Authors/Thomas Aquinas/Summa Theologiae/Part IIb/Q159

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Q158 Q160

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IIª-IIae q. 159 pr. Deinde considerandum est de crudelitate. Et circa hoc quaeruntur duo. Primo, utrum crudelitas opponatur clementiae. Secundo, de comparatione eius ad saevitiam vel feritatem. Question 159. Cruelty 1. Is cruelty opposed to clemency? 2. Its comparison with savagery or brutality
IIª-IIae q. 159 a. 1 arg. 1 Ad primum sic proceditur. Videtur quod crudelitas non opponatur clementiae. Dicit enim Seneca, in II de Clement., quod illi vocantur crudeles qui excedunt modum in puniendo, quod contrariatur iustitiae. Clementia autem non ponitur pars iustitiae, sed temperantiae. Ergo crudelitas non videtur opponi clementiae. Objection 1. It would seem that cruelty is not opposed to clemency. For Seneca says (De Clementia ii, 4) that "those are said to be cruel who exceed in punishing," which is contrary to justice. Now clemency is reckoned a part, not of justice but of temperance. Therefore apparently cruelty is not opposed to clemency.
IIª-IIae q. 159 a. 1 arg. 2 Praeterea, Ierem. VI dicitur, crudelis est, et non miserebitur, et sic videtur quod crudelitas opponatur misericordiae. Sed misericordia non est idem clementiae, ut supra dictum est. Ergo crudelitas non opponitur clementiae. Objection 2. Further, it is written (Jeremiah 6:23): "They are cruel, and will have no mercy"; so that cruelty would seem opposed to mercy. Now mercy is not the same as clemency, as stated above (157, 4, ad 3). Therefore cruelty is not opposed to clemency.
IIª-IIae q. 159 a. 1 arg. 3 Praeterea, clementia consideratur circa inflictionem poenarum, ut dictum est. Sed crudelitas consideratur etiam in subtractione beneficiorum, secundum illud Proverb. XI, qui crudelis est, propinquos abiicit. Ergo crudelitas non opponitur clementiae. Objection 3. Further, clemency is concerned with the infliction of punishment, as stated above (Question 157, Article 1): whereas cruelty applies to the withdrawal of beneficence, according to Proverbs 11:17, "But he that is cruel casteth off even his own kindred." Therefore cruelty is not opposed to clemency.
IIª-IIae q. 159 a. 1 s. c. Sed contra est quod dicit Seneca, in II de Clement., quod opponitur clementiae crudelitas, quae nihil aliud est quam atrocitas animi in exigendis poenis. On the contrary, Seneca says (De Clementia ii, 4) that "the opposite of clemency is cruelty, which is nothing else but hardness of heart in exacting punishment."
IIª-IIae q. 159 a. 1 co. Respondeo dicendum quod nomen crudelitatis a cruditate sumptum esse videtur. Sicut autem ea quae sunt decocta et digesta, solent habere suavem et dulcem saporem; ita illa quae sunt cruda, habent horribilem et asperum saporem. Dictum est autem supra quod clementia importat quandam animi lenitatem sive dulcedinem, per quam aliquis est diminutivus poenarum. Unde directe crudelitas clementiae opponitur. I answer that, Cruelty apparently takes its name from "cruditas" [rawness]. Now just as things when cooked and prepared are wont to have an agreeable and sweet savor, so when raw they have a disagreeable and bitter taste. Now it has been stated above (157, 3, ad 1; 4, ad 3) that clemency denotes a certain smoothness or sweetness of soul, whereby one is inclined to mitigate punishment. Hence cruelty is directly opposed to clemency.
IIª-IIae q. 159 a. 1 ad 1 Ad primum ergo dicendum quod, sicut diminutio poenarum quae est secundum rationem, pertinet ad epieikeiam, sed ipsa dulcedo affectus ex qua homo ad hoc inclinatur, pertinet ad clementiam; ita etiam superexcessus poenarum, quantum ad id quod exterius agitur, pertinet ad iniustitiam; sed quantum ad austeritatem animi per quam aliquis fit promptus ad poenas augendas, pertinet ad crudelitatem. Reply to Objection 1. Just as it belongs to equity to mitigate punishment according to reason, while the sweetness of soul which inclines one to this belongs to clemency: so too, excess in punishing, as regards the external action, belongs to injustice; but as regards the hardness of heart, which makes one ready to increase punishment, belongs to cruelty.
IIª-IIae q. 159 a. 1 ad 2 Ad secundum dicendum quod misericordia et clementia conveniunt in hoc quod utraque refugit et abhorret miseriam alienam, aliter tamen et aliter. Nam ad misericordiam pertinet miseriae subvenire per beneficii collationem, ad clementiam autem pertinet miseriam diminuere per subtractionem poenarum. Et quia crudelitas superabundantiam in exigendis poenis importat, directius opponitur clementiae quam misericordiae. Tamen, propter similitudinem harum virtutum, accipitur quandoque crudelitas pro immisericordia. Reply to Objection 2. Mercy and clemency concur in this, that both shun and recoil from another's unhappiness, but in different ways. For it belongs to mercy [Cf. 30, 1] to relieve another's unhappiness by a beneficent action, while it belongs to clemency to mitigate another's unhappiness by the cessation of punishment. And since cruelty denotes excess in exacting punishment, it is more directly opposed to clemency than to mercy; yet on account of the mutual likeness of these virtues, cruelty is sometimes taken for mercilessness.
IIª-IIae q. 159 a. 1 ad 3 Ad tertium dicendum quod crudelitas ibi accipitur pro immisericordia, ad quam pertinet beneficia non largiri. Quamvis etiam dici possit quod ipsa beneficii subtractio quaedam poena est. Reply to Objection 3. Cruelty is there taken for mercilessness, which is lack of beneficence. We may also reply that withdrawal of beneficence is in itself a punishment.
IIª-IIae q. 159 a. 2 arg. 1 Ad secundum sic proceditur. Videtur quod crudelitas a saevitia sive feritate non differat. Uni enim virtuti, ex una parte, unum vitium videtur esse oppositum. Sed clementiae per superabundantiam opponitur et crudelitas et saevitia. Ergo videtur quod saevitia et crudelitas sint idem. Objection 1. It would seem that cruelty differs not from savagery or brutality. For seemingly one vice is opposed in one way to one virtue. Now both savagery and cruelty are opposed to clemency by way of excess. Therefore it would seem that savagery and cruelty are the same.
IIª-IIae q. 159 a. 2 arg. 2 Praeterea, Isidorus dicit, in libro Etymol., quod severus dicitur quasi saevus et verus, quia sine pietate tenet iustitiam, et sic saevitia videtur excludere remissionem poenarum in iudiciis, quod pertinet ad pietatem. Hoc autem dictum est ad crudelitatem pertinere. Ergo crudelitas est idem quod saevitia. Objection 2. Further, Isidore says (Etym. x) that "severity is as it were savagery with verity, because it holds to justice without attending to piety": so that savagery would seem to exclude that mitigation of punishment in delivering judgment which is demanded by piety. Now this has been stated to belong to cruelty (1, ad 1). Therefore cruelty is the same as savagery.
IIª-IIae q. 159 a. 2 arg. 3 Praeterea, sicut virtuti opponitur aliquod vitium in excessu, ita etiam et in defectu, quod quidem contrariatur et virtuti, quae est in medio, et vitio quod est in excessu. Sed idem vitium ad defectum pertinens opponitur et crudelitati et saevitiae, videlicet remissio vel dissolutio, dicit enim Gregorius, XX Moral., sit amor, sed non emolliens, sit rigor, sed non exasperans. Sit zelus, sed non immoderate saeviens, sit pietas, sed non plus quam expediat parcens. Ergo saevitia est idem crudelitati. Objection 3. Further, just as there is a vice opposed to a virtue by way of excess, so is there a vice opposed to it by way of deficiency, which latter is opposed both to the virtue which is the mean, and to the vice which is in excess. Now the same vice pertaining to deficiency is opposed to both cruelty and savagery, namely remission or laxity. For Gregory says (Moral. xx, 5): "Let there be love, but not that which enervates, let there be severity, but without fury, let there be zeal without unseemly savagery, let there be piety without undue clemency." Therefore savagery is the same as cruelty.
IIª-IIae q. 159 a. 2 s. c. Sed contra est quod Seneca dicit, in II de Clement., quod ille qui non laesus, nec peccatori irascitur, non dicitur crudelis, sed ferus sive saevus. On the contrary, Seneca says (De Clementia ii, 4) that "a man who is angry without being hurt, or with one who has not offended him, is not said to be cruel, but to be brutal or savage."
IIª-IIae q. 159 a. 2 co. Respondeo dicendum quod nomen saevitiae et feritatis a similitudine ferarum accipitur, quae etiam saevae dicuntur. Huiusmodi enim animalia nocent hominibus ut ex eorum corporibus pascantur, non ex aliqua iustitiae causa, cuius consideratio pertinet ad solam rationem. Et ideo, proprie loquendo, feritas vel saevitia dicitur secundum quam aliquis in poenis inferendis non considerat aliquam culpam eius qui punitur, sed solum hoc quod delectatur in hominum cruciatu. Et sic patet quod continetur sub bestialitate, nam talis delectatio non est humana, sed bestialis, proveniens vel ex mala consuetudine vel ex corruptione naturae, sicut et aliae huiusmodi bestiales affectiones. Sed crudelitas attendit culpam in eo qui punitur, sed excedit modum in puniendo. Et ideo crudelitas differt a saevitia sive feritate sicut malitia humana a bestialitate, ut dicitur in VII Ethic. I answer that, "Savagery" and "brutality" take their names from a likeness to wild beasts which are also described as savage. For animals of this kind attack man that they may feed on his body, and not for some motive of justice the consideration of which belongs to reason alone. Wherefore, properly speaking, brutality or savagery applies to those who in inflicting punishment have not in view a default of the person punished, but merely the pleasure they derive from a man's torture. Consequently it is evident that it is comprised under bestiality: for such like pleasure is not human but bestial, and resulting as it does either from evil custom, or from a corrupt nature, as do other bestial emotions. On the other hand, cruelty not only regards the default of the person punished, but exceeds in the mode of punishing: wherefore cruelty differs from savagery or brutality, as human wickedness differs from bestiality, as stated in Ethic. vii, 5.
IIª-IIae q. 159 a. 2 ad 1 Ad primum ergo dicendum quod clementia est virtus humana, unde directe sibi opponitur crudelitas, quae est malitia humana. Sed saevitia vel feritas continetur sub bestialitate. Unde non directe opponitur clementiae, sed superexcellentiori virtuti, quam philosophus vocat heroicam vel divinam, quae secundum nos videtur pertinere ad dona spiritus sancti. Unde potest dici quod saevitia directe opponitur dono pietatis. Reply to Objection 1. Clemency is a human virtue; wherefore directly opposed to it is cruelty which is a form of human wickedness. But savagery or brutality is comprised under bestiality, wherefore it is directly opposed not to clemency, but to a more excellent virtue, which the Philosopher (Ethic. vii, 5) calls "heroic" or "god-like," which according to us, would seem to pertain to the gifts of the Holy Ghost. Consequently we may say that savagery is directly opposed to the gift of piety.
IIª-IIae q. 159 a. 2 ad 2 Ad secundum dicendum quod severus non dicitur simpliciter saevus, quia hoc sonat in vitium, sed dicitur saevus circa veritatem, propter aliquam similitudinem saevitiae, quae non est diminutiva poenarum. Reply to Objection 2. A severe man is not said to be simply savage, because this implies a vice; but he is said to be "savage as regards the truth," on account of some likeness to savagery which is not inclined to mitigate punishment.
IIª-IIae q. 159 a. 2 ad 3 Ad tertium dicendum quod remissio in puniendo non est vitium nisi inquantum praetermittitur ordo iustitiae, quo aliquis debet puniri propter culpam, quam excedit crudelitas. Saevitia autem penitus hunc ordinem non attendit. Unde remissio punitionis directe opponitur crudelitati, non autem saevitiae. Reply to Objection 3. Remission of punishment is not a vice, except it disregard the order of justice, which requires a man to be punished on account of his offense, and which cruelty exceeds. On the other hand, cruelty disregards this order altogether. Wherefore remission of punishment is opposed to cruelty, but not to savagery.


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