Authors/Thomas Aquinas/Summa Theologiae/Part IIb/Q52

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Q51 Q53



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IIª-IIae q. 52 pr. Deinde considerandum est de dono consilii, quod respondet prudentiae. Et circa hoc quaeruntur quatuor. Primo, utrum consilium debeat poni inter septem dona spiritus sancti. Secundo, utrum donum consilii respondeat virtuti prudentiae. Tertio, utrum donum consilii maneat in patria. Quarto, utrum quinta beatitudo, quae est, beati misericordes, respondeat dono consilii. Question 52. The gift of counsel Should counsel be reckoned among the seven gifts of the Holy Ghost? Does the gift of counsel correspond to prudence? Does the gift of counsel remain in heaven? Does the fifth beatitude, "Blessed are the merciful," etc. correspond to the gift of counsel?
IIª-IIae q. 52 a. 1 arg. 1 Ad primum sic proceditur. Videtur quod consilium non debeat poni inter dona spiritus sancti. Dona enim spiritus sancti in adiutorium virtutum dantur; ut patet per Gregorium, in II Moral. Sed ad consiliandum homo sufficienter perficitur per virtutem prudentiae, vel etiam eubuliae, ut ex dictis patet. Ergo consilium non debet poni inter dona spiritus sancti. Objection 1. It would seem that counsel should not be reckoned among the gifts of the Holy Ghost. The gifts of the Holy Ghost are given as a help to the virtues, according to Gregory (Moral. ii, 49). Now for the purpose of taking counsel, man is sufficiently perfected by the virtue of prudence, or even of euboulia (deliberating well), as is evident from what has been said (47, 1, ad 2; 51, 1,2). Therefore counsel should not be reckoned among the gifts of the Holy Ghost.
IIª-IIae q. 52 a. 1 arg. 2 Praeterea, haec videtur esse differentia inter septem dona spiritus sancti et gratias gratis datas, quod gratiae gratis datae non dantur omnibus, sed distribuuntur diversis; dona autem spiritus sancti dantur omnibus habentibus spiritum sanctum. Sed consilium videtur esse de his quae specialiter aliquibus a spiritu sancto dantur, secundum illud I Machab. II, ecce Simon, frater vester, ipse vir consilii est. Ergo consilium magis debet poni inter gratias gratis datas quam inter septem dona spiritus sancti. Objection 2. Further, the difference between the seven gifts of the Holy Ghost and the gratuitous graces seems to be that the latter are not given to all, but are divided among various people, whereas the gifts of the Holy Ghost are given to all who have the Holy Ghost. But counsel seems to be one of those things which are given by the Holy Ghost specially to certain persons, according to 1 Maccabees 2:65: "Behold . . . your brother Simon is a man of counsel." Therefore counsel should be numbered among the gratuitous graces rather than among the seven gifts of the Holy Ghost.
IIª-IIae q. 52 a. 1 arg. 3 Praeterea, Rom. VIII dicitur, qui spiritu Dei aguntur, hi filii Dei sunt. Sed his qui ab alio aguntur non competit consilium. Cum igitur dona spiritus sancti maxime competant filiis Dei, qui acceperunt spiritum adoptionis filiorum, videtur quod consilium inter dona spiritus sancti poni non debeat. Objection 3. Further, it is written (Romans 8:14): "Whosoever are led by the Spirit of God, they are the sons of God." But counselling is not consistent with being led by another. Since then the gifts of the Holy Ghost are most befitting the children of God, who "have received the spirit of adoption of sons," it would seem that counsel should not be numbered among the gifts of the Holy Ghost.
IIª-IIae q. 52 a. 1 s. c. Sed contra est quod Isaiae XI dicitur, requiescet super eum spiritus consilii et fortitudinis. On the contrary, It is written (Isaiah 11:2): "(The Spirit of the Lord) shall rest upon him . . . the spirit of counsel, and of fortitude."
IIª-IIae q. 52 a. 1 co. Respondeo dicendum quod dona spiritus sancti, ut supra dictum est, sunt quaedam dispositiones quibus anima redditur bene mobilis a spiritu sancto. Deus autem movet unumquodque secundum modum eius quod movetur, sicut creaturam corporalem movet per tempus et locum, creaturam autem spiritualem per tempus et non per locum, ut Augustinus dicit, VIII super Gen. ad Litt. Est autem proprium rationali creaturae quod per inquisitionem rationis moveatur ad aliquid agendum, quae quidem inquisitio consilium dicitur. Et ideo spiritus sanctus per modum consilii creaturam rationalem movet. Et propter hoc consilium ponitur inter dona spiritus sancti. I answer that, As stated above (I-II, 68, 1), the gifts of the Holy Ghost are dispositions whereby the soul is rendered amenable to the motion of the Holy Ghost. Now God moves everything according to the mode of the thing moved: thus He moves the corporeal creature through time and place, and the spiritual creature through time, but not through place, as Augustine declares (Gen. ad lit. viii, 20,22). Again, it is proper to the rational creature to be moved through the research of reason to perform any particular action, and this research is called counsel. Hence the Holy Ghost is said to move the rational creature by way of counsel, wherefore counsel is reckoned among the gifts of the Holy Ghost.
IIª-IIae q. 52 a. 1 ad 1 Ad primum ergo dicendum quod prudentia vel eubulia, sive sit acquisita sive infusa, dirigit hominem in inquisitione consilii secundum ea quae ratio comprehendere potest, unde homo per prudentiam vel eubuliam fit bene consilians vel sibi vel alii. Sed quia humana ratio non potest comprehendere singularia et contingentia quae occurrere possunt, fit quod cogitationes mortalium sunt timidae, et incertae providentiae nostrae, ut dicitur Sap. IX. Et ideo indiget homo in inquisitione consilii dirigi a Deo, qui omnia comprehendit. Quod fit per donum consilii, per quod homo dirigitur quasi consilio a Deo accepto. Sicut etiam in rebus humanis qui sibi ipsis non sufficiunt in inquisitione consilii a sapientioribus consilium requirunt. Reply to Objection 1. Prudence or euboulia (deliberating well), whether acquired or infused, directs man in the research of counsel according to principles that the reason can grasp; hence prudence or euboulia (deliberating well) makes man take good counsel either for himself or for another. Since, however, human reason is unable to grasp the singular and contingent things which may occur, the result is that "the thoughts of mortal men are fearful, and our counsels uncertain" (Wisdom 9:14). Hence in the research of counsel, man requires to be directed by God who comprehends all things: and this is done through the gift of counsel, whereby man is directed as though counseled by God, just as, in human affairs, those who are unable to take counsel for themselves, seek counsel from those who are wiser.
IIª-IIae q. 52 a. 1 ad 2 Ad secundum dicendum quod hoc potest pertinere ad gratiam gratis datam quod aliquis sit ita boni consilii quod aliis consilium praebeat. Sed quod aliquis a Deo consilium habeat quid fieri oporteat in his quae sunt necessaria ad salutem, hoc est commune omnium sanctorum. Reply to Objection 2. That a man be of such good counsel as to counsel others, may be due to a gratuitous grace; but that a man be counselled by God as to what he ought to do in matters necessary for salvation is common to all holy persons.
IIª-IIae q. 52 a. 1 ad 3 Ad tertium dicendum quod filii Dei aguntur a spiritu sancto secundum modum eorum, salvato scilicet libero arbitrio, quae est facultas voluntatis et rationis. Et sic inquantum ratio a spiritu sancto instruitur de agendis, competit filiis Dei donum consilii. Reply to Objection 3. The children of God are moved by the Holy Ghost according to their mode, without prejudice to their free-will which is the "faculty of will and reason" [Sent. iii, D, 24]. Accordingly the gift of counsel is befitting the children of God in so far as the reason is instructed by the Holy Ghost about what we have to do.
IIª-IIae q. 52 a. 2 arg. 1 Ad secundum sic proceditur. Videtur quod donum consilii non respondeat convenienter virtuti prudentiae. Inferius enim in suo supremo attingit id quod est superius, ut patet per Dionysium, VII cap. de Div. Nom., sicut homo attingit Angelum secundum intellectum. Sed virtus cardinalis est inferior dono, ut supra habitum est. Cum ergo consilium sit primus et infimus actus prudentiae, supremus autem actus eius est praecipere, medius autem iudicare; videtur quod donum respondens prudentiae non sit consilium, sed magis iudicium vel praeceptum. Objection 1. It would seem that the gift of counsel does not fittingly correspond to the virtue of prudence. For "the highest point of that which is underneath touches that which is above," as Dionysius observes (Div. Nom. vii), even as a man comes into contact with the angel in respect of his intellect. Now cardinal virtues are inferior to the gifts, as stated above (I-II, 68, 8). Since, then, counsel is the first and lowest act of prudence, while command is its highest act, and judgment comes between, it seems that the gift corresponding to prudence is not counsel, but rather a gift of judgment or command.
IIª-IIae q. 52 a. 2 arg. 2 Praeterea, uni virtuti sufficienter auxilium praebetur per unum donum, quia quanto aliquid est superius tanto est magis unitum, ut probatur in libro de causis. Sed prudentiae auxilium praebetur per donum scientiae, quae non solum est speculativa, sed etiam practica, ut supra habitum est. Ergo donum consilii non respondet virtuti prudentiae. Objection 2. Further, one gift suffices to help one virtue, since the higher a thing is the more one it is, as proved in De Causis. Now prudence is helped by the gift of knowledge, which is not only speculative but also practical, as shown above (Question 9, Article 3). Therefore the gift of counsel does not correspond to the virtue of prudence.
IIª-IIae q. 52 a. 2 arg. 3 Praeterea, ad prudentiam proprie pertinet dirigere, ut supra habitum est. Sed ad donum consilii pertinet quod homo dirigatur a Deo, sicut dictum est. Ergo donum consilii non pertinet ad virtutem prudentiae. Objection 3. Further, it belongs properly to prudence to direct, as stated above (Question 47, Article 8). But it belongs to the gift of counsel that man should be directed by God, as stated above (Article 1). Therefore the gift of counsel does not correspond to the virtue of prudence.
IIª-IIae q. 52 a. 2 s. c. Sed contra est quod donum consilii est circa ea quae sunt agenda propter finem. Sed circa haec etiam est prudentia. Ergo sibi invicem correspondent. On the contrary, The gift of counsel is about what has to be done for the sake of the end. Now prudence is about the same matter. Therefore they correspond to one another.
IIª-IIae q. 52 a. 2 co. Respondeo dicendum quod principium motivum inferius praecipue adiuvatur et perficitur per hoc quod movetur a superiori motivo principio, sicut corpus in hoc quod movetur a spiritu. Manifestum est autem quod rectitudo rationis humanae comparatur ad rationem divinam sicut principium motivum inferius ad superius, ratio enim aeterna est suprema regula omnis humanae rectitudinis. Et ideo prudentia, quae importat rectitudinem rationis, maxime perficitur et iuvatur secundum quod regulatur et movetur a spiritu sancto. Quod pertinet ad donum consilii, ut dictum est. Unde donum consilii respondet prudentiae, sicut ipsam adiuvans et perficiens. I answer that, A lower principle of movement is helped chiefly, and is perfected through being moved by a higher principle of movement, as a body through being moved by a spirit. Now it is evident that the rectitude of human reason is compared to the Divine Reason, as a lower motive principle to a higher: for the Eternal Reason is the supreme rule of all human rectitude. Consequently prudence, which denotes rectitude of reason, is chiefly perfected and helped through being ruled and moved by the Holy Ghost, and this belongs to the gift of counsel, as stated above (Article 1). Therefore the gift of counsel corresponds to prudence, as helping and perfecting it.
IIª-IIae q. 52 a. 2 ad 1 Ad primum ergo dicendum quod iudicare et praecipere non est moti, sed moventis. Et quia in donis spiritus sancti mens humana non se habet ut movens, sed magis ut mota, ut supra dictum est; inde est quod non fuit conveniens quod donum correspondens prudentiae praeceptum diceretur vel iudicium, sed consilium, per quod potest significari motio mentis consiliatae ab alio consiliante. Reply to Objection 1. To judge and command belongs not to the thing moved, but to the mover. Wherefore, since in the gifts of the Holy Ghost, the position of the human mind is of one moved rather than of a mover, as stated above (1; I-II, 68, 1), it follows that it would be unfitting to call the gift corresponding to prudence by the name of command or judgment rather than of counsel whereby it is possible to signify that the counselled mind is moved by another counselling it.
IIª-IIae q. 52 a. 2 ad 2 Ad secundum dicendum quod scientiae donum non directe respondet prudentiae, cum sit in speculativa, sed secundum quandam extensionem eam adiuvat. Donum autem consilii directe respondet prudentiae, sicut circa eadem existens. Reply to Objection 2. The gift of knowledge does not directly correspond to prudence, since it deals with speculative matters: yet by a kind of extension it helps it. On the other hand the gift of counsel corresponds to prudence directly, because it is concerned about the same things.
IIª-IIae q. 52 a. 2 ad 3 Ad tertium dicendum quod movens motum ex hoc quod movetur movet. Unde mens humana ex hoc ipso quod dirigitur a spiritu sancto, fit potens dirigere se et alios. Reply to Objection 3. The mover that is moved, moves through being moved. Hence the human mind, from the very fact that it is directed by the Holy Ghost, is enabled to direct itself and others.
IIª-IIae q. 52 a. 3 arg. 1 Ad tertium sic proceditur. Videtur quod donum consilii non maneat in patria. Consilium enim est eorum quae sunt agenda propter finem. Sed in patria nihil erit agendum propter finem, quia ibi homines ultimo fine potiuntur. Ergo in patria non est donum consilii. Objection 1. It would seem that the gift of counsel does not remain in heaven. For counsel is about what has to be done for the sake of an end. But in heaven nothing will have to be done for the sake of an end, since there man possesses the last end. Therefore the gift of counsel is not in heaven.
IIª-IIae q. 52 a. 3 arg. 2 Praeterea, consilium dubitationem importat, in his enim quae manifesta sunt ridiculum est consiliari, sicut patet per philosophum, in III Ethic. In patria autem tolletur omnis dubitatio. Ergo in patria non erit consilium. Objection 2. Further, counsel implies doubt, for it is absurd to take counsel in matters that are evident, as the Philosopher observes (Ethic. iii, 3). Now all doubt will cease in heaven. Therefore there is no counsel in heaven.
IIª-IIae q. 52 a. 3 arg. 3 Praeterea, in patria sancti maxime Deo conformantur, secundum illud I Ioan. III, cum apparuerit, similes ei erimus. Sed Deo non convenit consilium, secundum illud Rom. XI, quis consiliarius eius fuit? Ergo etiam neque sanctis in patria competit donum consilii. Objection 3. Further, the saints in heaven are most conformed to God, according to 1 John 3:2, "When He shall appear, we shall be like to Him." But counsel is not becoming to God, according to Romans 11:34, "Who hath been His counsellor?" Therefore neither to the saints in heaven is the gift of counsel becoming.
IIª-IIae q. 52 a. 3 s. c. Sed contra est quod dicit Gregorius, XVII Moral., cumque uniuscuiusque gentis vel culpa vel iustitia ad supernae curiae consilium ducitur, eiusdem gentis praepositus vel obtinuisse in certamine vel non obtinuisse perhibetur. On the contrary, Gregory says (Moral. xvii, 12): "When either the guilt or the righteousness of each nation is brought into the debate of the heavenly Court, the guardian of that nation is said to have won in the conflict, or not to have won."
IIª-IIae q. 52 a. 3 co. Respondeo dicendum quod, sicut dictum est, dona spiritus sancti ad hoc pertinent quod creatura rationalis movetur a Deo. Circa motionem autem humanae mentis a Deo duo considerari oportet. Primo quidem, quod alia est dispositio eius quod movetur dum movetur; et alia dum est in termino motus. Et quidem quando movens est solum principium movendi, cessante motu cessat actio moventis super mobile, quod iam pervenit ad terminum, sicut domus, postquam aedificata est, non aedificatur ulterius ab aedificatore. Sed quando movens non solum est causa movendi, sed etiam est causa ipsius formae ad quam est motus, tunc non cessat actio moventis etiam post adeptionem formae, sicut sol illuminat aerem etiam postquam est illuminatus. Et hoc modo Deus causat in nobis et virtutem et cognitionem non solum quando primo acquirimus, sed etiam quandiu in eis perseveramus. Et sic cognitionem agendorum causat Deus in beatis, non quasi in ignorantibus, sed quasi continuando in eis cognitionem eorum quae agenda sunt. Tamen quaedam sunt quae beati, vel Angeli vel homines, non cognoscunt, quae non sunt de essentia beatitudinis, sed pertinent ad gubernationem rerum secundum divinam providentiam. Et quantum ad hoc est aliud considerandum, scilicet quod mens beatorum aliter movetur a Deo, et aliter mens viatorum. Nam mens viatorum movetur a Deo in agendis per hoc quod sedatur anxietas dubitationis in eis praecedens. In mente vero beatorum circa ea quae non cognoscunt est simplex nescientia, a qua etiam Angeli purgantur, secundum Dionysium, VI cap. Eccl. Hier., non autem praecedit in eis inquisitio dubitationis, sed simplex conversio ad Deum. Et hoc est Deum consulere, sicut Augustinus dicit, V super Gen. ad Litt., quod Angeli de inferioribus Deum consulunt. Unde et instructio qua super hoc a Deo instruuntur consilium dicitur. Et secundum hoc donum consilii est in beatis, inquantum in eis a Deo continuatur cognitio eorum quae sciunt; et inquantum illuminantur de his quae nesciunt circa agenda. I answer that, As stated above (2; I-II, 68, 1), the gifts of the Holy Ghost are connected with the motion of the rational creature by God. Now we must observe two points concerning the motion of the human mind by God. First, that the disposition of that which is moved, differs while it is being moved from its disposition when it is in the term of movement. Indeed if the mover is the principle of the movement alone, when the movement ceases, the action of the mover ceases as regards the thing moved, since it has already reached the term of movement, even as a house, after it is built, ceases being built by the builder. On the other hand, when the mover is cause not only of the movement, but also of the form to which the movement tends, then the action of the mover does not cease even after the form has been attained: thus the sun lightens the air even after it is lightened. On this way, then, God causes in us virtue and knowledge, not only when we first acquire them, but also as long as we persevere in them: and it is thus that God causes in the blessed a knowledge of what is to be done, not as though they were ignorant, but by continuing that knowledge in them. Nevertheless there are things which the blessed, whether angels or men, do not know: such things are not essential to blessedness, but concern the government of things according to Divine Providence. As regards these, we must make a further observation, namely, that God moves the mind of the blessed in one way, and the mind of the wayfarer, in another. For God moves the mind of the wayfarer in matters of action, by soothing the pre-existing anxiety of doubt; whereas there is simple nescience in the mind of the blessed as regards the things they do not know. From this nescience the angel's mind is cleansed, according to Dionysius (Coel. Hier. vii), nor does there precede in them any research of doubt, for they simply turn to God; and this is to take counsel of God, for as Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. v, 19) "the angels take counsel of God about things beneath them": wherefore the instruction which they receive from God in such matters is called "counsel." Accordingly the gift of counsel is in the blessed, in so far as God preserves in them the knowledge that they have, and enlightens them in their nescience of what has to be done.
IIª-IIae q. 52 a. 3 ad 1 Ad primum ergo dicendum quod etiam in beatis sunt aliqui actus ordinati ad finem, vel quasi procedentes ex consecutione finis, sicut quod Deum laudant; vel quibus alios pertrahunt ad finem quem ipsi sunt consecuti, sicut sunt ministeria Angelorum et orationes sanctorum. Et quantum ad hoc habet in eis locum donum consilii. Reply to Objection 1. Even in the blessed there are acts directed to an end, or resulting, as it were, from their attainment of the end, such as the acts of praising God, or of helping on others to the end which they themselves have attained, for example the ministrations of the angels, and the prayers of the saints. On this respect the gift of counsel finds a place in them.
IIª-IIae q. 52 a. 3 ad 2 Ad secundum dicendum quod dubitatio pertinet ad consilium secundum statum vitae praesentis, non autem pertinet secundum quod est consilium in patria. Sicut etiam virtutes cardinales non habent omnino eosdem actus in patria et in via. Reply to Objection 2. Doubt belongs to counsel according to the present state of life, but not to that counsel which takes place in heaven. Even so neither have the theological virtues quite the same acts in heaven as on the way thither.
IIª-IIae q. 52 a. 3 ad 3 Ad tertium dicendum quod consilium non est in Deo sicut in recipiente, sed sicut in dante. Hoc autem modo conformantur Deo sancti in patria, sicut recipiens influenti. Reply to Objection 3. Counsel is in God, not as receiving but as giving it: and the saints in heaven are conformed to God, as receivers to the source whence they receive.
IIª-IIae q. 52 a. 4 arg. 1 Ad quartum sic proceditur. Videtur quod quinta beatitudo, quae est de misericordia, non respondeat dono consilii. Omnes enim beatitudines sunt quidam actus virtutum, ut supra habitum est. Sed per consilium in omnibus virtutum actibus dirigimur. Ergo consilio non respondet magis quinta beatitudo quam alia. Objection 1. It would seem that the fifth beatitude, which is that of mercy, does not correspond to the gift of counsel. For all the beatitudes are acts of virtue, as stated above (I-II, 69, 1). Now we are directed by counsel in all acts of virtue. Therefore the fifth beatitude does not correspond more than any other to counsel.
IIª-IIae q. 52 a. 4 arg. 2 Praeterea, praecepta dantur de his quae sunt de necessitate salutis, consilium autem datur de his quae non sunt de necessitate salutis. Misericordia autem est de necessitate salutis, secundum illud Iac. II, iudicium sine misericordia ei qui non fecit misericordiam, paupertas autem non est de necessitate salutis, sed pertinet ad perfectionem vitae, ut patet Matth. XIX. Ergo dono consilii magis respondet beatitudo paupertatis quam beatitudo misericordiae. Objection 2. Further, precepts are given about matters necessary for salvation, while counsel is given about matters which are not necessary for salvation. Now mercy is necessary for salvation, according to James 2:13, "Judgment without mercy to him that hath not done mercy." On the other hand poverty is not necessary for salvation, but belongs to the life of perfection, according to Matthew 19:21. Therefore the beatitude of poverty corresponds to the gift of counsel, rather than to the beatitude of mercy.
IIª-IIae q. 52 a. 4 arg. 3 Praeterea, fructus consequuntur ad beatitudines, important enim delectationem quandam spiritualem quae consequitur perfectos actus virtutum. Sed inter fructus non ponitur aliquid respondens dono consilii, ut patet Gal. V. Ergo etiam beatitudo misericordiae non respondet dono consilii. Objection 3. Further, the fruits result from the beatitudes, for they denote a certain spiritual delight resulting from perfect acts of virtue. Now none of the fruits correspond to the gift of counsel, as appears from Galatians 5:22-23. Therefore neither does the beatitude of mercy correspond to the gift of counsel.
IIª-IIae q. 52 a. 4 s. c. Sed contra est quod Augustinus dicit, in libro de Serm. Dom. in monte, consilium convenit misericordibus, quia unicum remedium est de tantis malis erui, dimittere aliis et dare. On the contrary, Augustine says (De Serm. Dom. iv): "Counsel is befitting the merciful, because the one remedy is to be delivered from evils so great, to pardon, and to give."
IIª-IIae q. 52 a. 4 co. Respondeo dicendum quod consilium proprie est de his quae sunt utilia ad finem. Unde ea quae maxime sunt utilia ad finem maxime debent correspondere dono consilii. Hoc autem est misericordia, secundum illud I ad Tim. IV, pietas ad omnia utilis est. Et ideo specialiter dono consilii respondet beatitudo misericordiae, non sicut elicienti, sed sicut dirigenti. I answer that, Counsel is properly about things useful for an end. Hence such things as are of most use for an end, should above all correspond to the gift of counsel. Now such is mercy, according to 1 Timothy 4:8, "Godliness ['Pietas,' which our English word 'pity,' which is the same as mercy; see note on II-II, 30, 1 is profitable to all things." Therefore the beatitude of mercy specially corresponds to the gift of counsel, not as eliciting but as directing mercy.
IIª-IIae q. 52 a. 4 ad 1 Ad primum ergo dicendum quod etsi consilium dirigat in omnibus actibus virtutum, specialiter tamen dirigit in operibus misericordiae, ratione iam dicta. Reply to Objection 1. Although counsel directs in all the acts of virtue, it does so in a special way in works of mercy, for the reason given above.
IIª-IIae q. 52 a. 4 ad 2 Ad secundum dicendum quod consilium, secundum quod est donum spiritus sancti, dirigit nos in omnibus quae ordinantur in finem vitae aeternae, sive sint de necessitate salutis sive non. Et tamen non omne opus misericordiae est de necessitate salutis. Reply to Objection 2. Counsel considered as a gift of the Holy Ghost guides us in all matters that are directed to the end of eternal life whether they be necessary for salvation or not, and yet not every work of mercy is necessary for salvation.
IIª-IIae q. 52 a. 4 ad 3 Ad tertium dicendum quod fructus importat quoddam ultimum. In practicis autem non est ultimum in cognitione, sed in operatione, quae est finis. Et ideo inter fructus nihil ponitur quod pertineat ad cognitionem practicam, sed solum ea quae pertinent ad operationes, in quibus cognitio practica dirigit. Inter quae ponitur bonitas et benignitas, quae respondent misericordiae. Reply to Objection 3. Fruit denotes something ultimate. Now the ultimate in practical matters consists not in knowledge but in an action which is the end. Hence nothing pertaining to practical knowledge is numbered among the fruits, but only such things as pertain to action, in which practical knowledge is the guide. Among these we find "goodness" and "benignity" which correspond to mercy.

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