Authors/Thomas Aquinas/Summa Theologiae/Part IIb/Q6

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Q5 Q7



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IIª-IIae q. 6 pr. Deinde considerandum est de causa fidei. Et circa hoc quaeruntur duo. Primo, utrum fides sit homini infusa a Deo. Secundo, utrum fides informis sit donum. Question 6. The cause of faith Is faith infused into man by God? Is lifeless faith a gift of God?
IIª-IIae q. 6 a. 1 arg. 1 Ad primum sic proceditur. Videtur quod fides non sit homini infusa a Deo. Dicit enim Augustinus, XIV de Trin., quod per scientiam gignitur in nobis fides, nutritur, defenditur et roboratur. Sed ea quae per scientiam in nobis gignuntur magis videntur acquisita esse quam infusa. Ergo fides non videtur in nobis esse ex infusione divina. Objection 1. It would seem that faith is not infused into man by God. For Augustine says (De Trin. xiv) that "science begets faith in us, and nourishes, defends and strengthens it." Now those things which science begets in us seem to be acquired rather than infused. Therefore faith does not seem to be in us by Divine infusion.
IIª-IIae q. 6 a. 1 arg. 2 Praeterea, illud ad quod homo pertingit audiendo et videndo videtur esse ab homine acquisitum. Sed homo pertingit ad credendum et videndo miracula et audiendo fidei doctrinam, dicitur enim Ioan. IV, cognovit pater quia illa hora erat in qua dixit ei Iesus, filius tuus vivit, et credidit ipse et domus eius tota; et Rom. X dicitur quod fides est ex auditu. Ergo fides habetur ab homine tanquam acquisita. Objection 2. Further, that to which man attains by hearing and seeing, seems to be acquired by him. Now man attains to belief, both by seeing miracles, and by hearing the teachings of faith: for it is written (John 4:53): "The father . . . knew that it was at the same hour, that Jesus said to him, Thy son liveth; and himself believed, and his whole house"; and (Romans 10:17) it is said that "faith is through hearing." Therefore man attains to faith by acquiring it.
IIª-IIae q. 6 a. 1 arg. 3 Praeterea, illud quod consistit in hominis voluntate ab homine potest acquiri. Sed fides consistit in credentium voluntate, ut Augustinus dicit, in libro de Praed. Sanct. Ergo fides potest esse ab homine acquisita. Objection 3. Further, that which depends on a man's will can be acquired by him. But "faith depends on the believer's will," according to Augustine (De Praedest. Sanct. v). Therefore faith can be acquired by man.
IIª-IIae q. 6 a. 1 s. c. Sed contra est quod dicitur ad Ephes. II, gratia estis salvati per fidem, et non ex vobis, ne quis glorietur, Dei enim donum est. On the contrary, It is written (Ephesians 2:8-9): "By grace you are saved through faith, and that not of yourselves . . . that no man may glory . . . for it is the gift of God."
IIª-IIae q. 6 a. 1 co. Respondeo dicendum quod ad fidem duo requiruntur. Quorum unum est ut homini credibilia proponantur, quod requiritur ad hoc quod homo aliquid explicite credat. Aliud autem quod ad fidem requiritur est assensus credentis ad ea quae proponuntur. Quantum igitur ad primum horum, necesse est quod fides sit a Deo. Ea enim quae sunt fidei excedunt rationem humanam, unde non cadunt in contemplatione hominis nisi Deo revelante. Sed quibusdam quidem revelantur immediate a Deo, sicut sunt revelata apostolis et prophetis, quibusdam autem proponuntur a Deo mittente fidei praedicatores, secundum illud Rom. X, quomodo praedicabunt nisi mittantur? Quantum vero ad secundum, scilicet ad assensum hominis in ea quae sunt fidei, potest considerari duplex causa. Una quidem exterius inducens, sicut miraculum visum, vel persuasio hominis inducentis ad fidem. Quorum neutrum est sufficiens causa, videntium enim unum et idem miraculum, et audientium eandem praedicationem, quidam credunt et quidam non credunt. Et ideo oportet ponere aliam causam interiorem, quae movet hominem interius ad assentiendum his quae sunt fidei. Hanc autem causam Pelagiani ponebant solum liberum arbitrium hominis, et propter hoc dicebant quod initium fidei est ex nobis, inquantum scilicet ex nobis est quod parati sumus ad assentiendum his quae sunt fidei; sed consummatio fidei est a Deo, per quem nobis proponuntur ea quae credere debemus. Sed hoc est falsum. Quia cum homo, assentiendo his quae sunt fidei, elevetur supra naturam suam, oportet quod hoc insit ei ex supernaturali principio interius movente, quod est Deus. Et ideo fides quantum ad assensum, qui est principalis actus fidei, est a Deo interius movente per gratiam. I answer that, Two things are requisite for faith. First, that the things which are of faith should be proposed to man: this is necessary in order that man believe anything explicitly. The second thing requisite for faith is the assent of the believer to the things which are proposed to him. Accordingly, as regards the first of these, faith must needs be from God. Because those things which are of faith surpass human reason, hence they do not come to man's knowledge, unless God reveal them. To some, indeed, they are revealed by God immediately, as those things which were revealed to the apostles and prophets, while to some they are proposed by God in sending preachers of the faith, according to Romans 10:15: "How shall they preach, unless they be sent?" As regards the second, viz. man's assent to the things which are of faith, we may observe a twofold cause, one of external inducement, such as seeing a miracle, or being persuaded by someone to embrace the faith: neither of which is a sufficient cause, since of those who see the same miracle, or who hear the same sermon, some believe, and some do not. Hence we must assert another internal cause, which moves man inwardly to assent to matters of faith. The Pelagians held that this cause was nothing else than man's free-will: and consequently they said that the beginning of faith is from ourselves, inasmuch as, to wit, it is in our power to be ready to assent to things which are of faith, but that the consummation of faith is from God, Who proposes to us the things we have to believe. But this is false, for, since man, by assenting to matters of faith, is raised above his nature, this must needs accrue to him from some supernatural principle moving him inwardly; and this is God. Therefore faith, as regards the assent which is the chief act of faith, is from God moving man inwardly by grace.
IIª-IIae q. 6 a. 1 ad 1 Ad primum ergo dicendum quod per scientiam gignitur fides et nutritur per modum exterioris persuasionis, quae fit ab aliqua scientia. Sed principalis et propria causa fidei est id quod interius movet ad assentiendum. Reply to Objection 1. Science begets and nourishes faith, by way of external persuasion afforded by science; but the chief and proper cause of faith is that which moves man inwardly to assent.
IIª-IIae q. 6 a. 1 ad 2 Ad secundum dicendum quod etiam ratio illa procedit de causa proponente exterius ea quae sunt fidei, vel persuadente ad credendum vel verbo vel facto. Reply to Objection 2. This argument again refers to the cause that proposes outwardly the things that are of faith, or persuades man to believe by words or deeds.
IIª-IIae q. 6 a. 1 ad 3 Ad tertium dicendum quod credere quidem in voluntate credentium consistit, sed oportet quod voluntas hominis praeparetur a Deo per gratiam ad hoc quod elevetur in ea quae sunt supra naturam, ut supra dictum est. Reply to Objection 3. To believe does indeed depend on the will of the believer: but man's will needs to be prepared by God with grace, in order that he may be raised to things which are above his nature, as stated above (2, 3).
IIª-IIae q. 6 a. 2 arg. 1 Ad secundum sic proceditur. Videtur quod fides informis non sit donum Dei. Dicitur enim Deut. XXXII, quod Dei perfecta sunt opera. Fides autem informis est quiddam imperfectum. Ergo fides informis non est opus Dei. Objection 1. It would seem that lifeless faith is not a gift of God. For it is written (Deuteronomy 32:4) that "the works of God are perfect." Now lifeless faith is something imperfect. Therefore it is not the work of God.
IIª-IIae q. 6 a. 2 arg. 2 Praeterea, sicut actus dicitur deformis propter hoc quod caret debita forma, ita etiam fides dicitur informis propter hoc quod caret debita forma. Sed actus deformis peccati non est a Deo, ut supra dictum est. Ergo neque etiam fides informis est a Deo. Objection 2. Further, just as an act is said to be deformed through lacking its due form, so too is faith called lifeless [informis] when it lacks the form due to it. Now the deformed act of sin is not from God, as stated above (I-II, 79, 2, ad 2). Therefore neither is lifeless faith from God.
IIª-IIae q. 6 a. 2 arg. 3 Praeterea, quaecumque Deus sanat totaliter sanat, dicitur enim Ioan. VII, si circumcisionem accipit homo in sabbato ut non solvatur lex Moysi, mihi indignamini quia totum hominem salvum feci in sabbato. Sed per fidem homo sanatur ab infidelitate. Quicumque ergo donum fidei a Deo accipit simul sanatur ab omnibus peccatis. Sed hoc non fit nisi per fidem formatam. Ergo sola fides formata est donum Dei. Non ergo fides informis. Objection 3. Further, whomsoever God heals, He heals wholly: for it is written (John 7:23): "If a man receive circumcision on the sabbath-day, that the law of Moses may not be broken; are you angry at Me because I have healed the whole man on the sabbath-day?" Now faith heals man from unbelief. Therefore whoever receives from God the gift of faith, is at the same time healed from all his sins. But this is not done except by living faith. Therefore living faith alone is a gift of God: and consequently lifeless faith is not from God.
IIª-IIae q. 6 a. 2 s. c. Sed contra est quod quaedam Glossa dicit, I ad Cor. XIII, quod fides quae est sine caritate est donum Dei. Sed fides quae est sine caritate est fides informis. Ergo fides informis est donum Dei. On the contrary, A gloss on 1 Corinthians 13:2 says that "the faith which lacks charity is a gift of God." Now this is lifeless faith. Therefore lifeless faith is a gift of God.
IIª-IIae q. 6 a. 2 co. Respondeo dicendum quod informitas privatio quaedam est. Est autem considerandum quod privatio quandoque quidem pertinet ad rationem speciei, quandoque autem non, sed supervenit rei iam habenti propriam speciem. Sicut privatio debitae commensurationis humorum est de ratione speciei ipsius aegritudinis, tenebrositas autem non est de ratione speciei ipsius diaphani, sed supervenit. Quia igitur cum assignatur causa alicuius rei, intelligitur assignari causa eius secundum quod in propria specie existit, ideo quod non est causa privationis non potest dici esse causa illius rei ad quam pertinet privatio sicut existens de ratione speciei ipsius, non enim potest dici causa aegritudinis quod non est causa distemperantiae humorum. Potest tamen aliquid dici esse causa diaphani quamvis non sit causa obscuritatis, quae non est de ratione speciei diaphani. Informitas autem fidei non pertinet ad rationem speciei ipsius fidei, cum fides dicatur informis propter defectum cuiusdam exterioris formae, sicut dictum est. Et ideo illud est causa fidei informis quod est causa fidei simpliciter dictae. Hoc autem est Deus, ut dictum est. Unde relinquitur quod fides informis sit donum Dei. I answer that, Lifelessness is a privation. Now it must be noted that privation is sometimes essential to the species, whereas sometimes it is not, but supervenes in a thing already possessed of its proper species: thus privation of the due equilibrium of the humors is essential to the species of sickness, while darkness is not essential to a diaphanous body, but supervenes in it. Since, therefore, when we assign the cause of a thing, we intend to assign the cause of that thing as existing in its proper species, it follows that what is not the cause of privation, cannot be assigned as the cause of the thing to which that privation belongs as being essential to its species. For we cannot assign as the cause of a sickness, something which is not the cause of a disturbance in the humors: though we can assign as cause of a diaphanous body, something which is not the cause of the darkness, which is not essential to the diaphanous body. Now the lifelessness of faith is not essential to the species of faith, since faith is said to be lifeless through lack of an extrinsic form, as stated above (Question 4, Article 4). Consequently the cause of lifeless faith is that which is the cause of faith strictly so called: and this is God, as stated above (Article 1). It follows, therefore, that lifeless faith is a gift of God.
IIª-IIae q. 6 a. 2 ad 1 Ad primum ergo dicendum quod fides informis, etsi non sit perfecta simpliciter perfectione virtutis, est tamen perfecta quadam perfectione quae sufficit ad fidei rationem. Reply to Objection 1. Lifeless faith, though it is not simply perfect with the perfection of a virtue, is, nevertheless, perfect with a perfection that suffices for the essential notion of faith.
IIª-IIae q. 6 a. 2 ad 2 Ad secundum dicendum quod deformitas actus est de ratione speciei ipsius actus secundum quod est actus moralis, ut supra dictum est, dicitur enim actus deformis per privationem formae intrinsecae, quae est debita commensuratio circumstantiarum actus. Et ideo non potest dici causa actus deformis Deus, qui non est causa deformitatis, licet sit causa actus inquantum est actus. Vel dicendum quod deformitas non solum importat privationem debitae formae, sed etiam contrariam dispositionem. Unde deformitas se habet ad actum sicut falsitas ad fidem. Et ideo sicut actus deformis non est a Deo, ita nec aliqua fides falsa. Et sicut fides informis est a Deo, ita etiam actus qui sunt boni ex genere, quamvis non sint caritate formati, sicut plerumque in peccatoribus contingit. Reply to Objection 2. The deformity of an act is essential to the act's species, considered as a moral act, as stated above (I, 48, 1, ad 2; I-II, 18, 5): for an act is said to be deformed through being deprived of an intrinsic form, viz. the due commensuration of the act's circumstances. Hence we cannot say that God is the cause of a deformed act, for He is not the cause of its deformity, though He is the cause of the act as such. We may also reply that deformity denotes not only privation of a due form, but also a contrary disposition, wherefore deformity is compared to the act, as falsehood is to faith. Hence, just as the deformed act is not from God, so neither is a false faith; and as lifeless faith is from God, so too, acts that are good generically, though not quickened by charity, as is frequently the case in sinners, are from God.
IIª-IIae q. 6 a. 2 ad 3 Ad tertium dicendum quod ille qui accipit a Deo fidem absque caritate non simpliciter sanatur ab infidelitate, quia non removetur culpa praecedentis infidelitatis, sed sanatur secundum quid, ut scilicet cesset a tali peccato. Hoc autem frequenter contingit, quod aliquis desistit ab uno actu peccati, etiam Deo hoc faciente, qui tamen ab actu alterius peccati non desistit, propria iniquitate suggerente. Et per hunc modum datur aliquando a Deo homini quod credat, non tamen datur ei caritatis donum, sicut etiam aliquibus absque caritate datur donum prophetiae vel aliquid simile. Reply to Objection 3. He who receives faith from God without charity, is healed from unbelief, not entirely (because the sin of his previous unbelief is not removed) but in part, namely, in the point of ceasing from committing such and such a sin. Thus it happens frequently that a man desists from one act of sin, through God causing him thus to desist, without desisting from another act of sin, through the instigation of his own malice. And in this way sometimes it is granted by God to a man to believe, and yet he is not granted the gift of charity: even so the gift of prophecy, or the like, is given to some without charity.

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