Authors/Thomas Aquinas/Summa Theologiae/Part IIb/Q143

• Question 143.1 The parts of temperance in general

Latin	English
IIª-IIae q. 143 pr. Deinde considerandum est de partibus temperantiae. Et primo, de ipsis partibus in generali; secundo, de singulis earum in speciali.	Question 143. The parts of temperance, in general
IIª-IIae q. 143 arg. 1 Ad primum sic proceditur. Videtur quod Tullius, in sua rhetorica, inconvenienter assignet partes temperantiae, quas dicit esse continentiam, clementiam, modestiam. Continentia enim contra virtutem dividitur, in VII Ethic. Sed temperantia continetur sub virtute. Ergo continentia non est pars temperantiae.	Objection 1. It would seem that Tully (De Invent. Rhet. ii, 54) unbecomingly assigns the parts of temperance, when he asserts them to be "continence, mildness, and modesty." For continence is reckoned to be distinct from virtue (Ethic. vii, 1): whereas temperance is comprised under virtue. Therefore continence is not a part of temperance.
IIª-IIae q. 143 arg. 2 Praeterea, clementia videtur esse mitigativa odii vel irae. Temperantia autem non est circa huiusmodi, sed circa delectationes tactus, ut dictum est. Ergo clementia non est pars temperantiae.	Objection 2. Further, mildness seemingly softens hatred or anger. But temperance is not about these things, but about pleasures of touch, as stated above (Question 141, Article 4). Therefore mildness is not a part of temperance.
IIª-IIae q. 143 arg. 3 Praeterea, modestia consistit in exterioribus actibus, unde et apostolus dicit, Philipp. IV, modestia vestra nota sit omnibus hominibus. Sed actus exteriores sunt materia iustitiae, ut supra habitum est. Ergo modestia magis est pars iustitiae quam temperantiae.	Objection 3. Further, modesty concerns external action, wherefore the Apostle says (Philippians 4:5): "Let your modesty be known to all men." Now external actions are the matter of justice, as stated above (Question 58, Article 8). Therefore modesty is a part of justice rather than of temperance.
IIª-IIae q. 143 arg. 4 Praeterea, Macrobius, super somnium Scipionis, ponit multo plures temperantiae partes, dicit enim quod temperantiam sequitur modestia, verecundia, abstinentia, castitas, honestas, moderatio, parcitas, sobrietas, pudicitia. Andronicus etiam dicit quod familiares temperantiae sunt austeritas, continentia, humilitas, simplicitas, ornatus, bona ordinatio, per se sufficientia. Videtur igitur insufficienter Tullius enumerasse temperantiae partes.	Objection 4. Further, Macrobius (In Somn. Scip. i, 8) reckons many more parts of temperance: for he says that "temperance results in modesty, shamefacedness, abstinence, chastity, honesty, moderation, lowliness, sobriety, purity." Andronicus also says [De Affectibus] that "the companions of temperance are gravity, continence, humility, simplicity, refinement, method, contentment." ['Per-se-sufficientiam' which could be rendered 'self-sufficiency,' but for the fact that this is taken in a bad sense. See 169, 1.] Therefore it seems that Tully insufficiently reckoned the parts of temperance.
IIª-IIae q. 143 co. Respondeo dicendum quod, sicut supra dictum est, alicuius virtutis cardinalis triplices partes esse possunt, scilicet integrales, subiectivae et potentiales. Et dicuntur partes integrales alicuius virtutis conditiones quas necesse est concurrere ad virtutem. Et secundum hoc, sunt duae partes integrales temperantiae, scilicet verecundia, per quam aliquis refugit turpitudinem temperantiae contrariam; et honestas, per quam scilicet aliquis amat pulchritudinem temperantiae. Nam sicut ex dictis patet, praecipue temperantia inter virtutes vindicat sibi quendam decorem, et vitia intemperantiae maxime turpitudinem habent. Partes autem subiectivae alicuius virtutis dicuntur species eius. Oportet autem diversificare species virtutum secundum diversitatem materiae vel obiecti. Est autem temperantia circa delectationes tactus, quae dividuntur in duo genera. Nam quaedam ordinantur ad nutrimentum. Et in his, quantum ad cibum, est abstinentia; quantum autem ad potum, proprie sobrietas. Quaedam vero ordinantur ad vim generativam. Et in his, quantum ad delectationem principalem ipsius coitus, est castitas; quantum autem ad delectationes circumstantes, puta quae sunt in osculis, tactibus et amplexibus, attenditur pudicitia. Partes autem potentiales alicuius virtutis principalis dicuntur virtutes secundariae, quae modum quem principalis virtus observat circa aliquam principalem materiam, eundem observant in quibusdam aliis materiis, in quibus non est ita difficile. Pertinet autem ad temperantiam moderari delectationes tactus, quas difficillimum est moderari. Unde quaecumque virtus moderationem quandam operatur in aliqua materia et refrenationem appetitus in aliquid tendentis, poni potest pars temperantiae sicut virtus ei adiuncta. Quod quidem contingit tripliciter, uno modo, in interioribus motibus animi; alio modo, in exterioribus motibus et actibus corporis; tertio modo, in exterioribus rebus. Praeter motum autem concupiscentiae, quem moderatur et refrenat temperantia, tres motus inveniuntur in anima tendentes in aliquid. Primus quidem est motus voluntatis commotae ex impetu passionis, et hunc motum refrenat continentia, ex qua fit ut, licet homo immoderatas concupiscentias patiatur, voluntas tamen non vincitur. Alius autem motus interior in aliquid tendens est motus spei, et audaciae, quae ipsam consequitur, et hunc motum moderatur sive refrenat humilitas. Tertius autem motus est irae tendentis in vindictam, quem refrenat mansuetudo sive clementia. Circa motus autem et actus corporales moderationem et refrenationem facit modestia. Quam Andronicus in tria dividit. Ad quorum primum pertinet discernere quid sit faciendum et quid dimittendum, et quid quo ordine sit agendum, et in hoc firmum persistere, et quantum ad hoc ponit bonam ordinationem. Aliud autem est quod homo in eo quod agit decentiam observet, et quantum ad hoc ponit ornatum. Tertium autem est in colloquiis amicorum, vel quibuscumque aliis, et quantum ad hoc ponitur austeritas. Circa exteriora vero duplex moderatio est adhibenda. Primo quidem, ut superflua non requirantur, et quantum ad hoc ponitur a Macrobio parcitas, et ab Andronico per se sufficientia. Secundo vero, ut homo non nimis exquisita requirat, et quantum ad hoc ponit Macrobius moderationem, Andronicus vero simplicitatem.	I answer that, As stated above (Q48,128), a cardinal virtue may have three kinds of parts, namely integral, subjective, and potential. The integral parts of a virtue are the conditions the concurrence of which are necessary for virtue: and in this respect there are two integral parts of temperance, "shamefacedness," whereby one recoils from the disgrace that is contrary to temperance, and "honesty," whereby one loves the beauty of temperance. For, as stated above (141, 2, ad 3), temperance more than any other virtue lays claim to a certain comeliness, and the vices of intemperance excel others in disgrace. The subjective parts of a virtue are its species: and the species of a virtue have to be differentiated according to the difference of matter or object. Now temperance is about pleasures of touch, which are of two kinds. For some are directed to nourishment: and in these as regards meat, there is "abstinence," and as regards drink properly there is "sobriety." Other pleasures are directed to the power of procreation, and in these as regards the principal pleasure of the act itself of procreation, there is "chastity," and as to the pleasures incidental to the act, resulting, for instance, from kissing, touching, or fondling, we have "purity." The potential parts of a principal virtue are called secondary virtues: for while the principal virtue observes the mode in some principal matter, these observe the mode in some other matter wherein moderation is not so difficult. Now it belongs to temperance to moderate pleasures of touch, which are most difficult to moderate. Wherefore any virtue that is effective of moderation in some matter or other, and restrains the appetite in its impulse towards something, may be reckoned a part of temperance, as a virtue annexed thereto. This happens in three ways: first, in the inward movements of the soul; secondly, in the outward movements and actions of the body; thirdly, in outward things. Now besides the movement of concupiscence, which temperance moderates and restrains, we find in the soul three movements towards a particular object. On the first place there is the movement of the will when stirred by the impulse of passion: and this movement is restrained by "continence," the effect of which is that, although a man suffer immoderate concupiscences, his will does not succumb to them. Another inward movement towards something is the movement of hope, and of the resultant daring, and this is moderated or restrained by "humility." The third movement is that of anger, which tends towards revenge, and this is restrained by "meekness" or "mildness." With regard to bodily movements and actions, moderation and restraint is the effect of "modesty," which, according to Andronicus, has three parts. The first of these enables one to discern what to do and what not to do, and to observe the right order, and to persevere in what we do: this he assigns to "method." The second is that a man observe decorum in what he does, and this he ascribes to "refinement." The third has to do with the conversation or any other intercourse between a man and his friends, and this is called "gravity." With regard to external things, a twofold moderation has to be observed. First, we must not desire too many, and to this Macrobius assigns "lowliness," and Andronicus "contentment"; secondly, we must not be too nice in our requirements, and to this Macrobius ascribes "moderation," Andronicus "simplicity."
IIª-IIae q. 143 ad 1 Ad primum ergo dicendum quod continentia differt quidem a virtute sicut imperfectum a perfecto, ut infra dicetur, et hoc modo condividitur virtuti. Convenit tamen cum temperantia et in materia, quia est circa delectationes tactus; et in modo, quia in quadam refrenatione consistit. Et ideo convenienter ponitur pars temperantiae.	Reply to Objection 1. It is true that continence differs from virtue, just as imperfect differs from perfect, as we shall state further on (165, 1); and in this sense it is condivided with virtue. Yet it has something in common with temperance both as to matter, since it is about pleasures of touch, and as to mode, since it is a kind of restraint. Hence it is suitably assigned as a part of temperance.
IIª-IIae q. 143 ad 2 Ad secundum dicendum quod clementia, sive mansuetudo, non ponitur pars temperantiae propter convenientiam materiae, sed quia convenit cum ea in modo refrenandi et moderandi, ut dictum est.	Reply to Objection 2. Mildness or meekness is reckoned a part of temperance not because of a likeness of matter, but because they agree as to the mode of restraint and moderation as stated above.
IIª-IIae q. 143 ad 3 Ad tertium dicendum quod circa actus exteriores iustitia attendit id quod est debitum alteri. Hoc autem modestia non attendit, sed solum moderationem quandam. Et ideo non ponitur pars iustitiae, sed temperantiae.	Reply to Objection 3. In the matter of external action justice considers what is due to another. Modesty does not consider this, but only a certain moderation. Hence it is reckoned a part not of justice but of temperance.
IIª-IIae q. 143 ad 4 Ad quartum dicendum quod Tullius sub modestia comprehendit omnia illa quae pertinent ad moderationem corporalium motuum et exteriorum rerum; et etiam moderationem spei, quam diximus ad humilitatem pertinere.	Reply to Objection 4. Under modesty Tully includes whatever pertains to the moderation of bodily movements and external things, as well as the moderation of hope which we reckoned as pertaining to humility.