Authors/Thomas Aquinas/Summa Theologiae/Part IIb/Q75

• Question 75.1 Or derision
• Question 75.2

Latin	English
IIª-IIae q. 75 pr. Deinde considerandum est de derisione. Et circa hoc quaeruntur duo. Primo, utrum derisio sit peccatum speciale distinctum ab aliis peccatis quibus per verba nocumentum proximo infertur. Secundo, utrum derisio sit peccatum mortale.	Question 75. Derision 1. Is derision a special sin distinct from the other sins whereby one's neighbor is injured by words? 2. Is derision a mortal sin?
IIª-IIae q. 75 a. 1 arg. 1 Ad primum sic proceditur. Videtur quod derisio non sit speciale peccatum ab aliis praemissis distinctum. Subsannatio enim videtur idem esse quod derisio. Sed subsannatio ad contumeliam videtur pertinere. Ergo derisio non videtur distingui a contumelia.	Objection 1. It would seem that derision is not a special sin distinct from those mentioned above. For laughing to scorn is apparently the same as derision. But laughing to scorn pertains to reviling. Therefore derision would seem not to differ from reviling.
IIª-IIae q. 75 a. 1 arg. 2 Praeterea, nullus irridetur nisi de aliquo turpi, ex quo homo erubescit. Huiusmodi autem sunt peccata, quae si manifeste de aliquo dicuntur, pertinent ad contumeliam; si autem occulte, pertinent ad detractionem sive susurrationem. Ergo derisio non est vitium a praemissis distinctum.	Objection 2. Further, no man is derided except for something reprehensible which puts him to shame. Now such are sins; and if they be imputed to a person publicly, it is a case of reviling, if privately, it amounts to backbiting or tale-bearing. Therefore derision is not distinct from the foregoing vices.
IIª-IIae q. 75 a. 1 arg. 3 Praeterea, huiusmodi peccata distinguuntur secundum nocumenta quae proximo inferuntur. Sed per derisionem non infertur aliud nocumentum proximo quam in honore vel fama vel detrimento amicitiae. Ergo derisio non est peccatum distinctum a praemissis.	Objection 3. Further, sins of this kind are distinguished by the injury they inflict on one's neighbor. Now the injury inflicted on a man by derision affects either his honor, or his good name, or is detrimental to his friendship. Therefore derision is not a sin distinct from the foregoing.
IIª-IIae q. 75 a. 1 s. c. Sed contra est quod irrisio fit ludo, unde et illusio nominatur. Nullum autem praemissorum ludo agitur, sed serio. Ergo derisio ab omnibus praedictis differt.	On the contrary, Derision is done in jest, wherefore it is described as "making fun." Now all the foregoing are done seriously and not in jest. Therefore derision differs from all of them.
IIª-IIae q. 75 a. 1 co. Respondeo dicendum quod, sicut supra dictum est, peccata verborum praecipue pensanda sunt secundum intentionem proferentis. Et ideo secundum diversa quae quis intendit contra alium loquens, huiusmodi peccata distinguuntur. Sicut autem aliquis conviciando intendit conviciati honorem deprimere, et detrahendo diminuere famam, et susurrando tollere amicitiam; ita etiam irridendo aliquis intendit quod ille qui irridetur erubescat. Et quia hic finis est distinctus ab aliis, ideo etiam peccatum derisionis distinguitur a praemissis peccatis.	I answer that, As stated above (Question 72, Article 2), sins of word should be weighed chiefly by the intention of the speaker, wherefore these sins are differentiated according to the various intentions of those who speak against another. Now just as the railer intends to injure the honor of the person he rails, the backbiter to depreciate a good name, and the tale-bearer to destroy friendship, so too the derider intends to shame the person he derides. And since this end is distinct from the others, it follows that the sin of derision is distinct from the foregoing sins.
IIª-IIae q. 75 a. 1 ad 1 Ad primum ergo dicendum quod subsannatio et irrisio conveniunt in fine, sed differunt in modo, quia irrisio fit ore, idest verbo et cachinnis; subsannatio autem naso rugato, ut dicit Glossa super illud Psalm., qui habitat in caelis irridebit eos. Talis tamen differentia non diversificat speciem. Utrumque tamen differt a contumelia, sicut erubescentia a dehonoratione, est enim erubescentia timor dehonorationis, sicut Damascenus dicit.	Reply to Objection 1. Laughing to scorn and derision agree as to the end but differ in mode, because derision is done with the "mouth," i.e. by words and laughter, while laughing to scorn is done by wrinkling the nose, as a gloss says on Psalm 2:4, "He that dwelleth in heaven shall laugh at them": and such a distinction does not differentiate the species. Yet they both differ from reviling, as being shamed differs from being dishonored: for to be ashamed is "to fear dishonor," as Damascene states (De Fide Orth. ii, 15).
IIª-IIae q. 75 a. 1 ad 2 Ad secundum dicendum quod de opere virtuoso aliquis apud alios et reverentiam meretur et famam; apud seipsum bonae conscientiae gloriam, secundum illud II ad Cor. I, gloria nostra haec est, testimonium conscientiae nostrae. Unde e contrario de actu turpi, idest vitioso, apud alios quidem tollitur hominis honor et fama, et ad hoc contumeliosus et detractor turpia de alio dicunt. Apud seipsum autem per turpia quae dicuntur aliquis perdit conscientiae gloriam per quandam confusionem et erubescentiam, et ad hoc turpia dicit derisor. Et sic patet quod derisor communicat cum praedictis vitiis in materia, differt autem in fine.	Reply to Objection 2. For doing a virtuous deed a man deserves both respect and a good name in the eyes of others, and in his own eyes the glory of a good conscience, according to 2 Corinthians 1:12, "Our glory is this, the testimony of our conscience." Hence, on the other hand, for doing a reprehensible, i.e. a vicious action, a man forfeits his honor and good name in the eyes of others--and for this purpose the reviler and the backbiter speak of another person--while in his own eyes, he loses the glory of his conscience through being confused and ashamed at reprehensible deeds being imputed to him--and for this purpose the derider speaks ill of him. It is accordingly evident that derision agrees with the foregoing vices as to the matter but differs as to the end.
IIª-IIae q. 75 a. 1 ad 3 Ad tertium dicendum quod securitas conscientiae et quies illius magnum bonum est, secundum illud Prov. XV, secura mens quasi iuge convivium. Et ideo qui conscientiam alicuius inquietat confundendo ipsum, aliquod speciale nocumentum ei infert. Unde derisio est peccatum speciale.	Reply to Objection 3. A secure and calm conscience is a great good, according to Proverbs 15:15, "A secure mind is like a continual feast." Wherefore he that disturbs another's conscience by confounding him inflicts a special injury on him: hence derision is a special kind of sin.
IIª-IIae q. 75 a. 2 arg. 1 Ad secundum sic proceditur. Videtur quod derisio non possit esse peccatum mortale. Omne enim peccatum mortale contrariatur caritati. Sed derisio non videtur contrariari caritati, agitur enim ludo quandoque inter amicos; unde et delusio nominatur. Ergo derisio non potest esse peccatum mortale.	Objection 1. It would seem that derision cannot be a mortal sin. Every mortal sin is contrary to charity. But derision does not seem contrary to charity, for sometimes it takes place in jest among friends, wherefore it is known as "making fun." Therefore derision cannot be a mortal sin.
IIª-IIae q. 75 a. 2 arg. 2 Praeterea, derisio illa videtur esse maxima quae fit in iniuriam Dei. Sed non omnis derisio quae vergit in iniuriam Dei est peccatum mortale. Alioquin quicumque recidivat in aliquod peccatum veniale de quo poenituit, peccaret mortaliter, dicit enim Isidorus quod irrisor est, et non poenitens, qui adhuc agit quod poenitet. Similiter etiam sequeretur quod omnis simulatio esset peccatum mortale, quia sicut Gregorius dicit, in Moral., per struthionem significatur simulator, qui deridet equum, idest hominem iustum, et ascensorem, idest Deum. Ergo derisio non est peccatum mortale.	Objection 2. Further, the greatest derision would appear to be that which is done as an injury to God. But derision is not always a mortal sin when it tends to the injury of God: else it would be a mortal sin to relapse into a venial sin of which one has repented. For Isidore says (De Sum. Bon. ii, 16) that "he who continues to do what he has repented of, is a derider and not a penitent." It would likewise follow that all hypocrisy is a mortal sin, because, according to Gregory (Moral. xxxi, 15) "the ostrich signifies the hypocrite, who derides the horse, i.e. the just man, and his rider, i.e. God." Therefore derision is not a mortal sin.
IIª-IIae q. 75 a. 2 arg. 3 Praeterea, contumelia et detractio videntur esse graviora peccata quam derisio, quia maius est facere aliquid serio quam ioco. Sed non omnis detractio vel contumelia est peccatum mortale. Ergo multo minus derisio.	Objection 3. Further, reviling and backbiting seem to be graver sins than derision, because it is more to do a thing seriously than in jest. But not all backbiting or reviling is a mortal sin. Much less therefore is derision a mortal sin.
IIª-IIae q. 75 a. 2 s. c. Sed contra est quod dicitur Prov. III, ipse deridet illusores. Sed deridere Dei est aeternaliter punire pro peccato mortali, ut patet per id quod dicitur in Psalm., qui habitat in caelis irridebit eos. Ergo derisio est peccatum mortale.	On the contrary, It is written (Proverbs 3:34): "He derideth [Vulgate: 'shall scorn'] the scorners." But God's derision is eternal punishment for mortal sin, as appears from the words of Psalm 2:4, "He that dwelleth in heaven shall laugh at them." Therefore derision is a mortal sin.
IIª-IIae q. 75 a. 2 co. Respondeo dicendum quod irrisio non fit nisi de aliquo malo vel defectu. Malum autem si sit magnum, non pro ludo accipitur, sed seriose. Unde si in lusum vel risum vertatur (ex quo irrisionis vel illusionis nomen sumitur), hoc est quia accipitur ut parvum. Potest autem aliquod malum accipi ut parvum, dupliciter, uno modo, secundum se; alio modo, ratione personae. Cum autem aliquis alterius personae malum vel defectum in ludum vel risum ponit quia secundum se parvum malum est, est veniale et leve peccatum secundum suum genus. Cum autem accipitur quasi parvum ratione personae, sicut defectus puerorum et stultorum parum ponderare solemus, sic aliquem illudere vel irridere est eum omnino parvipendere, et eum tam vilem aestimare ut de eius malo non sit curandum, sed sit quasi pro ludo habendum. Et sic derisio est peccatum mortale. Et gravius quam contumelia, quae similiter est in manifesto, quia contumeliosus videtur accipere malum alterius seriose, illusor autem in ludum; et ita videtur esse maior contemptus et dehonoratio. Et secundum hoc, illusio est grave peccatum, et tanto gravius quanto maior reverentia debetur personae quae illuditur. Unde gravissimum est irridere Deum et ea quae Dei sunt, secundum illud Isaiae XXXVII, cui exprobrasti? Et quem blasphemasti? Et super quem exaltasti vocem tuam? Et postea subditur, ad sanctum Israel. Deinde secundum locum tenet irrisio parentum. Unde dicitur Prov. XXX, oculum qui subsannat patrem et despicit partum matris suae, effodiant eum corvi de torrentibus, et comedant eum filii aquilae. Deinde iustorum derisio gravis est, quia honor est virtutis praemium. Et contra hoc dicitur Iob XII, deridetur iusti simplicitas. Quae quidem derisio valde nociva est, quia per hoc homines a bene agendo impediuntur; secundum illud Gregorii, qui in aliorum actibus exoriri bona conspiciunt, mox ea manu pestiferae exprobrationis evellunt.	I answer that, The object of derision is always some evil or defect. Now when an evil is great, it is taken, not in jest, but seriously: consequently if it is taken in jest or turned to ridicule (whence the terms 'derision' and 'jesting'), this is because it is considered to be slight. Now an evil may be considered to be slight in two ways: first, in itself, secondly, in relation to the person. When anyone makes game or fun of another's evil or defect, because it is a slight evil in itself, this is a venial sin by reason of its genus. on the other hand this defect may be considered as a slight evil in relation to the person, just as we are wont to think little of the defects of children and imbeciles: and then to make game or fun of a person, is to scorn him altogether, and to think him so despicable that his misfortune troubles us not one whit, but is held as an object of derision. On this way derision is a mortal sin, and more grievous than reviling, which is also done openly: because the reviler would seem to take another's evil seriously; whereas the derider does so in fun, and so would seem the more to despise and dishonor the other man. Wherefore, in this sense, derision is a grievous sin, and all the more grievous according as a greater respect is due to the person derided. Consequently it is an exceedingly grievous sin to deride God and the things of God, according to Isaiah 37:23, "Whom hast thou reproached, and whom hast thou blasphemed, and against whom hast thou exalted thy voice?" and he replies: "Against the Holy One of Israel." On the second place comes derision of one's parents, wherefore it is written (Proverbs 30:17): "The eye that mocketh at his father, and that despiseth the labor of his mother in bearing him, let the ravens of the brooks pick it out, and the young eagles eat it." Further, the derision of good persons is grievous, because honor is the reward of virtue, and against this it is written (Job 12:4): "The simplicity of the just man is laughed to scorn." Such like derision does very much harm: because it turns men away from good deeds, according to Gregory (Moral. xx, 14), "Who when they perceive any good points appearing in the acts of others, directly pluck them up with the hand of a mischievous reviling."
IIª-IIae q. 75 a. 2 ad 1 Ad primum ergo dicendum quod ludus non importat aliquid contrarium caritati respectu eius cum quo luditur, potest tamen importare aliquid contrarium caritati respectu eius de quo luditur, propter contemptum, ut dictum est.	Reply to Objection 1. Jesting implies nothing contrary to charity in relation to the person with whom one jests, but it may imply something against charity in relation to the person who is the object of the jest, on account of contempt, as stated above.
IIª-IIae q. 75 a. 2 ad 2 Ad secundum dicendum quod ille qui recidivat in peccatum de quo poenituit, et ille qui simulat, non expresse Deum irridet, sed quasi interpretative, inquantum scilicet ad modum deridentis se habet. Nec tamen venialiter peccando aliquis simpliciter recidivat vel simulat, sed dispositive et imperfecte.	Reply to Objection 2. Neither he that relapses into a sin of which he has repented, nor a hypocrite, derides God explicitly, but implicitly, in so far as either's behavior is like a derider's. Nor is it true that to commit a venial sin is to relapse or dissimulate altogether, but only dispositively and imperfectly.
IIª-IIae q. 75 a. 2 ad 3 Ad tertium dicendum quod derisio, secundum suam rationem, levius aliquid est quam detractio vel contumelia, quia non importat contemptum, sed ludum. Quandoque tamen habet maiorem contemptum quam etiam contumelia, ut supra dictum est. Et tunc est grave peccatum.	Reply to Objection 3. Derision considered in itself is less grievous than backbiting or reviling, because it does not imply contempt, but jest. Sometimes however it includes greater contempt than reviling does, as stated above, and then it is a grave sin.