Authors/Thomas Aquinas/Summa Theologiae/Part IIb/Q116

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Q115 Q117



Latin English
IIª-IIae q. 116 pr. Deinde considerandum est de litigio. Et circa hoc quaeruntur duo. Primo, utrum opponatur virtuti amicitiae. Secundo, de comparatione eius ad adulationem. Question 116. Quarreling 1. Is it opposed to the virtue of friendship? 2. Its comparison with flattery
IIª-IIae q. 116 a. 1 arg. 1 Ad primum sic proceditur. Videtur quod litigium non opponatur virtuti amicitiae vel affabilitatis. Litigium enim ad discordiam pertinere videtur, sicut et contentio. Sed discordia opponitur caritati, sicut dictum est. Ergo et litigium. Objection 1. It seems that quarreling is not opposed to the virtue of friendship or affability. For quarreling seems to pertain to discord, just as contention does. But discord is opposed to charity, as stated above (Question 37, Article 1). Therefore quarreling is also.
IIª-IIae q. 116 a. 1 arg. 2 Praeterea, Prov. XXVI dicitur, homo iracundus incendit litem. Sed iracundia opponitur mansuetudini. Ergo et lis, sive litigium. Objection 2. Further, it is written (Proverbs 26:21): "An angry man stirreth up strife." Now anger is opposed to meekness. Therefore strife or quarreling is also.
IIª-IIae q. 116 a. 1 arg. 3 Praeterea, Iac. IV dicitur, unde bella et lites in vobis? Nonne ex concupiscentiis vestris, quae militant in membris vestris? Sed sequi concupiscentias videtur opponi temperantiae. Ergo videtur quod litigium non opponatur amicitiae, sed temperantiae. Objection 3. Further, it is written (James 4:1): "From whence are wars and quarrels [Douay: 'contentions'] among you? Are they not hence, from your concupiscences which war in your members?" Now it would seem contrary to temperance to follow one's concupiscences. Therefore it seems that quarreling is opposed not to friendship but to temperance.
IIª-IIae q. 116 a. 1 s. c. Sed contra est quod philosophus, in IV Ethic., litigium opponit amicitiae. On the contrary, The Philosopher opposes quarreling to friendship (Ethic. iv, 6).
IIª-IIae q. 116 a. 1 co. Respondeo dicendum quod proprie litigium in verbis consistit, cum scilicet unus verbis alterius contradicit. In qua quidem contradictione duo possunt attendi. Quandoque enim contingit contradictio propter personam dicentis cui contradicens consentire recusat propter defectum amoris animos unientis. Et hoc videtur ad discordiam pertinere, caritati contrariam. Quandoque vero contradictio oritur ratione personae quam aliquis contristare non veretur. Et sic fit litigium, quod praedictae amicitiae vel affabilitati opponitur, ad quam pertinet delectabiliter aliis convivere. Unde philosophus dicit, in IV Ethic., quod illi qui ad omnia contrariantur causa eius quod est contristare, neque quodcumque curantes, discoli et litigiosi vocantur. I answer that, Quarreling consists properly in words, when, namely, one person contradicts another's words. Now two things may be observed in this contradiction. For sometimes contradiction arises on account of the person who speaks, the contradictor refusing to consent with him from lack of that love which unites minds together, and this seems to pertain to discord, which is contrary to charity. Whereas at times contradiction arises by reason of the speaker being a person to whom someone does not fear to be disagreeable: whence arises quarreling, which is opposed to the aforesaid friendship or affability, to which it belongs to behave agreeably towards those among whom we dwell. Hence the Philosopher says (Ethic. iv, 6) that "those who are opposed to everything with the intent of being disagreeable, and care for nobody, are said to be peevish and quarrelsome."
IIª-IIae q. 116 a. 1 ad 1 Ad primum ergo dicendum quod contentio magis proprie pertinet ad contradictionem discordiae, litigium autem ad contradictionem quae fit intentione contristandi. Reply to Objection 1. Contention pertains rather to the contradiction of discord, while quarreling belongs to the contradiction which has the intention of displeasing.
IIª-IIae q. 116 a. 1 ad 2 Ad secundum dicendum quod directa oppositio vitiorum ad virtutes non attenditur secundum causas, cum contingat unum vitium ex diversis causis oriri, sed attenditur secundum speciem actus. Licet autem quandoque litigium ex ira oriatur, potest tamen ex multis aliis causis oriri. Unde non oportet quod directe opponatur mansuetudini. Reply to Objection 2. The direct opposition of virtues to vices depends, not on their causes, since one vice may arise from many causes, but on the species of their acts. And although quarreling arises at times from anger, it may arise from many other causes, hence it does not follow that it is directly opposed to meekness.
IIª-IIae q. 116 a. 1 ad 3 Ad tertium dicendum quod Iacobus loquitur ibi de concupiscentia secundum quod est generale malum, ex quo omnia vitia oriuntur, prout dicit Glossa Rom. VII, bona est lex, quae, dum concupiscentiam prohibet, omne malum prohibet. Reply to Objection 3. James speaks there of concupiscence considered as a general evil whence all vices arise. Thus, a gloss on Romans 7:7 says: "The law is good, since by forbidding concupiscence, it forbids all evil."
IIª-IIae q. 116 a. 2 arg. 1 Ad secundum sic proceditur. Videtur quod litigium sit minus peccatum quam contrarium vitium, scilicet placiditatis vel adulationis. Quanto enim aliquod peccatum plus nocet, tanto peius esse videtur. Sed adulatio plus nocet quam litigium, dicitur enim Isaiae III, popule meus, qui beatum te dicunt, ipsi te decipiunt, et viam gressuum tuorum dissipant. Ergo adulatio est gravius peccatum quam litigium. Objection 1. It seems that quarreling is a less grievous sin than the contrary vice, viz. adulation or flattery. For the more harm a sin does the more grievous it seems to be. Now flattery does more harm than quarreling, for it is written (Isaiah 3:12): "O My people, they that call thee blessed, the same deceive thee, and destroy the way of thy steps." Therefore flattery is a more grievous sin than quarreling.
IIª-IIae q. 116 a. 2 arg. 2 Praeterea, in adulatione videtur esse quaedam dolositas, quia aliud adulator dicit ore, aliud habet in corde. Litigiosus autem caret dolo, quia manifeste contradicit. Ille autem qui cum dolo peccat, turpior est, ut philosophus dicit, in VII Ethic. Ergo gravius peccatum est adulatio quam litigium. Objection 2. Further, there appears to be a certain amount of deceit in flattery, since the flatterer says one thing, and thinks another: whereas the quarrelsome man is without deceit, for he contradicts openly. Now he that sins deceitfully is a viler man, according to the Philosopher (Ethic. vii, 6). Therefore flattery is a more grievous sin than quarreling.
IIª-IIae q. 116 a. 2 arg. 3 Praeterea, verecundia est timor de turpi, ut patet per philosophum, in IV Ethic. Sed magis verecundatur homo esse adulator quam litigiosus. Ergo litigium est minus peccatum quam adulatio. Objection 3. Further, shame is fear of what is vile, according to the Philosopher (Ethic. iv, 9). But a man is more ashamed to be a flatterer than a quarreler. Therefore quarreling is a less grievous sin than flattery.
IIª-IIae q. 116 a. 2 s. c. Sed contra est quod tanto aliquod peccatum videtur esse gravius quanto spirituali statui magis repugnat. Sed litigium magis repugnare videtur spirituali, dicitur enim I ad Tim. III, quod oportet episcopum non litigiosum esse; et II ad Tim. II, servum domini non oportet litigare. Ergo litigium videtur esse gravius peccatum. On the contrary, The more a sin is inconsistent with the spiritual state, the more it appears to be grievous. Now quarreling seems to be more inconsistent with the spiritual state: for it is written (1 Timothy 3:2-3) that it "behooveth a bishop to be . . . not quarrelsome"; and (2 Timothy 3:24): "The servant of the Lord must not wrangle." Therefore quarreling seems to be a more grievous sin than flattery.
IIª-IIae q. 116 a. 2 co. Respondeo dicendum quod de utroque istorum peccatorum loqui possumus dupliciter. Uno modo, considerando speciem utriusque peccati. Et secundum hoc, tanto aliquod vitium est gravius quanto magis repugnat oppositae virtuti. Virtus autem amicitiae principalius tendit ad delectandum quam ad contristandum. Et ideo litigiosus, qui superabundat in contristando, gravius peccat quam placidus vel adulator, qui superabundat in delectando. Alio modo possunt considerari secundum aliqua exteriora motiva. Et secundum hoc, quandoque adulatio est gravior, puta quando intendit per deceptionem indebite honorem vel lucrum acquirere. Quandoque vero litigium est gravius, puta quando homo intendit vel veritatem impugnare, vel dicentem in contemptum adducere. I answer that, We can speak of each of these sins in two ways. On one way we may consider the species of either sin, and thus the more a vice is at variance with the opposite virtue the more grievous it is. Now the virtue of friendship has a greater tendency to please than to displease: and so the quarrelsome man, who exceeds in giving displeasure sins more grievously than the adulator or flatterer, who exceeds in giving pleasure. On another way we may consider them as regards certain external motives, and thus flattery sometimes more grievous, for instance when one intends by deception to acquire undue honor or gain: while sometimes quarreling is more grievous; for instance, when one intends either to deny the truth, or to hold up the speaker to contempt.
IIª-IIae q. 116 a. 2 ad 1 Ad primum ergo dicendum quod sicut adulator potest nocere occulte decipiendo, ita litigiosus potest interdum nocere manifeste impugnando. Gravius autem est, ceteris paribus, manifeste alicui nocere, quasi per violentiam, quam occulte, unde rapina est gravius peccatum quam furtum, ut supra dictum est. Reply to Objection 1. Just as the flatterer may do harm by deceiving secretly, so the quarreler may do harm sometimes by assailing openly. Now, other things being equal, it is more grievous to harm a person openly, by violence as it were, than secretly. Wherefore robbery is a more grievous sin than theft, as stated above (Question 66, Article 09).
IIª-IIae q. 116 a. 2 ad 2 Ad secundum dicendum quod non semper in actibus humanis illud est gravius quod est turpius. Decor enim hominis est ex ratione, et ideo turpiora sunt peccata carnalia, quibus caro dominatur rationi, quamvis peccata spiritualia sint graviora, quia procedunt ex maiori contemptu. Et similiter peccata quae fiunt ex dolo sunt turpiora, inquantum videntur ex quadam infirmitate procedere, et ex quadam falsitate rationis, cum tamen peccata manifesta quandoque sint ex maiori contemptu. Et ideo adulatio, quasi cum dolo existens videtur esse turpior, sed litigium, quasi ex maiori contemptu procedens, videtur esse gravius. Reply to Objection 2. In human acts, the more grievous is not always the more vile. For the comeliness of a man has its source in his reason: wherefore the sins of the flesh, whereby the flesh enslaves the reason, are viler, although spiritual sins are more grievous, since they proceed from greater contempt. On like manner, sins that are committed through deceit are viler, in so far as they seem to arise from a certain weakness, and from a certain falseness of the reason, although sins that are committed openly proceed sometimes from a greater contempt. Hence flattery, through being accompanied by deceit, seems to be a viler sin; while quarreling, through proceeding from greater contempt, is apparently more grievous.
IIª-IIae q. 116 a. 2 ad 3 Ad tertium dicendum quod, sicut dictum est, verecundia respicit turpitudinem peccati. Unde non semper magis verecundatur homo de graviori peccato, sed de magis turpi peccato. Et inde est quod magis verecundatur homo de adulatione quam de litigio, quamvis litigium sit gravius. Reply to Objection 3. As stated in the objection, shame regards the vileness of a sin; wherefore a man is not always more ashamed of a more grievous sin, but of a viler sin. Hence it is that a man is more ashamed of flattery than of quarreling, although quarreling is more grievous.

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