Authors/Thomas Aquinas/Summa Theologiae/Part IIb/Q44

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IIª-IIae q. 44 pr. Deinde considerandum est de praeceptis caritatis. Et circa hoc quaeruntur octo. Primo, utrum de caritate sint danda praecepta. Secundo, utrum unum tantum, vel duo. Tertio, utrum duo sufficiant. Quarto, utrum convenienter praecipiatur ut Deus ex toto corde diligatur. Quinto, utrum convenienter addatur, ex tota mente et cetera. Sexto, utrum praeceptum hoc possit in vita ista impleri. Septimo, de hoc praecepto, diliges proximum tuum sicut teipsum. Octavo, utrum ordo caritatis cadat sub praecepto. Question 44. The precepts of charity Should precepts be given about charity? Should there be one or two? Do two suffice? Is it fittingly prescribed that we should love God, "with thy whole heart"? Is it fittingly added: "With thy whole mind," etc.? Is it possible to fulfil this precept in this life? The precept: "Thou shalt love thy neighbor as thyself" Is the order of charity included in the precept?
IIª-IIae q. 44 a. 1 arg. 1 Ad primum sic proceditur. Videtur quod de caritate non debeat dari aliquod praeceptum. Caritas enim imponit modum actibus omnium virtutum, de quibus dantur praecepta, cum sit forma virtutum, ut supra dictum est. Sed modus non est in praecepto, ut communiter dicitur. Ergo de caritate non sunt danda praecepta. Objection 1. It would seem that no precept should be given about charity. For charity imposes the mode on all acts of virtue, since it is the form of the virtues as stated above (Question 23, Article 8), while the precepts are about the virtues themselves. Now, according to the common saying, the mode is not included in the precept. Therefore no precepts should be given about charity.
IIª-IIae q. 44 a. 1 arg. 2 Praeterea, caritas, quae in cordibus nostris per spiritum sanctum diffunditur, facit nos liberos, quia ubi spiritus domini, ibi libertas, ut dicitur II ad Cor. III. Sed obligatio, quae ex praeceptis nascitur, libertati opponitur, quia necessitatem imponit. Ergo de caritate non sunt danda praecepta. Objection 2. Further, charity, which "is poured forth in our hearts by the Holy Ghost" (Romans 5:5), makes us free, since "where the Spirit of the Lord is, there is liberty" (2 Corinthians 3:17). Now the obligation that arises from a precept is opposed to liberty, since it imposes a necessity. Therefore no precept should be given about charity.
IIª-IIae q. 44 a. 1 arg. 3 Praeterea, caritas est praecipua inter omnes virtutes, ad quas ordinantur praecepta, ut ex supradictis patet. Si igitur de caritate dantur aliqua praecepta, deberent poni inter praecipua praecepta, quae sunt praecepta Decalogi. Non autem ponuntur. Ergo nulla praecepta sunt de caritate danda. Objection 3. Further, charity is the foremost among all the virtues, to which the precepts are directed, as shown above (I-II, 90, 2; I-II, 100, 09). If, therefore, any precepts were given about charity, they should have a place among the chief precepts which are those of the decalogue. But they have no place there. Therefore no precepts should be given about charity.
IIª-IIae q. 44 a. 1 s. c. Sed contra, illud quod Deus requirit a nobis cadit sub praecepto. Requirit autem Deus ab homine ut diligat eum, ut dicitur Deut. X. Ergo de dilectione caritatis, quae est dilectio Dei, sunt danda praecepta. On the contrary, Whatever God requires of us is included in a precept. Now God requires that man should love Him, according to Deuteronomy 10:12. Therefore it behooved precepts to be given about the love of charity, which is the love of God.
IIª-IIae q. 44 a. 1 co. Respondeo dicendum quod, sicut supra dictum est, praeceptum importat rationem debiti. Intantum ergo aliquid cadit sub praecepto inquantum habet rationem debiti. Est autem aliquid debitum dupliciter, uno modo, per se; alio modo, propter aliud. Per se quidem debitum est in unoquoque negotio id quod est finis, quia habet rationem per se boni; propter aliud autem est debitum id quod ordinatur ad finem, sicut medico per se debitum est ut sanet; propter aliud autem, ut det medicinam ad sanandum. Finis autem spiritualis vitae est ut homo uniatur Deo, quod fit per caritatem, et ad hoc ordinantur, sicut ad finem, omnia quae pertinent ad spiritualem vitam. Unde et apostolus dicit, I ad Tim. I, finis praecepti est caritas de corde puro et conscientia bona et fide non ficta. Omnes enim virtutes, de quarum actibus dantur praecepta, ordinantur vel ad purificandum cor a turbinibus passionum, sicut virtutes quae sunt circa passiones; vel saltem ad habendam bonam conscientiam, sicut virtutes quae sunt circa operationes; vel ad habendam rectam fidem, sicut illa quae pertinent ad divinum cultum. Et haec tria requiruntur ad diligendum Deum, nam cor impurum a Dei dilectione abstrahitur propter passionem inclinantem ad terrena; conscientia vero mala facit horrere divinam iustitiam propter timorem poenae; fides autem ficta trahit affectum in id quod de Deo fingitur, separans a Dei veritate. In quolibet autem genere id quod est per se potius est eo quod est propter aliud. Et ideo maximum praeceptum est de caritate, ut dicitur Matth. XXII. I answer that, As stated above (16, 1; I-II, 99, 1), a precept implies the notion of something due. Hence a thing is a matter of precept, in so far as it is something due. Now a thing is due in two ways, for its own sake, and for the sake of something else. On every affair, it is the end that is due for its own sake, because it has the character of a good for its own sake: while that which is directed to the end is due for the sake of something else: thus for a physician, it is due for its own sake, that he should heal, while it is due for the sake of something else that he should give a medicine in order to heal. Now the end of the spiritual life is that man be united to God, and this union is effected by charity, while all things pertaining to the spiritual life are ordained to this union, as to their end. Hence the Apostle says (1 Timothy 1:5): "The end of the commandment is charity from a pure heart, and a good conscience, and an unfeigned faith." For all the virtues, about whose acts the precepts are given, are directed either to the freeing of the heart from the whirl of the passions--such are the virtues that regulate the passions--or at least to the possession of a good conscience--such are the virtues that regulate operations--or to the having of a right faith--such are those which pertain to the worship of God: and these three things are required of man that he may love God. For an impure heart is withdrawn from loving God, on account of the passion that inclines it to earthly things; an evil conscience gives man a horror for God's justice, through fear of His punishments; and an untrue faith draws man's affections to an untrue representation of God, and separates him from the truth of God. Now in every genus that which is for its own sake takes precedence of that which is for the sake of another, wherefore the greatest precept is that of charity, as stated in Matthew 22:39.
IIª-IIae q. 44 a. 1 ad 1 Ad primum ergo dicendum quod, sicut supra dictum est cum de praeceptis ageretur, modus dilectionis non cadit sub illis praeceptis quae dantur de aliis actibus virtutum, puta sub hoc praecepto, honora patrem tuum et matrem tuam, non cadit quod hoc ex caritate fiat. Cadit tamen actus dilectionis sub praeceptis specialibus. Reply to Objection 1. As stated above (I-II, 100, 10) when we were treating of the commandments, the mode of love does not come under those precepts which are about the other acts of virtue: for instance, this precept, "Honor thy father and thy mother," does not prescribe that this should be done out of charity. The act of love does, however, fall under special precepts.
IIª-IIae q. 44 a. 1 ad 2 Ad secundum dicendum quod obligatio praecepti non opponitur libertati nisi in eo cuius mens aversa est ab eo quod praecipitur sicut patet in his qui ex solo timore praecepta custodiunt. Sed praeceptum dilectionis non potest impleri nisi ex propria voluntate. Et ideo libertati non repugnat. Reply to Objection 2. The obligation of a precept is not opposed to liberty, except in one whose mind is averted from that which is prescribed, as may be seen in those who keep the precepts through fear alone. But the precept of love cannot be fulfilled save of one's own will, wherefore it is not opposed to charity.
IIª-IIae q. 44 a. 1 ad 3 Ad tertium dicendum quod omnia praecepta Decalogi ordinantur ad dilectionem Dei et proximi. Et ideo praecepta caritatis non fuerunt connumeranda inter praecepta Decalogi, sed in omnibus includuntur. Reply to Objection 3. All the precepts of the decalogue are directed to the love of God and of our neighbor: and therefore the precepts of charity had not to be enumerated among the precepts of the decalogue, since they are included in all of them.
IIª-IIae q. 44 a. 2 arg. 1 Ad secundum sic proceditur. Videtur quod de caritate non fuerint danda duo praecepta. Praecepta enim legis ordinantur ad virtutem, ut supra dictum est. Sed caritas est una virtus, ut ex supradictis patet. Ergo de caritate non fuit dandum nisi unum praeceptum. Objection 1. It would seem that there should not have been given two precepts of charity. For the precepts of the Law are directed to virtue, as stated above (1, Objection 3). Now charity is one virtue, as shown above (Question 33, Article 5). Therefore only one precept of charity should have been given.
IIª-IIae q. 44 a. 2 arg. 2 Praeterea, sicut Augustinus dicit, in I de Doct. Christ., caritas in proximo non diligit nisi Deum. Sed ad diligendum Deum sufficienter ordinamur per hoc praeceptum, diliges dominum Deum tuum. Ergo non oportuit addere aliud praeceptum de dilectione proximi. Objection 2. Further, as Augustine says (De Doctr. Christ. i, 22,27), charity loves none but God in our neighbor. Now we are sufficiently directed to love God by the precept, "Thou shalt love the Lord thy God." Therefore there was no need to add the precept about loving our neighbor.
IIª-IIae q. 44 a. 2 arg. 3 Praeterea, diversa peccata diversis praeceptis opponuntur. Sed non peccat aliquis praetermittens dilectionem proximi, si non praetermittat dilectionem Dei, quinimmo dicitur Luc. XIV, si quis venit ad me et non odit patrem suum et matrem suam, non potest meus esse discipulus. Ergo non est aliud praeceptum de dilectione Dei et de dilectione proximi. Objection 3. Further, different sins are opposed to different precepts. But it is not a sin to put aside the love of our neighbor, provided we put not aside the love of God; indeed, it is written (Luke 15:26): "If any man come to Me, and hate not his father, and mother . . . he cannot be My disciple." Therefore the precept of the love of God is not distinct from the precept of the love of our neighbor.
IIª-IIae q. 44 a. 2 arg. 4 Praeterea, apostolus dicit, ad Rom. XIII, qui diligit proximum legem implevit. Sed non impletur lex nisi per observantiam omnium praeceptorum. Ergo omnia praecepta includuntur in dilectione proximi. Sufficit ergo hoc unum praeceptum de dilectione proximi. Non ergo debent esse duo praecepta caritatis. Objection 4. Further, the Apostle says (Romans 13:8): "He that loveth his neighbor hath fulfilled the Law." But a law is not fulfilled unless all its precepts be observed. Therefore all the precepts are included in the love of our neighbor: and consequently the one precept of the love of our neighbor suffices. Therefore there should not be two precepts of charity.
IIª-IIae q. 44 a. 2 s. c. Sed contra est quod dicitur I Ioan. IV, hoc mandatum habemus a Deo, ut qui diligit Deum diligat et fratrem suum. On the contrary, It is written (1 John 4:21): "This commandment we have from God, that he who loveth God, love also his brother."
IIª-IIae q. 44 a. 2 co. Respondeo dicendum quod, sicut supra dictum est cum de praeceptis ageretur, hoc modo se habent praecepta in lege sicut propositiones in scientiis speculativis. In quibus conclusiones virtute continentur in primis principiis, unde qui perfecte cognosceret principia secundum totam suam virtutem, non opus haberet ut ei conclusiones seorsum proponerentur. Sed quia non omnes qui cognoscunt principia sufficiunt considerare quidquid in principiis virtute continetur, necesse est propter eos ut in scientiis ex principiis conclusiones deducantur. In operabilibus autem, in quibus praecepta legis nos dirigunt, finis habet rationem principii, ut supra dictum est. Dilectio autem Dei finis est, ad quem dilectio proximi ordinatur. Et ideo non solum oportet dari praeceptum de dilectione Dei, sed etiam de dilectione proximi, propter minus capaces, qui non de facili considerarent unum horum praeceptorum sub alio contineri. I answer that, As stated above (I-II, 91, 3; I-II, 94, 2) when we were treating of the commandments, the precepts are to the Law what propositions are to speculative sciences, for in these latter, the conclusions are virtually contained in the first principles. Hence whoever knows the principles as to their entire virtual extent has no need to have the conclusions put separately before him. Since, however, some who know the principles are unable to consider all that is virtually contained therein, it is necessary, for their sake, that scientific conclusions should be traced to their principles. Now in practical matters wherein the precepts of the Law direct us, the end has the character of principle, as stated above (23, 07, ad 2; 26, 1, ad 1): and the love of God is the end to which the love of our neighbor is directed. Therefore it behooved us to receive precepts not only of the love of God but also of the love of our neighbor, on account of those who are less intelligent, who do not easily understand that one of these precepts is included in the other.
IIª-IIae q. 44 a. 2 ad 1 Ad primum ergo dicendum quod, si caritas sit una virtus, habet tamen duos actus, quorum unus ordinatur ad alium sicut ad finem. Praecepta autem dantur de actibus virtutum. Et ideo oportuit esse plura praecepta caritatis. Reply to Objection 1. Although charity is one virtue, yet it has two acts, one of which is directed to the other as to its end. Now precepts are given about acts of virtue, and so there had to be several precepts of charity.
IIª-IIae q. 44 a. 2 ad 2 Ad secundum dicendum quod Deus diligitur in proximo sicut finis in eo quod est ad finem. Et tamen oportuit de utroque explicite dari praecepta, ratione iam dicta. Reply to Objection 2. God is loved in our neighbor, as the end is loved in that which is directed to the end; and yet there was need for an explicit precept about both, for the reason given above.
IIª-IIae q. 44 a. 2 ad 3 Ad tertium dicendum quod id quod est ad finem habet rationem boni ex ordine ad finem. Et secundum hoc etiam recedere ab eo habet rationem mali, et non aliter. Reply to Objection 3. The means derive their goodness from their relation to the end, and accordingly aversion from the means derives its malice from the same source and from no other
IIª-IIae q. 44 a. 2 ad 4 Ad quartum dicendum quod in dilectione proximi includitur dilectio Dei sicut finis in eo quod est ad finem, et e converso. Et tamen oportuit utrumque praeceptum explicite dari, ratione iam dicta. Reply to Objection 4. Love of our neighbor includes love of God, as the end is included in the means, and vice versa: and yet it behooved each precept to be given explicitly, for the reason given above.
IIª-IIae q. 44 a. 3 arg. 1 Ad tertium sic proceditur. Videtur quod non sufficiant duo praecepta caritatis. Praecepta enim dantur de actibus virtutum. Actus autem secundum obiecta distinguuntur. Cum igitur quatuor homo debeat ex caritate diligere, scilicet Deum, seipsum, proximum et corpus proprium, ut ex supradictis patet; videtur quod quatuor debeant esse caritatis praecepta. Et sic duo non sufficiunt. Objection 1. It would seem that two precepts of charity do not suffice. For precepts are given about acts of virtue. Now acts are distinguished by their objects. Since, then, man is bound to love four things out of charity, namely, God, himself, his neighbor and his own body, as shown above (25, 12; 26), it seems that there ought to be four precepts of charity, so that two are not sufficient.
IIª-IIae q. 44 a. 3 arg. 2 Praeterea, caritatis actus non solum est dilectio, sed gaudium, pax, beneficentia. Sed de actibus virtutum sunt danda praecepta. Ergo duo praecepta caritatis non sufficiunt. Objection 2. Further, love is not the only act of charity, but also joy, peace and beneficence. But precepts should be given about the acts of the virtues. Therefore two precepts of charity do not suffice.
IIª-IIae q. 44 a. 3 arg. 3 Praeterea, sicut ad virtutem pertinet facere bonum, ita et declinare a malo. Sed ad faciendum bonum inducimur per praecepta affirmativa, ad declinandum a malo per praecepta negativa. Ergo de caritate fuerunt danda praecepta non solum affirmativa, sed etiam negativa. Et sic praedicta duo praecepta caritatis non sufficiunt. Objection 3. Further, virtue consists not only in doing good but also in avoiding evil. Now we are led by the positive precepts to do good, and by the negative precepts to avoid evil. Therefore there ought to have been not only positive, but also negative precepts about charity; and so two precepts of charity are not sufficient.
IIª-IIae q. 44 a. 3 s. c. Sed contra est quod dominus dicit, Matth. XXII, in his duobus mandatis tota lex pendet et prophetae. On the contrary, Our Lord said (Matthew 22:40): "On these two commandments dependeth the whole Law and the prophets."
IIª-IIae q. 44 a. 3 co. Respondeo dicendum quod caritas, sicut supra dictum est, est amicitia quaedam. Amicitia autem ad alterum est. Unde Gregorius dicit, in quadam homilia, caritas minus quam inter duos haberi non potest. Quomodo autem ex caritate aliquis seipsum diligat, supra dictum est. Cum autem dilectio et amor sit boni, bonum autem sit vel finis vel id quod est ad finem, convenienter de caritate duo praecepta sufficiunt, unum quidem quo inducimur ad Deum diligendum sicut finem; aliud autem quo inducimur ad diligendum proximum propter Deum sicut propter finem. I answer that, Charity, as stated above (Question 23, Article 1), is a kind of friendship. Now friendship is between one person and another, wherefore Gregory says (Hom. in Ev. xvii): "Charity is not possible between less than two": and it has been explained how one may love oneself out of charity (25, 4). Now since good is the object of dilection and love, and since good is either an end or a means, it is fitting that there should be two precepts of charity, one whereby we are induced to love God as our end, and another whereby we are led to love our neighbor for God's sake, as for the sake of our end
IIª-IIae q. 44 a. 3 ad 1 Ad primum ergo dicendum quod, sicut Augustinus dicit, in I de Doct. Christ., cum quatuor sint ex caritate diligenda, de secundo et quarto, idest de dilectione sui et corporis proprii, nulla praecepta danda erant, quantumlibet enim homo excidat a veritate, remanet illi dilectio sui et dilectio corporis sui. Modus autem diligendi praecipiendus est homini, ut scilicet se ordinate diligat et corpus proprium. Quod quidem fit per hoc quod homo diligit Deum et proximum. Reply to Objection 1. As Augustine says (De Doctr. Christ. i, 23), "though four things are to be loved out of charity, there was no need of a precept as regards the second and fourth," i.e. love of oneself and of one's own body. "For however much a man may stray from the truth, the love of himself and of his own body always remains in him." And yet the mode of this love had to be prescribed to man, namely, that he should love himself and his own body in an ordinate manner, and this is done by his loving God and his neighbor.
IIª-IIae q. 44 a. 3 ad 2 Ad secundum dicendum quod alii actus caritatis consequuntur ex actu dilectionis sicut effectus ex causa, ut ex supradictis patet. Unde in praeceptis dilectionis virtute includuntur praecepta de aliis actibus. Et tamen propter tardiores inveniuntur de singulis explicite praecepta tradita, de gaudio quidem, Philipp. IV, gaudete in domino semper; de pace autem, ad Heb. ult., pacem sequimini cum omnibus; de beneficentia autem, ad Gal. ult., dum tempus habemus, operemur bonum ad omnes. De singulis beneficentiae partibus inveniuntur praecepta tradita in sacra Scriptura, ut patet diligenter consideranti. Reply to Objection 2. As stated above (28, 4; 29, 3), the other acts of charity result from the act of love as effects from their cause. Hence the precepts of love virtually include the precepts about the other acts. And yet we find that, for the sake of the laggards, special precepts were given about each act--about joy (Philippians 4:4): "Rejoice in the Lord always"--about peace (Hebrews 12:14): "Follow peace with all men"--about beneficence (Galatians 6:10): "Whilst we have time, let us work good to all men"--and Holy Writ contains precepts about each of the parts of beneficence, as may be seen by anyone who considers the matter carefully.
IIª-IIae q. 44 a. 3 ad 3 Ad tertium dicendum quod plus est operari bonum quam vitare malum. Et ideo in praeceptis affirmativis virtute includuntur praecepta negativa. Et tamen explicite inveniuntur praecepta data contra vitia caritati opposita. Nam contra odium dicitur Lev. XIX, ne oderis fratrem tuum in corde tuo contra acediam dicitur Eccli. VI, ne acedieris in vinculis eius; contra invidiam, Gal. V, non efficiamur inanis gloriae cupidi, invicem provocantes, invicem invidentes; contra discordiam vero, I ad Cor. I, idipsum dicatis omnes, et non sint in vobis schismata; contra scandalum autem, ad Rom. XIV, ne ponatis offendiculum fratri vel scandalum. Reply to Objection 3. To do good is more than to avoid evil, and therefore the positive precepts virtually include the negative precepts. Nevertheless we find explicit precepts against the vices contrary to charity: for, against hatred it is written (Leviticus 12:17): "Thou shalt not hate thy brother in thy heart"; against sloth (Sirach 6:26): "Be not grieved with her bands"; against envy (Galatians 5:26): "Let us not be made desirous of vainglory, provoking one another, envying one another"; against discord (1 Corinthians 1:10): "That you all speak the same thing, and that there be no schisms among you"; and against scandal (Romans 14:13): "That you put not a stumbling-block or a scandal in your brother's way."
IIª-IIae q. 44 a. 4 arg. 1 Ad quartum sic proceditur. Videtur quod inconvenienter mandetur quod Deus diligatur ex toto corde. Modus enim virtuosi actus non est in praecepto, ut ex supradictis patet. Sed hoc quod dicitur ex toto corde, importat modum divinae dilectionis. Ergo inconvenienter praecipitur quod Deus ex toto corde diligatur. Objection 1. It would seem that it is unfittingly commanded that man should love God with his whole heart. For the mode of a virtuous act is not a matter of precept, as shown above (1, ad 1; I-II, 100, 09). Now the words "with thy whole heart" signify the mode of the love of God. Therefore it is unfittingly commanded that man should love God with his whole heart.
IIª-IIae q. 44 a. 4 arg. 2 Praeterea, totum et perfectum est cui nihil deest; ut dicitur in III Physic. Si igitur in praecepto cadit quod Deus ex toto corde diligatur, quicumque facit aliquid quod non pertinet ad Dei dilectionem agit contra praeceptum, et per consequens peccat mortaliter. Sed peccatum veniale non pertinet ad Dei dilectionem. Ergo peccatum veniale erit mortale. Quod est inconveniens. Objection 2. Further, "A thing is whole and perfect when it lacks nothing" (Phys. iii, 6). If therefore it is a matter of precept that God be loved with the whole heart, whoever does something not pertaining to the love of God, acts counter to the precept, and consequently sins mortally. Now a venial sin does not pertain to the love of God. Therefore a venial sin is a mortal sin, which is absurd.
IIª-IIae q. 44 a. 4 arg. 3 Praeterea, diligere Deum ex toto corde est perfectionis, quia secundum philosophum, totum et perfectum idem sunt. Sed ea quae sunt perfectionis non cadunt sub praecepto, sed sub consilio. Ergo non debet praecipi quod Deus ex toto corde diligatur. Objection 3. Further, to love God with one's whole heart belongs to perfection, since according to the Philosopher (Phys. iii, text. 64), "to be whole is to be perfect." But that which belongs to perfection is not a matter of precept, but a matter of counsel. Therefore we ought not to be commanded to love God with our whole heart.
IIª-IIae q. 44 a. 4 s. c. Sed contra est quod dicitur Deut. VI, diliges dominum Deum tuum ex toto corde tuo. On the contrary, It is written (Deuteronomy 6:5): "Thou shalt love the Lord thy God with thy whole heart."
IIª-IIae q. 44 a. 4 co. Respondeo dicendum quod, cum praecepta dentur de actibus virtutum, hoc ergo modo aliquis actus cadit sub praecepto, secundum quod est actus virtutis. Requiritur autem ad actum virtutis non solum quod cadat super debitam materiam, sed etiam quod vestiatur debitis circumstantiis, quibus sit proportionatus tali materiae. Deus autem est diligendus sicut finis ultimus, ad quem omnia sunt referenda. Et ideo totalitas quaedam fuit designanda circa praeceptum de dilectione Dei. I answer that, Since precepts are given about acts of virtue, an act is a matter of precept according as it is an act of virtue. Now it is requisite for an act of virtue that not only should it fall on its own matter, but also that it should be endued with its due circumstances, whereby it is adapted to that matter. But God is to be loved as the last end, to which all things are to be referred. Therefore some kind of totality was to be indicated in connection with the precept of the love of God.
IIª-IIae q. 44 a. 4 ad 1 Ad primum ergo dicendum quod sub praecepto quod datur de actu alicuius virtutis non cadit modus quem habet ille actus ex alia superiori virtute. Cadit tamen sub praecepto modus ille qui pertinet ad rationem propriae virtutis. Et talis modus significatur cum dicitur, ex toto corde. Reply to Objection 1. The commandment that prescribes an act of virtue does not prescribe the mode which that virtue derives from another and higher virtue, but it does prescribe the mode which belongs to its own proper virtue, and this mode is signified in the words "with thy whole heart."
IIª-IIae q. 44 a. 4 ad 2 Ad secundum dicendum quod dupliciter contingit ex toto corde Deum diligere. Uno quidem modo, in actu, idest ut totum cor hominis semper actualiter in Deum feratur. Et ista est perfectio patriae. Alio modo, ut habitualiter totum cor hominis in Deum feratur, ita scilicet quod nihil contra Dei dilectionem cor hominis recipiat. Et haec est perfectio viae. Cui non contrariatur peccatum veniale, quia non tollit habitum caritatis, cum non tendat in oppositum obiectum; sed solum impedit caritatis usum. Reply to Objection 2. To love God with one's whole heart has a twofold signification. First, actually, so that a man's whole heart be always actually directed to God: this is the perfection of heaven. Secondly, in the sense that a man's whole heart be habitually directed to God, so that it consent to nothing contrary to the love of God, and this is the perfection of the way. Venial sin is not contrary to this latter perfection, because it does not destroy the habit of charity, since it does not tend to a contrary object, but merely hinders the use of charity.
IIª-IIae q. 44 a. 4 ad 3 Ad tertium dicendum quod perfectio caritatis ad quam ordinantur consilia est media inter duas perfectiones praedictas, ut scilicet homo, quantum possibile est, se abstrahat a rebus temporalibus etiam licitis, quae, occupando animum, impediunt actualem motum cordis in Deum. Reply to Objection 3. That perfection of charity to which the counsels are directed, is between the two perfections mentioned in the preceding reply: and it consists in man renouncing, as much as possible, temporal things, even such as are lawful, because they occupy the mind and hinder the actual movement of the heart towards God.
IIª-IIae q. 44 a. 5 arg. 1 Ad quintum sic proceditur. Videtur quod inconvenienter, Deut. VI, super hoc quod dicitur, diliges dominum Deum tuum ex toto corde tuo, addatur, et ex tota anima tua et ex tota fortitudine tua. Non enim accipitur hic cor pro membro corporali, quia diligere Deum non est corporis actus. Oportet igitur quod cor accipiatur spiritualiter. Cor autem spiritualiter acceptum vel est ipsa anima vel aliquid animae. Superfluum igitur fuit utrumque ponere. Objection 1. It would seem that it was unfitting to the words, "Thou shalt love the Lord thy God, with thy whole heart," to add, "and with thy whole soul, and with thy whole strength" (Deuteronomy 6:5). For heart does not mean here a part of the body, since to love God is not a bodily action: and therefore heart is to be taken here in a spiritual sense. Now the heart understood spiritually is either the soul itself or part of the soul. Therefore it is superfluous to mention both heart and soul.
IIª-IIae q. 44 a. 5 arg. 2 Praeterea, fortitudo hominis praecipue dependet ex corde, sive spiritualiter hoc accipiatur, sive corporaliter. Ergo postquam dixerat, diliges dominum Deum tuum ex toto corde tuo, superfluum fuit addere, ex tota fortitudine tua. Objection 2. Further, a man's strength whether spiritual or corporal depends on the heart. Therefore after the words, "Thou shalt love the Lord thy God with thy whole heart," it was unnecessary to add, "with all thy strength."
IIª-IIae q. 44 a. 5 arg. 3 Praeterea, Matth. XXII dicitur, in tota mente tua, quod hic non ponitur. Ergo videtur quod inconvenienter hoc praeceptum detur Deut. VI. Objection 3. Further, in Matthew 22:37 we read: "With all thy mind," which words do not occur here. Therefore it seems that this precept is unfittingly worded in Deuteronomy 6.
IIª-IIae q. 44 a. 5 s. c. Sed contra est auctoritas Scripturae. On the contrary stands the authority of Scripture.
IIª-IIae q. 44 a. 5 co. Respondeo dicendum quod hoc praeceptum diversimode invenitur traditum in diversis locis. Nam sicut dictum est, Deut. VI ponuntur tria, scilicet ex toto corde, et ex tota anima, et ex tota fortitudine. Matth. XXII ponuntur duo horum, scilicet ex toto corde et in tota anima, et omittitur ex tota fortitudine, sed additur in tota mente. Sed Marc. XII ponuntur quatuor, scilicet ex toto corde, et ex tota anima, et ex tota mente, et ex tota virtute, quae est idem fortitudini. Et haec etiam quatuor tanguntur Luc. X, nam loco fortitudinis seu virtutis ponitur ex omnibus viribus tuis. Et ideo horum quatuor est ratio assignanda, nam quod alicubi unum horum omittitur, hoc est quia unum intelligitur ex aliis. Est igitur considerandum quod dilectio est actus voluntatis, quae hic significatur per cor, nam sicut cor corporale est principium omnium corporalium motuum, ita etiam voluntas, et maxime quantum ad intentionem finis ultimi, quod est obiectum caritatis, est principium omnium spiritualium motuum. Tria autem sunt principia factuum quae moventur a voluntate, scilicet intellectus, qui significatur per mentem; vis appetitiva inferior, quae significatur per animam; et vis executiva exterior, quae significatur per fortitudinem seu virtutem sive vires. Praecipitur ergo nobis ut tota nostra intentio feratur in Deum, quod est ex toto corde; et quod intellectus noster subdatur Deo, quod est ex tota mente; et quod appetitus noster reguletur secundum Deum, quod est ex tota anima; et quod exterior actus noster obediat Deo, quod est ex tota fortitudine vel virtute vel viribus Deum diligere. Chrysostomus tamen, super Matth., accipit e contrario cor et animam quam dictum sit. Augustinus vero, in I de Doct. Christ., refert cor ad cogitationes, et animam ad vitam, mentem ad intellectum. Quidam autem dicunt, ex toto corde, idest intellectu; anima, idest voluntate; mente, idest memoria. Vel, secundum Gregorium Nyssenum, per cor significat animam vegetabilem, per animam sensitivam, per mentem intellectivam, quia hoc quod nutrimur, sentimus et intelligimus, debemus ad Deum referre. I answer that, This precept is differently worded in various places: for, as we said in the first objection, in Deuteronomy 6 three points are mentioned: "with thy whole heart," and "with thy whole soul," and "with thy whole strength." On Matthew 22 we find two of these mentioned, viz. "with thy whole heart" and "with thy whole soul," while "with thy whole strength" is omitted, but "with thy whole mind" is added. Yet in Mark 12 we find all four, viz. "with thy whole heart," and "with thy whole soul," and "with thy whole mind," and "with thy whole force" which is the same as "strength." Moreover, these four are indicated in Luke 10, where in place of "strength" or "force" we read "with all thy might." [St. Thomas is explaining the Latin text which reads "ex tota fortitudine tua" (Deuteronomy), "ex tota virtue tua" (Mark), and "ex omnibus tuis" (Luke), although the Greek in all three cases has ex holes tes ischyos, which the Douay renders "with thy whole strength."] Accordingly these four have to be explained, since the fact that one of them is omitted here or there is due to one implying another. We must therefore observe that love is an act of the will which is here denoted by the "heart," because just as the bodily heart is the principle of all the movements of the body, so too the will, especially as regards the intention of the last end which is the object of charity, is the principle of all the movements of the soul. Now there are three principles of action that are moved by the will, namely, the intellect which is signified by "the mind," the lower appetitive power, signified by "the soul"; and the exterior executive power signified by "strength," "force" or "might." Accordingly we are commanded to direct our whole intention to God, and this is signified by the words "with thy whole heart"; to submit our intellect to God, and this is expressed in the words "with thy whole mind"; to regulate our appetite according to God, in the words "with thy whole soul"; and to obey God in our external actions, and this is to love God with our whole "strength," "force" or "might." Chrysostom [The quotation is from an anonymous author's unfinished work (Opus imperf. Hom. xlii, in Matth.) which is included in Chrysostom's works], on the other hand, takes "heart" and "soul" in the contrary sense; and Augustine (On Christian Doctrine I:21) refers "heart" to the thought, "soul" to the manner of life, and "mind" to the intellect. Again some explain "with thy whole heart" as denoting the intellect, "with thy whole soul" as signifying the will, "with thy mind" as pointing to the memory. And again, according to Gregory of Nyssa (De Hom. Opif. viii), "heart" signifies the vegetative soul, "soul" the sensitive, and "mind" the intellective soul, because our nourishment, sensation, and understanding ought all to be referred by us to God.
IIª-IIae q. 44 a. 5 ad arg. Et per hoc patet responsio ad obiecta. This suffices for the Replies to the Objections.
IIª-IIae q. 44 a. 6 arg. 1 Ad sextum sic proceditur. Videtur quod hoc praeceptum de dilectione Dei possit servari in via. Quia secundum Hieronymum, in Expos. Cathol. Fid., maledictus qui dicit Deum aliquid impossibile praecepisse. Sed Deus hoc praeceptum dedit, ut patet Deut. VI. Ergo hoc praeceptum potest in via impleri. Objection 1. It would seem that in this life it is possible to fulfil this precept of the love of God. For according to Jerome [Pelagius, Exposit. Cath. Fid.] "accursed is he who says that God has commanded anything impossible." But God gave this commandment, as is clear from Deuteronomy 6:5. Therefore it is possible to fulfil this precept in this life.
IIª-IIae q. 44 a. 6 arg. 2 Praeterea, quicumque non implet praeceptum peccat mortaliter, quia secundum Ambrosium, peccatum nihil est aliud quam transgressio legis divinae et caelestium inobedientia mandatorum. Si ergo hoc praeceptum non potest in via servari, sequitur quod nullus possit esse in vita ista sine peccato mortali. Quod est contra id quod apostolus dicit, I ad Cor. I, confirmabit vos usque in finem sine crimine; et I ad Tim. III, ministrent nullum crimen habentes. Objection 2. Further, whoever does not fulfil a precept sins mortally, since according to Ambrose (De Parad. viii) sin is nothing else than "a transgression of the Divine Law, and disobedience of the heavenly commandments." If therefore this precept cannot be fulfilled by wayfarers, it follows that in this life no man can be without mortal sin, and this is against the saying of the Apostle (1 Corinthians 1:8): "(Who also) will confirm you unto the end without crime," and (1 Timothy 3:10): "Let them minister, having no crime."
IIª-IIae q. 44 a. 6 arg. 3 Praeterea, praecepta dantur ad dirigendos homines in viam salutis, secundum illud Psalm., praeceptum domini lucidum, illuminans oculos. Sed frustra dirigitur aliquis ad impossibile. Non ergo impossibile est hoc praeceptum in vita ista servari. Objection 3. Further, precepts are given in order to direct man in the way of salvation, according to Psalm 18:9: "The commandment of the Lord is lightsome, enlightening the eyes." Now it is useless to direct anyone to what is impossible. Therefore it is not impossible to fulfill this precept in this life.
IIª-IIae q. 44 a. 6 s. c. Sed contra est quod Augustinus dicit, in libro de Perfect. Iustit. quod in plenitudine caritatis patriae praeceptum illud implebitur diliges dominum Deum tuum, et cetera. Nam cum adhuc est aliquid carnalis concupiscentiae quod continendo frenetur, non omnino ex tota anima diligitur Deus. On the contrary, Augustine says (De Perfect. Justit. viii): "In the fulness of heavenly charity this precept will be fulfilled: Thou shalt love the Lord thy God," etc. For as long as any carnal concupiscence remains, that can be restrained by continence, man cannot love God with all his heart.
IIª-IIae q. 44 a. 6 co. Respondeo dicendum quod praeceptum aliquod dupliciter impleri potest, uno modo, perfecte; alio modo, imperfecte. Perfecte quidem impletur praeceptum quando pervenitur ad finem quem intendit praecipiens, impletur autem, sed imperfecte, quando, etsi non pertingat ad finem praecipientis, non tamen receditur ab ordine ad finem. Sicut si dux exercitus praecipiat militibus ut pugnent, ille perfecte implet praeceptum qui pugnando hostem vincit, quod dux intendit, ille autem implet, sed imperfecte, cuius pugna ad victoriam non pertingit, non tamen contra disciplinam militarem agit. Intendit autem Deus per hoc praeceptum ut homo Deo totaliter uniatur, quod fiet in patria, quando Deus erit omnia in omnibus, ut dicitur I ad Cor. XV. Et ideo plene et perfecte in patria implebitur hoc praeceptum. In via vero impletur, sed imperfecte. Et tamen in via tanto unus alio perfectius implet, quanto magis accedit per quandam similitudinem ad patriae perfectionem. I answer that, A precept can be fulfilled in two ways; perfectly, and imperfectly. A precept is fulfilled perfectly, when the end intended by the author of the precept is reached; yet it is fulfilled, imperfectly however, when although the end intended by its author is not reached, nevertheless the order to that end is not departed from. Thus if the commander of an army order his soldiers to fight, his command will be perfectly obeyed by those who fight and conquer the foe, which is the commander's intention; yet it is fulfilled, albeit imperfectly, by those who fight without gaining the victory, provided they do nothing contrary to military discipline. Now God intends by this precept that man should be entirely united to Him, and this will be realized in heaven, when God will be "all in all," according to 1 Corinthians 15:28. Hence this precept will be observed fully and perfectly in heaven; yet it is fulfilled, though imperfectly, on the way. Nevertheless on the way one man will fulfil it more perfectly than another, and so much the more, as he approaches by some kind of likeness to the perfection of heaven.
IIª-IIae q. 44 a. 6 ad 1 Ad primum ergo dicendum quod ratio illa probat quod aliquo modo potest impleri in via, licet non perfecte. Reply to Objection 1. This argument proves that the precept can be fulfilled after a fashion on the way, but not perfectly.
IIª-IIae q. 44 a. 6 ad 2 Ad secundum dicendum quod sicut miles qui legitime pugnat, licet non vincat, non inculpatur nec poenam meretur; ita etiam qui in via hoc praeceptum implet nihil contra divinam dilectionem agens, non peccat mortaliter. Reply to Objection 2. Even as the soldier who fights legitimately without conquering is not blamed nor deserves to be punished for this, so too he that does not fulfil this precept on the way, but does nothing against the love of God, does not sin mortally.
IIª-IIae q. 44 a. 6 ad 3 Ad tertium dicendum quod, sicut Augustinus dicit, in libro de Perfect. Iustit., cur non praeciperetur homini ista perfectio, quamvis eam in hac vita nemo habeat? Non enim recte curritur, si quo currendum est nesciatur. Quomodo autem sciretur, si nullis praeceptis ostenderetur? Reply to Objection 3. As Augustine says (De Perfect. Justit. viii), "why should not this perfection be prescribed to man, although no man attains it in this life? For one cannot run straight unless one knows whither to run. And how would one know this if no precept pointed it out."
IIª-IIae q. 44 a. 7 arg. 1 Ad septimum sic proceditur. Videtur quod inconvenienter detur praeceptum de dilectione proximi. Dilectio enim caritatis ad omnes homines extenditur, etiam ad inimicos; ut patet Matth. V. Sed nomen proximi importat quandam propinquitatem, quae non videtur haberi ad omnes homines. Ergo videtur quod inconvenienter detur hoc praeceptum. Objection 1. It would seem that the precept of the love of our neighbor is unfittingly expressed. For the love of charity extends to all men, even to our enemies, as may be seen in Matthew 5:44. But the word "neighbor" denotes a kind of "nighness" which does not seem to exist towards all men. Therefore it seems that this precept is unfittingly expressed.
IIª-IIae q. 44 a. 7 arg. 2 Praeterea, secundum philosophum, in IX Ethic., amicabilia quae sunt ad alterum venerunt ex amicabilibus quae sunt ad seipsum, ex quo videtur quod dilectio sui ipsius sit principium dilectionis proximi. Sed principium potius est eo quod est ex principio. Ergo non debet homo diligere proximum sicut seipsum. Objection 2. Further, according to the Philosopher (Ethic. ix, 8) "the origin of our friendly relations with others lies in our relation to ourselves," whence it seems to follow that love of self is the origin of one's love for one's neighbor. Now the principle is greater than that which results from it. Therefore man ought not to love his neighbor as himself.
IIª-IIae q. 44 a. 7 arg. 3 Praeterea, homo seipsum diligit naturaliter, non autem proximum. Inconvenienter igitur mandatur quod homo diligat proximum sicut seipsum. Objection 3. Further, man loves himself, but not his neighbor, naturally. Therefore it is unfitting that he should be commanded to love his neighbor as himself.
IIª-IIae q. 44 a. 7 s. c. Sed contra est quod dicitur Matth. XXII, secundum praeceptum est simile huic, diliges proximum tuum sicut teipsum. On the contrary, It is written (Matthew 22:39): "The second" commandment "is like to this: Thou shalt love thy neighbor as thyself."
IIª-IIae q. 44 a. 7 co. Respondeo dicendum quod hoc praeceptum convenienter traditur, tangitur enim in eo et diligendi ratio et dilectionis modus. Ratio quidem diligendi tangitur ex eo quod proximus nominatur, propter hoc enim ex caritate debemus alios diligere, quia sunt nobis proximi et secundum naturalem Dei imaginem et secundum capacitatem gloriae. Nec refert utrum dicatur proximus vel frater, ut habetur I Ioan. IV; vel amicus, ut habetur Lev. XIX, quia per omnia haec eadem affinitas designatur. Modus autem dilectionis tangitur cum dicitur, sicut teipsum. Quod non est intelligendum quantum ad hoc quod aliquis proximum aequaliter sibi diligat; sed similiter sibi. Et hoc tripliciter. Primo quidem, ex parte finis, ut scilicet aliquis diligat proximum propter Deum, sicut et seipsum propter Deum debet diligere; ut sic sit dilectio proximi sancta. Secundo, ex parte regulae dilectionis, ut scilicet aliquis non condescendat proximo in aliquo malo, sed solum in bonis, sicut et suae voluntati satisfacere debet homo solum in bonis; ut sic sit dilectio proximi iusta. Tertio, ex parte rationis dilectionis, ut scilicet non diligat aliquis proximum propter propriam utilitatem vel delectationem, sed ea ratione quod velit proximo bonum, sicut vult bonum sibi ipsi; ut sic dilectio proximi sit vera. Nam cum quis diligit proximum propter suam utilitatem vel delectationem, non vere diligit proximum, sed seipsum. I answer that, This precept is fittingly expressed, for it indicates both the reason for loving and the mode of love. The reason for loving is indicated in the word "neighbor," because the reason why we ought to love others out of charity is because they are nigh to us, both as to the natural image of God, and as to the capacity for glory. Nor does it matter whether we say "neighbor," or "brother" according to 1 John 4:21, or "friend," according to Leviticus 19:18, because all these words express the same affinity. The mode of love is indicated in the words "as thyself." This does not mean that a man must love his neighbor equally as himself, but in like manner as himself, and this in three ways. First, as regards the end, namely, that he should love his neighbor for God's sake, even as he loves himself for God's sake, so that his love for his neighbor is a "holy" love. Secondly, as regards the rule of love, namely, that a man should not give way to his neighbor in evil, but only in good things, even as he ought to gratify his will in good things alone, so that his love for his neighbor may be a "righteous" love. Thirdly, as regards the reason for loving, namely, that a man should love his neighbor, not for his own profit, or pleasure, but in the sense of wishing his neighbor well, even as he wishes himself well, so that his love for his neighbor may be a "true" love: since when a man loves his neighbor for his own profit or pleasure, he does not love his neighbor truly, but loves himself.
IIª-IIae q. 44 a. 7 ad arg. Et per hoc patet responsio ad obiecta. This suffices for the Replies to the Objections.
IIª-IIae q. 44 a. 8 arg. 1 Ad octavum sic proceditur. Videtur quod ordo caritatis non cadat sub praecepto. Quicumque enim transgreditur praeceptum iniuriam facit. Sed si aliquis diligat aliquem quantum debet, et alterum quemcumque plus diligat, nulli facit iniuriam. Ergo non transgreditur praeceptum. Ordo ergo caritatis non cadit sub praecepto. Objection 1. It would seem that the order of charity is not included in the precept. For whoever transgresses a precept does a wrong. But if man loves some one as much as he ought, and loves any other man more, he wrongs no man. Therefore he does not transgress the precept. Therefore the order of charity is not included in the precept.
IIª-IIae q. 44 a. 8 arg. 2 Praeterea, ea quae cadunt sub praecepto sufficienter nobis traduntur in sacra Scriptura. Sed ordo caritatis qui supra positus est nusquam traditur nobis in sacra Scriptura. Ergo non cadit sub praecepto. Objection 2. Further, whatever is a matter of precept is sufficiently delivered to us in Holy Writ. Now the order of charity which was given above (Article 26) is nowhere indicated in Holy Writ. Therefore it is not included in the precept.
IIª-IIae q. 44 a. 8 arg. 3 Praeterea, ordo distinctionem quandam importat. Sed indistincte praecipitur dilectio proximi, cum dicitur, diliges proximum tuum sicut teipsum. Ergo ordo caritatis non cadit sub praecepto. Objection 3. Further, order implies some kind of distinction. But the love of our neighbor is prescribed without any distinction, in the words, "Thou shalt love thy neighbor as thyself." Therefore the order of charity is not included in the precept.
IIª-IIae q. 44 a. 8 s. c. Sed contra est quod illud quod Deus in nobis facit per gratiam, instruit per legis praecepta, secundum illud Ierem. XXXI, dabo legem meam in cordibus eorum. Sed Deus causat in nobis ordinem caritatis, secundum illud Cant. II, ordinavit in me caritatem. Ergo ordo caritatis sub praecepto legis cadit. On the contrary, Whatever God works in us by His grace, He teaches us first of all by His Law, according to Jeremiah 31:33: "I will give My Law in their heart [Vulgate: 'in their bowels, and I will write it in their heart']." Now God causes in us the order of charity, according to Canticles 2:4: "He set in order charity in me." Therefore the order of charity comes under the precept of the Law.
IIª-IIae q. 44 a. 8 co. Respondeo dicendum quod, sicut dictum est, modus qui pertinet ad rationem virtuosi actus cadit sub praecepto quod datur de actu virtutis. Ordo autem caritatis pertinet ad ipsam rationem virtutis, cum accipiatur secundum proportionem dilectionis ad diligibile, ut ex supradictis patet. Unde manifestum est quod ordo caritatis debet cadere sub praecepto. I answer that, As stated above (4, ad 1), the mode which is essential to an act of virtue comes under the precept which prescribes that virtuous act. Now the order of charity is essential to the virtue, since it is based on the proportion of love to the thing beloved, as shown above (25, 12; 26, 1 and 2). It is therefore evident that the order of charity must come under the precept.
IIª-IIae q. 44 a. 8 ad 1 Ad primum ergo dicendum quod homo plus satisfacit ei quem plus diligit. Et ita, si minus diligeret aliquis eum quem plus debet diligere, plus vellet satisfacere illi cui minus satisfacere debet. Et sic fieret iniuria illi quem plus debet diligere. Reply to Objection 1. A man gratifies more the person he loves more, so that if he loved less one whom he ought to love more, he would wish to gratify more one whom he ought to gratify less, and so he would do an injustice to the one he ought to love more.
IIª-IIae q. 44 a. 8 ad 2 Ad secundum dicendum quod ordo quatuor diligendorum ex caritate in sacra Scriptura exprimitur. Nam cum mandatur quod Deum ex toto corde diligamus, datur intelligi quod Deum super omnia debemus diligere. Cum autem mandatur quod aliquis diligat proximum sicut seipsum, praefertur dilectio sui ipsius dilectioni proximi. Similiter etiam cum mandatur, I Ioan. III, quod debemus pro fratribus animam ponere, idest vitam corporalem, datur intelligi quod proximum plus debemus diligere quam corpus proprium. Similiter etiam cum mandatur, ad Gal. ult., quod maxime operemur bonum ad domesticos fidei; et I ad Tim. V vituperatur qui non habet curam suorum, et maxime domesticorum; datur intelligi quod inter proximos, meliores et magis propinquos magis debemus diligere. Reply to Objection 2. The order of those four things we have to love out of charity is expressed in Holy Writ. For when we are commanded to love God with our "whole heart," we are given to understand that we must love Him above all things. When we are commanded to love our neighbor "as ourselves," the love of self is set before love of our neighbor. On like manner where we are commanded (1 John 3:16) "to lay down our souls," i.e. the life of our bodies, "for the brethren," we are given to understand that a man ought to love his neighbor more than his own body; and again when we are commanded (Galatians 6:10) to "work good . . . especially to those who are of the household of the faith," and when a man is blamed (1 Timothy 5:8) if he "have not care of his own, and especially of those of his house," it means that we ought to love most those of our neighbors who are more virtuous or more closely united to us.
IIª-IIae q. 44 a. 8 ad 3 Ad tertium dicendum quod ex ipso quod dicitur, diliges proximum tuum, datur consequenter intelligi quod illi qui sunt magis proximi sunt magis diligendi. Reply to Objection 3. It follows from the very words, "Thou shalt love thy neighbor" that those who are nearer to us are to be loved more.

Notes

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