Authors/Thomas Aquinas/Summa Theologiae/Part IIa/Q65

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Q64 Q66



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Iª-IIae q. 65 pr. Deinde considerandum est de connexione virtutum. Et circa hoc quaeruntur quinque. Primo, utrum virtutes morales sint ad invicem connexae. Secundo, utrum virtutes morales possint esse sine caritate. Tertio, utrum caritas possit esse sine eis. Quarto, utrum fides et spes possint esse sine caritate. Quinto, utrum caritas possit esse sine eis. Question 65. The connection of virtues Are the moral virtues connected with one another? Can the moral virtues be without charity? Can charity be without them? Can faith and hope be without charity? Can charity be without them?
Iª-IIae q. 65 a. 1 arg. 1 Ad primum sic proceditur. Videtur quod virtutes morales non sint ex necessitate connexae. Virtutes enim morales quandoque causantur ex exercitio actuum, ut probatur in II Ethic. Sed homo potest exercitari in actibus alicuius virtutis sine hoc quod exercitetur in actibus alterius virtutis. Ergo una virtus moralis potest haberi sine altera. Objection 1. It would seem that the moral virtues are not connected with one another. Because moral virtues are sometimes caused by the exercise of acts, as is proved in Ethic. ii, 1,2. But man can exercise himself in the acts of one virtue, without exercising himself in the acts of some other virtue. Therefore it is possible to have one moral virtue without another.
Iª-IIae q. 65 a. 1 arg. 2 Praeterea, magnificentia et magnanimitas sunt quaedam virtutes morales. Sed aliquis potest habere alias virtutes morales, sine hoc quod habeat magnificentiam et magnanimitatem, dicit enim philosophus, in IV Ethic., quod inops non potest esse magnificus, qui tamen potest habere quasdam alias virtutes; et quod ille qui parvis est dignus, et his se dignificat, temperatus est, magnanimus autem non est. Ergo virtutes morales non sunt connexae. Objection 2. Further, magnificence and magnanimity are moral virtues. Now a man may have other moral virtues without having magnificence or magnanimity: for the Philosopher says (Ethic. iv, 2,3) that "a poor man cannot be magnificent," and yet he may have other virtues; and (Ethic. iv) that "he who is worthy of small things, and so accounts his worth, is modest, but not magnanimous." Therefore the moral virtues are not connected with one another.
Iª-IIae q. 65 a. 1 arg. 3 Praeterea, sicut virtutes morales perficiunt partem appetitivam animae, ita virtutes intellectuales perficiunt partem intellectivam. Sed virtutes intellectuales non sunt connexae, potest enim aliquis habere unam scientiam, sine hoc quod habeat aliam. Ergo etiam neque virtutes morales sunt connexae. Objection 3. Further, as the moral virtues perfect the appetitive part of the soul, so do the intellectual virtues perfect the intellective part. But the intellectual virtues are not mutually connected: since we may have one science, without having another. Neither, therefore, are the moral virtues connected with one another.
Iª-IIae q. 65 a. 1 arg. 4 Praeterea, si virtutes morales sint connexae, hoc non est nisi quia connectuntur in prudentia. Sed hoc non sufficit ad connexionem virtutum moralium. Videtur enim quod aliquis possit esse prudens circa agibilia quae pertinent ad unam virtutem, sine hoc quod sit prudens in his quae pertinent ad aliam, sicut etiam aliquis potest habere artem circa quaedam factibilia, sine hoc quod habeat artem circa alia. Prudentia autem est recta ratio agibilium. Ergo non est necessarium virtutes morales esse connexas. Objection 4. Further, if the moral virtues are mutually connected, this can only be because they are united together in prudence. But this does not suffice to connect the moral virtues together. For, seemingly, one may be prudent about things to be done in relation to one virtue, without being prudent in those that concern another virtue: even as one may have the art of making certain things, without the art of making certain others. Now prudence is right reason about things to be done. Therefore the moral virtues are not necessarily connected with one another.
Iª-IIae q. 65 a. 1 s. c. Sed contra est quod Ambrosius dicit, super Lucam, connexae sibi sunt, concatenataeque virtutes, ut qui unam habet, plures habere videatur. Augustinus etiam dicit, in VI de Trin., quod virtutes quae sunt in animo humano, nullo modo separantur ab invicem. Et Gregorius dicit, XXII Moral., quod una virtus sine aliis aut omnino nulla est, aut imperfecta. Et Tullius dicit, in II de Tuscul. quaest., si unam virtutem confessus es te non habere, nullam necesse est te habiturum. On the contrary, Ambrose says on Luke 6:20: "The virtues are connected and linked together, so that whoever has one, is seen to have several": and Augustine says (De Trin. vi, 4) that "the virtues that reside in the human mind are quite inseparable from one another": and Gregory says (Moral. xxii, 1) that "one virtue without the other is either of no account whatever, or very imperfect": and Cicero says (Quaest. Tusc. ii): "If you confess to not having one particular virtue, it must needs be that you have none at all."
Iª-IIae q. 65 a. 1 co. Respondeo dicendum quod virtus moralis potest accipi vel perfecta vel imperfecta. Imperfecta quidem moralis virtus, ut temperantia vel fortitudo, nihil aliud est quam aliqua inclinatio in nobis existens ad opus aliquod de genere bonorum faciendum, sive talis inclinatio sit in nobis a natura, sive ex assuetudine. Et hoc modo accipiendo virtutes morales, non sunt connexae, videmus enim aliquem ex naturali complexione, vel ex aliqua consuetudine, esse promptum ad opera liberalitatis, qui tamen non est promptus ad opera castitatis. Perfecta autem virtus moralis est habitus inclinans in bonum opus bene agendum. Et sic accipiendo virtutes morales, dicendum est eas connexas esse; ut fere ab omnibus ponitur. Cuius ratio duplex assignatur, secundum quod diversimode aliqui virtutes cardinales distinguunt. Ut enim dictum est, quidam distinguunt eas secundum quasdam generales conditiones virtutum, utpote quod discretio pertineat ad prudentiam, rectitudo ad iustitiam, moderantia ad temperantiam, firmitas animi ad fortitudinem, in quacumque materia ista considerentur. Et secundum hoc, manifeste apparet ratio connexionis, non enim firmitas habet laudem virtutis, si sit sine moderatione, vel rectitudine, aut discretione; et eadem ratio est de aliis. Et hanc rationem connexionis assignat Gregorius, XXII Moral., dicens quod virtutes, si sint disiunctae, non possunt esse perfectae, secundum rationem virtutis, quia nec prudentia vera est quae iusta, temperans et fortis non est; et idem subdit de aliis virtutibus. Et similem rationem assignat Augustinus, in VI de Trin. Alii vero distinguunt praedictas virtutes secundum materias. Et secundum hoc assignatur ratio connexionis ab Aristotele, in VI Ethic. Quia sicut supra dictum est, nulla virtus moralis potest sine prudentia haberi, eo quod proprium virtutis moralis est facere electionem rectam, cum sit habitus electivus; ad rectam autem electionem non solum sufficit inclinatio in debitum finem, quod est directe per habitum virtutis moralis; sed etiam quod aliquis directe eligat ea quae sunt ad finem, quod fit per prudentiam, quae est consiliativa et iudicativa et praeceptiva eorum quae sunt ad finem. Similiter etiam prudentia non potest haberi nisi habeantur virtutes morales, cum prudentia sit recta ratio agibilium, quae, sicut ex principiis, procedit ex finibus agibilium, ad quos aliquis recte se habet per virtutes morales. Unde sicut scientia speculativa non potest haberi sine intellectu principiorum, ita nec prudentia sine virtutibus moralibus. Ex quo manifeste sequitur virtutes morales esse connexas. I answer that, Moral virtue may be considered either as perfect or as imperfect. An imperfect moral virtue, temperance for instance, or fortitude, is nothing but an inclination in us to do some kind of good deed, whether such inclination be in us by nature or by habituation. If we take the moral virtues in this way, they are not connected: since we find men who, by natural temperament or by being accustomed, are prompt in doing deeds of liberality, but are not prompt in doing deeds of chastity. But the perfect moral virtue is a habit that inclines us to do a good deed well; and if we take moral virtues in this way, we must say that they are connected, as nearly as all are agreed in saying. For this two reasons are given, corresponding to the different ways of assigning the distinction of the cardinal virtues. For, as we stated above (61, A3,4), some distinguish them according to certain general properties of the virtues: for instance, by saying that discretion belongs to prudence, rectitude to justice, moderation to temperance, and strength of mind to fortitude, in whatever matter we consider these properties to be. In this way the reason for the connection is evident: for strength of mind is not commended as virtuous, if it be without moderation or rectitude or discretion: and so forth. This, too, is the reason assigned for the connection by Gregory, who says (Moral. xxii, 1) that "a virtue cannot be perfect" as a virtue, "if isolated from the others: for there can be no true prudence without temperance, justice and fortitude": and he continues to speak in like manner of the other virtues (cf. 61, 4, Objection 1). Augustine also gives the same reason (De Trin. vi, 4). Others, however, differentiate these virtues in respect of their matters, and it is in this way that Aristotle assigns the reason for their connection (Ethic. vi, 13). Because, as stated above (Question 58, Article 4), no moral virtue can be without prudence; since it is proper to moral virtue to make a right choice, for it is an elective habit. Now right choice requires not only the inclination to a due end, which inclination is the direct outcome of moral virtue, but also correct choice of things conducive to the end, which choice is made by prudence, that counsels, judges, and commands in those things that are directed to the end. In like manner one cannot have prudence unless one has the moral virtues: since prudence is "right reason about things to be done," and the starting point of reason is the end of the thing to be done, to which end man is rightly disposed by moral virtue. Hence, just as we cannot have speculative science unless we have the understanding of the principles, so neither can we have prudence without the moral virtues: and from this it follows clearly that the moral virtues are connected with one another.
Iª-IIae q. 65 a. 1 ad 1 Ad primum ergo dicendum quod virtutum moralium quaedam perficiunt hominem secundum communem statum, scilicet quantum ad ea quae communiter in omni vita hominum occurrunt agenda. Unde oportet quod homo simul exercitetur circa materias omnium virtutum moralium. Et si quidem circa omnes exercitetur bene operando, acquiret habitus omnium virtutum moralium. Si autem exercitetur bene operando circa unam materiam, non autem circa aliam, puta bene se habendo circa iras, non autem circa concupiscentias; acquiret quidem habitum aliquem ad refrenandum iras, qui tamen non habebit rationem virtutis, propter defectum prudentiae, quae circa concupiscentias corrumpitur. Sicut etiam naturales inclinationes non habent perfectam rationem virtutis, si prudentia desit. Quaedam vero virtutes morales sunt quae perficiunt hominem secundum aliquem eminentem statum, sicut magnificentia, et magnanimitas. Et quia exercitium circa materias harum virtutum non occurrit unicuique communiter, potest aliquis habere alias virtutes morales, sine hoc quod habitus harum virtutum habeat actu, loquendo de virtutibus acquisitis. Sed tamen, acquisitis aliis virtutibus, habet istas virtutes in potentia propinqua. Cum enim aliquis per exercitium adeptus est liberalitatem circa mediocres donationes et sumptus, si superveniat ei abundantia pecuniarum, modico exercitio acquiret magnificentiae habitum, sicut geometer modico studio acquirit scientiam alicuius conclusionis quam nunquam consideravit. Illud autem habere dicimur, quod in promptu est ut habeamus; secundum illud philosophi, in II Physic., quod parum deest, quasi nihil deesse videtur. Reply to Objection 1. Some moral virtues perfect man as regards his general state, in other words, with regard to those things which have to be done in every kind of human life. Hence man needs to exercise himself at the same time in the matters of all moral virtues. And if he exercise himself, by good deeds, in all such matters, he will acquire the habits of all the moral virtues. But if he exercise himself by good deeds in regard to one matter, but not in regard to another, for instance, by behaving well in matters of anger, but not in matters of concupiscence; he will indeed acquire a certain habit of restraining his anger; but this habit will lack the nature of virtue, through the absence of prudence, which is wanting in matters of concupiscence. In the same way, natural inclinations fail to have the complete character of virtue, if prudence be lacking. But there are some moral virtues which perfect man with regard to some eminent state, such as magnificence and magnanimity; and since it does not happen to all in common to be exercised in the matter of such virtues, it is possible for a man to have the other moral virtues, without actually having the habits of these virtues--provided we speak of acquired virtue. Nevertheless, when once a man has acquired those other virtues he possesses these in proximate potentiality. Because when, by practice, a man has acquired liberality in small gifts and expenditure, if he were to come in for a large sum of money, he would acquire the habit of magnificence with but little practice: even as a geometrician, by dint of little study, acquires scientific knowledge about some conclusion which had never been presented to his mind before. Now we speak of having a thing when we are on the point of having it, according to the saying of the Philosopher (Phys. ii, text. 56): "That which is scarcely lacking is not lacking at all."
Iª-IIae q. 65 a. 1 ad 2 Et per hoc patet responsio ad secundum. This suffices for the Reply to the Second Objection.
Iª-IIae q. 65 a. 1 ad 3 Ad tertium dicendum quod virtutes intellectuales sunt circa diversas materias ad invicem non ordinatas, sicut patet in diversis scientiis et artibus. Et ideo non invenitur in eis connexio quae invenitur in virtutibus moralibus existentibus circa passiones et operationes, quae manifeste habent ordinem ad invicem. Nam omnes passiones, a quibusdam primis procedentes, scilicet amore et odio, ad quasdam alias terminantur, scilicet delectationem et tristitiam. Et similiter omnes operationes quae sunt virtutis moralis materia, habent ordinem ad invicem, et etiam ad passiones. Et ideo tota materia moralium virtutum sub una ratione prudentiae cadit. Habent tamen omnia intelligibilia ordinem ad prima principia. Et secundum hoc, omnes virtutes intellectuales dependent ab intellectu principiorum; sicut prudentia a virtutibus moralibus, ut dictum est. Principia autem universalia, quorum est intellectus principiorum, non dependent a conclusionibus, de quibus sunt reliquae intellectuales virtutes; sicut morales dependent a prudentia, eo quod appetitus movet quodammodo rationem, et ratio appetitum, ut supra dictum est. Reply to Objection 3. The intellectual virtues are about divers matters having no relation to one another, as is clearly the case with the various sciences and arts. Hence we do not observe in them the connection that is to be found among the moral virtues, which are about passions and operations, that are clearly related to one another. For all the passions have their rise in certain initial passions, viz. love and hatred, and terminate in certain others, viz. pleasure and sorrow. In like manner all the operations that are the matter of moral virtue are related to one another, and to the passions. Hence the whole matter of moral virtues falls under the one rule of prudence. Nevertheless, all intelligible things are related to first principles. And in this way, all the intellectual virtues depend on the understanding of principles; even as prudence depends on the moral virtues, as stated. On the other hand, the universal principles which are the object of the virtue of understanding of principles, do not depend on the conclusions, which are the objects of the other intellectual virtues, as do the moral virtues depend on prudence, because the appetite, in a fashion, moves the reason, and the reason the appetite, as stated above (9, 1; 58, 5, ad 1).
Iª-IIae q. 65 a. 1 ad 4 Ad quartum dicendum quod ea ad quae inclinant virtutes morales, se habent ad prudentiam sicut principia, non autem factibilia se habent ad artem sicut principia, sed solum sicut materia. Manifestum est autem quod, etsi ratio possit esse recta in una parte materiae, et non in alia; nullo tamen modo potest dici ratio recta, si sit defectus cuiuscumque principii. Sicut si quis erraret circa hoc principium, omne totum est maius sua parte, non posset habere scientiam geometricam, quia oporteret multum recedere a veritate in sequentibus. Et praeterea, agibilia sunt ordinata ad invicem; non autem factibilia, ut dictum est. Et ideo defectus prudentiae circa unam partem agibilium, induceret defectum etiam circa alia agibilia. Quod in factibilibus non contingit. Reply to Objection 4. Those things to which the moral virtues incline, are as the principles of prudence: whereas the products of art are not the principles, but the matter of art. Now it is evident that, though reason may be right in one part of the matter, and not in another, yet in no way can it be called right reason, if it be deficient in any principle whatever. Thus, if a man be wrong about the principle, "A whole is greater than its part," he cannot acquire the science of geometry, because he must necessarily wander from the truth in his conclusion. Moreover, things "done" are related to one another, but not things "made," as stated above (ad 3). Consequently the lack of prudence in one department of things to be done, would result in a deficiency affecting other things to be done: whereas this does not occur in things to be made.
Iª-IIae q. 65 a. 2 arg. 1 Ad secundum sic proceditur. Videtur quod virtutes morales possint esse sine caritate. Dicitur enim in libro sententiarum prosperi, quod omnis virtus praeter caritatem, potest esse communis bonis et malis. Sed caritas non potest esse nisi in bonis, ut dicitur ibidem. Ergo aliae virtutes possunt haberi sine caritate. Objection 1. It would seem that moral virtues can be without charity. For it is stated in the Liber Sentent. Prosperi vii, that "every virtue save charity may be common to the good and bad." But "charity can be in none except the good," as stated in the same book. Therefore the other virtues can be had without charity.
Iª-IIae q. 65 a. 2 arg. 2 Praeterea, virtutes morales possunt acquiri ex actibus humanis, ut dicitur in II Ethic. Sed caritas non habetur nisi ex infusione; secundum illud Rom. V, caritas Dei diffusa est in cordibus nostris per spiritum sanctum, qui datus est nobis. Ergo aliae virtutes possunt haberi sine caritate. Objection 2. Further, moral virtues can be acquired by means of human acts, as stated in Ethic. ii, 1,2, whereas charity cannot be had otherwise than by infusion, according to Romans 5:5: "The charity of God is poured forth in our hearts by the Holy Ghost Who is given to us." Therefore it is possible to have the other virtues without charity.
Iª-IIae q. 65 a. 2 arg. 3 Praeterea, virtutes morales connectuntur ad invicem, inquantum dependent a prudentia. Sed caritas non dependet a prudentia; immo prudentiam excedit, secundum illud Ephes. III, supereminentem scientiae caritatem Christi. Ergo virtutes morales non connectuntur caritati, sed sine ea esse possunt. Objection 3. Further, the moral virtues are connected together, through depending on prudence. But charity does not depend on prudence; indeed, it surpasses prudence, according to Ephesians 3:19: "The charity of Christ, which surpasseth all knowledge." Therefore the moral virtues are not connected with charity, and can be without it.
Iª-IIae q. 65 a. 2 s. c. Sed contra est quod dicitur I Ioan. III, qui non diligit, manet in morte. Sed per virtutes perficitur vita spiritualis, ipsae enim sunt quibus recte vivitur, ut Augustinus dicit, in II de Lib. Arbit. Ergo non possunt esse sine dilectione caritatis. On the contrary, It is written (1 John 3:14): "He that loveth not, abideth in death." Now the spiritual life is perfected by the virtues, since it is "by them" that "we lead a good life," as Augustine states (De Lib. Arb. ii, 17,19). Therefore they cannot be without the love of charity.
Iª-IIae q. 65 a. 2 co. Respondeo dicendum quod, sicut supra dictum est, virtutes morales prout sunt operativae boni in ordine ad finem qui non excedit facultatem naturalem hominis, possunt per opera humana acquiri. Et sic acquisitae sine caritate esse possunt, sicut fuerunt in multis gentilibus. Secundum autem quod sunt operativae boni in ordine ad ultimum finem supernaturalem, sic perfecte et vere habent rationem virtutis; et non possunt humanis actibus acquiri, sed infunduntur a Deo. Et huiusmodi virtutes morales sine caritate esse non possunt. Dictum est enim supra quod aliae virtutes morales non possunt esse sine prudentia; prudentia autem non potest esse sine virtutibus moralibus, inquantum virtutes morales faciunt bene se habere ad quosdam fines, ex quibus procedit ratio prudentiae. Ad rectam autem rationem prudentiae multo magis requiritur quod homo bene se habeat circa ultimum finem, quod fit per caritatem, quam circa alios fines, quod fit per virtutes morales, sicut ratio recta in speculativis maxime indiget primo principio indemonstrabili, quod est contradictoria non simul esse vera. Unde manifestum fit quod nec prudentia infusa potest esse sine caritate; nec aliae virtutes morales consequenter, quae sine prudentia esse non possunt. Patet igitur ex dictis quod solae virtutes infusae sunt perfectae, et simpliciter dicendae virtutes, quia bene ordinant hominem ad finem ultimum simpliciter. Aliae vero virtutes, scilicet acquisitae, sunt secundum quid virtutes, non autem simpliciter, ordinant enim hominem bene respectu finis ultimi in aliquo genere, non autem respectu finis ultimi simpliciter. Unde Rom. XIV super illud, omne quod non est ex fide, peccatum est, dicit Glossa Augustini, ubi deest agnitio veritatis, falsa est virtus etiam in bonis moribus. I answer that, As stated above (Question 63, Article 2), it is possible by means of human works to acquire moral virtues, in so far as they produce good works that are directed to an end not surpassing the natural power of man: and when they are acquired thus, they can be without charity, even as they were in many of the Gentiles. But in so far as they produce good works in proportion to a supernatural last end, thus they have the character of virtue, truly and perfectly; and cannot be acquired by human acts, but are infused by God. Such like moral virtues cannot be without charity. For it has been stated above (1; 58, A4,5) that the other moral virtues cannot be without prudence; and that prudence cannot be without the moral virtues, because these latter make man well disposed to certain ends, which are the starting-point of the procedure of prudence. Now for prudence to proceed aright, it is much more necessary that man be well disposed towards his ultimate end, which is the effect of charity, than that he be well disposed in respect of other ends, which is the effect of moral virtue: just as in speculative matters right reason has greatest need of the first indemonstrable principle, that "contradictories cannot both be true at the same time." It is therefore evident that neither can infused prudence be without charity; nor, consequently, the other moral virtues, since they cannot be without prudence. It is therefore clear from what has been said that only the infused virtues are perfect, and deserve to be called virtues simply: since they direct man well to the ultimate end. But the other virtues, those, namely, that are acquired, are virtues in a restricted sense, but not simply: for they direct man well in respect of the last end in some particular genus of action, but not in respect of the last end simply. Hence a gloss of Augustine [Cf. Lib. Sentent. Prosperi cvi.] on the words, "All that is not of faith is sin" (Romans 14:23), says: "He that fails to acknowledge the truth, has no true virtue, even if his conduct be good."
Iª-IIae q. 65 a. 2 ad 1 Ad primum ergo dicendum quod virtutes ibi accipiuntur secundum imperfectam rationem virtutis. Alioquin, si virtus moralis secundum perfectam rationem virtutis accipiatur, bonum facit habentem; et per consequens in malis esse non potest. Reply to Objection 1. Virtue, in the words quoted, denotes imperfect virtue. Else if we take moral virtue in its perfect state, "it makes its possessor good," and consequently cannot be in the wicked.
Iª-IIae q. 65 a. 2 ad 2 Ad secundum dicendum quod ratio illa procedit de virtutibus moralibus acquisitis. Reply to Objection 2. This argument holds good of virtue in the sense of acquired virtue.
Iª-IIae q. 65 a. 2 ad 3 Ad tertium dicendum quod, etsi caritas excedat scientiam et prudentiam, tamen prudentia dependet a caritate, ut dictum est. Et per consequens, omnes virtutes morales infusae. Reply to Objection 3. Though charity surpasses science and prudence, yet prudence depends on charity, as stated: and consequently so do all the infused moral virtues.
Iª-IIae q. 65 a. 3 arg. 1 Ad tertium sic proceditur. Videtur quod caritas sine aliis virtutibus moralibus haberi possit. Ad id enim ad quod sufficit unum, indebitum est quod plura ordinentur. Sed sola caritas sufficit ad omnia opera virtutis implenda, ut patet per id quod dicitur I ad Cor. XIII, caritas patiens est, benigna est, et cetera. Ergo videtur quod, habita caritate, aliae virtutes superfluerent. Objection 1. It would seem possible to have charity without the moral virtues. For when one thing suffices for a certain purpose, it is superfluous to employ others. Now charity alone suffices for the fulfilment of all the works of virtue, as is clear from 1 Corinthians 13:4, seqq.: "Charity is patient, is kind," etc. Therefore it seems that if one has charity, other virtues are superfluous.
Iª-IIae q. 65 a. 3 arg. 2 Praeterea, qui habet habitum virtutis, de facili operatur ea quae sunt virtutis, et ei secundum se placent, unde et signum habitus est delectatio quae fit in opere, ut dicitur in II Ethic. Sed multi habent caritatem, absque peccato mortali existentes, qui tamen difficultatem in operibus virtutum patiuntur, neque eis secundum se placent, sed solum secundum quod referuntur ad caritatem. Ergo multi habent caritatem, qui non habent alias virtutes. Objection 2. Further, he that has a habit of virtue easily performs the works of that virtue, and those works are pleasing to him for their own sake: hence "pleasure taken in a work is a sign of habit" (Ethic. ii, 3). Now many have charity, being free from mortal sin, and yet they find it difficult to do works of virtue; nor are these works pleasing to them for their own sake, but only for the sake of charity. Therefore many have charity without the other virtues.
Iª-IIae q. 65 a. 3 arg. 3 Praeterea, caritas in omnibus sanctis invenitur. Sed quidam sunt sancti qui tamen aliquibus virtutibus carent, dicit enim Beda quod sancti magis humiliantur de virtutibus quas non habent, quam de virtutibus quas habent, glorientur. Ergo non est necessarium quod qui habet caritatem, omnes virtutes morales habeat. Objection 3. Further, charity is to be found in every saint: and yet there are some saints who are without certain virtues. For Bede says (on Luke 17:10) that the saints are more humbled on account of their not having certain virtues, than rejoiced at the virtues they have. Therefore, if a man has charity, it does not follow of necessity that he has all the moral virtues.
Iª-IIae q. 65 a. 3 s. c. Sed contra est quod per caritatem tota lex impletur, dicitur enim Rom. XIII, qui diligit proximum, legem implevit. Sed tota lex impleri non potest nisi per omnes virtutes morales, quia lex praecipit de omnibus actibus virtutum, ut dicitur in V Ethic. Ergo qui habet caritatem, habet omnes virtutes morales. Augustinus etiam dicit, in quadam epistola, quod caritas includit in se omnes virtutes cardinales. On the contrary, The whole Law is fulfilled through charity, for it is written (Romans 13:8): "He that loveth his neighbor, hath fulfilled the Law." Now it is not possible to fulfil the whole Law, without having all the moral virtues: since the law contains precepts about all acts of virtue, as stated in Ethic. v, 1,2. Therefore he that has charity, has all the moral virtues. Moreover, Augustine says in a letter (Epis. clxvii) [Cf. Serm. xxxix and xlvi de Temp.] that charity contains all the cardinal virtues.
Iª-IIae q. 65 a. 3 co. Respondeo dicendum quod cum caritate simul infunduntur omnes virtutes morales. Cuius ratio est quia Deus non minus perfecte operatur in operibus gratiae, quam in operibus naturae. Sic autem videmus in operibus naturae, quod non invenitur principium aliquorum operum in aliqua re, quin inveniantur in ea quae sunt necessaria ad huiusmodi opera perficienda, sicut in animalibus inveniuntur organa quibus perfici possunt opera ad quae peragenda anima habet potestatem. Manifestum est autem quod caritas, inquantum ordinat hominem ad finem ultimum, est principium omnium bonorum operum quae in finem ultimum ordinari possunt. Unde oportet quod cum caritate simul infundantur omnes virtutes morales, quibus homo perficit singula genera bonorum operum. Et sic patet quod virtutes morales infusae non solum habent connexionem propter prudentiam; sed etiam propter caritatem. Et quod qui amittit caritatem per peccatum mortale, amittit omnes virtutes morales infusas. I answer that, All the moral virtues are infused together with charity. The reason for this is that God operates no less perfectly in works of grace than in works of nature. Now, in the works of nature, we find that whenever a thing contains a principle of certain works, it has also whatever is necessary for their execution: thus animals are provided with organs whereby to perform the actions that their souls empower them to do. Now it is evident that charity, inasmuch as it directs man to his last end, is the principle of all the good works that are referable to his last end. Wherefore all the moral virtues must needs be infused together with charity, since it is through them that man performs each different kind of good work. It is therefore clear that the infused moral virtues are connected, not only through prudence, but also on account of charity: and, again, that whoever loses charity through mortal sin, forfeits all the infused moral virtues.
Iª-IIae q. 65 a. 3 ad 1 Ad primum ergo dicendum quod ad hoc quod actus inferioris potentiae sit perfectus, requiritur quod non solum adsit perfectio in superiori potentia, sed etiam in inferiori, si enim principale agens debito modo se haberet, non sequeretur actio perfecta, si instrumentum non esset bene dispositum. Unde oportet ad hoc quod homo bene operetur in his quae sunt ad finem, quod non solum habeat virtutem qua bene se habeat circa finem, sed etiam virtutes quibus bene se habeat circa ea quae sunt ad finem, nam virtus quae est circa finem, se habet ut principalis et motiva respectu earum quae sunt ad finem. Et ideo cum caritate necesse est etiam habere alias virtutes morales. Reply to Objection 1. In order that the act of a lower power be perfect, not only must there be perfection in the higher, but also in the lower power: for if the principal agent were well disposed, perfect action would not follow, if the instrument also were not well disposed. Consequently, in order that man work well in things referred to the end, he needs not only a virtue disposing him well to the end, but also those virtues which dispose him well to whatever is referred to the end: for the virtue which regards the end is the chief and moving principle in respect of those things that are referred to the end. Therefore it is necessary to have the moral virtues together with charity.
Iª-IIae q. 65 a. 3 ad 2 Ad secundum dicendum quod quandoque contingit quod aliquis habens habitum, patitur difficultatem in operando, et per consequens non sentit delectationem et complacentiam in actu, propter aliquod impedimentum extrinsecus superveniens, sicut ille qui habet habitum scientiae, patitur difficultatem in intelligendo, propter somnolentiam vel aliquam infirmitatem. Et similiter habitus moralium virtutum infusarum patiuntur interdum difficultatem in operando, propter aliquas dispositiones contrarias ex praecedentibus actibus relictas. Quae quidem difficultas non ita accidit in virtutibus moralibus acquisitis, quia per exercitium actuum, quo acquiruntur, tolluntur etiam contrariae dispositiones. Reply to Objection 2. It happens sometimes that a man who has a habit, finds it difficult to act in accordance with the habit, and consequently feels no pleasure and complacency in the act, on account of some impediment supervening from without: thus a man who has a habit of science, finds it difficult to understand, through being sleepy or unwell. In like manner sometimes the habits of moral virtue experience difficulty in their works, by reason of certain ordinary dispositions remaining from previous acts. This difficulty does not occur in respect of acquired moral virtue: because the repeated acts by which they are acquired, remove also the contrary dispositions.
Iª-IIae q. 65 a. 3 ad 3 Ad tertium dicendum quod aliqui sancti dicuntur aliquas virtutes non habere, inquantum patiuntur difficultatem in actibus earum, ratione iam dicta; quamvis habitus omnium virtutum habeant. Reply to Objection 3. Certain saints are said not to have certain virtues, in so far as they experience difficulty in the acts of those virtues, for the reason stated; although they have the habits of all the virtues.
Iª-IIae q. 65 a. 4 arg. 1 Ad quartum sic proceditur. Videtur quod fides et spes nunquam sint sine caritate. Cum enim sint virtutes theologicae, digniores esse videntur virtutibus moralibus, etiam infusis. Sed virtutes morales infusae non possunt esse sine caritate. Ergo neque fides et spes. Objection 1. It would seem that faith and hope are never without charity. Because, since they are theological virtues, they seem to be more excellent than even the infused moral virtues. But the infused moral virtues cannot be without charity. Neither therefore can faith and hope be without charity.
Iª-IIae q. 65 a. 4 arg. 2 Praeterea, nullus credit nisi volens, sed caritas est in voluntate ut Augustinus dicit, super Ioan. Sicut perfectio eius, ut supra dictum est. Ergo fides non potest esse sine caritate. Objection 2. Further, "no man believes unwillingly" as Augustine says (Tract. xxvi in Joan.). But charity is in the will as a perfection thereof, as stated above (Question 62, Article 3). Therefore faith cannot be without charity.
Iª-IIae q. 65 a. 4 arg. 3 Praeterea, Augustinus dicit, in Enchirid., quod spes sine amore esse non potest. Amor autem est caritas, de hoc enim amore ibi loquitur. Ergo spes non potest esse sine caritate. Objection 3. Further, Augustine says (Enchiridion viii) that "there can be no hope without love." But love is charity: for it is of this love that he speaks. Therefore hope cannot be without charity.
Iª-IIae q. 65 a. 4 s. c. Sed contra est quod Matth. I, dicitur in Glossa quod fides generat spem, spes vero caritatem. Sed generans est prius generato, et potest esse sine eo. Ergo fides potest esse sine spe; et spes sine caritate. On the contrary, A gloss on Matthew 1:2 says that "faith begets hope, and hope, charity." Now the begetter precedes the begotten, and can be without it. Therefore faith can be without hope; and hope, without charity.
Iª-IIae q. 65 a. 4 co. Respondeo dicendum quod fides et spes, sicut et virtutes morales, dupliciter considerari possunt. Uno modo, secundum inchoationem quandam; alio modo, secundum perfectum esse virtutis. Cum enim virtus ordinetur ad bonum opus agendum, virtus quidem perfecta dicitur ex hoc quod potest in opus perfecte bonum, quod quidem est dum non solum bonum est quod fit, sed etiam bene fit. Alioquin, si bonum sit quod fit, non autem bene fiat, non erit perfecte bonum, unde nec habitus qui est talis operis principium, habebit perfecte rationem virtutis. Sicut si aliquis operetur iusta, bonum quidem facit, sed non erit opus perfectae virtutis, nisi hoc bene faciat, idest secundum electionem rectam, quod est per prudentiam, et ideo iustitia sine prudentia non potest esse virtus perfecta. Sic igitur fides et spes sine caritate possunt quidem aliqualiter esse, perfectae autem virtutis rationem sine caritate non habent. Cum enim fidei opus sit credere Deo; credere autem sit alicui propria voluntate assentire, si non debito modo velit, non erit fidei opus perfectum. Quod autem debito modo velit, hoc est per caritatem, quae perficit voluntatem, omnis enim rectus motus voluntatis ex recto amore procedit, ut Augustinus dicit, in XIV de Civ. Dei. Sic igitur fides est quidem sine caritate, sed non perfecta virtus, sicut temperantia vel fortitudo sine prudentia. Et similiter dicendum est de spe. Nam actus spei est expectare futuram beatitudinem a Deo. Qui quidem actus perfectus est, si fiat ex meritis quae quis habet, quod non potest esse sine caritate. Si autem hoc expectet ex meritis quae nondum habet, sed proponit in futurum acquirere, erit actus imperfectus, et hoc potest esse sine caritate. Et ideo fides et spes possunt esse sine caritate, sed sine caritate, proprie loquendo, virtutes non sunt; nam ad rationem virtutis pertinet ut non solum secundum ipsam aliquod bonum operemur, sed etiam bene, ut dicitur in II Ethic. I answer that, Faith and hope, like the moral virtues, can be considered in two ways; first in an inchoate state; secondly, as complete virtues. For since virtue is directed to the doing of good works, perfect virtue is that which gives the faculty of doing a perfectly good work, and this consists in not only doing what is good, but also in doing it well. Else, if what is done is good, but not well done, it will not be perfectly good; wherefore neither will the habit that is the principle of such an act, have the perfect character of virtue. For instance, if a man do what is just, what he does is good: but it will not be the work of a perfect virtue unless he do it well, i.e. by choosing rightly, which is the result of prudence; for which reason justice cannot be a perfect virtue without prudence. Accordingly faith and hope can exist indeed in a fashion without charity: but they have not the perfect character of virtue without charity. For, since the act of faith is to believe in God; and since to believe is to assent to someone of one's own free will: to will not as one ought, will not be a perfect act of faith. To will as one ought is the outcome of charity which perfects the will: since every right movement of the will proceeds from a right love, as Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xiv, 9). Hence faith may be without charity, but not as a perfect virtue: just as temperance and fortitude can be without prudence. The same applies to hope. Because the act of hope consists in looking to God for future bliss. This act is perfect, if it is based on the merits which we have; and this cannot be without charity. But to expect future bliss through merits which one has not yet, but which one proposes to acquire at some future time, will be an imperfect act; and this is possible without charity. Consequently, faith and hope can be without charity; yet, without charity, they are not virtues properly so-called; because the nature of virtue requires that by it, we should not only do what is good, but also that we should do it well (Ethic. ii, 6).
Iª-IIae q. 65 a. 4 ad 1 Ad primum ergo dicendum quod virtutes morales dependent a prudentia, prudentia autem infusa nec rationem prudentiae habere potest absque caritate, utpote deficiente debita habitudine ad primum principium, quod est ultimus finis. Fides autem et spes, secundum proprias rationes, nec a prudentia nec a caritate dependent. Et ideo sine caritate esse possunt; licet non sint virtutes sine caritate, ut dictum est. Reply to Objection 1. Moral virtue depends on prudence: and not even infused prudence has the character of prudence without charity; for this involves the absence of due order to the first principle, viz. the ultimate end. On the other hand faith and hope, as such, do not depend either on prudence or charity; so that they can be without charity, although they are not virtues without charity, as stated.
Iª-IIae q. 65 a. 4 ad 2 Ad secundum dicendum quod ratio illa procedit de fide quae habet perfectam rationem virtutis. Reply to Objection 2. This argument is true of faith considered as a perfect virtue.
Iª-IIae q. 65 a. 4 ad 3 Ad tertium dicendum quod Augustinus loquitur ibi de spe, secundum quod aliquis expectat futuram beatitudinem per merita quae iam habet, quod non est sine caritate. Reply to Objection 3. Augustine is speaking here of that hope whereby we look to gain future bliss through merits which we have already; and this is not without charity.
Iª-IIae q. 65 a. 5 arg. 1 Ad quintum sic proceditur. Videtur quod caritas possit esse sine fide et spe. Caritas enim est amor Dei. Sed Deus potest a nobis amari naturaliter, etiam non praesupposita fide, vel spe futurae beatitudinis. Ergo caritas potest esse sine fide et spe. Objection 1. It would seem that charity can be without faith and hope. For charity is the love of God. But it is possible for us to love God naturally, without already having faith, or hope in future bliss. Therefore charity can be without faith and hope.
Iª-IIae q. 65 a. 5 arg. 2 Praeterea, caritas est radix omnium virtutum; secundum illud Ephes. III, in caritate radicati et fundati. Sed radix aliquando est sine ramis. Ergo caritas potest esse aliquando sine fide et spe et aliis virtutibus. Objection 2. Further, charity is the root of all the virtues, according to Ephesians 3:17: "Rooted and founded in charity." Now the root is sometimes without branches. Therefore charity can sometimes be without faith and hope, and the other virtues.
Iª-IIae q. 65 a. 5 arg. 3 Praeterea, in Christo fuit perfecta caritas. Ipse tamen non habuit fidem et spem, quia fuit perfectus comprehensor, ut infra dicetur. Ergo caritas potest esse sine fide et spe. Objection 3. Further, there was perfect charity in Christ. And yet He had neither faith nor hope: because He was a perfect comprehensor, as we shall explain further on (TP, 7, A3,4). Therefore charity can be without faith and hope.
Iª-IIae q. 65 a. 5 s. c. Sed contra est quod apostolus dicit, Heb. XI, sine fide impossibile est placere Deo; quod maxime pertinet ad caritatem, ut patet; secundum illud Proverb. VIII, ego diligentes me diligo. Spes etiam est quae introducit ad caritatem, ut supra dictum est. Ergo caritas non potest haberi sine fide et spe. On the contrary, The Apostle says (Hebrews 11:6): "Without faith it is impossible to please God"; and this evidently belongs most to charity, according to Proverbs 8:17: "I love them that love me." Again, it is by hope that we are brought to charity, as stated above (Question 62, Article 4). Therefore it is not possible to have charity without faith and hope.
Iª-IIae q. 65 a. 5 co. Respondeo dicendum quod caritas non solum significat amorem Dei, sed etiam amicitiam quandam ad ipsum; quae quidem super amorem addit mutuam redamationem cum quadam mutua communicatione, ut dicitur in VIII Ethic. Et quod hoc ad caritatem pertineat, patet per id quod dicitur I Ioan. IV, qui manet in caritate, in Deo manet, et Deus in eo. Et I ad Cor. I dicitur, fidelis Deus, per quem vocati estis in societatem filii eius. Haec autem societas hominis ad Deum, quae est quaedam familiaris conversatio cum ipso, inchoatur quidem hic in praesenti per gratiam, perficietur autem in futuro per gloriam, quorum utrumque fide et spe tenetur. Unde sicut aliquis non posset cum aliquo amicitiam habere, si discrederet vel desperaret se posse habere aliquam societatem vel familiarem conversationem cum ipso; ita aliquis non potest habere amicitiam ad Deum, quae est caritas, nisi fidem habeat, per quam credat huiusmodi societatem et conversationem hominis cum Deo, et speret se ad hanc societatem pertinere. Et sic caritas sine fide et spe nullo modo esse potest. I answer that, Charity signifies not only the love of God, but also a certain friendship with Him; which implies, besides love, a certain mutual return of love, together with mutual communion, as stated in Ethic. viii, 2. That this belongs to charity is evident from 1 John 4:16: "He that abideth in charity, abideth in God, and God in him," and from 1 Corinthians 1:9, where it is written: "God is faithful, by Whom you are called unto the fellowship of His Son." Now this fellowship of man with God, which consists in a certain familiar colloquy with Him, is begun here, in this life, by grace, but will be perfected in the future life, by glory; each of which things we hold by faith and hope. Wherefore just as friendship with a person would be impossible, if one disbelieved in, or despaired of, the possibility of their fellowship or familiar colloquy; so too, friendship with God, which is charity, is impossible without faith, so as to believe in this fellowship and colloquy with God, and to hope to attain to this fellowship. Therefore charity is quite impossible without faith and hope.
Iª-IIae q. 65 a. 5 ad 1 Ad primum ergo dicendum quod caritas non est qualiscumque amor Dei, sed amor Dei quo diligitur ut beatitudinis obiectum, ad quod ordinamur per fidem et spem. Reply to Objection 1. Charity is not any kind of love of God, but that love of God, by which He is loved as the object of bliss, to which object we are directed by faith and hope.
Iª-IIae q. 65 a. 5 ad 2 Ad secundum dicendum quod caritas est radix fidei et spei, inquantum dat eis perfectionem virtutis. Sed fides et spes, secundum rationem propriam, praesupponuntur ad caritatem, ut supra dictum est. Et sic caritas sine eis esse non potest. Reply to Objection 2. Charity is the root of faith and hope, in so far as it gives them the perfection of virtue. But faith and hope as such are the precursors of charity, as stated above (Question 62, Article 4), and so charity is impossible without them.
Iª-IIae q. 65 a. 5 ad 3 Ad tertium dicendum quod Christo defuit fides et spes, propter id quod est imperfectionis in eis. Sed loco fidei, habuit apertam visionem; et loco spei, plenam comprehensionem. Et sic fuit perfecta caritas in eo. Reply to Objection 3. In Christ there was neither faith nor hope, on account of their implying an imperfection. But instead of faith, He had manifest vision, and instead of hope, full comprehension [See above, 4, 3]: so that in Him was perfect charity.

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