Authors/Thomas Aquinas/Summa Theologiae/Part IIb/Q81

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Q80 Q82



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IIª-IIae q. 81 pr. Deinde considerandum est de singulis praedictarum virtutum, quantum ad praesentem intentionem pertinet. Et primo considerandum est de religione; secundo, de pietate; tertio, de observantia; quarto, de gratia; quinto, de vindicta; sexto, de veritate; septimo, de amicitia; octavo, de liberalitate; nono, de epieikeia. De aliis autem hic enumeratis supra dictum est, partim in tractatu de caritate, scilicet de concordia et aliis huiusmodi; partim in hoc tractatu de iustitia, sicut de bona commutatione et innocentia; de legispositiva autem in tractatu de prudentia. Circa religionem vero tria consideranda occurrunt, primo quidem, de ipsa religione secundum se; secundo, de actibus eius; tertio, de vitiis oppositis. Circa primum quaeruntur octo. Primo, utrum religio consistat tantum in ordine ad Deum. Secundo, utrum religio sit virtus. Tertio, utrum religio sit una virtus. Quarto, utrum religio sit specialis virtus. Quinto, utrum religio sit virtus theologica. Sexto, utrum religio sit praeferenda aliis virtutibus moralibus. Septimo, utrum religio habeat exteriores actus. Octavo, utrum religio sit eadem sanctitati. Question 81. Religion 1. Does religion regard only our relation to God? 2. Is religion a virtue? 3. Is religion one virtue? 4. Is religion a special virtue? 5. Is religion a theological virtue? 6. Should religion be preferred to the other moral virtues? 7. Does religion have any external actions? 8. Is religion the same as holiness?
IIª-IIae q. 81 a. 1 arg. 1 Ad primum sic proceditur. Videtur quod religio non ordinet hominem solum ad Deum. Dicitur enim Iac. I, religio munda et immaculata apud Deum et patrem haec est, visitare pupillos et viduas in tribulatione eorum, et immaculatum se custodire ab hoc saeculo. Sed visitare pupillos et viduas dicitur secundum ordinem ad proximum, quod autem dicit immaculatum se custodire ab hoc saeculo, pertinet ad ordinem quo ordinatur homo in seipso. Ergo religio non solum dicitur in ordine ad Deum. Objection 1. It would seem that religion does not direct man to God alone. It is written (James 1:27): "Religion clean and undefiled before God and the Father is this, to visit the fatherless and widows in their tribulation, and to keep oneself unspotted from this world." Now "to visit the fatherless and widows" indicates an order between oneself and one's neighbor, and "to keep oneself unspotted from this world" belongs to the order of a man within himself. Therefore religion does not imply order to God alone.
IIª-IIae q. 81 a. 1 arg. 2 Praeterea, Augustinus dicit, in X de Civ. Dei, quia Latina loquendi consuetudine, non imperitorum, verum etiam doctissimorum, cognationibus humanis atque affinitatibus et quibuscumque necessitudinibus dicitur exhibenda religio; non eo vocabulo vitatur ambiguum cum de cultu deitatis vertitur quaestio, ut fidenter dicere valeamus religionem non esse nisi cultum Dei. Ergo religio dicitur non solum in ordine ad Deum, sed etiam in ordine ad propinquos. Objection 2. Further, Augustine says (De Civ. Dei x, 1) that "since in speaking Latin not only unlettered but even most cultured persons ere wont to speak of religion as being exhibited, to our human kindred and relations as also to those who are linked with us by any kind of tie, that term does not escape ambiguity when it is a question of Divine worship, so that we be able to say without hesitation that religion is nothing else but the worship of God." Therefore religion signifies a relation not only to God but also to our kindred.
IIª-IIae q. 81 a. 1 arg. 3 Praeterea, ad religionem videtur latria pertinere. Latria autem interpretatur servitus, ut Augustinus dicit, in X de Civ. Dei. Servire autem debemus non solum Deo, sed etiam proximis, secundum illud Gal. V, per caritatem spiritus servite invicem. Ergo religio importat etiam ordinem ad proximum. Objection 3. Further, seemingly "latria" pertains to religion. Now "latria signifies servitude," as Augustine states (De Civ. Dei x, 1). And we are bound to serve not only God, but also our neighbor, according to Galatians 5:13, "By charity of the spirit serve one another." Therefore religion includes a relation to one's neighbor also.
IIª-IIae q. 81 a. 1 arg. 4 Praeterea, ad religionem pertinet cultus. Sed homo dicitur non solum colere Deum, sed etiam proximum, secundum illud Catonis, cole parentes. Ergo etiam religio nos ordinat ad proximum, et non solum ad Deum. Objection 4. Further, worship belongs to religion. Now man is said to worship not only God, but also his neighbor, according to the saying of Cato [Dionysius Cato, Breves Sententiae], "Worship thy parents." Therefore religion directs us also to our neighbor, and not only to God.
IIª-IIae q. 81 a. 1 arg. 5 Praeterea, omnes in statu salutis existentes Deo sunt subiecti. Non autem dicuntur religiosi omnes qui sunt in statu salutis, sed solum illi qui quibusdam votis et observantiis et ad obediendum aliquibus hominibus se adstringunt. Ergo religio non videtur importare ordinem subiectionis hominis ad Deum. Objection 5. Further, all those who are in the state of grace are subject to God. Yet not all who are in a state of grace are called religious, but only those who bind themselves by certain vows and observances, and to obedience to certain men. Therefore religion seemingly does not denote a relation of subjection of man to God.
IIª-IIae q. 81 a. 1 s. c. Sed contra est quod Tullius dicit, II Rhet., quod religio est quae superioris naturae, quam divinam vocant, curam caeremoniamque affert. On the contrary, Tully says (Rhet. ii, 53) that "religion consists in offering service and ceremonial rites to a superior nature that men call divine."
IIª-IIae q. 81 a. 1 co. Respondeo dicendum quod, sicut Isidorus dicit, in libro Etymol., religiosus, ut ait Cicero, a religione appellatus, qui retractat et tanquam relegit ea quae ad cultum divinum pertinent. Et sic religio videtur dicta a religendo ea quae sunt divini cultus, quia huiusmodi sunt frequenter in corde revolvenda, secundum illud Prov. III, in omnibus viis tuis cogita illum. Quamvis etiam possit intelligi religio ex hoc dicta quod Deum reeligere debemus, quem amiseramus negligentes, sicut Augustinus dicit, X de Civ. Dei. Vel potest intelligi religio a religando dicta, unde Augustinus dicit, in libro de vera Relig., religet nos religio uni omnipotenti Deo. Sive autem religio dicatur a frequenti lectione, sive ex iterata electione eius quod negligenter amissum est, sive a religatione, religio proprie importat ordinem ad Deum. Ipse enim est cui principaliter alligari debemus, tanquam indeficienti principio; ad quem etiam nostra electio assidue dirigi debet, sicut in ultimum finem; quem etiam negligenter peccando amittimus, et credendo et fidem protestando recuperare debemus. I answer that, as Isidore says (Etym. x), "according to Cicero, a man is said to be religious from 'religio,' because he often ponders over, and, as it were, reads again [relegit], the things which pertain to the worship of God," so that religion would seem to take its name from reading over those things which belong to Divine worship because we ought frequently to ponder over such things in our hearts, according to Proverbs 3:6, "In all thy ways think on Him." According to Augustine (De Civ. Dei x, 3) it may also take its name from the fact that "we ought to seek God again, whom we had lost by our neglect" [St. Augustine plays on the words 'reeligere,' i.e. to choose over again, and 'negligere,' to neglect or despise.]. Or again, religion may be derived from "religare" [to bind together], wherefore Augustine says (De Vera Relig. 55): "May religion bind us to the one Almighty God." However, whether religion take its name from frequent reading, or from a repeated choice of what has been lost through negligence, or from being a bond, it denotes properly a relation to God. For it is He to Whom we ought to be bound as to our unfailing principle; to Whom also our choice should be resolutely directed as to our last end; and Whom we lose when we neglect Him by sin, and should recover by believing in Him and confessing our faith.
IIª-IIae q. 81 a. 1 ad 1 Ad primum ergo dicendum quod religio habet duplices actus. Quosdam quidem proprios et immediatos, quos elicit, per quos homo ordinatur ad solum Deum, sicut sacrificare, adorare et alia huiusmodi. Alios autem actus habet quos producit mediantibus virtutibus quibus imperat, ordinans eos in divinam reverentiam, quia scilicet virtus ad quam pertinet finis, imperat virtutibus ad quas pertinent ea quae sunt ad finem. Et secundum hoc actus religionis per modum imperii ponitur esse visitare pupillos et viduas in tribulatione eorum, quod est actus elicitus a misericordia, immaculatum autem custodire se ab hoc saeculo imperative quidem est religionis, elicitive autem temperantiae vel alicuius huiusmodi virtutis. Reply to Objection 1. Religion has two kinds of acts. Some are its proper and immediate acts, which it elicits, and by which man is directed to God alone, for instance, sacrifice, adoration and the like. But it has other acts, which it produces through the medium of the virtues which it commands, directing them to the honor of God, because the virtue which is concerned with the end, commands the virtues which are concerned with the means. Accordingly "to visit the fatherless and widows in their tribulation" is an act of religion as commanding, and an act of mercy as eliciting; and "to keep oneself unspotted from this world" is an act of religion as commanding, but of temperance or of some similar virtue as eliciting.
IIª-IIae q. 81 a. 1 ad 2 Ad secundum dicendum quod religio refertur ad ea quae exhibentur cognationibus humanis, extenso nomine religionis, non autem secundum quod religio proprie dicitur. Unde Augustinus, parum ante verba inducta, praemittit, religio distinctius non quemlibet, sed Dei cultum significare videtur. Reply to Objection 2. Religion is referred to those things one exhibits to one's human kindred, if we take the term religion in a broad sense, but not if we take it in its proper sense. Hence, shortly before the passage quoted, Augustine says: "In a stricter sense religion seems to denote, not any kind of worship, but the worship of God."
IIª-IIae q. 81 a. 1 ad 3 Ad tertium dicendum quod cum servus dicatur ad dominum, necesse est quod ubi est propria et specialis ratio dominii, ibi sit specialis et propria ratio servitutis. Manifestum est autem quod dominium convenit Deo secundum propriam et singularem quandam rationem, quia scilicet ipse omnia fecit, et quia summum in omnibus rebus obtinet principatum. Et ideo specialis ratio servitutis ei debetur. Et talis servitus nomine latriae designatur apud Graecos. Et ideo ad religionem proprie pertinet. Reply to Objection 3. Since servant implies relation to a lord, wherever there is a special kind of lordship there must needs be a special kind of service. Now it is evident that lordship belongs to God in a special and singular way, because He made all things, and has supreme dominion over all. Consequently a special kind of service is due to Him, which is known as "latria" in Greek; and therefore it belongs to religion.
IIª-IIae q. 81 a. 1 ad 4 Ad quartum dicendum quod colere dicimus homines quos honorificatione, vel recordatione, vel praesentia frequentamus. Et etiam aliqua quae nobis subiecta sunt coli a nobis dicuntur, sicut agricolae dicuntur ex eo quod colunt agros, et incolae dicuntur ex eo quod colunt loca quae inhabitant. Quia tamen specialis honor debetur Deo, tanquam primo omnium principio, etiam specialis ratio cultus ei debetur, quae Graeco nomine vocatur eusebia vel theosebia, ut patet per Augustinum, X de Civ. Dei. Reply to Objection 4. We are said to worship those whom we honor, and to cultivate [In the Latin the same word 'colere' stands for 'worship' and 'cultivate']: a man's memory or presence: we even speak of cultivating things that are beneath us, thus a farmer [agricola] is one who cultivates the land, and an inhabitant [incola] is one who cultivates the place where he dwells. Since, however, special honor is due to God as the first principle of all things, to Him also is due a special kind of worship, which in Greek is Eusebeia or Theosebeia, as Augustine states (De Civ. Dei x, 1).
IIª-IIae q. 81 a. 1 ad 5 Ad quintum dicendum quod quamvis religiosi dici possint communiter omnes qui Deum colunt, specialiter tamen religiosi dicuntur qui totam vitam suam divino cultui dedicant, a mundanis negotiis se abstrahentes. Sicut etiam contemplativi dicuntur non qui contemplantur, sed qui contemplationi totam vitam suam deputant. Huiusmodi autem non se subiiciunt homini propter hominem sed propter Deum, secundum illud apostoli, Gal. IV, sicut Angelum Dei excepistis me, sicut Christum Iesum. Reply to Objection 5. Although the name "religious" may be given to all in general who worship God, yet in a special way religious are those who consecrate their whole life to the Divine worship, by withdrawing from human affairs. Thus also the term "contemplative" is applied, not to those who contemplate, but to those who give up their whole lives to contemplation. Such men subject themselves to man, not for man's sake but for God's sake, according to the word of the Apostle (Galatians 4:14), "You . . . received me as an angel of God, even as Christ Jesus."
IIª-IIae q. 81 a. 2 arg. 1 Ad secundum sic proceditur. Videtur quod religio non sit virtus. Ad religionem enim pertinere videtur Deo reverentiam exhibere. Sed revereri est actus timoris, qui est donum, ut ex supradictis patet. Ergo religio non est virtus, sed donum. Objection 1. It would seem that religion is not a virtue. Seemingly it belongs to religion to pay reverence to God. But reverence is an act of fear which is a gift, as stated above (Question 19, Article 09). Therefore religion is not a virtue but a gift
IIª-IIae q. 81 a. 2 arg. 2 Praeterea, omnis virtus in libera voluntate consistit, unde dicitur habitus electivus, vel voluntarius. Sed sicut dictum est, ad religionem pertinet latria, quae servitutem quandam importat. Ergo religio non est virtus. Objection 2. Further, every virtue is a free exercise of the will, wherefore it is described as an "elective" or voluntary "habit" [Ethic. ii, 6. Now, as stated above (1, ad 3) "latria" belongs to religion, and "latria" denotes a kind of servitude. Therefore religion is not a virtue.
IIª-IIae q. 81 a. 2 arg. 3 Praeterea, sicut dicitur in II Ethic., aptitudo virtutum inest nobis a natura, unde ea quae pertinent ad virtutes sunt de dictamine rationis naturalis. Sed ad religionem pertinet caeremoniam divinae naturae afferre. Caeremonialia autem, ut supra dictum est, non sunt de dictamine rationis naturalis. Ergo religio non est virtus. Objection 3. Further, according to Ethic. ii, 1, aptitude for virtue is in us by nature, wherefore things pertaining to virtue belong to the dictate of natural reason. Now, it belongs to religion "to offer ceremonial worship to the Godhead" [Cf. 1, and ceremonial matters, as stated above (I-II, 99, 3, ad 2; I-II, 101), do not belong to the dictate of natural reason. Therefore religion is not a virtue.
IIª-IIae q. 81 a. 2 s. c. Sed contra est quia connumeratur aliis virtutibus, ut ex praemissis patet. On the contrary, It is enumerated with the other virtues, as appears from what has been said above (Article 80).
IIª-IIae q. 81 a. 2 co. Respondeo dicendum quod, sicut supra dictum est, virtus est quae bonum facit habentem et opus eius bonum reddit. Et ideo necesse est dicere omnem actum bonum ad virtutem pertinere. Manifestum est autem quod reddere debitum alicui habet rationem boni, quia per hoc quod aliquis alteri debitum reddit, etiam constituitur in proportione convenienti respectu ipsius, quasi convenienter ordinatus ad ipsum; ordo autem ad rationem boni pertinet, sicut et modus et species, ut per Augustinum patet, in libro de natura boni. Cum igitur ad religionem pertineat reddere honorem debitum alicui, scilicet Deo, manifestum est quod religio virtus est. I answer that, As stated above (58, 3; I-II, 55, 3,4) "a virtue is that which makes its possessor good, and his act good likewise," wherefore we must needs say that every good act belongs to a virtue. Now it is evident that to render anyone his due has the aspect of good, since by rendering a person his due, one becomes suitably proportioned to him, through being ordered to him in a becoming manner. But order comes under the aspect of good, just as mode and species, according to Augustine (De Nat. Boni iii). Since then it belongs to religion to pay due honor to someone, namely, to God, it is evident that religion is a virtue.
IIª-IIae q. 81 a. 2 ad 1 Ad primum ergo dicendum quod revereri Deum est actus doni timoris. Ad religionem autem pertinet facere aliqua propter divinam reverentiam. Unde non sequitur quod religio sit idem quod donum timoris, sed quod ordinetur ad ipsum sicut ad aliquid principalius. Sunt enim dona principaliora virtutibus moralibus, ut supra habitum est. Reply to Objection 1. To pay reverence to God is an act of the gift of fear. Now it belongs to religion to do certain things through reverence for God. Hence it follows, not that religion is the same as the gift of fear, but that it is referred thereto as to something more excellent; for the gifts are more excellent than the moral virtues, as stated above (9, 1, ad 3; I-II, 68, 8).
IIª-IIae q. 81 a. 2 ad 2 Ad secundum dicendum quod etiam servus potest voluntarie domino suo exhibere quod debet, et sic facit de necessitate virtutem, debitum voluntarie reddens. Et similiter etiam exhibere Deo debitam servitutem potest esse actus virtutis, secundum quod homo voluntarie hoc facit. Reply to Objection 2. Even a slave can voluntarily do his duty by his master, and so "he makes a virtue of necessity" [ Jerome, Ep. liv, ad Furiam.], by doing his duty voluntarily. On like manner, to render due service to God may be an act of virtue, in so far as man does so voluntarily.
IIª-IIae q. 81 a. 2 ad 3 Ad tertium dicendum quod de dictamine rationis naturalis est quod homo aliqua faciat ad reverentiam divinam, sed quod haec determinate faciat vel illa, istud non est de dictamine rationis naturalis, sed de institutione iuris divini vel humani. Reply to Objection 3. It belongs to the dictate of natural reason that man should do something through reverence for God. But that he should do this or that determinate thing does not belong to the dictate of natural reason, but is established by Divine or human law.
IIª-IIae q. 81 a. 3 arg. 1 Ad tertium sic proceditur. Videtur quod religio non sit una virtus. Per religionem enim ordinamur ad Deum, ut dictum est. In Deo autem est accipere tres personas, et iterum multa attributa, quae saltem ratione differunt. Diversa autem ratio obiecti sufficit ad diversificandum virtutes, ut ex supradictis patet. Ergo religio non est una virtus. Objection 1. It would seem that religion is not one virtue. Religion directs us to God, as stated above (Article 1). Now in God there are three Persons; and also many attributes, which differ at least logically from one another. Now a logical difference in the object suffices for a difference of virtue, as stated above (50, 2, ad 2). Therefore religion is not one virtue.
IIª-IIae q. 81 a. 3 arg. 2 Praeterea, unius virtutis unus videtur esse actus, habitus enim distinguuntur secundum actus. Religionis autem multi sunt actus, sicut colere et servire, vovere, orare, sacrificare, et multa huiusmodi. Ergo religio non est una virtus. Objection 2. Further, of one virtue there is seemingly one act, since habits are distinguished by their acts. Now there are many acts of religion, for instance to worship, to serve, to vow, to pray, to sacrifice and many such like. Therefore religion is not one virtue.
IIª-IIae q. 81 a. 3 arg. 3 Praeterea, adoratio ad religionem pertinet. Sed adoratio alia ratione adhibetur imaginibus, et alia ipsi Deo. Cum ergo diversa ratio distinguat virtutes, videtur quod religio non sit una virtus. Objection 3. Further, adoration belongs to religion. Now adoration is paid to images under one aspect, and under another aspect to God Himself. Since, then, a difference of aspect distinguishes virtues, it would seem that religion is not one virtue.
IIª-IIae q. 81 a. 3 s. c. Sed contra est quod dicitur Ephes. IV, unus Deus, una fides. Sed vera religio protestatur fidem unius Dei. Ergo religio est una virtus. On the contrary, It is written (Ephesians 4:5): "One God [Vulgate: 'Lord'], one faith." Now true religion professes faith in one God. Therefore religion is one virtue.
IIª-IIae q. 81 a. 3 co. Respondeo dicendum quod, sicut supra habitum est, habitus distinguuntur secundum diversam rationem obiecti. Ad religionem autem pertinet exhibere reverentiam uni Deo secundum unam rationem, inquantum scilicet est primum principium creationis et gubernationis rerum, unde ipse dicit, Malach. I, si ego pater, ubi honor meus? Patris enim est et producere et gubernare. Et ideo manifestum est quod religio est una virtus. I answer that, As stated above (I-II, 54, 2, ad 1), habits are differentiated according to a different aspect of the object. Now it belongs to religion to show reverence to one God under one aspect, namely, as the first principle of the creation and government of things. Wherefore He Himself says (Malachi 1:6): "If . . . I be a father, where is My honor?" For it belongs to a father to beget and to govern. Therefore it is evident that religion is one virtue.
IIª-IIae q. 81 a. 3 ad 1 Ad primum ergo dicendum quod tres personae divinae sunt unum principium creationis et gubernationis rerum, et ideo eis una religione servitur. Diversae autem rationes attributorum concurrunt ad rationem primi principii, quia Deus producit omnia et gubernat sapientia, voluntate et potentia bonitatis suae. Et ideo religio est una virtus. Reply to Objection 1. The three Divine Persons are the one principle of the creation and government of things, wherefore they are served by one religion. The different aspects of the attributes concur under the aspect of first principle, because God produces all things, and governs them by the wisdom, will and power of His goodness. Wherefore religion is one virtue.
IIª-IIae q. 81 a. 3 ad 2 Ad secundum dicendum quod eodem actu homo servit Deo et colit ipsum, nam cultus respicit Dei excellentiam, cui reverentia debetur; servitus autem respicit subiectionem hominis, qui ex sua conditione obligatur ad exhibendum reverentiam Deo. Et ad haec duo pertinent omnes actus qui religioni attribuuntur, quia per omnes homo protestatur divinam excellentiam et subiectionem sui ad Deum, vel exhibendo aliquid ei, vel iterum assumendo aliquid divinum. Reply to Objection 2. By the one same act man both serves and worships God, for worship regards the excellence of God, to Whom reverence is due: while service regards the subjection of man who, by his condition, is under an obligation of showing reverence to God. To these two belong all acts ascribed to religion, because, by them all, man bears witness to the Divine excellence and to his own subjection to God, either by offering something to God, or by assuming something Divine.
IIª-IIae q. 81 a. 3 ad 3 Ad tertium dicendum quod imaginibus non exhibetur religionis cultus secundum quod in seipsis considerantur, quasi res quaedam, sed secundum quod sunt imagines ducentes in Deum incarnatum. Motus autem qui est in imaginem prout est imago, non sistit in ipsa, sed tendit in id cuius est imago. Et ideo ex hoc quod imaginibus Christi exhibetur religionis cultus, non diversificatur ratio latriae, nec virtus religionis. Reply to Objection 3. The worship of religion is paid to images, not as considered in themselves, nor as things, but as images leading us to God incarnate. Now movement to an image as image does not stop at the image, but goes on to the thing it represents. Hence neither "latria" nor the virtue of religion is differentiated by the fact that religious worship is paid to the images of Christ.
IIª-IIae q. 81 a. 4 arg. 1 Ad quartum sic proceditur. Videtur quod religio non sit specialis virtus ab aliis distincta. Dicit enim Augustinus, X de Civ. Dei, verum sacrificium est omne opus quod geritur ut sancta societate Deo iungamur. Sed sacrificium pertinet ad religionem. Ergo omne opus virtutis ad religionem pertinet. Et sic non est specialis virtus. Objection 1. It would seem that religion is not a special virtue distinct from the others. Augustine says (De Civ. Dei x, 6): "Any action whereby we are united to God in holy fellowship, is a true sacrifice." But sacrifice belongs to religion. Therefore every virtuous deed belongs to religion; and consequently religion is not a special virtue.
IIª-IIae q. 81 a. 4 arg. 2 Praeterea, apostolus dicit, I ad Cor. X, omnia in gloriam Dei facite. Sed ad religionem pertinet aliqua facere ad Dei reverentiam, ut supra dictum est. Ergo religio non est specialis virtus. Objection 2. Further, the Apostle says (1 Corinthians 10:31): "Do all to the glory of God." Now it belongs to religion to do anything in reverence of God, as stated above (1, ad 2; 2). Therefore religion is not a special virtue.
IIª-IIae q. 81 a. 4 arg. 3 Praeterea, caritas qua diligitur Deus non est virtus distincta a caritate qua diligitur proximus. Sed sicut dicitur in VIII Ethic., honorari propinquum est ei quod est amari. Ergo religio, qua honoratur Deus, non est virtus specialiter distincta ab observantia vel dulia vel pietate, quibus honoratur proximus. Ergo non est virtus specialis. Objection 3. Further, the charity whereby we love God is not distinct from the charity whereby we love our neighbor. But according to Ethic. viii, 8 "to be honored is almost to be loved." Therefore the religion whereby we honor God is not a special virtue distinct from observance, or "dulia," or piety whereby we honor our neighbor. Therefore religion is not a special virtue.
IIª-IIae q. 81 a. 4 s. c. Sed contra est quod ponitur pars iustitiae ab aliis eius partibus distincta. On the contrary, It is reckoned a part of justice, distinct from the other parts.
IIª-IIae q. 81 a. 4 co. Respondeo dicendum quod cum virtus ordinetur ad bonum, ubi est specialis ratio boni, ibi oportet esse specialem virtutem. Bonum autem ad quod ordinatur religio est exhibere Deo debitum honorem. Honor autem debetur alicui ratione excellentiae. Deo autem competit singularis excellentia, inquantum omnia in infinitum transcendit secundum omnimodum excessum. Unde ei debetur specialis honor, sicut in rebus humanis videmus quod diversis excellentiis personarum diversus honor debetur, alius quidem patri, alius regi, et sic de aliis. Unde manifestum est quod religio est specialis virtus. I answer that, Since virtue is directed to the good, wherever there is a special aspect of good, there must be a special virtue. Now the good to which religion is directed, is to give due honor to God. Again, honor is due to someone under the aspect of excellence: and to God a singular excellence is competent, since He infinitely surpasses all things and exceeds them in every way. Wherefore to Him is special honor due: even as in human affairs we see that different honor is due to different personal excellences, one kind of honor to a father, another to the king, and so on. Hence it is evident that religion is a special virtue.
IIª-IIae q. 81 a. 4 ad 1 Ad primum ergo dicendum quod omne opus virtutis dicitur esse sacrificium inquantum ordinatur ad Dei reverentiam. Unde ex hoc non habetur quod religio sit generalis virtus, sed quod imperet omnibus aliis virtutibus, sicut supra dictum est. Reply to Objection 1. Every virtuous deed is said to be a sacrifice, in so far as it is done out of reverence of God. Hence this does not prove that religion is a general virtue, but that it commands all other virtues, as stated above (1, ad 1).
IIª-IIae q. 81 a. 4 ad 2 Ad secundum dicendum quod omnia, secundum quod in gloriam Dei fiunt, pertinent ad religionem non quasi ad elicientem, sed quasi ad imperantem. Illa autem pertinent ad religionem elicientem quae secundum rationem suae speciei pertinent ad reverentiam Dei. Reply to Objection 2. Every deed, in so far as it is done in God's honor, belongs to religion, not as eliciting but as commanding: those belong to religion as eliciting which pertain to the reverence of God by reason of their specific character.
IIª-IIae q. 81 a. 4 ad 3 Ad tertium dicendum quod obiectum amoris est bonum, obiectum autem honoris vel reverentiae est aliquid excellens. Bonitas autem Dei communicatur creaturae, non autem excellentia bonitatis eius. Et ideo caritas qua diligitur Deus non est virtus distincta a caritate qua diligitur proximus, religio autem, qua honoratur Deus, distinguitur a virtutibus quibus honoratur proximus. Reply to Objection 3. The object of love is the good, but the object of honor and reverence is something excellent. Now God's goodness is communicated to the creature, but the excellence of His goodness is not. Hence the charity whereby God is loved is not distinct from the charity whereby our neighbor is loved; whereas the religion whereby God is honored, is distinct from the virtues whereby we honor our neighbor.
IIª-IIae q. 81 a. 5 arg. 1 Ad quintum sic proceditur. Videtur quod religio sit virtus theologica. Dicit enim Augustinus, in Enchirid., quod Deus colitur fide, spe et caritate, quae sunt virtutes theologicae. Sed cultum Deo afferre pertinet ad religionem. Ergo religio est virtus theologica. Objection 1. It would seem that religion is a theological virtue. Augustine says (Enchiridion iii) that "God is worshiped by faith, hope and charity," which are theological virtues. Now it belongs to religion to pay worship to God. Therefore religion is a theological virtue.
IIª-IIae q. 81 a. 5 arg. 2 Praeterea, virtus theologica dicitur quae habet Deum pro obiecto. Religio autem habet Deum pro obiecto, quia ad solum Deum ordinat, ut dictum est. Ergo religio est virtus theologica. Objection 2. Further, a theological virtue is one that has God for its object. Now religion has God for its object, since it directs us to God alone, as stated above (Article 1). Therefore religion is a theological virtue.
IIª-IIae q. 81 a. 5 arg. 3 Praeterea, omnis virtus vel est theologica, vel intellectualis, vel moralis, ut ex supradictis patet. Manifestum est autem quod religio non est virtus intellectualis, quia eius perfectio non attenditur secundum considerationem veri. Similiter etiam non est virtus moralis, cuius proprium est tenere medium inter superfluum et diminutum, non enim aliquis potest superflue Deum colere, secundum illud Eccli. XLIII, benedicentes dominum, exaltate illum quantum potestis, maior enim est omni laude. Ergo relinquitur quod sit virtus theologica. Objection 3. Further, every virtue is either theological, or intellectual, or moral, as is clear from what has been said (I-II, 57,58,62). Now it is evident that religion is not an intellectual virtue, because its perfection does not depend on the consideration of truth: nor is it a moral virtue, which consists properly in observing the mean between too much and too little. for one cannot worship God too much, according to Sirach 43:33, "Blessing the Lord, exalt Him as much as you can; for He is above all praise." Therefore it remains that it is a theological virtue.
IIª-IIae q. 81 a. 5 s. c. Sed contra est quod ponitur pars iustitiae, quae est virtus moralis. On the contrary, It is reckoned a part of justice which is a moral virtue.
IIª-IIae q. 81 a. 5 co. Respondeo dicendum quod, sicut dictum est, religio est quae Deo debitum cultum affert. Duo igitur in religione considerantur. Unum quidem quod religio Deo affert, cultus scilicet, et hoc se habet per modum materiae et obiecti ad religionem. Aliud autem est id cui affertur, scilicet Deus. Cui cultus exhibetur non quasi actus quibus Deus colitur ipsum Deum attingunt, sicut cum credimus Deo, credendo Deum attingimus (propter quod supra dictum est quod Deus est fidei obiectum non solum inquantum credimus Deum, sed inquantum credimus Deo), affertur autem Deo debitus cultus inquantum actus quidam, quibus Deus colitur, in Dei reverentiam fiunt, puta sacrificiorum oblationes et alia huiusmodi. Unde manifestum est quod Deus non comparatur ad virtutem religionis sicut materia vel obiectum, sed sicut finis. Et ideo religio non est virtus theologica, cuius obiectum est ultimus finis, sed est virtus moralis, cuius est esse circa ea quae sunt ad finem. I answer that, As stated above (Article 4) religion pays due worship to God. Hence two things are to be considered in religion: first that which it offers to God, viz. worship, and this is by way of matter and object in religion; secondly, that to which something is offered, viz. God, to Whom worship is paid. And yet the acts whereby God is worshiped do not reach out to God himself, as when we believe God we reach out to Him by believing; for which reason it was stated (1, 1 and 2 and 4) that God is the object of faith, not only because we believe in a God, but because we believe God. Now due worship is paid to God, in so far as certain acts whereby God is worshiped, such as the offering of sacrifices and so forth, are done out of reverence for God. Hence it is evident that God is related to religion not as matter or object, but as end: and consequently religion is not a theological virtue whose object is the last end, but a moral virtue which is properly about things referred to the end.
IIª-IIae q. 81 a. 5 ad 1 Ad primum ergo dicendum quod semper potentia vel virtus quae operatur circa finem, per imperium movet potentiam vel virtutem operantem ea quae ordinantur in finem illum. Virtutes autem theologicae, scilicet fides, spes et caritas, habent actum circa Deum sicut circa proprium obiectum. Et ideo suo imperio causant actum religionis, quae operatur quaedam in ordine ad Deum. Et ideo Augustinus dicit quod Deus colitur fide, spe et caritate. Reply to Objection 1. The power or virtue whose action deals with an end, moves by its command the power or virtue whose action deals with matters directed to that end. Now the theological virtues, faith, hope and charity have an act in reference to God as their proper object: wherefore, by their command, they cause the act of religion, which performs certain deeds directed to God: and so Augustine says that God is worshiped by faith, hope and charity.
IIª-IIae q. 81 a. 5 ad 2 Ad secundum dicendum quod religio ordinat hominem in Deum non sicut in obiectum, sed sicut in finem. Reply to Objection 2. Religion directs man to God not as its object but as its end.
IIª-IIae q. 81 a. 5 ad 3 Ad tertium dicendum quod religio non est virtus theologica neque intellectualis, sed moralis, cum sit pars iustitiae. Et medium in ipsa accipitur non quidem inter passiones, sed secundum quandam aequalitatem inter operationes quae sunt ad Deum. Dico autem aequalitatem non absolute, quia Deo non potest tantum exhiberi quantum ei debetur, sed secundum considerationem humanae facultatis et divinae acceptationis. Superfluum autem in his quae ad divinum cultum pertinent esse potest, non secundum circumstantiam quanti, sed secundum alias circumstantias, puta quia cultus divinus exhibetur cui non debet exhiberi, vel quando non debet, vel secundum alias circumstantias prout non debet. Reply to Objection 3. Religion is neither a theological nor an intellectual, but a moral virtue, since it is a part of justice, and observes a mean, not in the passions, but in actions directed to God, by establishing a kind of equality in them. And when I say "equality," I do not mean absolute equality, because it is not possible to pay God as much as we owe Him, but equality in consideration of man's ability and God's acceptance. And it is possible to have too much in matters pertaining to the Divine worship, not as regards the circumstance of quantity, but as regards other circumstances, as when Divine worship is paid to whom it is not due, or when it is not due, or unduly in respect of some other circumstance.
IIª-IIae q. 81 a. 6 arg. 1 Ad sextum sic proceditur. Videtur quod religio non sit praeferenda aliis virtutibus moralibus. Perfectio enim virtutis moralis consistit in hoc quod attingit medium, ut patet in II Ethic. Sed religio deficit in attingendo medium iustitiae, quia non reddit Deo omnino aequale. Ergo religio non est potior aliis virtutibus moralibus. Objection 1. It would seem that religion should not be preferred to the other moral virtues. The perfection of a moral virtue consists in its observing the mean, as stated in Ethic. ii, 6. But religion fails to observe the mean of justice, since it does not render an absolute equal to God. Therefore religion is not more excellent than the other moral virtues.
IIª-IIae q. 81 a. 6 arg. 2 Praeterea, in his quae hominibus exhibentur, tanto videtur aliquid esse laudabilius quanto magis indigenti exhibetur, unde dicitur Isaiae LVIII, frange esurienti panem tuum. Sed Deus non indiget aliquo quod ei a nobis exhibeatur, secundum illud Psalm., dixi, Deus meus es tu, quoniam bonorum meorum non eges. Ergo religio videtur minus laudabilis aliis virtutibus, per quas hominibus subvenitur. Objection 2. Further, what is offered by one man to another is the more praiseworthy, according as the person it is offered to is in greater need: wherefore it is written (Isaiah 57:7): "Deal thy bread to the hungry."But God needs nothing that we can offer Him, according to Psalm 15:2, "I have said: Thou art my God, for Thou hast no need of my goods." Therefore religion would seem less praiseworthy than the other virtues whereby man's needs are relieved.
IIª-IIae q. 81 a. 6 arg. 3 Praeterea, quanto aliquid fit ex maiori necessitate, tanto minus est laudabile, secundum illud I ad Cor. IX, si evangelizavero, non est mihi gloria, necessitas mihi incumbit. Ubi autem est maius debitum, ibi est maior necessitas. Cum igitur Deo maxime sit debitum quod ei ab homine exhibetur, videtur quod religio sit minus laudabilis inter virtutes humanas. Objection 3. Further, the greater. the obligation to do a thing, the less praise does it deserve, according to 1 Corinthians 9:16, "If I preach the Gospel, it is no glory to me: a necessity lieth upon me." Now the more a thing is due, the greater the obligation of paying it. Since, then, what is paid to God by man is in the highest degree due to Him, it would seem that religion is less praiseworthy than the other human virtues.
IIª-IIae q. 81 a. 6 s. c. Sed contra est quod Exod. XX ponuntur primo praecepta ad religionem pertinentia, tanquam praecipua. Ordo autem praeceptorum proportionatur ordini virtutum, quia praecepta legis dantur de actibus virtutum. Ergo religio est praecipua inter virtutes morales. On the contrary, The precepts pertaining to religion are given precedence (Exodus 20) as being of greatest importance. Now the order of precepts is proportionate to the order of virtues, since the precepts of the Law prescribe acts of virtue. Therefore religion is the chief of the moral virtues.
IIª-IIae q. 81 a. 6 co. Respondeo dicendum quod ea quae sunt ad finem sortiuntur bonitatem ex ordine in finem, et ideo quanto sunt fini propinquiora, tanto sunt meliora. Virtutes autem morales, ut supra habitum est, sunt circa ea quae ordinantur in Deum sicut in finem. Religio autem magis de propinquo accedit ad Deum quam aliae virtutes morales, inquantum operatur ea quae directe et immediate ordinantur in honorem divinum. Et ideo religio praeeminet inter alias virtutes morales. I answer that, Whatever is directed to an end takes its goodness from being ordered to that end; so that the nearer it is to the end the better it is. Now moral virtues, as stated above (5; 04, 7), are about matters that are ordered to God as their end. And religion approaches nearer to God than the other moral virtues, in so far as its actions are directly and immediately ordered to the honor of God. Hence religion excels among the moral virtues.
IIª-IIae q. 81 a. 6 ad 1 Ad primum ergo dicendum quod laus virtutis in voluntate consistit, non autem in potestate. Et ideo deficere ab aequalitate, quae est medium iustitiae, propter defectum potestatis, non diminuit laudem virtutis, si non fuerit defectus ex parte voluntatis. Reply to Objection 1. Virtue is praised because of the will, not because of the ability: and therefore if a man fall short of equality which is the mean of justice, through lack of ability, his virtue deserves no less praise, provided there be no failing on the part of his will.
IIª-IIae q. 81 a. 6 ad 2 Ad secundum dicendum quod in his quae exhibentur alteri propter eorum utilitatem, est exhibitio laudabilior quae fit magis indigenti, quia est utilior. Deo autem non exhibetur aliquid propter eius utilitatem, sed propter eius gloriam, nostram autem utilitatem. Reply to Objection 2. In offering a thing to a man on account of its usefulness to him, the more needy the man the more praiseworthy the offering, because it is more useful: whereas we offer a thing to God not on account of its usefulness to Him, but for the sake of His glory, and on account of its usefulness to us.
IIª-IIae q. 81 a. 6 ad 3 Ad tertium dicendum quod ubi est necessitas, tollitur gloria supererogationis, non autem excluditur meritum virtutis, si adsit voluntas. Et propter hoc ratio non sequitur. Reply to Objection 3. Where there is an obligation to do a thing it loses the luster of supererogation, but not the merit of virtue, provided it be done voluntarily. Hence the argument proves nothing.
IIª-IIae q. 81 a. 7 arg. 1 Ad septimum sic proceditur. Videtur quod latria non habeat aliquem exteriorem actum. Dicitur enim Ioan. IV, Deus spiritus est, et eos qui adorant eum, in spiritu et veritate adorare oportet. Sed exteriores actus non pertinent ad spiritum, sed magis ad corpus. Ergo religio, ad quam pertinet adoratio, non habet exteriores actus, sed interiores. Objection 1. It would seem that religion has not an external act. It is written (John 4:24): "God is a spirit, and they that adore Him, must adore Him in spirit and in truth." Now external acts pertain, not to the spirit but to the body. Therefore religion, to which adoration belongs, has acts that are not external but internal.
IIª-IIae q. 81 a. 7 arg. 2 Praeterea, religionis finis est Deo reverentiam et honorem exhibere. Sed videtur ad irreverentiam alicuius excellentis pertinere si ea sibi exhibeantur quae proprie ad inferiores pertinent. Cum igitur ea quae exhibet homo corporalibus actibus proprie videantur ad indigentias hominum ordinari, vel ad reverentiam inferiorum creaturarum; non videtur quod congrue possunt assumi in divinam reverentiam. Objection 2. Further, the end of religion is to pay God reverence and honor. Now it would savor of irreverence towards a superior, if one were to offer him that which properly belongs to his inferior. Since then whatever man offers by bodily actions, seems to be directed properly to the relief of human needs, or to the reverence of inferior creatures, it would seem unbecoming to employ them in showing reverence to God.
IIª-IIae q. 81 a. 7 arg. 3 Praeterea, Augustinus, in VI de Civ. Dei, commendat Senecam de hoc quod vituperat quosdam qui idolis ea exhibebant quae solent hominibus exhiberi, quia scilicet immortalibus non conveniunt ea quae sunt mortalium. Sed haec multo minus conveniunt Deo vero, qui est excelsus super omnes deos. Ergo videtur reprehensibile esse quod aliquis corporalibus actibus Deum colat. Non ergo habet religio corporales actus. Objection 3. Further, Augustine (De Civ. Dei vi, 10) commends Seneca for finding fault with those who offered to idols those things that are wont to be offered to men, because, to wit, that which befits mortals is unbecoming to immortals. But such things are much less becoming to the true God, Who is "exalted above all gods" [Psalm 94:3. Therefore it would seem wrong to worship God with bodily actions. Therefore religion has no bodily actions.
IIª-IIae q. 81 a. 7 s. c. Sed contra est quod in Psalm. dicitur, cor meum et caro mea exultaverunt in Deum vivum. Sed sicut interiores actus pertinent ad cor, ita exteriores actus pertinent ad membra carnis. Ergo videtur quod Deus sit colendus non solum interioribus actibus, sed etiam exterioribus. On the contrary, It is written (Psalm 83:3): "My heart and my flesh have rejoiced in the living God." Now just as internal actions belong to the heart, so do external actions belong to the members of the flesh. Therefore it seems that God ought to be worshiped not only by internal but also by external actions.
IIª-IIae q. 81 a. 7 co. Respondeo dicendum quod Deo reverentiam et honorem exhibemus non propter ipsum, qui in seipso est gloria plenus, cui nihil a creatura adiici potest, sed propter nos, quia videlicet per hoc quod Deum reveremur et honoramus, mens nostra ei subiicitur, et in hoc eius perfectio consistit; quaelibet enim res perficitur per hoc quod subditur suo superiori, sicut corpus per hoc quod vivificatur ab anima, et aer per hoc quod illuminatur a sole. Mens autem humana indiget ad hoc quod coniungatur Deo, sensibilium manuductione, quia invisibilia per ea quae facta sunt, intellecta, conspiciuntur, ut apostolus dicit, ad Rom. Et ideo in divino cultu necesse est aliquibus corporalibus uti, ut eis, quasi signis quibusdam, mens hominis excitetur ad spirituales actus, quibus Deo coniungitur. Et ideo religio habet quidem interiores actus quasi principales et per se ad religionem pertinentes, exteriores vero actus quasi secundarios, et ad interiores actus ordinatos. I answer that, We pay God honor and reverence, not for His sake (because He is of Himself full of glory to which no creature can add anything), but for our own sake, because by the very fact that we revere and honor God, our mind is subjected to Him; wherein its perfection consists, since a thing is perfected by being subjected to its superior, for instance the body is perfected by being quickened by the soul, and the air by being enlightened by the sun. Now the human mind, in order to be united to God, needs to be guided by the sensible world, since "invisible things . . . are clearly seen, being understood by the things that are made," as the Apostle says (Romans 1:20). Wherefore in the Divine worship it is necessary to make use of corporeal things, that man's mind may be aroused thereby, as by signs, to the spiritual acts by means of which he is united to God. Therefore the internal acts of religion take precedence of the others and belong to religion essentially, while its external acts are secondary, and subordinate to the internal acts.
IIª-IIae q. 81 a. 7 ad 1 Ad primum ergo dicendum quod dominus loquitur quantum ad id quod est principale et per se intentum in cultu divino. Reply to Objection 1. Our Lord is speaking of that which is most important and directly intended in the worship of God.
IIª-IIae q. 81 a. 7 ad 2 Ad secundum dicendum quod huiusmodi exteriora non exhibentur Deo quasi his indigeat, secundum illud Psalm., numquid manducabo carnes taurorum, aut sanguinem hircorum potabo? Sed exhibentur Deo tanquam signa quaedam interiorum et spiritualium operum, quae per se Deus acceptat. Unde Augustinus dicit, in X de Civ. Dei, sacrificium visibile invisibilis sacrificii sacramentum, idest sacrum signum, est. Reply to Objection 2. These external things are offered to God, not as though He stood in need of them, according to Psalm 49:13, "Shall I eat the flesh of bullocks? or shall I drink the blood of goats?" but as signs of the internal and spiritual works, which are of themselves acceptable to God. Hence Augustine says (De Civ. Dei x, 5): "The visible sacrifice is the sacrament or sacred sign of the invisible sacrifice."
IIª-IIae q. 81 a. 7 ad 3 Ad tertium dicendum quod idololatrae deridentur ex hoc quod ea quae ad homines pertinent idolis exhibebant non tanquam signa excitantia eos ad aliqua spiritualia, sed tanquam per se eis accepta. Et praecipue quia erant vana et turpia. Reply to Objection 3. Idolaters are ridiculed for offering to idols things pertaining to men, not as signs arousing them to certain spiritual things, but as though they were of themselves acceptable to the idols; and still more because they were foolish and wicked.
IIª-IIae q. 81 a. 8 arg. 1 Ad octavum sic proceditur. Videtur quod religio non sit idem sanctitati. Religio enim est quaedam specialis virtus, ut habitum est. Sanctitas autem dicitur esse generalis virtus, est enim faciens fideles et servantes ea quae ad Deum sunt iusta, ut Andronicus dicit. Ergo sanctitas non est idem religioni. Objection 1. It would seem that religion is not the same as sanctity. Religion is a special virtue, as stated above (Article 4): whereas sanctity is a general virtue, because it makes us faithful, and fulfil our just obligations to God, according to Andronicus [De Affectibus]. Therefore sanctity is not the same as religion.
IIª-IIae q. 81 a. 8 arg. 2 Praeterea, sanctitas munditiam importare videtur, dicit enim Dionysius, XII cap. de Div. Nom., quod sanctitas est ab omni immunditia libera et perfecta et omnino immaculata munditia. Munditia autem maxime videtur pertinere ad temperantiam, quae turpitudines corporales excludit. Cum igitur religio ad iustitiam pertineat, videtur quod sanctitas non sit idem religioni. Objection 2. Further, sanctity seems to denote a kind of purity. For Dionysius says (Div. Nom. xii) that "sanctity is free from all uncleanness, and is perfect and altogether unspotted purity." Now purity would seem above all to pertain to temperance which repels bodily uncleanness. Since then religion belongs to justice, it would seem that sanctity is not the same as religion.
IIª-IIae q. 81 a. 8 arg. 3 Praeterea, ea quae dividuntur ex opposito non sunt idem. Sed in quadam enumeratione partium iustitiae sanctitas condividitur religioni, ut supra habitum est. Ergo sanctitas non est idem quod religio. Objection 3. Further, things that are opposite members of a division are not identified with one another. But in an enumeration given above (80, ad 4) of the parts of justice, sanctity is reckoned as distinct from religion. Therefore sanctity is not the same as religion.
IIª-IIae q. 81 a. 8 s. c. Sed contra est quod dicitur Luc. I, serviamus illi in sanctitate et iustitia. Sed servire Deo pertinet ad religionem, ut supra habitum est. Ergo religio est idem sanctitati. On the contrary, It is written (Luke 1:74-75): "That . . . we may serve Him . . . in holiness and justice." Now, "to serve God" belongs to religion, as stated above (1, ad 3; 3, ad 2). Therefore religion is the same as sanctity.
IIª-IIae q. 81 a. 8 co. Respondeo dicendum quod nomen sanctitatis duo videtur importare. Uno quidem modo, munditiam, et huic significationi competit nomen Graecum, dicitur enim agios quasi sine terra. Alio modo importat firmitatem, unde apud antiquos sancta dicebantur quae legibus erant munita ut violari non deberent; unde et dicitur esse aliquid sancitum quia est lege firmatum. Potest etiam secundum Latinos hoc nomen sanctus ad munditiam pertinere, ut intelligatur sanctus quasi sanguine tinctus, eo quod antiquitus illi qui purificari volebant sanguine hostiae tingebantur, ut Isidorus dicit, in libro Etymol. Et utraque significatio competit, ut sanctitas attribuatur his quae divino cultui applicantur, ita quod non solum homines, sed etiam templum et vasa et alia huiusmodi sanctificari dicantur ex hoc quod cultui divino applicantur. Munditia enim necessaria est ad hoc quod mens Deo applicetur. Quia mens humana inquinatur ex hoc quod inferioribus rebus immergitur, sicut quaelibet res ex immixtione peioris sordescit, ut argentum ex immixtione plumbi. Oportet autem quod mens ab inferioribus rebus abstrahatur, ad hoc quod supremae rei possit coniungi. Et ideo mens sine munditia Deo applicari non potest. Unde ad Heb. ult. dicitur, pacem sequimini cum omnibus, et sanctimoniam, sine qua nemo videbit Deum. Firmitas etiam exigitur ad hoc quod mens Deo applicetur. Applicatur enim ei sicut ultimo fini et primo principio, huiusmodi autem oportet maxime immobilia esse. Unde dicebat apostolus, Rom. VIII, certus sum quod neque mors neque vita separabit me a caritate Dei. Sic igitur sanctitas dicitur per quam mens hominis seipsam et suos actus applicat Deo. Unde non differt a religione secundum essentiam, sed solum ratione. Nam religio dicitur secundum quod exhibet Deo debitum famulatum in his quae pertinent specialiter ad cultum divinum, sicut in sacrificiis, oblationibus et aliis huiusmodi, sanctitas autem dicitur secundum quod homo non solum haec, sed aliarum virtutum opera refert in Deum, vel secundum quod homo se disponit per bona opera ad cultum divinum. I answer that, The word "sanctity" seems to have two significations. On one way it denotes purity; and this signification fits in with the Greek, for hagios means "unsoiled." On another way it denotes firmness, wherefore in olden times the term "sancta" was applied to such things as were upheld by law and were not to be violated. Hence a thing is said to be sacred [sancitum] when it is ratified by law. Again, in Latin, this word "sanctus" may be connected with purity, if it be resolved into "sanguine tinctus, since, in olden times, those who wished to be purified were sprinkled with the victim's blood," according to Isidore (Etym. x). In either case the signification requires sanctity to be ascribed to those things that are applied to the Divine worship; so that not only men, but also the temple, vessels and such like things are said to be sanctified through being applied to the worship of God. For purity is necessary in order that the mind be applied to God, since the human mind is soiled by contact with inferior things, even as all things depreciate by admixture with baser things, for instance, silver by being mixed with lead. Now in order for the mind to be united to the Supreme Being it must be withdrawn from inferior things: and hence it is that without purity the mind cannot be applied to God. Wherefore it is written (Hebrews 12:14): "Follow peace with all men, and holiness, without which no man shall see God." Again, firmness is required for the mind to be applied to God, for it is applied to Him as its last end and first beginning, and such things must needs be most immovable. Hence the Apostle said (Romans 8:38-39): "I am sure that neither death, nor life . . . shall separate me [Vulgate: 'shall be able to separate us'] from the love of God." Accordingly, it is by sanctity that the human mind applies itself and its acts to God: so that it differs from religion not essentially but only logically. For it takes the name of religion according as it gives God due service in matters pertaining specially to the Divine worship, such as sacrifices, oblations, and so forth; while it is called sanctity, according as man refers to God not only these but also the works of the other virtues, or according as man by means of certain good works disposes himself to the worship of God
IIª-IIae q. 81 a. 8 ad 1 Ad primum ergo dicendum quod sanctitas est quaedam specialis virtus secundum essentiam, et secundum hoc est quodammodo eadem religioni. Habet autem quandam generalitatem, secundum quod omnes virtutum actus per imperium ordinat in bonum divinum, sicut et iustitia legalis dicitur generalis virtus, inquantum ordinat omnium virtutum actus in bonum commune. Reply to Objection 1. Sanctity is a special virtue according to its essence; and in this respect it is in a way identified with religion. But it has a certain generality, in so far as by its command it directs the acts of all the virtues to the Divine good, even as legal justice is said to be a general virtue, in so far as it directs the acts of all the virtues to the common good.
IIª-IIae q. 81 a. 8 ad 2 Ad secundum dicendum quod temperantia munditiam quidem operatur, non tamen ita quod habeat rationem sanctitatis nisi referatur in Deum. Unde de ipsa virginitate dicit Augustinus, in libro de virginitate, quod non quia virginitas est, sed quia Deo dicata est, honoratur. Reply to Objection 2. Temperance practices purity, yet not so as to have the character of sanctity unless it be referred to God. Hence of virginity itself Augustine says (De Virgin. viii) that "it is honored not for what it is, but for being consecrated to God."
IIª-IIae q. 81 a. 8 ad 3 Ad tertium dicendum quod sanctitas distincta est a religione propter differentiam praedictam, non quia differat re, sed ratione tantum, ut dictum est. Reply to Objection 3. Sanctity differs from religion as explained above, not really but logically.

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