Authors/Thomas Aquinas/Summa Theologiae/Part IIa/Q57

From The Logic Museum

Jump to: navigation, search
Q56 Q58



Latin English
Iª-IIae q. 57 pr. Deinde considerandum est de distinctione virtutum. Et primo, quantum ad virtutes intellectuales; secundo, quantum ad morales; tertio, quantum ad theologicas. Circa primum quaeruntur sex. Primo, utrum habitus intellectuales speculativi sint virtutes. Secundo, utrum sint tres, scilicet sapientia, scientia et intellectus. Tertio, utrum habitus intellectualis qui est ars, sit virtus. Quarto, utrum prudentia sit virtus distincta ab arte. Quinto, utrum prudentia sit virtus necessaria homini. Sexto, utrum eubulia, synesis et gnome sint virtutes adiunctae prudentiae. Question 57. The intellectual virtues Are habits of the speculative intellect virtues? Are they three, namely, wisdom, science and understanding? Is the intellectual habit, which is art, a virtue? Is prudence a virtue distinct from art? Is prudence a virtue necessary to man? Are eubulia, synesis and gnome virtues annexed to prudence?
Iª-IIae q. 57 a. 1 arg. 1 Ad primum sic proceditur. Videtur quod habitus intellectuales speculativi non sint virtutes. Virtus enim est habitus operativus, ut supra dictum est. Sed habitus speculativi non sunt operativi, distinguitur enim speculativum a practico, idest operativo. Ergo habitus intellectuales speculativi non sunt virtutes. Objection 1. It would seem that the habits of the speculative intellect are not virtues. For virtue is an operative habit, as we have said above (Question 55, Article 2). But speculative habits are not operative: for speculative matter is distinct from practical, i.e. operative matter. Therefore the habits of the speculative intellect are not virtues.
Iª-IIae q. 57 a. 1 arg. 2 Praeterea, virtus est eorum per quae fit homo felix sive beatus, eo quod felicitas est virtutis praemium, ut dicitur in I Ethic. Sed habitus intellectuales non considerant actus humanos, aut alia bona humana, per quae homo beatitudinem adipiscitur, sed magis res naturales et divinas. Ergo huiusmodi habitus virtutes dici non possunt. Objection 2. Further, virtue is about those things by which man is made happy or blessed: for "happiness is the reward of virtue" (Ethic. i, 9). Now intellectual habits do not consider human acts or other human goods, by which man acquires happiness, but rather things pertaining to nature or to God. Therefore such like habits cannot be called virtues.
Iª-IIae q. 57 a. 1 arg. 3 Praeterea, scientia est habitus speculativus. Sed scientia et virtus distinguuntur sicut diversa genera non subalternatim posita; ut patet per philosophum, in IV Topic. Ergo habitus speculativi non sunt virtutes. Objection 3. Further, science is a speculative habit. But science and virtue are distinct from one another as genera which are not subalternate, as the Philosopher proves in Topic. iv. Therefore speculative habits are not virtues.
Iª-IIae q. 57 a. 1 s. c. Sed contra, soli habitus speculativi considerant necessaria quae impossibile est aliter se habere. Sed philosophus ponit, in VI Ethic., quasdam virtutes intellectuales in parte animae quae considerat necessaria quae non possunt aliter se habere. Ergo habitus intellectuales speculativi sunt virtutes. On the contrary, The speculative habits alone consider necessary things which cannot be otherwise than they are. Now the Philosopher (Ethic. vi, 1) places certain intellectual virtues in that part of the soul which considers necessary things that cannot be otherwise than they are. Therefore the habits of the speculative intellect are virtues.
Iª-IIae q. 57 a. 1 co. Respondeo dicendum quod, cum omnis virtus dicatur in ordine ad bonum, sicut supra dictum est, duplici ratione aliquis habitus dicitur virtus, ut supra dictum est, uno modo, quia facit facultatem bene operandi; alio modo, quia cum facultate, facit etiam usum bonum. Et hoc, sicut supra dictum est, pertinet solum ad illos habitus qui respiciunt partem appetitivam, eo quod vis appetitiva animae est quae facit uti omnibus potentiis et habitibus. Cum igitur habitus intellectuales speculativi non perficiant partem appetitivam, nec aliquo modo ipsam respiciant, sed solam intellectivam; possunt quidem dici virtutes inquantum faciunt facultatem bonae operationis, quae est consideratio veri (hoc enim est bonum opus intellectus), non tamen dicuntur virtutes secundo modo, quasi facientes bene uti potentia seu habitu. Ex hoc enim quod aliquis habet habitum scientiae speculativae, non inclinatur ad utendum, sed fit potens speculari verum in his quorum habet scientiam, sed quod utatur scientia habita, hoc est movente voluntate. Et ideo virtus quae perficit voluntatem, ut caritas vel iustitia, facit etiam bene uti huiusmodi speculativis habitibus. Et secundum hoc etiam, in actibus horum habituum potest esse meritum, si ex caritate fiant, sicut Gregorius dicit, in VI Moral., quod contemplativa est maioris meriti quam activa. I answer that, Since every virtue is ordained to some good, as stated above (Question 55, Article 3), a habit, as we have already observed (56, 3), may be called a virtue for two reasons: first, because it confers aptness in doing good; secondly, because besides aptness, it confers the right use of it. The latter condition, as above stated (55, 3), belongs to those habits alone which affect the appetitive part of the soul: since it is the soul's appetitive power that puts all the powers and habits to their respective uses. Since, then, the habits of the speculative intellect do not perfect the appetitive part, nor affect it in any way, but only the intellective part; they may indeed be called virtues in so far as they confer aptness for a good work, viz. the consideration of truth (since this is the good work of the intellect): yet they are not called virtues in the second way, as though they conferred the right use of a power or habit. For if a man possess a habit of speculative science, it does not follow that he is inclined to make use of it, but he is made able to consider the truth in those matters of which he has scientific knowledge: that he make use of the knowledge which he has, is due to the motion of his will. Consequently a virtue which perfects the will, as charity or justice, confers the right use of these speculative habits. And in this way too there can be merit in the acts of these habits, if they be done out of charity: thus Gregory says (Moral. vi) that the "contemplative life has greater merit than the active life."
Iª-IIae q. 57 a. 1 ad 1 Ad primum ergo dicendum quod duplex est opus, scilicet exterius, et interius. Practicum ergo, vel operativum, quod dividitur contra speculativum, sumitur ab opere exteriori, ad quod non habet ordinem habitus speculativus. Sed tamen habet ordinem ad interius opus intellectus, quod est speculari verum. Et secundum hoc est habitus operativus. Reply to Objection 1. Work is of two kinds, exterior and interior. Accordingly the practical or active faculty which is contrasted with the speculative faculty, is concerned with exterior work, to which the speculative habit is not ordained. Yet it is ordained to the interior act of the intellect which is to consider the truth. And in this way it is an operative habit.
Iª-IIae q. 57 a. 1 ad 2 Ad secundum dicendum quod virtus est aliquorum dupliciter. Uno modo, sicut obiectorum. Et sic huiusmodi virtutes speculativae non sunt eorum per quae homo fit beatus; nisi forte secundum quod ly per dicit causam efficientem vel obiectum completae beatitudinis, quod est Deus, quod est summum speculabile. Alio modo dicitur virtus esse aliquorum sicut actuum. Et hoc modo virtutes intellectuales sunt eorum per quae homo fit beatus. Tum quia actus harum virtutum possunt esse meritorii, sicut dictum est. Tum etiam quia sunt quaedam inchoatio perfectae beatitudinis, quae in contemplatione veri consistit, sicut supra dictum est. Reply to Objection 2. Virtue is about certain things in two ways. In the first place a virtue is about its object. And thus these speculative virtues are not about those things whereby man is made happy; except perhaps, in so far as the word "whereby" indicates the efficient cause or object of complete happiness, i.e. God, Who is the supreme object of contemplation. Secondly, a virtue is said to be about its acts: and in this sense the intellectual virtues are about those things whereby a man is made happy; both because the acts of these virtues can be meritorious, as stated above, and because they are a kind of beginning of perfect bliss, which consists in the contemplation of truth, as we have already stated (3, 7).
Iª-IIae q. 57 a. 1 ad 3 Ad tertium dicendum quod scientia dividitur contra virtutem secundo modo dictam, quae pertinet ad vim appetitivam. Reply to Objection 3. Science is contrasted with virtue taken in the second sense, wherein it belongs to the appetitive faculty.
Iª-IIae q. 57 a. 2 arg. 1 Ad secundum sic proceditur. Videtur quod inconvenienter distinguantur tres virtutes intellectuales speculativae, scilicet sapientia, scientia et intellectus. Species enim non debet condividi generi. Sed sapientia est quaedam scientia, ut dicitur in VI Ethic. Ergo sapientia non debet condividi scientiae, in numero virtutum intellectualium. Objection 1. It would seem unfitting to distinguish three virtues of the speculative intellect, viz. wisdom, science and understanding. Because a species is a kind of science, as stated in Ethic. vi, 7. Therefore wisdom should not be condivided with science among the intellectual virtues.
Iª-IIae q. 57 a. 2 arg. 2 Praeterea, in distinctione potentiarum, habituum et actuum, quae attenditur secundum obiecta, attenditur principaliter distinctio quae est secundum rationem formalem obiectorum, ut ex supradictis patet. Non ergo diversi habitus debent distingui secundum materiale obiectum; sed secundum rationem formalem illius obiecti. Sed principium demonstrationis est ratio sciendi conclusiones. Non ergo intellectus principiorum debet poni habitus alius, aut alia virtus, a scientia conclusionum. Objection 2. Further, in differentiating powers, habits and acts in respect of their objects, we consider chiefly the formal aspect of these objects, as we have already explained (I, 77, 3). Therefore diversity of habits is taken, not from their material objects, but from the formal aspect of those objects. Now the principle of a demonstration is the formal aspect under which the conclusion is known. Therefore the understanding of principles should not be set down as a habit or virtue distinct from the knowledge of conclusions.
Iª-IIae q. 57 a. 2 arg. 3 Praeterea, virtus intellectualis dicitur quae est in ipso rationali per essentiam. Sed ratio, etiam speculativa, sicut ratiocinatur syllogizando demonstrative; ita etiam ratiocinatur syllogizando dialectice. Ergo sicut scientia, quae causatur ex syllogismo demonstrativo, ponitur virtus intellectualis speculativa; ita etiam et opinio. Objection 3. Further, an intellectual virtue is one which resides in the essentially rational faculty. Now even the speculative reason employs the dialectic syllogism for the sake of argument, just as it employs the demonstrative syllogism. Therefore as science, which is the result of a demonstrative syllogism, is set down as an intellectual virtue, so also should opinion be.
Iª-IIae q. 57 a. 2 s. c. Sed contra est quod philosophus, VI Ethic., ponit has solum tres virtutes intellectuales speculativas, scilicet sapientiam, scientiam et intellectum. On the contrary, The Philosopher (Ethic. vi, 1) reckons these three alone as being intellectual virtues, viz. wisdom, science and understanding.
Iª-IIae q. 57 a. 2 co. Respondeo dicendum quod, sicut iam dictum est, virtus intellectualis speculativa est per quam intellectus speculativus perficitur ad considerandum verum, hoc enim est bonum opus eius. Verum autem est dupliciter considerabile, uno modo, sicut per se notum; alio modo, sicut per aliud notum. Quod autem est per se notum, se habet ut principium; et percipitur statim ab intellectu. Et ideo habitus perficiens intellectum ad huiusmodi veri considerationem, vocatur intellectus, qui est habitus principiorum. Verum autem quod est per aliud notum, non statim percipitur ab intellectu, sed per inquisitionem rationis, et se habet in ratione termini. Quod quidem potest esse dupliciter, uno modo, ut sit ultimum in aliquo genere; alio modo, ut sit ultimum respectu totius cognitionis humanae. Et quia ea quae sunt posterius nota quoad nos, sunt priora et magis nota secundum naturam, ut dicitur in I Physic.; ideo id quod est ultimum respectu totius cognitionis humanae, est id quod est primum et maxime cognoscibile secundum naturam. Et circa huiusmodi est sapientia, quae considerat altissimas causas, ut dicitur in I Metaphys. Unde convenienter iudicat et ordinat de omnibus, quia iudicium perfectum et universale haberi non potest nisi per resolutionem ad primas causas. Ad id vero quod est ultimum in hoc vel in illo genere cognoscibilium, perficit intellectum scientia. Et ideo secundum diversa genera scibilium, sunt diversi habitus scientiarum, cum tamen sapientia non sit nisi una. I answer that, As already stated (1), the virtues of the speculative intellect are those which perfect the speculative intellect for the consideration of truth: for this is its good work. Now a truth is subject to a twofold consideration--as known in itself, and as known through another. What is known in itself, is as a "principle," and is at once understood by the intellect: wherefore the habit that perfects the intellect for the consideration of such truth is called "understanding," which is the habit of principles. On the other hand, a truth which is known through another, is understood by the intellect, not at once, but by means of the reason's inquiry, and is as a "term." This may happen in two ways: first, so that it is the last in some particular genus; secondly, so that it is the ultimate term of all human knowledge. And, since "things that are knowable last from our standpoint, are knowable first and chiefly in their nature" (Phys. i, text. 2, 3); hence that which is last with respect to all human knowledge, is that which is knowable first and chiefly in its nature. And about these is "wisdom," which considers the highest causes, as stated in Metaph. i, 1,2. Wherefore it rightly judges all things and sets them in order, because there can be no perfect and universal judgment that is not based on the first causes. But in regard to that which is last in this or that genus of knowable matter, it is "science" which perfects the intellect. Wherefore according to the different kinds of knowable matter, there are different habits of scientific knowledge; whereas there is but one wisdom.
Iª-IIae q. 57 a. 2 ad 1 Ad primum ergo dicendum quod sapientia est quaedam scientia, inquantum habet id quod est commune omnibus scientiis, ut scilicet ex principiis conclusiones demonstret. Sed quia habet aliquid proprium supra alias scientias, inquantum scilicet de omnibus iudicat; et non solum quantum ad conclusiones, sed etiam quantum ad prima principia, ideo habet rationem perfectioris virtutis quam scientia. Reply to Objection 1. Wisdom is a kind of science, in so far as it has that which is common to all the sciences; viz. to demonstrate conclusions from principles. But since it has something proper to itself above the other sciences, inasmuch as it judges of them all, not only as to their conclusions, but also as to their first principles, therefore it is a more perfect virtue than science.
Iª-IIae q. 57 a. 2 ad 2 Ad secundum dicendum quod quando ratio obiecti sub uno actu refertur ad potentiam vel habitum, tunc non distinguuntur habitus vel potentiae penes rationem obiecti et obiectum materiale, sicut ad eandem potentiam visivam pertinet videre colorem, et lumen, quod est ratio videndi colorem et simul cum ipso videtur. Principia vero demonstrationis possunt seorsum considerari, absque hoc quod considerentur conclusiones. Possunt etiam considerari simul cum conclusionibus, prout principia in conclusiones deducuntur. Considerare ergo hoc secundo modo principia, pertinet ad scientiam, quae considerat etiam conclusiones, sed considerare principia secundum seipsa, pertinet ad intellectum. Unde, si quis recte consideret, istae tres virtutes non ex aequo distinguuntur ab invicem, sed ordine quodam; sicut accidit in totis potentialibus, quorum una pars est perfectior altera, sicut anima rationalis est perfectior quam sensibilis, et sensibilis quam vegetabilis. Hoc enim modo, scientia dependet ab intellectu sicut a principaliori. Et utrumque dependet a sapientia sicut a principalissimo, quae sub se continet et intellectum et scientiam, ut de conclusionibus scientiarum diiudicans, et de principiis earundem. Reply to Objection 2. When the formal aspect of the object is referred to a power or habit by one same act, there is no distinction of habit or power in respect of the formal aspect and of the material object: thus it belongs to the same power of sight to see both color, and light, which is the formal aspect under which color is seen, and is seen at the same time as the color. On the other hand, the principles of a demonstration can be considered apart, without the conclusion being considered at all. Again they can be considered together with the conclusions, since the conclusions can be deduced from them. Accordingly, to consider the principles in this second way, belongs to science, which considers the conclusions also: while to consider the principles in themselves belongs to understanding. Consequently, if we consider the point aright, these three virtues are distinct, not as being on a par with one another, but in a certain order. The same is to be observed in potential wholes, wherein one part is more perfect than another; for instance, the rational soul is more perfect than the sensitive soul; and the sensitive, than the vegetal. For it is thus that science depends on understanding as on a virtue of higher degree: and both of these depend on wisdom, as obtaining the highest place, and containing beneath itself both understanding and science, by judging both of the conclusions of science, and of the principles on which they are based.
Iª-IIae q. 57 a. 2 ad 3 Ad tertium dicendum quod, sicut supra dictum est, habitus virtutis determinate se habet ad bonum, nullo autem modo ad malum. Bonum autem intellectus est verum, malum autem eius est falsum. Unde soli illi habitus virtutes intellectuales dicuntur, quibus semper dicitur verum, et nunquam falsum. Opinio vero et suspicio possunt esse veri et falsi. Et ideo non sunt intellectuales virtutes, ut dicitur in VI Ethic. Reply to Objection 3. As stated above (55, A3,4), a virtuous habit has a fixed relation to good, and is nowise referable to evil. Now the good of the intellect is truth, and falsehood is its evil. Wherefore those habits alone are called intellectual virtues, whereby we tell the truth and never tell a falsehood. But opinion and suspicion can be about both truth and falsehood: and so, as stated in Ethic. vi, 3, they are not intellectual virtues.
Iª-IIae q. 57 a. 3 arg. 1 Ad tertium sic proceditur. Videtur quod ars non sit virtus intellectualis. Dicit enim Augustinus, in libro de libero arbitrio, quod virtute nullus male utitur. Sed arte aliquis male utitur, potest enim aliquis artifex, secundum scientiam artis suae, male operari. Ergo ars non est virtus. Objection 1. It would seem that art is not an intellectual virtue. For Augustine says (De Lib. Arb. ii, 18,19) that "no one makes bad use of virtue." But one may make bad use of art: for a craftsman can work badly according to the knowledge of his art. Therefore art is not a virtue.
Iª-IIae q. 57 a. 3 arg. 2 Praeterea, virtutis non est virtus. Artis autem est aliqua virtus, ut dicitur in VI Ethic. Ergo ars non est virtus. Objection 2. Further, there is no virtue of a virtue. But "there is a virtue of art," according to the Philosopher (Ethic. vi, 5). Therefore art is not a virtue.
Iª-IIae q. 57 a. 3 arg. 3 Praeterea, artes liberales sunt excellentiores quam artes mechanicae. Sed sicut artes mechanicae sunt practicae, ita artes liberales sunt speculativae. Ergo si ars esset virtus intellectualis, deberet virtutibus speculativis annumerari. Objection 3. Further, the liberal arts excel the mechanical arts. But just as the mechanical arts are practical, so the liberal arts are speculative. Therefore, if art were an intellectual virtue, it would have to be reckoned among the speculative virtues.
Iª-IIae q. 57 a. 3 s. c. Sed contra est quod philosophus, in VI Ethic., ponit artem esse virtutem; nec tamen connumerat eam virtutibus speculativis, quarum subiectum ponit scientificam partem animae. On the contrary, The Philosopher (Ethic. vi, 3,4) says that art is a virtue; and yet he does not reckon it among the speculative virtues, which, according to him, reside in the scientific part of the soul.
Iª-IIae q. 57 a. 3 co. Respondeo dicendum quod ars nihil aliud est quam ratio recta aliquorum operum faciendorum. Quorum tamen bonum non consistit in eo quod appetitus humanus aliquo modo se habet, sed in eo quod ipsum opus quod fit, in se bonum est. Non enim pertinet ad laudem artificis, inquantum artifex est, qua voluntate opus faciat; sed quale sit opus quod facit. Sic igitur ars, proprie loquendo, habitus operativus est. Et tamen in aliquo convenit cum habitibus speculativis, quia etiam ad ipsos habitus speculativos pertinet qualiter se habeat res quam considerant, non autem qualiter se habeat appetitus humanus ad illas. Dummodo enim verum geometra demonstret, non refert qualiter se habeat secundum appetitivam partem, utrum sit laetus vel iratus, sicut nec in artifice refert, ut dictum est. Et ideo eo modo ars habet rationem virtutis, sicut et habitus speculativi, inquantum scilicet nec ars, nec habitus speculativus, faciunt bonum opus quantum ad usum, quod est proprium virtutis perficientis appetitum; sed solum quantum ad facultatem bene agendi. I answer that, Art is nothing else but "the right reason about certain works to be made." And yet the good of these things depends, not on man's appetitive faculty being affected in this or that way, but on the goodness of the work done. For a craftsman, as such, is commendable, not for the will with which he does a work, but for the quality of the work. Art, therefore, properly speaking, is an operative habit. And yet it has something in common with the speculative habits: since the quality of the object considered by the latter is a matter of concern to them also, but not how the human appetite may be affected towards that object. For as long as the geometrician demonstrates the truth, it matters not how his appetitive faculty may be affected, whether he be joyful or angry: even as neither does this matter in a craftsman, as we have observed. And so art has the nature of a virtue in the same way as the speculative habits, in so far, to wit, as neither art nor speculative habit makes a good work as regards the use of the habit, which is the property of a virtue that perfects the appetite, but only as regards the aptness to work well.
Iª-IIae q. 57 a. 3 ad 1 Ad primum ergo dicendum quod, cum aliquis habens artem operatur malum artificium, hoc non est opus artis, immo est contra artem, sicut etiam cum aliquis sciens verum mentitur, hoc quod dicit non est secundum scientiam, sed contra scientiam. Unde sicut scientia se habet semper ad bonum, ut dictum est, ita et ars, et secundum hoc dicitur virtus. In hoc tamen deficit a perfecta ratione virtutis, quia non facit ipsum bonum usum, sed ad hoc aliquid aliud requiritur, quamvis bonus usus sine arte esse non possit. Reply to Objection 1. When anyone endowed with an art produces bad workmanship, this is not the work of that art, in fact it is contrary to the art: even as when a man lies, while knowing the truth, his words are not in accord with his knowledge, but contrary thereto. Wherefore, just as science has always a relation to good, as stated above (2, ad 3), so it is with art: and it is for this reason that it is called a virtue. And yet it falls short of being a perfect virtue, because it does not make its possessor to use it well; for which purpose something further is requisite: although there cannot be a good use without the art.
Iª-IIae q. 57 a. 3 ad 2 Ad secundum dicendum quod, quia ad hoc ut homo bene utatur arte quam habet, requiritur bona voluntas, quae perficitur per virtutem moralem; ideo philosophus dicit quod artis est virtus, scilicet moralis, inquantum ad bonum usum eius aliqua virtus moralis requiritur. Manifestum est enim quod artifex per iustitiam, quae facit voluntatem rectam, inclinatur ut opus fidele faciat. Reply to Objection 2. In order that man may make good use of the art he has, he needs a good will, which is perfected by moral virtue; and for this reason the Philosopher says that there is a virtue of art; namely, a moral virtue, in so far as the good use of art requires a moral virtue. For it is evident that a craftsman is inclined by justice, which rectifies his will, to do his work faithfully.
Iª-IIae q. 57 a. 3 ad 3 Ad tertium dicendum quod etiam in ipsis speculabilibus est aliquid per modum cuiusdam operis, puta constructio syllogismi aut orationis congruae aut opus numerandi vel mensurandi. Et ideo quicumque ad huiusmodi opera rationis habitus speculativi ordinantur, dicuntur per quandam similitudinem artes, sed liberales; ad differentiam illarum artium quae ordinantur ad opera per corpus exercita, quae sunt quodammodo serviles, inquantum corpus serviliter subditur animae, et homo secundum animam est liber. Illae vero scientiae quae ad nullum huiusmodi opus ordinantur, simpliciter scientiae dicuntur, non autem artes. Nec oportet, si liberales artes sunt nobiliores, quod magis eis conveniat ratio artis. Reply to Objection 3. Even in speculative matters there is something by way of work: e.g. the making of a syllogism or of a fitting speech, or the work of counting or measuring. Hence whatever habits are ordained to such like works of the speculative reason, are, by a kind of comparison, called arts indeed, but "liberal" arts, in order to distinguish them from those arts that are ordained to works done by the body, which arts are, in a fashion, servile, inasmuch as the body is in servile subjection to the soul, and man, as regards his soul, is free [liber]. On the other hand, those sciences which are not ordained to any such like work, are called sciences simply, and not arts. Nor, if the liberal arts be more excellent, does it follow that the notion of art is more applicable to them.
Iª-IIae q. 57 a. 4 arg. 1 Ad quartum sic proceditur. Videtur quod prudentia non sit alia virtus ab arte. Ars enim est ratio recta aliquorum operum. Sed diversa genera operum non faciunt ut aliquid amittat rationem artis, sunt enim diversae artes circa opera valde diversa. Cum igitur etiam prudentia sit quaedam ratio recta operum, videtur quod etiam ipsa debeat dici ars. Objection 1. It would seem that prudence is not a distinct virtue from art. For art is the right reason about certain works. But diversity of works does not make a habit cease to be an art; since there are various arts about works widely different. Since therefore prudence is also right reason about works, it seems that it too should be reckoned a virtue.
Iª-IIae q. 57 a. 4 arg. 2 Praeterea, prudentia magis convenit cum arte quam habitus speculativi, utrumque enim eorum est circa contingens aliter se habere, ut dicitur in VI Ethic. Sed quidam habitus speculativi dicuntur artes. Ergo multo magis prudentia debet dici ars. Objection 2. Further, prudence has more in common with art than the speculative habits have; for they are both "about contingent matters that may be otherwise than they are" (Ethic. vi, 4,5). Now some speculative habits are called arts. Much more, therefore, should prudence be called an art.
Iª-IIae q. 57 a. 4 arg. 3 Praeterea, ad prudentiam pertinet bene consiliari, ut dicitur in VI Ethic. Sed etiam in quibusdam artibus consiliari contingit, ut dicitur in III Ethic., sicut in arte militari, et gubernativa, et medicinali. Ergo prudentia ab arte non distinguitur. Objection 3. Further, it belongs to prudence, "to be of good counsel" (Ethic. vi, 5). But counselling takes place in certain arts also, as stated in Ethic. iii, 3, e.g. in the arts of warfare, of seamanship, and of medicine. Therefore prudence is not distinct from art.
Iª-IIae q. 57 a. 4 s. c. Sed contra est quod philosophus distinguit prudentiam ab arte, in VI Ethic. On the contrary, The Philosopher distinguishes prudence from art (Ethic. vi, 5).
Iª-IIae q. 57 a. 4 co. Respondeo dicendum quod ubi invenitur diversa ratio virtutis, ibi oportet virtutes distingui. Dictum est autem supra quod aliquis habitus habet rationem virtutis ex hoc solum quod facit facultatem boni operis, aliquis autem ex hoc quod facit non solum facultatem boni operis, sed etiam usum. Ars autem facit solum facultatem boni operis, quia non respicit appetitum. Prudentia autem non solum facit boni operis facultatem, sed etiam usum, respicit enim appetitum, tanquam praesupponens rectitudinem appetitus. Cuius differentiae ratio est, quia ars est recta ratio factibilium; prudentia vero est recta ratio agibilium. Differt autem facere et agere quia, ut dicitur in IX Metaphys., factio est actus transiens in exteriorem materiam, sicut aedificare, secare, et huiusmodi; agere autem est actus permanens in ipso agente, sicut videre, velle, et huiusmodi. Sic igitur hoc modo se habet prudentia ad huiusmodi actus humanos, qui sunt usus potentiarum et habituum, sicut se habet ars ad exteriores factiones, quia utraque est perfecta ratio respectu illorum ad quae comparatur. Perfectio autem et rectitudo rationis in speculativis, dependet ex principiis, ex quibus ratio syllogizat, sicut dictum est quod scientia dependet ab intellectu, qui est habitus principiorum, et praesupponit ipsum. In humanis autem actibus se habent fines sicut principia in speculativis, ut dicitur in VII Ethic. Et ideo ad prudentiam, quae est recta ratio agibilium, requiritur quod homo sit bene dispositus circa fines, quod quidem est per appetitum rectum. Et ideo ad prudentiam requiritur moralis virtus, per quam fit appetitus rectus. Bonum autem artificialium non est bonum appetitus humani, sed bonum ipsorum operum artificialium, et ideo ars non praesupponit appetitum rectum. Et inde est quod magis laudatur artifex qui volens peccat, quam qui peccat nolens; magis autem contra prudentiam est quod aliquis peccet volens, quam nolens, quia rectitudo voluntatis est de ratione prudentiae, non autem de ratione artis. Sic igitur patet quod prudentia est virtus distincta ab arte. I answer that, Where the nature of virtue differs, there is a different kind of virtue. Now it has been stated above (1; 56, 3) that some habits have the nature of virtue, through merely conferring aptness for a good work: while some habits are virtues, not only through conferring aptness for a good work, but also through conferring the use. But art confers the mere aptness for good work; since it does not regard the appetite; whereas prudence confers not only aptness for a good work, but also the use: for it regards the appetite, since it presupposes the rectitude thereof. The reason for this difference is that art is the "right reason of things to be made"; whereas prudence is the "right reason of things to be done." Now "making" and "doing" differ, as stated in Metaph. ix, text. 16, in that "making" is an action passing into outward matter, e.g. "to build," "to saw," and so forth; whereas "doing" is an action abiding in the agent, e.g. "to see," "to will," and the like. Accordingly prudence stands in the same relation to such like human actions, consisting in the use of powers and habits, as art does to outward making: since each is the perfect reason about the things with which it is concerned. But perfection and rectitude of reason in speculative matters, depend on the principles from which reason argues; just as we have said above (2, ad 2) that science depends on and presupposes understanding, which is the habit of principles. Now in human acts the end is what the principles are in speculative matters, as stated in Ethic. vii, 8. Consequently, it is requisite for prudence, which is right reason about things to be done, that man be well disposed with regard to the ends: and this depends on the rectitude of his appetite. Wherefore, for prudence there is need of a moral virtue, which rectifies the appetite. On the other hand the good things made by art is not the good of man's appetite, but the good of those things themselves: wherefore art does not presuppose rectitude of the appetite. The consequence is that more praise is given to a craftsman who is at fault willingly, than to one who is unwillingly; whereas it is more contrary to prudence to sin willingly than unwillingly, since rectitude of the will is essential to prudence, but not to art. Accordingly it is evident that prudence is a virtue distinct from art.
Iª-IIae q. 57 a. 4 ad 1 Ad primum ergo dicendum quod diversa genera artificialium omnia sunt extra hominem, et ideo non diversificatur ratio virtutis. Sed prudentia est recta ratio ipsorum actuum humanorum, unde diversificatur ratio virtutis, ut dictum est. Reply to Objection 1. The various kinds of things made by art are all external to man: hence they do not cause a different kind of virtue. But prudence is right reason about human acts themselves: hence it is a distinct kind of virtue, as stated above.
Iª-IIae q. 57 a. 4 ad 2 Ad secundum dicendum quod prudentia magis convenit cum arte quam habitus speculativi, quantum ad subiectum et materiam, utrumque enim est in opinativa parte animae, et circa contingens aliter se habere. Sed ars magis convenit cum habitibus speculativis in ratione virtutis, quam cum prudentia, ut ex dictis patet. Reply to Objection 2. Prudence has more in common with art than a speculative habit has, if we consider their subject and matter: for they are both in the thinking part of the soul, and about things that may be otherwise than they are. But if we consider them as virtues, then art has more in common with the speculative habits, as is clear from what has been said.
Iª-IIae q. 57 a. 4 ad 3 Ad tertium dicendum quod prudentia est bene consiliativa de his quae pertinent ad totam vitam hominis, et ad ultimum finem vitae humanae. Sed in artibus aliquibus est consilium de his quae pertinent ad fines proprios illarum artium. Unde aliqui, inquantum sunt bene consiliativi in rebus bellicis vel nauticis, dicuntur prudentes duces vel gubernatores, non autem prudentes simpliciter, sed illi solum qui bene consiliantur de his quae conferunt ad totam vitam. Reply to Objection 3. Prudence is of good counsel about matters regarding man's entire life, and the end of human life. But in some arts there is counsel about matters concerning the ends proper to those arts. Hence some men, in so far as they are good counselors in matters of warfare, or seamanship, are said to be prudent officers or pilots, but not simply prudent: only those are simply prudent who give good counsel about all the concerns of life.
Iª-IIae q. 57 a. 5 arg. 1 Ad quintum sic proceditur. Videtur quod prudentia non sit virtus necessaria ad bene vivendum. Sicut enim se habet ars ad factibilia, quorum est ratio recta; ita se habet prudentia ad agibilia, secundum quae vita hominis consideratur, est enim eorum recta ratio prudentia, ut dicitur in VI Ethic. Sed ars non est necessaria in rebus factibilibus nisi ad hoc quod fiant, non autem postquam sunt factae. Ergo nec prudentia est necessaria homini ad bene vivendum, postquam est virtuosus, sed forte solum quantum ad hoc quod virtuosus fiat. Objection 1. It would seem that prudence is not a virtue necessary to lead a good life. For as art is to things that are made, of which it is the right reason, so is prudence to things that are done, in respect of which we judge of a man's life: for prudence is the right reason about these things, as stated in Ethic. vi, 5. Now art is not necessary in things that are made, save in order that they be made, but not after they have been made. Neither, therefore is prudence necessary to man in order to lead a good life, after he has become virtuous; but perhaps only in order that he may become virtuous.
Iª-IIae q. 57 a. 5 arg. 2 Praeterea, prudentia est per quam recte consiliamur, ut dicitur in VI Ethic. Sed homo potest ex bono consilio agere non solum proprio, sed etiam alieno. Ergo non est necessarium ad bene vivendum quod ipse homo habeat prudentiam; sed sufficit quod prudentum consilia sequatur. Objection 2. Further, "It is by prudence that we are of good counsel," as stated in Ethic. vi, 5. But man can act not only from his own, but also from another's good counsel. Therefore man does not need prudence in order to lead a good life, but it is enough that he follow the counsels of prudent men.
Iª-IIae q. 57 a. 5 arg. 3 Praeterea, virtus intellectualis est secundum quam contingit semper dicere verum, et nunquam falsum. Sed hoc non videtur contingere secundum prudentiam, non enim est humanum quod in consiliando de agendis nunquam erretur; cum humana agibilia sint contingentia aliter se habere. Unde dicitur Sap. IX, cogitationes mortalium timidae, et incertae providentiae nostrae. Ergo videtur quod prudentia non debeat poni intellectualis virtus. Objection 3. Further, an intellectual virtue is one by which one always tells the truth, and never a falsehood. But this does not seem to be the case with prudence: for it is not human never to err in taking counsel about what is to be done; since human actions are about things that may be otherwise than they are. Hence it is written (Wisdom 9:14): "The thoughts of mortal men are fearful, and our counsels uncertain." Therefore it seems that prudence should not be reckoned an intellectual virtue.
Iª-IIae q. 57 a. 5 s. c. Sed contra est quod Sap. VIII, connumeratur aliis virtutibus necessariis ad vitam humanam, cum dicitur de divina sapientia, sobrietatem et prudentiam docet, iustitiam et virtutem, quibus utilius nihil est in vita hominibus. On the contrary, It is reckoned with other virtues necessary for human life, when it is written (Wisdom 8:7) of Divine Wisdom: "She teacheth temperance and prudence and justice and fortitude, which are such things as men can have nothing more profitable in life."
Iª-IIae q. 57 a. 5 co. Respondeo dicendum quod prudentia est virtus maxime necessaria ad vitam humanam. Bene enim vivere consistit in bene operari. Ad hoc autem quod aliquis bene operetur, non solum requiritur quid faciat, sed etiam quomodo faciat; ut scilicet secundum electionem rectam operetur, non solum ex impetu aut passione. Cum autem electio sit eorum quae sunt ad finem, rectitudo electionis duo requirit, scilicet debitum finem; et id quod convenienter ordinatur ad debitum finem. Ad debitum autem finem homo convenienter disponitur per virtutem quae perficit partem animae appetitivam, cuius obiectum est bonum et finis. Ad id autem quod convenienter in finem debitum ordinatur, oportet quod homo directe disponatur per habitum rationis, quia consiliari et eligere, quae sunt eorum quae sunt ad finem, sunt actus rationis. Et ideo necesse est in ratione esse aliquam virtutem intellectualem, per quam perficiatur ratio ad hoc quod convenienter se habeat ad ea quae sunt ad finem. Et haec virtus est prudentia. Unde prudentia est virtus necessaria ad bene vivendum. I answer that, Prudence is a virtue most necessary for human life. For a good life consists in good deeds. Now in order to do good deeds, it matters not only what a man does, but also how he does it; to wit, that he do it from right choice and not merely from impulse or passion. And, since choice is about things in reference to the end, rectitude of choice requires two things: namely, the due end, and something suitably ordained to that due end. Now man is suitably directed to his due end by a virtue which perfects the soul in the appetitive part, the object of which is the good and the end. And to that which is suitably ordained to the due end man needs to be rightly disposed by a habit in his reason, because counsel and choice, which are about things ordained to the end, are acts of the reason. Consequently an intellectual virtue is needed in the reason, to perfect the reason, and make it suitably affected towards things ordained to the end; and this virtue is prudence. Consequently prudence is a virtue necessary to lead a good life.
Iª-IIae q. 57 a. 5 ad 1 Ad primum ergo dicendum quod bonum artis consideratur non in ipso artifice, sed magis in ipso artificiato, cum ars sit ratio recta factibilium, factio enim, in exteriorem materiam transiens, non est perfectio facientis, sed facti, sicut motus est actus mobilis; ars autem circa factibilia est. Sed prudentiae bonum attenditur in ipso agente, cuius perfectio est ipsum agere, est enim prudentia recta ratio agibilium, ut dictum est. Et ideo ad artem non requiritur quod artifex bene operetur, sed quod bonum opus faciat. Requireretur autem magis quod ipsum artificiatum bene operaretur, sicut quod cultellus bene incideret, vel serra bene secaret; si proprie horum esset agere, et non magis agi, quia non habent dominium sui actus. Et ideo ars non est necessaria ad bene vivendum ipsi artificis; sed solum ad faciendum artificiatum bonum, et ad conservandum ipsum. Prudentia autem est necessaria homini ad bene vivendum, non solum ad hoc quod fiat bonus. Reply to Objection 1. The good of an art is to be found, not in the craftsman, but in the product of the art, since art is right reason about things to be made: for since the making of a thing passes into external matter, it is a perfection not of the maker, but of the thing made, even as movement is the act of the thing moved: and art is concerned with the making of things. On the other hand, the good of prudence is in the active principle, whose activity is its perfection: for prudence is right reason about things to be done, as stated above (Article 4). Consequently art does not require of the craftsman that his act be a good act, but that his work be good. Rather would it be necessary for the thing made to act well (e.g. that a knife should carve well, or that a saw should cut well), if it were proper to such things to act, rather than to be acted on, because they have not dominion over their actions. Wherefore the craftsman needs art, not that he may live well, but that he may produce a good work of art, and have it in good keeping: whereas prudence is necessary to man, that he may lead a good life, and not merely that he may be a good man.
Iª-IIae q. 57 a. 5 ad 2 Ad secundum dicendum quod, cum homo bonum operatur non secundum propriam rationem, sed motus ex consilio alterius; nondum est omnino perfecta operatio ipsius, quantum ad rationem dirigentem, et quantum ad appetitum moventem. Unde si bonum operetur, non tamen simpliciter bene; quod est bene vivere. Reply to Objection 2. When a man does a good deed, not of his own counsel, but moved by that of another, his deed is not yet quite perfect, as regards his reason in directing him and his appetite in moving him. Wherefore, if he do a good deed, he does not do well simply; and yet this is required in order that he may lead a good life.
Iª-IIae q. 57 a. 5 ad 3 Ad tertium dicendum quod verum intellectus practici aliter accipitur quam verum intellectus speculativi, ut dicitur in VI Ethic. Nam verum intellectus speculativi accipitur per conformitatem intellectus ad rem. Et quia intellectus non potest infallibiliter conformari rebus in contingentibus, sed solum in necessariis; ideo nullus habitus speculativus contingentium est intellectualis virtus, sed solum est circa necessaria. Verum autem intellectus practici accipitur per conformitatem ad appetitum rectum. Quae quidem conformitas in necessariis locum non habet, quae voluntate humana non fiunt, sed solum in contingentibus quae possunt a nobis fieri, sive sint agibilia interiora, sive factibilia exteriora. Et ideo circa sola contingentia ponitur virtus intellectus practici, circa factibilia quidem, ars; circa agibilia vero prudentia. Reply to Objection 3. As stated in Ethic. vi, 2, truth is not the same for the practical as for the speculative intellect. Because the truth of the speculative intellect depends on conformity between the intellect and the thing. And since the intellect cannot be infallibly in conformity with things in contingent matters, but only in necessary matters, therefore no speculative habit about contingent things is an intellectual virtue, but only such as is about necessary things. On the other hand, the truth of the practical intellect depends on conformity with right appetite. This conformity has no place in necessary matters, which are not affected by the human will; but only in contingent matters which can be effected by us, whether they be matters of interior action, or the products of external work. Hence it is only about contingent matters that an intellectual virtue is assigned to the practical intellect, viz. art, as regards things to be made, and prudence, as regards things to be done.
Iª-IIae q. 57 a. 6 arg. 1 Ad sextum sic proceditur. Videtur quod inconvenienter adiungantur prudentiae eubulia, synesis et gnome. Eubulia enim est habitus quo bene consiliamur, ut dicitur in VI Ethic. Sed bene consiliari pertinet ad prudentiam, ut in eodem libro dicitur. Ergo eubulia non est virtus adiuncta prudentiae, sed magis est ipsa prudentia. Objection 1. It would seem that "euboulia, synesis, and gnome" are unfittingly assigned as virtues annexed to prudence. For "euboulia" is "a habit whereby we take good counsel" (Ethic. vi, 9). Now it "belongs to prudence to take good counsel," as stated (Ethic. vi, 9). Therefore "euboulia" is not a virtue annexed to prudence, but rather is prudence itself.
Iª-IIae q. 57 a. 6 arg. 2 Praeterea, ad superiorem pertinet de inferioribus iudicare. Illa ergo virtus videtur suprema, cuius est actus iudicium. Sed synesis est bene iudicativa. Ergo synesis non est virtus adiuncta prudentiae, sed magis ipsa est principalis. Objection 2. Further, it belongs to the higher to judge the lower. The highest virtue would therefore seem to be the one whose act is judgment. Now "synesis" enables us to judge well. Therefore "synesis" is not a virtue annexed to prudence, but rather is a principal virtue.
Iª-IIae q. 57 a. 6 arg. 3 Praeterea, sicut diversa sunt ea de quibus est iudicandum, ita etiam diversa sunt ea de quibus est consiliandum. Sed circa omnia consiliabilia ponitur una virtus, scilicet eubulia. Ergo ad bene iudicandum de agendis, non oportet ponere, praeter synesim, aliam virtutem, scilicet gnomen. Objection 3. Further, just as there are various matters to pass judgment on, so are there different points on which one has to take counsel. But there is one virtue referring to all matters of counsel. Therefore, in order to judge well of what has to be done, there is no need, besides "synesis" of the virtue of "gnome."
Iª-IIae q. 57 a. 6 arg. 4 Praeterea, Tullius ponit, in sua rhetorica, tres alias partes prudentiae, scilicet memoriam praeteritorum, intelligentiam praesentium, et providentiam futurorum. Macrobius etiam ponit, super somnium Scipionis, quasdam alias partes prudentiae, scilicet cautionem, docilitatem, et alia huiusmodi. Non videntur igitur solae huiusmodi virtutes prudentiae adiungi. Objection 4. Further, Cicero (De Invent. Rhet. iii) mentions three other parts of prudence; viz. "memory of the past, understanding of the present, and foresight of the future." Moreover, Macrobius (Super Somn. Scip. 1) mentions yet others: viz. "caution, docility," and the like. Therefore it seems that the above are not the only virtues annexed to prudence.
Iª-IIae q. 57 a. 6 s. c. Sed contra est auctoritas philosophi, in VI Ethic., qui has tres virtutes ponit prudentiae adiunctas. On the contrary, stands the authority of the Philosopher (Ethic. vi, 9,10,11), who assigns these three virtues as being annexed to prudence.
Iª-IIae q. 57 a. 6 co. Respondeo dicendum quod in omnibus potentiis ordinatis illa est principalior, quae ad principaliorem actum ordinatur. Circa agibilia autem humana tres actus rationis inveniuntur, quorum primus est consiliari, secundus iudicare, tertius est praecipere. Primi autem duo respondent actibus intellectus speculativi qui sunt inquirere et iudicare, nam consilium inquisitio quaedam est. Sed tertius actus proprius est practici intellectus, inquantum est operativus, non enim ratio habet praecipere ea quae per hominem fieri non possunt. Manifestum est autem quod in his quae per hominem fiunt, principalis actus est praecipere, ad quem alii ordinantur. Et ideo virtuti quae est bene praeceptiva, scilicet prudentiae, tanquam principaliori, adiunguntur tanquam secundariae, eubulia, quae est bene consiliativa, et synesis et gnome, quae sunt partes iudicativae; de quarum distinctione dicetur. I answer that, Wherever several powers are subordinate to one another, that power is the highest which is ordained to the highest act. Now there are three acts of reason in respect of anything done by man: the first of these is counsel; the second, judgment; the third, command. The first two correspond to those acts of the speculative intellect, which are inquiry and judgment, for counsel is a kind of inquiry: but the third is proper to the practical intellect, in so far as this is ordained to operation; for reason does not have to command in things that man cannot do. Now it is evident that in things done by man, the chief act is that of command, to which all the rest are subordinate. Consequently, that virtue which perfects the command, viz. prudence, as obtaining the highest place, has other secondary virtues annexed to it, viz. "eustochia," which perfects counsel; and "synesis" and "gnome," which are parts of prudence in relation to judgment, and of whose distinction we shall speak further on (ad 3).
Iª-IIae q. 57 a. 6 ad 1 Ad primum ergo dicendum quod prudentia est bene consiliativa, non quasi bene consiliari sit immediate actus eius, sed quia hunc actum perficit mediante virtute sibi subiecta, quae est eubulia. Reply to Objection 1. Prudence makes us be of good counsel, not as though its immediate act consisted in being of good counsel, but because it perfects the latter act by means of a subordinate virtue, viz. "euboulia."
Iª-IIae q. 57 a. 6 ad 2 Ad secundum dicendum quod iudicium in agendis ad aliquid ulterius ordinatur, contingit enim aliquem bene iudicare de aliquo agendo, et tamen non recte exequi. Sed ultimum complementum est, quando ratio iam bene praecipit de agendis. Reply to Objection 2. Judgment about what is to be done is directed to something further: for it may happen in some matter of action that a man's judgment is sound, while his execution is wrong. The matter does not attain to its final complement until the reason has commanded aright in the point of what has to be done.
Iª-IIae q. 57 a. 6 ad 3 Ad tertium dicendum quod iudicium de unaquaque re fit per propria principia eius. Inquisitio autem nondum est per propria principia, quia his habitis, non esset opus inquisitione, sed iam res esset inventa. Et ideo una sola virtus ordinatur ad bene consiliandum, duae autem virtutes ad bene iudicandum, quia distinctio non est in communibus principiis, sed in propriis. Unde et in speculativis una est dialectica inquisitiva de omnibus, scientiae autem demonstrativae, quae sunt iudicativae, sunt diversae de diversis. Distinguuntur autem synesis et gnome secundum diversas regulas quibus iudicatur, nam synesis est iudicativa de agendis secundum communem legem; gnome autem secundum ipsam rationem naturalem, in his in quibus deficit lex communis; sicut plenius infra patebit. Reply to Objection 3. Judgment of anything should be based on that thing's proper principles. But inquiry does not reach to the proper principles: because, if we were in possession of these, we should need no more to inquire, the truth would be already discovered. Hence only one virtue is directed to being of good counsel, wheres there are two virtues for good judgment: because difference is based not on common but on proper principles. Consequently, even in speculative matters, there is one science of dialectics, which inquires about all matters; whereas demonstrative sciences, which pronounce judgment, differ according to their different objects. "Synesis" and "gnome" differ in respect of the different rules on which judgment is based: for "synesis" judges of actions according to the common law; while "gnome" bases its judgment on the natural law, in those cases where the common law fails to apply, as we shall explain further on (II-II, 51, 4).
Iª-IIae q. 57 a. 6 ad 4 Ad quartum dicendum quod memoria, intelligentia et providentia, similiter etiam cautio et docilitas, et alia huiusmodi, non sunt virtutes diversae a prudentia, sed quodammodo comparantur ad ipsam sicut partes integrales, inquantum omnia ista requiruntur ad perfectionem prudentiae. Sunt etiam et quaedam partes subiectivae, seu species prudentiae, sicut oeconomica, regnativa, et huiusmodi. Sed praedicta tria sunt quasi partes potentiales prudentiae, quia ordinantur sicut secundarium ad principale. Et de his infra dicetur. Reply to Objection 4. Memory, understanding and foresight, as also caution and docility and the like, are not virtues distinct from prudence: but are, as it were, integral parts thereof, in so far as they are all requisite for perfect prudence. There are, moreover, subjective parts or species of prudence, e.g. domestic and political economy, and the like. But the three first names are, in a fashion, potential parts of prudence; because they are subordinate thereto, as secondary virtues to a principal virtue: and we shall speak of them later (II-II, 48, seqq.).

Notes


  • [[]]
Personal tools