under the category of quality,—which he deals with there. But here he is dealing with the meaning of the term quality.
lib. 5 l. 16 n. 3 Secundum ponit ibi, alio vero dicit, quod alius modus qualitatis vel qualis est secundum quod immobilia et mathematica dicuntur qualia. Mathematica enim abstrahunt a motu, ut in sexto huius dicetur. Mathematica enim sunt numeri, et magnitudines; et in utrisque utimur nomine qualis. Dicimus enim superficies esse quales, inquantum sunt quadratae vel triangulares. Et similiter numeri dicuntur quales, inquantum sunt compositi. Dicuntur autem numeri compositi, qui communicant in aliquo numero mensurante eos; sicut senarius numerus et novenarius mensurantur ternario, et non solum ad unitatem comparationem habent, sicut ad mensuram communem. Numeri autem incompositi, vel primi in sua proportione dicuntur, quos non mensurat alius numerus communis, nisi sola unitas. 989. In another sense (488). (2) Here he gives a second sense in which the term quality is used. He says that the term quality or “qualified” is used in another sense insofar as immobile things and the objects of mathematics are said to be qualified in a certain way. For the objects of mathematics are abstracted from motion, as is stated in Book VI of this work (1161). Such objects are numbers and continuous quantities, and of both we use the term quality. Thus we say that surfaces are qualified as being square or triangular. And similarly numbers are said to be qualified as being compound. Those numbers are said to be compound which have some common number that measures them; for example, the number six and the number nine are measured by the number three, and are not merely referred to one as a common measure. But those which are measured by no common number other than one are called uncompounded or first in their proportion.
lib. 5 l. 16 n. 4 Dicuntur etiam numeri quales ad similitudinem superficiei et solidi, idest corporis. Secundum quidem imitationem superficiei, inquantum numerus ducitur in numerum, vel eumdem vel alium; ut cum dicitur bis tria, vel ter tria. Et hoc est quod dicit quoties quanti. Nam designatur quasi una dimensio in hoc quod dicitur tria, quasi vero secunda dimensio, hoc quod dicitur bis tria, vel etiam ter tria. 990. Numbers are also spoken of as having quality in a metaphor taken from surface and from “solid,” i.e., body. They are considered like a surface inasmuch as one number is multiplied by another, either by the same number or by a different one, as in the phrase “twice three” or “three times three.” And this is what he means by “so many times so much”; for something like one dimension is designated by saying “three,” and a sort of second dimension by saying “twice three” or “three times three.”
lib. 5 l. 16 n. 5 Ad imitationem vero solidi, quando est duplex ductus, vel eiusdem numeri in seipsum, vel diversorum numerorum in unum, ut cum dicitur ter tria ter, vel bis tria bis, vel bis tria quater. Et hoc est quod dicit quoties quot quanti. Sic enim considerantur in numero quasi tres dimensiones ad modum solidi. In hac autem numerorum ordinatione, aliquid consideratur per modum substantiae; sicut hoc quod dico tria, vel quicumque numerus qui in alium ducitur. Aliquid vero per modum quantitatis; sicut ipse ductus unius numeri in alterum, vel in se ipsum; ut cum dico bis tria, binarius significatur per modum quantitatis mensurantis, ternarius vero per modum substantiae. Id ergo, quod existit in substantia numeri praeter ipsam quantitatem, quae est numeri substantia, dicitur qualitas eius, ut hoc quod significatur per hoc quod dicitur bis vel ter. 991. Numbers are considered like a solid when there is a twofold multiplication, either of the same number by itself, or of different numbers by one; as in the expression “three times three times three” or “two times three times two” or “two times three times four.” And this is what he means by “so many times so many times so much.” For we treat of three dimensions in a number in somewhat the same way as in a solid; and in this arrangement of litlinbers there is something which is treated as a substance, as three, or any other number that is multiplied by another. And there is something else which is treated as quantity, as the multiplication of one number by another or by itself. Thus when I say “twice three,” the number two is signified after the manner of a measuring quantity, and the number three after the manner of a substance. Therefore what belongs to the substance of number besides quantity itself, which is the substance of number, is called a quality of it, as what is meant in saying twice or three times.
lib. 5 l. 16 n. 6 Alia litera habet secundum quantitatem; et tunc substantia numeri dicitur ipse numerus simpliciter prolatus, ut quod dico tria. Quantitas autem secundum quam attenditur eius qualitas, dicitur ipsa multiplicatio numeri in numerum. Et huic concordat litera sequens, quae dicit, quod substantia cuiuslibet numeri est id quod semel dicitur. Sicut substantia senarii est quod dicitur semel sex, non quod dicitur bis tria, vel ter duo: sed hoc pertinet ad eius qualitatem. Dicere enim numerum esse superficialem vel solidum sive quadratum, sive cubicum, significat eum esse qualem. Hic autem modus qualitatis est quarta species in praedicamentis posita. 992. Another text reads “according to quantity,” and then the substance of number is said to be the number itself expressed in an unqualified sense, as “three.” And insofar as we consider the quality of a quantity, this is designated by multiplying one number by another. The rest of the text agrees with this, saying that the substance of any number is what it is said to be once; for example, the substance of six is six taken once, and not three taken twice or two taken three times; and this pertains to its quality. For to speak of a number in terms of surface or solid, whether square or cubic,is to speak of its quality. And this type of quality is the fourth kind given in the Categories.
lib. 5 l. 16 n. 7 Tertio ponit ibi, amplius quaecumque dicit, quod etiam qualitates dicuntur passiones substantiarum mobilium, secundum quas corpora per alterationem mutantur, ut calidum, frigidum, et huiusmodi. Et hic modus pertinet ad tertiam speciem qualitatis in praedicamentis positam. 993. Again, all the modifications (489). (3) Then he gives the third sense in which quality is used. He says that qualities also mean the modifications of mobile substances according to which bodies are changed through alteration, as heat and cold and accidents of this kind. And this sense of quality belongs to the third kind of quality given in the Categories.
lib. 5 l. 16 n. 8 Quartum ponit ibi, amplius secundum dicit quod qualitas sive quale dicitur quarto modo secundum quod aliquid disponitur per virtutem et vitium, vel qualitercumque per bonum et malum, sicut per scientiam et ignorantiam, sanitatem et aegritudinem, et huiusmodi. Et haec est prima species qualitatis in praedicamentis posita. 994. (4) Next he gives the fourth sense in which quality is used. He says that quality or “qualified” is used in a fourth sense insofar as something is disposed by virtue or vice, or in whatever way it is well or badly disposed, as by knowledge or ignorance, health or sickness, and the like. This is the first kind of quality given in the Categories.
lib. 5 l. 16 n. 9 Praetermittit autem inter hos modos secundam qualitatis speciem, quia magis comprehenditur sub potentia, cum non significetur nisi ut principium passioni resistens; sed propter modum denominandi ponitur in praedicamentis inter species qualitatis. Secundum autem modum essendi magis continetur sub potentia, sicut et supra posuit. 995. Now he omits the second of these senses of quality because it is contained rather under power, since it is signified only as a principle which resists modification. But it is given in the Categories among the kinds of quality because of the way in which it is named. However, according to its mode of being it is contained rather under power, as he also held above (960).
lib. 5 l. 16 n. 10 Deinde cum dicit fere vero reducit quatuor positos modos ad duos; dicens, quod quale dicitur aliquid fere secundum duos modos, inquantum alii duo de quatuor reducuntur ad alios duos. Horum autem unus principalissimus est primus modus, secundum quem differentia substantiae dicitur qualitas, quia per eum aliquid significatur informatum et qualificatum. 996. The senses of quality (491). Then he reduces to two the four senses of quality so far given, saying that a thing is said to be qualified in a certain way in two senses, inasmuch as two of these four senses are reduced to the other two. (1) The most basic of these senses is the first one, according to which quality means substantial difference, because by means of it a thing is designated as being informed and qualified.
lib. 5 l. 16 n. 11 Et ad hunc modum reducitur qualitas, quae est in numeris, et in mathematicis aliis, sicut quaedam pars. Huiusmodi enim qualitates sunt quasi quaedam differentiae substantiales mathematicorum. Nam ipsa significantur per modum substantiae potius quam alia accidentia, ut in capitulo de quantitate dictum est. Sunt autem huiusmodi qualitates differentiae substantiarum aut non motarum, aut non inquantum sunt motae: et hoc dicit, ut ostendat quantum ad propositum non differre, utrum mathematica sint quaedam substantiae per se existentes secundum esse, ut dicebat Plato, a motu separatae; sive sint in substantiis mobilibus secundum esse, sed separatae secundum rationem. Primo enim modo essent qualitates non motorum. Secundo autem, motorum, sed non inquantum sunt mota. 997. The quality found in numbers and in other objects of mathematics is reduced to this as a part. For qualities of this kind are in a sense the substantial differences of mathematical objects, because they are signified after the manner of substance to a greater degree than the other accidents, as was stated in the chapter on quantity (980). Further, qualities of this kind constitute substantial differences, “either of things which are not moved, or not of them insofar as they are moved”; and he says this in order to show that it makes no difference to his thesis whether the objects of mathematics are self-subsistent substances, as Plato claimed, and are separate from motion; or whether they exist in substances which are mobile in reality but separate in thought. For in the first sense they would not be qualities of things which are moved; but in the second sense they would be, but not inasmuch as they are moved.
lib. 5 l. 16 n. 12 Secundus modus principalis est, ut passiones motorum inquantum mota, et etiam differentiae motuum dicantur qualitates. Quae quidem dicuntur differentiae motuum, quia alterationes differunt secundum huiusmodi qualitates, sicut calefieri et infrigidari secundum calidum et frigidum. 998. (2) The second basic sense in which quality is used is that in which the modifications of things which are moved as such, and also the differences of things which are moved, are called qualities. They are called the differences of motions because alterations differ in terms of such qualities, as becoming hot and becoming cold differ in terms of heat and cold.
lib. 5 l. 16 n. 13 Et ad hunc modum reducitur ille modus secundum quem vitium et virtus dicitur qualitas. Hic enim modus est quasi quaedam pars illius. Virtus enim et vitium ostendunt quasdam differentias motus et actus secundum bene et male. Nam virtus est, per quam se aliquis habet bene ad agendum et patiendum; vitium autem secundum quod male. Et simile est de aliis habitibus, sive intellectualibus, ut scientia, sive corporalibus, ut sanitas. 999. The sense in which virtue and vice are called qualities is reduced to this last sense, for it is in a way a part of this sense. For virtue and vice indicate certain differences of motion and activity based on good or bad performance. For virtue is that by which a thing is well disposed to act or be acted upon, and vice is that by which a thing is badly disposed. The same is true of other habits, whether they are intellectual, as science, or corporal, as health.
lib. 5 l. 16 n. 14 Sed tamen bene et male maxime pertinet ad qualitatem in rebus animatis; et praecipue in habentibus prohaeresim idest electionem. Et hoc ideo, quia bonum habet rationem finis. Ea vero, quae agunt per electionem, agunt propter finem. Agere autem propter finem maxime competit rebus animatis. Res enim inanimatae agunt vel moventur propter finem, non tamquam cognoscentes finem, neque tamquam se agentes ad finem; sed potius ab alio diriguntur, qui eis naturalem inclinationem dedit, sicut sagitta dirigitur in finem a sagittante. Res autem irrationales animatae cognoscunt quidem finem et appetunt ipsum appetitu animali, et movent seipsa localiter ad finem tamquam iudicium habentes de fine; sed appetitus finis, et eorum quae sunt propter finem, determinatur eis ex naturali inclinatione. Propter quod sunt magis acta quam agentia. Unde nec in eis est iudicium liberum. Rationalia vero in quibus solum est electio, cognoscunt finem, et proportionem eorum, quae sunt in finem ipsum. Et ideo sicut seipsa movent ad finem, ita etiam ad appetendum finem, vel ea quae sunt propter finem, ex quo est in eis electio libera. 1000. But the terms well and badly relate chiefly to quality in living things, and especially in those having “election,” i.e., choice. And this is true because good has the role of an end or goal. So those things which act by choice act for an end. Now to act for an end belongs particularly to living things. For non-living things act or are moved for an end, not inasmuch as they know the end, or inasmuch as they themselves act for an end, but rather inasmuch as they are directed by something else which gives them their natural inclination, just as an arrow, for example, is directed toward its goal by an archer. And non-rational living things apprehend an end or goal and desire it by an appetite of the soul, and they move locally toward some end or goal inasmuch as they have discernment of it; but their appetite for an end, and for those things which exist for the sake of the end, is determined for them by a natural inclination. Hence they are acted upon rather than act; and thus their judgment is not free. But rational beings, in whom alone choice exists, know both the end and the proportion of the means to the end. Therefore, just as they move themselves toward the end, so also do they move themselves to desire the end and the means; and for this reason they have free choice.

Lecture 17

Latin English
lib. 5 l. 17 n. 1 Hic determinat philosophus de ad aliquid: et circa hoc duo facit. Primo ponit modos eorum, quae sunt ad aliquid secundum se. Secundo eorum, quae sunt ad aliquid ratione alterius, ibi, illa vero quia sua genera. Circa primum duo facit. Primo enumerat modos eorum, quae secundum se ad aliquid dicuntur. Secundo prosequitur de eis, ibi, dicuntur autem prima. Ponit ergo tres modos eorum, quae ad aliquid dicuntur: quorum primus est secundum numerum et quantitatem, sicut duplum ad dimidium, et triplum ad tertiam partem, et multiplicatum, idest multiplex, ad partem multiplicati, idest ad submultiplex, et continens ad contentum. Accipitur autem continens pro eo, quod excedit secundum quantitatem. Omne enim excedens secundum quantitatem continet in se illud quod exceditur. Est enim hoc et adhuc amplius; sicut quinque continet in se quatuor, et tricubitum continet in se bicubitum. 1001. Here the Philosopher establishes the meaning of the relative or relation; and in regard to this he does two things. First, he gives the senses in which things are said to be relative directly; and second (1030), those in which things are said to be relative indirectly (“And other things”). In regard to the first he does two things. First, he enumerates the senses in which things are said to be relative directly. Second (1006), he proceeds to deal with these (“The first things”). He accordingly gives, first, three senses in which things are said to be relative directly. The first of these has to do with number and quantity as double to half and triple to a third, and “what is multiplied,” i.e., the multiple, to a part “of what is multiplied,” i.e., the submultiple, “and what includes to what is included in it.” But what includes is here taken for what is greater in quantity. For everything which is greater in quantity includes within itself that which it exceeds. For it is this and something more; for example, five includes within itself four, and three cubits include two.
lib. 5 l. 17 n. 2 Secundus modus est prout aliqua dicuntur ad aliquid secundum actionem et passionem, vel potentiam activam et passivam; sicut calefactivum ad calefactibile, quod pertinet ad actiones naturales, et sectivum ad sectibile, quod pertinet ad actiones artificiales, et universaliter omne activum ad passivum. 1002. The second sense is that in which some things are said to be relative according to acting and undergoing, or to active and passive potency; for example, in the realm of natural actions, as what can heat to what can be heated; and in the realm of artificial actions, as what can cut to what can be cut; and in general as everything active to everything passive.
lib. 5 l. 17 n. 3 Tertius modus est secundum quod mensurabile dicitur ad mensuram. Accipitur autem hic mensura et mensurabile non secundum quantitatem (hoc enim ad primum modum pertinet, in quo utrumque ad utrumque dicitur: nam duplum dicitur ad dimidium, et dimidium ad duplum), sed secundum mensurationem esse et veritatis. Veritas enim scientiae mensuratur a scibili. Ex eo enim quod res est vel non est, oratio scita vera vel falsa est, et non e converso. Et similiter est de sensibili et sensu. Et propter hoc non mutuo dicuntur mensura ad mensurabile et e converso, sicut in aliis modis, sed solum mensurabile ad mensuram. Et similiter etiam imago dicitur ad id cuius est imago, tamquam mensurabile ad mensuram. Veritas enim imaginis mensuratur ex re cuius est imago. 1003. The third sense of relation is that in which something measurable is said to be relative to a measure. Here measure and measurable are not taken (-) quantitatively (for this pertains to the first sense, in which either one is said to be relative to the other, since double is said to be relative to half and half to double), but (+) according to the measurement of being and truth. For the truth of knowledge is measured by the knowable object. For it is because a thing is so or is not so that a statement is known to be true or false, and not the reverse. The same thing applies in the case of a sensible object and sensation. And for this reason a measure and what is measurable are not said to be related to each other reciprocally, as in the other senses, but only what is measurable is related to its measure. And in a similar fashion too an image is related to that of which it is the image as what is measurable is related to its measure. For the truth of an image is measured by the thing whose image it is.
lib. 5 l. 17 n. 4 Ratio autem istorum modorum haec est. Cum enim relatio, quae est in rebus, consistat in ordine quodam unius rei ad aliam, oportet tot modis huiusmodi relationes esse, quot modis contingit unam rem ad aliam ordinari. Ordinatur autem una res ad aliam, vel secundum esse, prout esse unius rei dependet ab alia, et sic est tertius modus. Vel secundum virtutem activam et passivam, secundum quod una res ab alia recipit, vel alteri confert aliquid; et sic est secundus modus. Vel secundum quod quantitas unius rei potest mensurari per aliam; et sic est primus modus. 1004. These senses are explained as follows: since a real relation consists in the bearing of one thing upon another, there must be as many relations of this kind as there are ways in which one thing can bear upon another. (3) Now one thing bears upon another either in being, inasmuch as the being of one thing depends on another, and then we have the third sense; or (2) according to active or passive power, inasmuch as one thing receives something from another or confers it upon the other, and then we have the second sense; or (1) according as the quantity of one thing can be measured by another, and then we have the first sense.
lib. 5 l. 17 n. 5 Qualitas autem rei, inquantum huiusmodi, non respicit nisi subiectum in quo est. Unde secundum ipsam una res non ordinatur ad aliam, nisi secundum quod qualitas accipit rationem potentiae passivae vel activae, prout est principium actionis vel passionis. Vel ratione quantitatis, vel alicuius ad quantitatem pertinentis; sicut dicitur aliquid albius alio, vel sicut dicitur simile, quod habet unam aliquam qualitatem. Alia vero genera magis consequuntur relationem, quam possint relationem causare. Nam quando consistit in aliquali relatione ad tempus. Ubi vero, ad locum. Positio autem ordinem partium importat. Habitus autem relationem habentis ad habitum. 1005. But the quality as such of a thing pertains only to the subject in which it exists, and therefore from the viewpoint of quality one thing bears upon another only inasmuch as quality has the character of an active or passive power, which is a principle of action or of being acted upon. Or it is related by reason of quantity or of something pertaining to quantity; as one thing is said to be whiter than another, or as that which has the same quality as another is said to be like it. But the other classes of things are a (+) result of relation rather than a (-) cause of it. For the category when consists in a relation to time; and the category where in a relation to place. And posture implies an arrangement of parts; and having (attire), the relation of the thing having to the things had.
lib. 5 l. 17 n. 6 Deinde cum dicit dicuntur autem prosequitur tres modos enumeratos; et primo prosequitur primum. Secundo prosequitur secundum, ibi, activa vero et passiva. Tertio tertium, ibi, ergo secundum numerum. Circa primum duo facit. Primo ponit relationes quae consequuntur numerum absolute. Secundo ponit relationes quae consequuntur unitatem absolute, ibi, et amplius aequale. Dicit ergo, quod primus modus relationum, qui est secundum numerum, distinguitur hoc modo: quia vel est secundum comparationem numeri ad numerum, vel numeri ad unum. Et secundum comparationem ad utrumque dupliciter: quia vel est secundum comparationem numeri indeterminate ad numerum, aut ad unum determinate. Et hoc est quod dicit, quod prima, quae dicuntur ad aliquid secundum numerum, aut dicuntur simpliciter, idest universaliter, vel indeterminate, aut determinate. Et utrolibet modo ad eos, scilicet numeros. Aut ad unum, idest ad unitatem. 1006. The first things (493). Then he proceeds to deal with the three senses of relation which have been enumerated. First, he considers the first sense. Second (1023), he treats the second sense (“Active and passive”). Third (1026), he attends to the third sense (“Therefore, things”). In regard to the first he does two things. First, he describes the relations which are based simply on number; and second (1022), he treats those which are based simply on unity (“Further, equal”). He says, first, that the first way in which things are relative, which is numerical, is divided inasmuch as the relation is based on (a) the ratio of one number to another or (b) on that of a number to unity. And in either case it may be taken in two ways, for the number which is referred to another number or to unity in the ratio on which the relation is based is either definite or indefinite. This is his meaning in saying that the first things which are said to be relative numerically are said to be such “without qualification,” i.e., in general or indefinitely, “or else definitely.” And in both ways “to them,” namely, to numbers, “or to unity,” i.e., to the unit.
lib. 5 l. 17 n. 7 Sciendum est autem, quod omnis mensuratio, quae est in quantitatibus continuis, aliquo modo derivatur a numero. Et ideo relationes, quae sunt secundum quantitatem continuam, etiam attribuuntur numero. 1007. Now it should be borne in mind that every measure which is found in continuous quantities is derived in some way from number. Hence relations which are based on continuous quantity are also attributed to number.
lib. 5 l. 17 n. 8 Sciendum est etiam, quod proportio numeralis dividitur primo in duas; scilicet aequalitatis, et inaequalitatis. Inaequalitatis autem sunt duae species; scilicet excedens et excessum, et magis et minus. Inaequale autem excedens in quinque species dividitur. 1008. It should also be borne in mind that numerical ratios are divided first into two classes, that of equality and that of inequality. And there are two kinds of inequality: the larger and smaller, and more and less. And the larger is divided into five kinds.
lib. 5 l. 17 n. 9 Numerus enim maior quandoque respectu minoris est multiplex; quando scilicet aliquoties continet ipsum, sicut sex continet duo ter. Et si quidem contineat ipsum bis, dicitur duplum; sicut duo ad unum vel quatuor ad duo. Si ter, triplum. Si quater, quadruplum. Et sic inde. 1009. For a number is larger whenever it is multiple with respect to a smaller number, i.e., when it includes it many times, as six includes two three times. And if it includes it twice, it is called double; as two in relation to one, or four to two. And if it includes it three times, it is called triple; and if four times, quadruple; and so on.
lib. 5 l. 17 n. 10 Quandoque vero numerus maior continet totum numerum minorem semel, et insuper unam aliquam partem eius. Et tunc dicitur superparticularis. Et si quidem contineat totum et medium, vocatur sesquialterum, sicut tria ad duo. Si autem tertiam, sesquitertius, sicut quatuor ad tria. Si quartam, sesquiquartus, sicut quinque ad quatuor. Et sic inde. 1010. But sometimes a larger number includes a whole smaller number once and some part of it besides; and then it is said to be superparticular. If it includes a whole smaller number and a half of it besides, it is called sesquialteral, as three to two; and if a third part besides, it is called sesquitertian, as four to three; and if a fourth part besides, it is called sesquiquartan, as five to four; and so on.
lib. 5 l. 17 n. 11 Quandoque numerus maior continet minorem totum semel; et insuper non solum unam partem, sed plures partes. Et sic dicitur superpartiens. Et si quidem contineat duas partes, dicitur superbipartiens, sicut quinque se habent ad tria. Si vero tres, dicitur supertripartiens, sicut septem se habent ad quatuor. Si autem quatuor, sic est superquadripartiens; et sic se habet novem ad quinque. Et sic inde. 1011. Sometimes a larger number includes a whole smaller number once and not merely one part but many parts besides, and then it is called superpartient. And if it includes two parts, it is called superbipartient, as five to three. Again, if it includes three parts, then it is called supertripartient, as seven to four; and if it includes four parts, it is superquadripartient, and then it is related as nine to five; and so on.
lib. 5 l. 17 n. 12 Quandoque vero numerus maior continet totum minorem pluries, et insuper aliquam partem eius; et tunc dicitur multiplex superparticularis. Et si quidem contineat ipsum bis et mediam partem eius, dicitur duplum sesquialterum, sicut quinque ad duo. Si autem ter et mediam partem eius, vocabitur triplum sesquialterum, sicut se habent septem ad duo. Si autem quater et dimidiam partem eius, dicitur quadruplum sesquialterum, sicut novem ad duo. Possent etiam ex parte superparticularis huiusmodi proportionis species sumi, ut dicatur duplex sesquitertius, quando maior numerus habet minorem bis et tertiam partem eius, sicut se habent septem ad tria: vel duplex sesquiquartus, sicut novem ad quatuor, et sic de aliis. 1012. Sometimes a larger number includes a whole smaller number many times and some part of it besides, and then it is called multiple superparticular. If it includes it two and a half times, it is called double sesquialteral, as five to two. If it includes it three and a half times, it is called triple sesquialteral, as seven to two. And if it includes it four and a half times, it is called quadruple sesquialteral, as nine to two. And the species of this kind of ratio can also be considered in the case of the superparticular, inasmuch as we speak of the double sesquitertian ratio when a greater number includes a smaller number two and a third times, as seven to three; or of the double sesquiquartan, as nine to four; and so on.
lib. 5 l. 17 n. 13 Quandoque etiam numerus maior habet minorem totum pluries, et etiam plures partes eius, et tunc dicitur multiplex superpartiens. Et similiter proportio potest dividi secundum species multiplicitatis, et secundum species superpartientis, si dicatur duplum superbipartiens, quando habet maior numerus totum minorem bis et duas partes eius, sicut octo ad tria. Vel etiam triplum superbipartiens, sicut undecim ad tres. Vel etiam duplum supertripartiens, sicut undecim ad quatuor. Habet enim totum bis, et tres partes eius. 1013. Sometimes too a larger number includes a whole smaller number many times and many parts of it besides, and then it is called multiple superpartient. And similarly a ratio can be divided from the viewpoint of the species of multiplicity, and from that of the species of the superpartient, provided that we may speak of a double superbipartient, when a greater number includes a whole smaller number twice and two parts of it, as eight to three; or even of triple superbipartient, as eleven to three; or even of double supertripartient, as eleven to four. For it includes a whole number twice and three parts of it besides.
lib. 5 l. 17 n. 14 Et totidem species sunt ex parte inaequalitatis eius qui exceditur. Nam numerus minor dicitur submultiplex, subparticularis, subpartiens, submultiplex subparticularis, submultiplex subpartiens, et sic de aliis. 1014. And there are just as many species of inequality in the case of a smaller number. For a smaller number is called submultiple, subpartient, submultiple superparticular, submultiple superpartient, and so on.
lib. 5 l. 17 n. 15 Sciendum autem quod prima species proportionis, scilicet multiplicitas, consistit in comparatione unius numeri ad unitatem. Quaelibet enim eius species invenitur primo in aliquo numero respectu unitatis. Duplum primo invenitur in binario respectu unitatis. Et similiter proportio tripli in ternario respectu unitatis, et sic de aliis. Primi autem termini in quibus invenitur aliqua proportio, dant speciem ipsi proportioni. Unde in quibuscumque aliis terminis consequenter inveniatur, invenitur in eis secundum rationem primorum terminorum. Sicut proportio dupla primo invenitur inter duo et unum. Unde ex hoc proportio recipit rationem et nomen. Dicitur enim proportio dupla proportio duorum ad unum. Et propter hoc, si etiam unus numerus respectu alterius numeri sit duplus, tamen hoc est secundum quod minor numerus accipit rationem unius, et maior rationem duorum. Sex enim se habet in dupla proportione ad tria, inquantum tria se habent ad sex ut unum ad duo. Et simile est in tripla proportione, et in omnibus aliis speciebus multiplicitatis. Et ideo dicit, quod ista relatio dupli, est per hoc quod numerus determinatus, scilicet duo, refertur ad unum, idest ad unitatem. 1015. But it must be noted that the first species of ratio, namely, multiplicity, consists in the relation of one number to the unit. For any species of it is found first in the relation of some number to the unit. Double, for example, is found first in the relation of two to the unit. And similarly a triple ratio is found in the relation of three to the unit; and so on in other cases. But the first terms in which any ratio is found give species to the ratio itself. Hence in whatever other terms it is subsequently found, it is found in them according to the ratio of the first terms. For example, the double ratio is found first between two and the unit. It is from this, then, that the ratio receives its meaning and name; for a double ratio means the ratio of two to the unit. And it is for this reason too that we use the term in other cases; for even though one number is said to be double another, this happens only inasmuch as a smaller number takes on the role of the unit and a larger number the role of two; for six is related to three in a double ratio, inasmuch as six is to three as two is to one. And it is similar in the case of a triple ratio, and in all other species of multiplicity. Hence he says that the relation of double is a result of the fact that a definite number, i.e., two, “is referred to unity,” i.e., to the unit.
lib. 5 l. 17 n. 16 Sed hoc quod dico, multiplex, importat relationem numeri ad unitatem; sed non alicuius determinati numeri, sed numeri in universali. Si enim determinatus numerus accipiatur ut binarius vel ternarius, esset una species multiplicitatis, ut dupla vel tripla. Sicut autem duplum se habet ad duo, et triplum ad tria, quae sunt numeri determinati, ita multiplex ad multiplicitatem, quia significat numerum indeterminatum. 1016. But the term multiple implies the relation of a number to the unit, not of any definite number but of number in general. For if a definite number were taken, as two or three, there would be one species of multiplicity, as double or triple. And just as the double is related to two and the triple to three, which are definite numbers, so too the multiple is related to multiplicity, because it signifies an indefinite number.
lib. 5 l. 17 n. 17 Aliae autem proportiones non possunt attendi secundum numerum ad unitatem, scilicet neque proportio superparticularis, neque superpartiens, neque multiplex superparticularis, neque multiplex superpartiens. Omnes enim hae proportionum species attenduntur secundum quod maior numerus continet minorem semel, vel aliquoties; et insuper unam vel plures partes eius. Unitas autem partem habere non potest: et ideo nulla harum proportionum potest attendi secundum comparationem numeri ad unitatem, sed secundum comparationem numeri ad numerum. Et sic est duplex, vel secundum numerum determinatum, vel secundum numerum indeterminatum. 1017. Other ratios, however, cannot be reduced to the relation of a number to the unit: either a superparticular ratio, or a superpartient, or a multiple superparticular, or a multiple superpartient. For all of these species of ratios are based on the fact that a larger number includes a smaller number once, or some part of it, and one or several parts of it besides. But the unit cannot have a part, and therefore none of these ratios can be based on the relation of a number to the unit but on the relation of one number to another. Thus the double ratio is either that of a definite number, or that of an indefinite number.
lib. 5 l. 17 n. 18 Si autem secundum numerum determinatum, sic est hemiolum, idest sesquialterum, aut subhemiolum, idest supersesquialterum. Proportio enim sesquialtera primo consistit in his terminis, scilicet ternario et binario; et sub ratione eorum in omnibus aliis invenitur. Unde quod dicitur hemiolum vel sesquialterum importat relationem determinati numeri ad determinatum numerum, scilicet trium ad duo. 1018. And if it is that of a definite number, then “it is what is one and a half times as great,” i.e., sesquialteral, or “that which it exceeds,” i.e., supersesquialteral. For a sesquialteral ratio consists first in these terms: three and two; and in the ratio of these it is found in all other cases. Hence what is called one and a half times as great, or sesquialteral, implies the relation of one definite number to another, namely, of three to two.
lib. 5 l. 17 n. 19 Quod vero dicitur superparticulare, refertur ad subparticulare, non secundum determinatos numeros, sicut etiam multiplex refertur ad unum, sed secundum numerum indeterminatum. Primae enim species inaequalitatis superius numeratae accipiuntur secundum indeterminatos numeros, ut multiplex, superparticulare, superpartiens et cetera. Species vero istorum accipiuntur secundum numeros determinatos, ut duplum, triplum, sesquialterum, sesquitertium, et sic de aliis. 1019. But the relation which is called superparticular is relative to the subparticular, not according to any definite number, as the multiple is relative also to the unit, but according to an indefinite number. For the first species of inequality given above (1008) are taken according to indefinite numbers, for example, the multiple, superparticular, superpartient, and so on. But the species of these are taken according to definite numbers, as double, triple, sesquialteral, sesquiquartan, and so on.
lib. 5 l. 17 n. 20 Contingit enim aliquas quantitates continuas habere proportionem adinvicem, sed non secundum aliquem numerum, nec determinatum, nec indeterminatum. Omnium enim quantitatum continuarum est aliqua proportio; non tamen est proportio numeralis. Quorumlibet enim duorum numerorum est una mensura communis, scilicet unitas, quae aliquoties sumpta, quemlibet numerum reddit. Non autem quarumlibet quantitatum continuarum invenitur esse una mensura communis; sed sunt quaedam quantitates continuae incommensurabiles: sicut diameter quadrati est incommensurabilis lateri. Et hoc ideo, quia non est proportio eius ad latus, sicut proportio numeri ad numerum, vel numeri ad unum. 1020. Now it happens that some continuous quantities have a ratio to each other which does not involve any number, either definite or indefinite. For there is some ratio between all continuous quantities, although it is not a numerical ratio. For there is one common measure of any two numbers, namely, the unit, which, when taken many times, yields a number. But no common measure of all continuous quantities can be found, since there are certain incommensurable continuous quantities, as the diameter of a square is incommensurable with one of its sides. The reason is that there is no ratio between it and one of its sides like the ratio of one number to another or of a number to the unit.
lib. 5 l. 17 n. 21 Cum ergo dicitur in quantitatibus, quod haec est maior illa, vel se habet ad illam ut continens ad contentum, non solum haec ratio non attenditur secundum aliquam determinatam speciem numeri, sed nec etiam quod sit secundum numerum, quia omnis numerus est alteri commensurabilis. Omnes enim numeri habent unam communem mensuram, scilicet unitatem. Sed continens et contentum non dicuntur secundum aliquam commensurationem numeralem. Continens enim ad contentum dicitur, quod est tantum, et adhuc amplius. Et hoc est indeterminatum, utrum sit commensurabile, vel non commensurabile. Quantitas enim qualiscumque accipiatur, vel est aequalis, vel inaequalis. Unde, si non est aequalis, sequitur quod sit inaequalis et continens, etiam si non sit commensurabilis. Patet igitur quod omnia praedicta dicuntur ad aliquid secundum numerum, et secundum passiones numerorum, quae sunt commensuratio, proportio, et huiusmodi. 1021. Therefore, when it is said in the case of quantities that this quantity is greater than that one, or is related to that one as what includes is related to what is included in it, not only is this ratio not considered according to any definite species of number, but it is not even considered according to number at all, because every number is commensurable with another. For all numbers have one common measure, which is the unit. But what includes and what is included in it are not spoken of according to any numerical measure; for it is what is so much and something more that is said to have the relation of what includes to what is included in it. And this is indefinite, whether it be commensurable or incommensurable; for whatever quantity may be taken, it is either equal or unequal. If it is not equal, then it follows that it is unequal and includes something else, even though it is not commensurable. Hence it is clear that all of the above-mentioned things are said to be relative according to number and to the properties of numbers, which are commensuration, ratio, and the like.
lib. 5 l. 17 n. 22 Deinde cum dicit et amplius ponit relativa, quae accipiuntur secundum unitatem, et non per comparationem numeri ad unum vel ad numerum; et dicit quod alio modo a praedictis dicuntur relative, aequale, simile, et idem. Haec enim dicuntur secundum unitatem. Nam eadem sunt, quorum substantia est una. Similia, quorum qualitas est una. Aequalia, quorum quantitas est una. Cum autem unum sit principium numeri et mensura, patet etiam, quod haec dicuntur ad aliquid secundum numerum, idest secundum aliquid ad genus numeri pertinens; non eodem modo tamen haec ultima cum primis. Nam primae relationes erant secundum numerum ad numerum, vel secundum numerum ad unum; hoc autem secundum unum absolute. 1022. Further, equal (494). He now treats those relative terms which have a reference to unity or oneness and are not based on the relation of one number to another or to the unit. He says that equal, like and same are said to be relative in a different way than the foregoing. For these are called such in reference to unity. For those things are the same whose substance is one; and those are alike whose quality is one; and those are equal whose quantity is one. Now since unity is the principle and measure of number, it is also clear that the former terms are said to be relative “numerically,” i.e., in reference to something belonging to the class of number. But these last terms are not said to be relative in the same way as the first. For the first relations seen are those of number to number, or of a number to the unit; but this relation has to do with unity in an absolute sense.
lib. 5 l. 17 n. 23 Deinde cum dicit activa vero prosequitur de secundo modo relationum, quae sunt in activis et passivis: et dicit, quod huiusmodi relativa sunt relativa dupliciter. Uno modo secundum potentiam activam et passivam; et secundo modo secundum actus harum potentiarum, qui sunt agere et pati; sicut calefactivum dicitur ad calefactibile secundum potentiam activam et passivam. Nam calefactum est, quod potest calefacere; calefactibile vero, quod potest calefieri. Calefaciens autem ad calefactum, et secans ad id quod secatur, dicuntur relative secundum actus praedictarum potentiarum. 1023. Active and passive (495). (2) Here he proceeds to treat the second type of relations, which pertains to active and passive things. He says that relative beings of this kind are relative in two ways: in one way according to active and passive potency; and in a second way according to the actualizations of these potencies, which are action and passivity; for example, what can heat is said to be relative to what can be heated in virtue of active and passive potency. For it is what is capable of heating that can heat, and it is what is capable of being heated that can become hot. Again, what is heating in relation to what is heated, and what is cutting in relation to what is being cut, are said to be relative according to the operations of the aforesaid potencies.
lib. 5 l. 17 n. 24 Et differt iste modus relationum a praemissis. Quae enim sunt secundum numerum, non sunt aliquae actiones nisi secundum similitudinem, sicut multiplicare, dividere et huiusmodi, ut etiam in aliis dictum est, scilicet in secundo physicorum; ubi ostendit, quod mathematica abstrahunt a motu, et ideo in eis esse non possunt huiusmodi actiones, quae secundum motum sunt. 1024. Now this type of relation differs from those previously given; for those which are numerical are operations only figuratively, for example, to multiply, to divide, and so forth, as has also been stated elsewhere, namely, in Book II of the Physics, where he shows that the objects of mathematics abstract from motion, and therefore they cannot have operations of the kind that have to do with motion.
lib. 5 l. 17 n. 25 Sciendum etiam est quod eorum relativorum, quae dicuntur secundum potentiam activam et passivam, attenditur diversitas secundum diversa tempora. Quaedam enim horum dicuntur relative secundum tempus praeteritum, sicut quod fecit, ad illud quod factum est; ut pater ad filium, quia ille genuerit, iste genitus est; quae differunt secundum fecisse, et passum esse. Quaedam vero secundum tempus futurum, sicut facturus refertur ad faciendum. Et ad hoc genus relationum reducuntur illae relationes, quae dicuntur secundum privationem potentiae, ut impossibile et invisibile. Dicitur enim aliquid impossibile huic vel illi; et similiter invisibile. 1025. It should also be noted that among relative terms based on active and passive potency we find diversity from the viewpoint of time; for some of these terms are predicated relatively with regard to past time, as what has made something to what has been made; for instance, a father in relation to his son, because the former has begot and the latter has been begotten; and these differ as what has acted and what has been acted upon. And some are used with respect to future time, as when what will make is related to what will be made. And those relations which are based on privation of potency, as the impossible and the invisible, are reduced to this class of relations. For something is said to be impossible for this person or for that one; and the invisible is spoken of in the same way.
lib. 5 l. 17 n. 26 Deinde cum dicit ergo secundum prosequitur de tertio modo relationum; et dicit quod in hoc differt iste tertius modus a praemissis, quod in praemissis, unumquodque dicitur relative ex hoc, quod ipsum ad aliud refertur; non ex eo quod aliud referatur ad ipsum. Duplum enim refertur ad dimidium, et e converso; et similiter pater ad filium, et e converso; sed hoc tertio modo aliquid dicitur relative ex eo solum, quod aliquid refertur ad ipsum; sicut patet, quod sensibile et scibile vel intelligibile dicuntur relative, quia alia referuntur ad illa. Scibile enim dicitur aliquid, propter hoc, quod habetur scientia de ipso. Et similiter sensibile dicitur aliquid quod potest sentiri. 1026. Therefore, things (496). (3) Next he proceeds to deal with the third type of relations. He says that this third type differs from the foregoing in this way, that each of the foregoing things is said to be relative because each is referred to something else, not because something else is referred to it. For double is related to half, and vice versa; and in a similar way a father is related to his son, and vice versa. But something is said to be relative in this third way because something is referred to it. It is clear, for example, that the sensible and the knowable or intelligible are said to be relative because other things are related to them; for a thing is said to be knowable because knowledge is had of it. And similarly something is said to be sensible because it can be sensed.
lib. 5 l. 17 n. 27 Unde non dicitur relative propter aliquid quod sit ex eorum parte, quod sit qualitas, vel quantitas, vel actio, vel passio, sicut in praemissis relationibus accidebat; sed solum propter actiones aliorum, quae tamen in ipsa non terminantur. Si enim videre esset actio videntis perveniens ad rem visam, sicut calefactio pervenit ad calefactibile; sicut calefactibile refertur ad calefaciens, ita visibile referretur ad videntem. Sed videre et intelligere et huiusmodi actiones, ut in nono huius dicetur, manent in agentibus, et non transeunt in res passas; unde visibile et scibile non patitur aliquid, ex hoc quod intelligitur vel videtur. Et propter hoc non ipsamet referuntur ad alia, sed alia ad ipsa. Et simile est in omnibus aliis, in quibus relative aliquid dicitur propter relationem alterius ad ipsum, sicut dextrum et sinistrum in columna. Cum enim dextrum et sinistrum designent principia motuum in rebus animatis, columnae et alicui inanimato attribui non possunt, nisi secundum quod animata aliquo modo se habeant ad ipsam, sicut columna dicitur dextra, quia homo est ei sinister. Et simile est de imagine respectu exemplaris, et denario, quo fit pretium emptionis. In omnibus autem his tota ratio referendi in duobus extremis, pendet ex altero. Et ideo omnia huiusmodi quodammodo se habent ut mensurabile et mensura. Nam ab eo quaelibet res mensuratur, a quo ipsa dependet. 1027. Hence they are not said to be relative because of something which pertains to them, such as quality, quantity, action, or undergoing, as was the case in the foregoing relations, but only because of the action of other things, although these are not terminated in them. For if seeing were the action of the one seeing as extending to the thing seen, as heating extends to the thing which can be heated, then just as what can be heated is related to the one heating, so would what is visible be related to the one seeing. But to see and to understand and actions of this kind, as is stated in Book IX (1788) of this work, remain in the things acting and do not pass over into those which are acted upon. Hence what is visible or what is knowable is not acted upon by being known or seen. And on this account these are not referred to other things but others to them. The same is true in all other cases in which something is said to be relative because something else is related to it, as right and left in the case of a pillar. For since right and left designate starting points of motion in living things, they cannot be attributed to a pillar or to any nonliving thing except insofar as living things are related to a pillar in some way. It is in this sense that one speaks of a right-hand pillar because a man stands to the left of it. The same holds true of an image in relation to the original; and of a denarius, by means of which one fixes the price of a sale. And in all these cases the whole basis of relation between two extremes depends on something else. Hence all things of this kind are related in somewhat the same way as what is measurable and its measure. For everything is measured by the thing on which it depends.
lib. 5 l. 17 n. 28 Sciendum est autem, quod quamvis scientia secundum nomen videatur referri ad scientem et ad scibile, dicitur enim scientia scientis, et scientia scibilis, et intellectus ad intelligentem et intelligibile; tamen intellectus secundum quod ad aliquid dicitur, non ad hoc cuius est sicut subiecti dicitur: sequeretur enim quod idem relativum bis diceretur. Constat enim quoniam intellectus dicitur ad intelligibile, sicut ad obiectum. Si autem diceretur ad intelligentem, bis diceretur ad aliquid; et cum esse relativi sit ad aliud quodammodo se habere, sequeretur quod idem haberet duplex esse. Et similiter de visu patet quod non dicitur ad videntem, sed ad obiectum quod est color vel aliquid aliud tale. Quod dicit propter ea, quae videntur in nocte non per proprium colorem, ut habetur in secundo de anima. 1028. Now it must be borne in mind that, even though verbally knowledge would seem to be relative to the knower and to the object of knowledge (for we speak both of the knowledge of the knower and of the knowledge of the thing known), and thought to the thinker and to what is thought, nevertheless a thought as predicated relatively is not relative to the one whose thought it is as its subject, for it would follow that the same relative term would then be expressed twice. For it is evident that a thought is relative to what is thought about as to its object. Again, if it were relative to the thinker, it would then be called relative twice; and since the very existence of what is relative is to be relative in some way to something else, it would follow that the same thing would have two acts of existence. Similarly in the case of sight it is clear that sight is not relative to the seer but to its object, which is color, “or something of this sort.” He says this because of the things which are seen at night but not by means of their proper color, as is stated in The Soul, Book II.
lib. 5 l. 17 n. 29 Quamvis et hoc recte posset dici, scilicet quod visus sit videntis. Refertur autem visus ad videntem, non inquantum est visus, sed inquantum est accidens, vel potentia videntis. Relatio enim respicit aliquid extra, non autem subiectum nisi inquantum est accidens. Et sic patet, quod isti sunt modi, quibus aliqua dicuntur secundum se ad aliquid. 1029. And although it is correct to say that sight is of him who sees, sight is not related to the seer formally as sight but as an accident or power of the seer. For a relation has to do with something external, but a subject does not, except insofar as it is an accident. It is clear, then, that these are the ways in which some things are said to be relative directly.
lib. 5 l. 17 n. 30 Deinde cum dicit illa vero ponit tres modos, quibus aliqua dicuntur ad aliquid non secundum se, sed secundum aliud. Quorum primus est, quando aliqua dicuntur ad aliquid propter hoc quod sua genera sunt ad aliquid, sicut medicina dicitur ad aliquid, quia scientia est ad aliquid. Dicitur enim, quod medicina est scientia sani et aegri. Et isto modo refertur scientia per hoc quod est accidens. 1030. And other things (497). He now gives three ways in which some things are said to be relative not directly but indirectly. The first of these is that in which things are said to be relative because their genera are relative as medicine is said to be relative because science is relative. For medicine is called the science of health and sickness. And science is relative in this way because it is an accident.
lib. 5 l. 17 n. 31 Secundus modus est, quando aliqua abstracta dicuntur ad aliquid, quia concreta habentia illa abstracta ad aliud dicuntur; sicut aequalitas et similitudo dicuntur ad aliquid, quia simile et aequale ad aliquid sunt. Aequalitas autem et similitudo secundum nomen non dicuntur ad aliquid. 1031. The second way is that in which certain abstract terms are said to be relative because the concrete things to which these abstract terms apply are relative to something else. For example, equality and likeness are said to be relative because the like and the equal are relative. But equality and likeness are not considered relative as words.
lib. 5 l. 17 n. 32 Tertius modus est, quando subiectum dicitur ad aliquid, ratione accidentis; sicut homo vel album dicitur ad aliquid, quia utrique accidit duplum esse; et hoc modo caput dicitur ad aliquid, eo quod est pars. 1032. The third way is that in which a subject is said to be relative because of an accident. For example, a man or some white thing is said to be relative because each happens to be double; and in this way a head is said to be relative because it is a part.

Lecture 18

Latin English
lib. 5 l. 18 n. 1 Postquam philosophus distinxit nomina, quae significant causas, et subiectum, et partes subiectorum huius scientiae; hic incipit distinguere nomina quae significant ea quae se habent per modum passionis; et dividitur in duas partes. In prima distinguit nomina ea quae pertinent ad perfectionem entis. In secunda distinguit nomina quae pertinent ad entis defectum, ibi, falsum dicitur uno modo. Circa primum duo facit. Primo distinguit nomina significantia ea quae pertinent ad perfectionem entis. Secundo pertinentia ad totalitatem. Perfectum enim et totum, aut sunt idem, aut fere idem significant, ut dicitur in tertio physicorum. Secunda ibi, ex aliquo esse dicitur. Circa primum duo facit. Primo distinguit hoc nomen perfectum. Secundo distinguit quaedam nomina, quae significant quasdam perfectiones perfecti, ibi, terminus dicitur. Circa primum duo facit. Primo ponit modos, quibus aliqua dicuntur perfecta secundum se. Secundo modos, quibus aliqua dicuntur perfecta per respectum ad alia, ibi, alia vero. Circa primum duo facit. Primo ponit tres modos quibus aliquid secundum se dicitur perfectum. Secundo ostendit quomodo secundum hos modos aliqua diversimode perfecta dicuntur, ibi, secundum se dicta quidem igitur. 1033. Having treated the various senses of the terms which signify the causes, the subject and the parts of the subject of this science, here the Philosopher begins to treat the various senses of the terms which designate attributes having the character of properties. This is divided into two parts. In the first he gives the various senses of the terms which refer to the perfection or completeness of being. in the second (1128) he treats those which refer to a lack of being (“False means”). In regard to the first he does two things. First, he gives the different senses of the terms which designate attributes pertaining to the perfection of being; and second (1085), he treats those which designate the wholeness of being. For the terms perfect and whole have the same or nearly the same meaning, as is said in the Physics, Book III. He considers the second part of this division where he says, “To come from something.” In regard to the first part he does two things. First, he treats the various senses of the term perfect. Second (1044), he treats the various senses of the terms which signify certain conditions of that which is perfect (“The term limit”). In regard to the first he does two things. First, he considers the senses in which things are said to be perfect in themselves; and second (1043), he treats those in which things are said to be perfect by reason of something else (“And other things”). In regard to the first he does two things. First, he gives three senses in which a thing is said to be perfect in itself. Second (1040), he shows how, according to these senses, a thing is said to be perfect in different ways (“Things which are said”).
lib. 5 l. 18 n. 2 Dicit ergo primo, quod perfectum uno modo dicitur, extra quod non est accipere aliquam eius particulam; sicut homo dicitur perfectus, quando nulla deest ei pars. Et dicitur tempus perfectum, quando non est accipere extra aliquid quod sit temporis pars; sicut dicitur dies perfectus, quando nulla pars diei deest. 1034. (1) He accordingly says, first, that in one sense that thing is said to be perfect outside of which it is impossible to find any of its parts. For example, a man is said to be perfect when no part of him is missing; and a period of time is said to be perfect when none of its parts can be found outside of it. For example, a day is said to be perfect or complete when no part of it is missing.
lib. 5 l. 18 n. 3 Alio modo dicitur aliquid perfectum secundum virtutem; et sic dicitur aliquid perfectum, quod non habet hyperbolem, idest superexcellentiam vel superabundantiam ad hoc quod aliquid bene fiat secundum genus illud, et similiter nec defectum. Hoc enim dicimus bene se habere, ut dicitur in secundo Ethicorum, quod nihil habet nec plus nec minus quam debet habere. Et sic dicitur perfectus medicus et perfectus fistulator, quando non deficit ei aliquid, quod pertineat ad speciem propriae virtutis, secundum quam dicitur, quod hic est bonus medicus, et ille bonus fistulator. Virtus enim cuiuslibet est quae bonum facit habentem, et opus eius bonum reddit. 1035. (2) A thing is said to be perfect in another sense with reference to some ability. Thus a thing is said to be perfect which admits of “no further degree,” i.e., excess or superabundance, from the viewpoint of good performance in some particular line, and is not deficient in any respect. For we say that that thing is in a good state which has neither more nor less than it ought to have, as is said in Book II of the Ethics. Thus a man is said to be a perfect physician or a perfect flute player when he lacks nothing pertaining to the particular ability by reason of which he is said to be a good physician or a good flute player. For the ability which each thing has is what makes its possessor good and renders his work good.
lib. 5 l. 18 n. 4 Secundum autem hunc modum utimur translative nomine perfecti etiam in malis. Dicimus enim perfectum sycophantam, idest calumniatorem, et perfectum latronem, quando in nullo deficit ab eo quod competit eis inquantum sunt tales. Nec est mirum si in istis quae magis sonant defectum, utimur nomine perfectionis; quia etiam cum sint mala, utimur in eis nomine bonitatis per quamdam similitudinem. Dicimus enim bonum furem et bonum calumniatorem, quia sic se habent in suis operationibus, licet malis, sicut boni in bonis. 1036. And it is in this sense that we also transfer the term perfect to bad things. For we speak of a perfect “slanderer,” or scandal monger, and a perfect thief, when they lack none of the qualities proper to them as such. Nor is it surprising if we use the term perfect of those things which rather designate a defect, because even when things are bad we predicate the term good of them in an analogous sense. For we speak of a good thief and a good scandal monger because in their operations, even though they are evil, they are disposed as good men are with regard to good operations.
lib. 5 l. 18 n. 5 Et quod aliquid dicatur perfectum per comparationem ad virtutem propriam, provenit quia virtus est quaedam perfectio rei. Unumquodque enim tunc est perfectum quando nulla pars magnitudinis naturalis, quae competit ei secundum speciem propriae virtutis, deficit ei. Sicut autem quaelibet res naturalis, habet determinatam mensuram naturalis magnitudinis secundum quantitatem continuam, ut dicitur in secundo de anima, ita etiam quaelibet res habet determinatam quantitatem suae virtutis naturalis. Equus enim habet quantitatem dimensivam determinatam secundum naturam cum aliqua latitudine. Est enim aliqua quantitas, ultra quam nullus equus protenditur in magnitudine. Et similiter est aliqua quantitas, quam non transcendit in parvitate. Ita etiam ex utraque parte determinatur aliquibus terminis quantitas virtutis equi. Nam aliqua est virtus equi, qua maior in nullo equo invenitur: et similiter est aliqua tam parva, qua nulla est minor. 1037. The reason why a thing is said to be perfect in the line of its particular ability is that an ability is a perfection of a thing. For each thing is perfect when no part of the natural magnitude which belongs to it according to the form of its proper ability is missing. Moreover, just as each natural being has a definite measure of natural magnitude in continuous quantity, as is stated in Book II of The Soul, So too each thing has a definite amount of its own natural ability. For example, a horse has by nature a definite dimensive quantity, within certain limits; for there is both a maximum quantity and minimum quantity beyond which no horse can go in size. And in a similar way the quantity of active power in a horse has certain limits in both directions. For there is some maximum power of a horse which is not in fact surpassed in any horse; and similarly there is some minimum which never fails to be attained.
lib. 5 l. 18 n. 6 Sicuti igitur primus modus perfecti accipiebatur ex hoc quod nihil rei deerat de quantitate dimensiva sibi naturaliter determinata, ita hic secundus modus accipitur ex hoc quod nihil deest alicui de quantitate virtutis sibi debitae secundum naturam. Uterque autem modus perfectionis attenditur secundum interiorem perfectionem. 1038. Therefore, just as the first sense of the term perfect was based on the fact that a thing lacks no part of the dimensive quantity which itis naturally determined to have, in a similar way this second sense of the term is based on the fact that a thing lacks no part of the quantity of power which it is naturally determined to have. And each of these senses of the term has to do with internal perfection.
lib. 5 l. 18 n. 7 Amplius quibus tertium modum ponit per respectum ad exterius; dicens, quod illa dicuntur tertio modo perfecta quibus inest finis, idest quae iam consecuta sunt suum finem; si tamen ille finis fuerit studiosus, idest bonus: sicut homo, quando iam consequitur beatitudinem. Qui autem consequitur finem suum in malis, magis dicitur deficiens quam perfectus; quia malum est privatio perfectionis debitae. In quo patet, quod mali, quando suam perficiunt voluntatem, non sunt feliciores, sed miseriores. Quia vero omnis finis est quoddam ultimum, ideo per quamdam similitudinem transferimus nomen perfectum ad ea, quae perveniunt ad ultimum, licet illud sit malum. Sicut dicitur aliquid perfecte perdi, vel corrumpi, quando nihil deest de corruptione vel perditione rei. Et per hanc metaphoram, mors dicitur finis, quia est ultimum. Sed finis non solum habet quod sit ultimum, sed etiam quod sit cuius causa fit aliquid. Quod non contingit morti vel corruptioni. 1039. Further, those things (500). (3) Here he gives the third sense in which the term perfect is used, and it pertains to external perfection. He says that in a third way those things are said to be perfect “which have a goal,” i.e., which have already attained their end, but only if that end is “worth seeking,” or good. A man, for instance, is called perfect when he has already attained happiness. But someone who has attained some goal that is evil is said to be deficient rather than perfect, because evil is a privation of the perfection which a thing ought to have. Thus it is evident that, when evil men accomplish their will, they are not happier but sadder. And since every goal or end is something final, for this reason we transfer the term perfect somewhat figuratively to those things which have reached some final state, even though it be evil. For example, a thing is said to be perfectly spoiled or corrupted when nothing pertaining to its ruin or corruption is missing. And by this metaphor death is called an end, because it is something final. However, an end is not only something final but is also that for the sake of which a thing comes to be. This does not apply to death or corruption.
lib. 5 l. 18 n. 8 Deinde cum dicit secundum se ostendit quomodo aliqua diversimode se habeant ad praedictos modos perfectionis; et dicit, quod quaedam dicuntur secundum se perfecta: et hoc dupliciter. Alia quidem universaliter perfecta, quia nihil omnino deficit eis absolute, nec aliquam habent hyperbolem, idest excedentiam, quia a nullo videlicet penitus in bonitate exceduntur, nec aliquid extra accipiunt, quia nec indigent exteriori bonitate. Et haec est conditio primi principii, scilicet Dei, in quo est perfectissima bonitas, cui nihil deest de omnibus perfectionibus in singulis generibus inventis. 1040. Here he shows how things are perfect in different ways according to the foregoing senses of perfection. (1) He says that some things are said to be perfect in themselves; and this occurs in two ways. (a) For some things are altogether perfect because they lack absolutely nothing at all; they neither have any “further degree,” i.e., excess, because there is nothing which surpasses them in goodness; nor do they receive any good from outside, because they have no need of any external goodness. This is the condition of the first principle, God, in whom the most perfect goodness is found, and to whom none of all the perfections found in each class of things are lacking.
lib. 5 l. 18 n. 9 Alia dicuntur perfecta in aliquo genere, ex eo quod quantum ad illud genus pertinet, nec habent hyperbolem, idest excedentiam, quasi aliquid eis deficiat eorum, quae illi generi debentur; nec aliquid eorum, quae ad perfectionem illius generis pertinent, est extra ea, quasi eo careant; sicut homo dicitur perfectus, quando iam adeptus est beatitudinem. 1041. (b) Some things are said to be perfect in some particular line because “they do not admit of any further degree,” or excess, “in their class,” as though they lacked anything proper to that class. Nor is anything that belongs to the perfection of that class external to them, as though they lacked it; just as a man is said to be perfect when he has already attained happiness.
lib. 5 l. 18 n. 10 Et sicut fit haec distinctio quantum ad secundum modum perfectionis supra positum, ita potest fieri quantum ad primum, ut tangitur in principio caeli et mundi. Nam quodlibet corpus particulare est quantitas perfecta secundum suum genus, quia habet tres dimensiones, quibus non sunt plures. Sed mundus dicitur perfectus universaliter, quia omnino nihil extra ipsum est. 1042. And not only is this distinction made with reference to the second sense of perfection given above, but it can also be made with reference to the first sense of the term, as is mentioned at the beginning of The Heavens. For any individual body is a perfect quantity in its class, because it has three dimensions, which are all there are. But the world is said to be universally perfect because there is absolutely nothing outside of it.
lib. 5 l. 18 n. 11 Deinde cum dicit alia vero ponit modum, secundum quem aliqua dicuntur perfecta per respectum ad aliud: et dicit, quod alia dicuntur perfecta secundum ipsa, idest per comparationem ad perfecta, quae sunt secundum se perfecta. Vel ex eo, quod faciunt aliquid perfectum aliquo priorum modorum; sicut medicina est perfecta, quia facit sanitatem perfectam. Aut ex eo, quod habent aliquid perfectum; sicut homo dicitur perfectus, qui habet perfectam scientiam. Aut repraesentando tale perfectum; sicut illa, quae habent similitudinem ad perfecta; ut imago dicitur perfecta, quae repraesentat hominem perfecte. Aut qualitercumque aliter referantur ad ea, quae dicuntur per se perfecta primis modis. 1043. And other things (502). (2) He now gives the sense in which some things are said to be perfect by reason of their relation to something else. He says that other things are said to be perfect “in reference to these,” i.e., in reference to things which are perfect in themselves, (a) either because they make something perfect in one of the preceding ways, as medicine is perfect because it causes perfect health; or (b) because they have some perfection, as a man is said to be perfect who has perfect knowledge; or (c) because they represent such a perfect thing, as things which bear a likeness to those that are perfect (as, for example, an image which represents a man perfectly is said to be perfect); or in any other way in which they are referred to things that are said to be perfect in themselves in the primary senses.

Lecture 19

Latin English
lib. 5 l. 19 n. 1 Hic prosequitur de nominibus, quae significant conditiones perfecti. Perfectum autem, ut ex praemissis patet, est terminatum et absolutum, non dependens ab alio, et non privatum, sed habens ea, quae sibi secundum suum genus competunt. Et ideo primo ponit hoc nomen terminus. Secundo hoc quod dicitur per se, ibi, et secundum quod dicitur. Tertio hoc nomen habitus, ibi, habitus vero dicitur. Circa primum tria facit. Primo ponit rationem termini; dicens, quod terminus dicitur quod est ultimum cuiuslibet rei, ita quod nihil de primo terminato est extra ipsum terminum; et omnia quae sunt eius, continentur intra ipsum. Dicit autem primi quia contingit id, quod est ultimum primi, esse principium secundi; sicut nunc quod est ultimum praeteriti, est principium futuri. 1044. Here Aristotle proceeds to examine the terms which signify the conditions necessary for perfection. Now what is perfect or complete, as is clear from the above, is what is determinate and absolute, independent of anything else, and not deprived of anything but having whatever befits it in its own line. Therefore, first, he deals with the term limit (boundary or terminus); second (1050), with the phrase in itself (“The phrase according to which”); and third (1062), with the term having (“Having means”). In regard to the first he does three things. First, he gives the meaning of limit. He says that limit means the last part of anything, such that no part of what is first limited lies outside this limit; and all things which belong to it are contained within it. He says “first” because the last part of a first thing may be the starting point of a second thing; for example, the now of time, which is the last point of the past, is the beginning of the future.
lib. 5 l. 19 n. 2 Et quaecumque secundo ponit quatuor modos, quibus dicitur terminus; quorum primus est secundum quod in qualibet specie magnitudinis, finis magnitudinis, vel habentis magnitudinem, dicitur terminus; sicut punctus dicitur terminus lineae, et superficies corporis, vel etiam lapidis habentis quantitatem. 1045. And limit means the form (504). Second, he gives four senses in which the term limit is used: The first of these applies to any kind of continuous quantity insofar as the terminus of a continuous quantity, or of a thing having continuous quantity, is called a limit; for example, a point is called the limit of a line, and a surface the limit of a body, or also of a stone, which has quantity.
lib. 5 l. 19 n. 3 Secundus modus est similis primo, secundum quod unum extremum motus vel actionis dicitur terminus, hoc scilicet ad quod est motus, et non a quo: sicut terminus generationis est esse, non autem non esse; quamvis quandoque ambo extrema motus dicantur terminus largo modo, scilicet a quo, et in quod; prout dicimus, quod omnis motus est inter duos terminos. 1046. The second sense of limit is similar to the first inasmuch as one extreme of a motion or activity is called a limit, i.e., that toward which there is motion, and not that from which there is motion, as the limit of generation is being and not non-being. Sometimes, however, both extremes of motion are called limits in a broad sense, i.e., both that from which as well as that to which, inasmuch as we say that every motion is between two limits or extremes.
lib. 5 l. 19 n. 4 Tertius modus dicitur terminus, cuius causa fit aliquid; hoc enim est ultimum intentionis, sicut terminus secundo modo dictus est ultimum motus vel operationis. 1047. In a third sense limit means that for the sake of which something comes to be, for this is the terminus of an intention, just as limit in the second sense meant the terminus of a motion or an operation.
lib. 5 l. 19 n. 5 Quartus modus est secundum quod substantia rei, quae est essentia et definitio significans quod quid est res, dicitur terminus. Est enim terminus cognitionis. Incipit enim cognitio rei ab aliquibus signis exterioribus quibus pervenitur ad cognoscendum rei definitionem; quo cum perventum fuerit, habetur perfecta cognitio de re. Vel dicitur terminus cognitionis definitio, quia infra ipsam continentur ea, per quae scitur res. Si autem mutetur una differentia, vel addatur, vel subtrahatur, iam non erit eadem definitio. Si autem est terminus cognitionis, oportet quod sit rei terminus, quia cognitio fit per assimilationem cognoscentis ad rem cognitam. 1048. In a fourth sense limit means the substance of a thing, i.e., the essence of a thing or the definition signifying what a thing is. For this is the limit or terminus of knowledge, because knowledge of a thing begins with certain external signs from which we come to know a thing’s definition, and when we have arrived at it we have complete knowledge of the thing. Or the definition is called the limit or terminus of knowledge because under it are contained the notes by which the thing is known. And if one difference is changed, added, or subtracted, the definition will not remain the same. Now if it [i.e., the definition] is the limit of knowledge, it must also be the limit of the thing, because knowledge is had through the assimilation of the knower to the thing known.
lib. 5 l. 19 n. 6 Deinde cum dicit quare palam concludit comparationem termini ad principium; dicens, quod quoties dicitur principium, toties dicitur terminus, et adhuc amplius; quia omne principium est terminus, sed non terminus omnis est principium. Id enim ad quod motus est, terminus est, et nullo modo principium est: illud vero a quo est motus, est principium et terminus, ut ex praedictis patet. 1049. Hence it is clear (505). Here he concludes by comparing a limit with a principle, saying that limit has as many meanings as principle has, and even more, because every principle is a limit but not every limit is a principle. For that toward which there is motion is a limit, but it is not in any way a principle, whereas that from which there is motion is both a principle and a limit, as is clear from what was said above (1046).
lib. 5 l. 19 n. 7 Deinde cum dicit et secundum hic determinat de per se: et circa hoc tria facit. Primo determinat de hoc, quod dicitur secundum quod; quod est communius quam secundum se. Secundo concludit modos eius, quod dicitur secundum se, ibi, quare secundum se. Tertio, quia uterque dictorum modorum secundum aliquem modum significat dispositionem, determinat de nomine dispositionis, ibi, dispositio. Circa primum ponit quatuor modos eius quod dicitur secundum quod; quorum primus est, prout species, idest forma, et substantia rei, idest essentia, est id, secundum quod aliquid esse dicitur; sicut secundum Platonicos, per se bonum, idest idea boni, est illud, secundum quod aliquid bonum dicitur. 1050. The phrase “according to which” (506). Here he deals with the phrase in itself; and in regard to this he does three things. First, he lays down the meaning of the phrase according to which, which is more common than the phrase in itself. Second (1054), he draws his conclusion as to the ways in which the phrase in itself is used (“Hence the phrase”). Third (1058), he establishes the meaning of the term disposition, because each of the senses in which we use the phrases mentioned above somehow signifies disposition. In regard to the first, he gives four senses in which the phrase according to which is used: The first has to do with the “species,” i.e., the form, or “the substance of each thing,” or its essence, inasmuch as this is that according to which something is said to be; for example, according to the Platonists “the good itself,” i.e., the Idea of the Good, is that according to which something is said to be good.
lib. 5 l. 19 n. 8 Secundus modus est, prout subiectum, in quo primo aliquid natum est fieri, dicitur secundum quod, sicut color primo fit in superficie; et ideo dicitur, quod corpus est coloratum secundum superficiem. Hic autem modus differt a praedicto, quia praedictus pertinet ad formam, et hic pertinet ad materiam. 1051. This phrase has a second meaning insofar as the subject in which some attribute is naturally disposed to first come into being is termed “that according to which,” as color first comes into being in surface; and therefore it is said that a body is colored according to its surface. Now this sense differs from the preceding one, because the preceding sense pertains to form, but this last sense pertains to matter.
lib. 5 l. 19 n. 9 Tertius modus est, prout universaliter quaelibet causa dicitur secundum quod. Unde toties dicitur secundum quod quoties et causa. Idem enim est quaerere secundum quod venit, et cuius causa venit; similiter secundum quod paralogizatum, aut syllogizatum est, et qua causa facti sunt syllogismi. 1052. There is a third sense in which this phrase is used, inasmuch as any cause or reason in general is said to be “that according to which.” Hence the phrase “according to which” is used in the same number of senses as the term reason. For it is the same thing to ask, “According to what does he come?” and “For what reason does he come? “ And in like manner it is the same to ask, “According to what has he reasoned incorrectly or simply reasoned, and, for what reason has he reasoned?”
lib. 5 l. 19 n. 10 Quartus modus est prout secundum quod significat positionem et locum; sicut dicitur, iste stetit secundum hunc, idest iuxta hunc, et ille vadit secundum hunc, idest iuxta hunc; quae omnia significant positionem et locum. Et hoc manifestius in Graeco idiomate apparet. 1053. This phrase according to which (secundum quid) is used in a fourth sense inasmuch as it signifies position and place; as in the statement, “according to which he stands,” i.e., next to which, and, “according to which he walks,” i.e., along which he walks; and both of these signify place and position. This appears more clearly in the Greek idiom.
lib. 5 l. 19 n. 11 Deinde cum dicit quare secundum concludit ex praedictis, quatuor modos dicendi per se, vel secundum se. Quorum primus est, quando definitio significans quid est esse uniuscuiusque, dicitur ei inesse secundum se, sicut Callias et quod quid erat esse Calliam, idest et essentia rei, ita se habent quod unum inest secundum se alteri. Non autem solum tota definitio dicitur de definito secundum se; sed aliquo modo etiam quaecumque insunt in definitione dicente quid est, praedicantur de definito secundum se, sicut Callias est animal secundum se. Animal enim inest in ratione Calliae. Nam Callias est quoddam animal; et poneretur in eius definitione, si singularia definitionem habere possent. Et hi duo modi sub uno comprehenduntur. Nam eadem ratione, definitio et pars definitionis per se de unoquoque praedicantur. Est enim hic primus modus per se, qui ponitur in libro posteriorum; et respondet primo modo eius quod dicitur secundum quod, superius posito. 1054. Hence the phrase (507). From what has been said above he draws four senses in which the phrase in itself or of itself is used: The first of these is found when the definition, which signifies the quiddity of each thing, is said to belong to each in itself, as Callias “and the quiddity of Callias,” i.e., the essence of the thing, are such that one belongs to the other “in itself.” And not only the whole definition is predicated of the thing defined in itself, but so too in a way everything which belongs to the definition, which expresses the quiddity, is predicated of the thing defined in itself. For example, Callias is an animal in himself. For animal belongs in the definition of Callias, because Callias is an individual animal, and this would be given in his definition if individual things could have a definition. And these two senses are included under one, because both the definition and a part of the definition are predicated of each thing in itself for the same reason. For this is the first type of essential predication given in the Posterior Analytics; and it corresponds to the first sense given above (1050) in which we use the phrase according to which.
lib. 5 l. 19 n. 12 Secundus modus est, quando aliquid ostenditur esse in aliquo, sicut in primo subiecto, cum inest ei per se. Quod quidem contingit dupliciter: quia vel primum subiectum accidentis est ipsum totum subiectum de quo praedicatur (sicut superficies dicitur colorata vel alba secundum seipsam. Primum enim subiectum coloris est superficies, et ideo corpus dicitur coloratum ratione superficiei). Vel etiam aliqua pars eius; sicut homo dicitur vivens secundum se, quia aliqua pars eius est primum subiectum vitae, scilicet anima. Et hic est secundus modus dicendi per se in posterioribus positus, quando scilicet subiectum ponitur in definitione praedicati. Subiectum enim primum et proprium, ponitur in definitione accidentis proprii. 1055. This phrase is used in a second sense when something is shown to be in something else as in a first subject, when it belongs to it of itself. This can happen in two ways: (a) for either the first subject of an accident is the whole subject itself of which the accident is predicated (as a surface is said to be colored or white in itself; for the first subject of color is surface, and therefore a body is said to be colored by reason of its surface); or (b) also the subject of the accident is some part of the subject, just as a man is said to be alive in himself, because part of him, namely, the soul, is the first subject of life. This is the second type of essential predication given in the Posterior Analytics, namely, that in which the subject is given in the definition of the predicate. For the first and proper subject is given in the definition of a proper accident.
lib. 5 l. 19 n. 13 Tertius modus est prout secundum se esse dicitur illud, cuius non est aliqua alia causa; sicut omnes propositiones immediatae, quae scilicet per aliquod medium non probantur. Nam medium in demonstrationibus propter quid est causa, quod praedicatum insit subiecto. Unde, licet homo habeat multas causas, sicut animal et bipes, quae sunt causae formales eius; tamen huius propositionis, homo est homo, cum sit immediata, nihil est causa; et propter hoc homo est homo secundum se. Et ad hunc modum reducitur quartus modus dicendi per se in posterioribus positus, quando effectus praedicatur de causa; ut cum dicitur interfectus interiit propter interfectionem, vel infrigidatum infriguit vel refriguit propter refrigerium. 1056. This phrase is used in a third sense when something having no cause is spoken of as in itself; as all immediate propositions, i.e., those which are not proved by a middle term. For in a priori demonstrations the middle term is the cause of the predicate’s belonging to the subject. Hence, although man has many causes, for example, animal and two-footed, which are his formal cause, still nothing is the cause of the proposition “Man is man,” since it is an immediate one; and for this reason man is man in himself. And to this sense is reduced the fourth type of essential predication given in the Posterior Analytics, the case in which an effect is predicated of a cause; as when it is said that the slain man perished by slaying, or that the thing cooled was made cold or chilled by cooling.
lib. 5 l. 19 n. 14 Quartus modus est, prout illa dicuntur secundum se inesse alicui, quae ei soli inquantum soli insunt. Quod dicit ad differentiam priorum modorum, in quibus non dicebatur secundum se inesse ex eo quod est soli inesse. Quamvis etiam ibi aliquid soli inesset, ut definitio definito. Hic autem secundum se dicitur ratione solitudinis. Nam hoc quod dico secundum se, significat aliquid separatum; sicut dicitur homo secundum se esse, quando solus est. Et ad hunc reducitur tertius modus in posterioribus positus, et quartus modus dicendi secundum quod, qui positionem importabat. 1057. This phrase is used in a fourth sense inasmuch as those things are said to belong to something in themselves which belong to it alone and precisely as belonging to it alone. He says this in order to differentiate this sense of in itself from the preceding senses, in which it was not said that a thing belongs to something in itself because it belongs to it alone; although in that sense too something would belong to it alone, as the definition to the thing defined. But here something is said to be in itself by reason of its exclusiveness. For in itself signifies something separate, as a man is said to be by himself when he is alone. And to this sense is reduced the third sense given in the Posterior Analytics, and the fourth sense of the phrase according to which, which implies position.

Lecture 20

Latin English
lib. 5 l. 20 n. 1 Quia uno modo secundum quod positionem significat, ideo consequenter philosophus prosequitur de nomine dispositionis; et ponit rationem communem huius nominis dispositio, dicens, quod dispositio nihil est aliud quam ordo partium in habente partes. Ponit autem modos quibus dicitur dispositio: qui sunt tres. Quorum primus est secundum ordinem partium in loco. Et sic dispositio sive situs est quoddam praedicamentum. 1058. Because the phrase according to which signifies in one sense position, the Philosopher therefore proceeds to examine next (1058) the term disposition. He gives the common meaning of this term, saying that a disposition is nothing else than the order of parts in a thing which has parts. He also gives the senses in which the term disposition is used; and there are three of these: The first designates the order of parts in place, and in this sense disposition or posture is a special category.
lib. 5 l. 20 n. 2 Secundus modus est, prout ordo partium attenditur secundum potentiam sive virtutem; et sic dispositio ponitur in prima specie qualitatis. Dicitur enim aliquid hoc modo esse dispositum, utputa secundum sanitatem vel aegritudinem, ex eo quod partes eius habent ordinem in virtute activa vel passiva. 1059. Disposition is used in a second sense inasmuch as the order of parts is considered in reference to potency or active power, and then disposition is placed in the first species of quality. For a thing is said to be disposed in this sense, for example, according to health or sickness, by reason of the fact that its parts have an order in its active or passive power.
lib. 5 l. 20 n. 3 Tertius modus est, prout ordo partium attenditur secundum speciem et figuram totius; et sic dispositio sive situs ponitur differentia in genere quantitatis. Dicitur enim quod quantitas alia est habens positionem, ut linea, superficies, corpus et locus; alia non habens, ut numerus et tempus. 1060. Disposition is used in a third sense according as the order of parts is considered in reference to the form and figure of the whole; and then disposition or position is held to be a difference in the genus of quantity. For it is said that one kind of quantity has position, as line, surface, body and place, but that another has not, as number and time.
lib. 5 l. 20 n. 4 Ostendit etiam quod hoc nomen dispositio, ordinem significet. Significat enim positionem, sicut ipsa nominis impositio demonstrat: de ratione autem positionis est ordo. 1061. He also points out that the term disposition signifies order; for it signifies position, as the derivation itself of the term makes clear, and order is involved in the notion of position.
lib. 5 l. 20 n. 5 Habitus vero hic prosequitur de nomine habitus; et primo distinguit ipsum nomen habitus. Secundo quaedam nomina quae habent propinquam considerationem ad hoc nomen, ibi, passio dicitur. Ponit ergo primo duos modos, quibus hoc nomen dicitur. Quorum primus est aliquid medium inter habentem et habitum. Habere enim, licet non sit actio, significat tamen per modum actionis. Et ideo inter habentem et habitum intelligitur habitus esse medius, et quasi actio quaedam; sicut calefactio intelligitur esse media inter calefactum et calefaciens; sive illud medium accipiatur ut actus, sicut quando calefactio accipitur active; sive ut motus, sicut quando calefactio accipitur passive. Quando enim hoc facit, et illud fit, est media factio. In Graeco habetur poiesis, quod factionem significat. Et siquidem ulterius procedatur ab agente in patiens, est medium factio activa, quae est actus facientis. Si vero procedatur a facto in facientem, sic est medium factio passiva, quae est motus facti. Ita etiam inter hominem habentem vestem, et vestem habitam, est medius habitus; quia si consideretur procedendo ab homine ad vestem, erit ut actio, prout significatur in hoc quod dicitur habere: si vero e converso, erit ut passio motus, prout significatur in hoc quod dicitur haberi. 1062. “having” means (509). He now proceeds to examine the term having. First, he gives the different senses of the term having. Second (1065), he gives the different senses of certain other terms which are closely connected with this one. He accordingly gives, first, the two senses in which the term having is used: First, it designates something intermediate between the haver and the thing had. Now even though having is not an action, nonetheless it signifies something after the manner of an action. Therefore having is understood to be something intermediate between the haver and the thing had and to be a sort of action; just as heating is understood to be something intermediate between the thing being heated and the heater, whether what is intermediate be taken as an action, as when heating is taken in an active sense, or as a motion, as when heating is taken in a passive sense. For when one thing makes and another is made, the making stands between them. In Greek the term poi,hsij is used, and this signifies making. Moreover, if one goes from the agent to the patient, the intermediate is making in an active sense, and this is the action of the maker. But if one goes from the thing made to the maker, then the intermediate is making in a passive sense, and this is the motion of the thing being made. And between a man having clothing and the clothing had, the having is also an intermediate; because, if we consider it by going from the man to his clothing, it will be like an action, as is expressed under the form “to have.” But if we consider it in the opposite way, it will be like the undergoing of a motion, as is expressed under the form “to be had.”
lib. 5 l. 20 n. 6 Quamvis autem habitus intelligatur esse medius inter hominem et vestem, inquantum habet eam; tamen manifestum est, quod non contingit inter ipsum habitum et habentem esse aliud medium, quasi adhuc sit alius habitus medius inter habentem et ipsum medium habitum. Sic enim procederetur in infinitum, si dicatur quod convenit habere habitum habiti, idest rei habitae. Homo enim habet rem habitam, idest vestem. Sed illum habitum rei habitae non habet homo, alio medio habitu, sicut homo faciens facit factum factione media; sed ipsam mediam factionem non facit aliqua alia factione media. Et propter hoc etiam relationes, quibus subiectum refertur ad aliud, non referuntur ad subiectum aliqua alia relatione media, nec etiam ad oppositum; sicut paternitas neque ad patrem neque ad filium refertur aliqua alia relatione media: et si aliquae relationes mediae dicantur, sunt rationis tantum, et non rei. Habitus autem sic acceptus est unum praedicamentum. 1063. Now although having is understood to be intermediate between a man and his clothing inasmuch as he has it, nonetheless it is evident that there cannot be another intermediate between the having and the thing had, as though there were another having midway between the haver and the intermediate having. For if one were to say that it is possible to have the having “of what is had,” i.e., of the thing had, an infinite regress would then result. For the man has “the thing had,” i.e., his clothing, but he does not have the having of the thing had by way of another intermediate having. It is like the case of a maker, who makes the thing made by an intermediate making, but does not make the intermediate making itself by way of some other intermediate making. It is for this reason too ‘that the relations by which a subject is related to something else are not related to the subject by some other intermediate relation and also not to the opposite term; paternity, for example, is not related to a father or to a son by some other intermediate relation. And if some relations are said to be intermediate, they are merely conceptual relations and not real ones. Having in this sense is taken as one of the categories.
lib. 5 l. 20 n. 7 Secundo modo dicitur habitus dispositio, secundum quam aliquid disponitur bene et male; sicut sanitate aliquid disponitur bene, aegritudine male. Utroque autem, scilicet aegritudine et sanitate, aliquid disponitur bene vel male dupliciter; scilicet aut secundum se aut per respectum ad aliquid. Sicut sanum est quod est bene dispositum secundum se; robustum autem quod est bene dispositum ad aliquid agendum. Et ideo sanitas est habitus quidam, quia est talis dispositio qualis dicta est. Et non solum habitus dicitur dispositio totius, sed etiam dispositio partis, quae est pars dispositionis totius; sicuti bonae dispositiones partium animalis, sunt partes bonae habitudinis in toto animali. Et virtutes etiam partium animae, sunt quidam habitus; sicut temperantia concupiscibilis, et fortitudo irascibilis, et prudentia rationalis. 1064. In a second sense the term having means the disposition whereby something is well or badly disposed; for example, a thing is well disposed by health and badly disposed by sickness. Now by each of these, health and sickness, a thing is well or badly disposed in two ways: in itself or in relation to something else. Thus a healthy thing is one that is well disposed in itself, and a robust thing is one that is well disposed for doing something. Health is a kind of having, then, because it is a disposition such as has been described. And having (habit) designates not only the disposition of a whole but also that of a part, which is a part of the disposition of the whole. For example, the good dispositions of an animal’s parts are themselves parts of the good disposition of the whole animal. The virtues pertaining to the parts of the soul are also habits; for example, temperance is a habit of the concupiscible part, fortitude a habit of the irascible part, and prudence a habit of the rational part.
lib. 5 l. 20 n. 8 Deinde cum dicit passio dicitur hic prosequitur de illis quae consequuntur ad habitum; et primo de his quae se habent ad ipsum per modum oppositionis. Secundo de eo quod se habet ad ipsum per modum effectus, scilicet de habere, quod ab habitu denominatur, ibi, habere multipliciter dicitur. Habitui autem opponitur aliquid, scilicet passio, sicut imperfectum perfecto. Privatio autem oppositione directa. Unde primo determinat de passione. Secundo de privatione, ibi, privatio dicitur. Ponit ergo primo, quatuor modos, quibus passio dicitur. Uno modo dicitur qualitas, secundum quam fit alteratio, sicut album et nigrum et huiusmodi. Et haec est tertia species qualitatis. Probatum enim est in septimo physicorum, quod in sola tertia specie qualitatis potest esse alteratio. 1065. “Affection”Here he proceeds to treat the terms which are associated with having. First, he deals with those which are associated as an opposite; and second (1080), he considers something which is related to it as an effect, namely, to have, which derives its name from having. Now there is something which is opposed to having as the imperfect is opposed to the perfect, and this is affection (being affected). And privation is opposed by direct opposition. Hence, first (1065), he deals with affection; and second (1070), with privation (“The term privation”). He accordingly gives, first, four senses of the term affection.: In one sense (modification) it means the quality according to which alteration takes place, such as white and black and the like. And this is the third species of quality; for it has been proved in Book VII of the Physics that there can be alteration only in the third species of quality.
lib. 5 l. 20 n. 9 Secundus modus est, secundum quod huiusmodi actiones qualitatis et alterationis, quae fiunt secundum eas, dicuntur passiones; et sic passio est unum praedicamentum, ut calefieri et infrigidari et huiusmodi. 1066. Affection is used in another sense (undergoing) according as the actualizations of this kind of quality and alteration, which comes about through them, are called affections. And in this sense affection is one of the categories, for example, being heated and cooled and other motions of this kind.
lib. 5 l. 20 n. 10 Tertio modo dicuntur passiones, non quaelibet alterationes, sed quae sunt nocivae, et ad malum terminatae, et quae sunt lamentabiles, sive tristes: non enim dicitur aliquid pati secundum hunc modum quod sanatur, sed quod infirmatur; vel etiam cuicumque aliquod nocumentum accidit: et hoc rationabiliter. Patiens enim per actionem agentis sibi contrarii, trahitur a sua dispositione naturali in dispositionem similem agenti. Et ideo magis proprie dicitur pati, cum subtrahitur aliquid de eo quod sibi congruebat, et dum agitur in ipso contraria dispositio, quam quando fit e contrario. Tunc enim magis dicitur perfici. 1067. In a third sense (suffering) affection means, not any kind of alteration at all, but those which are harmful and terminate in some evil, and which are lamentable or sorrowful; for a thing is not said to suffer insofar as it is healed but insofar as it is made ill. Or it also designates anything harmful that befalls anything at alland with good reason. For a patient by the action of some agent which is contrary to it is drawn from its own natural disposition to one similar to that of the agent. Hence, a patient is said more properly to suffer when some part of something fitting to it is being removed and so long as its disposition is being changed into a contrary one, than when the reverse occurs. For then it is said rather to be perfected.
lib. 5 l. 20 n. 11 Et quia illa, quae sunt modica, quasi nulla reputantur, ideo quarto modo dicuntur passiones, non quaecumque nocivae alterationes, sed quae habent magnitudinem nocumenti, sicut magnae calamitates et magnae tristitiae. Quia etiam excedens laetitia fit nociva, cum quandocumque propter excessum laetitiae aliqui mortui sint et infirmati; et similiter superabundantia prosperitatis in nocumentum vertitur his qui ea bene uti nesciunt: ideo alia litera habet magnitudines lamentationum et exultationum passiones dicuntur. Cui concordat alia litera, quae dicit magnitudines dolorum et prosperorum. 1068. And because things which are not very great are considered as nothing, therefore in a fourth sense (passion) affection means not any kind of harmful alteration whatsoever, but those which are extremely injurious, as great calamities and great sorrows. And because excessive pleasure becomes harmful (for sometimes people have died or become ill as a result of it) and because too great prosperity is turned into something harmful to those who do not know how to make good use of it, therefore another text reads “great rejoicing and grieving are called affections.” And still another text agrees with this, saying, “very great sorrows and prosperities.”
lib. 5 l. 20 n. 12 Sciendum est autem, quod quia haec tria, scilicet dispositio, habitus, et passio, non significant genus praedicamenti, nisi secundum unum modum significationis, ut ex praehabitis patet, ideo non posuit ea cum aliis partibus entis, scilicet quantitate, qualitate et ad aliquid. In illis enim vel omnes vel plures modi ad genera praedicamenti, significata per illa nomina, pertinebant. 1069. Now it should be noted that because these three—disposition, habit or having, and affection— signify one of the categories only in one of the senses in which they are used, as is evident from what was said above, he therefore did not place them with the other parts of being, i.e., with quantity, quality and relation. For either all or most of the senses in which they were used pertained to the category signified by these terms.
lib. 5 l. 20 n. 13 Privatio dicitur hic distinguit modos, quibus dicitur privatio; et quia privatio includit in sua ratione negationem et aptitudinem subiecti, ideo primo distinguit modos privationis ex parte aptitudinis. Secundo ex parte negationis, ibi, et quoties. Et circa primum ponit quatuor modos. Primus modus est, secundum quod aptitudo consideratur ex parte rei privatae, non ex parte subiecti. Dicitur enim hoc modo privatio, quando ab aliquo non habetur id quod natum est haberi, licet hoc quod ipso caret non sit natum habere; sicut planta dicitur privari oculis, quia oculi nati sunt haberi, licet non a planta. In his vero, quae a nullo nata sunt haberi, non potest dici aliquid privari, sicut oculus visu penetrante per corpora opaca. 1070. The term “privation” (511). Here he gives the different senses in which the term privation is used. And since privation includes in its intelligible structure both negation and the fitness of some subject to possess some attribute, he therefore gives, first, the different senses of privation which refer to this fitness or aptitude for some attribute. Second (1074), he treats the various senses of negation (“And in all instances”). In regard to the first he gives four senses of privation: The first has to do with this natural fitness taken in reference to the attribute of which the subject is deprived and not in reference to the subject itself. For we speak of a privation in this sense when some attribute which is naturally fitted to be had is not had, even though the subject which lacks it is not designed by nature to have it. For example, a plant is said to be deprived of eyes because eyes are naturally designed to be had by something, although not by a plant. But in the case of those attributes which a subject is not naturally fitted to have, the subject cannot be said to be deprived of them, for example, that the eye by its power of vision should penetrate an opaque body.
lib. 5 l. 20 n. 14 Secundus modus attenditur secundum aptitudinem subiecti. Hoc enim modo dicitur privari hoc solum quod natum est illud habere, aut secundum se, aut secundum genus suum: secundum se, sicut homo caecus dicitur privari visu, quem natus est habere secundum se. Talpa autem dicitur privari visu, non quia ipsa secundum se sit nata habere visum; sed quia genus eius, scilicet animal, natum est habere visum. Multa enim sunt a quibus aliquid non impeditur ratione generis, sed ratione differentiae; sicut homo non impeditur quin habeat alas ratione generis, sed ratione differentiae. 1071. A second sense of the term privation is noted in reference to a subject’s fitness to have some attribute. For in this sense privation refers only to some attribute which a thing is naturally fitted to have either in itself or according to its class; in itself, for example, as when a blind person is said to be deprived of sight, which he is naturally fitted to have in himself. And a mole is said to be deprived of sight, not because it is naturally fitted to have it, but because the class, animal, to which the mole belongs, is so fitted. For there are many attributes which a thing is not prevented from having by reason of its genus but by reason of its differences; for example, a man is not prevented from having wings by reason of his genus but by reason of his difference.
lib. 5 l. 20 n. 15 Tertius modus attenditur ex parte circumstantiarum. Unde hoc modo dicitur aliquid privari aliquo, si non habet ipsum habitum cum natum sit habere. Sicut caecitas, quae est quaedam privatio, et tamen animal non dicitur caecum secundum omnem aetatem, sed solum si non habeat visum in illa aetate in qua natum est habere; unde canis non dicitur caecus ante nonum diem. Et sicut est de hac circumstantia quando, ita est et de aliis circumstantiis, scilicet in quo, ut in loco; sicut nox dicitur privatio lucis in loco ubi nata est esse lux, non in cavernis, ad quas lumen solis pervenire non potest; et secundum quid, sicut homo non dicitur edentulus, si non habet dentes in manu; sed si non habet secundum illam partem, secundum quam natus est habere; et ad quod, sicut homo non dicitur parvus, vel deficientis staturae si non est magnus respectu montis, vel respectu cuiuscumque alterius rei, ad cuius comparationem non est natus habere magnitudinem: et sic homo non dicitur tardus esse motu, si non currat ita velociter sicut lepus vel ventus; vel ignorans, si non intelligit sicut Deus. 1072. A third sense of the term privation is noted in reference to circumstances. And in this sense a thing is said to be deprived of something if it does not have it when it is naturally fitted to have it. This is the case, for example, with the privation blindness; for an animal is not said to be blind at every age but only if it does not have sight at an age when it is naturally fitted to have it. Hence a dog is not said to be blind before the ninth day. And what is true of the circumstance when also applies to other circumstances, as “to where,” or place. Thus night means the privation of light in a place where light may naturally exist, but not in caverns, which the sun’s rays cannot penetrate. And it applies “to what part,” as a man is not said to be toothless if he does not have teeth in his hand but only if he does not have them in that part in which they are naturally disposed to exist; and “to the object in relation to which,” as a man is not said to be small or imperfect in stature if he is not large in comparison with a mountain or with any other thing with which he is not naturally comparable in size. Hence a man is not said to be slow in moving if he does not run as fast as a hare or move as fast as the wind; nor is he said to be ignorant if he does not understand as God does.
lib. 5 l. 20 n. 16 Quartus modus est secundum quod ablatio cuiuslibet rei per violentiam, dicitur privatio. Violentum enim est contra impetum naturalem, ut habitum est supra. Et ita ablatio per violentiam est respectu eius quod quis natus est habere. 1073. Privation is used in a fourth sense inasmuch as the removal of anything by violence or force is called a privation. For what is forced is contrary to natural impulse, as has been said above (829); and thus the removal of anything by force has reference to something that a person is naturally fitted to have.
lib. 5 l. 20 n. 17 Deinde cum dicit et quoties distinguit modos privationis ex parte negationis. Graeci enim utuntur hac praepositione a in compositionibus ad designandas negationes et privationes, sicut nos utimur hac praepositione in. Dicit ergo quod quoties dicuntur negationes designatae ab hac praepositione a posita in principio dictionis per compositionem, toties dicuntur etiam privationes. Dicitur enim inaequale uno modo, quod non habet aequalitatem, si aptum natum est habere; et invisibile, quod non habet colorem; et sine pede, quod non habet pedes. 1074. And in all (512). Then he gives the different senses of privation which involve negation: For the Greeks use the prefix av-, when compounding words, to designate negations and privations, just as we use the prefix in- or un-; and therefore he says that in every case in which one expresses negations designated by the prefix av-, used in composition at the beginning of a word, privations are designated. For unequal means in one sense what lacks equality, provided that it is naturally such as to have it; and invisible means what lacks color; and footless, what lacks feet.
lib. 5 l. 20 n. 18 Secundo modo dicuntur huiusmodi negationes non per hoc quod est omnino non habere; sed per hoc quod est prave vel turpiter habere; sicut dicitur non habere colorem, quia habet malum colorem vel turpem; et non habere pedes, quia habet parvos vel turpes. 1075. Negations of this kind are used in a second sense to indicate not what is not had at all but what is had badly or in an ugly way; for example, a thing is said to be colorless because it has a bad or unfitting color; and a thing is said to be footless because it has defective or deformed feet.
lib. 5 l. 20 n. 19 Tertio modo significatur aliquid privative vel negative ex hoc, quod est parum habere; sicut dicitur in Graeco apirenon, idest non ignitum, ubi est modicum de igne: et hic modus quodammodo continetur sub secundo, quia parum habere est quodammodo prave et turpiter habere. 1076. In a third sense an attribute is signified privatively or negatively because it is had to a small degree; for example, the term avpu,rhnon i.e., unignited, is used in the Greek text, and it signifies a situation where the smallest amount of fire exists. And in a way this sense is contained under the second, because to have something to a small degree is in a way to have it defectively or unfittingly.
lib. 5 l. 20 n. 20 Quarto modo dicitur aliquid privative vel negative, ex eo quod non est facile, vel non bene; sicut aliquid dicitur insecabile, non solum quia non secatur, sed quia non facile, aut non bene. 1077. Something is designated as a privation or negation in a fourth sense because it is not done easily or well; for example, something is said to be uncuttable not only because it is not cut but because it is not cut easily or well.
lib. 5 l. 20 n. 21 Quinto modo dicitur aliquid negative vel privative, ex eo quod est omnino non habere. Unde monoculus non dicitur caecus, sed ille qui in ambobus oculis caret visu. 1078. And something is designated as a privation or negation in a fifth sense because it is not had in any way at all. Hence it is not a one-eyed person who is said to be blind but one who lacks sight in both eyes.
lib. 5 l. 20 n. 22 Ex hoc inducit quoddam corollarium; scilicet quod inter bonum et malum, iustum et iniustum, est aliquid medium. Non enim ex quocumque defectu bonitatis efficitur aliquis malus, sicut Stoici dicebant ponentes omnia peccata esse paria; sed quando multum a virtute recedit, et in contrarium habitum inducitur. Unde in secundo Ethicorum dicitur: ex eo quod homo recedit parum a medio virtutis, non vituperatur. 1079. From this he draws a corollary, namely, that there is some intermediate between good and evil, just and unjust. For a person does not become evil when he lacks goodness to any degree at all, as the Stoics said (for they held all sins to be equal), but when he deviates widely from virtue and is brought to a contrary habit. Hence it is said in Book II of the Ethics that a man is not to be blamed for deviating a little from virtue.
lib. 5 l. 20 n. 23 Deinde cum dicit habere multipliciter hic ponit quatuor modos eius, quod est habere: quorum primus est, secundum quod habere aliquid est ducere illud secundum suam naturam in rebus naturalibus, aut secundum suum impetum in rebus voluntariis. Et hoc modo febris dicitur habere hominem, quia homo traducitur a naturali dispositione in dispositionem febrilem. Et hoc modo habent tyranni civitates, quia secundum voluntatem et impetum tyrannorum res civitatum aguntur. Et hoc etiam modo induti dicuntur habere vestimentum, quia vestimentum coaptatur induto ut accipiat figuram eius. Et ad hunc modum reducitur etiam habere possessionem, quia homo re possessa utitur secundum suam voluntatem. 1080. “To have” (513). Then he gives four ways in which the term to have (to possess or hold) is used: First, to have a thing is to treat it according to one’s own nature in the case of natural things, or according to one’s own impulse in the case of voluntary matters. Thus a fever is said to possess a man because he is brought from a normal state to one of fever. And in the same sense tyrants are said to possess cities, because civic business is carried out according to the will and impulse of tyrants. And in this sense too those who are clothed are said to possess or have clothing, because clothing is fitted to the one who wears it so that it takes on his figure. And to have possession of a thing is also reduced to this sense of to have, because anything that a man possesses he uses as he wills.
lib. 5 l. 20 n. 24 Secundus modus est, prout illud, in quo existit aliquid ut in proprio susceptibili, dicitur habere illud; sicut aes habet speciem statuae, et corpus habet infirmitatem. Et sub hoc modo comprehenditur habere scientiam, quantitatem, et quodcumque accidens, vel quamcumque formam. 1081. To have is used in a second way inasmuch as that in which some attribute exists as its proper subject is said to have it. It is in this sense that bronze has the form of a statue, and a body has disease. And to have a science or quantity or any accident or form is included under this sense.
lib. 5 l. 20 n. 25 Tertius modus est, secundum quod continens dicitur habere contentum, et contentum haberi a continente; sicut dicimus quod lagena habet humidum, idest humorem aliquem, ut aquam vel vinum; et quod civitas habet homines, et navis nautas. Et secundum hunc modum etiam dicitur quod totum habet partes. Totum enim continet partem, sicut et locus locatum. In hoc enim differt locus a toto, quia locus est divisus a locato, non autem totum a partibus. Unde locatum est sicut pars divisa, ut habetur in quarto physicorum. 1082. To have is used in a third way (to hold) when a container is said to have or to hold the thing contained, and the thing contained is said to be held by the container. For example, we say that a bottle has or “holds a liquid,” i.e., some fluid, such as water or wine; and a city, men; and a ship, sailors. It is in this sense too that a whole is said to have parts; for a whole contains a part just as a place contains the thing in place. But a place differs from a whole in this respect that a place may be separated from the thing which occupies it, whereas a whole may not be separated from its parts. Hence, anything that occupies a place is like a separate part, as is said in Book IV of the Physics.
lib. 5 l. 20 n. 26 Quartus modus est secundum quod aliquid dicitur habere alterum, ex eo, quod prohibet ipsum operari vel moveri secundum suum impetum; sicut columnae dicuntur habere corpora ponderosa imposita super eas, quia prohibent ea descendere deorsum secundum inclinationem. Et hoc etiam modo poetae dixerunt quod Atlas habet caelum. Fingunt enim poetae quod Atlas est quidam gigas qui sustinet caelum ne cadat super terram. Quod etiam quidam naturales dicunt, qui ponebant quod caelum quandoque corrumpetur et resolutum cadet super terram. Quod patet praecipue ex opinione Empedoclis, qui posuit mundum infinities corrumpi et infinities generari. Habuit autem poetica fictio ex veritate originem. Atlas quidem magnus astrologus, subtiliter motus caelestium corporum perscrutatus est, ex quo fictio processit quod ipse caelum sustineret. Differt autem hic modus a primo. Nam in primo habens, habitum cogebat sequi secundum suum impetum, et sic erat causa motus violenti. Hic autem habens, prohibet habitum moveri motu naturali, unde est causa quietis violentae. Ad hunc autem modum reducitur tertius modus quo continens dicitur habere contenta; ea ratione quia aliter contenta suo proprio impetu singula separarentur abinvicem, nisi continens prohiberet; sicut patet in lagena continente aquam, quae prohibet partes abinvicem separari. 1083. To have is used in a fourth way (to hold up) inasmuch as one thing is said to hold another because it prevents it from operating or being moved according to its own impulse. It is in this sense that pillars are said to hold up the heavy bodies placed upon them, because they prevent these bodies from falling down in accordance with their own inclination. And in this sense too the poets said that Atlas holds up the heavens; for the poets supposed Atlas to be a giant who prevents the heavens from falling on the earth. And certain natural philosophers also say this, holding that the heavens will at some time be corrupted and fall in dissolution upon the earth. This is most evident in the opinions expressed by Empedocles, for he held that the world is destroyed an infinite number of times and comes into being an infinite number of times. And the fables of the poets have some basis in reality; for Atlas, who was a great astronomer, made an accurate study of the motion of the celestial bodies, and from this arose the story that he holds up the heavens. But this sense of the term to have differs from the first. For according to the first, as was seen, the thing having compels the thing had to follow by reason of its own impulse, and thus is the cause of forced motion. But here the thing having prevents the thing had from being moved by its own natural motion, and thus is the cause of forced rest. The third sense of having, according to which a container is said to have or hold the thing contained, is reduced to this sense, because the individual parts of the thing contained would be separated from each other by their own peculiar impulse if the container did not prevent this. This is clear, for example, in the case of a bottle containing water, inasmuch as the bottle prevents the parts of the water from being separated.
lib. 5 l. 20 n. 27 Dicit autem in fine, quod esse in aliquo similiter dicitur sicut et habere; et modi essendi in aliquo consequuntur ad modos habendi. Octo autem modi essendi in aliquo in quarto physicorum positi sunt: quorum duo, scilicet secundum quod totum integrale est in partibus et e converso: duo etiam, scilicet secundum quod totum universale est in partibus, et e converso, et alius modus secundum quod locatum est in loco, consequuntur ad tertium modum habendi, secundum quod totum habet partes, et locus locatum. Modus autem secundum quod aliquid dicitur esse in aliquo, ut in efficiente vel movente, sicut quae sunt regni in rege, consequitur primum modum habendi hic positum. Modus autem essendi in, secundum quod forma est in materia, reducitur ad secundum modum habendi hic positum. Modus autem quo aliquid est in fine, reducitur ad modum habendi quartum hic positum; vel etiam ad primum, quia secundum finem moventur et quiescunt ea quae sunt ad finem. 1084. In closing he says that the phrase to be in a thing is used in the same way as to have, and the ways of being in a thing correspond to those of having a thing. Now the eight ways of being in a thing have been treated in Book IV of the Physics. Two of these are as follows: (1&2) that in which an integral whole is in its parts, and the reverse of this. Two others are: (3&4) the way in which a universal whole is in its parts, and vice versa. (8) And another is that in which a thing in place is in a place, and this corresponds to the third sense of having, according to which a whole has parts, and a place thas the thing which occupies it. (6) But he way in which a thing is said to be in something as in an efficient cause or mover (as the things belonging to a kingdom are in the king) corresponds to the first sense of having given here (1080). (7) And the way in which a thing is in an end or goal is reduced to the fourth sense of having given here (1083), or also to the first, because those things which are related to an end are moved or at rest because of it. [(5) The way health is in a balance of temperature, and any form is in matter or a subject, whether the form be accidental or substantial.]

Lecture 21

Latin English
lib. 5 l. 21 n. 1 Hic incipit prosequi de his quae pertinent ad rationem totius et partis. Et primo de his quae pertinent ad partem. Secundo de his, quae pertinent ad totum, ibi, totum dicitur. Et quia ex partibus constituitur totum; ideo circa primum duo facit. Primo ostendit quot modis dicitur aliquid esse ex aliquo. Secundo quot modis dicitur pars, ibi, pars dicitur uno quidem modo. Circa primum tria facit. Primo ponit modos, quibus aliquid ex aliquo fieri dicitur proprie et primo. Secundo quo modo fit aliquid ex aliquo, sed non primo, ibi, alia vero si secundum partem. Tertio quo modo fit aliquid ex aliquo non proprie, ibi, alia vero. Circa primum ponit quatuor modos. Quorum primus est, secundum quod aliquid dicitur esse ex aliquo, ut ex materia. Quod quidem contingit dupliciter. Uno modo secundum quod accipitur materia primi generis, scilicet communis; sicut aqua est materia omnium liquabilium, quae omnia dicuntur esse ex aqua. Alio modo secundum speciem ultimam, idest specialissimam; sicut haec species, quae est statua, dicitur fieri ex aere. 1085. Here he begins to treat the things which pertain to the notion of whole and part. First, he deals with those which pertain to the notion of part; and second (1098), with those which pertain to the notion of whole (“Whole means”). And because a whole is constituted of parts, he therefore does two things in dealing with the first member of this division. First, he explains the various ways in which a thing is said to come from something; and second (1093), he considers the different senses in which the term part is used (“Part means”). In regard to the first he does three things. First, he considers the ways in which a thing is said to come from something in the primary and proper sense. Second (1090), he indicates the ways in which one thing comes from another but not in the primary sense (“But other things”). Third (1091), he considers the ways in which one thing comes from another but not in the proper sense (“And some things”). In dealing with the first part he gives four ways in which a thing is said to come from something: First, a thing is said to come from something as from matter, and this can happen in two ways: (a) In one way, inasmuch as matter is taken to be “the matter of the first genus,” i.e., common matter; as water is the matter of all liquids and liquables, all of which are said to come from water. (b) In another way, “in reference to the ultimate species,” i.e., the lowest species; as the species statue is said to come from bronze.
lib. 5 l. 21 n. 2 Secundo modo dicitur aliquid fieri ex alio ut ex primo principio movente, sicut pugna ex convitio, quod est principium movens animum convitiati ad pugnandum. Et sic etiam dicitur, quod domus est ex aedificante, et sanitas ex medicina. 1086. In a second way a thing is said to come from something as “from a first moving principle,” as a fight comes from a taunt, which is the principle moving the soul of the taunted person to fight. And it is in this way too that a house is said to come from a builder, and health from the medical art.
lib. 5 l. 21 n. 3 Tertio modo dicitur fieri ex aliquo, sicut simplex, ex composito ex materia et forma. Et hoc est in via resolutionis, sicut dicimus quod partes fiunt ex toto, et versus ex Iliade, idest ex toto tractatu Homeri de Troia; resolvitur enim Ilias in versus, sicut totum in partes. Et similiter dicitur quod lapides fiunt ex domo. Ratio autem huius est, quia forma est finis in generatione. Perfectum enim dicitur quod habet finem, ut supra habitum est. Unde patet, quod perfectum est quod habet formam. Quando igitur ex toto perfecto fit resolutio partium, est motus quasi a forma ad materiam; sicut e converso, quando partes componuntur, est motus a materia in formam. Et ideo haec praepositio ex quae principium designat, utrobique competit: et in via compositionis, quia determinat principium materiale; et in via resolutionis, quia significat principium formale. 1087. In a third way one thing is said to come from another as something simple “comes from the composite of matter and form.” This pertains to the process of dissolution; and it is in this way that we say parts come from a whole, “and a verse from the Iliad” (i.e., from the whole treatise of Homer about Troy); for the Iliad is divided into verses as a whole is divided into parts. And it is in the same way that stones are said to come from a house. The reason for this is that the form is the goal or end in the process of generation; for it is what has attained its end that is said to be perfect or complete, as was explained above (500:C 1039). Hence it is evident that that is perfect which has a form. Therefore, when a perfect whole is broken down into its parts, there is motion in a sense from form to matter; and in a similar way when parts are combined, there is an opposite motion from matter to form. Hence the preposition from, which designates a beginning, applies to both processes: both to the process of composition, because it signifies a material principle, and to that of dissolution, because it signifies a formal principle.
lib. 5 l. 21 n. 4 Quarto modo dicitur aliquod fieri ex aliquo sicut species ex parte speciei. Pars autem speciei potest accipi dupliciter: aut secundum rationem, aut secundum rem. Secundum rationem, sicut bipes est pars hominis, quia est pars definitionis eius, quamvis secundum rem non sit pars, quia aliter non praedicaretur de toto. Toti enim homini competit habere duos pedes. Secundum rem vero, sicut syllaba est ex elemento, idest ex litera sicut ex parte speciei. Hic autem quartus modus differt a primo. Nam ibi dicebatur aliquid esse ex parte materiae sicut statua ex aere. Nam haec substantia quae est statua, est composita ex sensibili materia tamquam ex parte substantiae. Sed haec species componitur ex parte speciei. 1088. In a fourth way a thing is said to come from something as “a species comes from a part of a species.” And part of a species can be taken in two ways: either in reference to the conceptual order or to the real order. (a) It is taken in reference to the conceptual order when we say, for example, that two-footed is a part of man; because while it is part of his definition, it is not a real part, otherwise it would not be predicated of the whole. For it is proper to the whole man to have two feet. (b) And it is taken in reference to the real order when we say, for example, that “a syllable comes from an element,” or letter, as from a part of the species. But here the fourth way in which the term is used differs from the first; for in the first way a thing was said to come from a part of matter, as a statue comes from bronze. For this substance, a statue, is composed of sensible matter as a part of its substance. But this species is composed of part of the species.
lib. 5 l. 21 n. 5 Sunt enim partium, quaedam partes speciei, et quaedam partes materiae. Partes quidem speciei dicuntur, a quibus dependet perfectio speciei, et sine quibus esse non potest species. Unde et tales partes in definitione totius ponuntur, sicut anima et corpus in definitione animalis, et angulus in definitione trianguli, et litera in definitione syllabae. Partes vero materiae dicuntur ex quibus species non dependet, sed quodammodo accidunt speciei; sicut accidit statuae quod fiat ex aere, vel ex quacumque materia. Accidit etiam circulo quod dividatur in duos semicirculos: et angulo recto, quod angulus acutus sit eius pars. Unde huiusmodi partes non ponuntur in definitione totius speciei, sed potius e converso, ut in septimo huius erit manifestum. Sic ergo patet quod sic quaedam dicuntur ex aliquo fieri primo et proprie. 1089. For some parts are parts of a species and some are parts of matter. Those which are called parts of a species are those on which the perfection of the species depends and without which it cannot be a species. And it is for this reason that such parts are placed in the definition of the whole, as body and soul are placed in the definition of an animal, and an angle in the definition of a triangle, and a letter in the definition of a syllable. And those parts which are called parts of matter are those on which the species does not depend but are in a sense accidental to the species; for example, it is accidental to a statue that it should come from bronze or from any particular matter at all. And it is also accidental that a circle should be divided into two semi-circles; and that a right angle should have an acute angle as part of it. Parts of this sort, then, are not placed in the definition of the whole species but rather the other way around, as will be shown in Book VII of this work (1542). Hence it is clear that in this way some things are said to come from others in the primary and proper sense.
lib. 5 l. 21 n. 6 Aliqua vero dicuntur ex aliquo fieri non primo, sed secundum partem. Et hoc secundum quaecumque praedictorum modorum; sicut puer dicitur fieri ex patre, sicut principio motivo, et matre sicut ex materia; quia quaedam pars patris movet, scilicet sperma, et quaedam pars matris est materia, scilicet menstruum. Et plantae fiunt ex terra; non tamen quidem ex toto, sed ex aliqua eius parte. 1090. But some things are said to come from something not in the (~) primary sense but (+)according to a part of that thing in “any of the aforesaid senses.” For example, a child is said to come from its father as an efficient principle, and from its mother as matter; because a certain part of the father causes motion, i.e., the sperm, and a certain part of the mother has the character of matter, i.e., the menstrual fluid. And plants come from the earth, although not from the whole of it but from some part.
lib. 5 l. 21 n. 7 Alio vero modo dicitur fieri aliquid ex aliquo non proprie, scilicet ex hoc ipso quod importat solum ordinem; et sic aliquid fieri dicitur ex aliquo, post quod fit, sicut nox fit ex die, idest post diem: et imber ex serenitate, idest post serenitatem. Hoc autem dicitur dupliciter. Quandoque enim inter ea, quorum unum dicitur fieri ex altero, attenditur ordo secundum motum, et non solum secundum tempus; quia vel sunt duo extrema eiusdem motus, ut cum dicitur quod album fit ex nigro: vel consequuntur aliqua extrema motus, sicut nox et dies consequuntur diversa ubi solis. Et similiter hiems et aestas. Unde in quibusdam dicitur hoc fieri post hoc, quia habent transmutationem adinvicem, ut in praedictis patet. 1091. And in another way a thing is said to come from something in an improper sense, namely, from the fact that this implies order or succession alone; and in this way one thing is said to come from another in the sense that it comes after it, as “night comes from day,” i.e., after the day, “and a storm from a calm,” i.e., after a calm. And this is said in reference to two things. For in those cases in which one thing is said to come from another, order is sometimes noted in reference to motion and not merely to time; because either they are the two extremes of the same motion, as when it is said that white comes from black, or they are a result of different extremes of the motion, as night and day are a result of different locations of the sun. And the same thing applies to winter and summer. Hence in some cases one thing is said to come from another because one is changed into the other, as is clear in the above examples.
lib. 5 l. 21 n. 8 Quandoque vero attenditur ordo secundum tempus tantum; sicut dicitur quod ex aequinoctio fit navigatio, idest post aequinoctium. Haec enim duo extrema non sunt duo extrema unius motus, sed ad diversos motus pertinent. Et similiter dicitur, ex Dionysiis fiunt Thargelia, quia fiunt post Dionysia. Haec autem sunt quaedam festa, quae apud gentiles celebrabantur, quorum unum erat prius et aliud posterius. 1092. But sometimes order or succession is considered in reference to time alone; for example, it is said that “a voyage is made from the equinox,” i.e., after the equinox. For these two extremes are not extremes of a single motion but pertain to different motions. And similarly it is said that the Thargelian festival [of Apollo and Artemis] comes from the Dionysian because it comes after the Dionysian, these being two feasts which were celebrated among the gentiles, one of which preceded the other in time.
lib. 5 l. 21 n. 9 Deinde cum dicit pars dicitur hic ponit quatuor modos, quibus aliquid dicitur esse pars. Primo modo pars dicitur, in quam dividitur aliquid secundum quantitatem: et hoc dupliciter. Uno enim modo quantumcumque fuerit quantitas minor, in quam quantitas maior dividitur, dicitur eius pars. Semper enim id quod aufertur a quantitate, dicitur pars eius; sicut duo aliquo modo sunt partes trium. Alio modo dicitur solum pars quantitas minor, quae mensurat maiorem. Et sic duo non sunt pars trium; sed sic duo sunt pars quatuor, quia bis duo sunt quatuor. 1093. “Part” means (515). He now gives four senses in which something is said to be a part: In one sense part means that into which a thing is divided from the viewpoint of quantity; and this can be taken in two ways. (a) For, in one way, no matter how much smaller that quantity may be into which a larger quantity is divided, it is called a part of this quantity. For anything that is taken away from a quantity is always called a part of it; for example, the number two is in a sense a part of the number three. (b) And, in another way, only a smaller quantity which measures a larger one is called a part. In this sense the number two is not a part of the number three but a part of the number four, because two times two equals four.
lib. 5 l. 21 n. 10 Secundo modo ea dicuntur partes, in quae dividitur aliquid sine quantitate: et per hunc modum species dicuntur esse partes generis. Dividitur enim in species, non sicut quantitas, in partes quantitatis. Nam tota quantitas non est in una suarum partium. Genus autem est in qualibet specierum. 1094. In a second sense parts mean those things into which something is divided irrespective of quantity; and it is in this sense that species are said to be parts of a genus. For a genus is divided into species, but not as a quantity is divided into quantitative parts. For a whole quantity is not in each one of its parts, but a genus is in each one of its species.
lib. 5 l. 21 n. 11 Tertio modo dicuntur partes, in quas dividitur, aut ex quibus componitur aliquod totum; sive sit species, sive aliquid habens speciem, scilicet individuum. Sunt enim, sicut dictum est, quaedam partes speciei, et quaedam partes materiae, quae sunt partes individui. Aes enim est pars sphaerae aereae, aut cubi aerei, sicut materia, in qua species est recepta. Unde aes non est pars speciei, sed pars habentis speciem. Est autem cubus corpus contentum ex superficiebus quadratis. Angulus autem est pars trianguli sicut speciei, sicut supra dictum est. 1095. In a third sense parts mean those things into which some whole is divided or of which it is composed, whether the whole is a species or the thing having a species, i.e., the individual. For, as has been pointed out already (1089), there are parts of the species and parts of matter, and these (species and matter) are parts of the individual. Hence bronze is a part of a bronze sphere or of a bronze cube as the matter in which the form is received, and thus bronze is not a part of the form but of the thing having the form. And a cube is a body composed of square surfaces. And an angle is part of a triangle as part of its form, as has been stated above (1099).
lib. 5 l. 21 n. 12 Quarto modo dicuntur partes, quae ponuntur in definitione cuiuslibet rei, quae sunt partes rationis sicut animal et bipes sunt partes hominis. 1096. In a fourth sense parts mean those things which are placed in the definition of anything, and these are parts of its intelligible structure; for example, animal and two-footed are parts of man.
lib. 5 l. 21 n. 13 Ex quo patet, quod genus quarto modo est pars speciei: aliter vero, scilicet secundo modo, species est pars generis. In secundo enim modo sumebatur pars pro parte subiectiva totius universalis; in aliis autem tribus pro parte integrali. Sed in primo pro parte quantitatis, in aliis autem duobus pro parte substantiae; ita tamen, quod pars secundum tertium modum est pars rei; sive sit pars speciei, sive pars individui. Quarto autem modo est pars rationis. 1097. From this it is clear that a genus is part of a species in this fourth sense, but that a species is part of a genus in a different sense, i.e., in the second sense. For in the second sense a part was taken as a subjective part of a universal whole, whereas in the other three senses it was taken as an integral part. And in the first sense it was taken as a part of quantity; and in the other two senses as a part of substance; yet in such a way that a part in the third sense means a part of a thing, whether it be a part of the species or of the individual. But in the fourth sense it is a part of the intelligible structure.
lib. 5 l. 21 n. 14 Deinde cum dicit totum dicitur hic prosequitur de his quae pertinent ad totum. Et primo de toto in communi. Secundo de toto quodam, scilicet de genere, ibi, genus dicitur. Circa primum duo facit. Primo prosequitur de ipso nomine totius. Secundo de eius opposito, scilicet de colobon, ibi, colobon autem dicitur. Circa primum tria facit. Primo ponit rationem communem totius, quae consistit in duobus. Primo in hoc quod perfectio totius integratur ex partibus. Et significat hoc, cum dicit quod totum dicitur cui nulla suarum partium deest, ex quibus scilicet partibus dicitur totum natura, idest totum secundum suam naturam constituitur. Secundum est quod partes uniuntur in toto. Et sic dicit quod totum continens est contenta, scilicet partes, ita quod illa contenta sunt aliquid unum in toto. 1098. “Whole” means (516). He proceeds to treat the things which pertain to a whole. First, he considers a whole in a general way; and second (1119), he deals with a particular kind of whole, namely a genus. In regard to the first part he does two things. First, he proceeds to deal with the term whole; and second 1109), with its opposite, mutilated. In regard to the first he does three things. First, he states the common meaning of whole, which involves two things. (1) The first is that the perfection of a whole is derived from its parts. He indicates this when he says “a whole means that from which none of the things,” i.e., the parts, “of which it is said to consist by nature,” i.e., of which the whole is composed according to its own nature, “are missing.” (2) The second is that the parts become one in the whole. Thus he says that a whole is “that which contains the things contained,” namely, the parts, in such a way that the things contained in the whole are some one thing.
lib. 5 l. 21 n. 15 Secundo ibi, hoc autem ponit duos modos totius; dicens quod totum dicitur dupliciter; aut ita quod unumquodque contentorum a toto continente, sit ipsum unum, scilicet ipsum totum continens, quod est in toto universali de qualibet suarum partium praedicato. Aut ex partibus constituatur unum, ita quod non quaelibet partium sit unum illud. Et haec est ratio totius integralis, quod de nulla suarum partium integralium praedicatur. 1099. But this occurs. (517). Second, he notes two ways in which a thing is a whole. He says that a thing is said to be a whole in two ways: (1) either in the sense that each of the things contained by the containing whole is “the one in question,” i.e., the containing whole, which is in the universal whole that is predicated of any one of its own parts; or (2) in the sense that it is one thing composed of parts in such a way that none of the parts are that one thing. This is the notion of an integral whole, which is not predicated of any of its own integral parts.
lib. 5 l. 21 n. 16 Tertio ibi, universale quidem exponit praedictos modos totius; et primo primum, dicens quod universale et quod totaliter idest quod communiter praedicatur, dicitur quasi sit aliquod unum totum ex hoc quod praedicatur de unoquoque, sicut universale, quasi multa continens ut partes, in eo quod praedicatur de unoquoque. Et omnia illa sunt unum in toto universali, ita quod unumquodque illorum est illud unum totum. Sicut animal continet hominem et equum et Deum, quia omnia sunt animalia, idest quia animal praedicatur de unoquoque. Deum autem hic dicit aliquod corpus caeleste, ut solem vel lunam, quae antiqui animata corpora esse dicebant et deos putabant. Vel animalia quaedam aerea, quae Platonici dicebant esse Daemones, et pro diis colebantur a gentibus. 1100. For a whole (518). Third, he explains the foregoing senses of whole. First, he explains the first sense. He says that a whole is a universal “or what is predicated in general,” i.e., a common predicate, as being some one thing as a universal is one, in the sense that it is predicated of each individual just as the universal, which contains many parts, is predicated of each of its parts. And all of these are one in a universal whole in such a way that each of them is that one whole; for example, living thing contains man and horse and god, because “all are living things,” i.e., because living thing is predicated of each. By a god he means here a celestial body, such as the sun or the moon, which the ancients said were living bodies and considered to be gods; or he means certain ethereal living beings, which the Platonists called demons, and which were worshipped by the pagans as gods.
lib. 5 l. 21 n. 17 Secundo ibi, continuum vero exponit modum secundum totius qui pertinet ad totum integrale; et circa hoc duo facit. Primo ponit rationem communem huius totius, et praecipue de toto quod dividitur in partes quantitativas, quod est manifestius; dicens, quod aliquid dicitur continuum et finitum, idest perfectum et totum. Nam infinitum non habet rationem totius, sed partis, ut dicitur in tertio physicorum; quando scilicet unum aliquod fit ex pluribus quae insunt toti. Et hoc dicit ad removendum modum quo aliquid fit ex aliquo sicut ex contrario. 1101. A whole is something (519). Second, he explains the meaning of whole in the sense of an integral whole; and in regard to this he does two things. First, he gives the common meaning of this kind of whole, and particularly of that which is divided into quantitative parts, which is more evident to us. He says that a whole is something “continuous and limited,” i.e., perfect or complete (for what is unlimited does not have the character of a whole but of a part, as is said in Book III of the Physics when one thing is composed of many parts which are present in it. He says this in order to exclude the sense in which one thing comes from another as from a contrary.
lib. 5 l. 21 n. 18 Partes autem ex quibus constituitur totum dupliciter possunt esse in toto. Uno modo in potentia, alio modo in actu. Partes quidem sunt in potentia in toto continuo; actu vero in toto non continuo, sicut lapides actu sunt in acervo. Magis autem est unum, et per consequens magis totum, continuum, quam non continuum. Et ideo dicit quod oportet partes inesse toti, maxime quidem in potentia sicut in toto continuo. Et si non in potentia, saltem energia, idest in actu. Dicitur enim energia, interior actio. 1102. Now the parts of which a whole is composed can be present in it in two ways: in one way potentially, and in another actually. Parts are potentially present in a whole which is continuous, and actually present in a whole which is not continuous, as stones are actually present in a heap. But that which is continuous is one to a greater degree, and therefore is a whole to a greater degree, than that which is not continuous. Hence he says that parts must be present in a whole, especially potential parts, as they are in a continuous whole; and if not potentially, then at least “in activity,” or actually. For “activity” means interior action.
lib. 5 l. 21 n. 19 Licet autem magis sit totum quando partes sunt in eo in potentia, quam quando sunt actu, tamen si respiciamus ad partes, magis sunt ipsae partes, quando sunt actu, quam quando sunt in potentia. Unde alia litera habet maxime quidem perfectione et actu. Sin autem, et potestate. Et subiungit etiam quod prius dictum est et maxime potestate. Sin autem, et energia. Unde videtur quod translator duas invenit literas et utramque transtulit, et errore factum est, sic ut coniungantur ambae quasi una litera. Et hoc patet ex alia translatione quae non habet nisi alterum tantum. Sic enim dicit continuum autem et finitum est, cum unum aliquod sit ex pluribus inhaerentibus, maxime quod potentia. Si autem non, actu sunt. 1003. Now although a thing is a whole to a greater degree when its parts are present potentially than when they are present actually, nonetheless if we look to the parts, they are parts to a greater degree when they exist actually than when they exist potentially. Hence another text reads, “especially when they are present perfectly and actually; but otherwise, even when they are present potentially.” And it also adds the words given above: “particularly when they are present potentially; but if not, even when they are present in activity.” Hence it seems that the translator found two texts, which he translated, and then made the mistake of combining both so as to make one text. This is clear from another translation, which contains only one of these statements; for it reads as follows: “And a whole is continuous and limited when some one thing, is composed of many intrinsic parts, especially when they are present potentially; but if not, when they are present actually.”
lib. 5 l. 21 n. 20 Secundo ibi, horum vero ostendit duas diversitates in isto secundo modo totius: quarum prima est, quod continuorum quaedam sunt continua per artem, quaedam per naturam. Et illa quae sunt continua per naturam, magis sunt talia, idest tota, quam quae sunt per artem. Sicut de uno dictum est supra; scilicet quod illa quae sunt continua per naturam, magis sunt unum, ac si totalitas sit aliqua unio: ex quo patet quod, quod est magis unum, est magis totum. 1104. And of these same things (520). Second, he indicates two differences within this second sense of whole. The first is that some continuous things are such by art and some by nature. Those which are continuous by nature are “such,” i.e., wholes, to a greater degree than those which are such by art. And since we spoke in the same way above (848) about things which are one, saying that things which are continuous by nature are one to a greater degree, as though wholeness were oneness, it is clear from this that anything which is one to a greater degree is a whole to a greater degree.
lib. 5 l. 21 n. 21 Deinde cum dicit amplius quanto secundam diversitatem ponit. Cum enim ita sit quod in quantitate sit ordo partium, quia est ibi principium, medium et ultimum, in quo ratio positionis consistit, oportet quod omnia tota ista continuam habeant positionem in suis partibus. Sed ad positionem partium totum continuum tripliciter se invenitur habere. Quaedam enim tota sunt in quibus diversa positio partium non facit diversitatem, sicut patet in aqua. Qualitercumque enim transponantur partes aquae, nihil differunt: et similiter est de aliis humidis, sicut de oleo, vino et huiusmodi. In his autem significatur totum per hoc quod dicitur omne, non autem ipso nomine totius. Dicimus enim, omnis aqua, vel omne vinum, vel omnis numerus; non autem totus, nisi secundum metaphoram: et hoc forte est secundum proprietatem Graeci idiomatis. Nam apud nos dicitur proprie. 1105. Again, since a quantity (521). He gives the second difference. For since it is true that there is an order of parts in quantity, because a quantity has a beginning, a middle point and an end, and the notion of position involves these, the positions of the parts in all these quantities must be continuous. But if we consider the position of the parts, a whole is found to be continuous in three ways. (1) For there are some wholes which are unaffected by a difference of position in their parts. This is evident in the case of water, for it makes no difference how the parts of water are interchanged. The same thing is true of other liquids, as oil and wine and the like. And in these things a whole is signified by the term all and not by the term whole. For we say all the water or all the wine or all the numbers, but not the whole, except metaphorically. This perhaps applies to the Greek idiom, but for us it is a proper way of speaking.
lib. 5 l. 21 n. 22 Quaedam vero sunt in quibus positio differentiam facit, sicut in homine, et in quolibet animali, et in domo et huiusmodi. Non enim est domus qualitercumque partes ordinentur, sed secundum determinatum ordinem partium: et similiter nec homo nec animal; et in his dicimus totum, et non omne. Dicimus enim de uno solo animali loquentes, totum animal, non omne animal. 1106. (2) And there are some things to which the position of the parts does make a difference, for example, a man and any animal and a house and the like. For a thing is not a house if its parts are arranged in just any way at all, but only if they have a definite arrangement; and of these we use the term whole and not the term all. And similarly a thing is not a man or an animal if its parts are arranged in just any way at all. For when we speak of only one animal, we say the whole animal and not all the animal.
lib. 5 l. 21 n. 23 Quaedam vero sunt in quibus contingunt ambo, quia positio quodammodo facit differentiam in eis. In his autem dicimus utrumque, scilicet et omne et totum; et ista sunt in quibus facta transpositione partium manet eadem materia, sed non eadem forma sive figura; ut patet in cera, cuius qualitercumque transponantur partes, nihilominus est cera, licet non eiusdem figurae: et similiter est de vestimento, et de omnibus quae sunt similium partium, retinentium diversam figuram. Humida enim, etsi sunt similium partium, non tamen figuram possunt habere propriam, quia non terminantur terminis propriis, sed alienis: et ideo transpositio in eis nihil variat quod sit ex parte eorum. 1107. (3) And there are some things to which both of these apply, because in a sense the position of their parts accounts for their differences; and of these we use both terms—all and whole. And these are the things in which, when the parts are interchanged, the matter remains the same but not the form or shape. This is clear, for example, in the case of wax; for no matter how its parts are interchanged the wax still remains, but it does not have the same shape. The same is true of a garment and of all things which have like parts and take on a different shape. For even though liquids have like parts, they cannot have a shape of their own, because they are not limited by their own boundaries but by those of other things. Hence when their parts are interchanged no change occurs in anything that is proper to them.
lib. 5 l. 21 n. 24 Ratio autem huius diversitatis est, quia omne, distributivum est: et ideo requirit multitudinem in actu, vel in potentia propinqua: et quia ea sunt similium partium, dividuntur in partes consimiles toti, fitque ibi multiplicatio totius. Nam si quaelibet pars aquae est aqua, in unaquaque aqua sunt multae aquae, licet in potentia; sicut in uno numero sunt multae unitates in actu. Totum vero significat collectionem partium in aliquo uno: et ideo in illis proprie dicitur totum in quibus, ex omnibus partibus acceptis simul, fit unum perfectum, cuius perfectio nulli partium competit, sicut domus et animal. Unde omne animal, non dicitur de uno animali, sed de pluribus: et ideo in fine dicit, quod in illis totis in quibus dicitur omne, ut de uno referente ad totum, potest dici omnia in plurali, ut in diversis referendo ad partes: sicut dicitur, omnis hic numerus et omnes hae unitates et omnis haec aqua, demonstrato toto, et omnes hae aquae, demonstratis partibus. 1108. The reason for this difference is that the term all is distributive and therefore requires an actual multitude or one in proximate potency to act; and because those things have like parts, they are divided into parts entirely similar to the whole, and in that manner multiplication of the whole takes place. For if every part of water is water, then in each part of water there are many waters, although they are present potentially, just as in one number there are many units actually. But a whole signifies a collection of parts into some one thing; and therefore in those cases in which the term whole is properly used, one complete thing is made from all the parts taken together, and the perfection of the whole belongs to none of the parts. A house and an animal are examples of this. Hence, “every animal” is not said of one animal but of many. Therefore at the end of this part of his discussion he says that those wholes of which the term every is used, as is done of one thing when reference is made to a whole, can have the term all (in the plural) used of them, as is done of several things when reference is made to them as parts. For example, one says “all this number,” and “all these units,” and “all this water,” when the whole has been indicated, and “all these waters” when the parts have been indicated.
lib. 5 l. 21 n. 25 Deinde cum dicit colobon vero hic determinat de eo, quod est oppositum toti, quod est colobon, pro quo alia translatio habet diminutum membro, sed non usquequaque convenienter. Nam colobon non dicitur solum in animalibus, in quibus solis sunt membra. Videtur autem esse colobon quod nos dicimus truncatum. Unde Boetius transtulit mancum, id est defectivum. Est ergo intentio philosophi ostendere quid requiratur ad hoc quod aliquid dicatur colobon. Et primo quid requiratur ex parte totius; secundo quid requiratur ex parte partis deficientis, ibi, adhuc autem neque quaelibet. 1109. It is not any quantity (522). Here he clarifies the issue about the opposite of “whole,” which is mutilated, in place of which another translation reads “diminished (or reduced) by a member”; but this does not always fit. For the term mutilated is used only of animals, which alone have members. Now mutilated seems to mean “cut off,” and thus Boethius translated it “maimed,” i.e., “defective.” Hence the Philosopher’s aim here is to show what is required in order that a thing may be said to be mutilated: and first, what is required on the side of the whole; and second (1117), what is required on the side of the part which is missing (“Further, neither”).
lib. 5 l. 21 n. 26 Ad hoc autem, quod aliquod totum dici possit colobon, septem requiruntur. Primum est, ut illud totum sit quantum habens partes in quas dividatur secundum quantitatem. Non enim totum universale potest dici colobon si una species eius auferatur. 1110. Now in order that a whole can be said to be mutilated, seven things are required. First, the whole must be a quantified being having parts into which it may be divided quantitatively. For a universal whole cannot be said to be mutilated if one of its species is removed.
lib. 5 l. 21 n. 27 Secundum est quod non quodlibet quantum potest dici colobon, sed oportet quod sit partibile, idest distinctionem habens, et totum, idest ex diversis partibus integratum. Unde ultimae partes, in quas aliquod totum resolvitur, licet habeant quantitatem, non possunt dici colobae, sicut caro vel nervus. 1111. Second, not every kind of quantified being can be said to be mutilated, but it must be one that is “divisible into parts,” i.e., capable of being separated, and be “a whole,” i.e., something composed of different parts. Hence the ultimate parts into which any whole is divided, such as flesh and sinew, even though they have quantity, cannot be said to be mutilated.
lib. 5 l. 21 n. 28 Tertium est, quod duo non sunt coloba, vel aliquid habens duas partes, si altera earum auferatur. Et hoc ideo quia nunquam colobonium, idest quod aufertur a colobon, est aequale residuo, sed semper oportet residuum esse maius. 1112. Third, (~) two things are not mutilated, i.e., anything having two parts, if one of them is taken away from the other. And this is true because a “mutilated part,” i.e., whatever is taken away from the mutilated thing, is never equal to the remainder, but the remainder must always be larger.
lib. 5 l. 21 n. 29 Quartum est, quod numerus nullus potest esse colobus quotcumque partes habeat; quia substantia colobi manet parte subtracta; sicut si calix truncetur, adhuc manet calix; sed numerus non manet idem, ablata quacumque parte. Quaelibet enim unitas addita vel subtracta, variat numeri speciem. 1113. Fourth, no (~) number can be mutilated no matter how many parts it may have, because the substance of the mutilated thing remains after the part is taken away. For example, when a goblet is mutilated it still remains a goblet; but a number does not remain the same no matter what part of it is taken away. For when a unit is added to or subtracted from a number, it changes the species of the number.
lib. 5 l. 21 n. 30 Quintum est, quia oportet quod habeat partes dissimiles. Ea enim, quae sunt similium partium, non possunt dici coloba, quia ratio totius salvatur in qualibet parte: unde, si auferatur aliqua partium, altera pars non dicitur coloba. Nec tamen omnia, quae sunt dissimilium partium, possunt dici coloba: numerus enim non potest dici colobus, ut dictum est, quamvis quodammodo habeat dissimiles partes, sicut duodenarius habet pro partibus dualitatem et Trinitatem. Aliquo tamen modo omnis numerus habet partes similes, prout omnis numerus ex unitatibus constituitur. 1114. Fifth, the thing mutilated must have unlike parts. For those things which have like parts cannot be said to be mutilated, because the nature of the whole remains verified in each part. Hence, if any of the parts are taken away, the others are not said to be mutilated. Not all things having unlike parts, however, can be said to be mutilated; for a number cannot, as has been stated, even though in a sense it has unlike parts; for example, the number twelve has the number two and the number three as parts of it. Yet in a sense every number has like parts because every number is constituted of units.
lib. 5 l. 21 n. 31 Sextum est quod nullum eorum potest dici colobon, in quibus positio non facit differentiam, sicut aqua aut ignis. Oportet enim coloba talia esse, quod in suae ratione substantiae habeant determinatam positionem, sicut homo vel domus. 1115. Sixth, none of those things (~) in which the position of the parts makes no difference can be said to be mutilated, for example, water or fire. For mutilated things must be such that the intelligible structure of their substance contains the notion of a determinate arrangement of parts, as in the case of a man or of a house.
lib. 5 l. 21 n. 32 Septimum est quod oportet esse continua coloba. Harmonia enim musicalis non potest dici coloba voce vel chorda subtracta, licet sit dissimilium partium: quia constituitur ex vocibus gravibus, et acutis; et licet partes eius habeant determinatam positionem: non enim qualitercumque voces graves et acutae ordinatae, talem constituunt harmoniam. 1116. Seventh, mutilated things must be continuous. For a musical harmony cannot be said to be mutilated when a note or a chord is taken away, even though it is made up of low and high pitched sounds, and even though its parts have a determinate position, it is not any low and high pitched sounds arranged in any way at all that constitute such a harmony.
lib. 5 l. 21 n. 33 Deinde cum dicit adhuc autem ostendit quae sunt conditiones colobi ex parte partis diminutae; et ponit tres: dicens quod sicut non quaelibet tota possunt dici coloba, ita nec cuiuslibet particulae ablatione potest aliquid dici colobon. Oportet enim primo quod pars ablata non sit pars substantiae principalis, quae scilicet rei substantiam constituit, et sine qua substantia esse non possit; quia, ut supra dictum est, colobon oportet manere ablata parte. Unde homo non potest dici colobus, capite abscisso. 1117. Further, neither is (523). Then he indicates the conditions which must prevail with regard to the part cut off in order that a thing may be mutilated; and there are three of these. He says that, just as not every kind of whole can be said to be mutilated, so neither can there be mutilation by the removal of every part. For, first, the part which is removed must not be a (~) principal part of the substance, that is, one which constitutes the substance of the thing and without which the substance cannot be, because the thing that is mutilated must remain when a part is removed, as has been stated above (1113). Hence a man cannot be said to be mutilated when his head has been cut off.
lib. 5 l. 21 n. 34 Secundo, ut pars subtracta non sit ubique, sed sit in extremitate. Unde si perforatur calix circa medium aliqua parte eius ablata, non potest dici colobus; sed, si accipiatur auris calicis, idest particula, quae est ad similitudinem auris, aut quaecumque alia extremitas. Et similiter homo non dicitur colobus, si amittat aliquid de carne, vel in tibia, vel in brachio, vel circa medium corporis; aut si amittens splenem, vel aliquam eius partem; sed si amittat aliquam eius extremitatem, ut manum aut pedem. 1118. Second, the part removed should not be everywhere, but in some extremity. Thus, if a goblet is perforated about the middle by removing some part of it, it cannot be said to be mutilated; but this is said if someone removes “the ear of a goblet,” i.e., a part which is similar to an ear, or any other extremity. Similarly a man is not said to be mutilated if he loses some of his flesh from his leg or from his arm or from his waist, or if he loses his spleen or some part of it, but if he loses one of his extremities, such as a hand or a foot.
lib. 5 l. 21 n. 35 Tertio vero, ut non omni particula in extremitate existente ablata, aliquid dicatur colobum; sed, si sit talis pars, quae non regeneratur iterum, si tota auferatur, sicut manus, aut pes. Capillus autem totus incisus iterum regeneratur. Unde per eorum subtractionem, licet in extremitate sint, non dicitur colobus. Et propter hoc calvi non dicuntur colobi. 1118a. Third, a thing is not said to be mutilated if just any part that is an extremity is removed, but if it is such a part which does not regenerate if the whole of it is removed, as a hand or a foot. But if a whole head of hair is cut off, it grows again. So if such parts are removed, the man is not said to be mutilated, even though they are extremities. And for this reason people with shaven heads are not said to be mutilated.

Lecture 22

Latin English
lib. 5 l. 22 n. 1 Hic determinat de quodam toto, scilicet de genere. Et primo ostendit quot modis dicitur genus. Secundo quot modis dicuntur aliqua diversa, ibi, diversa vero genere. Dicit ergo primo, quod genus dicitur quatuor modis. Primo generatio continua aliquorum habentium eamdem speciem. Sicut dicitur dum erit genus hominum, idest dum durabit generatio continua hominum. Iste est primus modus positus in Porphyrio, scilicet multitudo habentium relationem adinvicem et ad unum principium. 1119. Here he gives his views about a particular kind of whole, namely, a genus. First, he gives the different senses in which the term genus is used; and second (1124), he treats the different senses in which things are said to be diverse (or other) in genus (“Things are said”). He accordingly says, first, that the term genus is used in four senses: First, it means the continuous generation of things that have the same species; for example, it is said, “as long as ‘the genus of man’ will exist,” i.e., “while the continuous generation of men will last.” This is the first sense of genus given in Porphyry, i.e., a multitude of things having a relation to each other and to one principle.
lib. 5 l. 22 n. 2 Secundo modo dicitur genus illud a quo primo movente ad esse, idest a generante procedunt aliqua; sicut dicuntur Hellenes genere, quia descendunt a quodam Hellene nomine, et aliqui dicuntur Iones genere, quia descendunt a quodam Ione, sicut a primo generante. Magis autem denominantur aliqui a patre, qui est generans, quam a matre, quae dat materiam in generatione: et tamen aliqui denominantur genere a matre, sicut a quadam femina nomine Pleia, dicuntur aliquae Pleiades. Et iste est secundus modus generis in Porphyrio positus. 1120. In a second sense genus (race) means that from which “things are first brought into being,” i.e., some things proceed from a begetter. For example, some men are called Hellenes by race because they are descendants of a man called Hellen; and some are called Ionians by race because they are descendants of a certain Ion as their first begetter. Now people are more commonly named from their father, who is their begetter, than from their mother, who produces the matter of generation, although some derive the name of their race from the mother; for example, some are named from a certain woman called Pleia. This is the second sense of genus given in Porphyry.
lib. 5 l. 22 n. 3 Tertio modo dicitur genus, sicut superficies est genus figurarum superficialium, et solidum, idest corpus, dicitur esse genus figurarum solidarum, idest corporearum. Genus autem hoc non est quod significat essentiam speciei, sicut animal est genus hominis; sed quod est proprium subiectum, specie differentium accidentium. Superficies enim est subiectum omnium figurarum superficialium. Et habet similitudinem cum genere; quia proprium subiectum ponitur in definitione accidentis, sicut genus in definitione speciei. Unde subiectum proprium de accidente praedicatur ad similitudinem generis. Unaquaeque enim figurarum haec quidem, idest superficialis, est talis superficies. Hoc autem, idest figura solida, est tale solidum, ac si figura sit differentia qualificans superficiem vel solidum. Superficies enim se habet ad figuras superficiales, et solidum ad solidas, sicut genus quod subiicitur contrariis. Nam differentia praedicatur in eo quod quale. Et propter hoc, sicut cum dicitur animal rationale significatur tale animal, ita cum dicitur superficies quadrata, significatur talis superficies. 1121. The term genus is used in a third sense when the surface or the plane is called the genus of plane figures, “and the solid,” or body, is called the genus of solid figures, or bodies. This sense of genus is not the one that signifies the essence of a species, as animal is the genus of man, but the one that is the proper subject in the species of different accidents. For surface is the subject of all plane figures. And it bears some likeness to a genus, because the proper subject is given in the definition of an accident just as a genus is given in the definition of a species. Hence the proper subject of an accident is predicated like a genus. “For each of the figures,” i.e., plane figures, is such and such a surface. “And this,” i.e., a solid figure, is such and such a solid, as though the figure were a difference qualifying surface or solid. For surface is related to plane (surface) figures, and solid to solid figures, as a genus, which is the subject of contraries; and difference is predicated in the sense of quality. And for this reason, just as when we say rational animal, such and such an animal is signified, so too when we say square surface, such and such a surface is signified.
lib. 5 l. 22 n. 4 Quarto modo genus dicitur, quod primo ponitur in definitione, et praedicatur in eo quod quid, et differentiae sunt eius qualitates. Sicut in definitione hominis primo ponitur animal, et bipes sive rationale, quod est quaedam substantialis qualitas hominis. 1122. In a fourth sense genus means the primary element given in a definition, which is predicated quidditatively, and differences are its qualities. For example, in the definition of man, animal is given first and then two-footed or rational, which is a certain substantial quality of man.
lib. 5 l. 22 n. 5 Patet ergo quod tot modis dicitur genus. Uno modo secundum generationem continuam in eadem specie, quod pertinet ad primum modum. Alio modo secundum primum movens, quod pertinet ad secundum. Alio modo sicut materia, quod pertinet ad tertium et quartum modum. Hoc enim modo se habet genus ad differentiam, sicut subiectum ad qualitatem. Et ideo patet quod genus praedicabile, et genus subiectum, quasi sub uno modo comprehenduntur, et utrumque se habet per modum materiae. Licet enim genus praedicabile non sit materia, sumitur tamen a materia, sicut differentia a forma. Dicitur enim aliquid animal ex eo quod habet naturam sensitivam. Rationale vero ex eo, quod habet rationalem naturam, quae se habet ad sensitivam sicut forma ad materiam. 1123. It is evident, then, that the term genus is used in so many different senses: (1) in one sense as the continuous generation of the same species, and this pertains to the first sense; (2) in another as the first moving principle, and this pertains to the second sense; (3&4) and in another as matter, and this pertains to the third and fourth senses. For a genus is related to a difference in the same way as a subject is to a quality. Hence it is evident that genus as a predicable and genus as a subject are included in a way under one meaning, and that each has the character of matter. For even though genus as a predicable is not matter, still it is taken from matter as difference is taken from form. For a thing is called an animal because it has a sentient nature; and it is called rational because it has a rational nature, which is related to sentient nature as form is to matter.
lib. 5 l. 22 n. 6 Deinde cum dicit diversa vero hic ostendit quot modis dicuntur aliqua diversa genere; et ponit duos modos respondentes ultimis duobus modis generis. Primi enim duo modi non multum pertinent ad philosophicam considerationem. Primo igitur modo dicuntur aliqua genere diversa, quia eorum primum subiectum est diversum. Sicut primum subiectum colorum est superficies, primum autem subiectum saporum est humor. Unde quantum ad genus subiectum, sapor et color sunt diversa genere. 1124. Things are said (525). Here he explains the different senses in which things are said to be diverse (or other) in genus; and he gives two senses of this corresponding to the last two senses of genus. For the first two senses are of little importance for the study of philosophy. In the first sense, then, some things are said to be diverse in genus because their first subject is diverse; for example, the first subject of color is surface, and the first subject of flavors is something moist. Hence, with regard to their subject-genus, flavor and color are diverse in genus.
lib. 5 l. 22 n. 7 Oportet autem quod duo diversa subiecta, talia sint, quorum unum non resolvatur in alterum. Solidum enim quodammodo resolvitur in superficies. Unde figurae solidi, et figurae superficiales non sunt diversorum generum. Et iterum oportet quod ambo non resolvantur in aliquod idem. Sicut species et materia sunt diversa genere, si secundum suam essentiam considerentur, quod nihil est commune utrique. Et similiter corpora caelestia et inferiora sunt diversa genere, inquantum non habent materiam communem. 1125. Further, the two different subjects must be such that one of them is not reducible to the other. Now a solid is in a sense reducible to surfaces, and therefore solid figures and plane figures do not belong to diverse genera. Again, they must not be reducible to the same thing. For example, form and matter are diverse in genus if they are considered according to their own essence, because there is nothing common to both. And in a similar way the celestial bodies and lower bodies are diverse in genus inasmuch as they do not have a common matter.
lib. 5 l. 22 n. 8 Alio modo dicuntur diversa genere, quae dicuntur secundum diversam figuram categoriae, idest praedicationis entis. Alia namque entia significant quid est, alia quale, alia aliis modis, sicut divisum est prius, ubi tractavit de ente. Istae enim categoriae nec resolvuntur invicem, quia una non continetur sub alia. Nec resolvuntur in unum aliquid, quia non est unum aliquod genus commune ad omnia praedicamenta. 1126. In another sense those things are said to be diverse in genus which are predicated “according to a different figure of the category of being,” i.e., of the predication of being. For some things signify quiddity, some quality, and some signify in other ways, which are given in the division made above where he dealt with being (889-94). For these categories are not reducible one to the other, because one is not included under the other. Nor are they reducible to some one thing, because there is not some one common genus for all the categories.
lib. 5 l. 22 n. 9 Patet autem ex dictis quod aliqua continentur sub uno praedicamento, et sunt unum genere hoc modo secundo, quae tamen sunt diversa genere primo modo. Sicut corpora caelestia et elementaria, et colores, et sapores. Primus autem modus diversitatis secundum genus consideratur magis a naturali, et etiam a philosopho, quia est magis realis. Secundus autem modus consideratur a logico, quia est rationis. 1127. Now it is clear, from what has been said, that some things are contained under one category and are in one genus in this second sense, although they are diverse in genus in the first sense. Examples of this are the celestial bodies and elemental bodies, and colors and flavors. The first way in which things are diverse in genus is considered rather by the natural scientist and also by the philosopher, because it is more real. But the second way in which things are diverse in genus is considered by the logician, because it is conceptual.
lib. 5 l. 22 n. 10 Deinde cum dicit falsum dicitur hic distinguit nomina, quae significant defectum entis, vel ens incompletum. Et primo hoc nomen falsum. Secundo hoc nomen accidens. Circa primum tria facit. Primo ostendit quomodo dicatur falsum in rebus. Secundo quomodo in definitionibus, ibi, ratio vero falsa. Tertio quomodo sit falsum in hominibus, ibi, sed et homo falsus. Dicit ergo primo, quod falsum dicitur uno modo in rebus, per hoc quod oratio significans rem non congrue componitur. Quod quidem contingit dupliciter. Uno modo per hoc, quod aliquid componitur quod non debet componi, sicut est in falsis contingentibus. Alio modo per hoc quod est impossibile componi, sicut est in falsis impossibilibus. Si enim dicamus diametrum esse commensurabilem quadrati lateri, est falsum impossibile, quia impossibile est commensurabile componi diametro. Si autem dicatur te sedere, te stante, est falsum contingens, quia praedicatum non inest subiecto, licet non sit impossibile inesse. Unde unum istorum, scilicet impossibile, est falsum semper; sed aliud, scilicet contingens, non est falsum semper. Sic igitur falsa dicuntur, quae omnino sunt non entia. Nam oratio tunc esse falsa dicitur, quando non est id quod oratione significatur. 1128. “False” means (526). Here he gives the various senses of the terms which signify a lack of being or incomplete being. First, he gives the senses in which the term false is used. Second (1139), he deals with the various senses of accident. In regard to the first he does three things. First, he shows how the term false is used of real things; and second (1130), how it is used of definitions (“A false notion”); and third (1135), how men are said to be false (“A false man”). He accordingly says, first, that the term false is applied in one sense to real things inasmuch as a statement signifying a reality is not properly composed. And there are two ways in which this can come about: In one way by forming a proposition which should not be formed; and this is what happens, for instance, in the case of false contingent propositions. In another way by forming a proposition about something impossible; and this is what happens in the case of false impossible propositions. For if we say that the diagonal of a square is commensurable with one of its sides, it is a false impossible proposition; for it is impossible to combine “commensurable” and “diagonal.” And if someone says that you are sitting while you are standing, it is a false contingent proposition; for the predicate does not attach to the subject, although it is not impossible for it to do so. Hence one of these—the impossible—is always false; but the other—the contingent is not always so. Therefore those things are said to be false which are non-beings in their entirety; for a statement is said to be false when what is signified by the statement is nonexistent.
lib. 5 l. 22 n. 11 Secundo modo dicitur falsum in rebus ex eo, quod aliqua quidem sunt entia in se, sed tamen sunt apta nata videri aut qualia non sunt, aut quae non sunt, sicut schiagraphia, idest umbrosa descriptio. Umbrae enim quandoque videntur res, quarum sunt umbrae, sicut umbra hominis videtur homo. Et eadem ratio est de somniis, quae videntur res verae, tamen non sunt nisi rerum similitudines. Et similiter dicitur aurum falsum, quod habet similitudinem auri veri. Differt autem hic modus a primo: quia in primo dicebatur aliquod falsum, ex eo quod non erat. Hic autem dicuntur aliqua falsa quae quidem in se sunt aliquid, sed non sunt illa quorum faciunt phantasiam, idest quorum habent apparentiam. Patet ergo quod res dicuntur falsae, aut quia non sunt, aut quia ab eis est apparentia eius quod non est. 1129. The term false is applied to real things in a second way inasmuch as some things, though beings in themselves, are fitted by nature to appear either to, be other than they are or as things that do not exist, as “a shadowgraph,” i.e., a delineation in shadow. For sometimes shadows appear to be the things of which they are the shadows, as the shadow of a man appears to be a man. The same applies to dreams, which seem to be real things yet are only the likenesses of things. And one speaks in the same way of false gold, because it bears a resemblance to real gold. Now this sense differs from the first, because in the first sense things were said to be false because they did not exist, but here things are said to be false because, while being something in themselves, they are not the things “of which they cause an image,” i.e., which they resemble. It is clear, then, that things are said to be false (1) either because they do not exist or (2) because there arises from them the appearance of what does not exist.
lib. 5 l. 22 n. 12 Deinde cum dicit ratio vero ostendit quomodo est falsum in definitionibus: et dicit quod ratio, idest definitio, inquantum est falsa, est non entium. Dicit autem inquantum est falsa, quia definitio dicitur falsa dupliciter. Aut secundum se; et sic non est definitio alicuius, sed penitus non entis. Aut est definitio vera in se, sed falsa est prout attribuitur alteri quam proprio definito, et sic dicitur falsa inquantum non est eius. 1130. A “false” notion (527). He indicates how the term false applies to definitions. He says that “a notion,” i.e., a definition, inasmuch as it is false, is the notion of something non-existent. Now he says “inasmuch as it is false” because a definition is said to be false in two ways: It is either a false definition in itself, and then it is not the definition of anything but has to do entirely with the nonexistent; or it is a true definition in itself but false inasmuch as it is attributed to something other than the one properly defined; and then it is said to be false inasmuch as it does not apply to the thing defined.
lib. 5 l. 22 n. 13 Unde patet, quod omnis definitio, quae est vera definitio alicuius rei, est falsa definitio alterius; ut definitio quae est vera de circulo, est falsa de triangulo. Definitio autem cuiuslibet rei significans quod quid est, quodam modo est una tantum unius, et quodam modo sunt multae unius. Aliquo enim modo ipsum subiectum per se sumptum, et ipsum passum, idest cum passione sumptum, est idem, sicut Socrates et Socrates musicus. Aliquo modo non: est enim idem per accidens, sed non per se. Patet autem, quod eorum sunt definitiones diversae. Alia enim est definitio Socratis et Socratis musici; et tamen ambae sunt quodammodo eiusdem. 1131. It is clear, then, that every definition which is a true definition of one thing is a false definition of something else; for example, the definition which is true of a circle is false when applied to a triangle. Now for one thing there is, in one sense, only one definition signifying its quiddity; and in another sense there are many definitions for one thing. For in one sense the subject taken in itself and “the thing with a modification,” i.e., taken in conjunction with a modification, are the same, as Socrates and musical Socrates. But in another sense they are not, for it is the same thing accidentally but not in itself. And it is clear that they have different definitions. For the definition of Socrates and that of musical Socrates are different, although in a sense both are definitions of the same thing.
lib. 5 l. 22 n. 14 Sed illa definitio, quae est falsa secundum se, non potest esse definitio alicuius rei. Definitio autem falsa secundum se vel simpliciter, dicitur ex eo, quod una pars definitionis non potest stare cum altera; sicut si diceretur, animal inanimatum. 1132. But a definition which is false in itself cannot be a definition of anything. And a definition is said to be false in itself, or unqualifiedly false, by reason of the fact that one part of it cannot stand with the other; and such a definition would be had, for example, if one were to say “inanimate living thing.”
lib. 5 l. 22 n. 15 Patet autem ex hoc, quod stulta fuit opinio Antisthenis. Volebat enim, quod quia voces sunt signa rerum, quod sicut res non habet aliam essentiam nisi propriam, ita in propositione nihil posset praedicari de aliquo, nisi propria eius definitio, ut simpliciter vel semper de uno subiecto dicatur unum praedicatum. Et ex hoc sequitur, quod non sit contradictio; quia, si de homine praedicatur animal, quod est in eius ratione, non poterit de ipso praedicari non animal; et ita non poterit formari negativa propositio. Et ex hac positione etiam sequitur, quod non contingit aliquem mentiri: quia propria definitio rei vere praedicatur de re. Unde, si de nullo potest praedicari nisi propria definitio, nulla propositio erit falsa. 1133. Again, it is clear from this that Antisthenes’ opinion was foolish. For, since words are the signs of things, he maintained that, just as a thing does not have any essence other than its own, so too in a proposition nothing can be predicated of a subject but its own definition, so that only one predicate absolutely or always may be used of one subject. And from this position it follows that there is no such thing as a contradiction; because if animal, which is included in his notion, is predicated of man, non-animal can not be predicated of him, and thus a negative proposition cannot be formed. And from this position it also follows that one cannot speak falsely, because the proper definition of a thing is truly predicated of it. Hence, if only a thing’s own definition can be predicated of it, no proposition can be false.
lib. 5 l. 22 n. 16 Est autem eius opinio falsa, quia contingit praedicari de unoquoque non solum suam definitionem, sed etiam alterius. Quod quando fit, universaliter et omnino, est falsa praedicatio. Aliquo tamen modo potest esse vera praedicatio; sicut octo dicuntur dupla, inquantum habent rationem dualitatis, quia ratio dupli est ut se habeat sicut duo ad unum. Octo autem, inquantum sunt duplum, sunt quodammodo duo, quia dividuntur in duo aequalia. Haec ergo dicuntur falsa modo praedicto. 1134. But his opinion is false, because of each thing we can predicate not only its own definition but also the definition of something else. And when this occurs in a universal or general way, the predication is false. Yet in a way there can be a true predication; for example, eight is said to be double inasmuch as it has the character of duality, because the character of duality is to be related as two is to one. But inasmuch as it is double, eight is in a sense two, because it is divided into two equal quantities. These things, then, are said to be false in the foregoing way.
lib. 5 l. 22 n. 17 Deinde cum dicit sed homo ostendit quomodo falsum dicatur de homine: et circa hoc duo facit. Primo ponit duos modos, quibus homo dicitur falsus: quorum primus est, quod homo dicitur falsus, qui est promptus vel gaudens in huiusmodi rationibus, scilicet falsis, et qui est electivus talium rationum non propter aliquod aliud, sed propter se. Unicuique enim habenti habitum fit delectabilis et in promptu operatio, quae est secundum habitum illum; et sic habens habitum operatur secundum habitum illum, non propter aliquod extrinsecum. Sicut luxuriosus fornicatur propter delectationem coitus: si autem fornicetur propter aliquid aliud, puta ut furetur, magis est fur quam luxuriosus. Similiter et qui eligit falsum dicere, propter lucrum, magis est avarus quam falsus. 1135. Then he shows how the term false may be predicated of a man; and in regard to this he does two things. First, he gives two ways in which a man is said to be false. (1) In one way a man is said to be false if he is ready to think, or takes pleasure in thinking, thoughts of this kind, i.e., false ones, and chooses such thoughts not for any other reason but for themselves. For anyone who has a habit finds the operation relating to that habit to be pleasurable and readily performed; and thus one who has a habit acts in accordance with that habit and not for the sake of anything extrinsic. For example, a debauched person commits fornication because of the pleasure resulting from coition; but if he commits fornication for some other end, for instance, that he may steal, he is more of a thief than a lecher. And similarly one who chooses to speak falsely for the sake of money is more avaricious than false.
lib. 5 l. 22 n. 18 Secundus modus est prout homo dicitur falsus, qui facit aliis falsas rationes; quasi consimili modo sicut supra dicebamus res esse falsas quae faciunt falsam phantasiam. Patet autem ex praemissis, quod falsum pertinet ad non ens; ex quo homo dicitur falsus per respectum ad rationes falsas: et ratio dicitur falsa, inquantum est non entis. 1136. (2) In a second way a man is said to be false if he causes false notions in others, in much the same way as we said above that things are false which cause a false image or impression. For it is clear from what has been said that the false has to do with the non-existent. Hence a man is said to be false inasmuch as he makes false statements, and a notion is said to be false inasmuch as it is about something nonexistent.
lib. 5 l. 22 n. 19 Secundo ibi, quare in excludit ex praemissis duas falsas opiniones: de quarum prima concludit ex praemissis, dicens, quod ex quo falsus homo est electivus et factivus falsarum opinionum, rationabiliter refutatur et reprobatur in Hippia, qui est liber quidam Platonis, oratio quaedam, quae dicebat, eamdem rationem esse veram et falsam. Haec enim opinio accipiebat illum hominem esse falsum qui potest mentiri; et sic, cum idem homo possit mentiri et verum dicere, idem homo esset verus et falsus. Similiter eadem oratio esset vera et falsa, quia eadem oratio vera et falsa potest esse, ut haec, Socrates sedet, eo sedente est vera, non sedente, est falsa. Constat autem, quod hic inconvenienter accipit, quia etiam homo sciens et prudens potest mentiri; non tamen est falsus, quia non est factivus vel electivus falsarum rationum vel opinionum, ex qua ratione dicitur homo falsus, ut dictum est. 1137. Hence, the speech (529). Second, he excludes two false opinions from what has been laid down above. He draws the first of these from the points made above. He says that, since a false man is one who chooses and creates false opinions, one may logically refute or reject a statement made in the Hippias, i.e., one of Plato’s works, which said that the same notion is both true and false. For this opinion considered that man to be false who is able to deceive, so that, being able both to deceive and to speak the truth, the same man is both true and false. And similarly the same statement will be both true and false, because the same statement is able to be both true and false; for example, the statement “Socrates sits” is true when he is seated, but is false when he is not seated. Now it is evident that this is taken unwarrantedly, because even a man who is prudent and knowing is able to deceive; yet he is not false, because he does not cause or choose false notions or opinions, and this is the reason why a man is said to be false, as has been stated (1135).
lib. 5 l. 22 n. 20 Deinde cum dicit amplius volentem secundam falsam opinionem excludit. Dicebat haec opinio, quod homo, qui facit turpia et prava volens, melior est eo qui facit nolens, quod est falsum. Nam quilibet vitiosus ex hoc definitur quod est promptus vel electivus malorum. Et tamen hoc falsum vult accipere per quamdam inductionem ex simili. Ille enim qui claudicat voluntarie, melior et dignior est eo, qui, claudicat non voluntarie. Et ita dicit, quod prava agere imitatur hoc quod est claudicare, ut scilicet sit eadem ratio de utroque. Et hoc quodammodo verum est. Nam claudicans voluntarie deterior est quantum ad morem, licet sit perfectior quantum ad virtutem gressivam. Et similiter qui agit prava voluntarie, deterior est quantum ad morem, licet forte non sit deterior quantum ad aliquam aliam potentiam. Sicut ille qui dicit falsum voluntarie, licet sit peior secundum morem, est tamen intelligentior eo qui credit se verum dicere, cum falsum dicat non voluntarie. 1138. And further (530). Then he rejects the second false opinion. This opinion maintained that a man who does base things and wills evil is better than one who does not But this is false. For anyone is defined as being evil on the grounds that he is ready to do or to choose evil things. Yet this opinion wishes to accept this sense of false on the basis of a sort of induction from a similar case. For one who voluntarily limps is better and nobler than one who limps involuntarily: Hence he says that to do evil is like limping inasmuch as the same notion applies to both. And in a sense this is true; for one who limps voluntarily is worse as regards his moral character, although he is more perfect as regards his power of walking. And similarly one who voluntarily does evil is worse as regards his moral character, although perhaps he is not worse as regards some other power. For example, even though that man is more evil, morally speaking, who voluntarily says what is false, still he is more intelligent than one who believes that he speaks the truth when he in fact speaks falsely, though not wilfully.
lib. 5 l. 22 n. 21 Deinde cum dicit accidens est hic ultimo, distinguit nomen accidentis: et ponit duos modos, quibus dicitur hoc nomen accidens: quorum primus est, quod accidens dicitur id quod inest alicui, et quod contingit vere affirmare, non tamen ex necessitate, nec secundum magis idest ut in pluribus, sed ut in paucioribus; sicut, si aliquis fodiens aliquam fossam ad plantandum aliquam plantam, inveniat thesaurum. Hoc ergo, quod est fodientem fossam invenire thesaurum, est quoddam accidens. Neque enim unum est causa alterius ex necessitate, ut hoc sit ex hoc necessario. Neque etiam de necessitate se comitantur, ut hoc sit post hoc, sicut dies consequitur noctem, quamvis unum non sit causa alterius. Neque etiam secundum magis hoc contingit, sive ut in pluribus, hoc contingit, ut ille qui plantat, inveniat thesaurum. Et simili modo musicus dicitur esse albus, sed tamen hoc non est ex necessitate, nec fit ut in pluribus; ideo dicimus hoc per accidens. Differt autem hoc exemplum a primo. Nam in primo exemplo sumebatur accidens quantum ad fieri; in secundo vero quantum ad esse. 1139. An “accident” (531). Here, finally, he gives the different senses in which the term accident is used; and there are two of these: (1) First, an accident means anything that attaches to a thing and is truly affirmed of it, although not necessarily or “for the most part,” i.e., in the majority of cases, but in a minority; for example, if one were to find a treasure while digging a hole to set out a plant. Hence, finding a treasure while (digging a hole is an accident. For the one is not necessarily the cause of the other so that the one necessarily comes from the other. Neither do they necessarily accompany each other so that the latter comes after the former as day follows night, even though the one is not the cause of the other. Neither does it happen for the most part, or in the majority of cases, that this should occur, i.e., that one who sets out a plant finds a treasure. And similarly a musician is said to be white, although this is not necessarily so nor does it happen for the most part. Hence our statement is accidental. But this example differs from the first; for in the first example the term accident is taken in reference to becoming, and in the second example it is taken in reference to being.
lib. 5 l. 22 n. 22 Quia ergo sicut aliquid inest alicui subiecto determinate, ita et aliquid consideratur esse alicubi, idest in aliquo loco determinato, et quandoque, idest in aliquo tempore determinato, in omnibus contingit inesse per accidens, si non insit secundum quod huiusmodi. Sicut si album dicitur de musico, hoc est per accidens, quia non inest musico inquantum huiusmodi. Et similiter si sit abundantia pluviae in aestate, hoc est per accidens, quia non accidit in aestate inquantum est aestas; et similiter si grave sit sursum, hoc est per accidens, non enim est in tali loco secundum quod talis locus est, sed per aliquam causam extraneam. 1140. Now just as something belongs to some definite subject, so too it is considered “to belong somewhere,” i.e., in some definite place, “and at some time,” i.e., at some definite time. And therefore it happens to belong to all of these accidentally if it does not belong to them by reason of their own nature; for example, when white is predicated of a musician, this is accidental, because white does not belong to a musician as such. And similarly if there is an abundance of rain in summer, this is accidental, because it does not happen in summer inasmuch as it is summer. And again if what is heavy is high up, this is accidental, for it is not in such a place inasmuch as the place is such, but because of some external cause.
lib. 5 l. 22 n. 23 Et sciendum, quod accidentis hoc modo dicti, non est aliqua causa determinata, sed contingens, idest qualiscumque contingat, vel quia forte, idest causa fortuita, quae est causa indeterminata. Sicut accidit alicui quod veniat Aeginam, idest ad illam villam, si non propter hoc advenit ut illuc veniat, idest si non propter hoc incepit moveri ut ad hunc terminum perveniret, sed ab aliqua extranea causa illuc adductus est, sicut quia impulsus est ab hieme concitante tempestatem in mari, aut etiam captus est a latronibus, et illuc perductus praeter intentionem. Unde patet, quod hoc est per accidens, et causari potest ex diversis causis; sed tamen quod iste navigans ad hunc locum perveniat non est inquantum ipsum, idest inquantum erat navigans, cum intenderet ad alium locum navigare; sed hoc contingit inquantum alterum, idest secundum aliquam aliam causam extraneam. Hiems enim est causa veniendi quo non navigabat, idest ad Aeginam, aut latrones, aut aliquid aliud huiusmodi. 1141. And it should be borne in mind that there is no determinate cause of the kind of accident here mentioned, “but only a contingent cause,” i.e., whatever one there happens to be, or “a chance cause,” i.e., a fortuitous one, which is an indeterminate cause. For example, it was an accident that someone “came to Aegina,” i.e., to that city, if he did not come there “in order to get there,” i.e., if he began to head for that city not in order that he might reach it but because he was forced there by some external cause; for example, because he was driven there by the winter wind which caused a tempest at sea, or even because he was captured by pirates and was brought there against his will. It is clear, then, that this is accidental, and that it can be brought about by different causes. Yet the fact that in sailing he reaches this place occurs “not of itself,” i.e., inasmuch as he was sailing (since he intended to sail to another place), but “by reason of something else,” i.e., another external cause. For a storm is the cause of his coming to the place “to which he was not sailing,” i.e., Aegina; or pirates; or something else of this kind.
lib. 5 l. 22 n. 24 Secundo modo dicitur accidens, quod inest alicui secundum se, et tamen non est de substantia eius. Et hic est secundus modus dicendi per se, ut supra dictum est. Nam primus erat prout secundum se dicitur de aliquo quod in eius definitione ponitur, ut animal de homine, quod nullo modo est accidens. Sed triangulo inest per se duos rectos habere, et non est de substantia eius; unde est accidens. 1142. (2) [property] In a second sense accident means whatever belongs to each thing of itself but is not in its substance. This is the second mode of essential predication, as was noted above (1055); for the first mode exists when something is predicated essentially of something which is given in its definition, as animal is predicated of man, which is not an accident in any way. Now it belongs essentially to a triangle to have two right angles, but this does not belong to its substance. Hence it is an accident.
lib. 5 l. 22 n. 25 Differt autem hic modus a primo, quia accidentia hoc secundo modo contingit esse sempiterna. Semper enim triangulus habet tres angulos aequales duobus rectis. Accidentium vero secundum primum modum, nullum contingit esse sempiternum, quia sunt semper ut in paucioribus: et huius ratio habetur in aliis, sicut infra in sexto huius, et in secundo physicorum. Accidens ergo secundum primum modum opponitur ad secundum se. Accidens vero secundo modo opponitur ad substantialiter. Et haec de quinto. 1143. This sense of accident differs from the first, because accidents in this second sense can be eternal. For a triangle always has three angles equal to two right angles. But none of those things which are accidents in the first sense can be eternal, because they are always such as occur in the minority of cases. The discussion of this kind of accident is undertaken in another place, for example in Book VI of this work (1172), and in Book II of the Physics. Accident in the first sense, then, is opposed to what exists in itself; but accident in the second sense is opposed to what is substantial. This completes Book V.



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