Authors/Thomas Aquinas/Summa Theologiae/Part IIb/Q122

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IIª-IIae q. 122 pr. Deinde considerandum est de praeceptis iustitiae. Et circa hoc quaeruntur sex. Primo, utrum praecepta Decalogi sint praecepta iustitiae. Secundo, de primo praecepto Decalogi. Tertio, de secundo. Quarto, de tertio. Quinto, de quarto. Sexto, de aliis sex. Question 122. The precepts of justice 1. Are the precepts of the decalogue precepts of justice? 2. The first precept of the decalogue 3. The second 4. The third 5. The fourth 6. The other six
IIª-IIae q. 122 a. 1 arg. 1 Ad primum sic proceditur. Videtur quod praecepta Decalogi non sint praecepta iustitiae. Intentio enim legislatoris est cives facere virtuosos secundum omnem virtutem, ut dicitur in II Ethic., unde et in V Ethic. dicitur quod lex praecipit de omnibus actibus virtutum omnium. Sed praecepta Decalogi sunt prima principia totius divinae legis. Ergo praecepta Decalogi non pertinent ad solam iustitiam. Objection 1. It seems that the precepts of the decalogue are not precepts of justice. For the intention of a lawgiver is "to make the citizens virtuous in respect of every virtue," as stated in Ethic. ii, 1. Wherefore, according to Ethic. v, 1, "the law prescribes about all acts of all virtues." Now the precepts of the decalogue are the first. principles of the whole Divine Law. Therefore the precepts of the decalogue do not pertain to justice alone.
IIª-IIae q. 122 a. 1 arg. 2 Praeterea, ad iustitiam videntur pertinere praecipue praecepta iudicialia, quae contra moralia dividuntur, ut supra habitum est. Sed praecepta Decalogi sunt praecepta moralia, ut ex supra dictis patet. Ergo praecepta Decalogi non sunt praecepta iustitiae. Objection 2. Further, it would seem that to justice belong especially the judicial precepts, which are condivided with the moral precepts, as stated above (I-II, 99, 4). But the precepts of the decalogue are moral precepts, as stated above (I-II, 100, 3). Therefore the precepts of the decalogue are not precepts of justice.
IIª-IIae q. 122 a. 1 arg. 3 Praeterea, lex praecipue tradit praecepta de actibus iustitiae pertinentibus ad bonum commune, puta de officiis publicis, et aliis huiusmodi. Sed de his non fit mentio in praeceptis Decalogi. Ergo videtur quod praecepta Decalogi non pertineant proprie ad iustitiam. Objection 3. Further, the Law contains chiefly precepts about acts of justice regarding the common good, for instance about public officers and the like. But there is no mention of these in the precepts of the decalogue. Therefore it seems that the precepts of the decalogue do not properly belong to justice.
IIª-IIae q. 122 a. 1 arg. 4 Praeterea, praecepta Decalogi distinguuntur in duas tabulas secundum dilectionem Dei et proximi, quae pertinent ad virtutem caritatis. Ergo praecepta Decalogi magis pertinent ad caritatem quam ad iustitiam. Objection 4. Further, the precepts of the decalogue are divided into two tables, corresponding to the love of God and the love of our neighbor, both of which regard the virtue of charity. Therefore the precepts of the decalogue belong to charity rather than to justice.
IIª-IIae q. 122 a. 1 s. c. Sed contra est quod iustitia sola videtur esse virtus per quam ordinamur ad alterum. Sed per omnia praecepta Decalogi ordinamur ad alterum, ut patet discurrenti per singula. Ergo omnia praecepta Decalogi pertinent ad iustitiam. On the contrary, Seemingly justice is the sole virtue whereby we are directed to another. Now we are directed to another by all the precepts of the decalogue, as is evident if one consider each of them. Therefore all the precepts of the decalogue pertain to justice.
IIª-IIae q. 122 a. 1 co. Respondeo dicendum quod praecepta Decalogi sunt prima praecepta legis, et quibus statim ratio naturalis assentit sicut manifestissimis. Manifestissime autem ratio debiti, quae requiritur ad praeceptum, apparet in iustitia, quae est ad alterum, quia in his quae spectant ad seipsum, videtur primo aspectui quod homo sit sui dominus, et quod liceat ei facere quodlibet; sed in his quae sunt ad alterum, manifeste apparet quod homo est alteri obligatus ad reddendum ei quod debet. Et ideo praecepta Decalogi oportuit ad iustitiam pertinere. Unde tria prima praecepta sunt de actibus religionis, quae est potissima pars iustitiae; quartum autem praeceptum est de actu pietatis, quae est pars iustitiae secunda; alia vero sex dantur de actibus iustitiae communiter dictae, quae inter aequales attenditur. I answer that, The precepts of the decalogue are the first principles of the Law: and the natural reason assents to them at once, as to principles that are most evident. Now it is altogether evident that the notion of duty, which is essential to a precept, appears in justice, which is of one towards another. Because in those matters that relate to himself it would seem at a glance that man is master of himself, and that he may do as he likes: whereas in matters that refer to another it appears manifestly that a man is under obligation to render to another that which is his due. Hence the precepts of the decalogue must needs pertain to justice. Wherefore the first three precepts are about acts of religion, which is the chief part of justice; the fourth precept is about acts of piety, which is the second part of justice; and the six remaining are about justice commonly so called, which is observed among equals.
IIª-IIae q. 122 a. 1 ad 1 Ad primum ergo dicendum quod lex intendit omnes homines facere virtuosos, sed ordine quodam, ut scilicet prius tradat eis praecepta de his in quibus est manifestior ratio debiti, ut dictum est. Reply to Objection 1. The intention of the law is to make all men virtuous, but in a certain order, namely, by first of all giving them precepts about those things where the notion of duty is most manifest, as stated above.
IIª-IIae q. 122 a. 1 ad 2 Ad secundum dicendum quod iudicialia praecepta sunt quaedam determinationes moralium praeceptorum prout ordinantur ad proximum, sicut et caeremonialia sunt quaedam determinationes moralium praeceptorum prout ordinantur ad Deum. Unde neutra praecepta continentur in Decalogo. Sunt tamen determinationes praeceptorum Decalogi. Et sic ad iustitiam pertinent. Reply to Objection 2. The judicial precepts are determinations of the moral precepts, in so far as these are directed to one's neighbor, just as the ceremonial precepts are determinations of the moral precepts in so far as these are directed to God. Hence neither precepts are contained in the decalogue: and yet they are determinations of the precepts of the decalogue, and therefore pertain to justice.
IIª-IIae q. 122 a. 1 ad 3 Ad tertium dicendum quod ea quae pertinent ad bonum commune oportet diversimode dispensari secundum hominum diversitatem. Et ideo non fuerunt ponenda inter praecepta Decalogi, sed inter praecepta iudicialia. Reply to Objection 3. Things that concern the common good must needs be administered in different ways according to the difference of men. Hence they were to be given a place not among the precepts of the decalogue, but among the judicial precepts.
IIª-IIae q. 122 a. 1 ad 4 Ad quartum dicendum quod praecepta Decalogi pertinent ad caritatem sicut ad finem, secundum illud I ad Tim. I, finis praecepti caritas est. Sed ad iustitiam pertinent inquantum immediate sunt de actibus iustitiae. Reply to Objection 4. The precepts of the decalogue pertain to charity as their end, according to 1 Timothy 1:5, "The end of the commandment is charity": but they belong to justice, inasmuch as they refer immediately to acts of justice.
IIª-IIae q. 122 a. 2 arg. 1 Ad secundum sic proceditur. Videtur quod primum praeceptum Decalogi inconvenienter tradatur. Magis enim homo est obligatus Deo quam patri carnali, secundum illud Heb. XII, quanto magis obtemperabimus patri spirituum, et vivemus? Sed praeceptum pietatis, qua honoratur pater, ponitur affirmative, cum dicitur, honora patrem tuum et matrem tuam. Ergo multo magis primum praeceptum religionis, qua honoratur Deus, debuit proponi affirmative, praesertim cum affirmatio sit naturaliter prior negatione. Objection 1. It seems that the first precept of the decalogue is unfittingly expressed. For man is more bound to God than to his father in the flesh, according to Hebrews 12:9, "How much more shall we [Vulgate: 'shall we not much more'] obey the Father of spirits and live?" Now the precept of piety, whereby man honors his father, is expressed affirmatively in these words: "Honor thy father and thy mother." Much more, therefore, should the first precept of religion, whereby all honor God, be expressed affirmatively, especially as affirmation is naturally prior to negation.
IIª-IIae q. 122 a. 2 arg. 2 Praeterea, primum praeceptum Decalogi ad religionem pertinet, ut dictum est. Sed religio, cum sit una virtus, habet unum actum. In primo autem praecepto prohibentur tres actus, nam primo dicitur, non habebis deos alienos coram me; secundo dicitur, non facies tibi sculptile; tertio, non adorabis ea, neque coles. Ergo inconvenienter traditur primum praeceptum. Objection 2. Further, the first precept of the decalogue pertains to religion, as stated above (Article 1). Now religion, since it is one virtue, has one act. Yet in the first precept three acts are forbidden: since we read first: "Thou shalt not have strange gods before Me"; secondly, "Thou shalt not make to thyself any graven thing"; and thirdly, "Thou shalt not adore them nor serve them." Therefore the first precept is unfittingly expressed.
IIª-IIae q. 122 a. 2 arg. 3 Praeterea, Augustinus dicit, in libro de decem chordis, quod per primum praeceptum excluditur vitium superstitionis. Sed multae sunt aliae noxiae superstitiones praeter idololatriam, ut supra dictum est. Insufficienter ergo prohibetur sola idololatria. Objection 3. Further, Augustine says (De decem chord. ix) that "the first precept forbids the sin of superstition." But there are many wicked superstitions besides idolatry, as stated above (Question 92, Article 2). Therefore it was insufficient to forbid idolatry alone.
IIª-IIae q. 122 a. 2 s. c. In contrarium est auctoritas Scripturae. On the contrary, stands the authority of Scripture.
IIª-IIae q. 122 a. 2 co. Respondeo dicendum quod ad legem pertinet facere homines bonos. Et ideo oportet praecepta legis ordinari secundum ordinem generationis, qua scilicet homo fit bonus. In ordine autem generationis duo sunt attendenda. Quorum primum est quod prima pars primo constituitur, sicut in generatione animalis primo generatur cor, et in domo primo fit fundamentum. In bonitate autem animae prima pars est bonitas voluntatis, ex qua aliquis homo bene utitur qualibet alia bonitate. Bonitas autem voluntatis attenditur ad obiectum suum, quod est finis. Et ideo in eo qui erat per legem instituendus ad virtutem, primo oportuit quasi iacere quoddam fundamentum religionis, per quam homo debite ordinatur in Deum, qui est ultimus finis humanae voluntatis. Secundo attendendum est in ordine generationis quod primo contraria et impedimenta tolluntur, sicut agricola primo purgat agrum, et postea proiicit semina, secundum illud Ierem. IV, novate vobis novale, et nolite serere super spinas. Et ideo circa religionem primo homo erat instituendus ut impedimenta verae religionis excluderet. Praecipuum autem impedimentum religionis est quod homo falso Deo inhaereat, secundum illud Matth. VI, non potestis servire Deo et mammonae. Et ideo in primo praecepto legis excluditur cultus falsorum deorum. I answer that, It pertains to law to make men good, wherefore it behooved the precepts of the Law to be set in order according to the order of generation, the order, to wit, of man's becoming good. Now two things must be observed in the order of generation. The first is that the first part is the first thing to be established; thus in the generation of an animal the first thing to be formed is the heart, and in building a home the first thing to be set up is the foundation: and in the goodness of the soul the first part is goodness of the will, the result of which is that a man makes good use of every other goodness. Now the goodness of the will depends on its object, which is its end. Wherefore since man was to be directed to virtue by means of the Law, the first thing necessary was, as it were, to lay the foundation of religion, whereby man is duly directed to God, Who is the last end of man's will. The second thing to be observed in the order of generation is that in the first place contraries and obstacles have to be removed. Thus the farmer first purifies the soil, and afterwards sows his seed, according to Jeremiah 4:3, "Break up anew your fallow ground, and sow not upon thorns." Hence it behooved man, first of all to be instructed in religion, so as to remove the obstacles to true religion. Now the chief obstacle to religion is for man to adhere to a false god, according to Matthew 6:24, "You cannot serve God and mammon." Therefore in the first precept of the Law the worship of false gods is excluded.
IIª-IIae q. 122 a. 2 ad 1 Ad primum ergo dicendum quod etiam circa religionem ponitur unum praeceptum affirmativum, scilicet, memento ut diem sabbati sanctifices. Sed erant praemittenda praecepta negativa, quibus impedimenta religionis tollerentur. Quamvis enim affirmatio naturaliter sit prior negatione, tamen in via generationis negatio, qua removentur impedimenta, est prior, ut dictum est. Et praecipue in rebus divinis in quibus negationes praeferuntur affirmationibus, propter insufficientiam nostram, ut Dionysius dicit, II cap. Cael. Hier. Reply to Objection 1. In point of fact there is one affirmative precept about religion, namely: "Remember that thou keep holy the Sabbath Day." Still the negative precepts had to be given first, so that by their means the obstacles to religion might be removed. For though affirmation naturally precedes negation, yet in the process of generation, negation, whereby obstacles are removed, comes first, as stated in the Article. Especially is this true in matters concerning God, where negation is preferable to affirmation, on account of our insufficiency, as Dionysius observes (Coel. Hier. ii).
IIª-IIae q. 122 a. 2 ad 2 Ad secundum dicendum quod cultus alienorum deorum dupliciter apud aliquos observabatur. Quidam enim quasdam creaturas pro diis colebant absque institutione imaginum, unde Varro dixit quod antiqui Romani diu sine simulacris deos coluerunt. Et hic cultus prohibetur primo, cum dicitur, non habebis deos alienos. Apud alios autem erat cultus falsorum deorum sub quibusdam imaginibus. Et ideo opportune prohibetur et ipsarum imaginum institutio, cum dicitur, non facies tibi sculptile; et imaginum ipsarum cultus, cum dicitur, non coles ea, et cetera. Reply to Objection 2. People worshiped strange gods in two ways. For some served certain creatures as gods without having recourse to images. Hence Varro says that for a long time the ancient Romans worshiped gods without using images: and this worship is first forbidden by the words, "Thou shalt not have strange gods." Among others the worship of false gods was observed by using certain images: and so the very making of images was fittingly forbidden by the words, "Thou shalt not make to thyself any graven thing," as also the worship of those same images, by the words, "Thou shalt not adore them," etc.
IIª-IIae q. 122 a. 2 ad 3 Ad tertium dicendum quod omnes aliae superstitiones procedunt ex aliquo pacto cum Daemonibus inito tacito vel expresso. Et ideo omnes intelliguntur prohiberi in hoc quod dicitur, non habebis deos alienos. Reply to Objection 3. All other kinds of superstition proceed from some compact, tacit or explicit, with the demons; hence all are understood to be forbidden by the words, "Thou shalt not have strange gods."
IIª-IIae q. 122 a. 3 arg. 1 Ad tertium sic proceditur. Videtur quod secundum praeceptum Decalogi non convenienter tradatur. Hoc enim praeceptum, non assumes nomen Dei tui in vanum, sic exponitur in Glossa Exod. XX, idest, non existimes creaturam esse filium Dei, per quod prohibetur error contra fidem. Et Deut. V exponitur, non assumes nomen Dei tui in vanum, scilicet, nomen Dei ligno et lapidi attribuendo, per quod prohibetur falsa confessio, quae est actus infidelitatis, sicut et error. Infidelitas autem est prior superstitione, sicut et fides religione. Ergo hoc praeceptum debuit praemitti primo, in quo prohibetur superstitio. Objection 1. It seems that the second precept of the decalogue is unfittingly expressed. For this precept, "Thou shalt not take the name of thy God in vain" is thus explained by a gloss on Exodus 20:7: "Thou shalt not deem the Son of God to be a creature," so that it forbids an error against faith. Again, a gloss on the words of Deuteronomy 5:11, "Thou shalt not take the name of . . . thy God in vain, " adds, i.e. "by giving the name of God to wood or stone," as though they forbade a false confession of faith, which, like error, is an act of unbelief. Now unbelief precedes superstition, as faith precedes religion. Therefore this precept should have preceded the first, whereby superstition is forbidden.
IIª-IIae q. 122 a. 3 arg. 2 Praeterea, nomen Dei ad multa assumitur, sicut ad laudandum, ad miracula faciendum, et universaliter ad omnia quae dicuntur vel fiunt a nobis, secundum illud Coloss. III, omne quodcumque facitis in verbo vel opere, in nomine domini facite. Ergo praeceptum quo prohibetur nomen Dei assumi in vanum, videtur universalius esse quam praeceptum quo prohibetur superstitio. Et ita debuit ei praemitti. Objection 2. Further, the name of God is taken for many purposes --for instance, those of praise, of working miracles, and generally speaking in conjunction with all we say or do, according to Colossians 3:17, "All whatsoever you do in word or in work . . . do ye in the name of the Lord." Therefore the precept forbidding the taking of God's name in vain seems to be more universal than the precept forbidding superstition, and thus should have preceded it.
IIª-IIae q. 122 a. 3 arg. 3 Praeterea, Exod. XX exponitur illud praeceptum, non assumes nomen Dei tui in vanum, iurando scilicet pro nihilo. Unde videtur per hoc prohiberi vana iuratio, quae scilicet est sine iudicio. Sed multo gravior est falsa iuratio, quae est sine veritate; et iniusta iuratio, quae est sine iustitia. Ergo magis debuerunt illa prohiberi per hoc praeceptum. Objection 3. Further, a gloss on Exodus 20:7 expounds the precept, "Thou shalt not take the name of . . . thy God in vain," namely, by swearing to nothing. Hence this precept would seem to forbid useless swearing, that is to say, swearing without judgment. But false swearing, which is without truth, and unjust swearing, which is without justice, are much more grievous. Therefore this precept should rather have forbidden them.
IIª-IIae q. 122 a. 3 arg. 4 Praeterea, multo gravius peccatum est blasphemia, vel quidquid fiat verbo vel facto in contumeliam Dei, quam periurium. Ergo blasphemia et alia huiusmodi magis debuerunt per hoc praeceptum prohiberi. Objection 4. Further, blasphemy or any word or deed that is an insult to God is much more grievous than perjury. Therefore blasphemy and other like sins should rather have been forbidden by this precept.
IIª-IIae q. 122 a. 3 arg. 5 Praeterea, multa sunt Dei nomina. Ergo non debuit indeterminate dici, non assumes nomen Dei tui in vanum. Objection 5. Further, God's names are many. Therefore it should not have been said indefinitely: "Thou shalt not take the name of . . . thy God in vain."
IIª-IIae q. 122 a. 3 s. c. Sed in contrarium est Scripturae auctoritas. On the contrary, stands the authority of Scripture.
IIª-IIae q. 122 a. 3 co. Respondeo dicendum quod oportet prius impedimenta verae religionis excludere in eo qui instituitur ad virtutem, quam eum in vera religione fundare. Opponitur autem verae religioni aliquid dupliciter. Uno modo, per excessum, quando scilicet id quod est religionis alteri indebite exhibetur, quod pertinet ad superstitionem. Alio modo, quasi per defectum reverentiae, cum scilicet Deus contemnitur, quod pertinet ad vitium irreligiositatis, ut supra habitum est. Superstitio autem impedit religionem quantum ad hoc, ne suscipiatur Deus ad colendum. Ille autem cuius animus implicatus est indebito cultui, non potest simul debitum Dei cultum suscipere, secundum illud Isaiae XXVIII, angustatum est stratum, ut alter decidat, scilicet Deus verus vel falsus a corde hominis, et pallium breve utrumque operire non potest. Per irreligiositatem autem impeditur religio quantum ad hoc, ne Deus, postquam susceptus est, honoretur. Prius autem est Deum suscipere ad colendum quam eum susceptum honorare. Et ideo praemittitur praeceptum quo prohibetur superstitio secundo praecepto, quo prohibetur periurium, ad irreligiositatem pertinens. I answer that, In one who is being instructed in virtue it is necessary to remove obstacles to true religion before establishing him in true religion. Now a thing is opposed to true religion in two ways. First, by excess, when, to wit, that which belongs to religion is given to others than to whom it is due, and this pertains to superstition. Secondly, by lack, as it were, of reverence, when, to wit, God is contemned, and this pertains to the vice of irreligion, as stated above (97, in the preamble, and in the Article that follows). Now superstition hinders religion by preventing man from acknowledging God so as to worship Him: and when a man's mind is engrossed in some undue worship, he cannot at the same time give due worship to God, according to Isaiah 28:20, "The bed is straitened, so that one must fall out," i.e. either the true God or a false god must fall out from man's heart, "and a short covering cannot cover both." On the other hand, irreligion hinders religion by preventing man from honoring God after he has acknowledged Him. Now one must first of all acknowledge God with a view to worship, before honoring Him we have acknowledged. For this reason the precept forbidding superstition is placed before the second precept, which forbids perjury that pertains to irreligion.
IIª-IIae q. 122 a. 3 ad 1 Ad primum ergo dicendum quod illae expositiones sunt mysticae. Litteralis autem expositio est quae habetur Deut. V, non assumes nomen Dei tui in vanum, scilicet iurando pro re quae non est. Reply to Objection 1. These expositions are mystical. The literal explanation is that which is given Deuteronomy 5:11: "Thou shalt not take the name of . . . thy God in vain," namely, "by swearing on that which is not [Vulgate: 'for he shall not be unpunished that taketh His name upon a vain thing']."
IIª-IIae q. 122 a. 3 ad 2 Ad secundum dicendum quod non prohibetur quaelibet assumptio divini nominis per hoc praeceptum, sed proprie illa qua sumitur divinum nomen ad confirmationem humani verbi per modum iuramenti, quia ista assumptio divini nominis est frequentior apud homines. Potest tamen ex consequenti intelligi ut per hoc prohibeatur omnis inordinata divini nominis assumptio. Et secundum hoc procedunt illae expositiones de quibus supra dictum est. Reply to Objection 2. This precept does not forbid all taking of the name of God, but properly the taking of God's name in confirmation of a man's word by way of an oath, because men are wont to take God's name more frequently in this way. Nevertheless we may understand that in consequence all inordinate taking of the Divine name is forbidden by this precept: and it is in this sense that we are to take the explanation quoted in the First Objection.
IIª-IIae q. 122 a. 3 ad 3 Ad tertium dicendum quod pro nihilo iurare dicitur ille qui iurat pro eo quod non est, quod pertinet ad falsam iurationem, quae principaliter periurium nominatur, ut supra dictum est. Quando enim aliquis falsum iurat, tunc iuratio est vana secundum seipsam, quia non habet firmamentum veritatis. Quando autem aliquis iurat sine iudicio ex aliqua levitate, si verum iurat, non est ibi vanitas ex parte ipsius iuramenti, sed solum ex parte iurantis. Reply to Objection 3. To swear to nothing means to swear to that which is not. This pertains to false swearing, which is chiefly called perjury, as stated above (98, 1, ad 3). For when a man swears to that which is false, his swearing is vain in itself, since it is not supported by the truth. on the other hand, when a man swears without judgment, through levity, if he swear to the truth, there is no vanity on the part of the oath itself, but only on the part of the swearer.
IIª-IIae q. 122 a. 3 ad 4 Ad quartum dicendum quod sicut ei qui instruitur in aliqua scientia primo proponuntur quaedam communia documenta, ita etiam lex, quae instituit hominem ad virtutem, in praeceptis Decalogi, quae sunt prima, ea proposuit, vel prohibendo vel mandando, quae communius in cursu humanae vitae solent accidere. Et ideo inter praecepta Decalogi prohibetur periurium, quod frequentius accidit quam blasphemia, in quam homo rarius prolabitur. Reply to Objection 4. Just as when we instruct a man in some science, we begin by putting before him certain general maxims, even so the Law, which forms man to virtue by instructing him in the precepts of the decalogue, which are the first of all precepts, gave expression, by prohibition or by command, to those things which are of most common occurrence in the course of human life. Hence the precepts of the decalogue include the prohibition of perjury, which is of more frequent occurrence than blasphemy, since man does not fall so often into the latter sin.
IIª-IIae q. 122 a. 3 ad 5 Ad quintum dicendum quod nominibus Dei debetur reverentia ex parte rei significatae, quae est una, non autem ratione vocum significantium, quae sunt multae. Et ideo singulariter dixit, non assumes nomen Dei tui in vanum, quia non differt per quodcumque nomen Dei periurium committatur. Reply to Objection 5. Reverence is due to the Divine names on the part of the thing signified, which is one, and not on the part of the signifying words, which are many. Hence it is expressed in the singular: "Thou shalt not take the name of . . . thy God in vain": since it matters not in which of God's names perjury is committed.
IIª-IIae q. 122 a. 4 arg. 1 Ad quartum sic proceditur. Videtur quod inconvenienter tertium praeceptum Decalogi tradatur, scilicet de sanctificatione sabbati. Hoc enim praeceptum, spiritualiter intellectum, est generale, dicit enim Ambrosius, super illud Luc. XIII, archisynagogus indignans quia sabbato curasset, lex, inquit, in sabbato non hominem curare, sed servilia opera facere, idest peccatis gravari, prohibet. Secundum autem litteralem sensum, est praeceptum caeremoniale, dicitur enim Exod. XXXI, videte ut sabbatum meum custodiatis, quia signum est inter me et vos in generationibus vestris. Praecepta autem Decalogi et sunt praecepta spiritualia, et sunt moralia. Inconvenienter ergo ponitur inter praecepta Decalogi. Objection 1. It seems that the third precept of the decalogue, concerning the hallowing of the Sabbath, is unfittingly expressed. For this, understood spiritually, is a general precept: since Bede in commenting on Luke 13:14, "The ruler of the synagogue being angry that He had healed on the Sabbath," says (Comment. iv): "The Law forbids, not to heal man on the Sabbath, but to do servile works," i.e. "to burden oneself with sin." Taken literally it is a ceremonial precept, for it is written (Exodus 31:13): "See that you keep My Sabbath: because it is a sign between Me and you in your generations." Now the precepts of the decalogue are both spiritual and moral. Therefore it is unfittingly placed among the precepts of the decalogue.
IIª-IIae q. 122 a. 4 arg. 2 Praeterea, caeremonialia legis praecepta continent sacra, sacrificia, sacramenta et observantias, ut supra habitum est. Ad sacra autem pertinebant non solum sacri dies, sed etiam sacra loca et sacra vasa et alia huiusmodi. Similiter etiam erant multi sacri dies praeter sabbatum. Inconveniens igitur est quod, praetermissis omnibus aliis caeremonialibus, de sola observantia sabbati fit mentio. Objection 2. Further, the ceremonial precepts of the Law contain "sacred things, sacrifices, sacraments and observances," as stated above (I-II, 101, 4). Now sacred things comprised not only sacred days, but also sacred places and sacred vessels, and so on. Moreover, there were many sacred days other than the Sabbath. Therefore it was unfitting to omit all other ceremonial observances and to mention only that of the Sabbath.
IIª-IIae q. 122 a. 4 arg. 3 Praeterea, quicumque transgreditur praeceptum Decalogi, peccat. Sed in veteri lege aliqui transgredientes observantiam sabbati non peccabant, sicut circumcidentes pueros octava die, et sacerdotes in templo sabbatis operantes. Et Elias, cum quadraginta diebus pervenisset ad montem Dei Horeb, consequens est quod in sabbato itineraverit. Similiter etiam sacerdotes, dum circumferrent septem diebus arcam domini, ut legitur Iosue VI, intelliguntur eam die sabbati circumtulisse. Dicitur etiam Luc. XIII, nonne unusquisque vestrum solvit bovem suum aut asinum et ducit adaquare? Ergo inconvenienter ponitur inter praecepta Decalogi. Objection 3. Further, whoever breaks a precept of the decalogue, sins. But in the Old Law some who broke the observances of the Sabbath did not sin--for instance, those who circumcised their sons on the eighth day, and the priests who worked in the temple on the Sabbath. Also Elias (1 Kings 19), who journeyed for forty days unto the mount of God, Horeb, must have traveled on a Sabbath: the priests also who carried the ark of the Lord for seven days, as related in Joshua 7, must be understood to have carried it on a Sabbath. Again it is written (Luke 13:15): "Doth not every one of you on the Sabbath day loose his ox or his ass . . . and lead them to water?" Therefore it is unfittingly placed among the precepts of the decalogue.
IIª-IIae q. 122 a. 4 arg. 4 Praeterea, praecepta Decalogi sunt etiam in nova lege observanda. Sed in nova lege non servatur hoc praeceptum, nec quantum ad diem sabbati, nec quantum ad diem dominicam, in qua et cibi coquuntur, et itinerantur et piscantur homines, et alia multa huiusmodi faciunt. Ergo inconvenienter traditur praeceptum de observantia sabbati. Objection 4. Further, the precepts of the decalogue have to be observed also under the New Law. Yet in the New Law this precept is not observed, neither in the point of the Sabbath day, nor as to the Lord's day, on which men cook their food, travel, fish, and do many like things. Therefore the precept of the observance of the Sabbath is unfittingly expressed.
IIª-IIae q. 122 a. 4 s. c. Sed in contrarium est Scripturae auctoritas. On the contrary, stands the authority of Scripture.
IIª-IIae q. 122 a. 4 co. Respondeo dicendum quod, remotis impedimentis verae religionis per primum et secundum praeceptum Decalogi, ut supra dictum est, consequens fuit ut tertium praeceptum poneretur, per quod homines in vera religione fundarentur. Ad religionem autem pertinet cultum Deo exhibere. Sicut autem in Scriptura divina traduntur nobis sub aliquibus corporalium rerum similitudinibus, ita cultus exterior Deo exhibetur per aliquod sensibile signum. Et quia ad interiorem cultum, qui consistit in oratione et devotione, magis inducitur homo ex interiori spiritus sancti instinctu, praeceptum legis dandum fuit de exteriori cultu secundum aliquod sensibile signum. Et quia praecepta Decalogi sunt quasi quaedam prima et communia legis principia, ideo in tertio praecepto Decalogi praecipitur exterior Dei cultus sub signo communis beneficii quod pertinet ad omnes, scilicet ad repraesentandum opus creationis mundi, a quo requievisse dicitur Deus septimo die, in cuius signum, dies septima mandatur sanctificanda, idest deputanda ad vacandum Deo. Et ideo Exod. XX, praemisso praecepto de sanctificatione sabbati, assignatur ratio, quia sex diebus fecit Deus caelum et terram, et in die septimo requievit. I answer that, The obstacles to true religion being removed by the first and second precepts of the decalogue, as stated above (2,3), it remained for the third precept to be given whereby man is established in true religion. Now it belongs to religion to give worship to God: and just as the Divine scriptures teach the interior worship under the guise of certain corporal similitudes, so is external worship given to God under the guise of sensible signs. And since for the most part man is induced to pay interior worship, consisting in prayer and devotion, by the interior prompting of the Holy Ghost, a precept of the Law as necessary respecting the exterior worship that consists in sensible signs. Now the precepts of the decalogue are, so to speak, first and common principles of the Law, and consequently the third precept of the decalogue describes the exterior worship of God as the sign of a universal boon that concerns all. This universal boon was the work of the Creation of the world, from which work God is stated to have rested on the seventh day: and sign of this we are commanded to keep holy seventh day--that is, to set it aside as a day to be given to God. Hence after the precept about the hallowing of the Sabbath the reason for it is given: "For in six days the Lord made heaven and earth . . . and rested on the seventh day."
IIª-IIae q. 122 a. 4 ad 1 Ad primum ergo dicendum quod praeceptum de sanctificatione sabbati, litteraliter intellectum, est partim morale, partim caeremoniale. Morale quidem, quantum ad hoc quod homo deputet aliquod tempus vitae suae ad vacandum divinis. Inest enim homini naturalis inclinatio ad hoc quod cuilibet rei necessariae deputetur aliquod tempus, sicut corporali refectioni, somno et aliis huiusmodi. Unde etiam spirituali refectioni, qua mens hominis in Deo reficitur, secundum dictamen rationis naturalis aliquod tempus deputat homo. Et sic habere aliquod tempus deputatum ad vacandum divinis, cadit sub praecepto morali. Sed inquantum in hoc praecepto determinatur speciale tempus in signum creationis mundi, sic est praeceptum caeremoniale. Similiter etiam caeremoniale est secundum allegoricam significationem, prout fuit figura quietis Christi in sepulcro, quae fuit septima die. Et similiter secundum moralem significationem, prout significat cessationem ab omni actu peccati et quietem mentis in Deo, et secundum hoc quodammodo est praeceptum generale. Similiter etiam caeremoniale est secundum significationem anagogicam, prout scilicet praefigurat quietem fruitionis Dei quae erit in patria. Unde praeceptum de sanctificatione sabbati ponitur inter praecepta Decalogi inquantum est praeceptum morale, non inquantum est caeremoniale. Reply to Objection 1. The precept about hallowing the Sabbath, understood literally, is partly moral and partly ceremonial. It is a moral precept in the point of commanding man to aside a certain time to be given to Divine things. For there is in man a natural inclination to set aside a certain time for each necessary thing, such as refreshment of the body, sleep, and so forth. Hence according to the dictate of reason, man sets aside a certain time for spiritual refreshment, by which man's mind is refreshed in God. And thus to have a certain time set aside for occupying oneself with Divine things is the matter of a moral precept. But, in so far as this precept specializes the time as a sign representing the Creation of the world, it is a ceremonial precept. Again, it is a ceremonial precept in its allegorical signification, as representative of Christ's rest in the tomb on the seventh day: also in its moral signification, as representing cessation from all sinful acts, and the mind's rest in God, in which sense, too, it is a general precept. Again, it is a ceremonial precept in its analogical signification, as foreshadowing the enjoyment of God in heaven. Hence the precept about hallowing the Sabbath is placed among the precepts of the decalogue, as a moral, but not as a ceremonial precept.
IIª-IIae q. 122 a. 4 ad 2 Ad secundum dicendum quod aliae caeremoniae legis sunt signa aliquorum particularium effectuum Dei. Sed observatio sabbati est signum generalis beneficii, scilicet productionis universae creaturae. Et ideo convenientius poni debuit inter generalia praecepta Decalogi quam aliquod aliud caeremoniale legis. Reply to Objection 2. The other ceremonies of the Law are signs of certain particular Divine works: but the observance of the Sabbath is representative of a general boon, namely, the production of all creatures. Hence it was fitting that it should be placed among the general precepts of the decalogue, rather than any other ceremonial precept of the Law.
IIª-IIae q. 122 a. 4 ad 3 Ad tertium dicendum quod in observantia sabbati duo sunt consideranda. Quorum unum est sicut finis, et hoc est ut homo vacet rebus divinis. Quod significatur in hoc quod dicit, memento ut diem sabbati sanctifices, illa enim sanctificari dicuntur in lege quae divino cultui applicantur. Aliud autem est cessatio operum, quae significatur cum subditur, septimo die domini Dei tui, non facies omne opus. Sed de quo opere intelligatur, apparet per id quod exponitur Levit. XXIII, omne opus servile non facietis in eo. Opus autem servile dicitur a servitute. Est autem triplex servitus. Una quidem qua homo servit peccato, secundum illud, qui facit peccatum, servus est peccati. Et secundum hoc, omne opus peccati dicitur servile. Alia vero servitus est qua homo servit homini. Est autem homo alterius servus non secundum mentem, sed secundum corpus, ut supra habitum est. Et ideo opera servilia, secundum hoc, dicuntur opera corporalia in quibus unus homo alteri servit. Tertia autem est servitus Dei. Et secundum hoc, opus servile posset dici opus latriae, quod pertinet ad Dei servitium. Si autem sic intelligatur opus servile, non prohibetur in die sabbati. Quia hoc esset contrarium fini observationis sabbati, homo enim ad hoc ab aliis operibus abstinet in die sabbati, ut vacet operibus ad Dei servitutem pertinentibus. Et inde est quod, sicut dicitur Ioan. VII, circumcisionem accipit homo in sabbato, ut non solvatur lex Moysi. Inde etiam est quod, sicut dicitur Matth. XII, sabbatis sacerdotes in templo sabbatum violant, idest, corporaliter in sabbato operantur, et sine crimine sunt. Et sic etiam sacerdotes in sabbato circumferentes arcam non transgrediebantur praeceptum de observantia sabbati. Et similiter etiam nullius spiritualis actus exercitium est contra observantiam sabbati, puta si quis doceat verbo vel scripto, unde Num. XXVIII, dicit Glossa quod fabri et huiusmodi artifices otiantur in die sabbati. Lector autem divinae legis vel doctor ab opere suo non desinit, nec tamen contaminatur sabbatum, sicut sacerdotes in templo sabbatum violant, et sine crimine sunt. Sed alia opera servilia, quae dicuntur servilia primo vel secundo modo, contrariantur observantiae sabbati, inquantum impediunt applicationem hominis ad divina. Et quia impeditur magis homo a rebus divinis per opus peccati quam per opus licitum, quamvis sit corporale; ideo magis contra hoc praeceptum agit qui peccat in die festo quam qui aliquod corporale opus licitum facit. Unde Augustinus dicit, in libro de decem chordis, melius faceret Iudaeus in agro suo aliquid utile quam in theatro seditiosus existeret. Et melius feminae eorum die sabbati lanam facerent quam tota die in Neomeniis suis impudice saltarent. Non autem qui peccat venialiter in sabbato contra hoc praeceptum facit, quia peccatum veniale non excludit sanctitatem. Opera etiam corporalia ad spiritualem Dei cultum non pertinentia intantum servilia dicuntur inquantum proprie pertinent ad servientes, inquantum vero sunt communia et servis et liberis, servilia non dicuntur. Quilibet autem, tam servus quam liber, tenetur in necessariis providere non tantum sibi, sed etiam proximo, praecipue quidem in his quae ad salutem corporis pertinent, secundum illud Prov. XXIV, erue eos qui ducuntur ad mortem; secundario autem etiam in damno rerum vitando, secundum illud Deut. XXII, non videbis bovem aut ovem fratris tui errantem et praeteribis, sed reduces fratri tuo. Et ideo opus corporale pertinens ad conservandam salutem proprii corporis non violat sabbatum, non enim est contra observantiam sabbati quod aliquis comedat, et alia huiusmodi faciat quibus salus corporis conservatur. Et propter hoc Machabaei non polluerunt sabbatum pugnantes ad sui defensionem die sabbati, ut legitur I Machab. II. Similiter etiam nec Elias fugiens a facie Iezabel in die sabbati. Et propter hoc etiam dominus, Matth. XII, excusat discipulos suos, qui colligebant spicas in die sabbati propter necessitatem quam patiebantur. Similiter etiam opus corporale quod ordinatur ad salutem corporalem alterius, non est contra observantiam sabbati. Unde dominus, Ioan. VII, mihi indignamini quia totum hominem salvum feci in sabbato? Similiter etiam opus corporale quod ordinatur ad imminens damnum rei exterioris vitandum, non violat sabbatum. Unde dominus dicit, Matth. XII, quis erit ex vobis homo qui habet unam ovem, et ceciderit sabbato in foveam, nonne tenebit et levabit eam? Reply to Objection 3. Two things are to be observed in the hallowing of the Sabbath. One of these is the end: and this is that man occupy himself with Divine things, and is signified in the words: "Remember that thou keep holy the Sabbath day." For in the Law those things are said to be holy which are applied to the Divine worship. The other thing is cessation from work, and is signified in the words (Exodus 20:11), "On the seventh day . . . thou shalt do no work." The kind of work meant appears from Leviticus 23:3, "You shall do no servile work on that day [Vulgate: 'You shall do no work on that day']." Now servile work is so called from servitude: and servitude is threefold. One, whereby man is the servant of sin, according to John 8:34, "Whosoever committeth sin is the servant of sin," and in this sense all sinful acts are servile. Another servitude is whereby one man serves another. Now one man serves another not with his mind but with his body, as stated above (104, 5,6, ad 1). Wherefore in this respect those works are called servile whereby one man serves another. The third is the servitude of God; and in this way the work of worship, which pertains to the service of God, may be called a servile work. On this sense servile work is not forbidden on the Sabbath day, because that would be contrary to the end of the Sabbath observance: since man abstains from other works on the Sabbath day in order that he may occupy himself with works connected with God's service. For this reason, according to John 7:23, "a man [Vulgate: 'If a man,' etc.] receives circumcision on the Sabbath day, that the law of Moses may not be broken": and for this reason too we read (Matthew 12:5), that "on the Sabbath days the priests in the temple break the Sabbath," i.e. do corporal works on the Sabbath, "and are without blame." Accordingly, the priests in carrying the ark on the Sabbath did not break the precept of the Sabbath observance. On like manner it is not contrary to the observance of the Sabbath to exercise any spiritual act, such as teaching by word or writing. Wherefore a gloss on Numbers 28 says that "smiths and like craftsmen rest on the Sabbath day, but the reader or teacher of the Divine law does not cease from his work. Yet he profanes not the Sabbath, even as the priests in the temple break the Sabbath, and are without blame." On the other hand, those works that are called servile in the first or second way are contrary to the observance of the Sabbath, in so far as they hinder man from applying himself to Divine things. And since man is hindered from applying himself to Divine things rather by sinful than by lawful albeit corporal works, it follows that to sin on a feast day is more against this precept than to do some other but lawful bodily work. Hence Augustine says (De decem chord. iii): "It would be better if the Jew did some useful work on his farm than spent his time seditiously in the theatre: and their womenfolk would do better to be making linen on the Sabbath than to be dancing lewdly all day in their feasts of the new moon." It is not, however, against this precept to sin venially on the Sabbath, because venial sin does not destroy holiness. Again, corporal works, not pertaining to the spiritual worship of God, are said to be servile in so far as they belong properly to servants; while they are not said to be servile, in so far as they are common to those who serve and those who are free. Moreover, everyone, be he servant or free, is bound to provide necessaries both for himself and for his neighbor, chiefly in respect of things pertaining to the well-being of the body, according to Proverbs 24:11, "Deliver them that are led to death": secondarily as regards avoiding damage to one's property, according to Deuteronomy 22:1, "Thou shalt not pass by if thou seest thy brother's ox or his sheep go astray, but thou shalt bring them back to thy brother." Hence a corporal work pertaining to the preservation of one's own bodily well-being does not profane the Sabbath: for it is not against the observance of the Sabbath to eat and do such things as preserve the health of the body. For this reason the Machabees did not profane the Sabbath when they fought in self-defense on the Sabbath day (1 Maccabees 2), nor Elias when he fled from the face of Jezabel on the Sabbath. For this same reason our Lord (Matthew 12:3) excused His disciples for plucking the ears of corn on account of the need which they suffered. On like manner a bodily work that is directed to the bodily well-being of another is not contrary to the observance of the Sabbath: wherefore it is written (John 7:23): "Are you angry at Me because I have healed the whole man on the Sabbath day?" And again, a bodily work that is done to avoid an imminent damage to some external thing does not profane the Sabbath, wherefore our Lord says (Matthew 12:11): "What man shall there be among you, that hath one sheep, and if the same fall into a pit on the Sabbath day, will he not take hold on it and lift it up?"
IIª-IIae q. 122 a. 4 ad 4 Ad quartum dicendum quod observatio diei dominicae in nova lege succedit observantiae sabbati non ex vi praecepti legis, sed ex constitutione Ecclesiae et consuetudine populi Christiani. Nec etiam huiusmodi observatio est figuralis, sicut fuit observatio sabbati in veteri lege. Et ideo non est ita arcta prohibitio operandi in die dominica sicut in die sabbati, sed quaedam opera conceduntur in die dominica quae in die sabbati prohibebantur, sicut decoctio ciborum et alia huiusmodi. Et etiam in quibusdam operibus prohibitis facilius propter necessitatem dispensatur in nova quam in veteri lege, quia figura pertinet ad protestationem veritatis, quam nec in modico praeterire oportet; opera autem secundum se considerata immutari possunt pro loco et tempore. Reply to Objection 4. In the New Law the observance of the Lord's day took the place of the observance of the Sabbath, not by virtue of the precept but by the institution of the Church and the custom of Christian people. For this observance is not figurative, as was the observance of the Sabbath in the Old Law. Hence the prohibition to work on the Lord' day is not so strict as on the Sabbath: and certain works are permitted on the Lord's day which were forbidden on the Sabbath, such as the cooking of food and so forth. And again in the New Law, dispensation is more easily granted than in the Old, in the matter of certain forbidden works, on account of their necessity, because the figure pertains to the protestation of truth, which it is unlawful to omit even in small things; while works, considered in themselves, are changeable in point of place and time.
IIª-IIae q. 122 a. 5 arg. 1 Ad quintum sic proceditur. Videtur quod inconvenienter tradatur quartum praeceptum, de honoratione parentum. Hoc enim praeceptum pertinet ad pietatem. Sed sicut pietas est pars iustitiae, ita etiam observantia et gratia, et alia de quibus dictum est. Ergo videtur quod non debuit dari speciale praeceptum de pietate, cum de aliis non detur. Objection 1. It seems that the fourth precept, about honoring one's parents, is unfittingly expressed. For this is the precept pertaining to piety. Now, just as piety is a part of justice, so are observance, gratitude, and others of which we have spoken (Q101,102, seq.). Therefore it seems that there should not have been given a special precept of piety, as none is given regarding the others.
IIª-IIae q. 122 a. 5 arg. 2 Praeterea, pietas non solum exhibet cultum parentibus, sed etiam patriae et aliis sanguine coniunctis et patriae benevolis, ut supra dictum est. Inconvenienter ergo in hoc quarto praecepto fit mentio solum de honoratione patris et matris. Objection 2. Further, piety pays worship not only to one's parents, but also to one's country, and also to other blood kindred, and to the well-wishers of our country, as stated above (101, 1 and 2). Therefore it was unfitting for this precept to mention only the honoring of one's father and mother.
IIª-IIae q. 122 a. 5 arg. 3 Praeterea, parentibus non solum debetur honoris reverentia, sed etiam sustentatio. Ergo insufficienter sola parentum honoratio praecipitur. Objection 3. Further, we owe our parents not merely honor but also support. Therefore the mere honoring of one's parents is unfittingly prescribed.
IIª-IIae q. 122 a. 5 arg. 4 Praeterea, contingit quandoque quod aliqui qui honorant parentes cito moriuntur, et e contrario qui parentes non honorant diu vivunt. Inconvenienter ergo additur huic praecepto haec promissio, ut sis longaevus super terram. Objection 4. Further, sometimes those who honor their parents die young, and on the contrary those who honor them not live a long time. Therefore it was unfitting to supplement this precept with the promise, "That thou mayest be long-lived upon earth."
IIª-IIae q. 122 a. 5 s. c. In contrarium est auctoritas sacrae Scripturae. On the contrary, stands the authority of Scripture.
IIª-IIae q. 122 a. 5 co. Respondeo dicendum quod praecepta Decalogi ordinantur ad dilectionem Dei et proximi. Inter proximos autem, maxime obligamur parentibus. Et ideo immediate post praecepta ordinantia nos in Deum, ponitur praeceptum ordinans nos ad parentes, qui sunt particulare principium nostri esse, sicut Deus est universale principium. Et sic est quaedam affinitas huius praecepti ad praecepta primae tabulae. I answer that, The precepts of the decalogue are directed to the love of God and of our neighbor. Now to our parents, of all our neighbors, we are under the greatest obligation. Hence, immediately after the precepts directing us to God, a place is given to the precept directing us to our parents, who are the particular principle of our being, just as God is the universal principle: so that this precept has a certain affinity to the precepts of the First Table.
IIª-IIae q. 122 a. 5 ad 1 Ad primum ergo dicendum quod, sicut supra dictum est, pietas ordinatur ad reddendum debitum parentibus, quod communiter ad omnes pertinet. Et ideo inter praecepta Decalogi, quae sunt communia, magis debet poni aliquid pertinens ad pietatem quam ad alias partes iustitiae, quae respiciunt aliquod debitum speciale. Reply to Objection 1. As stated above (Question 101, Article 2), piety directs us to pay the debt due to our parents, a debt which is common to all. Hence, since the precepts of the decalogue are general precepts, they ought to contain some reference to piety rather than to the other parts of justice, which regard some special debt.
IIª-IIae q. 122 a. 5 ad 2 Ad secundum dicendum quod per prius debetur aliquid parentibus quam patriae et consanguineis, quia per hoc quod sumus a parentibus nati, pertinent ad nos et consanguinei et patria. Et ideo, cum praecepta Decalogi sint prima praecepta legis, magis per ea ordinatur homo ad parentes quam ad patriam vel ad alios consanguineos. Nihilominus tamen in hoc praecepto, quod est de honoratione parentum, intelligitur mandari quidquid pertinet ad reddendum debitum cuicumque personae, sicut secundarium includitur in principali. Reply to Objection 2. The debt to one's parents precedes the debt to one's kindred and country since it is because we are born of our parents that our kindred and country belong to us. Hence, since the precepts of the decalogue are the first precepts of the Law, they direct man to his parents rather than to his country and other kindred. Nevertheless this precept of honoring our parents is understood to command whatever concerns the payment of debt to any person, as secondary matter included in the principal matter.
IIª-IIae q. 122 a. 5 ad 3 Ad tertium dicendum quod parentibus inquantum huiusmodi, debetur reverentiae honor. Sed sustentatio et alia debentur eis ratione alicuius accidentis, puta inquantum sunt indigentes, vel secundum aliquid huiusmodi, ut supra dictum est. Et quia quod est per se prius est eo quod est per accidens, ideo inter prima praecepta legis, quae sunt praecepta Decalogi, specialiter praecipitur honoratio parentum. In qua tamen, sicut in quodam principali, intelligitur mandari et sustentatio et quidquid aliud debetur parentibus. Reply to Objection 3. Reverential honor is due to one's parents as such, whereas support and so forth are due to them accidentally, for instance, because they are in want, in slavery, or the like, as stated above (Question 101, Article 2). And since that which belongs to a thing by nature precedes that which is accidental, it follows that among the first precepts of the Law, which are the precepts of the decalogue, there is a special precept of honoring our parents: and this honor, as a kind of principle, is understood to comprise support and whatever else is due to our parents.
IIª-IIae q. 122 a. 5 ad 4 Ad quartum dicendum quod longaevitas promittitur honorantibus parentes non solum quantum ad futuram vitam, sed etiam quantum ad praesentem, secundum illud apostoli, I ad Tim. IV, pietas ad omnia utilis est, promissionem habens vitae quae nunc est et futurae. Et hoc rationabiliter. Qui enim gratus est beneficio meretur secundum quandam congruentiam ut sibi beneficium conservetur, propter ingratitudinem autem meretur aliquis beneficium perdere. Beneficium autem vitae corporalis, post Deum, a parentibus habemus. Et ideo ille qui honorat parentes, quasi beneficio gratus, meretur vitae conservationem, qui autem non honorat parentes, tanquam ingratus, meretur vita privari. Quia tamen praesentia bona vel mala non cadunt sub merito vel demerito nisi inquantum ordinantur ad futuram remunerationem, ut dictum est; ideo quandoque secundum occultam rationem divinorum iudiciorum, quae maxime futuram remunerationem respiciunt, ideo aliqui qui sunt pii in parentes citius vita privantur, alii vero qui sunt impii in parentes diutius vivunt. Reply to Objection 4. A long life is promised to those who honor their parents not only as to the life to come, but also as to the present life, according to the saying of the Apostle (1 Timothy 4:8): "Piety [Douay: 'godliness'] is profitable to all things, having promise of the life that now is and of that which is to come." And with reason. Because the man who is grateful for a favor deserves, with a certain congruity, that the favor should be continued to him, and he who is ungrateful for a favor deserves to lose it. Now we owe the favor of bodily life to our parents after God: wherefore he that honors his parents deserves the prolongation of his life, because he is grateful for that favor: while he that honors not his parents deserves to be deprived of life because he is ungrateful for the favor. However, present goods or evils are not the subject of merit or demerit except in so far as they are directed to a future reward, as stated above (I-II, 114, 12). Wherefore sometimes in accordance with the hidden design of the Divine judgments, which regard chiefly the future reward, some, who are dutiful to their parents, are sooner deprived of life, while others, who are undutiful to their parents, live longer.
IIª-IIae q. 122 a. 6 arg. 1 Ad sextum sic proceditur. Videtur quod alia sex praecepta Decalogi inconvenienter tradantur. Non enim sufficit ad salutem quod aliquis proximo suo non noceat, sed requiritur quod ei debitum reddat, secundum illud Rom. XIII, reddite omnibus debita. Sed in sex ultimis praeceptis solum prohibetur nocumentum proximo inferendum. Ergo inconvenienter praedicta praecepta traduntur. Objection 1. It seems that the other six precepts of the decalogue are unfittingly expressed. For it is not sufficient for salvation that one refrain from injuring one's neighbor; but it is required that one pay one's debts, according to Romans 13:7, "Render . . . to all men their dues." Now the last six precepts merely forbid one to injure one's neighbor. Therefore these precepts are unfittingly expressed.
IIª-IIae q. 122 a. 6 arg. 2 Praeterea, in praedictis praeceptis prohibentur homicidium, adulterium, furtum et falsum testimonium. Sed multa alia nocumenta possunt proximo inferri, ut patet ex his quae supra determinata sunt. Ergo videtur quod inconvenienter sint tradita huiusmodi praecepta. Objection 2. Further, these precepts forbid murder, adultery, stealing and bearing false witness. But many other injuries can be inflicted on one's neighbor, as appears from those which have been specified above (Q72, seq.). Therefore it seems that the aforesaid precepts are unfittingly expressed.
IIª-IIae q. 122 a. 6 arg. 3 Praeterea, concupiscentia dupliciter accipi potest, uno modo, secundum quod est actus voluntatis, ut dicitur Sap. VI, concupiscentia sapientiae perducit ad regnum perpetuum; alio modo, secundum quod est actus sensualitatis, sicut dicitur Iac. IV, unde bella et lites in vobis? Nonne ex concupiscentiis quae militant in membris vestris? Sed per praeceptum Decalogi non prohibetur concupiscentia sensualitatis, quia secundum hoc, primi motus essent peccata mortalia, utpote contra praeceptum Decalogi existentes. Similiter etiam non prohibetur concupiscentia voluntatis, quia haec includitur in quolibet peccato. Inconvenienter ergo inter praecepta Decalogi ponuntur quaedam concupiscentiae prohibitiva. Objection 3. Further, concupiscence may be taken in two ways. First as denoting an act of the will, as in Wisdom 6:21, "The desire [concupiscentia] of wisdom bringeth to the everlasting kingdom": secondly, as denoting an act of the sensuality, as in James 4:1, "From whence are wars and contentions among you? Are they not . . . from your concupiscences which war in your members?" Now the concupiscence of the sensuality is not forbidden by a precept of the decalogue, otherwise first movements would be mortal sins, as they would be against a precept of the decalogue. Nor is the concupiscence of the will forbidden, since it is included in every sin. Therefore it is unfitting for the precepts of the decalogue to include some that forbid concupiscence.
IIª-IIae q. 122 a. 6 arg. 4 Praeterea, homicidium est gravius peccatum quam adulterium vel furtum. Sed non ponitur aliquod praeceptum prohibitivum concupiscentiae homicidii. Ergo etiam inconvenienter ponuntur quaedam praecepta prohibitiva concupiscentiae furti et adulterii. Objection 4. Further, murder is a more grievous sin than adultery or theft. But there is no precept forbidding the desire of murder. Therefore neither was it fitting to have precepts forbidding the desire of theft and of adultery.
IIª-IIae q. 122 a. 6 s. c. Sed in contrarium est auctoritas Scripturae. On the contrary, stands the authority of Scripture.
IIª-IIae q. 122 a. 6 co. Respondeo dicendum quod sicut per partes iustitiae debitum redditur aliquibus determinatis personis quibus homo ex aliqua speciali ratione obligatur, ita etiam per iustitiam proprie dictam aliquis debitum reddit communiter omnibus. Et ideo post tria praecepta pertinentia ad religionem, qua redditur debitum Deo et post quartum praeceptum, quod est pietatis, qua redditur parentibus debitum, in quo includitur omne debitum quod ex aliqua speciali ratione debetur; necesse fuit quod ponerentur consequenter alia praecepta pertinentia ad iustitiam proprie dictam, quae indifferenter omnibus debitum reddit. I answer that, Just as by the parts of justice a man pays that which is due to certain definite persons, to whom he is bound for some special reason, so too by justice properly so called he pays that which is due to all in general. Hence, after the three precepts pertaining to religion, whereby man pays what is due God, and after the fourth precept pertaining to piety, whereby he pays what is due to his parents--which duty includes the paying of all that is due for any special reason--it was necessary in due sequence to give certain precepts pertaining to justice properly so called, which pays to all indifferently what is due to them.
IIª-IIae q. 122 a. 6 ad 1 Ad primum ergo dicendum quod communiter ad hoc obligatur homo ut nulli inferat nocumentum. Et ideo praecepta negativa, quibus prohibentur nocumenta quae possunt proximis inferri, tanquam communia, fuerunt ponenda inter praecepta Decalogi. Ea vero quae sunt proximis exhibenda, diversimode exhibentur diversis. Et ideo non fuerunt inter praecepta Decalogi ponenda de his affirmativa praecepta. Reply to Objection 1. Man is bound towards all persons in general to inflict injury on no one: hence the negative precepts, which forbid the doing of those injuries that can be inflicted on one's neighbor, had to be given a place, as general precepts, among the precepts of the decalogue. On the other hand, the duties we owe to our neighbor are paid in different ways to different people: hence it did not behoove to include affirmative precepts about those duties among the precepts of the decalogue.
IIª-IIae q. 122 a. 6 ad 2 Ad secundum dicendum quod omnia alia nocumenta quae proximis inferuntur, possunt ad ista reduci quae his praeceptis prohibentur tanquam ad quaedam communiora et principaliora. Nam omnia nocumenta quae in personam proximi inferuntur, intelliguntur prohiberi in homicidio, sicut in principaliori. Quae vero inferuntur in personam coniunctam, et maxime per modum libidinis, intelliguntur prohiberi simul cum adulterio. Quae vero pertinent ad damna in rebus illata, intelliguntur prohiberi simul cum furto. Quae autem pertinet ad locutionem, sicut detractiones, blasphemiae, et si qua huiusmodi, intelliguntur prohiberi falso testimonio, quod directius iustitiae contrariatur. Reply to Objection 2. All other injuries that are inflicted on our neighbor are reducible to those that are forbidden by these precepts, as taking precedence of others in point of generality and importance. For all injuries that are inflicted on the person of our neighbor are understood to be forbidden under the head of murder as being the principal of all. Those that are inflicted on a person connected with one's neighbor, especially by way of lust, are understood to be forbidden together with adultery: those that come under the head of damage done to property are understood to be forbidden together with theft: and those that are comprised under speech, such as detractions, insults, and so forth, are understood to be forbidden together with the bearing of false witness, which is more directly opposed to justice.
IIª-IIae q. 122 a. 6 ad 3 Ad tertium dicendum quod per praecepta prohibitiva concupiscentiae non intelligitur prohiberi primus motus concupiscentiae, qui sistit infra limites sensualitatis. Sed prohibetur directe consensus voluntatis qui est in opus vel in delectationem. Reply to Objection 3. The precepts forbidding concupiscence do not include the prohibition of first movements of concupiscence, that do not go farther than the bounds of sensuality. The direct object of their prohibition is the consent of the will, which is directed to deed or pleasure.
IIª-IIae q. 122 a. 6 ad 4 Ad quartum dicendum quod homicidium secundum se non est concupiscibile, sed magis horribile, quia non habet de se rationem alicuius boni. Sed adulterium habet aliquam rationem boni, scilicet delectabilis. Furtum etiam habet rationem alicuius boni, scilicet utilis. Bonum autem de se habet rationem concupiscibilis. Et ideo fuit specialibus praeceptis prohibenda concupiscentia furti et adulterii, non autem concupiscentia homicidii. Reply to Objection 4. Murder in itself is an object not of concupiscence but of horror, since it has not in itself the aspect of good. On the other hand, adultery has the aspect of a certain kind of good, i.e. of something pleasurable, and theft has an aspect of good, i.e. of something useful: and good of its very nature has the aspect of something concupiscible. Hence the concupiscence of theft and adultery had to be forbidden by special precepts, but not the concupiscence of murder.

Notes

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