Authors/Thomas Aquinas/Summa Theologiae/Part IIb/Q181

From The Logic Museum

Jump to: navigation, search
Q180 Q182



Latin English
IIª-IIae q. 181 pr. Deinde considerandum est de vita activa. Et circa hoc quaeruntur quatuor. Primo, utrum omnia opera virtutum moralium pertineant ad vitam activam. Secundo, utrum prudentia pertineat ad vitam activam. Tertio, utrum doctrina pertineat ad vitam activam. Quarto, de diuturnitate vitae activae. Question 181. The active life 1. Do all the works of the moral virtues pertain to the active life? 2. Does prudence pertain to the active life? 3. Does teaching pertain to the active life? 4. The duration of the active life
IIª-IIae q. 181 a. 1 arg. 1 Ad primum sic proceditur. Videtur quod non omnes actus virtutum moralium pertineant ad vitam activam. Vita enim activa videtur consistere solum in his quae sunt ad alterum, dicit enim Gregorius, super Ezech., quod activa vita est panem esurienti tribuere, et in fine, multis enumeratis quae ad alterum pertinent, subdit, et quae singulis quibusque expediunt dispensare. Sed non per omnes actus virtutum moralium ordinamur ad alios, sed solum secundum iustitiam et partes eius, ut ex supra dictis patet. Non ergo actus omnium virtutum moralium pertinent ad vitam activam. Objection 1. It would seem that the acts of the moral virtues do not all pertain to the active life. For seemingly the active life regards only our relations with other persons: hence Gregory says (Hom. xiv in Ezech.) that "the active life is to give bread to the hungry," and after mentioning many things that regard our relations with other people he adds finally, "and to give to each and every one whatever he needs." Now we are directed in our relations to others, not by all the acts of moral virtues, but only by those of justice and its parts, as stated above (58, 2 and 8; I-II, 60, 2 and 3). Therefore the acts of the moral virtues do not all pertain to the active life.
IIª-IIae q. 181 a. 1 arg. 2 Praeterea, Gregorius dicit, super Ezech., quod per Liam, quae fuit lippa sed fecunda, significatur vita activa, quae, dum occupatur in opere, minus videt; sed dum modo per verbum, modo per exemplum ad imitationem suam proximos accendit, multos in bono opere filios generat. Hoc autem magis videtur pertinere ad caritatem, per quam diligimus proximum, quam ad virtutes morales. Ergo videtur quod actus virtutum moralium non pertineant ad vitam activam. Objection 2. Further, Gregory says (Hom. xiv in Ezech.) that Lia who was blear-eyed but fruitful signifies the active life: which "being occupied with work, sees less, and yet since it urges one's neighbor both by word and example to its imitation it begets a numerous offspring of good deeds." Now this would seem to belong to charity, whereby we love our neighbor, rather than to the moral virtues. Therefore seemingly the acts of moral virtue do not pertain to the active life.
IIª-IIae q. 181 a. 1 arg. 3 Praeterea, sicut supra dictum est, virtutes morales disponunt ad vitam contemplativam. Sed dispositio et perfectio pertinent ad idem. Ergo videtur quod virtutes morales non pertineant ad vitam activam. Objection 3. Further, as stated above (Question 180, Article 2), the moral virtues dispose one to the contemplative life. Now disposition and perfection belong to the same thing. Therefore it would seem that the moral virtues do not pertain to the active life.
IIª-IIae q. 181 a. 1 s. c. Sed contra est quod Isidorus dicit, in libro de summo bono, in activa vita prius per exercitium boni operis cuncta exhaurienda sunt vitia, ut in contemplativa iam pura mentis acie ad contemplandum Deum quisque pertranseat. Sed cuncta vitia non exhauriuntur nisi per actus virtutum moralium. Ergo actus virtutum moralium ad vitam activam pertinent. On the contrary, Isidore says (De Summo Bono iii, 15): "In the active life all vices must first of all be extirpated by the practice of good works, in order that in the contemplative life the mind's eye being purified one may advance to the contemplation of the Divine light." Now all vices are not extirpated save by acts of the moral virtues. Therefore the acts of the moral virtues pertain to the active life.
IIª-IIae q. 181 a. 1 co. Respondeo dicendum quod, sicut supra dictum est, vita activa et contemplativa distinguuntur secundum diversa studia hominum intendentium ad diversos fines, quorum unum est consideratio veritatis, quae est finis vitae contemplativae, aliud autem est exterior operatio, ad quam ordinatur vita activa. Manifestum est autem quod in virtutibus moralibus non principaliter quaeritur contemplatio veritatis, sed ordinantur ad operandum, unde philosophus dicit, in II Ethic., quod ad virtutem scire quidem parum aut nihil potest. Unde manifestum est quod virtutes morales pertinent essentialiter ad vitam activam. Unde et philosophus, in X Ethic., virtutes morales ordinat ad felicitatem activam. I answer that, As stated above (Question 179, Article 1) the active and the contemplative life differ according to the different occupations of men intent on different ends: one of which occupations is the consideration of the truth; and this is the end of the contemplative life, while the other is external work to which the active life is directed. Now it is evident that the moral virtues are directed chiefly, not to the contemplation of truth but to operation. Wherefore the Philosopher says (Ethic. ii, 4) that "for virtue knowledge is of little or no avail." Hence it is clear that the moral virtues belong essentially to the active life; for which reason the Philosopher (Ethic. x, 8) subordinates the moral virtues to active happiness.
IIª-IIae q. 181 a. 1 ad 1 Ad primum ergo dicendum quod inter virtutes morales praecipua est iustitia, qua aliquis ad alterum ordinatur, ut philosophus probat, in V Ethic. Unde vita activa describitur per ea quae ad alterum ordinantur, non quia in his solum, sed quia in his principalius consistit. Reply to Objection 1. The chief of the moral virtues is justice by which one man is directed in his relations towards another, as the Philosopher proves (Ethic. v, 1). Hence the active life is described with reference to our relations with other people, because it consists in these things, not exclusively, but principally.
IIª-IIae q. 181 a. 1 ad 2 Ad secundum dicendum quod per actus omnium virtutum moralium potest aliquis proximos suo exemplo dirigere ad bonum, quod Gregorius ibidem attribuit vitae activae. Reply to Objection 2. It is possible, by the acts of all the moral virtues, for one to direct one's neighbor to good by example: and this is what Gregory here ascribes to the active life.
IIª-IIae q. 181 a. 1 ad 3 Ad tertium dicendum quod, sicut virtus quae ordinatur in finem alterius virtutis, transit quodammodo in speciem eius; ita etiam quando aliquis utitur his quae sunt vitae activae solum prout disponunt ad contemplationem, comprehenduntur sub vita contemplativa. In his autem qui operibus virtutum moralium intendunt tanquam secundum se bonis, non autem tanquam disponentibus ad vitam contemplativam, virtutes morales pertinent ad vitam activam. Quamvis etiam dici possit quod vita activa dispositio sit ad contemplativam. Reply to Objection 3. Even as the virtue that is directed to the end of another virtue passes, as it were, into the species of the latter virtue, so again when a man makes use of things pertaining to the active life, merely as dispositions to contemplation, such things are comprised under the contemplative life. On the other hand, when we practice the works of the moral virtues, as being good in themselves, and not as dispositions to the contemplative life, the moral virtues belong to the active life. It may also be replied, however, that the active life is a disposition to the contemplative life.
IIª-IIae q. 181 a. 2 arg. 1 Ad secundum sic proceditur. Videtur quod prudentia non pertineat ad vitam activam. Sicut enim vita contemplativa pertinet ad vim cognitivam, ita activa ad vim appetitivam. Prudentia autem non pertinet ad vim appetitivam, sed magis ad cognitivam. Ergo prudentia non pertinet ad vitam activam. Objection 1. It would seem that prudence does not pertain to the active life. For just as the contemplative life belongs to the cognitive power, so the active life belongs to the appetitive power. Now prudence belongs not to the appetitive but to the cognitive power. Therefore prudence does not belong to the active life.
IIª-IIae q. 181 a. 2 arg. 2 Praeterea, Gregorius dicit, super Ezech., quod activa vita, dum occupatur in opere, minus videt, unde significatur per Liam, quae lippos oculos habebat. Prudentia autem requirit claros oculos, ut recte iudicet homo de agendis. Ergo videtur quod prudentia non pertineat ad vitam activam. Objection 2. Further, Gregory says (Hom. xiv in Ezech.) that the "active life being occupied with work, sees less," wherefore it is signified by Lia who was blear-eyed. But prudence requires clear eyes, so that one may judge aright of what has to be done. Therefore it seems that prudence does not pertain to the active life.
IIª-IIae q. 181 a. 2 arg. 3 Praeterea, prudentia media est inter virtutes morales et intellectuales. Sed sicut virtutes morales pertinent ad vitam activam, ut dictum est, ita intellectuales ad contemplativam. Ergo videtur quod prudentia pertineat neque ad vitam activam neque ad contemplativam, sed ad medium vivendi genus quod Augustinus ponit, XIX de Civ. Dei. Objection 3. Further, prudence stands between the moral and the intellectual virtues. Now just as the moral virtues belong to the active life, as stated above (Article 1), so do the intellectual virtues pertain to the contemplative life. Therefore it would seem that prudence pertains neither to the active nor to the contemplative life, but to an intermediate kind of life, of which Augustine makes mention (De Civ. Dei xix, 2,3,19).
IIª-IIae q. 181 a. 2 s. c. Sed contra est quod philosophus, in X Ethic., prudentiam pertinere dicit ad felicitatem activam, ad quam pertinent virtutes morales. On the contrary, The Philosopher says (Ethic. x, 8) that prudence pertains to active happiness, to which the moral virtues belong.
IIª-IIae q. 181 a. 2 co. Respondeo dicendum quod, sicut supra dictum est, id quod ordinatur ad aliud sicut ad finem, praecipue in moralibus, trahitur in speciem eius ad quod ordinatur, sicut ille qui moechatur ut furetur, magis dicitur fur quam moechus, secundum philosophum, in V Ethic. Manifestum est autem quod cognitio prudentiae ordinatur ad operationes virtutum moralium sicut ad finem, est enim recta ratio agibilium, ut dicitur in VI Ethic. Unde et fines virtutum moralium sunt principia prudentiae, sicut in eodem libro philosophus dicit. Sicut ergo dictum est quod virtutes morales in eo qui ordinat eas ad quietem contemplationis, pertinent ad vitam contemplativam; ita cognitio prudentiae, quae de se ordinatur ad operationes virtutum moralium, directe pertinet ad vitam activam. Si tamen prudentia proprie sumatur, secundum quod de ea philosophus loquitur. Si autem sumatur communius, prout scilicet comprehendit qualemcumque humanam cognitionem, sic prudentia quantum ad aliquam sui partem pertineret ad vitam contemplativam, secundum quod Tullius dicit, in I de Offic., quod qui acutissime et celerrime potest et videre verum et explicare rationem, is prudentissimus et sapientissimus rite haberi solet. I answer that, As stated above (1, ad 3; I-II, 18, 6), if one thing be directed to another as its end, it is drawn, especially in moral matters, to the species of the thing to which it is directed: for instance "he who commits adultery that he may steal, is a thief rather than an adulterer," according to the Philosopher (Ethic. v, 2). Now it is evident that the knowledge of prudence is directed to the works of the moral virtues as its end, since it is "right reason applied to action" (Ethic. vi, 5); so that the ends of the moral virtues are the principles of prudence, as the Philosopher says in the same book. Accordingly, as it was stated above (1, ad 3) that the moral virtues in one who directs them to the quiet of contemplation belong to the contemplative life, so the knowledge of prudence, which is of itself directed to the works of the moral virtues, belongs directly to the active life, provided we take prudence in its proper sense as the Philosopher speaks of it. If, however, we take it in a more general sense, as comprising any kind of human knowledge, then prudence, as regards a certain part thereof, belongs to the contemplative life. On this sense Tully (De Offic. i, 5) says that "the man who is able most clearly and quickly to grasp the truth and to unfold his reasons, is wont to be considered most prudent and wise."
IIª-IIae q. 181 a. 2 ad 1 Ad primum ergo dicendum quod operationes morales specificantur ex fine, ut supra habitum est. Et ideo ad vitam contemplativam illa cognitio pertinet quae finem habet in ipsa cognitione veritatis, cognitio autem prudentiae, quae magis habet finem in actu appetitivae virtutis, pertinet ad vitam activam. Reply to Objection 1. Moral works take their species from their end, as stated above (I-II, 18, 4,6), wherefore the knowledge pertaining to the contemplative life is that which has its end in the very knowledge of truth; whereas the knowledge of prudence, through having its end in an act of the appetitive power, belongs to the active life.
IIª-IIae q. 181 a. 2 ad 2 Ad secundum dicendum quod occupatio exterior facit hominem minus videre in rebus intelligibilibus, quae sunt separatae a sensibilibus, in quibus operationes activae vitae consistunt. Sed tamen occupatio exterior activae vitae facit hominem magis clare videre in iudicio agibilium, quod pertinet ad prudentiam. Tum propter experientiam. Tum propter mentis attentionem, quia, ubi intenderis, ibi ingenium valet, ut Sallustius dicit. Reply to Objection 2. External occupation makes a man see less in intelligible things, which are separated from sensible objects with which the works of the active life are concerned. Nevertheless the external occupation of the active life enables a man to see more clearly in judging of what is to be done, which belongs to prudence, both on account of experience, and on account of the mind's attention, since "brains avail when the mind is attentive" as Sallust observes [Bell. Catilin., LI].
IIª-IIae q. 181 a. 2 ad 3 Ad tertium dicendum quod prudentia dicitur esse media inter virtutes intellectuales et morales quantum ad hoc, quod in subiecto convenit cum virtutibus intellectualibus, in materia autem totaliter convenit cum moralibus. Illud autem tertium genus vivendi medium est inter activam vitam et contemplativam quantum ad ea circa quae occupatur, quia quandoque occupatur in contemplatione veritatis, quandoque autem occupatur circa exteriora. Reply to Objection 3. Prudence is said to be intermediate between the intellectual and the moral virtues because it resides in the same subject as the intellectual virtues, and has absolutely the same matter as the moral virtues. But this third kind of life is intermediate between the active and the contemplative life as regards the things about which it is occupied, because it is occupied sometimes with the contemplation of the truth, sometimes with eternal things.
IIª-IIae q. 181 a. 3 arg. 1 Ad tertium sic proceditur. Videtur quod docere non sit actus vitae activae, sed contemplativae. Dicit enim Gregorius, super Ezech., quod viri perfecti bona caelestia quae contemplari potuerunt, fratribus denuntiant, eorumque animos in amorem intimae claritatis accendunt. Sed hoc pertinet ad doctrinam. Ergo docere est actus vitae contemplativae. Objection 1. It would seem that teaching is a work not of the active but of the contemplative life. For Gregory says (Hom. v in Ezech.) that "the perfect who have been able to contemplate heavenly goods, at least through a glass, proclaim them to their brethren, whose minds they inflame with love for their hidden beauty." But this pertains to teaching. Therefore teaching is a work of the contemplative life.
IIª-IIae q. 181 a. 3 arg. 2 Praeterea, ad idem genus vitae videtur reduci actus et habitus. Sed docere est actus sapientiae, dicit enim philosophus, in principio Metaphys., quod signum scientis est posse docere. Cum ergo sapientia vel scientia pertineat ad vitam contemplativam, videtur quod etiam doctrina ad vitam contemplativam pertineat. Objection 2. Further, act and habit would seem to be referable to the same kind of life. Now teaching is an act of wisdom: for the Philosopher says (Metaph. i, 1) that "to be able to teach is an indication of knowledge." Therefore since wisdom or knowledge pertain to the contemplative life, it would seem that teaching also belongs to the contemplative life.
IIª-IIae q. 181 a. 3 arg. 3 Praeterea, sicut contemplatio est actus vitae contemplativae, ita et oratio. Sed oratio qua quis orat pro alio, nihilominus pertinet ad vitam contemplativam. Ergo quod aliquis veritatem meditatam in alterius notitiam per doctrinam deducat, videtur ad vitam contemplativam pertinere. Objection 3. Further, prayer, no less than contemplation, is an act of the contemplative life. Now prayer, even when one prays for another, belongs to the contemplative life. Therefore it would seem that it belongs also to the contemplative life to acquaint another, by teaching him, of the truth we have meditated.
IIª-IIae q. 181 a. 3 s. c. Sed contra est quod Gregorius dicit, super Ezech., activa vita est panem esurienti tribuere, verbo sapientiae nescientem docere. On the contrary, Gregory says (Hom. xiv in Ezech.): "The active life is to give bread to the hungry, to teach the ignorant the words of wisdom."
IIª-IIae q. 181 a. 3 co. Respondeo dicendum quod actus doctrinae habet duplex obiectum, fit enim doctrina per locutionem; locutio autem est signum audibile interioris conceptus. Est igitur unum obiectum doctrinae id quod est materia sive obiectum interioris conceptionis. Et quantum ad hoc obiectum, quandoque doctrina pertinet ad vitam activam, quandoque ad contemplativam, ad activam quidem, quando homo interius concipit aliquam veritatem ut per eam in exteriori actione dirigatur; ad contemplativam autem, quando homo interius concipit aliquam veritatem intelligibilem in cuius consideratione et amore delectatur. Unde Augustinus dicit, in libro de verbis Dom., eligant sibi partem meliorem, scilicet vitae contemplativae; vacent verbo, inhient doctrinae dulcedini, occupentur circa scientiam salutarem, ubi manifeste dicit doctrinam ad vitam contemplativam pertinere. Aliud vero obiectum doctrinae est ex parte sermonis audibilis. Et sic obiectum doctrinae est ipse audiens. Et quantum ad hoc obiectum, omnis doctrina pertinet ad vitam activam, ad quam pertinent exteriores actiones. I answer that, The act of teaching has a twofold object. For teaching is conveyed by speech, and speech is the audible sign of the interior concept. Accordingly one object of teaching is the matter or object of the interior concept; and as to this object teaching belongs sometimes to the active, sometimes to the contemplative life. It belongs to the active life, when a man conceives a truth inwardly, so as to be directed thereby in his outward action; but it belongs to the contemplative life when a man conceives an intelligible truth, in the consideration and love whereof he delights. Hence Augustine says (De Verb. Dom. Serm. civ, 1): "Let them choose for themselves the better part," namely the contemplative life, "let them be busy with the word, long for the sweetness of teaching, occupy themselves with salutary knowledge," thus stating clearly that teaching belongs to the contemplative life. The other object of teaching is on the part of the speech heard, and thus the object of teaching is the hearer. As to this object all doctrine belongs to the active life to which external actions pertain.
IIª-IIae q. 181 a. 3 ad 1 Ad primum ergo dicendum quod auctoritas illa expresse loquitur de doctrina quantum ad materiam, prout versatur circa considerationem et amorem veritatis. Reply to Objection 1. The authority quoted speaks expressly of doctrine as to its matter, in so far as it is concerned with the consideration and love of truth.
IIª-IIae q. 181 a. 3 ad 2 Ad secundum dicendum quod habitus et actus communicant in obiecto. Et ideo manifeste illa ratio procedit ex parte materiae interioris conceptus. In tantum enim ad sapientem vel scientem pertinet posse docere, in quantum potest interiorem conceptum verbis exprimere, ad hoc quod possit alium adducere ad intellectum veritatis. Reply to Objection 2. Habit and act have a common object. Hence this argument clearly considers the matter of the interior concept. For it pertains to the man having wisdom and knowledge to be able to teach, in so far as he is able to express his interior concept in words, so as to bring another man to understand the truth.
IIª-IIae q. 181 a. 3 ad 3 Ad tertium dicendum quod ille qui orat pro alio, nihil agit erga illum pro quo orat, sed solum erga Deum, qui est intelligibilis veritas. Sed ille qui alium docet, aliquid circa eum agit exteriori actione. Unde non est similis ratio de utroque. Reply to Objection 3. He who prays for another does nothing towards the man for whom he prays, but only towards God Who is the intelligible truth; whereas he who teaches another does something in his regard by external action. Hence the comparison fails.
IIª-IIae q. 181 a. 4 arg. 1 Ad quartum sic proceditur. Videtur quod vita activa maneat post hanc vitam. Ad vitam enim activam pertinent actus virtutum moralium, ut dictum est. Sed virtutes morales permanent post hanc vitam, ut Augustinus dicit, XIV de Trin. Ergo vita activa permanet post hanc vitam. Objection 1. It would seem that the active life remains after this life. For the acts of the moral virtues belong to the active life, as stated above (Article 1). But the moral virtues endure after this life according to Augustine (De Trin. xiv, 9). Therefore the active life remains after this life.
IIª-IIae q. 181 a. 4 arg. 2 Praeterea, docere alios pertinet ad vitam activam, ut dictum est. Sed in futura vita, in qua similes erimus Angelis, poterit esse doctrina, sicut et in Angelis esse videtur, quorum unus alium illuminat, purgat et perficit, quod refertur ad scientiae assumptionem, ut patet per Dionysium, VII cap. Cael. Hier. Ergo videtur quod vita activa remanet post hanc vitam. Objection 2. Further, teaching others belongs to the active life, as stated above (Article 3). But in the life to come when "we shall be like the angels," teaching will be possible: even as apparently it is in the angels of whom one "enlightens, cleanses, and perfects" [Coel. Hier. iii, viii] another, which refers to the "receiving of knowledge," according to Dionysius (Coel. Hier. vii). Therefore it would seem that the active life remains after this life.
IIª-IIae q. 181 a. 4 arg. 3 Praeterea, illud quod de se est durabilius, magis videtur posse post hanc vitam remanere. Sed vita activa videtur esse de se durabilior, dicit enim Gregorius, super Ezech., quod in vita activa fixi permanere possumus, in contemplativa autem intenta mente manere nullo modo valemus. Ergo multo magis vita activa potest manere post hanc vitam quam contemplativa. Objection 3. Further, the more lasting a thing is in itself, the more is it able to endure after this life. But the active life is seemingly more lasting in itself: for Gregory says (Hom. v in Ezech.) that "we can remain fixed in the active life, whereas we are nowise able to maintain an attentive mind in the contemplative life." Therefore the active life is much more able than the contemplative to endure after this life.
IIª-IIae q. 181 a. 4 s. c. Sed contra est quod Gregorius dicit, super Ezech., cum praesenti saeculo vita aufertur activa, contemplativa autem hic incipitur ut in caelesti patria perficiatur. On the contrary, Gregory says (Hom. xiv in Ezech.): "The active life ends with this world, but the contemplative life begins here, to be perfected in our heavenly home."
IIª-IIae q. 181 a. 4 co. Respondeo dicendum quod, sicut dictum est, activa vita habet finem in exterioribus actibus, qui si referuntur ad quietem contemplationis, iam pertinent ad vitam contemplativam. In futura autem vita beatorum cessabit occupatio exteriorum actuum, et si qui actus exteriores sint, referentur ad finem contemplationis. Ut enim Augustinus dicit, in fine de Civ. Dei, ibi vacabimus et videbimus; videbimus et amabimus; amabimus et laudabimus. Et in eodem libro praemittit quod Deus ibi sine fine videbitur, sine fastidio amabitur, sine fatigatione laudabitur. Hoc munus, hic affectus, hic actus erit omnibus. I answer that, As stated above (Article 1), the active life has its end in external actions: and if these be referred to the quiet of contemplation, for that very reason they belong to the contemplative life. But in the future life of the blessed the occupation of external actions will cease, and if there be any external actions at all, these will be referred to contemplation as their end. For, as Augustine says at the end of De Civitate Dei xxii, 30, "there we shall rest and we shall see, we shall see and love, we shall love and praise." And he had said before (De Civ. Dei xxii, 30) that "there God will be seen without end, loved without wearying, praised without tiring: such will be the occupation of all, the common love, the universal activity."
IIª-IIae q. 181 a. 4 ad 1 Ad primum ergo dicendum quod, sicut supra dictum est, virtutes morales manebunt non secundum actus quos habent circa ea quae sunt ad finem, sed secundum actus quos habent circa finem. Huiusmodi autem actus sunt secundum quod constituunt quietem contemplationis. Quam Augustinus in praemissis verbis significat per vacationem, quae est intelligenda non solum ab exterioribus tumultibus, sed etiam ab interiori perturbatione passionum. Reply to Objection 1. As stated above (136, 1, ad 1), the moral virtues will remain not as to those actions which are about the means, but as to the actions which are about the end. Such acts are those that conduce to the quiet of contemplation, which in the words quoted above Augustine denotes by "rest," and this rest excludes not only outward disturbances but also the inward disturbance of the passions.
IIª-IIae q. 181 a. 4 ad 2 Ad secundum dicendum quod vita contemplativa, sicut supra dictum est, praecipue consistit in contemplatione Dei. Et quantum ad hoc, unus Angelus alium non docet, quia, ut dicitur Matth. XVIII de Angelis pusillorum, qui sunt inferioris ordinis, quod semper vident faciem patris. Et sic etiam in futura vita nullus hominum alium docebit de Deo, sed omnes videbimus eum sicuti est, ut habetur I Ioan. III. Et hoc est quod dicitur Ierem. XXXI, non docebit ultra vir proximum suum, dicens, cognosce dominum, omnes enim cognoscent me, a minimo eorum usque ad maximum. Sed de his quae pertinent ad dispensationem ministeriorum Dei, unus Angelus docet alium, purgando, illuminando et perficiendo. Et secundum hoc, aliquid habent de vita activa quandiu mundus durat, ex hoc quod administrationi inferioris creaturae intendunt. Quod significatur per hoc quod Iacob vidit Angelos in scala ascendentes, quod pertinet ad contemplationem, et descendentes, quod pertinet ad actionem. Sed sicut dicit Gregorius, II Moral., non sic a divina visione foris exeunt ut internae contemplationis gaudiis priventur. Et ideo in eis non distinguitur vita activa a contemplativa, sicut in nobis, qui per opera activa impedimur a contemplatione. Non autem promittitur nobis similitudo Angelorum quantum ad administrationem inferioris creaturae, quae nobis non competit secundum ordinem naturae nostrae, sicut competit Angelis, sed secundum visionem Dei. Reply to Objection 2. The contemplative life, as stated above (Question 180, Article 4), consists chiefly in the contemplation of God, and as to this, one angel does not teach another, since according to Matthew 18:10, "the little ones' angels," who belong to the lower order, "always see the face of the Father"; and so, in the life to come, no man will teach another of God, but "we shall" all "see Him as He is" (1 John 3:2). This is in keeping with the saying of Jeremiah 31:34: "They shall teach no more every man his neighbor . . . saying: Know the Lord: for all shall know me, from the least of them even to the greatest." But as regards things pertaining to the "dispensation of the mysteries of God," one angel teaches another by cleansing, enlightening, and perfecting him: and thus they have something of the active life so long as the world lasts, from the fact that they are occupied in administering to the creatures below them. This is signified by the fact that Jacob saw angels "ascending" the ladder--which refers to contemplation--and "descending" --which refers to action. Nevertheless, as Gregory remarks (Moral. ii, 3), "they do not wander abroad from the Divine vision, so as to be deprived of the joys of inward contemplation." Hence in them the active life does not differ from the contemplative life as it does in us for whom the works of the active life are a hindrance to contemplation. Nor is the likeness to the angels promised to us as regards the administering to lower creatures, for this is competent to us not by reason of our natural order, as it is to the angels, but by reason of our seeing God.
IIª-IIae q. 181 a. 4 ad 3 Ad tertium dicendum quod durabilitas vitae activae in statu praesenti excedens durabilitatem vitae contemplativae, non provenit ex proprietate utriusque vitae secundum se consideratae, sed ex defectu nostro, qui ex corporis gravitate retrahimur ab altitudine contemplationis. Unde ibidem subdit Gregorius quod ipsa sua infirmitate ab immensitate tantae celsitudinis repulsus animus in semetipso relabitur. Reply to Objection 3. That the durability of the active life in the present state surpasses the durability of the contemplative life arises not from any property of either life considered in itself, but from our own deficiency, since we are withheld from the heights of contemplation by the weight of the body. Hence Gregory adds (Moral. ii, 3) that "the mind through its very weakness being repelled from that immense height recoils on itself."

Notes


  • [[]]
Personal tools