Authors/Thomas Aquinas/Summa Theologiae/Part IIa/Q63

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Q62 Q64



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Iª-IIae q. 63 pr. Deinde considerandum est de causa virtutum. Et circa hoc quaeruntur quatuor. Primo, utrum virtus sit in nobis a natura. Secundo, utrum aliqua virtus causetur in nobis ex assuetudine operum. Tertio, utrum aliquae virtutes morales sint in nobis per infusionem. Quarto, utrum virtus quam acquirimus ex assuetudine operum, sit eiusdem speciei cum virtute infusa. Question 63. The cause of virtues Is virtue in us by nature? Is any virtue caused in us by habituation? Are any moral virtues in us by infusion? Is virtue acquired by habituation, of the same species as infused virtue?
Iª-IIae q. 63 a. 1 arg. 1 Ad primum sic proceditur. Videtur quod virtus sit in nobis a natura. Dicit enim Damascenus, in III libro, naturales sunt virtutes, et aequaliter insunt omnibus. Et Antonius dicit, in sermone ad monachos, si naturam voluntas mutaverit, perversitas est; conditio servetur, et virtus est. Et Matth. IV, super illud, circuibat Iesus etc., dicit Glossa, docet naturales iustitias, scilicet castitatem, iustitiam, humilitatem, quas naturaliter habet homo. Objection 1. It would seem that virtue is in us by nature. For Damascene says (De Fide Orth. iii, 14): "Virtues are natural to us and are equally in all of us." And Antony says in his sermon to the monks: "If the will contradicts nature it is perverse, if it follow nature it is virtuous." Moreover, a gloss on Matthew 4:23, "Jesus went about," etc., says: "He taught them natural virtues, i.e. chastity, justice, humility, which man possesses naturally."
Iª-IIae q. 63 a. 1 arg. 2 Praeterea, bonum virtutis est secundum rationem esse, ut ex dictis patet. Sed id quod est secundum rationem, est homini naturale, cum ratio sit hominis natura. Ergo virtus inest homini a natura. Objection 2. Further, the virtuous good consists in accord with reason, as was clearly shown above (55, 4, ad 2). But that which accords with reason is natural to man; since reason is part of man's nature. Therefore virtue is in man by nature.
Iª-IIae q. 63 a. 1 arg. 3 Praeterea, illud dicitur esse nobis naturale, quod nobis a nativitate inest. Sed virtutes quibusdam a nativitate insunt, dicitur enim Iob XXXI, ab infantia crevit mecum miseratio, et de utero egressa est mecum. Ergo virtus inest homini a natura. Objection 3. Further, that which is in us from birth is said to be natural to us. Now virtues are in some from birth: for it is written (Job 31:18): "From my infancy mercy grew up with me; and it came out with me from my mother's womb." Therefore virtue is in man by nature.
Iª-IIae q. 63 a. 1 s. c. Sed contra, id quod inest homini a natura, est omnibus hominibus commune, et non tollitur per peccatum, quia etiam in Daemonibus bona naturalia manent, ut Dionysius dicit, in IV cap. de Div. Nom. Sed virtus non inest omnibus hominibus; et abiicitur per peccatum. Ergo non inest homini a natura. On the contrary, Whatever is in man by nature is common to all men, and is not taken away by sin, since even in the demons natural gifts remain, as Dionysius states (Div. Nom. iv). But virtue is not in all men; and is cast out by sin. Therefore it is not in man by nature.
Iª-IIae q. 63 a. 1 co. Respondeo dicendum quod circa formas corporales, aliqui dixerunt quod sunt totaliter ab intrinseco, sicut ponentes latitationem formarum. Aliqui vero, quod totaliter sint ab extrinseco, sicut ponentes formas corporales esse ab aliqua causa separata. Aliqui vero, quod partim sint ab intrinseco, inquantum scilicet praeexistunt in materia in potentia; et partim ab extrinseco, inquantum scilicet reducuntur ad actum per agens. Ita etiam circa scientias et virtutes, aliqui quidem posuerunt eas totaliter esse ab intrinseco, ita scilicet quod omnes virtutes et scientiae naturaliter praeexistunt in anima; sed per disciplinam et exercitium impedimenta scientiae et virtutis tolluntur, quae adveniunt animae ex corporis gravitate; sicut cum ferrum clarificatur per limationem. Et haec fuit opinio Platonicorum. Alii vero dixerunt quod sunt totaliter ab extrinseco, idest ex influentia intelligentiae agentis, ut ponit Avicenna. Alii vero dixerunt quod secundum aptitudinem scientiae et virtutes sunt in nobis a natura, non autem secundum perfectionem, ut philosophus dicit, in II Ethic. Et hoc verius est. Ad cuius manifestationem, oportet considerare quod aliquid dicitur alicui homini naturale dupliciter, uno modo, ex natura speciei; alio modo, ex natura individui. Et quia unumquodque habet speciem secundum suam formam, individuatur vero secundum materiam; forma vero hominis est anima rationalis, materia vero corpus, id quod convenit homini secundum animam rationalem, est ei naturale secundum rationem speciei; id vero quod est ei naturale secundum determinatam corporis complexionem, est ei naturale secundum naturam individui. Quod enim est naturale homini ex parte corporis secundum speciem, quodammodo refertur ad animam, inquantum scilicet tale corpus est tali animae proportionatum. Utroque autem modo virtus est homini naturalis secundum quandam inchoationem. Secundum quidem naturam speciei, inquantum in ratione homini insunt naturaliter quaedam principia naturaliter cognita tam scibilium quam agendorum, quae sunt quaedam seminalia intellectualium virtutum et moralium; et inquantum in voluntate inest quidam naturalis appetitus boni quod est secundum rationem. Secundum vero naturam individui, inquantum ex corporis dispositione aliqui sunt dispositi vel melius vel peius ad quasdam virtutes, prout scilicet vires quaedam sensitivae actus sunt quarundam partium corporis, ex quarum dispositione adiuvantur vel impediuntur huiusmodi vires in suis actibus, et per consequens vires rationales, quibus huiusmodi sensitivae vires deserviunt. Et secundum hoc, unus homo habet naturalem aptitudinem ad scientiam, alius ad fortitudinem, alius ad temperantiam. Et his modis tam virtutes intellectuales quam morales, secundum quandam aptitudinis inchoationem, sunt in nobis a natura. Non autem consummatio earum. Quia natura determinatur ad unum, consummatio autem huiusmodi virtutum non est secundum unum modum actionis, sed diversimode, secundum diversas materias in quibus virtutes operantur, et secundum diversas circumstantias. Sic ergo patet quod virtutes in nobis sunt a natura secundum aptitudinem et inchoationem, non autem secundum perfectionem, praeter virtutes theologicas, quae sunt totaliter ab extrinseco. I answer that, With regard to corporeal forms, it has been maintained by some that they are wholly from within, by those, for instance, who upheld the theory of "latent forms" [Anaxagoras; Cf. I, 45, 8; 65, 4]. Others held that forms are entirely from without, those, for instance, who thought that corporeal forms originated from some separate cause. Others, however, esteemed that they are partly from within, in so far as they pre-exist potentially in matter; and partly from without, in so far as they are brought into act by the agent. In like manner with regard to sciences and virtues, some held that they are wholly from within, so that all virtues and sciences would pre-exist in the soul naturally, but that the hindrances to science and virtue, which are due to the soul being weighed down by the body, are removed by study and practice, even as iron is made bright by being polished. This was the opinion of the Platonists. Others said that they are wholly from without, being due to the inflow of the active intellect, as Avicenna maintained. Others said that sciences and virtues are within us by nature, so far as we are adapted to them, but not in their perfection: this is the teaching of the Philosopher (Ethic. ii, 1), and is nearer the truth. To make this clear, it must be observed that there are two ways in which something is said to be natural to a man; one is according to his specific nature, the other according to his individual nature. And, since each thing derives its species from its form, and its individuation from matter, and, again, since man's form is his rational soul, while his matter is his body, whatever belongs to him in respect of his rational soul, is natural to him in respect of his specific nature; while whatever belongs to him in respect of the particular temperament of his body, is natural to him in respect of his individual nature. For whatever is natural to man in respect of his body, considered as part of his species, is to be referred, in a way, to the soul, in so far as this particular body is adapted to this particular soul. In both these ways virtue is natural to man inchoatively. This is so in respect of the specific nature, in so far as in man's reason are to be found instilled by nature certain naturally known principles of both knowledge and action, which are the nurseries of intellectual and moral virtues, and in so far as there is in the will a natural appetite for good in accordance with reason. Again, this is so in respect of the individual nature, in so far as by reason of a disposition in the body, some are disposed either well or ill to certain virtues: because, to wit, certain sensitive powers are acts of certain parts of the body, according to the disposition of which these powers are helped or hindered in the exercise of their acts, and, in consequence, the rational powers also, which the aforesaid sensitive powers assist. In this way one man has a natural aptitude for science, another for fortitude, another for temperance: and in these ways, both intellectual and moral virtues are in us by way of a natural aptitude, inchoatively, but not perfectly, since nature is determined to one, while the perfection of these virtues does not depend on one particular mode of action, but on various modes, in respect of the various matters, which constitute the sphere of virtue's action, and according to various circumstances. It is therefore evident that all virtues are in us by nature, according to aptitude and inchoation, but not according to perfection, except the theological virtues, which are entirely from without.
Iª-IIae q. 63 a. 1 ad 1 Et per hoc patet responsio ad obiecta. Nam primae duae rationes procedunt secundum quod seminalia virtutum insunt nobis a natura, inquantum rationales sumus. Tertia vero ratio procedit secundum quod ex naturali dispositione corporis, quam habet ex nativitate, unus habet aptitudinem ad miserendum, alius ad temperate vivendum, alius ad aliam virtutem. This suffices for the Replies to the Objections. For the first two argue about the nurseries of virtue which are in us by nature, inasmuch as we are rational beings. The third objection must be taken in the sense that, owing to the natural disposition which the body has from birth, one has an aptitude for pity, another for living temperately, another for some other virtue.
Iª-IIae q. 63 a. 2 arg. 1 Ad secundum sic proceditur. Videtur quod virtutes in nobis causari non possint ex assuetudine operum. Quia super illud Rom. XIV, omne quod non est ex fide, peccatum est, dicit Glossa Augustini, omnis infidelium vita peccatum est; et nihil est bonum sine summo bono. Ubi deest cognitio veritatis, falsa est virtus etiam in optimis moribus. Sed fides non potest acquiri ex operibus, sed causatur in nobis a Deo; secundum illud Ephes. II, gratia estis salvati per fidem. Ergo nulla virtus potest in nobis acquiri ex assuetudine operum. Objection 1. It would seem that virtues can not be caused in us by habituation. Because a gloss of Augustine [Cf. Lib. Sentent. Prosperi cvi.] commenting on Romans 14:23, "All that is not of faith is sin," says: "The whole life of an unbeliever is a sin: and there is no good without the Sovereign Good. Where knowledge of the truth is lacking, virtue is a mockery even in the best behaved people." Now faith cannot be acquired by means of works, but is caused in us by God, according to Ephesians 2:8: "By grace you are saved through faith." Therefore no acquired virtue can be in us by habituation.
Iª-IIae q. 63 a. 2 arg. 2 Praeterea, peccatum, cum contrarietur virtuti, non compatitur secum virtutem. Sed homo non potest vitare peccatum nisi per gratiam Dei; secundum illud Sap. VIII, didici quod non possum esse aliter continens, nisi Deus det. Ergo nec virtutes aliquae possunt in nobis causari ex assuetudine operum; sed solum dono Dei. Objection 2. Further, sin and virtue are contraries, so that they are incompatible. Now man cannot avoid sin except by the grace of God, according to Wisdom 8:21: "I knew that I could not otherwise be continent, except God gave it." Therefore neither can any virtues be caused in us by habituation, but only by the gift of God.
Iª-IIae q. 63 a. 2 arg. 3 Praeterea, actus qui sunt in virtutem, deficiunt a perfectione virtutis. Sed effectus non potest esse perfectior causa. Ergo virtus non potest causari ex actibus praecedentibus virtutem. Objection 3. Further, actions which lead toward virtue, lack the perfection of virtue. But an effect cannot be more perfect than its cause. Therefore a virtue cannot be caused by actions that precede it.
Iª-IIae q. 63 a. 2 s. c. Sed contra est quod Dionysius dicit, IV cap. de Div. Nom., quod bonum est virtuosius quam malum. Sed ex malis actibus causantur habitus vitiorum. Ergo multo magis ex bonis actibus possunt causari habitus virtutum. On the contrary, Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv) that good is more efficacious than evil. But vicious habits are caused by evil acts. Much more, therefore, can virtuous habits be caused by good acts.
Iª-IIae q. 63 a. 2 co. Respondeo dicendum quod de generatione habituum ex actibus, supra in generali dictum est. Nunc autem specialiter quantum ad virtutem, considerandum est quod sicut supra dictum est, virtus hominis perficit ipsum ad bonum. Cum autem ratio boni consistat in modo, specie et ordine, ut Augustinus dicit in libro de natura boni; sive in numero, pondere et mensura, ut dicitur Sap. XI, oportet quod bonum hominis secundum aliquam regulam consideretur. Quae quidem est duplex, ut supra dictum est, scilicet ratio humana, et lex divina. Et quia lex divina est superior regula, ideo ad plura se extendit, ita quod quidquid regulatur ratione humana, regulatur etiam lege divina, sed non convertitur. Virtus igitur hominis ordinata ad bonum quod modificatur secundum regulam rationis humanae, potest ex actibus humanis causari, inquantum huiusmodi actus procedunt a ratione, sub cuius potestate et regula tale bonum consistit. Virtus vero ordinans hominem ad bonum secundum quod modificatur per legem divinam, et non per rationem humanam, non potest causari per actus humanos, quorum principium est ratio, sed causatur solum in nobis per operationem divinam. Et ideo, huiusmodi virtutem definiens, Augustinus posuit in definitione virtutis, quam Deus in nobis sine nobis operatur. I answer that, We have spoken above (51, A2,3) in a general way about the production of habits from acts; and speaking now in a special way of this matter in relation to virtue, we must take note that, as stated above (55, A3,4), man's virtue perfects him in relation to good. Now since the notion of good consists in "mode, species, and order," as Augustine states (De Nat. Boni. iii) or in "number, weight, and measure," as expressed in Wisdom 11:21, man's good must needs be appraised with respect to some rule. Now this rule is twofold, as stated above (19, A3,4), viz. human reason and Divine Law. And since Divine Law is the higher rule, it extends to more things, so that whatever is ruled by human reason, is ruled by the Divine Law too; but the converse does not hold. It follows that human virtue directed to the good which is defined according to the rule of human reason can be caused by human acts: inasmuch as such acts proceed from reason, by whose power and rule the aforesaid good is established. On the other hand, virtue which directs man to good as defined by the Divine Law, and not by human reason, cannot be caused by human acts, the principle of which is reason, but is produced in us by the Divine operation alone. Hence Augustine in giving the definition of the latter virtue inserts the words, "which God works in us without us" (Super Ps. 118, Serm. xxvi).
Iª-IIae q. 63 a. 2 ad 1 Et de huiusmodi etiam virtutibus prima ratio procedit. It is also of these virtues that the First Objection holds good.
Iª-IIae q. 63 a. 2 ad 2 Ad secundum dicendum quod virtus divinitus infusa, maxime si in sua perfectione consideretur, non compatitur secum aliquod peccatum mortale. Sed virtus humanitus acquisita potest secum compati aliquem actum peccati, etiam mortalis, quia usus habitus in nobis est nostrae voluntati subiectus, ut supra dictum est; non autem per unum actum peccati corrumpitur habitus virtutis acquisitae; habitui enim non contrariatur directe actus, sed habitus. Et ideo, licet sine gratia homo non possit peccatum mortale vitare, ita quod nunquam peccet mortaliter; non tamen impeditur quin possit habitum virtutis acquirere, per quam a malis operibus abstineat ut in pluribus, et praecipue ab his quae sunt valde rationi contraria. Sunt etiam quaedam peccata mortalia quae homo sine gratia nullo modo potest vitare, quae scilicet directe opponuntur virtutibus theologicis, quae ex dono gratiae sunt in nobis. Hoc tamen infra manifestius fiet. Reply to Objection 2. Mortal sin is incompatible with divinely infused virtue, especially if this be considered in its perfect state. But actual sin, even mortal, is compatible with humanly acquired virtue; because the use of a habit in us is subject to our will, as stated above (Question 49, Article 3): and one sinful act does not destroy a habit of acquired virtue, since it is not an act but a habit, that is directly contrary to a habit. Wherefore, though man cannot avoid mortal sin without grace, so as never to sin mortally, yet he is not hindered from acquiring a habit of virtue, whereby he may abstain from evil in the majority of cases, and chiefly in matters most opposed to reason. There are also certain mortal sins which man can nowise avoid without grace, those, namely, which are directly opposed to the theological virtues, which are in us through the gift of grace. This, however, will be more fully explained later (109, 4).
Iª-IIae q. 63 a. 2 ad 3 Ad tertium dicendum quod, sicut dictum est, virtutum acquisitarum praeexistunt in nobis quaedam semina sive principia, secundum naturam. Quae quidem principia sunt nobiliora virtutibus eorum virtute acquisitis, sicut intellectus principiorum speculabilium est nobilior scientia conclusionum; et naturalis rectitudo rationis est nobilior rectificatione appetitus quae fit per participationem rationis, quae quidem rectificatio pertinet ad virtutem moralem. Sic igitur actus humani, inquantum procedunt ex altioribus principiis, possunt causare virtutes acquisitas humanas. Reply to Objection 3. As stated above (1; 51, 1), certain seeds or principles of acquired virtue pre-exist in us by nature. These principles are more excellent than the virtues acquired through them: thus the understanding of speculative principles is more excellent than the science of conclusions, and the natural rectitude of the reason is more excellent than the rectification of the appetite which results through the appetite partaking of reason, which rectification belongs to moral virtue. Accordingly human acts, in so far as they proceed from higher principles, can cause acquired human virtues.
Iª-IIae q. 63 a. 3 arg. 1 Ad tertium sic proceditur. Videtur quod praeter virtutes theologicas, non sint aliae virtutes nobis infusae a Deo. Ea enim quae possunt fieri a causis secundis, non fiunt immediate a Deo, nisi forte aliquando miraculose, quia, ut Dionysius dicit, lex divinitatis est ultima per media adducere. Sed virtutes intellectuales et morales possunt in nobis causari per nostros actus, ut dictum est. Non ergo convenienter causantur in nobis per infusionem. Objection 1. It would seem that no virtues besides the theological virtues are infused in us by God. Because God does not do by Himself, save perhaps sometimes miraculously, those things that can be done by second causes; for, as Dionysius says (Coel. Hier. iv), "it is God's rule to bring about extremes through the mean." Now intellectual and moral virtues can be caused in us by our acts, as stated above (Article 2). Therefore it is not reasonable that they should be caused in us by infusion.
Iª-IIae q. 63 a. 3 arg. 2 Praeterea, in operibus Dei multo minus est aliquid superfluum quam in operibus naturae. Sed ad ordinandum nos in bonum supernaturale, sufficiunt virtutes theologicae. Ergo non sunt aliae virtutes supernaturales, quas oporteat in nobis causari a Deo. Objection 2. Further, much less superfluity is found in God's works than in the works of nature. Now the theological virtues suffice to direct us to supernatural good. Therefore there are no other supernatural virtues needing to be caused in us by God.
Iª-IIae q. 63 a. 3 arg. 3 Praeterea, natura non facit per duo, quod potest facere per unum, et multo minus Deus. Sed Deus inseruit animae nostrae semina virtutum, ut dicit Glossa Heb. I. Ergo non oportet quod alias virtutes in nobis per infusionem causet. Objection 3. Further, nature does not employ two means where one suffices: much less does God. But God sowed the seeds of virtue in our souls, according to a gloss on Hebrews 1 [Cf. Jerome on Galatians 1:15-16]. Therefore it is unfitting for Him to cause in us other virtues by means of infusion.
Iª-IIae q. 63 a. 3 s. c. Sed contra est quod dicitur Sap. VIII, sobrietatem et iustitiam docet, prudentiam et virtutem. On the contrary, It is written (Wisdom 8:7): "She teacheth temperance and prudence and justice and fortitude."
Iª-IIae q. 63 a. 3 co. Respondeo dicendum quod oportet effectus esse suis causis et principiis proportionatos. Omnes autem virtutes tam intellectuales quam morales, quae ex nostris actibus acquiruntur, procedunt ex quibusdam naturalibus principiis in nobis praeexistentibus, ut supra dictum est. Loco quorum naturalium principiorum, conferuntur nobis a Deo virtutes theologicae, quibus ordinamur ad finem supernaturalem, sicut supra dictum est. Unde oportet quod his etiam virtutibus theologicis proportionaliter respondeant alii habitus divinitus causati in nobis, qui sic se habeant ad virtutes theologicas sicut se habent virtutes morales et intellectuales ad principia naturalia virtutum. I answer that, Effects must needs be proportionate to their causes and principles. Now all virtues, intellectual and moral, that are acquired by our actions, arise from certain natural principles pre-existing in us, as above stated (1; 51, 1): instead of which natural principles, God bestows on us the theological virtues, whereby we are directed to a supernatural end, as stated (62, 1). Wherefore we need to receive from God other habits corresponding, in due proportion, to the theological virtues, which habits are to the theological virtues, what the moral and intellectual virtues are to the natural principles of virtue.
Iª-IIae q. 63 a. 3 ad 1 Ad primum ergo dicendum quod aliquae quidem virtutes morales et intellectuales possunt causari in nobis ex nostris actibus, tamen illae non sunt proportionatae virtutibus theologicis. Et ideo oportet alias, eis proportionatas, immediate a Deo causari. Reply to Objection 1. Some moral and intellectual virtues can indeed be caused in us by our actions: but such are not proportionate to the theological virtues. Therefore it was necessary for us to receive, from God immediately, others that are proportionate to these virtues.
Iª-IIae q. 63 a. 3 ad 2 Ad secundum dicendum quod virtutes theologicae sufficienter nos ordinant in finem supernaturalem, secundum quandam inchoationem, quantum scilicet ad ipsum Deum immediate. Sed oportet quod per alias virtutes infusas perficiatur anima circa alias res, in ordine tamen ad Deum. Reply to Objection 2. The theological virtues direct us sufficiently to our supernatural end, inchoatively: i.e. to God Himself immediately. But the soul needs further to be perfected by infused virtues in regard to other things, yet in relation to God.
Iª-IIae q. 63 a. 3 ad 3 Ad tertium dicendum quod virtus illorum principiorum naturaliter inditorum, non se extendit ultra proportionem naturae. Et ideo in ordine ad finem supernaturalem, indiget homo perfici per alia principia superaddita. Reply to Objection 3. The power of those naturally instilled principles does not extend beyond the capacity of nature. Consequently man needs in addition to be perfected by other principles in relation to his supernatural end.
Iª-IIae q. 63 a. 4 arg. 1 Ad quartum sic proceditur. Videtur quod virtutes infusae non sint alterius speciei a virtutibus acquisitis. Virtus enim acquisita et virtus infusa, secundum praedicta, non videntur differre nisi secundum ordinem ad ultimum finem. Sed habitus et actus humani non recipiunt speciem ab ultimo fine, sed a proximo. Non ergo virtutes morales vel intellectuales infusae differunt specie ab acquisitis. Objection 1. It would seem that infused virtue does not differ in species from acquired virtue. Because acquired and infused virtues, according to what has been said (3), do not differ seemingly, save in relation to the last end. Now human habits and acts are specified, not by their last, but by their proximate end. Therefore the infused moral or intellectual virtue does not differ from the acquired virtue.
Iª-IIae q. 63 a. 4 arg. 2 Praeterea, habitus per actus cognoscuntur. Sed idem est actus temperantiae infusae, et acquisitae, scilicet moderari concupiscentias tactus. Ergo non differunt specie. Objection 2. Further, habits are known by their acts. But the act of infused and acquired temperance is the same, viz. to moderate desires of touch. Therefore they do not differ in species.
Iª-IIae q. 63 a. 4 arg. 3 Praeterea, virtus acquisita et infusa differunt secundum illud quod est immediate a Deo factum, et a creatura. Sed idem est specie homo quem Deus formavit, et quem generat natura; et oculus quem caeco nato dedit, et quem virtus formativa causat. Ergo videtur quod est eadem specie virtus acquisita, et infusa. Objection 3. Further, acquired and infused virtue differ as that which is wrought by God immediately, from that which is wrought by a creature. But the man whom God made, is of the same species as a man begotten naturally; and the eye which He gave to the man born blind, as one produced by the power of generation. Therefore it seems that acquired and infused virtue belong to the same species.
Iª-IIae q. 63 a. 4 s. c. Sed contra, quaelibet differentia in definitione posita, mutata diversificat speciem. Sed in definitione virtutis infusae ponitur, quam Deus in nobis sine nobis operatur, ut supra dictum est. Ergo virtus acquisita, cui hoc non convenit, non est eiusdem speciei cum infusa. On the contrary, Any change introduced into the difference expressed in a definition involves a difference of species. But the definition of infused virtue contains the words, "which God works in us without us," as stated above (Question 55, Article 4). Therefore acquired virtue, to which these words cannot apply, is not of the same species as infused virtue.
Iª-IIae q. 63 a. 4 co. Respondeo dicendum quod dupliciter habitus distinguuntur specie. Uno modo, sicut praedictum est, secundum speciales et formales rationes obiectorum. Obiectum autem virtutis cuiuslibet est bonum consideratum in materia propria, sicut temperantiae obiectum est bonum delectabilium in concupiscentiis tactus. Cuius quidem obiecti formalis ratio est a ratione, quae instituit modum in his concupiscentiis, materiale autem est id quod est ex parte concupiscentiarum. Manifestum est autem quod alterius rationis est modus qui imponitur in huiusmodi concupiscentiis secundum regulam rationis humanae, et secundum regulam divinam. Puta in sumptione ciborum, ratione humana modus statuitur ut non noceat valetudini corporis, nec impediat rationis actum, secundum autem regulam legis divinae, requiritur quod homo castiget corpus suum, et in servitutem redigat, per abstinentiam cibi et potus, et aliorum huiusmodi. Unde manifestum est quod temperantia infusa et acquisita differunt specie, et eadem ratio est de aliis virtutibus. Alio modo habitus distinguuntur specie secundum ea ad quae ordinantur, non enim est eadem specie sanitas hominis et equi, propter diversas naturas ad quas ordinantur. Et eodem modo dicit philosophus, in III Polit., quod diversae sunt virtutes civium, secundum quod bene se habent ad diversas politias. Et per hunc etiam modum differunt specie virtutes morales infusae, per quas homines bene se habent in ordine ad hoc quod sint cives sanctorum et domestici Dei; et aliae virtutes acquisitae, secundum quas homo se bene habet in ordine ad res humanas. I answer that, There is a twofold specific difference among habits. The first, as stated above (54, 2; 56, 2; 60, 1), is taken from the specific and formal aspects of their objects. Now the object of every virtue is a good considered as in that virtue's proper matter: thus the object of temperance is a good in respect of the pleasures connected with the concupiscence of touch. The formal aspect of this object is from reason which fixes the mean in these concupiscences: while the material element is something on the part of the concupiscences. Now it is evident that the mean that is appointed in such like concupiscences according to the rule of human reason, is seen under a different aspect from the mean which is fixed according to Divine rule. For instance, in the consumption of food, the mean fixed by human reason, is that food should not harm the health of the body, nor hinder the use of reason: whereas, according to the Divine rule, it behooves man to "chastise his body, and bring it into subjection" (1 Corinthians 9:27), by abstinence in food, drink and the like. It is therefore evident that infused and acquired temperance differ in species; and the same applies to the other virtues. The other specific differences among habits is taken from the things to which they are directed: for a man's health and a horse's are not of the same species, on account of the difference between the natures to which their respective healths are directed. In the same sense, the Philosopher says (Polit. iii, 3) that citizens have diverse virtues according as they are well directed to diverse forms of government. In the same way, too, those infused moral virtues, whereby men behave well in respect of their being "fellow-citizens with the saints, and of the household [Douay: 'domestics'] of God" (Ephesians 2:19), differ from the acquired virtues, whereby man behaves well in respect of human affairs.
Iª-IIae q. 63 a. 4 ad 1 Ad primum ergo dicendum quod virtus infusa et acquisita non solum differunt secundum ordinem ad ultimum finem; sed etiam secundum ordinem ad propria obiecta, ut dictum est. Reply to Objection 1. Infused and acquired virtue differ not only in relation to the ultimate end, but also in relation to their proper objects, as stated.
Iª-IIae q. 63 a. 4 ad 2 Ad secundum dicendum quod alia ratione modificat concupiscentias delectabilium tactus temperantia acquisita, et temperantia infusa, ut dictum est. Unde non habent eundem actum. Reply to Objection 2. Both acquired and infused temperance moderate desires for pleasures of touch, but for different reasons, as stated: wherefore their respective acts are not identical.
Iª-IIae q. 63 a. 4 ad 3 Ad tertium dicendum quod oculum caeci nati Deus fecit ad eundem actum ad quem formantur alii oculi secundum naturam, et ideo fuit eiusdem speciei. Et eadem ratio esset, si Deus vellet miraculose causare in homine virtutes quales acquiruntur ex actibus. Sed ita non est in proposito, ut dictum est. Reply to Objection 3. God gave the man born blind an eye for the same act as the act for which other eyes are formed naturally: consequently it was of the same species. It would be the same if God wished to give a man miraculously virtues, such as those that are acquired by acts. But the case is not so in the question before us, as stated.

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