Authors/Thomas Aquinas/Summa Theologiae/Part IIb/Q134

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Q133 Q135



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IIª-IIae q. 134 pr. Deinde considerandum est de magnificentia et vitiis oppositis. Circa magnificentiam autem quaeruntur quatuor. Primo, utrum magnificentia sit virtus. Secundo, utrum sit virtus specialis. Tertio, quae sit materia eius. Quarto, utrum sit pars fortitudinis. Question 134. Magnificence 1. Is magnificence a virtue? 2. Is it a special virtue? 3. What is its matter? 4. Is it a part of fortitude?
IIª-IIae q. 134 a. 1 arg. 1 Ad primum sic proceditur. Videtur quod magnificentia non sit virtus. Qui enim habet unam virtutem, habet omnes, ut supra habitum est. Sed aliquis potest habere alias virtutes sine magnificentia, dicit enim philosophus, in IV Ethic., quod non omnis liberalis est magnificus. Ergo magnificentia non est virtus. Objection 1. It seems that magnificence is not a virtue. For whoever has one virtue has all the virtues, as stated above (I-II, 65, 1). But one may have the other virtues without having magnificence: because the Philosopher says (Ethic. iv, 2) that "not every liberal man is magnificent." Therefore magnificence is not a virtue.
IIª-IIae q. 134 a. 1 arg. 2 Praeterea, virtus moralis consistit in medio, ut in II Ethic. dicitur. Sed magnificentia non videtur consistere in medio. Superexcellit enim liberalitatem magnitudine. Magnum autem opponitur parvo sicut extremum, quorum medium est aequale, ut dicitur X Metaphys. Et sic magnificentia non est in medio, sed in extremo. Ergo non est virtus. Objection 2. Further, moral virtue observes the mean, according to Ethic. ii, 6. But magnificence does not seemingly observe the mean, for it exceeds liberality in greatness. Now "great" and "little" are opposed to one another as extremes, the mean of which is "equal," as stated in Metaph. x. Hence magnificence observes not the mean, but the extreme. Therefore it is not a virtue.
IIª-IIae q. 134 a. 1 arg. 3 Praeterea, nulla virtus contrariatur inclinationi naturali, sed magis perficit ipsam, ut supra habitum est. Sed sicut philosophus dicit, in IV Ethic., magnificus non est sumptuosus in seipsum, quod est contra inclinationem naturalem, per quam aliquis maxime providet sibi. Ergo magnificentia non est virtus. Objection 3. Further, no virtue is opposed to a natural inclination, but on the contrary perfects it, as stated above (108, 2;117, 1, Objection 1). Now according to the Philosopher (Ethic. iv, 2) the "magnificent man is not lavish towards himself": and this is opposed to the natural inclination one has to look after oneself. Therefore magnificence is not a virtue.
IIª-IIae q. 134 a. 1 arg. 4 Praeterea, secundum philosophum, in VI Ethic., ars est recta ratio factibilium. Sed magnificentia est circa factibilia, ut ex ipso nomine apparet. Ergo magis est ars quam virtus. Objection 4. Further, according to the Philosopher (Ethic. vi, 4) "act is right reason about things to be made." Now magnificence is about things to be made, as its very name denotes [Magnificence= magna facere--i.e. to make great things]. Therefore it is an act rather than a virtue.
IIª-IIae q. 134 a. 1 s. c. Sed contra, virtus humana est participatio quaedam virtutis divinae. Sed magnificentia pertinet ad virtutem divinam, secundum illud Psalmi, magnificentia eius et virtus eius in nubibus. Ergo magnificentia est virtus. On the contrary, Human virtue is a participation of Divine power. But magnificence [virtutis] belongs to Divine power, according to Psalm 47:35: "His magnificence and His power is in the clouds." Therefore magnificence is a virtue.
IIª-IIae q. 134 a. 1 co. Respondeo dicendum quod, sicut dicitur in I de caelo, virtus dicitur per comparationem ad ultimum in quod potentia potest, non quidem ad ultimum ex parte defectus; sed ex parte excessus, cuius ratio consistit in magnitudine. Et ideo operari aliquid magnum, ex quo sumitur nomen magnificentiae, proprie pertinet ad rationem virtutis. Unde magnificentia nominat virtutem. I answer that, According to De Coelo i, 16, "we speak of virtue in relation to the extreme limit of a thing's power," not as regards the limit of deficiency, but as regards the limit of excess, the very nature of which denotes something great. Wherefore to do something great, whence magnificence takes its name, belongs properly to the very notion of virtue. Hence magnificence denotes a virtue.
IIª-IIae q. 134 a. 1 ad 1 Ad primum ergo dicendum quod non omnis liberalis est magnificus quantum ad actum, quia desunt sibi ea quibus uti necesse est ad actum magnificum. Tamen omnis liberalis habet habitum magnificentiae, vel actu vel in propinqua dispositione, ut supra dictum est, cum de connexione virtutum ageretur. Reply to Objection 1. Not every liberal man is magnificent as regards his actions, because he lacks the wherewithal to perform magnificent deeds. Nevertheless every liberal man has the habit of magnificence, either actually or in respect of a proximate disposition thereto, as explained above (129, 3, ad 2), as also (I-II, 65, 1) when we were treating of the connection of virtues.
IIª-IIae q. 134 a. 1 ad 2 Ad secundum dicendum quod magnificentia consistit quidem in extremo, considerata quantitate eius quod facit. Sed tamen in medio consistit, considerata regula rationis, a qua non deficit nec eam excedit, sicut et de magnanimitate dictum est. Reply to Objection 2. It is true that magnificence observes the extreme, if we consider the quantity of the thing done: yet it observes the mean, if we consider the rule of reason, which it neither falls short of nor exceeds, as we have also said of magnanimity (129, 3, ad 1).
IIª-IIae q. 134 a. 1 ad 3 Ad tertium dicendum quod ad magnificentiam pertinet facere aliquid magnum. Quod autem pertinet ad personam uniuscuiusque, est aliquid parvum in comparatione ad id quod convenit rebus divinis vel rebus communibus. Et ideo magnificus non principaliter intendit sumptus facere in his quae pertinent ad personam propriam, non quia bonum suum non quaerat, sed quia non est magnum. Si quid tamen in his quae ad ipsum pertinent magnitudinem habeat, hoc etiam magnifice magnificus prosequitur, sicut ea quae semel fiunt, ut nuptiae vel aliquid aliud huiusmodi; vel etiam ea quae permanentia sunt, sicut ad magnificum pertinet praeparare convenientem habitationem, ut dicitur in IV Ethic. Reply to Objection 3. It belongs to magnificence to do something great. But that which regards a man's person is little in comparison with that which regards Divine things, or even the affairs of the community at large. Wherefore the magnificent man does not intend principally to be lavish towards himself, not that he does not seek his own good, but because to do so is not something great. Yet if anything regarding himself admits of greatness, the magnificent man accomplishes it magnificently: for instance, things that are done once, such as a wedding, or the like; or things that are of a lasting nature; thus it belongs to a magnificent man to provide himself with a suitable dwelling, as stated in Ethic. iv.
IIª-IIae q. 134 a. 1 ad 4 Ad quartum dicendum quod, sicut philosophus dicit, in VI Ethic., oportet artis esse quandam virtutem, scilicet moralem, per quam scilicet appetitus inclinetur ad recte utendum ratione artis. Et hoc pertinet ad magnificentiam. Unde non est ars, sed virtus. Reply to Objection 4. As the Philosopher says (Ethic. vi, 5) "there must needs be a virtue of act," i.e. a moral virtue, whereby the appetite is inclined to make good use of the rule of act: and this is what magnificence does. Hence it is not an act but a virtue.
IIª-IIae q. 134 a. 2 arg. 1 Ad secundum sic proceditur. Videtur quod magnificentia non sit specialis virtus. Ad magnificentiam enim videtur pertinere facere aliquid magnum. Sed facere aliquid magnum potest convenire cuilibet virtuti, si sit magna, sicut qui habet magnam virtutem temperantiae, facit magnum temperantiae opus. Ergo magnificentia non est aliqua specialis virtus, sed significat statum perfectum cuiuslibet virtutis. Objection 1. It seems that magnificence is not a special virtue. For magnificence would seem to consist in doing something great. But it may belong to any virtue to do something great, if the virtue be great: as in the case of one who has a great virtue of temperance, for he does a great work of temperance. Therefore, magnificence is not a special virtue, but denotes a perfect degree of any virtue.
IIª-IIae q. 134 a. 2 arg. 2 Praeterea, eiusdem videtur facere aliquid et tendere in illud. Sed tendere in aliquid magnum pertinet ad magnanimitatem, ut supra dictum est. Ergo et facere aliquid magnum pertinet ad magnanimitatem. Non ergo magnificentia est virtus distincta a magnanimitate. Objection 2. Further, seemingly that which tends to a thing is the same as that which does it. But it belongs to magnanimity to tend to something great, as stated above (129, 1 and 2). Therefore it belongs to magnanimity likewise to do something great. Therefore magnificence is not a special virtue distinct from magnanimity.
IIª-IIae q. 134 a. 2 arg. 3 Praeterea, magnificentia videtur ad sanctitatem pertinere, dicitur enim Exod. XV, magnificus in sanctitate; et in Psalmo, sanctitas et magnificentia in sanctificatione eius. Sed sanctitas idem est religioni, ut supra habitum est. Ergo magnificentia videtur esse idem religioni. Non ergo est virtus specialis ab aliis distincta. Objection 3. Further, magnificence seems to belong to holiness, for it is written (Exodus 15:11): "Magnificent [Douay: 'glorious'] in holiness," and (Psalm 95:6): "Holiness and magnificence [Douay: 'Majesty'] in His sanctuary." Now holiness is the same as religion, as stated above (Question 81, Article 8). Therefore magnificence is apparently the same as religion. Therefore it is not a special virtue, distinct from the others.
IIª-IIae q. 134 a. 2 s. c. Sed contra est quod philosophus connumerat eam aliis virtutibus specialibus. On the contrary, The Philosopher reckons it with other special virtues (Ethic. ii, 7; iv 2).
IIª-IIae q. 134 a. 2 co. Respondeo dicendum quod ad magnificentiam pertinet facere aliquid magnum, sicut ex ipso nomine apparet. Facere autem dupliciter potest accipi, uno modo, proprie; alio modo, communiter. Proprie autem facere dicitur operari aliquid in exteriori materia, sicut facere domum vel aliquid aliud huiusmodi. Communiter autem dicitur facere pro quacumque actione, sive transeat in exteriorem materiam, sicut urere et secare; sive maneat in ipso agente, sicut intelligere et velle. Si igitur magnificentia accipiatur secundum quod importat factionem alicuius magni prout factio proprie dicitur, sic magnificentia est specialis virtus. Opus enim factibile producitur ab arte. In cuius quidem usu potest attendi una specialis ratio bonitatis quod ipsum opus factum per artem sit magnum, scilicet in quantitate, pretiositate vel dignitate, quod facit magnificentia. Et secundum hoc magnificentia est specialis virtus. Si vero nomen magnificentiae accipiatur ab eo quod est facere magnum secundum quod facere communiter sumitur, sic magnificentia non est specialis virtus. I answer that, It belongs to magnificence to do [facere] something great, as its name implies [magnificence= magna facere--i.e. to make great things]. Now "facere" may be taken in two ways, in a strict sense, and in a broad sense. Strictly "facere" means to work something in external matter, for instance to make a house, or something of the kind; in a broad sense "facere" is employed to denote any action, whether it passes into external matter, as to burn or cut, or remain in the agent, as to understand or will. Accordingly if magnificence be taken to denote the doing of something great, the doing [factio] being understood in the strict sense, it is then a special virtue. For the work done is produced by act: in the use of which it is possible to consider a special aspect of goodness, namely that the work produced [factum] by the act is something great, namely in quantity, value, or dignity, and this is what magnificence does. On this way magnificence is a special virtue. If, on the other hand, magnificence take its name from doing something great, the doing [facere] being understood in a broad sense, it is not a special virtue.
IIª-IIae q. 134 a. 2 ad 1 Ad primum ergo dicendum quod ad quamlibet virtutem perfectam pertinet magnum facere in suo genere, secundum quod facere communiter sumitur, non autem secundum quod sumitur proprie, sed hoc est proprium magnificentiae. Reply to Objection 1. It belongs to every perfect virtue to do something great in the genus of that virtue, if "doing" [facere] be taken in the broad sense, but not if it be taken strictly, for this is proper to magnificence.
IIª-IIae q. 134 a. 2 ad 2 Ad secundum dicendum quod ad magnanimitatem pertinet non solum tendere in magnum, sed etiam in omnibus virtutibus magnum operari, vel faciendo vel qualitercumque agendo, ut dicitur in IV Ethic., ita tamen quod magnanimitas circa hoc respicit solam rationem magni. Aliae autem virtutes, quae, si sint perfectae, magnum operantur, non principaliter dirigunt intentionem suam ad magnum, sed ad id quod est proprium unicuique virtuti, magnitudo autem consequitur ex quantitate virtutis. Ad magnificentiam vero pertinet non solum facere magnum secundum quod facere proprie sumitur, sed etiam ad magnum faciendum tendere animo, unde Tullius dicit, in sua rhetorica, quod magnificentia est rerum magnarum et excelsarum, cum animi quadam ampla et splendida propositione, cogitatio atque administratio; ut cogitatio referatur ad interiorem intentionem, administratio ad exteriorem executionem. Unde oportet quod sicut magnanimitas intendit aliquod magnum in omni materia, ita magnificentia in aliquo opere factibili. Reply to Objection 2. It belongs to magnanimity not only to tend to something great, but also to do great works in all the virtues, either by making [faciendo], or by any kind of action, as stated in Ethic. iv, 3: yet so that magnanimity, in this respect, regards the sole aspect of great, while the other virtues which, if they be perfect, do something great, direct their principal intention, not to something great, but to that which is proper to each virtue: and the greatness of the thing done is sometimes consequent upon the greatness of the virtue. On the other hand, it belongs to magnificence not only to do something great, "doing" [facere] being taken in the strict sense, but also to tend with the mind to the doing of great things. Hence Tully says (De Invent. Rhet. ii) that "magnificence is the discussing and administering of great and lofty undertakings, with a certain broad and noble purpose of mind, discussion" referring to the inward intention, and "administration" to the outward accomplishment. Wherefore just as magnanimity intends something great in every matter, it follows that magnificence does the same in every work that can be produced in external matter [factibili].
IIª-IIae q. 134 a. 2 ad 3 Ad tertium dicendum quod magnificentia intendit opus magnum facere. Opera autem ab hominibus facta ad aliquem finem ordinantur. Nullus autem finis humanorum operum est adeo magnus sicut honor Dei. Et ideo magnificentia praecipue magnum opus facit in ordine ad honorem Dei. Unde philosophus dicit, in IV Ethic., quod honorabiles sumptus sunt maxime qui pertinent ad divina sacrificia, et circa hoc maxime studet magnificus. Et ideo magnificentia coniungitur sanctitati, quia praecipue eius effectus ad religionem, sive ad sanctitatem, ordinatur. Reply to Objection 3. The intention of magnificence is the production of a great work. Now works done by men are directed to an end: and no end of human works is so great as the honor of God: wherefore magnificence does a great work especially in reference to the Divine honor. Wherefore the Philosopher says (Ethic. iv, 2) that "the most commendable expenditure is that which is directed to Divine sacrifices": and this is the chief object of magnificence. For this reason magnificence is connected with holiness, since its chief effect is directed to religion or holiness.
IIª-IIae q. 134 a. 3 arg. 1 Ad tertium sic proceditur. Videtur quod materia magnificentiae non sint sumptus magni. Circa eandem enim materiam non sunt duae virtutes. Sed circa sumptus est liberalitas, ut supra habitum est. Ergo magnificentia non est circa sumptus. Objection 1. It seems that the matter of magnificence is not great expenditure. For there are not two virtues about the same matter. But liberality is about expenditure, as stated above (Question 117, Article 2). Therefore magnificence is not about expenditure.
IIª-IIae q. 134 a. 3 arg. 2 Praeterea, omnis magnificus est liberalis, ut dicitur in IV Ethic. Sed liberalitas magis est circa dona quam circa sumptus. Ergo etiam magnificentia non praecipue est circa sumptus, sed magis circa dona. Objection 2. Further, "every magnificent man is liberal" (Ethic. iv, 2). But liberality is about gifts rather than about expenditure. Therefore magnificence also is not chiefly about expenditure, but about gifts.
IIª-IIae q. 134 a. 3 arg. 3 Praeterea, ad magnificentiam pertinet aliquod opus exterius facere. Non autem quibuslibet sumptibus fit aliquod exterius opus, etiam si sint sumptus magni, puta cum aliquis multa expendit in exenniis mittendis. Ergo sumptus non sunt propria materia magnificentiae. Objection 3. Further, it belongs to magnificence to produce an external work. But not even great expenditure is always the means of producing an external work, for instance when one spends much in sending presents. Therefore expenditure is not the proper matter of magnificence.
IIª-IIae q. 134 a. 3 arg. 4 Praeterea, magnos sumptus non possunt facere nisi divites. Sed omnes virtutes possunt habere etiam pauperes, quia virtutes non ex necessitate indigent exteriori fortuna, sed sibi ipsis sufficiunt, ut Seneca dicit, in libro de ira. Ergo magnificentia non est circa magnos sumptus. Objection 4. Further, only the rich are capable of great expenditure. But the poor are able to possess all the virtues, since "the virtues do not necessarily require external fortune, but are sufficient for themselves," as Seneca says (De Ira i: De vita beata xvi). Therefore magnificence is not about great expenditure.
IIª-IIae q. 134 a. 3 s. c. Sed contra est quod philosophus dicit, in IV Ethic., quod magnificentia non extenditur circa omnes operationes quae sunt in pecuniis, sicut liberalitas, sed circa sumptuosas solum, in quibus excellit liberalitatem magnitudine. Ergo est solum circa magnos sumptus. On the contrary, The Philosopher says (Ethic. iv, 2) that "magnificence does not extend, like liberality, to all transactions in money, but only to expensive ones, wherein it exceeds liberality in scale." Therefore it is only about great expenditure.
IIª-IIae q. 134 a. 3 co. Respondeo dicendum quod ad magnificentiam, sicut dictum est, pertinet intendere ad aliquod magnum opus faciendum. Ad hoc autem quod aliquod magnum opus convenienter fiat, requiruntur proportionati sumptus, non enim possunt magna opera fieri nisi cum magnis expensis. Unde ad magnificentiam pertinet magnos sumptus facere ad hoc quod opus magnum convenienter fiat, unde et philosophus dicit, in IV Ethic., quod magnificus ab aequali, idest proportionato, sumptu, opus faciet magis magnificum. Sumptus autem est quaedam pecuniae emissio, a qua potest aliquis prohiberi per superfluum amorem pecuniae. Et ideo materia magnificentiae possunt dici et ipsi sumptus, quibus utitur magnificus ad opus magnum faciendum; et ipsa pecunia, qua utitur ad sumptus magnos faciendos; et amor pecuniae, quem moderatur magnificus, ne sumptus magni impediantur. I answer that, As stated above (Article 2), it belongs to magnificence to intend doing some great work. Now for the doing of a great work, proportionate expenditure is necessary, for great works cannot be produced without great expenditure. Hence it belongs to magnificence to spend much in order that some great work may be accomplished in becoming manner. Wherefore the Philosopher says (Ethic. iv, 2) that "a magnificent man will produce a more magnificent work with equal," i.e. proportionate, "expenditure." Now expenditure is the outlay of a sum of money; and a man may be hindered from making that outlay if he love money too much. Hence the matter of magnificence may be said to be both this expenditure itself, which the magnificent man uses to produce a great work, and also the very money which he employs in going to great expense, and as well as the love of money, which love the magnificent man moderates, lest he be hindered from spending much.
IIª-IIae q. 134 a. 3 ad 1 Ad primum ergo dicendum quod, sicut supra dictum est, virtutes illae quae sunt circa res exteriores habent aliquam difficultatem ex ipso genere rei circa quam est virtus, et aliam difficultatem ex magnitudine ipsius rei. Et ideo oportet circa pecuniam et usum eius esse duas virtutes, scilicet liberalitatem, quae respicit communiter usum pecuniae; et magnificentiam, quae respicit magnum in pecuniae usu. Reply to Objection 1. As stated above (Question 129, Article 2), those virtues that are about external things experience a certain difficulty arising from the genus itself of the thing about which the virtue is concerned, and another difficulty besides arising from the greatness of that same thing. Hence the need for two virtues, concerned about money and its use; namely, liberality, which regards the use of money in general, and magnificence, which regards that which is great in the use of money.
IIª-IIae q. 134 a. 3 ad 2 Ad secundum dicendum quod usus pecuniae aliter pertinet ad liberalem, et aliter ad magnificum. Ad liberalem enim pertinet secundum quod procedit ex ordinato affectu circa pecunias. Et ideo omnis usus debitus pecuniae, cuius impedimentum tollit moderatio amoris pecuniae, pertinet ad liberalitatem, scilicet et dona et sumptus. Sed usus pecuniae pertinet ad magnificum in ordine ad aliquod opus magnum quod faciendum est. Et talis usus non potest esse nisi sumptus sive expensa. Reply to Objection 2. The use of money regards the liberal man in one way and the magnificent man in another. For it regards the liberal man, inasmuch as it proceeds from an ordinate affection in respect of money; wherefore all due use of money (such as gifts and expenditure), the obstacles to which are removed by a moderate love of money, belongs to liberality. But the use of money regards the magnificent man in relation to some great work which has to be produced, and this use is impossible without expenditure or outlay.
IIª-IIae q. 134 a. 3 ad 3 Ad tertium dicendum quod magnificus etiam dat dona vel exennia, ut dicitur in IV Ethic., non tamen sub ratione doni, sed potius sub ratione sumptus ordinati ad aliquod opus faciendum, puta ad honorandum aliquem, vel ad faciendum aliquid unde proveniat honor toti civitati, sicut cum facit aliquid ad quod tota civitas studet. Reply to Objection 3. The magnificent man also makes gifts of presents, as stated in Ethic. iv, 2, but not under the aspect of gift, but rather under the aspect of expenditure directed to the production of some work, for instance in order to honor someone, or in order to do something which will reflect honor on the whole state: as when he brings to effect what the whole state is striving for.
IIª-IIae q. 134 a. 3 ad 4 Ad quartum dicendum quod principalis actus virtutis est interior electio, quam virtus potest habere absque exteriori fortuna. Et sic etiam pauper potest esse magnificus. Sed ad exteriores actus virtutum requiruntur bona fortunae sicut quaedam instrumenta. Et secundum hoc, pauper non potest actum magnificentiae exteriorem exercere in his quae sunt magna simpliciter, sed forte in his quae sunt magna per comparationem ad aliquod opus quod, etsi in se sit parvum, tamen potest magnifice fieri secundum proportionem illius generis; nam parvum et magnum dicuntur relative, ut philosophus dicit, in praedicamentis. Reply to Objection 4. The chief act of virtue is the inward choice, and a virtue may have this without outward fortune: so that even a poor man may be magnificent. But goods of fortune are requisite as instruments to the external acts of virtue: and in this way a poor man cannot accomplish the outward act of magnificence in things that are great simply. Perhaps, however, he may be able to do so in things that are great by comparison to some particular work; which, though little in itself, can nevertheless be done magnificently in proportion to its genus: for little and great are relative terms, as the Philosopher says (De Praedic. Cap. Ad aliquid.).
IIª-IIae q. 134 a. 4 arg. 1 Ad quartum sic proceditur. Videtur quod magnificentia non sit pars fortitudinis. Magnificentia enim convenit in materia cum liberalitate, ut dictum est. Sed liberalitas non est pars fortitudinis, sed iustitiae. Ergo magnificentia non est pars fortitudinis. Objection 1. It seems that magnificence is not a part of fortitude. For magnificence agrees in matter with liberality, as stated above (Article 3). But liberality is a part, not of fortitude, but of justice. Therefore magnificence is not a part of fortitude.
IIª-IIae q. 134 a. 4 arg. 2 Praeterea, fortitudo est circa timores et audacias. Magnificentia autem in nullo videtur respicere timorem, sed solum sumptus, qui sunt operationes quaedam. Ergo magnificentia magis videtur pertinere ad iustitiam, quae est circa operationes, quam ad fortitudinem. Objection 2. Further, fortitude is about fear and darings. But magnificence seems to have nothing to do with fear, but only with expenditure, which is a kind of action. Therefore magnificence seems to pertain to justice, which is about actions, rather than to fortitude.
IIª-IIae q. 134 a. 4 arg. 3 Praeterea, philosophus dicit, in IV Ethic., quod magnificus scienti assimilatur. Sed scientia magis convenit cum prudentia quam cum fortitudine. Ergo magnificentia non debet poni pars fortitudinis. Objection 3. Further, the Philosopher says (Ethic. iv, 2) that "the magnificent man is like the man of science." Now science has more in common with prudence than with fortitude. Therefore magnificence should not be reckoned a part of fortitude.
IIª-IIae q. 134 a. 4 s. c. Sed contra est quod Tullius et Macrobius et Andronicus magnificentiam partem fortitudinis ponunt. On the contrary, Tully (De Invent. Rhet. ii) and Macrobius (De Somn. Scip. i) and Andronicus reckon magnificence to be a part of fortitude.
IIª-IIae q. 134 a. 4 co. Respondeo dicendum quod magnificentia, secundum quod est specialis virtus, non potest poni pars subiectiva fortitudinis, quia non convenit cum ea in materia, sed ponitur pars eius inquantum adiungitur ei sicut virtus secundaria principali. Ad hoc autem quod aliqua virtus adiungatur alicui principali, duo requiruntur, ut supra dictum est, quorum unum est ut secundaria conveniat cum principali; aliud autem est ut in aliquo excedatur ab ea. Magnificentia autem convenit cum fortitudine in hoc quod, sicut fortitudo tendit in aliquod arduum et difficile, ita etiam et magnificentia, unde etiam videtur esse in irascibili, sicut et fortitudo. Sed magnificentia deficit a fortitudine in hoc quod illud arduum in quod tendit fortitudo, habet difficultatem propter periculum quod imminet personae, arduum autem in quod tendit magnificentia, habet difficultatem propter dispendium rerum; quod est multo minus quam periculum personae. Et ideo magnificentia ponitur pars fortitudinis. I answer that, Magnificence, in so far as it is a special virtue, cannot be reckoned a subjective part of fortitude, since it does not agree with this virtue in the point of matter: but it is reckoned a part thereof, as being annexed to it as secondary to principal virtue. In order for a virtue to be annexed to a principal virtue, two things are necessary, as stated above (Article 80). The one is that the secondary virtue agree with the principal, and the other is that in some respect it be exceeded thereby. Now magnificence agrees with fortitude in the point that as fortitude tends to something arduous and difficult, so also does magnificence: wherefore seemingly it is seated, like fortitude, in the irascible. Yet magnificence falls short of fortitude, in that the arduous thing to which fortitude tends derives its difficulty from a danger that threatens the person, whereas the arduous thing to which magnificence tends, derives its difficulty from the dispossession of one's property, which is of much less account than danger to one's person. Wherefore magnificence is accounted a part of fortitude.
IIª-IIae q. 134 a. 4 ad 1 Ad primum ergo dicendum quod iustitia respicit operationes secundum se, prout in eis consideratur ratio debiti. Sed liberalitas et magnificentia considerant operationes sumptuum secundum quod comparantur ad passiones animae, diversimode tamen. Nam liberalitas respicit sumptus per comparationem ad amorem et concupiscentiam pecuniarum, quae sunt passiones concupiscibilis, quibus non impeditur liberalis a dationibus et sumptibus faciendis, unde est in concupiscibili. Sed magnificentia respicit sumptus per comparationem ad spem, attingendo ad aliquid arduum, non simpliciter, sicut magnanimitas, sed in determinata materia, scilicet in sumptibus. Unde magnificentia videtur esse in irascibili, sicut et magnanimitas. Reply to Objection 1. Justice regards operations in themselves, as viewed under the aspect of something due: but liberality and magnificence regard sumptuary operations as related to the passions of the soul, albeit in different ways. For liberality regards expenditure in reference to the love and desire of money, which are passions of the concupiscible faculty, and do not hinder the liberal man from giving and spending: so that this virtue is in the concupiscible. On the other hand, magnificence regards expenditure in reference to hope, by attaining to the difficulty, not simply, as magnanimity does, but in a determinate matter, namely expenditure: wherefore magnificence, like magnanimity, is apparently in the irascible part.
IIª-IIae q. 134 a. 4 ad 2 Ad secundum dicendum quod magnificentia, etsi non conveniat cum fortitudine in materia, convenit tamen cum ea in conditione materiae, inquantum scilicet tendit in aliquid arduum circa sumptus, sicut fortitudo in aliquid arduum circa timores. Reply to Objection 2. Although magnificence does not agree with fortitude in matter, it agrees with it as the condition of its matter: since it tends to something difficult in the matter of expenditure, even as fortitude tends to something difficult in the matter of fear.
IIª-IIae q. 134 a. 4 ad 3 Ad tertium dicendum quod magnificentia ordinat usum artis ad aliquid magnum, ut dictum est. Ars autem est in ratione. Et ideo ad magnificum pertinet bene uti ratione in attendendo proportionem sumptus ad opus quod faciendum est. Et hoc praecipue necessarium est propter magnitudinem utriusque, quia nisi diligens consideratio adhiberetur, immineret periculum magni damni. Reply to Objection 3. Magnificence directs the use of art to something great, as stated above and in the preceding Article. Now art is in the reason. Wherefore it belongs to the magnificent man to use his reason by observing proportion of expenditure to the work he has in hand. This is especially necessary on account of the greatness of both those things, since if he did not take careful thought, he would incur the risk of a great loss.

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