Authors/Thomas Aquinas/Summa Theologiae/Part IIb/Q170

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Q169 Q171



Latin English
IIª-IIae q. 170 pr. Deinde considerandum est de praeceptis temperantiae. Et primo, de praeceptis ipsius temperantiae. Secundo, de praeceptis partium eius. Question 170. The precepts of temperance 1. The precepts of temperance itself 2. The precepts of its parts
IIª-IIae q. 170 a. 1 arg. 1 Ad primum sic proceditur. Videtur quod praecepta temperantiae inconvenienter in lege divina tradantur. Fortitudo enim est potior virtus quam temperantia, ut supra dictum est. Sed nullum praeceptum fortitudinis ponitur inter praecepta Decalogi, quae sunt potiora legis praecepta. Ergo inconvenienter inter praecepta Decalogi ponitur prohibitio adulterii, quod contrariatur temperantiae, ut ex supra dictis patet. Objection 1. It would seem that the precepts of temperance are unsuitably given in the Divine law. Because fortitude is a greater virtue than temperance, as stated above (123, 12; 141, 8; I-II, 66, 4). Now there is no precept of fortitude among the precepts of the decalogue, which are the most important among the precepts of the Law. Therefore it was unfitting to include among the precepts of the decalogue the prohibition of adultery, which is contrary to temperance, as stated above (154, 1,8).
IIª-IIae q. 170 a. 1 arg. 2 Praeterea, temperantia non solum est circa venerea, sed etiam circa delectationem ciborum et potuum. Sed inter praecepta Decalogi non prohibetur aliquod vitium pertinens ad delectationem ciborum et potuum, neque etiam pertinens ad aliquam aliam speciem luxuriae. Ergo neque etiam debet poni aliquod praeceptum prohibens adulterium, quod pertinet ad delectationem venereorum. Objection 2. Further, temperance is not only about venereal matters, but also about pleasures of meat and drink. Now the precepts of the decalogue include no prohibition of a vice pertaining to pleasures of meat and drink, or to any other species of lust. Neither, therefore, should they include a precept prohibiting adultery, which pertains to venereal pleasure.
IIª-IIae q. 170 a. 1 arg. 3 Praeterea, principalius est in intentione legislatoris inducere ad virtutes quam vitia prohibere, ad hoc enim vitia prohibentur, ut virtutum impedimenta tollantur. Sed praecepta Decalogi sunt principalia in lege divina. Ergo inter praecepta Decalogi magis debuit poni praeceptum aliquod affirmativum directe inducens ad virtutem temperantiae, quam praeceptum negativum prohibens adulterium, quod ei directe opponitur. Objection 3. Further, in the lawgiver's intention inducement to virtue precedes the prohibition of vice, since vices are forbidden in order that obstacles to virtue may be removed. Now the precepts of the decalogue are the most important in the Divine law. Therefore the precepts of the decalogue should have included an affirmative precept directly prescribing the virtue of temperance, rather than a negative precept forbidding adultery which is directly opposed thereto.
IIª-IIae q. 170 a. 1 s. c. In contrarium est auctoritas Scripturae. On the contrary, stands the authority of Scripture in the decalogue (Exodus 20:14-17).
IIª-IIae q. 170 a. 1 co. Respondeo dicendum quod, sicut apostolus dicit, I ad Tim. I, finis praecepti caritas est, ad quam duobus praeceptis inducimur pertinentibus ad dilectionem Dei et proximi. Et ideo illa praecepta in Decalogo ponuntur quae directius ordinantur ad dilectionem Dei et proximi. Inter vitia autem temperantiae opposita, maxime dilectioni proximi videtur opponi adulterium, per quod aliquis usurpat sibi rem alienam, abutendo scilicet uxore proximi. Et ideo inter praecepta Decalogi praecipue prohibetur adulterium, non solum secundum quod opere exercetur, sed etiam secundum quod corde concupiscitur. I answer that, As the Apostle says (1 Timothy 1:5), "the end of the commandment is charity," which is enjoined upon us in the two precepts concerning the love of God and of our neighbor. Wherefore the decalogue contains those precepts which tend more directly to the love of God and of our neighbor. Now among the vices opposed to temperance, adultery would seem most of all opposed to the love of our neighbor, since thereby a man lays hold of another's property for his own use, by abusing his neighbor's wife. Wherefore the precepts of the decalogue include a special prohibition of adultery, not only as committed in deed, but also as desired in thought.
IIª-IIae q. 170 a. 1 ad 1 Ad primum ergo dicendum quod inter species vitiorum quae opponuntur fortitudini, nulla est quae ita directe contrarietur dilectioni proximi sicut adulterium, quod est species luxuriae, quae temperantiae contrariatur. Et tamen vitium audaciae, quod opponitur fortitudini, quandoque solet esse causa homicidii, quod inter praecepta Decalogi prohibetur, dicitur enim Eccli. VIII, cum audace non eas in via, ne forte gravet mala sua in te. Reply to Objection 1. Among the species of vices opposed to fortitude there is not one that is so directly opposed to the love of our neighbor as adultery, which is a species of lust that is opposed to temperance. And yet the vice of daring, which is opposed to fortitude, is wont to be sometimes the cause of murder, which is forbidden by one of the precepts of the decalogue: for it is written (Sirach 8:18): "Go not on the way with a bold man lest he burden thee with his evils."
IIª-IIae q. 170 a. 1 ad 2 Ad secundum dicendum quod gula directe non opponitur dilectioni proximi, sicut adulterium, neque etiam aliqua alia species luxuriae. Non enim tanta fit iniuria patri per stuprum virginis, quae non est eius connubio deputata, quanta fit iniuria viro per adulterium, cuius corporis potestatem ipse habet, non uxor. Reply to Objection 2. Gluttony is not directly opposed to the love of our neighbor, as adultery is. Nor indeed is any other species of lust, for a father is not so wronged by the seduction of the virgin over whom he has no connubial right, as is the husband by the adultery of his wife, for he, not the wife herself, has power over her body [1 Corinthians 7:4.
IIª-IIae q. 170 a. 1 ad 3 Ad tertium dicendum quod praecepta Decalogi, ut supra dictum est, sunt quaedam universalia divinae legis principia, unde oportet ea esse communia. Non potuerunt autem aliqua praecepta communia affirmativa de temperantia dari, quia usus eius variatur secundum diversa tempora, sicut Augustinus dicit, in libro de bono Coniug., et secundum diversas hominum leges et consuetudines. Reply to Objection 3. As stated above (122, 1,4) the precepts of the decalogue are universal principles of the Divine law; hence they need to be common precepts. Now it was not possible to give any common affirmative precepts of temperance, because the practice of temperance varies according to different times, as Augustine remarks (De Bono Conjug. xv, 7), and according to different human laws and customs.
IIª-IIae q. 170 a. 2 arg. 1 Ad secundum sic proceditur. Videtur quod inconvenienter tradantur in divina lege praecepta de virtutibus annexis temperantiae. Praecepta enim Decalogi, ut dictum est, sunt quaedam universalia principia totius legis divinae. Sed superbia est initium omnis peccati, ut dicitur Eccli. X. Ergo inter praecepta Decalogi debuit aliquod poni prohibitivum superbiae. Objection 1. It would seem that the precepts of the virtues annexed to temperance are unsuitably given in the Divine law. For the precepts of the Decalogue, as stated above (1, ad 3), are certain universal principles of the whole Divine law. Now "pride is the beginning of all sin," according to Sirach 10:15. Therefore among the precepts of the Decalogue there should have been one forbidding pride.
IIª-IIae q. 170 a. 2 arg. 2 Praeterea, illa praecepta maxime debent in Decalogo poni per quae homines maxime inclinantur ad legis impletionem, quia ista videntur esse principalia. Sed per humilitatem, per quam homo Deo subiicitur, maxime videtur homo disponi ad observantiam divinae legis, unde obedientia inter gradus humilitatis computatur, ut supra habitum est. Et idem etiam videtur esse dicendum de mansuetudine, per quam fit ut homo divinae Scripturae non contradicat, ut Augustinus dicit, in II de Doct. Christ. Ergo videtur quod de humilitate et mansuetudine aliqua praecepta in Decalogo poni debuerunt. Objection 2. Further, a place before all should have been given in the decalogue to those precepts by which men are especially induced to fulfil the Law, because these would seem to be the most important. Now since humility subjects man to God, it would seem most of all to dispose man to the fulfilment of the Divine law; wherefore obedience is accounted one of the degrees of humility, as stated above (Question 161, Article 6); and the same apparently applies to meekness, the effect of which is that a man does not contradict the Divine Scriptures, as Augustine observes (De Doctr. Christ. ii, 7). Therefore it seems that the Decalogue should have contained precepts of humility and meekness.
IIª-IIae q. 170 a. 2 arg. 3 Praeterea, dictum est quod adulterium in Decalogo prohibetur quia contrariatur dilectioni proximi. Sed etiam inordinatio exteriorum motuum, quae contrariatur modestiae, dilectioni proximi opponitur, unde Augustinus dicit, in regula, in omnibus motibus vestris nihil fiat quod cuiusquam offendat aspectum. Ergo videtur quod etiam huiusmodi inordinatio debuit prohiberi per aliquod praeceptum Decalogi. Objection 3. Further, it was stated in the foregoing Article that adultery is forbidden in the decalogue, because it is contrary to the love of our neighbor. But inordinateness of outward movements, which is contrary to modesty, is opposed to neighborly love: wherefore Augustine says in his Rule (Ep. ccxii): "In all your movements let nothing be done to offend the eye of any person whatever." Therefore it seems that this kind of inordinateness should also have been forbidden by a precept of the Decalogue.
IIª-IIae q. 170 a. 2 s. c. In contrarium sufficit auctoritas Scripturae. On the contrary, suffices the authority of Scripture.
IIª-IIae q. 170 a. 2 co. Respondeo dicendum quod virtutes temperantiae annexae dupliciter considerari possunt, uno modo, secundum se; alio modo, secundum suos effectus. Secundum se quidem, non habent directam habitudinem ad dilectionem Dei vel proximi, sed magis respiciunt quandam moderationem eorum quae ad ipsum hominem pertinent. Quantum autem ad effectus suos, possunt respicere dilectionem Dei vel proximi. Et secundum hoc, aliqua praecepta in Decalogo ponuntur pertinentia ad prohibendum effectus vitiorum oppositorum temperantiae partibus, sicut ex ira, quae opponitur mansuetudini, procedit interdum aliquis ad homicidium, quod in Decalogo prohibetur, vel ad subtrahendum debitum honorem parentibus. Quod etiam potest ex superbia provenire, ex qua etiam multi transgrediuntur praecepta primae tabulae. I answer that, The virtues annexed to temperance may be considered in two ways: first, in themselves; secondly, in their effects. Considered in themselves they have no direct connection with the love of God or of our neighbor; rather do they regard a certain moderation of things pertaining to man himself. But considered in their effects, they may regard the love of God or of our neighbor: and in this respect the decalogue contains precepts that relate to the prohibition of the effects of the vices opposed to the parts of temperance. Thus the effect of anger, which is opposed to meekness, is sometimes that a man goes on to commit murder (and this is forbidden in the Decalogue), and sometimes that he refuses due honor to his parents, which may also be the result of pride, which leads many to transgress the precepts of the first table.
IIª-IIae q. 170 a. 2 ad 1 Ad primum ergo dicendum quod superbia est initium peccati, sed latens in corde, cuius etiam inordinatio non perpenditur communiter ab omnibus. Unde eius prohibitio non debuit poni inter praecepta Decalogi, quae sunt sicut prima principia per se nota. Reply to Objection 1. Pride is the beginning of sin, but it lies hidden in the heart; and its inordinateness is not perceived by all in common. Hence there was no place for its prohibition among the precepts of the Decalogue, which are like first self-evident principles.
IIª-IIae q. 170 a. 2 ad 2 Ad secundum dicendum quod praecepta quae inducunt ad observantiam legis, praesupponunt iam legem. Unde non possunt esse prima legis praecepta, ut in Decalogo ponantur. Reply to Objection 2. Those precepts which are essentially an inducement to the observance of the Law presuppose the Law to be already given, wherefore they cannot be first precepts of the Law so as to have a place in the Decalogue.
IIª-IIae q. 170 a. 2 ad 3 Ad tertium dicendum quod inordinatio exteriorum motuum non pertinet ad offensam proximi secundum ipsam speciem actus, sicut homicidium, adulterium et furtum, quae in Decalogo prohibentur, sed solum secundum quod sunt signa interioris inordinationis, ut supra dictum est. Reply to Objection 3. Inordinate outward movement is not injurious to one's neighbor, if we consider the species of the act, as are murder, adultery, and theft, which are forbidden in the decalogue; but only as being signs of an inward inordinateness, as stated above (168, 1, ad 1,3).

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