Authors/Thomas Aquinas/Summa Theologiae/Part IIb/Q153

From The Logic Museum

Jump to: navigation, search
Q152 Q154



Latin English
IIª-IIae q. 153 pr. Deinde considerandum est de vitio luxuriae, quod opponitur castitati. Et primo, de ipsa in generali; secundo, de speciebus eius. Circa primum quaeruntur quinque. Primo, quid sit materia luxuriae. Secundo, utrum omnis concubitus sit illicitus. Tertio, utrum luxuria sit peccatum mortale. Quarto, utrum luxuria sit vitium capitale. Quinto, de filiabus eius. Question 153. Lust 1. What is the matter of lust? 2. Is all copulation unlawful? 3. Is lust a mortal sin? 4. Is lust a capital vice? 5. Its daughters
IIª-IIae q. 153 a. 1 arg. 1 Ad primum sic proceditur. Videtur quod materia luxuriae non sit solum concupiscentiae et delectationes venereae. Dicit enim Augustinus, in libro Confess., quod luxuria ad satietatem atque abundantiam se cupit vocari. Sed satietas pertinet ad cibos et potus, abundantia autem ad divitias. Ergo luxuria non est proprie circa concupiscentias et voluptates venereas. Objection 1. It would seem that the matter of lust is not only venereal desires and pleasures. For Augustine says (Confess. ii, 6) that "lust affects to be called surfeit and abundance." But surfeit regards meat and drink, while abundance refers to riches. Therefore lust is not properly about venereal desires and pleasures.
IIª-IIae q. 153 a. 1 arg. 2 Praeterea, Prov. XX dicitur, luxuriosa res est vinum. Sed vinum pertinet ad delectationem cibi et potus. Ergo circa has maxime videtur esse luxuria. Objection 2. Further, it is written (Proverbs 20:1): "Wine is a lustful [Douay: 'luxurious'] thing." Now wine is connected with pleasure of meat and drink. Therefore these would seem to be the matter of lust.
IIª-IIae q. 153 a. 1 arg. 3 Praeterea, luxuria esse dicitur libidinosae voluptatis appetitus. Sed libidinosa voluptas non solum est in venereis, sed etiam in multis aliis. Ergo luxuria non solum est circa concupiscentias et voluptates venereas. Objection 3. Further, lust is defined "as the desire of wanton pleasure" [Alexander of Hales, Summ. Theol. ii, cxvli]. But wanton pleasure regards not only venereal matters but also many others. Therefore lust is not only about venereal desires and pleasures.
IIª-IIae q. 153 a. 1 s. c. Sed contra est quod dicitur in libro de vera Relig., dicitur luxuriosis, qui seminat in carne, de carne metet corruptionem. Sed seminatio carnis fit per voluptates venereas. Ergo ad has pertinet luxuria. On the contrary, To the lustful it is said (De Vera Relig. iii [Written by St. Augustine]): "He that soweth in the flesh, of the flesh shall reap corruption." Now the sowing of the flesh refers to venereal pleasures. Therefore these belong to lust.
IIª-IIae q. 153 a. 1 co. Respondeo dicendum quod, sicut Isidorus dicit, in libro Etymol., luxuriosus aliquis dicitur quasi solutus in voluptates. Maxime autem voluptates venereae animum hominis solvunt. Et ideo circa voluptates venereas maxime luxuria consideratur. I answer that, As Isidore says (Etym. x), "a lustful man is one who is debauched with pleasures." Now venereal pleasures above all debauch a man's mind. Therefore lust is especially concerned with such like pleasures.
IIª-IIae q. 153 a. 1 ad 1 Ad primum ergo dicendum quod, sicut temperantia principaliter quidem et proprie est circa delectationes tactus, dicitur autem ex consequenti et per similitudinem quandam in quibusdam aliis materiis; ita etiam luxuria principaliter quidem est in voluptatibus venereis, quae maxime et praecipue animum hominis resolvunt; secundario aut dicitur in quibuscumque aliis ad excessum pertinentibus. Unde Galat. V, dicit Glossa quod luxuria est quaelibet superfluitas. Reply to Objection 1. Even as temperance chiefly and properly applies to pleasures of touch, yet consequently and by a kind of likeness is referred to other matters, so too, lust applies chiefly to venereal pleasures, which more than anything else work the greatest havoc in a man's mind, yet secondarily it applies to any other matters pertaining to excess. Hence a gloss on Galatians 5:19 says "lust is any kind of surfeit."
IIª-IIae q. 153 a. 1 ad 2 Ad secundum dicendum quod vinum dicitur esse res luxuriosa, vel secundum hunc modum quo in qualibet materia abundantia ad luxuriam refertur. Vel inquantum superfluus usus vini incentivum voluptati venereae praebet. Reply to Objection 2. Wine is said to be a lustful thing, either in the sense in which surfeit in any matter is ascribed to lust, or because the use of too much wine affords an incentive to venereal pleasure.
IIª-IIae q. 153 a. 1 ad 3 Ad tertium dicendum quod libidinosa voluptas etsi in aliis materiis dicatur, tamen specialiter hoc nomen sibi vindicant venereae delectationes, in quibus etiam specialiter libido dicitur, ut Augustinus dicit, XIV de Civ. Dei. Reply to Objection 3. Although wanton pleasure applies to other matters, the name of lust has a special application to venereal pleasures, to which also wantonness is specially applicable, as Augustine remarks (De Civ. xiv, 15,16).
IIª-IIae q. 153 a. 2 arg. 1 Ad secundum sic proceditur. Videtur quod nullus actus venereus possit esse sine peccato. Nihil enim videtur impedire virtutem nisi peccatum. Sed omnis actus venereus maxime impedit virtutem, dicit enim Augustinus, in I Soliloq., nihil esse sentio quod magis ex arce deiiciat animum virilem quam blandimenta feminae, corporumque ille contactus. Ergo nullus actus venereus videtur esse sine peccato. Objection 1. It would seem that no venereal act can be without sin. For nothing but sin would seem to hinder virtue. Now every venereal act is a great hindrance to virtue. For Augustine says (Soliloq. i, 10): "I consider that nothing so casts down the manly mind from its height as the fondling of a woman, and those bodily contacts." Therefore, seemingly, no venereal act is without sin.
IIª-IIae q. 153 a. 2 arg. 2 Praeterea, ubicumque invenitur aliquid superfluum per quod a bono rationis receditur, hoc est vitiosum, quia virtus corrumpitur per superfluum et diminutum, ut dicitur in II Ethic. Sed in quolibet actu venereo est superfluitas delectationis, quae in tantum absorbet rationem quod impossibile est aliquid intelligere in ipsa, ut philosophus dicit, in VII Ethic., et sicut Hieronymus dicit, in illo actu spiritus prophetiae non tangebat corda prophetarum. Ergo nullus actus venereus potest esse sine peccato. Objection 2. Further, any excess that makes one forsake the good of reason is sinful, because virtue is corrupted by "excess" and "deficiency" as stated in Ethic. ii, 2. Now in every venereal act there is excess of pleasure, since it so absorbs the mind, that "it is incompatible with the act of understanding," as the Philosopher observes (Ethic. vii, 11); and as Jerome [Origen, Hom. vi in Num.; Cf. Jerome, Ep. cxxiii ad Ageruch.] states, rendered the hearts of the prophets, for the moment, insensible to the spirit of prophecy. Therefore no venereal act can be without sin.
IIª-IIae q. 153 a. 2 arg. 3 Praeterea, causa potior est quam effectus. Sed peccatum originale in parvulis trahitur a concupiscentia, sine qua actus venereus esse non potest, ut patet per Augustinum, in libro de nuptiis et Concup. Ergo nullus actus venereus potest esse sine peccato. Objection 3. Further, the cause is more powerful than its effect. Now original sin is transmitted to children by concupiscence, without which no venereal act is possible, as Augustine declares (De Nup. et Concup. i, 24). Therefore no venereal act can be without sin.
IIª-IIae q. 153 a. 2 s. c. Sed contra est quod Augustinus dicit, in libro de bono Coniug., satis responsum est haereticis, si tamen capiunt, non esse peccatum quod neque contra naturam committitur, neque contra morem, neque contra praeceptum. Et loquitur de actu venereo quo antiqui patres pluribus coniugibus utebantur. Ergo non omnis actus venereus est peccatum. On the contrary, Augustine says (De Bono Conjug. xxv): "This is a sufficient answer to heretics, if only they will understand that no sin is committed in that which is against neither nature, nor morals, nor a commandment": and he refers to the act of sexual intercourse between the patriarchs of old and their several wives. Therefore not every venereal act is a sin.
IIª-IIae q. 153 a. 2 co. Respondeo dicendum quod peccatum in humanis actibus est quod est contra ordinem rationis. Habet autem hoc rationis ordo, ut quaelibet convenienter ordinet in suum finem. Et ideo non est peccatum si per rationem homo utatur rebus aliquibus ad finem ad quem sunt, modo et ordine convenienti, dummodo ille finis sit aliquod vere bonum. Sicut autem est vere bonum quod conservetur corporalis natura unius individui, ita etiam est quoddam bonum excellens quod conservetur natura speciei humanae. Sicut autem ad conservationem vitae unius hominis ordinatur usus ciborum, ita etiam ad conservationem totius humani generis usus venereorum, unde Augustinus dicit, in libro de bono Coniug., quod est cibus ad salutem hominis, hoc est concubitus ad salutem generis. Et ideo, sicut usus ciborum potest esse absque peccato, si fiat debito modo et ordine, secundum quod competit saluti corporis; ita etiam et usus venereorum potest esse absque omni peccato, si fiat debito modo et ordine, secundum quod est conveniens ad finem generationis humanae. I answer that, A sin, in human acts, is that which is against the order of reason. Now the order of reason consists in its ordering everything to its end in a fitting manner. Wherefore it is no sin if one, by the dictate of reason, makes use of certain things in a fitting manner and order for the end to which they are adapted, provided this end be something truly good. Now just as the preservation of the bodily nature of one individual is a true good, so, too, is the preservation of the nature of the human species a very great good. And just as the use of food is directed to the preservation of life in the individual, so is the use of venereal acts directed to the preservation of the whole human race. Hence Augustine says (De Bono Conjug. xvi): "What food is to a man's well being, such is sexual intercourse to the welfare of the whole human race." Wherefore just as the use of food can be without sin, if it be taken in due manner and order, as required for the welfare of the body, so also the use of venereal acts can be without sin, provided they be performed in due manner and order, in keeping with the end of human procreation.
IIª-IIae q. 153 a. 2 ad 1 Ad primum ergo dicendum quod aliquid potest impedire virtutem dupliciter. Uno modo, quantum ad communem statum virtutis, et sic non impeditur virtus nisi per peccatum. Alio modo, quantum ad perfectum virtutis statum, et sic potest impediri virtus per aliquid quod non est peccatum, sed est minus bonum. Et hoc modo usus feminae deiicit animum, non a virtute, sed ab arce, idest perfectione virtutis. Unde Augustinus dicit, in libro de bono Coniug., sicut bonum erat quod Martha faciebat occupata circa ministerium sanctorum, sed melius quod Maria audiens verbum Dei; ita etiam bonum Susannae in castitate coniugali laudamus, sed bonum viduae Annae, et magis Mariae virginis, anteponimus. Reply to Objection 1. A thing may be a hindrance to virtue in two ways. First, as regards the ordinary degree of virtue, and as to this nothing but sin is an obstacle to virtue. Secondly, as regards the perfect degree of virtue, and as to this virtue may be hindered by that which is not a sin, but a lesser good. On this way sexual intercourse casts down the mind not from virtue, but from the height, i.e. the perfection of virtue. Hence Augustine says (De Bono Conjug. viii): "Just as that was good which Martha did when busy about serving holy men, yet better still that which Mary did in hearing the word of God: so, too, we praise the good of Susanna's conjugal chastity, yet we prefer the good of the widow Anna, and much more that of the Virgin Mary."
IIª-IIae q. 153 a. 2 ad 2 Ad secundum dicendum quod, sicut supra dictum est, medium virtutis non attenditur secundum quantitatem, sed secundum quod convenit rationi rectae. Et ideo abundantia delectationis quae est in actu venereo secundum rationem ordinato, non contrariatur medio virtutis. Et praeterea ad virtutem non pertinet quantum sensus exterior delectetur, quod consequitur corporis dispositionem, sed quantum appetitus interior ad huiusmodi delectationes afficiatur. Nec hoc etiam quod ratio non potest liberum actum rationis ad spiritualia consideranda simul cum illa delectatione habere, ostendit quod actus ille sit contrarius virtuti. Non enim est contrarium virtuti si rationis actus aliquando intermittatur aliquo quod secundum rationem fit, alioquin, quod aliquis se somno tradit, esset contra virtutem. Hoc tamen quod concupiscentia et delectatio venereorum non subiacet imperio et moderationi rationis, provenit ex poena primi peccati, inquantum scilicet ratio rebellis Deo meruit habere suam carnem rebellem, ut patet per Augustinum, XIII de Civ. Dei. Reply to Objection 2. As stated above (152, 2, ad 2; I-II, 64, 2), the mean of virtue depends not on quantity but on conformity with right reason: and consequently the exceeding pleasure attaching to a venereal act directed according to reason, is not opposed to the mean of virtue. Moreover, virtue is not concerned with the amount of pleasure experienced by the external sense, as this depends on the disposition of the body; what matters is how much the interior appetite is affected by that pleasure. Nor does it follow that the act in question is contrary to virtue, from the fact that the free act of reason in considering spiritual things is incompatible with the aforesaid pleasure. For it is not contrary to virtue, if the act of reason be sometimes interrupted for something that is done in accordance with reason, else it would be against virtue for a person to set himself to sleep. That venereal concupiscence and pleasure are not subject to the command and moderation of reason, is due to the punishment of the first sin, inasmuch as the reason, for rebelling against God, deserved that its body should rebel against it, as Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xiii, 13).
IIª-IIae q. 153 a. 2 ad 3 Ad tertium dicendum quod, sicut Augustinus ibidem dicit, quod ex concupiscentia carnis, quae regeneratis non imputatur in peccatum, tanquam ex filia peccati, proles nascitur originali obligata peccato. Unde non sequitur quod actus ille sit peccatum, sed quod in illo actu sit aliquid poenale a peccato primo derivatum. Reply to Objection 3. As Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xiii, 13), "the child, shackled with original sin, is born of fleshly concupiscence (which is not imputed as sin to the regenerate) as of a daughter of sin." Hence it does not follow that the act in question is a sin, but that it contains something penal resulting from the first sin.
IIª-IIae q. 153 a. 3 arg. 1 Ad tertium sic proceditur. Videtur quod luxuria quae est circa actus venereos, non possit esse aliquod peccatum. Per actum enim venereum semen emittitur, quod est superfluum alimenti, ut patet per philosophum, in libro de Generat. Animal. Sed in emissione aliarum superfluitatum non attenditur aliquod peccatum. Ergo neque circa actus venereos potest esse aliquod peccatum. Objection 1. It would seem that lust about venereal acts cannot be a sin. For the venereal act consists in the emission of semen which is the surplus from food, according to the Philosopher (De Gener. Anim. i, 18). But there is no sin attaching to the emission of other superfluities. Therefore neither can there be any sin in venereal acts.
IIª-IIae q. 153 a. 3 arg. 2 Praeterea, quilibet potest licite uti ut libet, eo quod suum est. Sed in actu venereo homo non utitur nisi eo quod suum est, nisi forte in adulterio vel raptu. Ergo in usu venereo non potest esse peccatum. Et ita luxuria non erit peccatum. Objection 2. Further, everyone can lawfully make what use he pleases of what is his. But in the venereal act a man uses only what is his own, except perhaps in adultery or rape. Therefore there can be no sin in venereal acts, and consequently lust is no sin.
IIª-IIae q. 153 a. 3 arg. 3 Praeterea, omne peccatum habet vitium oppositum. Sed luxuriae nullum vitium videtur esse oppositum. Ergo luxuria non est peccatum. Objection 3. Further, every sin has an opposite vice. But, seemingly, no vice is opposed to lust. Therefore lust is not a sin.
IIª-IIae q. 153 a. 3 s. c. 1 Sed contra est quod causa est potior effectu. Sed vinum prohibetur propter luxuriam, secundum illud apostoli, Ephes. V, nolite inebriari vino, in quo est luxuria. Ergo luxuria est prohibita. On the contrary, The cause is more powerful than its effect. Now wine is forbidden on account of lust, according to the saying of the Apostle (Ephesians 5:18), "Be not drunk with wine wherein is lust [Douay: 'luxury']." Therefore lust is forbidden.
IIª-IIae q. 153 a. 3 s. c. 2 Praeterea, Galat. V, enumeratur inter opera carnis. Further, it is numbered among the works of the flesh: Galatians 5:19 [Douay: 'luxury'].
IIª-IIae q. 153 a. 3 co. Respondeo dicendum quod quanto aliquid est magis necessarium, tanto magis oportet ut circa illud rationis ordo servetur. Unde per consequens magis est vitiosum si ordo rationis praetermittatur. Usus autem venereorum, sicut dictum est, est valde necessarius ad bonum commune, quod est conservatio humani generis. Et ideo circa hoc maxime attendi debet rationis ordo. Et per consequens, si quid circa hoc fiat praeter id quod ordo rationis habet, vitiosum erit. Hoc autem pertinet ad rationem luxuriae, ut ordinem et modum rationis excedat circa venerea. Et ideo absque dubio luxuria est peccatum. I answer that, The more necessary a thing is, the more it behooves one to observe the order of reason in its regard; wherefore the more sinful it becomes if the order of reason be forsaken. Now the use of venereal acts, as stated in the foregoing Article, is most necessary for the common good, namely the preservation of the human race. Wherefore there is the greatest necessity for observing the order of reason in this matter: so that if anything be done in this connection against the dictate of reason's ordering, it will be a sin. Now lust consists essentially in exceeding the order and mode of reason in the matter of venereal acts. Wherefore without any doubt lust is a sin.
IIª-IIae q. 153 a. 3 ad 1 Ad primum ergo dicendum quod, sicut philosophus, in eodem libro, dicit, semen est superfluum quo indigetur, dicitur enim superfluum ex eo quod residuum est operationis virtutis nutritivae, tamen indigetur eo ad opus virtutis generativae. Sed aliae superfluitates humani corporis sunt quibus non indigetur. Et ideo non refert qualitercumque emittantur, salva decentia convictus humani. Sed non est simile in seminis emissione, quae taliter debet fieri ut conveniat fini ad quem eo indigetur. Reply to Objection 1. As the Philosopher says in the same book (De Gener. Anim. i, 18), "the semen is a surplus that is needed." For it is said to be superfluous, because it is the residue from the action of the nutritive power, yet it is needed for the work of the generative power. But the other superfluities of the human body are such as not to be needed, so that it matters not how they are emitted, provided one observe the decencies of social life. It is different with the emission of semen, which should be accomplished in a manner befitting the end for which it is needed.
IIª-IIae q. 153 a. 3 ad 2 Ad secundum dicendum quod, sicut apostolus dicit, I ad Cor. VI, contra luxuriam loquens, empti estis pretio magno. Glorificate ergo et portate Deum in corpore vestro. Ex eo ergo quod aliquis inordinate suo corpore utitur per luxuriam, iniuriam facit domino, qui est principalis dominus corporis nostri. Unde et Augustinus dicit, in libro de decem chordis, dominus, qui gubernat servos suos ad utilitatem illorum, non suam, hoc praecepit, ne per illicitas voluptates corruat templum eius, quod esse coepisti. Reply to Objection 2. As the Apostle says (1 Corinthians 6:20) in speaking against lust, "You are bought with a great price: glorify and bear God in your body." Wherefore by inordinately using the body through lust a man wrongs God Who is the Supreme Lord of our body. Hence Augustine says (De Decem. Chord. 10 [Serm. ix (xcvi de Temp.)]): "God Who thus governs His servants for their good, not for His, made this order and commandment, lest unlawful pleasures should destroy His temple which thou hast begun to be."
IIª-IIae q. 153 a. 3 ad 3 Ad tertium dicendum quod oppositum luxuriae non contingit in multis, eo quod homines magis sint proni ad delectationes. Et tamen oppositum vitium continetur sub insensibilitate. Et accidit hoc vitium in eo qui in tantum detestatur mulierum usum quod etiam uxori debitum non reddit. Reply to Objection 3. The opposite of lust is not found in many, since men are more inclined to pleasure. Yet the contrary vice is comprised under insensibility, and occurs in one who has such a dislike for sexual intercourse as not to pay the marriage debt.
IIª-IIae q. 153 a. 4 arg. 1 Ad quartum sic proceditur. Videtur quod luxuria non sit vitium capitale. Luxuria enim videtur idem esse immunditiae, ut patet per Glossam, Ephes. V. Sed immunditia est filia gulae, ut patet per Gregorium, XXXI Moral. Ergo luxuria non est vitium capitale. Objection 1. It seems that lust is not a capital vice. For lust is apparently the same as "uncleanness," according to a gloss on Ephesians 5:3 (Cf. 2 Corinthians 12:21). But uncleanness is a daughter of gluttony, according to Gregory (Moral. xxxi, 45). Therefore lust is not a capital vice.
IIª-IIae q. 153 a. 4 arg. 2 Praeterea, Isidorus dicit, in libro de summo bono, quod sicut per superbiam mentis itur in prostitutionem libidinis, ita per humilitatem mentis salva fit castitas carnis. Sed contra rationem capitalis vitii esse videtur quod ex alio vitio oriatur. Ergo luxuria non est vitium capitale. Objection 2. Further, Isidore says (De Summo Bono ii, 39) that "as pride of mind leads to the depravity of lust, so does humility of mind safeguard the chastity of the flesh." Now it is seemingly contrary to the nature of a capital vice to arise from another vice. Therefore lust is not a capital vice.
IIª-IIae q. 153 a. 4 arg. 3 Praeterea, luxuria causatur ex desperatione, secundum illud Ephes. IV, qui, desperantes, seipsos tradiderunt impudicitiae. Sed desperatio non est vitium capitale, quinimmo ponitur filia acediae, ut supra habitum est. Ergo multo minus luxuria est vitium capitale. Objection 3. Further, lust is caused by despair, according to Ephesians 4:19, "Who despairing, have given themselves up to lasciviousness." But despair is not a capital vice; indeed, it is accounted a daughter of sloth, as stated above (35, 4, ad 2). Much less, therefore, is lust a capital vice.
IIª-IIae q. 153 a. 4 s. c. Sed contra est quod Gregorius, XXXI Moral., ponit luxuriam inter vitia capitalia. On the contrary, Gregory (Moral. xxxi, 45) places lust among the capital vices.
IIª-IIae q. 153 a. 4 co. Respondeo dicendum quod, sicut ex dictis patet, vitium capitale est quod habet finem multum appetibilem, ita quod ex eius appetitu homo procedit ad multa peccata perpetranda, quae omnia ex illo vitio tanquam ex principali oriri dicuntur. Finis autem luxuriae est delectatio venereorum, quae est maxima. Unde huiusmodi delectatio est maxime appetibilis secundum appetitum sensitivum, tum propter vehementiam delectationis; tum etiam propter connaturalitatem huius concupiscentiae. Unde manifestum est quod luxuria est vitium capitale. I answer that, As stated above (148, 5; I-II, 84, 3,4), a capital vice is one that has a very desirable end, so that through desire for that end, a man proceeds to commit many sins, all of which are said to arise from that vice as from a principal vice. Now the end of lust is venereal pleasure, which is very great. Wherefore this pleasure is very desirable as regards the sensitive appetite, both on account of the intensity of the pleasure, and because such like concupiscence is connatural to man. Therefore it is evident that lust is a capital vice.
IIª-IIae q. 153 a. 4 ad 1 Ad primum ergo dicendum quod immunditia, secundum quosdam, quae ponitur filia gulae, est quaedam immunditia corporalis, ut supra dictum est. Et sic obiectio non est ad propositum. Si vero accipiatur pro immunditia luxuriae, sic dicendum quod ex gula causatur materialiter, inquantum scilicet gula ministrat materiam corporalem luxuriae, non autem secundum rationem causae finalis, secundum quam potissime attenditur origo aliorum vitiorum ex vitiis capitalibus. Reply to Objection 1. As stated above (Question 148, Article 6), according to some, the uncleanness which is reckoned a daughter of gluttony is a certain uncleanness of the body, and thus the objection is not to the point. If, however, it denote the uncleanness of lust, we must reply that it is caused by gluttony materially--in so far as gluttony provides the bodily matter of lust--and not under the aspect of final cause, in which respect chiefly the capital vices are said to be the cause of others.
IIª-IIae q. 153 a. 4 ad 2 Ad secundum dicendum quod, sicut supra dictum est, cum de inani gloria ageretur, superbia ponitur communis mater omnium peccatorum, et ideo etiam vitia capitalia ex superbia oriuntur. Reply to Objection 2. As stated above (132, 4, ad 1), when we were treating of vainglory, pride is accounted the common mother of all sins, so that even the capital vices originate therefrom.
IIª-IIae q. 153 a. 4 ad 3 Ad tertium dicendum quod a delectationibus luxuriae praecipue aliqui abstinent propter spem futurae gloriae, quam desperatio subtrahit. Et ideo causat luxuriam sicut removens prohibens, non sicut per se causa, quod videtur requiri ad vitia capitalia. Reply to Objection 3. Certain persons refrain from lustful pleasures chiefly through hope of the glory to come, which hope is removed by despair, so that the latter is a cause of lust, as removing an obstacle thereto, not as its direct cause; whereas this is seemingly necessary for a capital vice.
IIª-IIae q. 153 a. 5 arg. 1 Ad quintum sic proceditur. Videtur quod inconvenienter dicantur esse filiae luxuriae caecitas mentis, inconsideratio, inconstantia, praecipitatio, amor sui, odium Dei, affectus praesentis saeculi, horror vel desperatio futuri. Quia caecitas mentis et inconsideratio et praecipitatio pertinent ad imprudentiam, quae invenitur in omni peccato, sicut et prudentia in omni virtute. Ergo non debent poni speciales filiae luxuriae. Objection 1. It would seem that the daughters of lust are unfittingly reckoned to be "blindness of mind, thoughtlessness, inconstancy, rashness, self-love, hatred of God, love of this world and abhorrence or despair of a future world." For mental blindness, thoughtlessness and rashness pertain to imprudence, which is to be found in every sin, even as prudence is in every virtue. Therefore they should not be reckoned especially as daughters of lust.
IIª-IIae q. 153 a. 5 arg. 2 Praeterea, constantia ponitur pars fortitudinis, ut supra habitum est. Sed luxuria non opponitur fortitudini, sed temperantiae. Ergo inconstantia non est filia luxuriae. Objection 2. Further, constancy is reckoned a part of fortitude, as stated above (128, ad 6; 137, 3). But lust is contrary, not to fortitude but to temperance. Therefore inconstancy is not a daughter of lust.
IIª-IIae q. 153 a. 5 arg. 3 Praeterea, amor sui usque ad contemptum Dei est principium omnis peccati, ut patet per Augustinum, XIV de Civ. Dei. Non ergo debet poni filia luxuriae. Objection 3. Further, "Self-love extending to the contempt of God" is the origin of every sin, as Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xiv, 28). Therefore it should not be accounted a daughter of lust.
IIª-IIae q. 153 a. 5 arg. 4 Praeterea, Isidorus ponit quatuor, scilicet turpiloquia, scurrilia, ludicra, stultiloquia. Ergo praedicta enumeratio videtur esse superflua. Objection 4. Further, Isidore [QQ. in Deut., qu. xvi] mentions four, namely, "obscene," "scurrilous," "wanton" and "foolish talking." There the aforesaid enumeration would seem to be superfluous.
IIª-IIae q. 153 a. 5 s. c. Sed contra est auctoritas Gregorii, XXXI Moral. On the contrary, stands the authority of Gregory (Moral. xxxi, 45).
IIª-IIae q. 153 a. 5 co. Respondeo dicendum quod quando inferiores potentiae vehementer afficiuntur ad sua obiecta, consequens est quod superiores vires impediantur et deordinentur in suis actibus. Per vitium autem luxuriae maxime appetitus inferior, scilicet concupiscibilis, vehementer intendit suo obiecto, scilicet delectabili, propter vehementiam delectationis. Et ideo consequens est quod per luxuriam maxime superiores vires deordinentur, scilicet ratio et voluntas. Sunt autem rationis quatuor actus in agendis. Primo quidem, simplex intelligentia, quae apprehendit aliquem finem ut bonum. Et hic actus impeditur per luxuriam, secundum illud Dan. XIII, species decepit te, et concupiscentia subvertit cor tuum. Et quantum ad hoc, ponitur caecitas mentis. Secundus actus est consilium de his quae sunt agenda propter finem. Et hoc etiam impeditur per concupiscentiam luxuriae, unde Terentius dicit, in eunucho, loquens de amore libidinoso, quae res in se neque consilium neque modum habet ullum, eam consilio regere non potes. Et quantum ad hoc, ponitur praecipitatio, quae importat subtractionem consilii, ut supra habitum est, tertius autem actus est iudicium de agendis. Et hoc etiam impeditur per luxuriam, dicitur enim Dan. XIII, de senibus luxuriosis, averterunt sensum suum, ut non recordarentur iudiciorum iustorum. Et quantum ad hoc, ponitur inconsideratio. Quartus autem actus est praeceptum rationis de agendo. Quod etiam impeditur per luxuriam, inquantum scilicet homo impeditur ex impetu concupiscentiae ne exequatur id quod decrevit esse faciendum. Unde Terentius dicit, in eunucho, de quodam qui dicebat se recessurum ab amica, haec verba una falsa lacrimula restringet. Ex parte autem voluntatis, consequitur duplex actus inordinatus. Quorum unus est appetitus finis. Et quantum ad hoc, ponitur amor sui, quantum scilicet ad delectationem quam inordinate appetit, et per oppositum ponitur odium Dei, inquantum scilicet prohibet delectationem concupitam. Alius autem est appetitus eorum quae sunt ad finem. Et quantum ad hoc, ponitur affectus praesentis saeculi, in quo scilicet aliquis vult frui voluptate, et per oppositum ponitur desperatio futuri saeculi, quia dum nimis detinetur carnalibus delectationibus, non curat pervenire ad spirituales, sed fastidit eas. I answer that, When the lower powers are strongly moved towards their objects, the result is that the higher powers are hindered and disordered in their acts. Now the effect of the vice of lust is that the lower appetite, namely the concupiscible, is most vehemently intent on its object, to wit, the object of pleasure, on account of the vehemence of the pleasure. Consequently the higher powers, namely the reason and the will, are most grievously disordered by lust. Now the reason has four acts in matters of action. First there is simple understanding, which apprehends some end as good, and this act is hindered by lust, according to Daniel 13:56, "Beauty hath deceived thee, and lust hath perverted thy heart." On this respect we have "blindness of mind." The second act is counsel about what is to be done for the sake of the end: and this is also hindered by the concupiscence of lust. Hence Terence says (Eunuch., act 1, sc. 1), speaking of lecherous love: "This thing admits of neither counsel nor moderation, thou canst not control it by counseling." On this respect there is "rashness," which denotes absence of counsel, as stated above (Question 53, Article 3). The third act is judgment about the things to be done, and this again is hindered by lust. For it is said of the lustful old men (Daniel 13:9): "They perverted their own mind . . . that they might not . . . remember just judgments." On this respect there is "thoughtlessness." The fourth act is the reason's command about the thing to be done, and this also is impeded by lust, in so far as through being carried away by concupiscence, a man is hindered from doing what his reason ordered to be done. [To this "inconstancy" must be referred.] [The sentence in brackets is omitted in the Leonine edition.] Hence Terence says (Eunuch., act 1, sc. 1) of a man who declared that he would leave his mistress: "One little false tear will undo those words." On the part of the will there results a twofold inordinate act. One is the desire for the end, to which we refer "self-love," which regards the pleasure which a man desires inordinately, while on the other hand there is "hatred of God," by reason of His forbidding the desired pleasure. The other act is the desire for the things directed to the end. With regard to this there is "love of this world," whose pleasures a man desires to enjoy, while on the other hand there is "despair of a future world," because through being held back by carnal pleasures he cares not to obtain spiritual pleasures, since they are distasteful to him.
IIª-IIae q. 153 a. 5 ad 1 Ad primum ergo dicendum quod, sicut philosophus dicit, in VI Ethic. intemperantia maxime corrumpit prudentiam. Et ideo vitia opposita prudentiae maxime oriuntur ex luxuria, quae est praecipua intemperantiae species. Reply to Objection 1. According to the Philosopher (Ethic. vi, 5), intemperance is the chief corruptive of prudence: wherefore the vices opposed to prudence arise chiefly from lust, which is the principal species of intemperance.
IIª-IIae q. 153 a. 5 ad 2 Ad secundum dicendum quod constantia in arduis et terribilibus ponitur pars fortitudinis. Sed constantiam habere in abstinendo a delectationibus pertinet ad continentiam, quae ponitur pars temperantiae, ut supra dictum est. Et ideo inconstantia quae ei opponitur, ponitur filia luxuriae. Et tamen etiam prima inconstantia ex luxuria causatur, inquantum emollit cor hominis et effeminatum reddit, secundum illud Osee IV, fornicatio, et vinum et ebrietas, aufert cor. Et Vegetius dicit, in libro de re militari, quod minus mortem metuit qui minus deliciarum novit in vita. Nec oportet, sicut saepe dictum est, quod filiae vitii capitalis cum eo in materia conveniant. Reply to Objection 2. The constancy which is a part of fortitude regards hardships and objects of fear; but constancy in refraining from pleasures pertains to continence which is a part of temperance, as stated above (143). Hence the inconstancy which is opposed thereto is to be reckoned a daughter of lust. Nevertheless even the first named inconstancy arises from lust, inasmuch as the latter enfeebles a man's heart and renders it effeminate, according to Hosea 4:11, "Fornication and wine and drunkenness take away the heart [Douay: 'understanding']." Vegetius, too, says (De Re Milit. iii) that "the less a man knows of the pleasures of life, the less he fears death." Nor is there any need, as we have repeatedly stated, for the daughters of a capital vice to agree with it in matter (cf. 35, 4, ad 2; 118, 8, ad 1; 148, 6).
IIª-IIae q. 153 a. 5 ad 3 Ad tertium dicendum quod amor sui quantum ad quaecumque bona quae sibi aliquis appetit, est commune principium peccatorum. Sed quantum ad hoc specialiter quod aliquis appetit sibi delectabilia carnis, ponitur amor sui filia luxuriae. Reply to Objection 3. Self-love in respect of any goods that a man desires for himself is the common origin of all sins; but in the special point of desiring carnal pleasures for oneself, it is reckoned a daughter of lust.
IIª-IIae q. 153 a. 5 ad 4 Ad quartum dicendum quod illa quae Isidorus ponit, sunt quidam inordinati actus exteriores, et praecipue ad locutionem pertinentes. In qua est aliquid inordinatum quadrupliciter. Uno modo, propter materiam. Et sic ponuntur turpiloquia. Quia enim ex abundantia cordis os loquitur, ut dicitur Matth. XII, luxuriosi, quorum cor est turpibus concupiscentiis plenum, de facili ad turpia verba prorumpunt. Secundo, ex parte causae. Quia enim luxuria inconsiderationem et praecipitationem causat, consequens est quod faciat prorumpere in verba leviter et inconsiderate dicta, quae dicuntur scurrilia. Tertio, quantum ad finem. Quia enim luxuriosus delectationem quaerit, etiam verba sua ad delectationem ordinat, et sic prorumpit in verba ludicra. Quarto, quantum ad sententiam verborum, quam pervertit luxuria, propter caecitatem mentis quam causat. Et sic prorumpit in stultiloquia, utpote cum suis verbis praefert delectationes quas appetit, quibuscumque aliis rebus. Reply to Objection 4. The sins mentioned by Isidore are inordinate external acts, pertaining in the main to speech; wherein there is a fourfold inordinateness. First, on account of the matter, and to this we refer "obscene words": for since "out of the abundance of the heart the mouth speaketh" (Matthew 12:34), the lustful man, whose heart is full of lewd concupiscences, readily breaks out into lewd words. Secondly, on account of the cause: for, since lust causes thoughtlessness and rashness, the result is that it makes a man speak without weighing or giving a thought to his words. which are described as "scurrilous." Thirdly, on account of the end: for since the lustful man seeks pleasure, he directs his speech thereto, and so gives utterance to "wanton words." Fourthly, on account of the sentiments expressed by his words, for through causing blindness of mind, lust perverts a man's sentiments, and so he gives way "to foolish talking," for instance, by expressing a preference for the pleasures he desires to anything else.

Notes


  • [[]]
Personal tools