Authors/Thomas Aquinas/Summa Theologiae/Part IIb/Q118

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Q117 Q119



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IIª-IIae q. 118 pr. Deinde considerandum est de vitiis oppositis liberalitati. Et primo, de avaritia; secundo, de prodigalitate. Circa primum quaeruntur octo. Primo, utrum avaritia sit peccatum. Secundo, utrum sit speciale peccatum. Tertio, cui virtuti opponatur. Quarto, utrum sit peccatum mortale. Quinto, utrum sit gravissimum peccatorum. Sexto, utrum sit peccatum carnale, vel spirituale. Septimo, utrum sit vitium capitale. Octavo, de filiabus eius. Question 118. The vices opposed to liberality, and in the first place, of covetousness 1. Is covetousness a sin? 2. Is it a special sin? 3. To which virtue it is opposed 4. Is it a mortal sin? 5. Is it the most grievous of sins? 6. Is it a sin of the flesh or a spiritual sin? 7. Is it a capital vice? 8. Its daughters
IIª-IIae q. 118 a. 1 arg. 1 Ad primum sic proceditur. Videtur quod avaritia non sit peccatum. Dicitur enim avaritia quasi aeris aviditas, quia scilicet in appetitu pecuniae consistit, per quam omnia exteriora bona intelligi possunt. Sed appetere exteriora bona non est peccatum. Naturaliter enim homo ea appetit, tum quia naturaliter subiecta sunt homini; tum quia per ea vita hominis conservatur, unde et substantia hominis dicuntur. Ergo avaritia non est peccatum. Objection 1. It seems that covetousness is not a sin. For covetousness [avaritia] denotes a certain greed for gold [aeris aviditas*], because, to wit, it consists in a desire for money, under which all external goods may be comprised. [The Latin for covetousness "avaritia" is derived from "aveo" to desire; but the Greek philargyria signifies literally "love of money": and it is to this that St. Thomas is alluding (cf. 2, Objection 2)]. Now it is not a sin to desire external goods: since man desires them naturally, both because they are naturally subject to man, and because by their means man's life is sustained (for which reason they are spoken of as his substance). Therefore covetousness is not a sin.
IIª-IIae q. 118 a. 1 arg. 2 Praeterea, omne peccatum aut est in Deum, aut in proximum, aut est in seipsum, sicut supra habitum est. Sed avaritia non est proprie peccatum contra Deum, non enim opponitur neque religioni neque virtutibus theologicis, quibus homo ordinatur in Deum. Neque etiam est peccatum in seipsum, hoc enim proprie pertinet ad gulam et luxuriam, de qua apostolus dicit, I ad Cor. VI, quod qui fornicatur in corpus suum peccat. Similiter etiam non videtur peccatum esse in proximum, quia per hoc quod homo retinet sua, nulli facit iniuriam. Ergo avaritia non est peccatum. Objection 2. Further, every sin is against either God, or one's neighbor, or oneself, as stated above (I-II, 72, 4). But covetousness is not, properly speaking, a sin against God: since it is opposed neither to religion nor to the theological virtues, by which man is directed to God. Nor again is it a sin against oneself, for this pertains properly to gluttony and lust, of which the Apostle says (1 Corinthians 6:18): "He that committeth fornication sinneth against his own body." On like manner neither is it apparently a sin against one's neighbor, since a man harms no one by keeping what is his own. Therefore covetousness is not a sin.
IIª-IIae q. 118 a. 1 arg. 3 Praeterea, ea quae naturaliter adveniunt non sunt peccata. Sed avaritia naturaliter consequitur senectutem et quemlibet defectum, ut philosophus dicit, in IV Ethic. Ergo avaritia non est peccatum. Objection 3. Further, things that occur naturally are not sins. Now covetousness comes naturally to old age and every kind of defect, according to the Philosopher (Ethic. iv, 1). Therefore covetousness is not a sin.
IIª-IIae q. 118 a. 1 s. c. Sed contra est quod dicitur Heb. ult., sint mores sine avaritia, contenti praesentibus. On the contrary, It is written (Hebrews 13:5): "Let your manners be without covetousness, contented with such things as you have."
IIª-IIae q. 118 a. 1 co. Respondeo dicendum quod in quibuscumque bonum consistit in debita mensura, necesse est quod per excessum vel diminutionem illius mensurae malum proveniat. In omnibus autem quae sunt propter finem, bonum consistit in quadam mensura, nam ea quae sunt ad finem necesse est commensurari fini, sicut medicina sanitati; ut patet per philosophum, in I Polit. Bona autem exteriora habent rationem utilium ad finem, sicut dictum est. Unde necesse est quod bonum hominis circa ea consistat in quadam mensura, dum scilicet homo secundum aliquam mensuram quaerit habere exteriores divitias prout sunt necessaria ad vitam eius secundum suam conditionem. Et ideo in excessu huius mensurae consistit peccatum, dum scilicet aliquis supra debitum modum vult eas vel acquirere vel retinere. Quod pertinet ad rationem avaritiae, quae definitur esse immoderatus amor habendi. Unde patet quod avaritia est peccatum. I answer that, In whatever things good consists in a due measure, evil must of necessity ensue through excess or deficiency of that measure. Now in all things that are for an end, the good consists in a certain measure: since whatever is directed to an end must needs be commensurate with the end, as, for instance, medicine is commensurate with health, as the Philosopher observes (Polit. i, 6). External goods come under the head of things useful for an end, as stated above (117, 3; I-II, 02, 1). Hence it must needs be that man's good in their respect consists in a certain measure, in other words, that man seeks, according to a certain measure, to have external riches, in so far as they are necessary for him to live in keeping with his condition of life. Wherefore it will be a sin for him to exceed this measure, by wishing to acquire or keep them immoderately. This is what is meant by covetousness, which is defined as "immoderate love of possessing." It is therefore evident that covetousness is a sin.
IIª-IIae q. 118 a. 1 ad 1 Ad primum ergo dicendum quod appetitus rerum exteriorum est homini naturalis ut eorum quae sunt propter finem. Et ideo intantum vitio caret inquantum continetur sub regula sumpta ex ratione finis. Avaritia autem hanc regulam excedit. Et ideo est peccatum. Reply to Objection 1. It is natural to man to desire external things as means to an end: wherefore this desire is devoid of sin, in so far as it is held in check by the rule taken from the nature of the end. But covetousness exceeds this rule, and therefore is a sin.
IIª-IIae q. 118 a. 1 ad 2 Ad secundum dicendum quod avaritia potest importare immoderantiam circa res exteriores dupliciter. Uno modo, immediate, quantum ad acceptionem vel conservationem ipsarum, ut scilicet homo plus debito eas acquirat vel conservet. Et secundum hoc, est directe peccatum in proximum, quia in exterioribus divitiis non potest unus homo superabundare nisi alter deficiat, quia bona temporalia non possunt simul possideri a multis. Alio modo, potest importare immoderantiam circa interiores affectiones quas quis ad divitias habet, puta quod immoderate aliquis divitias amet aut desideret, aut delectetur in eis. Et sic avaritia est peccatum hominis in seipsum, quia per hoc deordinatur eius affectus; licet non deordinetur corpus, sicut per vitia carnalia. Ex consequenti autem est peccatum in Deum, sicut et omnia peccata mortalia, inquantum homo propter bonum temporale contemnit aeternum. Reply to Objection 2. Covetousness may signify immoderation about external things in two ways. First, so as to regard immediately the acquisition and keeping of such things, when, to wit, a man acquires or keeps them more than is due. On this way it is a sin directly against one's neighbor, since one man cannot over-abound in external riches, without another man lacking them, for temporal goods cannot be possessed by many at the same time. Secondly, it may signify immoderation in the internal affection which a man has for riches when, for instance, a man loves them, desires them, or delights in them, immoderately. On this way by covetousness a man sins against himself, because it causes disorder in his affections, though not in his body as do the sins of the flesh. As a consequence, however, it is a sin against God, just as all mortal sins, inasmuch as man contemns things eternal for the sake of temporal things.
IIª-IIae q. 118 a. 1 ad 3 Ad tertium dicendum quod inclinationes naturales sunt regulandae secundum rationem, quae principatum tenet in natura humana. Et ideo quamvis senes, propter naturae defectum, avidius exteriorum rerum inquirant subsidia, sicut et omnis indigens quaerit suae indigentiae supplementum; non tamen a peccato excusantur, si debitam rationis mensuram circa divitias excedant. Reply to Objection 3. Natural inclinations should be regulated according to reason, which is the governing power in human nature. Hence though old people seek more greedily the aid of external things, just as everyone that is in need seeks to have his need supplied, they are not excused from sin if they exceed this due measure of reason with regard to riches.
IIª-IIae q. 118 a. 2 arg. 1 Ad secundum sic proceditur. Videtur quod avaritia non sit speciale peccatum. Dicit enim Augustinus, in III de Lib. Arbit., avaritia, quae Graece philargyria dicitur, non in solo argento vel nummis, sed in omnibus rebus quae immoderate cupiuntur, intelligenda est. Sed in omni peccato est cupiditas immoderata alicuius rei, quia peccatum est, spreto bono incommutabili, bonis commutabilibus inhaerere, ut supra habitum est. Ergo avaritia est generale peccatum. Objection 1. It seems that covetousness is not a special sin. For Augustine says (De Lib. Arb. iii): "Covetousness, which in Greek is called philargyria, applies not only to silver or money, but also to anything that is desired immoderately." Now in every sin there is immoderate desire of something, because sin consists in turning away from the immutable good, and adhering to mutable goods, as state above (I-II, 71, 6, Objection 3). Therefore covetousness is a general sin.
IIª-IIae q. 118 a. 2 arg. 2 Praeterea, secundum Isidorum, in libro Etymol., avarus dicitur quasi avidus aeris, idest pecuniae, unde et in Graeco avaritia philargyria nominatur, idest amor argenti. Sed sub argento, per quod pecunia significatur, significantur omnia exteriora bona quorum pretium potest numismate mensurari, ut supra habitum est. Ergo avaritia consistit in appetitu cuiuslibet exterioris rei. Ergo videtur esse generale peccatum. Objection 2. Further, according to Isidore (Etym. x), "the covetous [avarus] man" is so called because he is "greedy for brass [avidus aeris]," i.e. money: wherefore in Greek covetousness is called philargyria, i.e. "love of silver." Now silver, which stands for money, signifies all external goods the value of which can be measured by money, as stated above (117, 2, ad 2). Therefore covetousness is a desire for any external thing: and consequently seems to be a general sin.
IIª-IIae q. 118 a. 2 arg. 3 Praeterea, super illud Rom. VII, nam concupiscentiam nesciebam etc., dicit Glossa, bona est lex, quae, dum concupiscentiam prohibet, omne malum prohibet. Videtur autem lex specialiter prohibere concupiscentiam avaritiae, ubi dicitur, Exod. XX, non concupisces rem proximi tui. Ergo concupiscentia avaritiae est omne malum. Et ita avaritia est generale peccatum. Objection 3. Further, a gloss on Romans 7:7, "For I had not known concupiscence," says: "The law is good, since by forbidding concupiscence, it forbids all evil." Now the law seems to forbid especially the concupiscence of covetousness: hence it is written (Exodus 20:17): "Thou shalt not covet thy neighbor's goods." Therefore the concupiscence of covetousness is all evil, and so covetousness is a general sin.
IIª-IIae q. 118 a. 2 s. c. Sed contra est quod Rom. I, avaritia connumeratur inter alia specialia peccata, ubi dicitur, repletos omni iniquitate, malitia, fornicatione, avaritia, et cetera. On the contrary, Covetousness is numbered together with other special sins (Romans 1:29), where it is written: "Being filled with all iniquity, malice, fornication, covetousness" [Douay: 'avarice'], etc.
IIª-IIae q. 118 a. 2 co. Respondeo dicendum quod peccata sortiuntur speciem secundum obiecta, ut supra habitum est. Obiectum autem peccati est illud bonum in quod tendit inordinatus appetitus. Et ideo ubi est specialis ratio boni quod inordinate appetitur, ibi est specialis ratio peccati. Alia autem est ratio boni utilis, et boni delectabilis. Divitiae autem secundum se habent rationem utilis, ea enim ratione appetuntur, inquantum in usum hominis cedunt. Et ideo speciale quoddam peccatum est avaritia, secundum quod est immoderatus amor habendi possessiones, quae nomine pecuniae designantur, ex qua sumitur avaritiae nomen. Verum quia verbum habendi secundum primam impositionem ad possessiones pertinere videtur, quarum sumus totaliter domini; ad multa alia derivatur, sicut dicitur homo habere sanitatem, uxorem, vestimentum, et alia huiusmodi, ut patet in praedicamentis, per consequens etiam et nomen avaritiae ampliatum est ad omnem immoderatum appetitum habendi quamcumque rem; sicut Gregorius dicit, in quadam homilia, quod avaritia est non solum pecuniae, sed etiam scientiae et altitudinis, cum supra modum sublimitas ambitur. Et secundum hoc, avaritia non esset peccatum speciale. Et hoc etiam modo loquitur Augustinus de avaritia in auctoritate inducta. I answer that, Sins take their species from their objects, as stated above (I-II, 72, 1). Now the object of a sin is the good towards which an inordinate appetite tends. Hence where there is a special aspect of good inordinately desired, there is a special kind of sin. Now the useful good differs in aspect from the delightful good. And riches, as such, come under the head of useful good, since they are desired under the aspect of being useful to man. Consequently covetousness is a special sin, forasmuch as it is an immoderate love of having possessions, which are comprised under the name of money, whence covetousness [avaritia] is denominated. Since, however, the verb "to have," which seems to have been originally employed in connection with possessions whereof we are absolute masters, is applied to many other things (thus a man is said to have health, a wife, clothes, and so forth, as stated in De Praedicamentis), consequently the term "covetousness" has been amplified to denote all immoderate desire for having anything whatever. Thus Gregory says in a homily (xvi in Ev.) that "covetousness is a desire not only for money, but also for knowledge and high places, when prominence is immoderately sought after." On this way covetousness is not a special sin: and in this sense Augustine speaks of covetousness in the passage quoted in the First Objection.
IIª-IIae q. 118 a. 2 ad 1 Unde patet responsio ad primum. Wherefore this suffices for the Reply to the First Objection.
IIª-IIae q. 118 a. 2 ad 2 Ad secundum dicendum quod omnes res exteriores quae veniunt in usum humanae vitae, nomine pecuniae intelliguntur inquantum habent rationem boni utilis. Sunt autem quaedam exteriora bona quae potest aliquis pecunia consequi, sicut voluptates et honores et alia huiusmodi, quae habent aliam rationem appetibilitatis. Et ideo illorum appetitus non proprie dicitur avaritia, secundum quod est vitium speciale. Reply to Objection 2. All those external things that are subject to the uses of human life are comprised under the term "money," inasmuch as they have the aspect of useful good. But there are certain external goods that can be obtained by money, such as pleasures, honors, and so forth, which are desirable under another aspect. Wherefore the desire for such things is not properly called covetousness, in so far as it is a special vice.
IIª-IIae q. 118 a. 2 ad 3 Ad tertium dicendum quod Glossa illa loquitur de concupiscentia inordinata cuiuscumque rei. Potest enim intelligi quod per prohibitionem concupiscentiae rerum possessarum prohibeatur quarumcumque rerum concupiscentia quae per res possessas acquiri possunt. Reply to Objection 3. This gloss speaks of the inordinate concupiscence for anything whatever. For it is easy to understand that if it is forbidden to covet another's possessions it is also forbidden to covet those things that can be obtained by means of those possessions.
IIª-IIae q. 118 a. 3 arg. 1 Ad tertium sic proceditur. Videtur quod avaritia non opponatur liberalitati. Quia super illud Matth. V, beati qui esuriunt et sitiunt iustitiam, dicit Chrysostomus quod est duplex iustitia, una generalis, et alia specialis, cui opponitur avaritia. Et hoc idem philosophus dicit, in V Ethic. Ergo avaritia non opponitur liberalitati. Objection 1. It seems that covetousness is not opposed to liberality. For Chrysostom, commenting on Matthew 5:6, "Blessed are they that hunger and thirst after justice," says, (Hom. xv in Matth.) that there are two kinds of justice, one general, and the other special, to which covetousness is opposed: and the Philosopher says the same (Ethic. v, 2). Therefore covetousness is not opposed to liberality.
IIª-IIae q. 118 a. 3 arg. 2 Praeterea, peccatum avaritiae in hoc consistit quod homo transcendit mensuram in rebus possessis. Sed huiusmodi mensura statuitur per iustitiam. Ergo avaritia directe opponitur iustitiae, et non liberalitati. Objection 2. Further, the sin of covetousness consists in a man's exceeding the measure in the things he possesses. But this measure is appointed by justice. Therefore covetousness is directly opposed to justice and not to liberality.
IIª-IIae q. 118 a. 3 arg. 3 Praeterea, liberalitas est virtus media inter duo vitia contraria, ut patet per philosophum, in II et IV Ethic. Sed avaritia non habet peccatum contrarium oppositum, ut patet per philosophum, in V Ethic. Ergo avaritia non opponitur liberalitati. Objection 3. Further, liberality is a virtue that observes the mean between two contrary vices, as the Philosopher states (Ethic. i, 7; iv, 1). But covetousness has no contrary and opposite sin, according to the Philosopher (Ethic. v, 1,2). Therefore covetousness is not opposed to liberality.
IIª-IIae q. 118 a. 3 s. c. Sed contra est quod, sicut dicitur Eccle. V, avarus non impletur pecunia, et qui amat divitias fructum non capiet ex eis. Sed non impleri pecunia, et inordinate eas amare, est contrarium liberalitati, quae in appetitu divitiarum medium tenet. Ergo avaritia opponitur liberalitati. On the contrary, It is written (Ecclesiastes 5:9): "A covetous man shall not be satisfied with money, and he that loveth riches shall have no fruits from them." Now not to be satisfied with money and to love it inordinately are opposed to liberality, which observes the mean in the desire of riches. Therefore covetousness is opposed to liberality.
IIª-IIae q. 118 a. 3 co. Respondeo dicendum quod avaritia importat immoderantiam quandam circa divitias dupliciter. Uno modo, immediate circa ipsam acceptionem et conservationem divitiarum, inquantum scilicet aliquis acquirit pecuniam ultra debitum aliena subripiendo vel retinendo. Et sic opponitur iustitiae. Et hoc modo accipitur avaritia Ezech. XXII, ubi dicitur, principes eius in medio eius quasi lupi rapientes praedam ad effundendum sanguinem, et avare lucra sectanda. Alio modo, importat immoderantiam circa interiores affectiones divitiarum, puta cum quis nimis amat vel desiderat divitias, aut nimis delectatur in eis, etiam si nolit rapere aliena. Et hoc modo avaritia opponitur liberalitati, quae moderatur huiusmodi affectiones, ut dictum est. Et sic accipitur avaritia II ad Cor. IX, praeparent repromissam benedictionem hanc paratam esse sic quasi benedictionem, non quasi avaritiam, Glossa, ut scilicet doleant pro dato, et parum sit quod dent. I answer that, Covetousness denotes immoderation with regard to riches in two ways. First, immediately in respect of the acquisition and keeping of riches. On this way a man obtains money beyond his due, by stealing or retaining another's property. This is opposed to justice, and in this sense covetousness is mentioned (Ezekiel 22:27): "Her princes in the midst of her are like wolves ravening the prey to shed blood . . . and to run after gains through covetousness." Secondly, it denotes immoderation in the interior affections for riches; for instance, when a man loves or desires riches too much, or takes too much pleasure in them, even if he be unwilling to steal. On this way covetousness is opposed to liberality, which moderates these affections, as stated above (117, 2, ad 3, 3, ad 3, 6). On this sense covetousness is spoken of (2 Corinthians 9:5): "That they would . . . prepare this blessing before promised, to be ready, so as a blessing, not as covetousness," where a gloss observes: "Lest they should regret what they had given, and give but little."
IIª-IIae q. 118 a. 3 ad 1 Ad primum ergo dicendum quod Chrysostomus et philosophus loquuntur de avaritia primo modo dicta. Avaritiam autem secundo modo dictam nominat philosophus illiberalitatem. Reply to Objection 1. Chrysostom and the Philosopher are speaking of covetousness in the first sense: covetousness in the second sense is called illiberality [aneleutheria] by the Philosopher.
IIª-IIae q. 118 a. 3 ad 2 Ad secundum dicendum quod iustitia proprie statuit mensuram in acceptionibus et conservationibus divitiarum secundum rationem debiti legalis, ut scilicet homo nec accipiat nec retineat alienum. Sed liberalitas constituit mensuram rationis principaliter quidem in interioribus affectionibus, et per consequens in exteriori acceptione et conservatione pecuniarum et emissione earum secundum quod ex interiori affectione procedunt, non observando rationem debiti legalis, sed debiti moralis, quod attenditur secundum regulam rationis. Reply to Objection 2. It belongs properly to justice to appoint the measure in the acquisition and keeping of riches from the point of view of legal due, so that a man should neither take nor retain another's property. But liberality appoints the measure of reason, principally in the interior affections, and consequently in the exterior taking and keeping of money, and in the spending of the same, in so far as these proceed from the interior affection, looking at the matter from the point of view not of the legal but of the moral debt, which latter depends on the rule of reason.
IIª-IIae q. 118 a. 3 ad 3 Ad tertium dicendum quod avaritia secundum quod opponitur iustitiae, non habet vitium oppositum, quia avaritia consistit in plus habendo quam debeat secundum iustitiam, et huic opponitur minus habere, quod non habet rationem culpae, sed poenae. Sed avaritia secundum quod opponitur liberalitati, habet vitium prodigalitatis oppositum. Reply to Objection 3. Covetousness as opposed to justice has no opposite vice: since it consists in having more than one ought according to justice, the contrary of which is to have less than one ought, and this is not a sin but a punishment. But covetousness as opposed to liberality has the vice of prodigality opposed to it.
IIª-IIae q. 118 a. 4 arg. 1 Ad quartum sic proceditur. Videtur quod avaritia semper sit peccatum mortale. Nullus enim est dignus morte nisi pro peccato mortali. Sed propter avaritiam homines digni sunt morte, cum enim apostolus, ad Rom. I, praemisisset, repletos omni iniquitate, fornicatione, avaritia, subdit, qui talia agunt digni sunt morte. Ergo avaritia est peccatum mortale. Objection 1. It seems that covetousness is always a mortal sin. For no one is worthy of death save for a mortal sin. But men are worthy of death on account of covetousness. For the Apostle after saying (Romans 1:29): "Being filled with all iniquity . . . fornication, covetousness [Douay: 'avarice']," etc. adds (Romans 1:32): "They who do such things are worthy of death." Therefore covetousness is a mortal sin.
IIª-IIae q. 118 a. 4 arg. 2 Praeterea, minimum in avaritia est quod aliquis inordinate retineat sua. Sed hoc videtur esse peccatum mortale, dicit enim Basilius, est panis famelici quem tu tenes, nudi tunica quam conservas, indigentis argentum quod possides. Quocirca tot iniuriaris quot exhibere valeres. Sed iniuriari alteri est peccatum mortale, quia contrariatur dilectioni proximi. Ergo multo magis omnis alia avaritia est peccatum mortale. Objection 2. Further, the least degree of covetousness is to hold to one's own inordinately. But this seemingly is a mortal sin: for Basil says (Serm. super. Luc. xii, 18): "It is the hungry man's bread that thou keepest back, the naked man's cloak that thou hoardest, the needy man's money that thou possessest, hence thou despoilest as many as thou mightest succor."Now it is a mortal sin to do an injustice to another, since it is contrary to the love of our neighbor. Much more therefore is all covetousness a mortal sin.
IIª-IIae q. 118 a. 4 arg. 3 Praeterea, nullus excaecatur spirituali caecitate nisi per peccatum mortale, quod animam privat lumine gratiae. Sed secundum Chrysostomum, tenebra animae est pecuniarum cupido. Ergo avaritia, quae est pecuniarum cupido, est peccatum mortale. Objection 3. Further, no one is struck with spiritual blindness save through a mortal sin, for this deprives a man of the light of grace. But, according to Chrysostom [Hom. xv in the Opus Imperfectum, falsely ascribed to St. Chrysostom], "Lust for money brings darkness on the soul." Therefore covetousness, which is lust for money, is a mortal sin.
IIª-IIae q. 118 a. 4 s. c. Sed contra est quod I ad Cor. III, super illud, si quis aedificaverit super hoc fundamentum etc., dicit Glossa quod lignum, faenum et stipulam superaedificat ille qui cogitat quae mundi sunt, quomodo placeat mundo, quod pertinet ad peccatum avaritiae. Ille autem qui aedificat lignum, faenum et stipulam, non peccat mortaliter, sed venialiter, de eo enim dicitur quod salvus erit sic quasi per ignem. Ergo avaritia quandoque est peccatum veniale. On the contrary, A gloss on 1 Corinthians 3:12, "If any man build upon this foundation," says (cf. St. Augustine, De Fide et Oper. xvi) that "he builds wood, hay, stubble, who thinks in the things of the world, how he may please the world," which pertains to the sin of covetousness. Now he that builds wood, hay, stubble, sins not mortally but venially, for it is said of him that "he shall be saved, yet so as by fire." Therefore covetousness is some times a venial sin.
IIª-IIae q. 118 a. 4 co. Respondeo dicendum quod, sicut supra dictum est, avaritia dupliciter dicitur. Uno modo, secundum quod opponitur iustitiae. Et hoc modo ex genere suo est peccatum mortale, sic enim ad avaritiam pertinet quod aliquis iniuste accipiat vel retineat res alienas, quod pertinet ad rapinam vel furtum, quae sunt peccata mortalia, ut supra habitum est. Contingit tamen in hoc genere avaritiae aliquid esse peccatum veniale propter imperfectionem actus, sicut supra dictum est, cum de furto ageretur. Alio modo potest accipi avaritia secundum quod opponitur liberalitati. Et secundum hoc, importat inordinatum amorem divitiarum. Si ergo intantum amor divitiarum crescat quod praeferatur caritati, ut scilicet propter amorem divitiarum aliquis non vereatur facere contra amorem Dei et proximi, sic avaritia erit peccatum mortale. Si autem inordinatio amoris infra hoc sistat, ut scilicet homo, quamvis superflue divitias amet, non tamen praefert earum amorem amori divino, ut scilicet propter divitias non velit aliquid facere contra Deum et proximum, sic avaritia est peccatum veniale. I answer that, As stated above (Article 3) covetousness is twofold. On one way it is opposed to justice, and thus it is a mortal sin in respect of its genus. For in this sense covetousness consists in the unjust taking or retaining of another's property, and this belongs to theft or robbery, which are mortal sins, as stated above (66, 6,8). Yet venial sin may occur in this kind of covetousness by reason of imperfection of the act, as stated above (66, 6, ad 3), when we were treating of theft. In another way covetousness may be take as opposed to liberality: in which sense it denotes inordinate love of riches. Accordingly if the love of riches becomes so great as to be preferred to charity, in such wise that a man, through love of riches, fear not to act counter to the love of God and his neighbor, covetousness will then be a mortal sin. If, on the other hand, the inordinate nature of his love stops short of this, so that although he love riches too much, yet he does not prefer the love of them to the love of God, and is unwilling for the sake of riches to do anything in opposition to God or his neighbor, then covetousness is a venial sin.
IIª-IIae q. 118 a. 4 ad 1 Ad primum ergo dicendum quod avaritia connumeratur peccatis mortalibus secundum illam rationem qua est peccatum mortale. Reply to Objection 1. Covetousness is numbered together with mortal sins, by reason of the aspect under which it is a mortal sin.
IIª-IIae q. 118 a. 4 ad 2 Ad secundum dicendum quod Basilius loquitur in illo casu in quo aliquis tenetur ex debito legali bona sua pauperibus erogare, vel propter periculum necessitatis, vel etiam propter superfluitatem habitorum. Reply to Objection 2. Basil is speaking of a case wherein a man is bound by a legal debt to give of his goods to the poor, either through fear of their want or on account of his having too much.
IIª-IIae q. 118 a. 4 ad 3 Ad tertium dicendum quod cupido divitiarum obtenebrat animam proprie quando excludit lumen caritatis, praeferendo amorem divitiarum amori divino. Reply to Objection 3. Lust for riches, properly speaking, brings darkness on the soul, when it puts out the light of charity, by preferring the love of riches to the love of God.
IIª-IIae q. 118 a. 5 arg. 1 Ad quintum sic proceditur. Videtur quod avaritia sit maximum peccatorum. Dicitur enim Eccli. X, avaro nihil est scelestius; et postea subditur, nihil est iniquius quam amare pecuniam, hic enim et animam suam venalem habet. Et Tullius dicit, in I de Offic., nihil est tam angusti animi, tamque parvi, quam amare pecuniam. Sed hoc pertinet ad avaritiam. Ergo avaritia est gravissimum peccatorum. Objection 1. It seems that covetousness is the greatest of sins. For it is written (Sirach 10:9): "Nothing is more wicked than a covetous man," and the text continues: "There is not a more wicked thing than to love money: for such a one setteth even his own soul to sale." Tully also says (De Offic. i, under the heading, 'True magnanimity is based chiefly on two things'): "Nothing is so narrow or little minded as to love money." But this pertains to covetousness. Therefore covetousness is the most grievous of sins.
IIª-IIae q. 118 a. 5 arg. 2 Praeterea, tanto aliquod peccatum est gravius quanto magis caritati contrariatur. Sed avaritia maxime contrariatur caritati, dicit enim Augustinus, in libro octoginta trium quaest., quod venenum caritatis est cupiditas. Ergo avaritia est maximum peccatorum. Objection 2. Further, the more a sin is opposed to charity, the more grievous it is. Now covetousness is most opposed to charity: for Augustine says (Q83, qu. 36) that "greed is the bane of charity." Therefore covetousness is the greatest of sins.
IIª-IIae q. 118 a. 5 arg. 3 Praeterea, ad gravitatem peccati pertinet quod sit incurabile, unde et peccatum in spiritum sanctum, quod est gravissimum, dicitur esse irremissibile. Sed avaritia est peccatum insanabile, ut dicit philosophus, in IV Ethic., quod senectus et omnis impotentia illiberales facit. Ergo avaritia est gravissimum peccatorum. Objection 3. Further, the gravity of a sin is indicated by its being incurable: wherefore the sin against the Holy Ghost is said to be most grievous, because it is irremissible. But covetousness is an incurable sin: hence the Philosopher says (Ethic. iv, 1) that "old age and helplessness of any kind make men illiberal." Therefore covetousness is the most grievous of sins.
IIª-IIae q. 118 a. 5 arg. 4 Praeterea, apostolus dicit, ad Ephes. V, quod avaritia est idolorum servitus. Sed idololatria computatur inter gravissima peccata. Ergo et avaritia. Objection 4. Further, the Apostle says (Ephesians 5:5) that covetousness is "a serving of idols." Now idolatry is reckoned among the most grievous sins. Therefore covetousness is also.
IIª-IIae q. 118 a. 5 s. c. Sed contra est quod adulterium est gravius peccatum quam furtum, ut habetur Prov. VI. Furtum autem pertinet ad avaritiam. Ergo avaritia non est gravissimum peccatorum. On the contrary, Adultery is a more grievous sin than theft, according to Proverbs 6:30. But theft pertains to covetousness. Therefore covetousness is not the most grievous of sins.
IIª-IIae q. 118 a. 5 co. Respondeo dicendum quod omne peccatum, ex hoc ipso quod est malum, consistit in quadam corruptione seu privatione alicuius boni, inquantum autem est voluntarium, consistit in appetitu alicuius boni. Dupliciter ergo ordo peccatorum potest attendi. Uno modo, ex parte boni quod per peccatum contemnitur vel corrumpitur, quod quanto maius est, tanto peccatum gravius est. Et secundum hoc, peccatum quod est contra Deum est gravissimum; et sub hoc est peccatum quod est contra personam hominis; sub quo est peccatum quod est contra res exteriores quae sunt ad usum hominis deputatae, quod videtur ad avaritiam pertinere. Alio modo potest attendi gradus peccatorum ex parte boni cui inordinate subditur appetitus humanus, quod quanto minus est, tanto peccatum est deformius; turpius enim est subesse inferiori bono quam superiori. Bonum autem exteriorum rerum est infimum inter humana bona, est enim minus quam bonum corporis; quod etiam est minus quam bonum animae; quod etiam exceditur a bono divino. Et secundum hoc, peccatum avaritiae, quo appetitus humanus subiicitur etiam exterioribus rebus, habet quodammodo deformitatem maiorem. Quia tamen corruptio vel privatio boni formaliter se habet in peccato, conversio autem ad bonum commutabile materialiter; magis est iudicanda gravitas peccati ex parte boni quod corrumpitur quam ex parte boni cui subiicitur appetitus. Et ideo dicendum est quod avaritia non est simpliciter maximum peccatorum. I answer that, Every sin, from the very fact that it is an evil, consists in the corruption or privation of some good: while, in so far as it is voluntary, it consists in the desire of some good. Consequently the order of sins may be considered in two ways. First, on the part of the good that is despised or corrupted by sin, and then the greater the good the graver the sin. From this point of view a sin that is against God is most grievous; after this comes a sin that is committed against a man's person, and after this comes a sin against external things, which are deputed to man's use, and this seems to belong to covetousness. Secondly, the degrees of sin may be considered on the part of the good to which the human appetite is inordinately subjected; and then the lesser the good, the more deformed is the sin: for it is more shameful to be subject to a lower than to a higher good. Now the good of external things is the lowest of human goods: since it is less than the good of the body, and this is less than the good of the soul, which is less than the Divine good. From this point of view the sin of covetousness, whereby the human appetite is subjected even to external things, has in a way a greater deformity. Since, however, corruption or privation of good is the formal element in sin, while conversion to a mutable good is the material element, the gravity of the sin is to be judged from the point of view of the good corrupted, rather than from that of the good to which the appetite is subjected. Hence we must assert that covetousness is not simply the most grievous of sins.
IIª-IIae q. 118 a. 5 ad 1 Ad primum ergo dicendum quod auctoritates illae loquuntur de avaritia ex parte boni cui subditur appetitus. Unde et in ecclesiastico pro ratione subditur, quia avarus animam suam habet venalem, quia videlicet animam suam, idest vitam, exponit periculis pro pecunia, et ideo subdit, quoniam in vita sua proiecit, idest contempsit, intima sua, ut scilicet pecuniam lucraretur. Tullius etiam addit hoc esse angusti animi, ut scilicet velit pecuniae subiici. Reply to Objection 1. These authorities speak of covetousness on the part of the good to which the appetite is subjected. Hence (Sirach 10:10) it is given as a reason that the covetous man "setteth his own soul to sale"; because, to wit, he exposes his soul--that is, his life--to danger for the sake of money. Hence the text continues: "Because while he liveth he hath cast away"--that is, despised--"his bowels," in order to make money. Tully also adds that it is the mark of a "narrow mind," namely, that one be willing to be subject to money.
IIª-IIae q. 118 a. 5 ad 2 Ad secundum dicendum quod Augustinus ibi accipit cupiditatem generaliter cuiuscumque temporalis boni, non secundum quod specialiter pro avaritia accipitur. Cupiditas enim cuiuscumque temporalis boni est venenum caritatis, inquantum scilicet homo spernit bonum divinum propter hoc quod inhaeret bono temporali. Reply to Objection 2. Augustine is taking greed generally, in reference to any temporal good, not in its special acceptation for covetousness: because greed for any temporal good is the bane of charity, inasmuch as a man turns away from the Divine good through cleaving to a temporal good.
IIª-IIae q. 118 a. 5 ad 3 Ad tertium dicendum quod aliter est insanabile peccatum in spiritum sanctum, et aliter avaritia. Nam peccatum in spiritum sanctum est insanabile ex parte contemptus, puta quia homo contemnit vel misericordiam vel iustitiam divinam, aut aliquid horum per quae hominis peccata sanantur. Et ideo talis insanabilitas pertinet ad maiorem gravitatem peccati. Avaritia vero habet insanabilitatem ex parte defectus humani, in quem scilicet semper procedit humana natura, quia quo aliquis est magis deficiens, eo magis indiget adminiculo exteriorum rerum, et ideo magis in avaritiam labitur. Unde per talem insanabilitatem non ostenditur peccatum esse gravius, sed quodammodo per hoc est periculosius. Reply to Objection 3. The sin against the Holy Ghost is incurable in one way, covetousness in another. For the sin against the Holy Ghost is incurable by reason of contempt: for instance, because a man contemns God's mercy, or His justice, or some one of those things whereby man's sins are healed: wherefore incurability of this kind points to the greater gravity of the sin. on the other hand, covetousness is incurable on the part of a human defect; a thing which human nature ever seeks to remedy, since the more deficient one is the more one seeks relief from external things, and consequently the more one gives way to covetousness. Hence incurability of this kind is an indication not of the sin being more grievous, but of its being somewhat more dangerous.
IIª-IIae q. 118 a. 5 ad 4 Ad quartum dicendum quod avaritia comparatur idololatriae per quandam similitudinem quam habet ad ipsam, quia sicut idololatra subiicit se creaturae exteriori, ita etiam et avarus. Non tamen eodem modo, sed idololatra quidem subiicit se creaturae exteriori ut exhibeat ei cultum divinum; avarus autem subiicit se creaturae exteriori immoderate ipsam concupiscendo ad usum, non ad cultum. Et ideo non oportet quod avaritia habeat tantam gravitatem quantam habet idololatria. Reply to Objection 4. Covetousness is compared to idolatry on account of a certain likeness that it bears to it: because the covetous man, like the idolater, subjects himself to an external creature, though not in the same way. For the idolater subjects himself to an external creature by paying it Divine honor, whereas the covetous man subjects himself to an external creature by desiring it immoderately for use, not for worship. Hence it does not follow that covetousness is as grievous a sin as idolatry.
IIª-IIae q. 118 a. 6 arg. 1 Ad sextum sic proceditur. Videtur quod avaritia non sit peccatum spirituale. Vitia enim spiritualia videntur esse circa spiritualia bona. Sed materia avaritiae sunt bona corporalia, scilicet exteriores divitiae. Ergo avaritia non est peccatum spirituale. Objection 1. It seems that covetousness is not a spiritual sin. For spiritual sins seem to regard spiritual goods. But the matter of covetousness is bodily goods, namely, external riches. Therefore covetousness is not a spiritual sin.
IIª-IIae q. 118 a. 6 arg. 2 Praeterea, peccatum spirituale contra carnale dividitur. Sed avaritia videtur esse peccatum carnale, sequitur enim corruptionem carnis; ut patet in senibus, qui propter naturae carnalis defectum in avaritiam incidunt. Ergo avaritia non est peccatum spirituale. Objection 2. Further, spiritual sin is condivided with sin of the flesh. Now covetousness is seemingly a sin of the flesh, for it results from the corruption of the flesh, as instanced in old people who, through corruption of carnal nature, fall into covetousness. Therefore covetousness is not a spiritual sin.
IIª-IIae q. 118 a. 6 arg. 3 Praeterea, peccatum carnale est per quod etiam corpus hominis deordinatur, secundum illud apostoli, I ad Cor. VI, qui fornicatur in corpus suum peccat. Sed avaritia etiam hominem corporaliter vexat, unde et Chrysostomus, Marc. V, comparat avarum daemoniaco, qui in corpore vexatur. Ergo avaritia non videtur esse peccatum spirituale. Objection 3. Further, a sin of the flesh is one by which man's body is disordered, according to the saying of the Apostle (1 Corinthians 6:18), "He that committeth fornication sinneth against his own body." Now covetousness disturbs man even in his body; wherefore Chrysostom (Hom. xxix in Matth.) compares the covetous man to the man who was possessed by the devil (Mark 5) and was troubled in body. Therefore covetousness seems not to be a spiritual sin.
IIª-IIae q. 118 a. 6 s. c. Sed contra est quod Gregorius, XXXI Moral., computat avaritiam vitiis spiritualibus. On the contrary, Gregory (Moral. xxxi) numbers covetousness among spiritual vices.
IIª-IIae q. 118 a. 6 co. Respondeo dicendum quod peccata praecipue in affectu consistunt. Omnes autem affectiones animae, sive passiones, terminantur ad delectationes et tristitias, ut patet per philosophum, in II Ethic. Delectationum autem quaedam sunt carnales, et quaedam spirituales. Carnales quidem delectationes dicuntur quae in sensu carnis complentur, sicut delectationes ciborum et venereorum, delectationes vero spirituales dicuntur quae complentur in sola animae apprehensione. Illa ergo peccata dicuntur carnalia quae perficiuntur in carnalibus delectationibus, illa vero dicuntur spiritualia quae perficiuntur in spiritualibus delectationibus, absque carnali delectatione. Et huiusmodi est avaritia, delectatur enim avarus in hoc quod considerat se possessorem divitiarum. Et ideo avaritia est peccatum spirituale. I answer that, Sins are seated chiefly in the affections: and all the affections or passions of the soul have their term in pleasure and sorrow, according to the Philosopher (Ethic. ii, 5). Now some pleasures are carnal and some spiritual. Carnal pleasures are those which are consummated in the carnal senses--for instance, the pleasures of the table and sexual pleasures: while spiritual pleasures are those which are consummated in the mere apprehension of the soul. Accordingly, sins of the flesh are those which are consummated in carnal pleasures, while spiritual sins are consummated in pleasures of the spirit without pleasure of the flesh. Such is covetousness: for the covetous man takes pleasure in the consideration of himself as a possessor of riches. Therefore covetousness is a spiritual sin.
IIª-IIae q. 118 a. 6 ad 1 Ad primum ergo dicendum quod avaritia circa corporale obiectum non quaerit delectationem corporalem, sed solum animalem, prout scilicet homo delectatur in hoc quod divitias possideat. Et ideo non est peccatum carnale. Ratione tamen obiecti, medium est inter peccata pure spiritualia, quae quaerunt delectationem spiritualem circa obiecta spiritualia, sicut superbia est circa excellentiam; et vitia pure carnalia, quae quaerunt delectationem pure corporalem circa obiectum corporale. Reply to Objection 1. Covetousness with regard to a bodily object seeks the pleasure, not of the body but only of the soul, forasmuch as a man takes pleasure in the fact that he possesses riches: wherefore it is not a sin of the flesh. Nevertheless by reason of its object it is a mean between purely spiritual sins, which seek spiritual pleasure in respect of spiritual objects (thus pride is about excellence), and purely carnal sins, which seek a purely bodily pleasure in respect of a bodily object.
IIª-IIae q. 118 a. 6 ad 2 Ad secundum dicendum quod motus recipit speciem secundum terminum ad quem, non autem secundum terminum a quo. Et ideo vitium dicitur carnale ex hoc quod tendit in delectationem carnalem, non autem ex eo quod procedit ex aliquo defectu carnis. Reply to Objection 2. Movement takes its species from the term "whereto" and not from the term "wherefrom." Hence a vice of the flesh is so called from its tending to a pleasure of the flesh, and not from its originating in some defect of the flesh.
IIª-IIae q. 118 a. 6 ad 3 Ad tertium dicendum quod Chrysostomus comparat avarum daemoniaco, non quia vexetur in carne sicut daemoniacus, sed per oppositum, quia sicut daemoniacus ille de quo legitur Marc. V, se denudabat, ita avarus se superfluis divitiis onerat. Reply to Objection 3. Chrysostom compares a covetous man to the man who was possessed by the devil, not that the former is troubled in the flesh in the same way as the latter, but by way of contrast, since while the possessed man, of whom we read in Mark 5, stripped himself, the covetous man loads himself with an excess of riches.
IIª-IIae q. 118 a. 7 arg. 1 Ad septimum sic proceditur. Videtur quod avaritia non sit vitium capitale. Avaritia enim opponitur liberalitati sicut medio, et prodigalitati sicut extremo. Sed neque liberalitas est principalis virtus, neque prodigalitas vitium capitale. Ergo etiam avaritia non debet poni vitium capitale. Objection 1. It seems that covetousness is not a capital vice. For covetousness is opposed to liberality as the mean, and to prodigality as extreme. But neither is liberality a principal virtue, nor prodigality a capital vice. Therefore covetousness also should not be reckoned a capital vice.
IIª-IIae q. 118 a. 7 arg. 2 Praeterea, sicut supra dictum est, illa dicuntur esse vitia capitalia quae habent principales fines, ad quos ordinantur fines aliorum vitiorum. Sed hoc non competit avaritiae, quia divitiae non habent rationem finis, sed magis rationem eius quod est ad finem, ut dicitur in I Ethic. Ergo avaritia non est vitium capitale. Objection 2. Further, as stated above (I-II, 84, 3,4), those vices are called capital which have principal ends, to which the ends of other vices are directed. But this does not apply to covetousness: since riches have the aspect, not of an end, but rather of something directed to an end, as stated in Ethic. i, 5. Therefore covetousness is not a capital vice.
IIª-IIae q. 118 a. 7 arg. 3 Praeterea, Gregorius dicit, in Moral., quod avaritia quandoque oritur ex elatione, quandoque per timorem. Dum enim quidam deficere sibi ad sumptum necessaria aestimant, mentem ad avaritiam relaxant. Sunt alii qui, dum potentiores videri appetunt, ad alienarum rerum ambitum succenduntur. Ergo avaritia magis oritur ab aliis vitiis quam ipsa sit vitium capitale respectu aliorum. Objection 3. Further, Gregory says (Moral. xv), that "covetousness arises sometimes from pride, sometimes from fear. For there are those who, when they think that they lack the needful for their expenses, allow the mind to give way to covetousness. And there are others who, wishing to be thought more of, are incited to greed for other people's property." Therefore covetousness arises from other vices instead of being a capital vice in respect of other vices.
IIª-IIae q. 118 a. 7 s. c. Sed contra est quod Gregorius, XXXI Moral., ponit avaritiam inter vitia capitalia. On the contrary, Gregory (Moral. xxxi) reckons covetousness among the capital vices.
IIª-IIae q. 118 a. 7 co. Respondeo dicendum quod, sicut supra dictum est, vitium capitale dicitur ex quo alia oriuntur secundum rationem finis; qui cum sit multum appetibilis, propter eius appetitum homo procedit ad multa facienda vel bona vel mala. Finis autem maxime appetibilis est beatitudo sive felicitas, quae est ultimus finis humanae vitae, ut supra habitum est. Et ideo quanto aliquid magis participat conditiones felicitatis, tanto magis est appetibile. Est autem una de conditionibus felicitatis ut sit per se sufficiens, alioquin non quietaret appetitum tanquam ultimus finis. Sed per se sufficientiam maxime repromittunt divitiae, ut Boetius dicit, in III de Consol. Cuius ratio est quia, sicut philosophus dicit, in V Ethic., denario utimur quasi fideiussore ad omnia habenda, et Eccle. X dicitur quod pecuniae obediunt omnia. Et ideo avaritia, quae consistit in appetitu pecuniae, est vitium capitale. I answer that, As stated in the Second Objection, a capital vice is one which under the aspect of end gives rise to other vices: because when an end is very desirable, the result is that through desire thereof man sets about doing many things either good or evil. Now the most desirable end is happiness or felicity, which is the last end of human life, as stated above (I-II, 01, 4,7,8): wherefore the more a thing is furnished with the conditions of happiness, the more desirable it is. Also one of the conditions of happiness is that it be self-sufficing, else it would not set man's appetite at rest, as the last end does. Now riches give great promise of self-sufficiency, as Boethius says (De Consol. iii): the reason of which, according to the Philosopher (Ethic. v, 5), is that we "use money in token of taking possession of something," and again it is written (Ecclesiastes 10:19): "All things obey money." Therefore covetousness, which is desire for money, is a capital vice.
IIª-IIae q. 118 a. 7 ad 1 Ad primum ergo dicendum quod virtus perficitur secundum rationem, vitium autem perficitur secundum inclinationem appetitus sensitivi. Non autem ad idem genus principaliter respicit ratio, et appetitus sensitivus. Et ideo non oportet quod principale vitium opponatur principali virtuti. Unde licet liberalitas non sit principalis virtus, quia non respicit ad principale bonum rationis; avaritia tamen est principale vitium, quia respicit ad pecuniam, quae habet quandam principalitatem inter bona sensibilia, ratione iam dicta. Prodigalitas autem non ordinatur ad aliquem finem principaliter appetibilem, sed magis videtur procedere ex defectu rationis. Unde philosophus dicit, in IV Ethic., quod prodigus magis dicitur vanus quam malus. Reply to Objection 1. Virtue is perfected in accordance with reason, but vice is perfected in accordance with the inclination of the sensitive appetite. Now reason and sensitive appetite do not belong chiefly to the same genus, and consequently it does not follow that principal vice is opposed to principal virtue. Wherefore, although liberality is not a principal virtue, since it does not regard the principal good of the reason, yet covetousness is a principal vice, because it regards money, which occupies a principal place among sensible goods, for the reason given in the Article. On the other hand, prodigality is not directed to an end that is desirable principally, indeed it seems rather to result from a lack of reason. Hence the Philosopher says (Ethic. iv, 1) that "a prodigal man is a fool rather than a knave."
IIª-IIae q. 118 a. 7 ad 2 Ad secundum dicendum quod pecunia ordinatur quidem ad aliud sicut ad finem, inquantum tamen utilis est ad omnia sensibilia conquirenda, continet quodammodo virtute omnia. Et ideo habet quandam similitudinem felicitatis, ut dictum est. Reply to Objection 2. It is true that money is directed to something else as its end: yet in so far as it is useful for obtaining all sensible things, it contains, in a way, all things virtually. Hence it has a certain likeness to happiness, as stated in the Article.
IIª-IIae q. 118 a. 7 ad 3 Ad tertium dicendum quod nihil prohibet vitium capitale interdum a quibusdam aliis oriri, ut dictum est, dum tamen ex eo alia vitia soleant plerumque oriri. Reply to Objection 3. Nothing prevents a capital vice from arising sometimes out of other vices, as stated above (36, 4, ad 1; I-II, 84, 4), provided that itself be frequently the source of others.
IIª-IIae q. 118 a. 8 arg. 1 Ad octavum sic proceditur. Videtur quod non sint avaritiae filiae quae dicuntur, scilicet proditio, fraus, fallacia, periuria, inquietudo, violentiae, et contra misericordiam obduratio. Avaritia enim opponitur liberalitati, ut dictum est. Proditio autem, fraus et fallacia opponuntur prudentiae; periuria religioni; inquietudo spei vel caritati, quae quiescit in amato; violentiae opponuntur iustitiae; obduratio misericordiae. Ergo huiusmodi vitia non pertinent ad avaritiam. Objection 1. It seems that the daughters of covetousness are not as commonly stated, namely, "treachery, fraud, falsehood, perjury, restlessness, violence, and insensibility to mercy." For covetousness is opposed to liberality, as stated above (Article 3). Now treachery, fraud, and falsehood are opposed to prudence, perjury to religion, restlessness to hope, or to charity which rests in the beloved object, violence to justice, insensibility to mercy. Therefore these vices have no connection with covetousness.
IIª-IIae q. 118 a. 8 arg. 2 Praeterea, proditio, dolus et fallacia ad idem pertinere videntur, scilicet ad proximi deceptionem. Ergo non debent enumerari tanquam diversae filiae avaritiae. Objection 2. Further, treachery, fraud and falsehood seem to pertain to the same thing, namely, the deceiving of one's neighbor. Therefore they should not be reckoned as different daughters of covetousness.
IIª-IIae q. 118 a. 8 arg. 3 Praeterea, Isidorus ponit novem filias, quae sunt mendacium, fraus, furtum, periurium, et turpis lucri appetitus, falsa testimonia, violentia inhumanitas, rapacitas. Ergo prima assignatio filiarum fuit insufficiens. Objection 3. Further, Isidore (Comment. in Deut.) enumerates nine daughters of covetousness; which are "lying, fraud, theft, perjury, greed of filthy lucre, false witnessing, violence, inhumanity, rapacity." Therefore the former reckoning of daughters is insufficient.
IIª-IIae q. 118 a. 8 arg. 4 Praeterea, philosophus, in IV Ethic., ponit multa genera vitiorum pertinentium ad avaritiam, quam illiberalitatem nominat, videlicet parcos, tenaces, kimibiles, illiberales operationes operantes, et de meretricio pastos, et usurarios, aleatores, et mortuorum spoliatores, et latrones. Ergo videtur quod praedicta enumeratio sit insufficiens. Objection 4. Further, the Philosopher (Ethic. iv, 1) mentions many kinds of vices as belonging to covetousness which he calls illiberality, for he speaks of those who are "sparing, tight-fisted, skinflints [kyminopristes], misers [kimbikes], who do illiberal deeds," and of those who "batten on whoredom, usurers, gamblers, despoilers of the dead, and robbers." Therefore it seems that the aforesaid enumeration is insufficient.
IIª-IIae q. 118 a. 8 arg. 5 Praeterea, tyranni maxime violentias subditis inferunt. Dicit autem philosophus, ibidem, quod tyrannos civitates desolantes et sacra praedantes non dicimus illiberales, idest avaros. Ergo violentia non debet poni filia avaritiae. Objection 5. Further, tyrants use much violence against their subjects. But the Philosopher says (Ethic. iv, 1) that "tyrants who destroy cities and despoil sacred places are not to be called illiberal," i.e. covetous. Therefore violence should not be reckoned a daughter of covetousness.
IIª-IIae q. 118 a. 8 s. c. Sed contra est quod Gregorius, XXXI Moral., assignat avaritiae filias prius enumeratas. On the contrary, Gregory (Moral. xxxi) assigns to covetousness the daughters mentioned above.
IIª-IIae q. 118 a. 8 co. Respondeo dicendum quod filiae avaritiae dicuntur vitia quae ex ipsa oriuntur, et praecipue secundum appetitum finis. Quia vero avaritia est superfluus amor habendi divitias, in duobus excedit. Primo enim, superabundat in retinendo. Et ex hac parte oritur ex avaritia obduratio contra misericordiam, quia scilicet cor eius misericordia non emollitur, ut de divitiis suis subveniat miseris. Secundo, ad avaritiam pertinet superabundare in accipiendo. Et secundum hoc, avaritia potest considerari dupliciter. Uno modo, secundum quod est in affectu. Et sic ex avaritia oritur inquietudo, inquantum ingerit homini sollicitudinem et curas superfluas, avarus enim non impletur pecunia, ut dicitur Eccle. V. Alio modo, potest considerari in effectu. Et sic in acquirendo aliena utitur quandoque quidem vi, quod pertinet ad violentias; quandoque autem dolo. Qui quidem si fiat in verbo, erit fallacia, quantum ad simplex verbum; periurium autem si addatur confirmatio iuramenti. Si autem dolus committatur in opere, sic, quantum ad res, erit fraus; quantum autem ad personas, proditio, ut patet de Iuda, qui ex avaritia prodidit Christum. I answer that, The daughters of covetousness are the vices which arise therefrom, especially in respect of the desire of an end. Now since covetousness is excessive love of possessing riches, it exceeds in two things. For in the first place it exceeds in retaining, and in this respect covetousness gives rise to "insensibility to mercy," because, to wit, a man's heart is not softened by mercy to assist the needy with his riches [See 30, 1]. On the second place it belongs to covetousness to exceed in receiving, and in this respect covetousness may be considered in two ways. First as in the thought [affectu]. On this way it gives rise to "restlessness," by hindering man with excessive anxiety and care, for "a covetous man shall not be satisfied with money" (Ecclesiastes 5:9). Secondly, it may be considered in the execution [effectu]. On this way the covetous man, in acquiring other people's goods, sometimes employs force, which pertains to "violence," sometimes deceit, and then if he has recourse to words, it is "falsehood," if it be mere words, "perjury" if he confirm his statement by oath; if he has recourse to deeds, and the deceit affects things, we have "fraud"; if persons, then we have "treachery," as in the case of Judas, who betrayed Christ through covetousness.
IIª-IIae q. 118 a. 8 ad 1 Ad primum ergo dicendum quod non oportet filias alicuius peccati capitalis ad idem genus vitii pertinere, quia ad finem unius vitii possunt ordinari etiam peccata alterius generis. Aliud est enim peccatum habere filias, et peccatum habere species. Reply to Objection 1. There is no need for the daughters of a capital sin to belong to that same kind of vice: because a sin of one kind allows of sins even of a different kind being directed to its end; seeing that it is one thing for a sin to have daughters, and another for it to have species.
IIª-IIae q. 118 a. 8 ad 2 Ad secundum dicendum quod illa tria distinguuntur sicut dictum est. Reply to Objection 2. These three are distinguished as stated in the Article.
IIª-IIae q. 118 a. 8 ad 3 Ad tertium dicendum quod illa novem reducuntur ad praedicta septem. Nam mendacium et falsum testimonium continetur sub fallacia, falsum enim testimonium est quaedam specificatio mendacii; sicut et furtum est quaedam specificatio fraudis, unde sub fraude continetur. Appetitus autem turpis lucri pertinet ad inquietudinem. Rapacitas autem continetur sub violentia, cum sit species eius. Inhumanitas autem est idem quod obduratio contra misericordiam. Reply to Objection 3. These nine are reducible to the seven aforesaid. For lying and false witnessing are comprised under falsehood, since false witnessing is a special kind of lie, just as theft is a special kind of fraud, wherefore it is comprised under fraud; and greed of filthy lucre belongs to restlessness; rapacity is comprised under violence, since it is a species thereof; and inhumanity is the same as insensibility to mercy.
IIª-IIae q. 118 a. 8 ad 4 Ad quartum dicendum quod illa quae ponit Aristoteles sunt illiberalitatis vel avaritiae species magis quam filiae. Potest enim aliquis dici illiberalis vel avarus ex eo quod deficit in dando, et si quidem parum det, vocatur parcus; si autem nihil, tenax; si autem cum magna difficultate det, vocatur kimibilis, quasi kimini venditor, quia de parvis magnam vim facit. Quandoque autem aliquis dicitur illiberalis vel avarus quia excedit in accipiendo. Et hoc dupliciter. Uno modo, quia turpiter lucratur, vel vilia et servilia opera exercendo per illiberales operationes; vel quia de aliquibus vitiosis actibus lucratur, sicut de meretricio, vel de aliquo huiusmodi; vel quia lucratur de eo quod gratis oportet concedere, sicut usurarii; vel quia lucratur parva cum magno labore. Alio modo, quia iniuste lucratur, vel vivis vim inferendo, sicut latrones; vel mortuos spoliando; vel ab amicis auferendo, sicut aleatores. Reply to Objection 4. The vices mentioned by Aristotle are species rather than daughters of illiberality or covetousness. For a man may be said to be illiberal or covetous through a defect in giving. If he gives but little he is said to be "sparing"; if nothing, he is "tightfisted": if he gives with great reluctance, he is said to be kyminopristes [skinflint], a cumin-seller, as it were, because he makes a great fuss about things of little value. Sometimes a man is said to be illiberal or covetous, through an excess in receiving, and this in two ways. On one way, through making money by disgraceful means, whether in performing shameful and servile works by means of illiberal practices, or by acquiring more through sinful deeds, such as whoredom or the like, or by making a profit where one ought to have given gratis, as in the case of usury, or by laboring much to make little profit. On another way, in making money by unjust means, whether by using violence on the living, as robbers do, or by despoiling the dead, or by preying on one's friends, as gamblers do.
IIª-IIae q. 118 a. 8 ad 5 Ad quintum dicendum quod sicut liberalitas est circa mediocres pecunias, ita et illiberalitas. Unde tyranni, qui magna per violentiam auferunt, non dicuntur illiberales, sed iniusti. Reply to Objection 5. Just as liberality is about moderate sums of money, so is illiberality. Wherefore tyrants who take great things by violence, are said to be, not illiberal, but unjust.

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